Title Thirteen  “Defamation” is the proper term for libel as used in
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR Art. 353.
Chapter One. Libel
Section One. Definition, forms and punishment of this
crime
Article 353. Libel
Article 354. Requirement for publicity
Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar
means
Article356. Threatening to publish and offer to
present such publication for a compensation
Article 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred
to in the course of official proceedings
Article 358. Slander
Article 359. Slander by deed
Section Two. General Provisions
Article 360. Persons responsible
Article 361. Proof of the truth
Article 362. Libelous remarks
Chapter Two. Incriminatory Machinations
Article 363. Incriminating innocent persons
Article 364. Intriguing against honor
Article 353. Definition of Libel
A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstances tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead.
Elements:
1. There must be an imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance;
2. The imputation must be made publicly;
3. It must be malicious;
4. The imputation must be directed at a natural
or juridical person, or one who is dead;
5. The imputation must tend to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed.
There must be a defamatory imputation. The
imputation may cover:
a. crime allegedly committed by the
offended party;
b. vice or defect, real or imaginary, of
the offended party; or
c. any act or omission, condition,
status of, or circumstance relating
to the offended party.
 “Libel” strictly is a defamation committed by means
of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph …. or any similar means.
 When the defamation is oral, it is called “slander”.
 Seditious libel is punished not in this chapter but in
Art. 142 (Inciting to sedition).
 Test of defamatory character of words used: A
charged is sufficient if the words are calculated to
induce the hearers to suppose and understand that
the person against whom they were uttered was
guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach
his honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold him up to
public ridicule.
 The meaning of the writer is immaterial. It is
not the intention of the writer or speaker, or the
understanding of the plaintiff or of any hearer or
reader by which the actionable quality of the
words is to be determined, but the meaning that
the words in fact conveyed on the minds of
persons of reasonable understanding, discretion
and candor, taking into consideration the
surrounding circumstances which were known to
the hearer or reader.
 ELEMENT 1: IMPUTATION
Examples:
* Imputation of a vice  imputing upon a person
lascivious and immoral habits in an article
* Imputation of an act or omission  “X borrows
money without intention to pay, she had her breasts
augmented without paying the doctor”
* Imputation of condition, status or circumstance 
calling another a bastard or mangkukulam
 ELEMENT 2: PUBLICATION
 Publication is the communication of the
defamatory matter to some third person or persons.
 Hence, sending a latter in a sealed envelope
through a messenger is not publication. But sending
to the wife, a letter defamatory of her husband, is
sufficient publication. (The person defamed is the
husband and the wife is already considered a 3 rd
person)
If the defamatory imputation is not published there
is NO crime. The law permits us to think as badly as
we please of our neighbors so long as we keep our
uncharitable thought to ourselves.
 ELEMENT 3: MALICE
 Malice is used to indicate that the offender is
prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks
merely to injure the reputation of the person
defamed.
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 Malice may be in-fact or in-law.
 Malice in fact
- must be proved by a showing of ill-will, hatred or
purpose to injure
 Malice in law
- is presumed from a defamatory imputation  proof
of malice is not required
 (The distinction exists for purposes of determining
WON there is defamation where privileged
communication is involved thus:) As a general rule,
malice in law is presumed from a defamatory
imputation. But where privileged communication is
involved, malice (in law) is NOT presumed  the
plaintiff must prove malice in fact. In either case,
where malice in fact is present, justifiable motives
cannot exist and the imputations become actionable.
ELEMENT 4: IDENTIFICATION
 It must be shown that at least a 3 rd person could
identify the offended party as the object of the
libelous publication.
 But libel published in different parts may be taken
together to establish the identification of the offended
party.
ELEMENT 5: DISHONOR, DISCREDIT, CONTEMPT
 Dishonor – disgrace, shame, ignominy
Discredit – loss of credit or reputation; disesteem
Contempt – state of being despised
There are as many offenses as there were persons
defamed (PP vs. Del Rosario). When the alleged
slanderous utterances were committed on the same
date and at the same place, but against two different
persons, the situation has given rise to two separate
and individual causes for prosecution, with respect to
each of the persons defamed.
Mercado vs. CFI
Petitioner was charged with libel for imputing to Mrs.
