Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 4 (2015) 215–219

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jcbs

The Functional Contextual a-ontological stance and Bas C. van

Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism
R. Trent Codd IIIn
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Center of WNC, P.A., United States

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Functional Contextualists use a pragmatic truth criterion that is based on successful working. When
Received 22 October 2014 applying their truth criterion they maintain an agnostic stance with respect to ontology; that is, they
Received in revised form maintain an a-ontological stance. Scientists from other areas of behavior analysis and psychology who
17 April 2015
primarily operate from a perspective of Scientific Realism have criticized this stance on several grounds.
Accepted 3 May 2015
In this paper, the reader is introduced to Bas C. van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. This introduction
allows for the development of a strong philosophical base which is then used to mount a defense of the
Keywords: a-ontological position.
Philosophy & 2015 Association for Contextual Behavioral Science. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Pragmatism
Realism
Philosophy of science
Ontology

1. The a-ontological stance and Bas van Fraassen’s
Constructive Empiricism
1.1. Introduction
Functional Contextualism (FC; Hayes, 1993) is the philosophical
base of Contextual Behavioral Science (CBS). One central feature of
Functional Contextualism is its a-ontological position or its ag-
nosticism with respect to ontology. To adopt an a-ontological
posture is to embrace a successful working truth criterion rather
than a correspondence one, and to do so without regard for any
other epistemic matters. This posture has been widely misunder-
stood, and often scorned, since it was first mentioned in the CBS
literature in the chapter “Behavioral epistemology includes non-
verbal knowing” by Hayes (1997). It has also been the subject of
much debate (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, 2000; Barnes-Holmes, 2005;
Marr, 2009; Tonneau, 2005).
There are several reasons the a-ontological position has been
poorly understood and met with disdain. These reasons include,
but are not limited to: (1) widespread undervaluing of the im-
portance and relevance of philosophy of science on the part of
many psychological scientists and (2) the fact that the philoso-
phical literature is often difficult for the philosophical layperson to
comprehend. These reasons have led to a pervasive knowledge
n
Correspondence to: Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Center of Western North
Carolina, PA, 1085 Tunnel Rd., 7A, Asheville, NC 28805, United States.
E-mail address: rtcodd@behaviortherapist.com
deficit with respect to the philosophy of science literature, and
when knowledge is present, understanding is superficial at best.
Most scientists, including psychological scientists, if they at-
tend to philosophy of science matters at all, would identify
themselves as Scientific Realists. Multiple formulations of the
Scientific Realist position exist, so it is important to articulate a
clear working definition in this manuscript. Specifically, we will be
working from Bas C. van Fraassen's definition of Realism (1980).
His definition is fair, responsible, and avoids a straw man con-
ceptualization of the Scientific Realist position, which he defines
this way: “Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true
story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific
theory involves the belief that it is true” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 8).
Unfortunately, many scientists who consider themselves Realists,
especially when they did not arrive at that stance through con-
scious deliberation, remain largely unaware of the difficulties as-
sociated with adopting this position. The a-ontological stance, as I
will argue, is more logically sound, stays closer to scientific data,
and is less risky than the Realist’s position with respect to beliefs
about theories.
A prerequisite to comprehending the strengths and weaknesses
of philosophical assumptions is an awareness that one has as-
sumptions, whether one realizes it or not, and what the logical
consequences of those assumptions are. The assumptions under-
pinning Realism and van Frassen's Anti-Realism, as well as their
consequences, as they pertain to Functional Contextualism's
a-ontological stance, will be discussed in this manuscript.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcbs.2015.05.004
2212-1447/& 2015 Association for Contextual Behavioral Science. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
216 R.T. Codd III / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 4 (2015) 215–219
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a philosophical per-
spective that is new to the CBS literature and to apply this per-
spective to criticisms leveled at Functional Contextualisms a-on-
tological stance. More specifically, the work of van Fraassen (1980),
who has produced a mature and robust philosophy of science, is
surveyed for the reader, and references to important works are
included so that interested readers may pursue them further.
