Professional Documents
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a. Unit level costs vary with the number of units manufactured. Examples include
direct labor, direct materials, machine costs, and energy.
Batch level costs vary not with the number of units but with the number of
batches. Examples include set-ups, material movements, purchase orders, and
inspections.
Product line costs vary with the number of different product lines in the factory.
Examples include process engineering, product specifications, engineering change
notices, and product enhancement activities.
Production sustaining costs are all remaining costs in the factory incurred to
provide the capacity to produce. These costs do not vary with the number of units
produced, batches processed, or product lines manufactured in the factory.
Examples include plant management, building and grounds, and heating and
lighting.
b. False. As long as production-sustaining costs (which are fixed with respect to all
volume measures) are allocated to products based on expected or actual volume,
then unit costs will vary inversely with volume. “Normal costing” must be used
for each allocation base to prevent unit costs from varying with volumes. For
example, batch-level costs must be allocated based on the normal number of
batches over the business cycle as long as there are any fixed costs (fixed with
respect to the number of batches) in batch-level costs.
Fettuccine’s per pound inspection cost is higher under ABC than absorption
costing ($0.1875 vs. $0.10), whereas spaghetti’s inspection cost falls from $0.05
to $0.0208.
c. When inspection costs are allocated based on actual inspection hours, fettuccine’s
cost of inspection per pound, instead of being twice as large, is now nine times
larger than spaghetti’s per-pound cost. Even though inspectors spend three times
more hours inspecting fettuccine (24 hours vs. 8 hours), only one-third the amount
of fettuccine is produced (2,000 pounds vs. 6,000) pounds.
In this problem, inspection costs are being converted from an indirect cost
to direct cost because the times of the inspectors are being metered.
The author of this quote, Robin Cooper, an early advocate of ABC, makes the
following implicit points:
i. ABC will not replace traditional costing methods for financial accounting.
ii. ABC will be a supplemental source of information in most firms.
iii. Dual cost systems will be used.
The author fails to discuss which system (ABC or financial accounting) will be used for
performance measurement. Just giving the users control over the ABC system does not
change their incentives if they are still evaluated and rewarded based on the traditional
financial accounting system that remains under the control of accounting and finance.
This quotation correctly points out that in most firms, successful implementation
of ABC requires the users to have the decision rights over system design, not the
accounting department. The likely (unstated) reason for this being that the users have
i. Why will anyone pay attention to the ABC numbers if they are still
evaluated and compensated based on the traditional financial accounting
numbers?
ii. How large are the costs of having two accounting systems reporting costs
for the same products? For example, how large are the reconciliation
costs and influence costs if two systems are used?
The quote is typical of ABC proponents. They assume that cost systems serve
primarily a decision management function and they ignore the decision control role
served by traditional systems under the control of accounting departments.
b. All S&D expenses allocated using advertising and marketing budget shares:
c. Advertising & marketing costs allocated using advertising & marketing budget
shares, distribution & administration costs divided equally, and selling costs
assigned based on gross margin.
a. Unit manufacturing costs of Basic and Custom DVDs using traditional absorption
costing. Manufacturing overhead is allocated based on direct labor dollars.
c. DVDS should not change its costing method because this will likely cause its total
tax liability to increase. Custom DVDs are sold in the high tax rate country (35%)
whereas Basic DVDs are sold in the low tax rate country (15%). Therefore,
assuming that both countries’ tax authorities accept absorption costing as an
acceptable tax method (and apparently they are using this method now), activity-
based costing causes the unit manufacturing cost of Custom DVDs to fall from
$130.00 to $125.24. Higher profits in the high tax rate country generate a larger
tax liability. The table below calculates that ABC would cause taxes to rise by
$66,667 ($401,667 - $335,000). If DVDS uses ABC for internal reporting and
absorption costing for taxes, it exposes itself to charges by tax authorities that its
choice of cost allocation methods for taxes (absorption costing) is being used
solely to minimize taxes and has no legitimate business purpose as evidenced by
the use of ABC.