Virginia Mercado acts constituting enrichment thru corrupt
practices. The offensive telegram which contained the
allegations was addressed to the Secretary of the,
Department of Public Works and Communications
purportedly in line with President Marcos' appeal to the
public to give information on undesirable employees in the
government service to achieve the objectives of the New
Society. He filed an MTD on the ground of the telegram
being privileged communication. After the same was
denied, a MTQ, alleging that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, was filed but when the same again
met with a denial, the present action was instituted to
annul the aforesaid orders. Respondents, in their
Comment, stressed there was absence of any privilege,
there being malice and bad faith, petitioner having been
motivated by vengeance and ill-will in making the said
communication as established by his previous conduct viz a
viz the private respondent: the filing of several complaints,
both administrative and criminal aimed to malign her good
character and reputation which were subsequently
dismissed or closed for lack of merit and/or insufficiency of
evidence.
HELD: Petition dismissed. Qualified privilege
communication may be lost by proof of malice. The
prosecution should be given the opportunity of proving
malice in view of petitioner's conduct towards private
respondent which casts doubt on his good faith.
Agbayani vs. Sayo
Mahinan, manager of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the GSIS
at Cauayan, Isabela, file at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a
complaint for written defamation against 4 subordinates.
The 4 accused filed a MTQ, contending that the CFI Nueva
Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The proper venue of Mahinan’s criminal action
against the petitioners is the CFI Isabela, since as GSIS
branch manager, he was a public officer stationed at
Cauayan, Isabela and that alleged libel was committed
when he was in the public service.
Newsweek vs. IAC
An article entitled “An Island of Fear ” was published in
Newsweek. The author wrote that the island province of
Negros Occidental is a place dominated by big landowners
who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid
sugarcane laborers, but also brutalized and killed them
with impunity. The sugarcane planters instituted a class
action for libel.
HELD: To maintain a libel suit, a victim must be
identifiable. Defamatory matter which does not reveal the
identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast
affords no ground of action unless it can be shown that the
readers of the libel could have identified the personality of
the individual defamed. Defamatory remarks directed at a
group of persons is not actionable unless the statements
are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for the victim to
be identifiable.
Lacsa vs. IAC
Lacsa and Marquez were officers of the Philippine
Columbian Association. Lacsa uncovered a glitch in the
qualification of Marquez to be president. He addressed a
letter to Marquez in the ff. tenor: that Marquez should step
down from the presidency, because the position is open
only for proprietary members and Marquez has failed to
show any proof of his proprietary membership, that in view
of these, he has been holding the position in a de facto
capacity. This letter was published in the publication of the
association.
HELD: The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a
sentence into component phrases with the meticulous care
of the grammarian or stylist, but the import conveyed by
the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader. The
SolGen is correct in holding that the imputation of being
called a de facto president is tantamount to being
acknowledged as a pretender or impostor.
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 Soriano vs. IAC
Soriano’s criminal liability was based on an article
published in “The Guardian”, of which he is the editor. The
basis of the article was a press release prepared in
Tacloban and delivered to various newspapers. The
intended circulation of “The Guardian” is nationwide. The
libel case was docked at the RTC Leyte. Soriano filed a
MTQ on the basis of improper venue. He argues that the
Leyte court had no jurisdiction because the publication
house of “The Guardian” was located in Quezon City and
that Tantuico also holds office in QC.
HELD: Local jurisprudence follow the “multiple
publication” rule – that each and every publication of the
same libel suit constitutes a separate offense, and warrants
a separate cause of action for filing a libel suit. However,
the publication requirement set forth by RPC360 refers to
the “publication” (the official circulating organ) and not
the “press release”. In harmonizing RPC360 with the
“multiple publication” rule, the “press release” is not the
document to be examined. Since the official publication is
produced in QC and was not proven to have been
produced/copied in Leyte or elsewhere, the trial should
have been handled by a QC court.
Bulletin vs. Noel
The article contained statements to the effect that
American influence was a significant driver of the political
ascendancy of the Mindalanos of Lanao. Complainants
claimed this was an insulting statement that damaged the
social standing of the clan.
HELD: The published work alleged to contain the libelous
excerpt must be examined and viewed as a whole. Titles of
royalty and nobility are not generally recognized or
acknowledged socially in the national community. Personal
hurt or embarrassment, even if real, is not automatically
equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation
protects the interest of a person in acquiring, retaining,
and enjoying a reputation as good as one’s character and
conduct warrant in the community. It is the community
standards, not personal or family standards, that a court
must refer in evaluation a publication claimed to be
defamatory.
Santos vs. CA
The article published was a verbatim copy of a complained
filed by Sandejas with the SEC against the brokerage firm
of Carlos Sison.
HELD: The public article is but a faithful reproduction of a
pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. There are no
embellishments, wild imputations etc. calculated to
damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose
them to public contempt. No valid cause of action to
institute an action for libel exists.