1.2. Bas C. van Fraassen and Constructive Empiricism
Bas van Fraassen fully presented his position, which he labeled
Constructive Empiricism,1 in his 1980 book The Scientific Image.
Prior to the publication of this work, Anti-Realism was considered
deceased within philosophy of science, but following van Fraas-
sen's publication, he received widespread credit for salvaging this
perspective.
As we shall see, his work is compatible with Functional Con-
textualism and, notably, contains concepts that provide strong
support for Functional Contextualism's a-ontological stance. As
with most mature philosophical and scientific matters, van
Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism has survived decades of peer
review and philosophical argument. He has produced extensive
and robust counter arguments to many existing criticisms, pro-
vided clarification of misunderstood positions, and has made
conservative modifications to the approach. As a mature system,
Constructive Empiricism is a valuable formulation to apply to an
evaluation of a-ontology and its criticisms2.
As follows, discussion is confined to key concepts in van
Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism that relate specifically to our
concern with a-ontology and its criticisms.
1.2.1. Empirical adequacy
The central tenet of van Fraassen's position is that scientists
should only be interested in producing and accepting theories that
are empirically adequate. An empirically adequate theory, ac-
cording to van Fraassen, is one that accurately describes ob-
servable parts of the world. While empirically adequate theories
may be simultaneously describing the “real” world, he suggests
that we need not be concerned with this epistemic matter because
it has no practical value. It is worth noting that for theories to be
empirically adequate they must describe all observable phenom-
enon within a domain. Van Fraassen chose the term “constructive”
to emphasize the fact that scientists do not discover the real world,
but rather they construct theories that accurately describe scien-
tific observations. His approach is an empirical one, which pre-
vents the scientist from going beyond what is known by experi-
ence, hence the “empiricism” in “Constructive Empiricism.”
1
Many terms used in this paper, which are derived from the philosophy of
science literature, are used differently in clinical behavior analysis. Clinical behavior
analytic readers should keep this in mind when reading this material.
2 servability is crucial to understanding their view of empirical
Many critical discussions of Constructive Empiricism have appeared in philo-
sophical journals. Most notably, a collection of papers entitled “Images of Science”
were published in 1985 and contained a thorough evaluation of van Fraassen's po-
sition as well as his responses to those evaluations (van Fraassen, Churchland &
Hooker, 1985). For a thorough understanding of his work, the reader is referred to
this collection of papers, ideally after reading The Scientific Image. It is also re-
commended that readers subsequently access Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
Perspective, which he published in 2010 and in which he argues for a modification of
his approach to accommodate an appropriate notion of representation. His suggested
modifications retain his central epistemic commitments (which pertain to the con-
cerns addressed in this paper) while conferring new advantages. In this work he
directs the reader to a thoroughly pragmatic conception of science. Finally, the reader
is referred to The Empirical Stance (van Fraassen, 2008) for a thorough discussion of
empiricism from the vantage point of Constructive Empiricism
1.2.2. Attitude
van Fraassen articulates the attitude one should take in relation
to a theory that works. He labels this attitude “acceptance” and
suggests that one should accept a theory when one believes it to
be empirically adequate. No further beliefs about the theory are
necessary in order to accept it. Accepting a theory also involves a
commitment to rely upon the theory’s concepts when addressing
future problems. When a Constructive Empiricist accepts a theory,
they do not assert that they are accepting a literally true story
about the world; they “display” it and specify pragmatic ad-
vantages associated with it.
van Fraassen's approach is sometimes misidentified as an In-
strumentalist one. Though his position shares many concepts with
Instrumentalism, it contains a key difference: it concedes that
theories could be true in the way Realists use that term, but since
the scientist will never know one way or the other he suggests that
the best stance for a scientist to adopt is one of agnosticism.
In essence, when van Fraassen suggests we discriminate be-
tween accepting and believing a theory, he is recommending that
we take an agnostic stance with our theories with respect to
whether they say anything that’s literally true about the world. He
states it this way:
To be an empiricist is to withhold belief in anything that goes
beyond the actual, observable phenomena…to develop an
empiricist account of science is to depict it as involving a search
for truth only about the empirical world, about what is actual
and observable” (van Fraassen,1980, pp. 202–203).