This case study illustrates that poorly designed ABC systems trying to recover the
cost of excess capacity can fail.
a. The problem is they are trying to recover a sunk cost — fixed asset depreciation
of $400,000. Because volumes have fallen, the original decision to acquire this
much capacity turns out to have been wrong. They should take a one-time charge
to profits by writing off some or most of the $400,000 machine. This will then
lower unit costs. Other issues include:
– The volume-related death spiral. When volume decreases you raise prices,
volume decreases more, you raise prices more, etc.
– Is the accounting system broken? They are installing ABC to fix a broken
accounting system but that is not the major problem. Allocating the historical
cost of excess capacity is the problem.
– Unitized transfer price. Unitization of fixed costs provides the wrong decision
information to management for short-run decision making such as pricing
special orders. Beware of unitized costs.
– Both the old absorption and new ABC accounting systems are sending the
wrong signal for short-run decisions. Both systems are signaling higher costs
and thus the apparent necessity to raise prices. Given the high fixed costs and
decreasing volume, this is an incorrect inference.
– Allocation of decision rights (decision management versus decision control).
How should management change the allocation and what will the systems’
changes do to the focus of management? Are the benefits of the imperfect
decentralized system outweighing the costs?
b. In reviewing the data provided in Table 2, the apparent cost drivers have been
identified and “properly” allocated to the parts using ABC costing. What is not
apparent is that the unitized costs are misleading in the first place. Unitizing the
fixed costs will cause the apparent profitability of parts to vary with volume. This
unitization is misleading and should be avoided. Since the firm has so much
a. The following statement presents the ABC-based operating incomes for the three
divisions.
Canned &
Dairy & Packaged
Beverages Meats Foods Total
Sales $250.00 $470.00 $620.00 $1,340.00
Direct costs:
Cost of Goods Sold 200.00 329.00 527.00 1,056.00
Indirect costs:
Shelf space costs 22.50 31.50 36.00 90.00
Handling costs 0.00 15.00 5.00 20.00
Coupon costs 3.00 0.00 12.00 15.00
Shrinkage 1.00 21.00 6.00 28.00
Other indirect costs 11.02 18.13 29.04 58.20
Total costs 237.52 414.63 615.04 1,267.20
Operating income $ 12.48 $ 55.37 $ 4.96 $ 72.80
The preceding indirect costs were calculated using the following allocation rates:
b. Before this question can be answered, one must first determine how management
will use the statement. Is the primary function of the statement decision
management or decision control or both?
Without a more detailed description of the function of the statement,
some, more general comments can be offered.
i. The revised, ABC statement has some attractive features. In
particular, some of the previous indirect costs are metered more
accurately to the three departments. These consist of handling,
coupons, and shrinkage. These former indirect costs are now
directly traced to the departments.
ii. Based on the apparently more accurate allocation of costs under
the ABC system, it is tempting to argue that canned and packaged
foods are really making a small profit (instead of a loss) and that
dairy and meats is not making as much money as originally
thought. However, the ABC report may be no better a gauge of
relative profitability than the original statement for two reasons.
First, a substantial portion of the indirect costs are occupancy costs
which include accounting depreciation. Accounting depreciation is
not the opportunity cost of shelf space. The opportunity cost of
shelf space is the profits forgone by the product(s) not stocked.
Second, the grocery store offers one stop shopping for the
consumer — a joint product for the consumer. Thus, dropping a
product line (e.g., canned and packaged goods) would likely
severely affect the demand for the remaining products. Allocating
joint and common costs can produce misleading information for
dropping/adding product lines.
iii. If the financial statement is used for performance evaluation, then
adopting the ABC report requires adjustments to the performance
reward system. Without such adjustments there will be windfall
gains and windfall losses among the department managers if their
compensation is tied to their department’s operating income.
iv. The issue of the other indirect costs and how to allocate them
remains. Is cost of goods sold the right cost driver to tax? Does
this create the desired incentives?