Sazon vs. CA
HELD: When the imputation is already held defamatory,
malice on the part of the defendant (malice-in-fact) need
not be proved because the law already presumes that the
imputation is malicious (malice-in-law).
Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts
of public officers which are related to the discharge of
their duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves
that truth of the imputation (thus a form of privileged
communication), but any attack on the private capacities
of a public officer clearly beyond the scope of his official
duties may constitute libel.
Even if the article falls under the cloak of privileged
communications, it will not discount the fact that he wrote
the same with malice, due to grudges an ill-will attendant
in the circumstances surrounding the facts.
Vasquez vs. CA
HELD: If the defamatory statement is made against a public
official with respect to the discharge of his official duties
and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the
accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he
doesn’t prove that the imputation was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. (Because, upon proof of
truth, the burden of proving that the offender acted with
malice would be on the public officer)
Actual Malice Rule – Even if the defamatory statement is
false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that the
statement was made with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Navarette vs. CA
Petitioner claims that private respondent alluded to him
when she said the words "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers",
and "plunderers" while testifying on the Deed of Sale with
Right of Repurchase subject of a civil case. In her Answer,
private respondent cited decisions of the Supreme Court to
the effect that no action for libel or for damages may be
founded on utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings.
HELD: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings
are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains
regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of
malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to
the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. Thus, the
person making these statements such as a judge, lawyer or
witness does not thereby incur the risk of being found
liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages.
The statements made during the course of judicial
proceedings enjoy the shield of absolute privilege. The
privilege is not intended so much for the protection of
those engaged in the public service and in the enactment
and administration of law, as for the promotion of public
welfare, the purpose being that members of the
legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses
may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal
prosecution or an action for damages. In determining the
issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial
proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by
resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy.
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Without question, the use of blatantly defamatory language
like "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers" in
describing the adverse parties detract from the honor and
dignity that befits a court proceeding and should have been
stricken out of the records.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that the
terms used by the private respondent in her pleading and in
her testimony cannot be the basis for an award of moral
damages and attorney's fees in favor of petitioner.
Jalandoni vs. Drilon
Respondents here were accused of printing libelous matter
in newspapers. The matter pertained to actions by
Jalandoni as member of the PCGG alleged to be illegal and
unauthorized (sold certain shares of a company at
undervalued prices to RCBC thereby defrauding the
government). Justice secretary reversed the findings of
prosecutors and dismissed the complaints.
HELD: Articles are not libelous. Articles merely stated
insinuations on the deal between RCBC and Jalandoni as
part of the PCGG. It just served to inform the public of
irregularities in the transaction. In libels against public
officers, to be liable, libel must relate to official conduct,
even if the statement is false, unless officer proves that it
was made with actual malice (with knowledge that it was
false or not).
Borjal vs. CA
Borjal wrote a series of articles in his column about a
certain “Edsa hero who is organizing conferences and
seminars and soliciting money in the name of the President
and DOTC secretary without the latter’s consent and
authority. Wenceslao filed a case for libel saying that he
felt alluded to in the articles as the organizer and that he
was almost certain that it was him.
HELD: No libel. In libel, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable even if not actually named. It is not sufficient
that the victim himself made the identification, but it is
necessary that at least the victim be identifiable by a 3 rd
person.
CAB, no sufficient identification. Victim was not named,
there were many Edsa heroes and many organizers of the
seminars. And even the victim was not absolutely sure that
it was him being alluded to.
Fortich vs. Galleron
Fortich is a salesman of San Miguel. His supervisor Galleron
suspected him of misappropriating the collections he
received retailers and buyers, so an investigation was
conducted on the matter. Galleron submitted an inter-
office memorandum containing the results of his
investigation. The memo was addressed to the Regional
Sales Manager and contained this paragraph:
“In addition, I would like to further inform management
that S/M Stanley Fortich is an avid mahjong player and a
cockfighting enthusiast. In spite of several advices, there
seems to be no change in his lifestyle. Also, respondent had
a similar case last September 11, 1978.”
HELD: The controversial paragraph is not libelous. First,
the memo was part and parcel of the investigation on
Fortich’s non-remittance of collections. Secondly, the
memo was notcirculated or publicized, much less read by
officers of the corporation other than those involved in the
investigation or those directly supervising the petitioner's
work. More importantly, Fortich was unable to prove that
the issuance of the memo was motivated by malice.
While malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation,
there are certain exceptions to this rule. The memo falls
under the privileged communication rule. A privileged
communication is one made bona fide upon any subject
matter in which the party communicating has an interest,
or in reference to which he has a duty. In the case at bar,
Galleron, being Fortich’s supervisor, was charged with the
duty to carry out and enforce company rules and policies,
including the duty to undertake initial investigation of
possible irregularities in customer accounts. The memo
was an official act done in good faith, an honest innocent
statement arising from a moral and legal obligation which
the private respondent certainly owed to the company in
the performance of his duties.
Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA
Rafael filed an action for annulment of his marriage to
Teresita. Among the evidence presented by Rafael in the
trial court were several tape recordings of telephone
conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons.
The recordings were obtained when Rafael allowed his
friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
HELD: Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and
Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes"
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in
evidence. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same,
the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under
Rep. Act No. 4200.
People v. Ogie Diaz (2007)
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or
identifiable from the contents of the libelous article.   In
order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim
be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the
person be named.  It is enough if by intrinsic reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters
of description or reference to facts and circumstances
from which others reading the articl e may know the
person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by
extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such
person could and did understand that he was the person
referred to.  Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons laid
the rule that this requirement is complied with where a
third person recognized or could identify the party vilified
in the article.
Article 354. Requirement for Publicity
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
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justifiable notice for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1. A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral, or social duty;
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.
 The two exceptions in Art. 354 are the so-called
privileged communications. When privileged
communication is involved, malice in fact must be
proved to convict the accused.
Illustration of Art. 354: A tells C that B is a thief. The
fact is B is really is a thief, because he was previously
convicted of theft. Can it be presumed that the
imputation by B is malicious? Yes, because Art. 354
says that “every defeamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious even if it be true.”
But the presumption of malice is rebutted if A can
show (1) good intention and (2) justifiable motive for
making the imputation.
Thus, if B is applying for a position of security guard
in the store of C, brother of A, and the purpose of A is
to protect his brother from undesirable employees,
then malice cannot be presumed.
 Two kinds of privileged communication:
(1) Absolute
- not actionable, EVEN IF its author acted in bad
faith
- this class includes statements made by
members of Congress in the discharge of their
functions as such, allegations in pleadings made
by parties or their counsel, answers given by
witnesses in reply to questions propounded to
them (provided the answers are responsive and
the allegations are relevant)
- usually limited to legislative and judicial
proceedings and other acts of state
(2) Conditional or qualified
- not actionable UNLESS made with malice or
bad faith
- this class includes those communications
mentioned as exceptions in Art. 354
 RE: Par. 1 (Private communication made by any
person to another…)
Illustration: X files a complaint in good faith against a
priest to his ecclesiastical superior allegedly for taking
indecent liberties of women  private communication
in the performance of a moral duty  privileged!
 Unnecessary publicity destroys good faith. So for
example, if a copy of the complaint above is sent to a
newspaper for publication, the privilege is destroyed.
 That the statement is a privileged communication
is a matter of defense and, like all other matters of
defense, must be established by the accused.
 Tapos, if the accused sets up privileged
communication as a defense, to overcome it, the
prosecutions must prove that (1) the defendant acted
with malice in fact (because the privileged only
negates the presumption of malice in law), or (2)
there is no reasonable ground for believing the
charge to be true.
Illustration of “no reasonable ground for believing the
charge to be true”: X admitted that he had personally
made no investigation with reference to the truth of
many of the statements made in the communication
to the Secretary of Justice, especially with reference
to the statements based on rumors that a judge
received a bribe for dismissing a murder case.
 RE: Par. 2 (Fair and true report of official
proceedings…)
 Defamatory remarks and comments on the
conduct or acts of public officers which are related to
the discharge of their official duties will not constitute
libel if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation. The conduct of public officers which are
related to the discharge of their official duties are
matters of public interest, and it is a defense to an
action for libel or slander that the words complained
of are a fair comment on a matter of public interest.
What is a fair comment? If the comment is an
expression of an opinion, based upon proven facts,
then it is no matter that the opinion happens to be
mistaken so long as it might be reasonably inferred
from the facts. Comment may be fair, although
wrong.
 But any attack upon the private character of the
public officer on matters which are not related to the
discharge of their official functions, may constitute
libel. No one has the right to invade another’s privacy.
 Rule on self-defense – A person libeled is justified to
hit back with another libel. But the defamatory
statements made by the accused must be a fair
answer to the libel made by the offended party and
must be related to the imputation made. The answer
should not be unnecessarily libelous.