1.2.3. Virtues
van Fraassen suggests that theories have two kinds of virtues:
epistemic and pragmatic. To his mind, epistemic virtues are made
up of empirical adequacy, which we have already discussed, and
empirical strength, which refers to the amount of information
about the observable world that the theory contains. Thus, if one
were required to choose between two empirically adequate the-
ories one would make the selection based on which was the more
empirically strong (note: empirical strength is synonymous with
“scope” as typically used in the CBS community). van Fraassen
emphasizes that when examining his suggested agnostic position,
it is unlikely that the Realist will have much disagreement around
pragmatic dimensions. The primary disagreements are in the
epistemic realm.
Realists will make use of non-epistemic dimensions when en-
gaging in theory selection - however, it is evident that pragmatic
dimensions are also important to them (i.e., it is not just about
mapping the true world). When engaging in theory selection they
do consider a theory’s parsimony, scope, unity, etc.
1.2.4. Observability
Understanding the Constructive Empiricist’s view on ob-
adequacy. First, in contrast to some Realists, they believe that there
are two kinds of entities in the world that can be discriminated:
observable and unobservable. They suggest that confusion on this
point often arises when presuming that language can be divided
into theoretical and observational categories. This is problematic
because describing things with theoretical language can hide
the fact that the things being described are observable. Second,
they acknowledge that specifying the precise boundary between
observable and unobservable entities can be tricky. van Fraassen
referred to observability as a “vague predicate” and noted that
it exists on a continuum. Many entities can be classified easily
 R.T. Codd III / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 4 (2015) 215–219
as observable or unobservable, while others cannot. However,
van Fraassen instructs that even though we cannot always draw a
clear line between these two categories, they remain advanta-
geous in making useful discriminations. He argues that some
discrimination is possible because clear cases and counter-cases of
observable entities can be found. He views observation as a type of
measurement and suggests that the human organism can be
thought of, in some sense, as a type of measuring device. In some
real sense what it means for something to be observable is tied to
what a human is equipped to observe, and the limitations “…will
be described by the final physics and biology” (van Fraassen, 1980,
p. 17).
Some philosophers maintain a view (e.g., Quine) that ob-
servable entities are postulated to explain our experience, on
analogy with unobservable entities postulated in scientific the-
ories. van Fraassen denies this view and explains:
…such entities as sense-data, when they are not already un-
derstood in the framework of observable phenomena ordinarily
recognized, are theoretical entities. They are, what is worse, the
theoretical entities of an armchair psychology that cannot even
rightfully claim to be scientific. I wish merely to be agnostic
about the existence of the unobservable aspects of the world
described by science—but sense data, I am sure, do not exist
(van Fraassen, 1980, p. 72).
In Scientific Representation (2008) van Fraassen progresses his
work in this area considerably by adding a discrimination between
observable phenomena and appearances, and introduces a three-
layer model (theory-phenomena-appearances) that rescues his
earlier work from isomorphism with respect to theory and phe-
nomena. The interested reader is referred to this important work.
2. Constructive Empiricism and a-ontology
Having introduced the basic tenets of Constructive Empiricism
we are now in a position to apply them to an analysis of a-on-
tology, harnessing them in an evaluation of the specific arguments
leveled against the position. A first priority, however, is to note
what the Functional Contextualist means when they say they
adopt an a-ontological stance and to illustrate the advantages they
believe are achieved when orienting themselves in the position.
When the Functional Contextualist indicates they are taking an
a-ontological stance they mean that they are adopting an agnostic
position with respect to ontology. They do not mean that they are
adopting an anti-ontological or non-ontological stance.
2.1. Molar and molecular analyses
The proper level of analysis in the analysis of behavior has been
the subject of much debate, specifically regarding the usefulness of
a molar versus a molecular level of analysis as well as the defini-
tions of these respective analytic levels. In general, contemporary
usage formulates these levels of analysis in terms of the time-scale
of environment–behavior relations with molar analyses referring
to longer time horizons relative to molecular analyses.
