G.R. No.
152611            August 5, 2003 Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65276 dated December 11, 2001,1 which annulled the Orders
dated January 29, 2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.2
Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an
area of 246.0561 hectares, located in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily offered
to sell the said land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR),3 under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the
property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the respondent.
Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of
Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine
the just compensation of the land.
On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation,
the prior valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines is
hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN MILLION
NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE
PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of
240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby
ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner provided
for by law.
SO ORDERED.4
manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just
compensation in the manner provided by law.5
On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the
PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of
Execution issued on June 18, 1999. He argued that such failure of the
petitioner to comply with the writ of execution constitutes contempt of the
DARAB.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC), for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in
Section 16 (f) of the CARL.6
On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for
Contempt, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is
hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent
LAND BANK, is cited for indirect contempt and hereby ordered to be
imprisoned until he complies with the Decision of the case dated
October 14, 1998.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted
Order,8 which was however denied by the PARAD on September 20,
2000.9 Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting
its intention to appeal the decision to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule
XI, Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure.10
On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the
determination of just compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an
Order dated October 25, 2000. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of
said dismissal was likewise denied.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due
course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just
compensation to respondent.11 On January 3, 2001, he directed the issuance
of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes.12
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of
arrest.13 The case was raffled to Branch 51 of said court. On January 29,
2001, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial
Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as
it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr.
Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC
Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land
Bank.
SO ORDERED.14
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order,
which was denied in an Order dated April 2, 2001.15
Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals,16 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65276. On December 11, 2001, the
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision which nullified the Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENTERTAINING THE
RESPONDENT’S SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO
QUESTION THE FINAL ORDER OF THE RTC WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS
SUBJECT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN ANNULLING AND SETTING
ASIDE THE RTC FINAL ORDER OF INJUNCTION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PARAD DID NOT ACQUIRE COMPETENT JURISDICTION OVER
THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS INASMUCH AS IT WAS INITIATED BY
MERE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND NOT BY VERIFIED PETITION, IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 2, RULE XI OF THE NEW DARAB RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND OF RULE 71 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
B. THE PARAD CONTEMPT ORDER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FINAL
AND EXECUTORY, BECAUSE THE PARAD ITSELF DISALLOWED THE
PETITIONER’S APPEAL TO THE DARAB CENTRAL OFFICE, IN
DISREGARD OF THE BASIC RULE THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
DETERMINES THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL.
C. THE PARAD ORDER OF ARREST AGAINST LBP MANAGER ALEX
LORAYES WAS IN GROSS AND PATENT VIOLATION OF HIS
PERSONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST UNJUST
ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT, INASMUCH AS, UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST
AGAINST CITIZENS, AND THE PROPER SUBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT
PROCEEDING WAS THE PETITIONER ITSELF AND NOT THE LBP
MANAGER, AND YET THE CONTEMPT ORDER WAS AGAINST THE LBP
MANAGER.
D. THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND
VOID, AS IT ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PARAD DECISION THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND
EXECUTORY, AS THE MATTER OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS ON APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS.17
As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action
for certiorari  filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals to nullify the
injunction issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court was a final order which is
appealable to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal.18
Petitioner’s submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative
remedy for the protection of one’s substantive right or interest. It is not a
cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a
main suit. Thus, it has been held that an order granting a writ of preliminary
injunction is an interlocutory order. As distinguished from a final order
which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be adjudicated upon.19
Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an
interlocutory order, hence, unappealable. Therefore, respondent’s special
civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the correct remedy
under the circumstances. Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.20
The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an
interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an
appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a
party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may
file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently
erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief.21
On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioner’s
manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003
DARAB Rules reads, in pertinent part:
Section 2. Indirect Contempt. – The Board or any of its members or
its Adjudicator may also cite and punish any person for indirect
contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner prescribed
under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which deals with the commencement of indirect contempt proceedings,
provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which
the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said
petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the
court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
x x x           x x x           x x x
The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the Rules of Court Committee
that drafted the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explains this requirement:
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper
procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such
proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the
former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts,
has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any
docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the
second paragraph of this amended section.
x x x           x x x           x x x
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings
initiated motu proprio  by order of or a formal charge by the
offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified
petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and
shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this
section.22
Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect
contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal
charge initiated by the court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr.