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Illustration: A to B, C & D: “You pimp, women of ill
repute, thieves, paramours of my husband”. B to A:
“You are a woman of the street, you smell bad, and
your money was stolen from the PCAU” + C to A “You
are shameless, blackmailer, murderer” + D to A “You
have a thick face, you are not legally married, you are
the paramour of Father Baluyut.”
Held: To repel attack, the defendant may make an
explanation of the imputation, and it is only where, if
by explaining, he must of necessity have to use
scurrilous and slanderous remarks, that he may
legally be allowed to do so without placing himself
under criminal prosecution. Here, B, C, D’s remarks
were unnecessarily scurrilous.
Article 355. Libel by Means of Writings or
Similar Means
A libel may be committed by means of -
1. Writing;
2. Printing;
3. Lithography;
4. Engraving;
5. Radio;
6. Photograph;
7. Painting;
8. Theatrical exhibition;
9. Cinematographic exhibition; or
10. Any similar means.
 Defamation through amplifier is not libel, but oral
defamation. The word ‘radio’ should be considered
in relation to the terms with which it is associated –
all of which have a common characteristic, namely,
their permanent nature as a means of publication.
 But defamation made in a TV program is libel. It
easily qualifies under the general provision “or any
similar means”.
Magno v. People (2006)
Sending an unsealed libelous letter to the offended party
constitutes publication.   In what felonies is blackmail possible? Blackmail is
Buatis v. People (2006)
Facts: One lawyer sent another an insulting letter, in
closing saying, “Yours in Satan’s name”.
Held: There is publication in this case.  In libel, publication
means making the defamatory matter, after it is written,
known to someone other than the person against whom it
has been written.  Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself
states that the same was copy furnished to all
concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his
secretary.  It is enough that the author of the libel
complained of has communicated it to a third person.
Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was
open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the
reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of
imprisonment applicable to petitioner’s case of libel. We
note that this is petitioner’s first offense of this nature.
He never knew respondent prior to the demand letter
sent   by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his
assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the
RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising
a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private
complainant. In fact, petitioner could have applied for
probation to evade prison term but he did not do so
believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed
his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in
the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for
economic usefulness and other social ends. Consequently,
we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and
instead impose a fine of six thousand pesos.
This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of
imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of
libel.  In Sazon v. Court of Appeals, petitioner was
convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of
imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition filed with us,
we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty
imposed to a mere fine.
Article 356. Threatening to Publish and Offer
to Prevent Such Publication for A
Compensation
Acts punished
1.Threatening another to publish a libel concerning
him, or his parents, spouse, child, or other members
of his family;
2. Offering to prevent the publication of such libel for
compensation or money consideration.
 Blackmail - In its metaphorical sense, blackmail
may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money
by threats of accusation or exposure. Two words are
expressive of the crime - hush money.
possible in (1) light threats under Article 283; and (2)
threatening to publish, or offering to prevent the
publication of, a libel for compensation, under Article
356.
Article 357. Prohibited Publication of Acts
Referred to in the Course of Official
Proceedings
Elements
1. Offender is a reporter, editor or manager of
a newspaper, daily or magazine;
2. He publishes facts connected with the
private life of another;
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 3. Such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue
and reputation of said person.
 The provisions of Art. 357 constitute the so-called
“Gag Law”. Newspaper reports on cases pertaining
to adultery, divorce, issues about the legitimacy of
children etc., will necessarily be barred from
publication.
 The prohibition applies even though said
publication be made in connection with or under the
pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any
judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such
facts have been mentioned.
Illustration: A uttered defamatory remarks calling a
priest a savage and that he had a concubine. While
the case was pending trial, a newspaper published
the complaint verbatim including the defamatory
expressions of A.
 RA1477 – The publisher, editor, columnist or
reporter of any periodical of general circulation
cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news
report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in confidence to such publisher etc.
unless the court or a House or committee of Congress
finds that such revelation is demanded by the security
of the State, without prejudice to the publisher’s etc.
liability under civil and criminal laws.
Article 358. Slander
Slander is oral defamation. There are two kinds of
oral defamation:
(1) Simple slander; and
(2) Grave slander, when it is of a
serious and insulting nature.
 Factors that determine the gravity of oral
defamation:
1. expressions used
2. personal relations of the accused and the
offended party
3. circumstances surrounding the case
Illustration of grave slander: “You sold the union. You
swindled the money of the members and received
bribe money in the amount of P10K…”
Illustration of simple slander: An accusation that the
offended party has been living successively and with
several men uttered before several persons, when
intended to correct an improper conduct of the
offended party, a kin of the accused, is only simple
slander.