The different levels of analysis, as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of each from a Constructive Empiricist perspective,
are best illustrated with a specific example: consider a person with
a 20-year tobacco habit who decides to quit smoking and is suc-
cessful in doing so. The environmental events related to the de-
creased smoking behavior may not be available for observation
locally over a short time horizon, and thus may escape the view of
someone pursuing a molecular level of analysis. In this circum-
stance the failure to observe relevant environmental events may
217
give rise to postulating behavior on the part of the molecular
analyst. They may postulate the presence of private events, such as
self-talk of some kind, and conclude that these private events are
responsible for the observed behavioral decrease. Constructive
Empiricism would view this as problematic because such postu-
lated entities cannot be observed, and thus there is no sound
empirical epistemic justification for these events; they are merely
postulated on the basis of behavior that is observable. The Con-
structive Empiricist would acknowledge that these private events
could exist, but whether they exist can never be known. Equally
problematic, from the perspective of Constructive Empiricism, is
that these postulated unobservables do not confer the pragmatic
advantage of empirical testability. In contrast, a scientist pursuing
a molar level of analysis would identify observable environmental
events that emerge over time such as improved health, and fi-
nancial and social consequences. Importantly, these events are
observable and are thus justified epistemically. They also confer
the important pragmatic advantages of testability and manipul-
ability, as an unobservable cannot be manipulated by the clinician
for intervention purposes.
This is not to suggest that a molecular level of analysis is never
useful or always results in the postulation of unobservables as,
indeed, a large body of research in behavior analysis demonstrates
that it often is useful. The important point relates to observability
and the epistemic soundness and pragmatic advantages of staying
grounded in observables and how such an analysis can set the
occasion for postulating.
2.2. Observability and instrumentation
Another important example involves the use of instrumenta-
tion such as brain scans (e.g., fMRIs). In the Constructive Empiricist
view, brain scans do not make unobservables observable. Rather,
they produce new images that are different from the brain phe-
nomena of interest; these images are what become observable to
the scientist. The Constructive Empiricist believes it is a mistake to
believe these images are the phenomena themselves. These
measurement techniques and the images they produce may in-
deed confer pragmatic advantages to the scientist, but they do not
produce phenomena wherein a scientist is justified, epistemically,
in believing the unobservable has become observable. This is an-
other circumstance in which Realists engage in postulating beha-
vior, postulating the existence of unobservables on the basis of the
observable phenomena produced by the instrumentation. Because
of this difficulty, van Fraasen maintains that what is observable is
what can be observed by a human’s unaided senses.
Also worth noting is that when one examines the a-ontological
position within the broader Functional Contextual literature, one
observes strong connections to the work of Richard Rorty. van
Fraassen and Rorty share many philosophical connections and si-
milarities, but van Fraassen does not share Rorty's emphatic pre-
dilection for philosophical Pragmatism (B.C. van Fraassen, personal
communication, July 2, 2014). Rorty's work is also useful for the
Functional Contextualist but their perspectives may lead to dif-
ferent consequences. Rorty highlighted some of the differences
between his and van Fraassen’s work in his review of van Fraas-
sen's The Empirical Stance (Rorty, 2002).
2.3. Functional Contextualism and Constructive Empiricism
It may be useful to the reader to now compare and contrast
Functional Contextualism and Constructive Empiricism. See Ta-
ble 1 for a brief summation of important comparative dimensions.
Functional Contextualism and Constructive Empiricism have more
in common than they do in distinction. Both are empirical philo-
sophes of science that emphasize the importance of pragmatic
218 R.T. Codd III / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 4 (2015) 215–219
Table 1
Comparative dimensions of Functional Contextualism's a-ontological stance and
Constructive Empiricism.