a. The table below calculates product costs using the more disaggregate data:
Houston Milling
Revised Cost Allocations Based on Disaggregated Cost Pool Data
Setup Machining
Dept. 1 Dept. 2 Dept. 1 Dept. 2 Total
Total Cost $3,000 $2,000 $8,000 $2,000 $15,000
Allocation base Number of Number of Direct labor Direct labor
setups setups hours hours
Usage: A11 7 3 32 34
D43 13 2 18 16
Total 20 5 50 50
b. With the very limited knowledge provided in this case, one cannot discuss the
pros and cons of the two different allocation bases. We know nothing of how
these costs are being used by Houston. Are they being used for decision making
and/or control, or for tax purposes? Given that more cost drivers and cost pools
are used, one is tempted to argue that the data in part (a) is a more accurate
reflection of the “true” costs of A11 and D43 than the data in Table 1. But what
do we mean by “true” costs? Is this the “true” historical cost of production? For
what purpose are these numbers being used? Are there joint and/or common costs
in the production process? If so, then allocating these costs is not a meaningful
exercise. Besides, both A11 and D43 are sold to Pratt & Whitney who
presumably wants to source both housings from a single supplier (Houston). Why
is more “accurate” cost data important to Houston? If the cost of one product
falls, the other product’s cost rises. Houston is only interested in the total profit
on the P&W contract. Finally, as we will see in part (c), more complex
allocations do not necessarily produce more accurate costs.
c. The table below computes the costs of A11 and D43 using setup hours and
machine hours as the allocation bases.
Allocation rate $100 per setup $40 per machine $200 per setup $10 per machine
hr. hr. hr. hr.
d. One thing we learn from this exercise is that the simple, more aggregate allocation
scheme in Table 1 provides reasonably accurate estimates of product costs. Total
allocated costs to each product vary little across the three methods. For example,
in Table 1 A11 has a product cost of $8,600 compared to the most accurate
estimate in part (c) of $8,500, or an error of $100. Using more disaggregated data
in part (a) yields a product cost estimate of $8,730 or a difference of $230.
Therefore, more cost drivers do not necessarily guarantee more accurate product
cost estimates. What drives “accuracy” is whether or not the cost driver used
captures the “true” cause-and-effect relation.
ABC analysis:
Revenue $612,000 $325,000 $680,000 $210,000 $1,827,000
Cost of goods sold (including freight) (348,000) (200,000) (392,000) (150,000) (1,090,000)
Inventory holding cost* (69,600) (40,000) (78,400) (30,000) (218,000)
Marketing costs (1/4th per SKU) (33,750) (33,750) (33,750) (33,750) (135,000)
Direct selling cost (% of revenue) (117,241) (62,261) (130,268) (40,230) (350,000)
Net income $43,409 $(11,011) $45,582 $(43,980) $34,000
The problem with the above analysis is that it assumes that if SKU2 is dropped,
$62,261 of direct selling costs would be eliminated, and if SKU4 is dropped,
$40,230 of direct selling costs would be eliminated. However, the dollars spent
on the direct sales force is unlikely to change by these amounts if these SKUs
were deleted. The existing sales people will be selling fewer products. Given that
they have fewer SKUs to sell, they may exert more effort selling the remaining
SKUs and the sales of the remaining SKUs might increase, but by how much is
difficult to estimate.
An alternative SKU profitability analysis is to focus on the direct costs and
allocated marketing department costs, and to ignore the direct selling costs:
The first table assumes that direct selling costs vary with revenues. The second
table assumes they are entirely fixed and will not vary with revenues. In the
second table, we see that only SKU4 is unprofitable. If SKU4 is dropped, all of its
revenues are lost, but Sanchez saves SKU4’s cost of goods sold, inventory
holding costs, and ¼ of the marketing costs. The second table treats the direct
selling costs as a JOINT COST. Like other joint costs, all of the direct selling
costs of $350,000 must be incurred to generate sales of SKUs.
a. Unit manufacturing cost of the U.S. and EU models using total direct labor to
allocate the $39 million of manufacturing overhead.
