Grave Oral Defamation

(DIGNA RAMOS, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 226454, November 20,
2017)
Article 358 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crimes of Serious Oral Defamation and
Slight Oral Defamation, to wit:
Article 358. Slander. - Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a
serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
In De Leon v. People (G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016, 779 SCRA 84) the Court
thoroughly discussed the nature of Oral Defamation and the parameters for classifying
the same as either Grave or Slight:
Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means,
instead of in writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory
words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood." The elements of oral defamation are: (1)
there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3)
publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or
one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of
the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It
becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the
commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or
any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor
or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of
one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used in the statement must be construed in their entirety and should be taken
in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
 understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used
and understood in another sense. It must be stressed that words which are
merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words
of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in
the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is
offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
xxxx
Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation,
depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the
utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the
social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. "The gravity
depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case,
the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In
particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger,
with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a
light felony."

There are cases where the Court considered the circumstances of the concerned
parties and held that the defamation was grave serious in nature.

In U.S. v. Tolosa (37 Phil. 166, 1917) where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive
and scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable
married lady and tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court
ruled that the crime committed was grave slander. In Balite v. People (124 Phil. 868,
1956) the accused was found guilty of grave oral defamation as the scurrilous words he
imputed to the offended party constituted the crime of estafa.
In some cases, the Court has declared that the defamatory utterances were not grave
on the basis of the peculiar situations obtaining.

In the case of People v. Arcand (68 Phil. 601, 1939) a priest called the offended party a
gangster in the middle of the sermon. The Court affirmed the conviction of the accused
for slight slander as there was no imputation of a crime, a vice or immorality. In Pader v.
People (381 Phil. 932-937, 2000) the Court ruled that the crime committed was only slight
oral defamation as it considered the expression, "putang ina mo," as expression to convey
anger or displeasure. Such utterance was found not seriously insulting considering that
he was drunk when he uttered those words and his anger was instigated by what the
private complainant did when the former’s father died. Also, in Jamilano v. Court of
Appeals (140 Phil. 524-532, 1969) where calling someone "yabang" (boastful or arrogant)
was found not defamatory, the complainant’s subsequent recourse to the law on oral
defamation was not sustained by the Court.

The slander need not be heard by the offended party

There is oral defamation, even if other persons and not the offended party heard the
slanderous words, because a man’s reputation is the estimate in which others hold him,
not the good opinion which he has of himself (People vs Clarin, C.A., 37 O.G. 1106;
People vs Atencio. C.A.-G.R. Nos. 11351-R to 11353-R, December 14, 1954).

Defenses Available in Grave Oral Defamation

1. Parameters/Guidelines
To commit the crime of defamation in general (libel, oral defamation and slander by
deed), the following requisites must concur:
(a) The writing, utterance or acts must be defamatory;
(b) It must be malicious;
(c) It must be given publicity; and
(d) The victim must be identifiable.
NOTE: the absence of one element means that the crime is not committed; hence, the
action for defamation should be dismissed.
 No defamatory imputation.
Defamatory imputation is the defamatory accusation or charge that the plaintiff alleges
is conveyed by the matter published by the defendant concerning the plaintiff. The
imputation may take the form of words, symbols, pictures, cartoon or signs. Without a
defamatory imputation, there is no libel.
Example: the reference in a magazine article to a deceased Muslim patriarch as not
belonging to a royal house and having once lived with an American family, is not
defamatory. Titles of royalty are not generally recognized in our national community
with republican and egalitarian foundation. Likewise, it is also not unusual for citizens
to live with and share in the culture or mores of foreigners.
 No actual malice
Malice indicates the presence of personal ill will or spite, or the intention to injure the
reputation of the person defamed. Malice involves an evil intent or motive arising from
spite or ill will; personal hatred or ill will; or culpable recklessness or a willful and
wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the person defamed. In a libel case it
consists in intentionally publishing, without justifiable cause, any written or printed
matter which is injurious to the character of another. Malice may be defined, insofar as
defamation is concerned, as acting in bad faith and with knowledge of falsity of
statements.
There are two kinds of malice, malice in law and malice in fact:
a. Malice in Law – every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even
if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
b. Malice in fact – the following circumstances will negate the presumption of
malice in a defamatory statement: (1) if there is good intention and justifiable for
making it is shown; (2) if the defamatory statement is a privilege communication.
However, if the plaintiff or complainant in the libel action is a public officer or a public
figure, the element of “actual malice” has a different connotation.
 No Publication
Publication refers to the dissemination of the defamatory matter to any person other
than the person injuriously affected thereby. When a public officer, in the discharge of
his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or body of officers,
who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication,
such communication does not amount to publication within the meaning of the law on
defamation. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been
written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. The
reason for such rule is that “a communication of the defamatory matter to the person
defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man’s
reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others
hold him.”
 Victim not identified
The element of identifiability means that the third person who read or learned about the
libelous matter must know that it referred to the plaintiff. In order to maintain a libel
suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be
named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify
him as the object of the libelous publication.