A-ontology Constructive Empiricism
Agnostic about all epistemic matters Agnostic about unobservable epistemic
matters
Exclusively interested in pragmatic Interested in pragmatic and observable
dimensions epistemic dimensions
Silent on instrumentation and Instrumentation does not provide a
observability window to unobservables
Empirical philosophy of science Empirical philosophy of science
dimensions and epistemic agnosticism, although the particulars of
the latter differ.
They differ along two general dimensions, the first of which is
unimportant for our purposes and primarily reflects differing areas
of emphasis. For example, Constructive Empiricism is interested in
describing overall scientific practice whereas Functional Con-
textualism is more specifically interested in describing and ar-
ticulating the goals of a behavioral science. The second dimension,
which is relevant to our present purposes, pertains to where they
lie on the Anti-Realism – Realism continuum. Functional Con-
textualism is slightly closer to the Anti-Realism endpoint than
Constructive Empiricism. Constructive Empiricism confers many
advantages to the Functional Contextualist especially in support-
ing the justification of their a-ontological position because it is a
more fully developed and well-articulated philosophy of science.
3. Arguments against a-ontology and application of Con-
structive Empiricism to those arguments
Argument 1: “Some operant theorists have argued that the most
fundamental concepts of behavior analysis have antirealist implica-
tions: for example,… we have no epistemic access to a physical
world…” (Tonneau, 2005, p. 55). My contention is that this is not
the Functional Contextualist's position. Instead, I contend the po-
sition is that we should strive for what van Fraassen describes as
empirical adequacy. Striving for empirical adequacy is more hon-
est than striving for literal truth, as the former does not extend
beyond the data as far as the latter does. To make claims about
what happens in the unobservable world, as many Realists do, is to
go beyond the actual phenomena recorded by the scientist (i.e.,
observable phenomena), and no one can ever really know what is
occurring in that realm. Importantly, extending beyond observable
parts of the world into unobservable parts is to extend beyond the
realm of science.
It’s important to explore van Fraassen's emphasis on ob-
servables a bit further. Recall his belief that scientific theories can
only relate to observable phenomena. Grover Maxwell criticized
this approach (Maxwell, 1962), arguing that distinguishing ob-
servable from unobservable objects is impossible due to the lack of
objective criteria with which to do so. As previously discussed van
Fraassen responded by acknowledging that some difficulties with
this discrimination are present, but that they are not fundamen-
tally problematic. He suggested that clear cases of each category
could be given, that theoretical language can obscure the dis-
crimination, and that some objects are not described with these
terms even though in some contexts these descriptions could
make sense.
Argument 2: No Miracles Argument: “Any coherent position of
scientific pragmatism (‘successful working’) must address why some
practices are demonstrably more successful than others” (Marr,
2012). Here, noted experimental behavior analyst M. Jackson Marr
is essentially invoking the no miracles argument, also known as
the “ultimate” argument, which comes from Putnam’s well-known
claim that realism “is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the
success of science a miracle,” (Putnam, 1979, p.73). Many philo-
sophers of science believe this to be the most robust argument in
favor of Scientific Realism. In essence, the argument is that if the
most successful theories are not successful because they are de-
scribing the world as it actually is, it would be a miracle. The belief
is that they are successful because they are actually true. van
Fraassen counters this argument this way:
…science is a biological phenomenon, an activity by one kind
of organism which facilitates its interaction with the environ-
ment. And this makes me think that a very different kind of
scientific explanation is required.
I can best make the point by contrasting two accounts of the
mouse who runs from its enemy, the cat. St. Augustine …
provided an intentional explanation: the mouse perceives that
the cat is its enemy, hence the mouse runs. What is postulated
here is the ‘adequacy’ of the mouse’s thought to the order of
nature: the relation of enmity is correctly reflected in his mind.
But the Darwinist says: Do not ask why the mouse runs from its
enemy. Species which did not cope with their natural enemies
no longer exist. That is why there are only ones who do.
In just the same way, I claim that the success of current scientific
theories is no miracle … For any scientific theory is born into a
life of fierce competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only the
successful theories survive – the ones which in fact latched on to
actual [observable] regularities in nature. (pp. 39-40).
