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APRIL 1958
ii

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5 / \»» / _, <H/ ,\. .'§"“\
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

// f

l
USSR ICBM
vehicle at Tyura
launches second
Tam/Klyuchi
test I ,3 Y.
F9
range within
ballistic missile
week. Missile covered at least 5,/" }f~
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Some reports
.
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of opposition to 1~ /" "
Khrushchev received. However,
'1 ,y.==» ,1 *" ' ‘

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®
;, ,,‘ rm‘; _/
there is no indication at this time
\

.,{l.{ !I\

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~ ~

-<
. 1

of an organized effort against him. .

;_.
While Khrushchev says USSR will \\
accept controls over nuclear test
I

suspension, more likely Moscow \\ \\ ,~~~. u

will continue to insist on test
\ ¢

suspension before control details

@
\

are negotiated.
\ \
\\.
Hungarians give Khrushchev cool
@
\“
reception.
.

>(//\
Technical and substantive \
problems may delay publication “ 4

Q
of new international Communist
©
\

journal until July or September.

N/' \\
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reaction to suggestion that
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negative . .

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'

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labor on Chinese rojects

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ASIA-AFRICA
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11.
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\\ Indonesia - Hints by government

¢e~e
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g/'0 officials that Djakarta will shortly

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some anti-Communist
.
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take
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/,
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probably are designed to curry
'

favor with West.

gar Israelis likely to resume canal
cfi digging in Lake Hula area; further
border clashes probable.

® Gaza
4

9
v

\\
\
legislative council asks for
membership
I

Arab Republic
i

..\ in United

3 if l\\ at "right opportunity."

0

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\. THE WEST
,
E

P III.
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- Castro will probably attempt
.
general strike about 7 April.
/
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1

'

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§ \ \
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continues.

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Canada Election results foreshadow
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modification of Canadian
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policies
.-

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.

=§\s'->101

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Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03177792 l

 Approved for Release. 2019/08/20 C03177792

%.~I$l5;-E-l§§~

CENTRAL INTELLHGENCE BULLETIN

5 April 1958

DAILY BRIEF
\
/_,.
££_P_E>___@__ 1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet ICBM test: The USSR on 4 April launched.
the second. ICBM test vehicle at Tyura Tam/Klyuchi
ballistic missile ran e within a week.
KO
_,

?the missile covered at least

x

3,500 nautical miles.

\

(Page 1)

3
\ \

* Soviet leadership: Although Khrushchev appears to

have reached a position of uncontested authority, there
are some reports of continuing opposition to him.
\goes so far as to state that Suslov
will replace Khrushchev as party first. secretary within
\

the next two weeks. There have been indications that

700 Suslov is out of step with current policies and Khrushchev's
Q‘,

t_ake-over as premier cou ld give any le a ders wh 0 may

' ‘

fear Khrushchev's power a compelling motive for uniting

against him. Any combination strong enough to oust him
would have to include a. number of his hand.-picked lieu-
tenants in the presidium, and the opportunities for the
coalescence of effective opposition are limited. There
is no clear evidence that an or anized roup of opponents
has begun to form. 2)

USSR -—
Summittactics: In his 4 April Budapest
77/0
.

speech, Khrushchev said that the USSR was prepared

to accept international control over nuclear test suspen-
siom His emphasis on the ease of solving the control
problem, however, suggests that at the summit nego-
tiations the USSR would. seek to minimize the degree of
inspection and continue to insist that the nuclear powers

m
i

TOP S

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 .Z::eRE'r
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OP s /.
.

1
—~
5 .

agree on test suspension before the details of control

are negotiated. In answer to the 31 March Western
proposal for diplomatic exchanges in Moscow, the
USSR is likely either to propose a foreign ministers‘
conference in April without preliminary talks or to
insist that ambassadorial exchanges should be con-
fined to settling procedural details for an early min-
isters‘ meeting. In mid-March, Khrushchev expressed
his preference for a heavily publicized foreign minis-
ters‘ meeting without preliminary diplomatic exchanges.
(Page 3) \

Hungary- USSR: Budapest Khrushchev is being

In
greeted with "cold indifference," and so far Hungarians
have turned out in "pitifully" small numbers for the
liberation ceremonies. Khrushchev is going out of his
5'
=11

way to build up Janos Kadar as Moscow's chosen leader,

and is making it unmistakably clear he has no intention
of returning the associates of former leader Rakosi to
power. The visit to date has disclosed nothing on the
future fate of Imre Nagy.\ \

New Communist journal: The new Communist inter-

national journal, replacing the defunct Cominform journal
established in Prague on ll March probably will not ap-
pear before July and maybe not until September. A num-
ber of technical and substantive problems remain to be
Q
ironed out, possibly including the nature of Polish and
.-2 .»<'i/“