b. Unit manufacturing cost of the U.S. and EU models using the ABC analysis to
allocate the $39 million of manufacturing overhead.
c. Income statements (including income tax expense) for Wedig and its European.
subsidiary using the unit manufacturing cost calculated in part (a) (overhead is
allocated using direct labor).
d. Income statements (including income tax expense) for Wedig and its European
subsidiary using the unit manufacturing cost calculated in part (b) (overhead is
allocated using the ABC analysis).
e. The major advantage of using direct labor instead of ABC to allocate the $39
million of overhead is the lower total tax liability of the entire firm. Direct labor
allocation results in a total tax liability of $2,526,300 compared to a tax liability
of $2,841,300, or $315,000 difference. The usual assumed advantages of ABC,
namely that it is better for decision making, are unlikely to offset the tax
disadvantage of ABC in the case of Wedig. Trying to maintain two sets of books
(ABC for internal use and direct labor for taxes) places Wedig at some risk if the
U.S. tax authorities challenge Wedig to show that their costing methodology for
taxes (direct labor) has a legitimate business purpose.
Given the overhead rate, the pro forma income statement by product line is:
Under absorption costing, all three products are profitable, but CCC is the least
profitable.
b. Since half of the fixed overhead is in the warehousing function, these costs are
assigned to the products using "unit days in warehousing."
Toby Manufacturing
Pro Forma Income Statement
Overhead Assigned Based on Direct Labor Cost & Warehousing Days
**Non-warehousing costs:
Non-warehousing fixed overhead $225,000
÷ Direct labor cost 118,000
Fixed overhead rate 190.7%
c. It now appears that product CCC is losing money after the warehousing costs are
allocated on unit-days. However, without further analysis of how warehousing
costs vary (i.e., the opportunity costs of warehousing one more unit), the
allocations produced in (b) above may be no more representative of opportunity
costs than traditional full absorption costs in (a). For example, does a unit of
AAA require the same amount of space in the warehouse as a unit of CCC? Do
some units require special handling or special racks? The issue is: should
warehousing unit-days be taxed?
This problem demonstrates that while ABC can be useful in producing more
accurate product cost data, it can increase the firm’s tax liability at the same time.
The first step is to compute overhead cost per switch using direct labor and
number of set-ups.
c. The income statements in part a based on allocating overhead using direct labor
are likely to be better than those in part b which allocate overhead using ABC.
The reason is that taxes are lower by about $1.2 million using direct labor. Given
the U.S. tax rate (35 percent) is higher than the tax rate in Ireland (10 percent), a
transfer price that causes more overhead expense to be reported in the U.S. entity
results in a lower overall tax liability. The direct labor allocation base causes the
cost of the U.S. switches to be higher by about $5.00 per switch than if the
number of batches is used as the allocation scheme. Because this is a closely held
firm with the two brothers managing the two entities, control of agency problems
is likely to be unimportant. Likewise, given the high margins they are earning on
the switches, the pricing decision is unlikely to be sensitive to accurate product
cost data. Therefore, both decision control and decision management reasons for
allocating overhead costs are unlikely to be important in this firm. Thus,
minimizing taxes is likely to dominate these other criteria, especially given the
magnitude of the difference in taxes resulting from a change to ABC. In other
words, it’s hard to imagine that the decision management and decision control
benefits of ABC are worth $1.2 million to justify the larger tax liability that might
result if ABC is adopted.
b. Pros: The allocation is simple, easy to understand, and creates incentives for the
three divisions to cooperate.
Using the percentages supplied in the problem, the following allocations of each
corporate overhead item is calculated, and then used to determine divisional
profits.
d. Pros: the report appears to more accurately reflect the actual consumption of
corporate resources.
Cons: Racing is now showing a large loss and will be under pressure to become
“profitable.” Likewise, Passenger and Industrial appear more profitable and may
be tempted to consume more perks, including empire building via negative NPV
projects. Higher influence costs are likely as division managers jockey over the
The consultant’s analysis of corporate R&D and image advertising suggests that
these expenditures are in reality joint costs. They are conducted to enhance all the
divisions simultaneously, and one division’s “consumption” of the resource does
not really reduce the resource for other divisions. Research projects are chosen
that have “maximum corporate-wide benefits.” To allocate R&D and image
advertising, the following report uses Net Realizable Value (division contribution
margin before division fixed expense) as the allocation base.