2. Defensive Libel
In defense of honor, a person libeled may hit back with another libel even if there is an
appreciable interval of time between the aggressive libel and the defensive libel. In
defensive libel, the means employed by the accused must be reasonably necessary to
restore his ruined reputation or honor and not just to retaliate by ruining also the
reputation of the aggressor.

3. Truth of the Libelous Statement

In libel as a rule, truth of the defamatory statement is not a defense by itself, as “every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true.” Even if the
offender is able to prove the truth of the defamatory statement, he is not relieved from
liability. By way of exceptions, proof of truth will help exonerate the author of the
defamation in the following:
A. In a criminal prosecution for libel, if the accused presents, in addition to proof of
the truth of the matter charged as libelous, good motives and justifiable ends in
publishing the matter, he shall be acquitted.
B. When the offended party is a government employee, if the defamatory
imputation is related to the discharge of his official duties, even if the imputation
does not constitute a crime, proof of truth is sufficient for acquittal. Under this
exception, it is not required for the defendant or accused to prove good motives
and justifiable ends in publishing the defamatory matter.

4. Privileged Communication
In libel law, the term privileged communication refers to statements which, though
having the elements of libel, are nevertheless accorded protection from liability due to
considerations or interests that outweigh the need for redress to the private injury
sustained by the offended party as a result of the defamatory statements.
The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the
free and unfettered administration of justice, though as an incidental result it may in
some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.
Privileged communication is of two kinds: (a) absolute, and (b) conditional or qualified.
Absolutely privileged communication.
A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author
has acted in bad faith. It is a total immunity granted on the basis of the position or
status of the author or speaker.
Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication.
The privilege consists in the removal of the legal presumption of malice arising from the
defamatory imputation contained in the two types of communication mentioned in Art.
354, RPC, which states:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. – Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
 The fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable; the
privileged character simply does away with the presumption of malice, which the
plaintiff has to prove in such a case. The privileged character is lost by proof of actual
malice or malice in fact in making the statement, or by proof of other circumstances that
have the effect of taking away the privilege.

5. Fair Comment and Opinion

It is a defense to an action for libel that the words complained of are a fair comment on
a matter of public interest. The reason for this is that freedom of speech is not only one
of the constitutional rights of a person but it is also absolutely essential to the
democratic rules under the aegis of which our libel law was evolved and wherein the
people are supposed to sit in judgment upon all public affairs.

6. Fair Criticism
The plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost
freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and
appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes
into contact. The Supreme Court in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals (314 SCRA 460, 477,
1999) quoted Justice Brandeis who wrote in Whitney v. California (247 U.S. 357
(1927)) that “public discussion is a political duty” and the “greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people.”
However, the criticism should be directed at the conduct but not at the person of the
public official.

7. Good Motives and Justifiable Ends

As stated in Art. 361, RPC, in every prosecution for libel, the accused shall be acquitted
if he is able to prove not only the truth of the matter alleged to be libelous, but also that
it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
The existence of justifiable motive is a question that has to be decided by taking into
consideration not only the intention of the author of the publication but all the other
circumstances of each particular case. Good intentions and justifiable motive constitute
a defense insofar as they negative malice.

8. Freedom of Speech and of the Press

The major purpose of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press is to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, as well as to encourage
and nurture uninhibited, robust, and wide-open self-expression, particularly in matters
of governing importance. It rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public.
These constitutional guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all the people, by giving the citizens unrestricted access to information and
views on all sides of an issue.

9. Correction or Retraction
Prompt correction or retraction may tend to indicate that an erroneous statement was
accidental, and it will therefore be admitted to help establish absence of “actual malice,”
although it is not conclusive. A retraction, in order to operate as an effective check upon
the propagation of a defamatory publication, should contain an admission of the
incorrectness of the libelous publication and evince a desire to repair the wrong
occasioned thereby. Retraction is not a complete justification but a mitigating
circumstance, and the most that can be said is that the tort was not aggravated.

Specific for Grave Oral Defamation

The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office and trade, business, or means of livelihood.
The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made
orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or
one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed.
NOTE: as mentioned, absent of one element means that the crime of grave oral
defamation is not committed. Being an element of the crime, the prosecution must
prove all the elements constituting the offense just like the crime itself.
Guidelines to be observed: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may
tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
The defamatory statement uttered constitute only of simple slander
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or
slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.