7-’?

ii Yugoslav participation. \ \

Communist China: relations effort byA public

Peiping to get several Asian foreign diplomats to join
bloc diplomats in volunteering for token physical labor
on Chinese Communist construction projects could have
adverse repercussions among some Asian nations. UAR
:£\--11“ diplomats in Peiping have already volunteered, but the
Burmese and Indian ambassadors are unwilling to join.
The Burmese ambassador has told Rangoon that he

5 Apr 58 DAILY BRIEF ii

-+
1-1
mg,
"P

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 3
\

‘<Page
5:3 »
'

\. _

‘\\§
. .
‘_

\ considers the request "beyond. toleration." Rangoon has

instructed its ambassador not to participate.
5>
~~

_\\f1\\§\\‘

.\Z*‘ ‘~\‘ ;
\

I I. ASIA-- AF RICA >5 '31§§§$£

Indonesia: Hints by Indonesian officials that some

.=;\:~:».-.\\;

\\
anti-Communist action will be taken by the government \

7149 shortly may have been made .to- curry favor with ”the';,West, \
particularly the United States, and to assua e fears of
rowin Communist influence in Indonesia.
\
6» <Map> \\
\
Israeli-Syrian border: More fighting in the Lake
‘/to Hlaaea's'kly'
u r 1 11 e 1f the Israelis
'
'

resume canal d’iggig

‘n
\\
operations there as is probable. \
\ \

\\
\\\
Gaza Strip: The recently created Gaza Legislative
Council has asked. for membership in Nasir's United Arab
\\
Republic at "the right opportunity." Nasir may wait to ac-
cede to this "request" until the move could be made part
71,0 of a. wider campaign resuming pressure on King Husayn's
\\
government in Jordan, where most of the Palestine Arab \
refugees are located.
(Page 7)
\ \

III. THE WEST

\

Cuba: The situation in Oriente Province remains

essentially unchanged, Castro is said to have set 7 April
for attempting a general strike, but the government has
increased its chances of thwarting this by authorizing
7% violence against strike agitators. Batista's reiteration
of an amnesty offer appears to be propaganda designed to
impress public opinion with the government's sincerity
in wanting a eaceful solution with free elections in No= \

5 Apr 58 ‘DAILY BRIEF 111

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 WCRET
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A
003177792
‘
=

Bolivia: The basic conflict between President Siles

and leftist labor leader Juan Lechin--which threatens the
US-backed economic stabilization program--has not been
‘
if if/1_/' resolved. Although the crisis between the two precipitated
J
3
in early March has subsided slowly, a new dispute may
arise in connection with the government party convention
in preparation for congressional elections which legally
must be held before 6 June. 8)

Qa_1_1@_g.: The American Embassy in Ottawa antici-

pates that the Diefenbaker government's overwhelming
electoral victory will result in more acts of self—asser-
tion in relations with the United States. This may involve
IL/.1/”
increased efforts to reduce economic dependence on the
if

j.
r United States, and the government's raising of a political
1! umbrella over US-Canadian defense cooperation will con-
tinue to slow defense planning. The growing popular de-
sire for a modus vivendi with the Communist world, while
not changing Ottawa's active support of NATO, presents
some risk of a future Canadian diver ence from the United
States on some important issues.
<Pa- 9>

5 Apr 58 DAILY BRIEF iv

igwcfii
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ll,‘/V“ I \Il \-v-I \l-J 1

L THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soyiet Test ICBM Firing on 4 April 1958

Tyura Tam/Klyuchi ballistic missile range in-

dicate that a test ICBM was launched at about 1530 GMT
on 4 r11 1958
test ICBM covered afleast the
\

full 3,500~nautical--mile range.

This is the second test 1[CBM launching from Tyura Tam

in le than one week, indicating a high test launching rate
cygflity. \ \

5 Apr 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BLJLLETIN Page 1

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Continuing Opposition to Khrushchev

- v--v -_v--v-, ‘..'- -----Q L.-1--J V-____ __-_ V--______--_ _ _v___ W __|___ _

arty Secretary Suslov is Khrushchev's main critic

and that he will try to unseat him if current policies are un-
successful.

la
Soviet official answered allegations that Khrushchev's as-
\

sumption of the premiership was a return to Stalinism by

stating that within two weeks a central committee plenum
would be called at which Khrushchev would resign as first
secretary in favor of Suslov.

These reports conflict with the fact that Khrushchev .

~

emerged from the recent Supreme Soviet session with great-

er powers than ever before in his career. At the same time,
he is vulnerable to charges of trying to become another
Stalin, and fear of this possibility might be a compelling
motive for uniting against him.