Lorayes with indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
referring to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides:
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. — Unless
otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt
committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules
as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by
law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place
wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction
over such charges as may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions
regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the
former Rule 71 applied only to superior and inferior courts and did
not comprehend contempt committed against administrative or
quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is clearly
considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in
the second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The
provision referred to contemplates the situation where a person,
without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or
produce documents when required to do so by the official or body
exercising such powers. For such violation, said person shall be
subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon
application of the official or body with the Regional Trial Court for
the corresponding sanctions.23 (emphasis in the original)
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for
indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so
by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their
jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These
matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the
present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional
Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr.
Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion
for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the
following reasons:24 First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a
verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with
in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu
proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the
PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed
by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the
power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that
stemmed from respondent’s "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders
of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of
Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated
December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which
enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its
stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending
the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue
warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street,
Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for
brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at
ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking
PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager.
— Horty
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong,
Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan
naganap and ginawang
panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong
inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman
naganap ang pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan
ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at
sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9
month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis.
So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang
ibigay and PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand
Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the
petitioner the following telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR
BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA
BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE.
MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6,
1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST
YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner
had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which
reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential
Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby
order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being
operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you
have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New
Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the
same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your
criminal prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of
November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and
Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio
Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked
to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so,
the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and
mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie
Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the
petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating
Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team
served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs.
Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the
premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that
Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the
studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers —
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more
waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes
which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan
and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the
following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that
the personal properties seized at her residence last January
26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said
seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the
owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior
notice or hearing, hence the Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3,
1987 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the
Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Philippine Constitution which guarantees
right of the people "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures  of
whatever nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi
Marquez and five (5) others (including 2
policemen) are the  private residence of the
Salazar family, and the entry, search as well
as the seizure of the personal properties
belonging to our client were without her
consent and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation, together with grave
abuse of the color of authority, and
 constitute robbery and violation of domicile
under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth
around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
in all (and which were already due for
shipment to Japan) are returned within
twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt
hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal
action, civil and criminal, to protect our
client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to
these important matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the
letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date,
POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig
Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although
the acts sought to be barred are already  fait accompli, thereby making
prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of
the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor
Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's
resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case,
it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
x x x           x x x          x x x
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just
been described is the state of the law as it was in
September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer
does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct
preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest.
Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this
power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered  functus
officio  by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino
people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
The constitutional proscription has thereby been
manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining
probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants
of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only
by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law" found in the
counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside
from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and
issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers,
 and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and
detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable
cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate,
a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his
case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and
not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person
accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary
and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and
jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our
mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
5
unconstitutional.  Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as
an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late
President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the
exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised
recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized
representative shall have the power to recommend the
arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal
recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920,
with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against
illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure
powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the
power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-
licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public order or will lead to
further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order
the closure of companies, establishment and entities found
to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to
do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No.
2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to cause
the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder
of authority if after investigation it is determined that his
activities constitute a danger to national security and public
order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other
implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the
closure of companies, establishment and entities found to
be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to
do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor
Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of
authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v.  Vivo 9 is not well-
taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the
defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration
Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable
alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in
order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid,
however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters
involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
 x x x           x x x          x x x
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable
aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960,
40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the
Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for
the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice
Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds
that there are aliens whose continued presence in the
country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in
the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re
McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because
their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is
absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs.
Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104
Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is,
obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to
extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the
sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia
argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential
Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby
order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being
operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you
have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New
Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the
same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal
prosecution under existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized,
otherwise, it is null and void, thus:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are
in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia,
paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/
recording equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE
FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets,
leaflets, books, and other publications to
promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as
 Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the
distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM"
and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate
No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with
Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with
Plate No. PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate
No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v.  State of Texas, the search warrant which
authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of
Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for
being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any
evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of
a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197
of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a
notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord
between the Tudor Government and the English Press,
when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions
to search where they pleased in order to suppress and
destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan."
Reference herein to such historical episode would not be
relevant for it is not the policy of our government to
suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with
"the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security. 14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following
principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is
only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest
and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following
a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor
Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents
are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation
of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.