 The slander need not be heard by the offended
party, because a man’s reputation is the estimate in
which other hold him, not the good opinion which he
has of himself.
People vs. Pelayo
Pelayo told Clapano (councilor), within the hearing of three
people, that in one of his investigations on illegal gambling,
an operator, Lim Peng, told him Almendras (governor)
received P500 from said operator as protection money. The
following day, Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in the
City Council’s session where it could be inferred that he
was referring to Almendras as a “tong collector”.
HELD: Facts of the case do NOT constitute intriguing
against honor where the source of the derogatory
information cannot be determined and defendant borrows
the same without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it
to others. The information allegedly came from a definite
source (Lim Peng) which he adopted as his, passed it to
another for the purpose of causing dishonor to the other’s
reputation. The act is slander (light oral defamation).
Victorio vs. CA
Father and son Victorio were overheard by people to have
uttered defamatory words against Atty. Ruiz after a hearing
where Atty. Ruiz moved for contempt of the counsel of
Victorio. They were found guilty of Grave Oral Defamation.
HELD: Oral defamation or slander has been defined as the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business
or means of livelihood. The special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between offended and
offender, which might tend to prove intention of offender
at the time, aside from the sense and grammatical meaning
of the defamatory words are considered as guidelines in
determining whether the offense is serious or slight.
Attributing to a prominent lawyer a crime (estafa) is a
serious and insulting imputation that strikes deep into the
character of the victim. No special circumstance need be
shown for defamatory words to be considered grave oral
defamation.
That defamatory words were uttered in the heat of anger
cannot lie where there was no reason or lawful cause to be
angry against Ruiz who was merely performing his duties
aw a lawyer in defense of client, and no provocation.
People vs. Orcullo
Judge Orcullo dismissed the case for oral defamation
against Peralta (she imputed adultery and prostitution
against Flores) on the ground that it was a private crime to
be instituted by the offended party. SC reinstated case for
trial.
HELD: The words said by Peralta are indubitably imputation
of the crime of prostitution, which can be prosecuted de
oficio and not adultery. Connotation of hostess is
notoriously referred to prostitutes. Only when derogatory
remarks clearly and categorically reflect the elements
constituting adultery would the complainant for libel by
the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution
Villanueva v. People (2006)
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The Court does not condone the vilification or use of
scurrilous language on the part of petitioner, but following
the rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the
accused must be taken in his favor, it is our considered
view that the slander committed by petitioner can be
characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that
uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with
some provocation on the part of the offended party,
constitutes only a light felony.
Figeroa v. People (2006)
While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends
on its scope, spirit and motive taken in their entirety, the
article in question as a whole explicitly makes mention of
private complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said
that the article was a mere general commentary on the
alleged existing state of affairs at the aforementioned
public market because Rivera was not only specifically
pointed out several times therein but was even tagged with
derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-calling was, as
correctly found by the two courts below, directed at the
very person of Rivera himself.
Article 359. Slander by Deed
Elements
1. Offender performs any act not included in
any other crime against honor;
2. Such act is performed in the presence of
other person or persons;
3. Such act casts dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon the offended party.
Slander by deed refers to performance of an act, not
use of words.
Two kinds of slander by deed
1. Simple slander by deed; and
2. Grave slander by deed, that is, which is of a
serious nature.
 What is slander by deed? It is a crime against honor
which is committed by performing an act which casts
dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person.
Illustrations: slapping the face of another if the
intention is to cause shame and humiliation, fighting
another with intention to humiliate him
 vs. Acts of lasciviousness
Kissing a girl in public and touching her breasts
without lewd designs, committed by a rejected suitor
to cast dishonor on the girl is slander by deed NOT
acts of lasciviousness.
 vs. Maltreatment
The nature and effects of the maltreatment determine
the crime committed. If the offended party suffered
from shame or humiliation caused by the
maltreatment, it is slander by deed.
Unjust vexation Slander by deed Acts of
lasciviousness
Irritation or annoyance
+ With publicity + presence of the
and dishonor or circumstances
contempt provided for in
RPC 335 on rape
(force or
intimidation,
unconscious etc.)
together with
lewd designs
People vs. Motita
Motita used a mirror to view reflection of private parts of
Letada. Crowd nearby were laughing with their eyes
directed towards her.
HELD: Crime committed was slander by deed.