There have been indications that Suslov is out of step

with current policies--particularly the machine-tractor
program;--but he would have to gain the support of several
members of the party presidium who have been part of the
Khrushchev camp before attempting a showdown with the
premier" Opportunities for the coalescence of effective
opposition are limited, and there is no clear evidence that
an organized group of opponents has begun to form.
I

SEC
5 Apr 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2

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pi
Soviet Summit Tactics
In his April speech in Budapest, Khrushchev reiterated
ll

that the USSR is prepared to accept international control over

nuclear test suspension and urged Britain and the United States
to follow the Soviet example by suspending tests without delay.
His emphasis on the ease of solving the control problem, how-
ever, suggests that at summit talks the USSR would seek to
minimize the degree of inspection and probably continue to in-
sist that the nuclear powers agree on test suspension before
the details of control are negotiated.

A member of the Soviet UN delegation has told an American

delegate that diplomatic exchanges in Moscow regarding a sum-
mit meeting, as proposed by the three Western powers on 31
March, would be useless because the USSR could not be expected
to show the "extreme flexibility" in preparatory talks which it
isprepared to show at the summit. He called. the proposal a
Western device to produce a deadlock which the West could use
as an excuse for avoiding a summit conference. ~

This statement reflects Khrushchev's suspicion of diplo-

matic talks, which he said in mid.-March might "bog down in
an endless 1abyrinth" and "quiet].y bury the idea of a summit
meeting." While not flatly rejecting diplomatic talks, Khru-
shchev expressed his preference for a foreign ministers‘ meet-
ing, which would be held. in the full glare of publicity.

In reply to the 31 March Western notes, Moscow is likely

either to propose a foreign ministers’ meeting in April without
preliminary diplomatic talks or to insist that ambassadorial ex-
changes be confined. to settling procedural details for an early
foreign ministers’ meeting. The USSR is probably interested
in getting a summit meeting quickly because Bulganin's letter-
writing campaign has failed to force any major ‘Western con-
cessions on terms for a conference, and its propaganda value
is decreasing. On his recent visitfto Moscow, UN Secretary
General Hammarskjold found. the Soviet leaders Self-c0nfi‘dent
and determined. to have a summit meeting if only to show the
world that the USSR is a major force to be reckoned with.

SWT
5 ADI‘ 53 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page-3

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14 /55V1 M1.
umu
for Release:
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2019/00/20 C03177792
/1

Pub 11c ation

'
of New Communist Internatidnal
i f
Journal Delayed

The new Communist international journal established

in Prague on I1 March, originally reported as scheduled
to begin publication in May, probably will not appear before
July and maybe not until September, according to the coun-
selor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Prague. This source at-
tributes the delay to a number of unspecified technical and
substantive problems. There have been numerous conflict-
ing reports concerning the question of Yugoslav and Polish
participation in the new journal.

B. N. Ponomarev, who may become editor in chief of

the new journal, has assumed considerable prominence in
the USSR in the past two years. He is a member of the
editorial board of the Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist
and is thought to head the department of the Soviet party cen-
tral committee for liaison with foreign Communist parties.

According to a Soviet official, the new journal will be

"less theoretical" than the Cominform journal- -_F__‘p_r Last- A
ing Peace, For A
People’-5 Democracy. It will be similar
in form to the Soviet publication International Affairs, a
reportorial and journalistic monthly. If the new journal is
confined mainly to foreign policy questions, it robabl will
be acceptable to the Poles and Yugoslavs.

"
tjiii FNTIAL
5 Apr 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

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Burmese and Indian Diplomats in Peiping Balk at

Joining "Socialist Construction"

Communist efforts to win the voluntary participation

of some Asian diplomats in Peiping in China's "socialist
construction" may backfire. Burmese and Indian diplo-
mats have taken personal affront at the proposal, which
calls for token physicallabor on agricultural and indus-
trial projects. ‘

Peiping Radio announced. on 24 March that Ambassador

Rajab of the United Arab Republic and 40 members of his
staff put in six hours of "voluntary labor" at a reservoir
gjgect near Peiping, thus following the example set earlier
anton by visiting bloc delegations.
'

5 ADI‘ 53 -CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

3
Situation in Indonesia

dissidents in the Prapat area of North Sumatra were

well armed and were maintaining strong defensive posi-
tions, presumably in the hills outside the towns. Farther
north, dissident troops were reported by the progovern-
ment Medan radio to be attacking in the Siantar area. The
local commander in Tapanuli, who has protested the pres-
ence of progovernment forces in his territory, has been
informed by the deputy chief of staff in Medan that these
troops will withdraw immediately once he has taken ac-
tion against the dissidents whom he has freely permitted
to enter his command.

by Indonesian officials that some

In Djakarta, hints
anti-Communist action will be taken by the government
shortly apparently are intended to curry favor with the
West, particularly the United States, and to allay fears
of growing Communist influence in Indonesiat

5 Apr 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6

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L @S'ECRI:.I ,

Gaza Strip - Jordan

The bid by the Gaza Legislative Coun.<3il_for§.inclusion

in the United Arab Republic may presage increased UAR
pressure on the pro-Western regime in Jordan, home of
nearly half a million refugees from Arab Palestine.