Finally, corporate interest and corporate office expenses are allocated per
the ABC percentages in (c).
One can argue that NRV should be calculated using division contribution margin
after deducting division fixed expenses. The following table provides this
alternative:
Divisional profits change slightly, but the overall tenor of the results remains
unaffected.
f. Pros: The report in (e) credits Racing for the net cash flow it generates for the
other two divisions. In this sense, the report e attempts to capture the benefits
(synergies) among the divisions. Using NRV to allocate R&D and corporate
advertising, does not distort the relative profitability of the three divisions. NRV
as an allocation base creates incentives for the three divisions to cooperate.
Cons: The allocations are complicated. Moreover, the sum of the three divisional
profits no longer total firm-wide profits because the Passenger and Industrial
margin that is credited to Racing is double counted. This leads to some confusion
within Goodstone. Also, the consultant’s estimate of the 10 percent and 5 percent
of additional revenue generated by Racing for Passenger and Industrial is
arbitrary and subject to substantial measurement error. Presumably, these
percentages vary over time, and it is costly to hire the consultant each year to re-
estimate these percentages. Moreover, these percentages are subject to lobbying
(influence costs) by Racing seeking to improve its bottom line.
Notice, that the simple allocations in part (a) are fairly close to the
presumably more accurate, but much more complicated ones in part (e). This
illustrates that apparently inaccurate allocations can often capture both the
common costs and synergies among divisions.
a. The first table takes the operating data presented in the problem and converts it to
total number of patients, total days, total billings, and total minutes by inpatients
and outpatients. Using these totals an allocation rate is computed for each
potential allocation base (number of patients, total days, total billings, and total
minutes).
The next table converts the overhead rates above into a cost per patient encounter
by multiplying the allocation rate above by the average allocation base per
patient.
The last table shows the total dollars allocated to inpatient and outpatient services.
Each cell in the table is computed by taking the allocation rate (above) times the
totals reported in the first table above.
b. This actual case study illustrates the rather dramatic differences that can result
when costs are allocated based on estimated usage of the admissions office
(minutes to register) instead of bed days or number of admissions.
Using number of patients, inpatient services receive about 17 percent of
the admission office’s costs. If these costs are allocated based on total billings,
inpatient services receive 71 percent of the costs.
The managerial implications of the various allocation bases depend on two
things: (i) what drives costs in the admission office, and (ii) how are these
numbers going to be used? If all or most of the costs in the admission office are
variable with the number of minutes spent admitting patients, then the number of
minutes is a reasonably accurate, maybe the most accurate, cost driver (predictor)
of admission office costs. However, if most of the admission office costs are
fixed (supervisors, computer systems, etc.), then each additional minute spent
admitting patients does not cost the hospital $0.5556 per minute. The allocation
rate is an average, not a marginal cost.
This leads to the second issue: how are these numbers going to be used?
If they are used for decision making (such as expanding/contracting a medical
b. Product-line profits
AbsorptionCosting ABC
Hi-V Lo-V Hi-V Lo-V
Selling price $ 95 $ 100 $ 95.00 $100.00
Unit cost 91 33 70.58 94.25
Margin $ 4 $ 67 $ 24.42 $ 5.75
Units sold 11,300 4,000 11,300 4,000
Product line profits $45,200 $268,000 $275,946 $23,000
d. Switching to ABC will not, in general, lower taxes. However, under certain
conditions, ABC can lower taxes. The general conditions are: 1
(i) ABC must yield substantially different product costs than the old system.
(ii) Average closing inventories of overcosted products are greater than the
average closing inventories of undercosted products (in switch years).
(iv) Both annual costs and production are either constant or growing.