Unjust vexation is committed when the offender’s act
caused annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment, distress or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed. If there was attendant publicity and dishonor or
contempt in addition to the irrigation or annoyance,
offense would be slander by deed as in this case. If any of
the circumstances provided for rape together with lewd
designs were present in addition to the annoyance, the
offense would be act of lasciviousness.
Article 360. Persons responsible
The persons responsible for libel are:
1. The person who publishes, exhibits or
causes the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or similar means;
2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet;
3. The editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper magazine or serial publication;
4. The owner of a printing plant which
publishes a libelous article with his consent
and all other persons who in any way
participate in or have connection with its
publication.
Venue of criminal and civil actions for damages in
cases of written defamations (In case one of the
offended parties is a private individual)
1. Where the libelous article is printed and first
published; or
2. Where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the
offense.
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 Where one of the offended parties is a public
officer, the action shall be filed in the CFI (1) of the
province or city where he held office at the time of
the commission of the offense OR (2) where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
 The civil action shall be filed in the same cdourt
where the criminal action is filed and vice versa.
 The court where the criminal action or civil action
for damages is 1st filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts.
 If the defamation consists in the imputation of a
crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio (adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of
lasciviousness), then the offended party must a
complaint.
 RE: DAMAGES recoverable
 Actual damages need not be proved, at least (1)
where the publication is libelous per se or (2) when
the amount of the award is more or less nominal,
because libel, by its nature, causes injury to the
reputation of the offended party.
 There is no remedy for damages for slander or
libel in case of absolutely privileged communication.
Article 361. Proof of the truth
In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may
be given in evidence to the court and if it appears
that the matter charged as libelous is true, and,
moreover, that it was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, the defendant shall be
acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or
omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made
against the Government employees with respect to
facts related to the discharge of their duties.
In such cases, if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
Proof of truth is admissible in any of the following:
1. When the act or omission imputed
constitutes a crime regardless of whether the
offended party is a private individual or a
public officer;
2. When the offended party is a Government
employee, even if the act or omission
imputed doesn’t constitute a crime,
provided, it is related to the discharge of his
official duties.
Illustration: A said that B, a gov’t official, was in the
habit of drinking during office hours and that he was
always in a boisterous condition. Is proof of truth
allowed in case B should file a complaint against A for
defamation? Yes. Both public interest and the good of
the service demand that a drunkard be barred from
the service. But when the imputation involves the
private life of B which is not related to the discharge
of his official duties, the offender cannot prove the
truth thereof.
Another illustration: A made several imputations
against C, a private individual, some of which
insinuated the commission of crimes and some did
not. Is proof of truth allowed? It depends. The
defendant will be allowed to prove the truth of the
imputations constituting crimes but he will not be
allowed to prove the truth of the imputations not
constituting crimes.
 DEFENSE in defamation, requisities:
1. Truth
2. Matter was published with good motives
3. For justifiable ends
 Retraction may mitigate damages. But in order to
have the desired effect, the retraction should contain
an admission of the falsity of the libelous publication
and evince a strong desire to repair the wrong
occasioned thereby.
Article 362. Libelous remarks
Libelous remarks or comments connected with the
matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354,
if made with malice, shall not exempt the author
thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a
newspaper from criminal liability.
 Thus, the author of a publication who distorts or
discolors official proceedings reported by him, or adds
comments thereon to cast aspersion on the character
of the parties concerned, is guilty of libel,
notwithstanding that the defamatory matter is
published in connection with a privileged matter.
Article 363. Incriminating Innocent Persons
Elements
1. Offender performs an act;
2. By such an act, he incriminates or imputes to
an innocent person the commission of a
crime;
3. Such act does not constitute perjury.
 This article is limited to “planting” evidence and
the like, which do not in themselves constitute false
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prosecutions but tend directly to cause false is a case of entrapment not planting of evidence. The
prosecution. conclusion is based on the following:
(1) The subpoena was illegally issued;
(2) The Motion to Quash Hold Departure Order and the
Incriminating an Perjury by making false Order of Cancellation of the Hold Departure Order were
innocent person accusation prepared and typewritten by the respondent; and
Committed by performing an The gravamen is the (3) The Money used in the entrapment operation was
act by which the offender imputation itself, falsely recovered from one of the left drawers of the respondent's
directly incriminates another made before an officer table.
Limited to the act of planting Giving of false statement
evidence under oath or making a false
affidavit, imputing to Article 364. Intriguing against Honor
another the commission of a
crime
This crime is committed by any person who shall
make any intrigue which has for its principal purpose
Incriminatory Defamation
machinations to blemish the honor or reputation of another person.