It therefore possible that the Jordanian exiles have

is
reached agreement on a cooperative effort to undermine
King Husayn. On 27 March, exiled Jordanian Baath party
leader Rimawi left Damascus for Cairo for a meeting with
Nasir on a "very serious matter."
\the Egyptians are expected to step
\

up their efforts to cultivate support among the Palestinian

refugees in Jordan, and will distribute gifts in the camps
during the holiday following conclusion of Ramadan the ‘

end of April. \ ‘

”1‘°” R‘-"

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III. THE WEST

New Tensions Likely in Bolivia

Bolivian political tensions, which led to a threat of

civi.l war in mid.- March, may reach another crisis this
month as two factions in the governing Nationalist Rev-
olutionary Movement seek to dominate nominations for
the congressional elections, which by law must be held.
before 6 June. Neither moderate President Siles nor
leftist labor leader Juan Lechin won a clear-cut victory
in the mid- March test of strength, and each is likely to
make a new effort to secure support for his faction in the
approaching convention. Since the party polled 82 percent
of the vote in the 1956 election, its nominations are re-
garded as decisive in this year's election of 6 senators
and 34 deputies.
Political tensions, increased labor unrest, and the
1 April drop in the price of ].ead seriously threaten the
US—backed economic stabilization program despite the
relative success an.d popularity of the program during
1957, its first year of operation. If the International Tin
Council is unable to support tin prices at present levels
as has been rumored, the Bolivian economy will face a
further strain since tin and lead rovide three fourths of V

exchange earnings. Tp

Sources:

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LUIVI 1LlL=P\‘1‘1I-1L "1

Canadian Government May Take More Nationalistic Line

As a resultof the recent Canadian elections, the US
Embassy anticipates a more difficult period ahead for US-
Canadian relations. The new Diefenbaker government,
eager to accommodate public opinion, will strive to reduce
Canada's economic dependence on the United States by in~=
creasing economic ties with the Commonwealth and to take
a more independent approach on some defense and foreign
policy issues. It will be quick to seize on specific issues
which seem to it to involve US economic domination.

While there will be no change in Canada's attitude

toward NATO, the growing popular desire for a modus vi-
vendi with the Communist world may lead to a gradual
softening of the government's attitude toward the Sino-Soviet
bloc. A review of Canada's policy of refusing to recognize
Communist China is a possibility. The government will
probably be more inclined than previously to inject polit-
ical considerations into negotiations on joint US- Canadian
defense projects.
\ \

,/
Source :
\

CONF TIAL
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\
\
5 April 1958
\§~
\
‘E:

.DA|LY BRIEF
x

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC §\ \

\\
Soviet ICBM test: The USSR on 4 April launched
the second ICBM test vehicle at Tyura Tam/Kl uchl
missile range within a week.
ball.istic
-

\the missile covere a eas .

3,500 nautical miles. (P3-gel)

\

\ \

\\\
'
Hungary- USSR: In Budapest Khrushchev is being
greeted with "cold indifference," and so far Hungarians
have turned out in "pitifully" small numbers for the
liberation ceremonies. Khrushchev is going out of his
way to build up Janos Kadar as Moscow's chosen leader,
and is making it unmistakably clear he has no intention
of returning the associates of former leader Rakosi to
power. The visit to date has disclosed nothing on the
future fate of Imre Nagy‘, \ \

New Communist journal: The new Communist inter-

national journal, replacing the defunct Cominform journal,
established in Prague on 11 March probably will not ap-
pear before July and maybe not until September. A num-
ber of technical and substantive problems remain to be
ironed. out, possibly includinr the nature of Polish and
Yugoslav participation. 4) V

; : A -
\ I 7
,' —=<\—_-.t.¢(:-

-L7“? Cuba: The situation in Oriente Province remains

essentially unchangedo Castro is said to have set 7 April ‘IT
for attempting a general strike, but the government has
increased its chances of thwarting this by authorizing
violence against strike agitators. Batista's reiteration
of an amnesty offer appears to be propaganda designed to
impress public opinion with the government's sincerity
in wanting a peaceful solution with free elections in No-
"°m'°°1'-

5 Apr 58 DAILY BRIEF 11

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