1 This problem is based on S. Dilley, F. Jacobs, and R. Marshall, “The Tax Benefits of ABC,”
Journal of Accountancy (March 1997), pp. 34–37.
Accounting and IT
Number of policies 150,000 375,000 225,000 750,000.00
Allocation % 20.00% 50.00% 30.00% 100.00%
Accounting and IT expenses ($14.00) ($35.00) ($21.00) ($70.00)
Human resources:
Policy acquisition expenses ($180.00) ($135.00) ($135.00) ($450.00)
Profit center expenses ($6.00) ($15.00) ($9.00) ($30.00)
Total labor costs ($186.00) ($150.00) ($144.00) ($480.00)
Allocation % 38.75% 31.25% 30.00% 100.00%
Human resource expenses ($15.50) ($12.50) ($12.00) ($40.00)
Given the preceding revised allocations of the investment income and expenses,
the following table presents the revised statement of operations for the three profit
centers:
b. The first point to recognize is that FMC’s business strategy involves selling three
insurance products to the same client in a specialized market niche (the Hispanic
community). FMC is selling convenience to its customers – dealing with a single
insurance agent and company to satisfy all their insurance needs. FMC offers
one-stop shopping. Also, FMC captures economies of scope in its advertising and
policy processing (selling, underwriting, claims, and accounting). It is probably
cheaper for one company to provide these transactions processing than three
separate companies. Neither allocation methodology captures these synergies.
The following table compares the profit center net incomes before taxes of
the two methodologies:
Here we see that the Home Insurance profit center is the big winner in the sense
that its net income rises by $116 million, whereas the other two profit centers
(Life and Auto) fall by $34.33 million and $81.76 million, respectively. Hence,
changing allocation methods creates winners and losers among the profit center
managers, and without corresponding changes in the compensation plans
(particularly how bonuses are calculated) wealth transfers are generated among
the three profit center managers. Changing the allocation methodology generates
influence costs when the profit center managers start lobbying for and against the
new methodology. Moreover, each profit center manager will propose a
continuous stream of “new and improved” methods for allocating the various
revenue and expense items beyond those suggested by the consultant.
The advantages and disadvantages of the two methods can be summarized
as:
Since neither method captures the various synergies, there is little reason to
change the allocation method methodology.
a. Absorption costing:
As the preceding table illustrates, the cost of high volume chains (A & B) falls
whereas the cost of low volume chains (C, D, & E) rise. The reason for this is
that in part (a) overhead is allocated based on direct labor, which varies with
volume. High volume products received relatively more overheads than low
volume products. Under ABC, overhead is allocated based on batches. Low
volume products have relatively more batches (given their smaller batch size) and
hence receive relatively more overhead than high volume products.
a. The following table presents the income statement for the two balls after
allocating the $61.429 million of overhead based on revenue.
Tilist Golf
Ball Division
Divisional Profits
ABC Overhead Allocations
In this statement, both balls are yielding positive profits. The Masters ball
reports a positive contribution of $1.9 million. But this does not account for the
likely increase in demand for Distance balls created when a Masters ball
advertisement is run. When ads for either ball are run, the ads create brand-name
recognition for the other ball and for all Tilist products.
We can say that the Ball Division is generating incremental cash flows of
$68,288,000, but cannot allocate this between the two divisions in any meaningful
way to assess the relative profitability of each ball. And even this $68,288,000
profits for the division does not capture the synergies that exist between the Ball
Division and the other Tilist divisions.
b. The first step is to use the task force analysis and develop a set of ABC
allocations for manufacturing overhead:
The next step is to recompute the net incomes of the two product lines:
c. Attaching machines was the more profitable of the two product lines in part (a),
but in part (b) the attaching machines are now losing about $17 million and the
fasteners are now making about $26 million.
d. The new methodology based on the task force’s analysis (part b) appears to
capture more accurately the consumption of the indirect costs of manufacturing
and selling and service. However, SnapOn’s two product lines are highly
interdependent. Ask the question, “What is SnapOn’s business (or strategy)?”