Here van Fraassen suggests a selectionist explanation, an ex-
planatory framework that should be both familiar and comfortable
to any clinical behavior analyst. It is also a stronger explanation for
the success of scientific theories. But, van Fraassen’s argument is
only beginning to build momentum. He argues further that ex-
planation cannot continue in an infinite regress and thus a term-
inal point in the explanatory process must be chosen. The Realist
would acknowledge that explanation cannot continue indefinitely
and disagrees only as to where the stopping point should be. The
Constructive Empiricist wonders why explanation can’t terminate
with empirical adequacy, as the history of science confirms that
theories are selected on this basis. Indeed, science involves beha-
vior and thus science is what scientists do. Striving for empirical
adequacy more accurately describes the actual behavior of
scientists.
Argument 3: Unobservables and causal properties: “Much of the
discussions about scientific realism are focused on the status of cer-
tain unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, black holes, stellar
interiors, dark energy, and such. But even to begin addressing these
complex questions, there are some starting positions most natural
scientists would hold. Without these positions, asserting the existence
of at least some of the unobservables proposed by natural scientists
would be nonsensical” (Marr, 2012). Often Realists explain events
by appealing to unobservables. They believe that if these entities
are actually causes then they must in fact exist. van Fraassen's
compelling counterargument suggests that this type of causal talk
from scientists results from their being immersed in their theories.
He suggests that what they are actually talking about, when ex-
plaining, are the internal structure of their models, and in doing so
speak as if the pictures afforded by their models are literally true.
Many scientists form beliefs that unobservables have causal
properties when they speak this way, but they are really only
describing how their model fits together. They are not speaking of
how the world literally fits together.
Argument 4: Attention to philosophical matters and their prac-
tical consequences: “just what that ontological position might, or
should be will likely remain an unsettled question, which means it
 R.T. Codd III / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 4 (2015) 215–219
can’t be that important” (Marr, 2012). Philosophy of science is
concerned with answering questions that science can’t address
and with an examination of why those questions can’t be pursued
through science. Thus, there are important questions in need of
answering that only philosophical behavior can derive. One ex-
ample pertains to the question of whether scientists must pursue
theories that tell a literally true story about the world in order to
be successful. This question is the primary focus of this paper and
the conclusion drawn from answering this question directly im-
pacts the behavior of the scientist. For example, it affects the sci-
entific goals they pursue and the conclusions they draw.
Another example relates to one of the primary problems with
the Realist paradigm, the well-known problem of induction. This
problem is laid out by David Hume and others, and can be sum-
marized with the following question: how does one know that
inductive methods are justified and reliable? This is an important
question that can only be pursued with philosophy and it lies at
the very core of the scientific enterprise. Popper made a serious
attempt to resolve this problem, but his solution did not sa-
tisfactorily resolve the dilemma; there are many historical in-
stances in which Popper’s position was unable to address the way
successful science was unfolding. Constructive Empiricism, how-
ever, seems to describe scientific practice more accurately
(Schlaak, 2014) and thus suggests how scientists should behave
scientifically in order to be successful with scientific behavior.
Science is replete with philosophical questions and supposi-
tions in need of examination, which are often hidden from view.
The unfortunate result is that many scientists engage in scientific
behavior without prior conscious examination of their assump-
tions. This has tremendous consequences including what we can
conclude from our scientific theories, how confident we can be in
the reliability of our theories and whether our scientific goals are
meaningful. Finally, the claim that engaging in philosophy of sci-
ence has no practical consequences is itself a philosophical claim
in need of evaluation and defense.
4. Conclusion
Bas C. van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism is mature, robust and
congruent with the functional contextual a-ontological stance. These
219
qualities make Constructive Empiricism a useful body of material for
the CBS community with respect to a number of aims including: (1)
more fully understanding the concept of a-ontology, (2) understanding
the pitfalls associated with the Scientific Realist position and (3) un-
derstanding the philosophical strengths associated with this stance.
The Contextual Behavioral Scientist would benefit from developing
fluency with this work as this would leave them with a more defen-
sible position than the one offered by Realism.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.
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