Offender doesn’t avail Words, written or spoken,
himself of written or spoken are availed of Incriminating an Intriguing against Honor
words in besmirching the innocent person
victim’s reputation Offender performs an act by Offender resorts to an
Not required Imputation must be public which he directly intrigue for the purpose of
and malicious & must be incriminates or imputes to blemishing the honor or
calculated to cause the an innocent person the reputation of another person
dishonor, discredit or commission of a crime
contempt of the aggrieved
party Defamation Intriguing against Honor
Done by availing directly of Committed by means which
spoken words consists of some tricky and
People vs. Alagao ex., gossiping secret plot

Is there a complex crime of incriminating an innocent person Slander Intriguing against Honor
through unlawful arrest? The source of the info can The source or the author of
be pinpointed and the the derogatory info cannot
HELD: Yes. The two acts imputed to the accused closely defendant, adopting as his be determined and the
followed each other, the unlawful arrest being a necessary own the information he has defendant borrows the
means to plant the incriminatory evidence. Under the obtained, passes the same same, and without
circumstances of the case, the accused had to arrest M to another for the purpose subscribing to the truth
because it was the only way that they could with facility of causing dishonor to thereof, passes it to others
detain him, search his person or effects and, commingle complainant’s reputation
therewith the marked peso bill. A complex crime was
committed. REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200

AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING

Huggland vs. Lantin
Judge Lantin was arrested for bribery for allegedly having
received marked money amounting to P5,000 from one
Magdalena Huggland who was implicated in a criminal case.
The P5,000 was allegedly part of the P25,000 being asked
by Judge Lantin for the cancellation of the hold departure
order issued against Ms. Huggland. The issue is whether
this is case of entrapment or planting of evidence.
HELD: This is a case of entrapment. Let us distinguish
entrapment from planting of evidence. In entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged
originates in the mind of the accused and the law
enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of
the offense, the accused cannot justify his conduct.
Planting of evidence or incriminating innocent person is
committed by performing an act by which the offender
directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the
commission of a crime.
From the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties, there is reason to believe that indeed, this
AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY
OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
It shall be unlawful:
a) for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described;
b) for any person, be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, (1) to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited
by this law; or (2) to replay the same for any

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other person or persons; or (3) to communicate
the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing,
or (4) to furnish transcriptions thereof , whether
complete or partial, to any other person.
Provided, That the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses,
shall not be covered by this prohibition;
c) for any person who willfully or knowingly does or
who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of
the acts declared to be unlawful or who violates
the provisions of the following section or of any
order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or
causes such violation.
It is not unlawful:
a) for any peace officer, who is authorized by a
written order of the Court, to execute any of the
acts declared to be unlawful in cases involving the
crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and
disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the
high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code,
and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other offenses against
national security: Provided, That such written
order shall only be issued or granted upon
written application and the examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce and a
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that any of the crimes enumerated
hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed:
Provided, however, That in cases involving the
offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to
sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon
prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as
the case may be, have actually been or are being
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that evidence will be obtained essential
to the conviction of any person for, or to the
solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means
readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Effect of violation of the law: Any communication or spoken
word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Gaanan vs. IAC
Atty. Pinto filed a complaint for direct assault against Atty.
Laconico. Pintor, through phone, offered to withdraw the
complaint for consideration. Atty. Gaanan was able to
overhear this conversation through a telephone extension.
Pinto was arrested for extortion. But Gaanan and Laconico
were charged with violation of RA4200 and found guilty by
the lower court.
HELD: The phrase “any other device or arrangement” in the
Anti-Wiretapping Law doesn’t cover an extension line. The
law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device
or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording the communication. There must
be the physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order
to overhear, intercept or record the spoken words. The
extension here was not installed for the purpose but for
ordinary office use. Also, an extension phone is an
instrument which is very common, not what the law refers
to in which the presence of such devices cannot be
presumed by the party being overheard.
Ramirez vs. CA
Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against Garcia. IN
support of her claim, she produced a verbatim transcript of
the confrontation with Garcia where the latter allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her. The transcription on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a
result of the recording, Garcia filed a criminal case against
Ramirez for violation of RA 4200.
HELD: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the
use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent CA
correctly concluded, even a person privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify
as a violator under the provisions of RA4200. The
lawmakers contemplated to make illegal unauthorized
taped recording of private conversation or communication
taken by either of the parties themselves of by third
persons. The nature of the conversation is immaterial for
conviction of the crime and communication as used
includes conversation.
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