The answer is: “Providing fashion designers the ability to deliver high quality
garments with distinctive fasteners in a timely manner.” To do this, SnapOn must
have fasteners, attaching machines, and service — all coordinated as a seamless
operation. Moreover, SnapOn is price discriminating. They lease the machines
fairly inexpensively, and then charge high prices for the fasteners. In this way,
designers who use more fasteners pay more than designers using fewer fasteners.
It is the same strategy used by Hewlett Packard in their desk-top printers. The
printers are cheap, but the ink cartridges are expensive.
The current costing methodology allocates more of the indirect costs of
manufacturing and selling and service to the fasteners, making it appear that
fasteners are costly to manufacture. This forces the fastener line of business
manager to charge high prices for the fasteners. Likewise, the attaching machines
appear inexpensive to manufacture which allows the attaching machine line of
business manager to set lower lease prices to encourage the placement of more
machines in the field.
Hence, while the current costing methodology appears to be inaccurate, it
supports the current SnapOn strategy of price discrimination. If the new costing
Chapter 11 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2011
11-32 Instructor’s Manual, Accounting for Decision Making and Control
methodology is adopted, it will likely NUKE the exisiting SnapOn strategy of
price discrimination. SnapOn is currently profitable. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it!”
In summary, what appears to be a bad costing system in fact is perfectly
consistent with SnapOn’s strategy of price dissemination. In terms of Figure 1-3,
the performance measurement system supports SnapOn’s business strategy.
This case allows a good discussion of the problems of cost-based pricing. It also
allows students to design and implement an ABC system.
Cost-Based Pricing
The first thing to note in this case is Dyna Golf’s pricing policy of marking up
cost 35 percent and seeing if they can sell the product at that price. If they can, they try
to set higher prices. There is no attempt to set prices where marginal costs and marginal
revenues are equated, which is the profit-maximizing price. If Dyna’s product costs are
wrong then their prices are wrong. Competitors with more accurate estimates of their
costs can offer more competitive prices. Given the highly aggregated nature of their
overhead cost allocations, Dyna doesn’t know if they are making or loosing money on a
product.
Peter Drucker describes the problems with cost-driven pricing as:3
“Most American and practically all European companies arrive at
their prices by adding up costs and then putting a profit margin on top.
And then, as soon as they have introduced the product, they have to start
cutting price, have to redesign the product at enormous expense, have to
take losses – and, often, have to drop a perfectly good product because it is
priced incorrectly. Their argument? ‘We have to recover our costs and
make a profit.’”
“This is true but irrelevant: Customers do not see it as their job to
ensure manufacturers a profit. The only way to price is to start out with
what the market is willing to pay – and thus, it must be assumed, what the
competition will charge – and design to that price specification.”
Not only is Dyna ignoring marginal revenue information (they do not know the
price elasticity of demand), they also are not taking advantage of any cross elasticities of
demand among their products. For example, are consumers more likely to purchase a
Dyna wedge or putter if they already own a Dyna driver? If this is the case, driver prices
should be lowered to sell more, thus eventually increasing the sales of wedges and
putters.
2 This case is based on J Shank and V Govindarajan, “The Perils of Allocation Based on Production
Volumes” Accounting Horizons (December 1988), pp. 71-79
3 Peter F. Drucker, The Five Deadly Sins,” The Wall Street Journal (October 21, 1993).
Given the overhead rate is 757 percent of direct labor dollars, each product’s cost and
product profitability can be calculated as:
The proposed system causes drivers’ costs to fall, but raises the costs of wedges
and putters. However, Phil Meyers’ improvements might not accurately capture all the
costs of making clubs as revealed in an ABC analysis, presented next.
Given the preceding ABC cost allocations for each overhead account, ABC
product costs are:
Selling Prices:
Target $162.61 $134.09 $81.31
Actual $162.61 $125.96 $105.70
From this table we can begin to see why Dyna has not been able to maintain the
price of wedges. The cost of wedges is lower than Dyna believed. If ABC product costs
are representative of our competitors’ costs, then the additional price competition on