STUDIA 

ROMANA  ET  MEDIÆVALIA  EUROPÆNSIA 

Miscellanea in honorem annos LXXXV peragentis 
Professoris emeriti Dan Gh. Teodor oblata 
 
 
 CONTENTS

TABULA GRATULATORIA.........................................................................................................11 

ABBREVIATIONS ...........................................................................................................................15 

Professor Dan Gh. Teodor at 85 years ......................................................................................... 23 

Publications of Professor Dan Gh. Teodor .................................................................................29 

Doina Benea, Simona Regep

„Anonyme“ Kolonisierungen in Dakien zur Zeit Trajans
[Anonymous Colonisation in Dacia during Trajan’s Reign] ...............................................47 

Анна Болдуряну, Светлана Рябцева

О новой находке медальона провинциально-византийского круга
[On the recent discovery of a medallion in the provincial-Byzantine area].....................61 

Florin Curta
The earliest Slavs in East Central Europe? Remarks on the Early Medieval
settlement in Nova Tabla (Slovenia) ......................................................................................81 

Stella Doncheva
A bronze amulet from the teritory of Northeastern Bulgaria ..........................................99 

Andrei Gândilă
Money Talks: Financial Crisis and the Fate of the Roman Balkans, c. 582-602............... 107 

George Dan Hânceanu

An earring with star shaped pendant discovered in a dwelling from
Roșiori – Dulcești (Neamț county)...................................................................................... 141 

Ștefan Honcu, Lucian Munteanu

The Roman fibula in the hoard of Oboroceni (Heleșteni commune, Iași county) ..... 155 

Michel Kazanski
Deux appliques de selle post-hunnique provenant de Jalpug (Delta du Danube) :
parallèles et datation
[Two post-Hunnic saddle decorations from Jalpug (Danube Delta):
Analogies and Chronology] ................................................................................................... 169 

Сержиу Мустяцэ, Александру Попа

Старый Орхей и неинвазивные методы в археологии
[Old Orhei and the non-invasive methods in archaeology]............................................. 189 
George Nuțu
Live by the sword and under the shield. A note on two Late Antiquity
weapons from Aegyssus.......................................................................................................... 201 

Silviu Oța, Ernest Oberländer Târnoveanu

The hoard of medieval adornments discovered in
the Cernica Forest (Ilfov County) ......................................................................................... 221 

Nad’a Profantová
Der Beschlag von einer Spathascheide und eine Cloisonné-Schnalle aus
Mittelböhmen. Indizien für die Anwesenheit von Elitegruppen im 5. Jahrhundert?
[The fittings of a spatha sheath and a cloisonné buckle from Central Bohemia.
Indications of the presence of elite groups in the 5th century?] ....................................... 255 

Роман Рабинович
К вопросу о достоверности некоторых сведений булгарских летописей
[On the question of the reliability of certain information in
the Bulgarian Chronicles] ....................................................................................................... 277 

Ioan Stanciu
Cross-shaped signs on 6th and 7th centuries pottery ........................................................ 307 

Ioan Stanciu, Dan Băcueţ-Crișan

New investigations in the Early Slavic settlement of Badon–Doaște
(North-West Romania)........................................................................................................... 355 

Cristina Paraschiv-Talmațchi
Early medieval belt decorations discovered in southern Dobruja ................................. 387 

Gabriel M. Talmaţchi
Découvertes monétaires byzantines dans le quartier sud de
Tropaeum Traiani (secteur C)
[Byzantine coin finds in the South quarter of Tropaeum Trajani (C Sector)] .............. 405 

Eugen S. Teodor
Mapping change in the Romanian Plain along the 1st millennium,
until the 7th century AD .......................................................................................................... 431 

Valeri Yotov
Data about Northmen’s presence in the Lower Danube Area....................................... 467 
 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS, C. 582-602

Andrei Gândilă

Abstract: Historians have long regarded Maurice Tiberius as the last Roman
emperor who struggled to restore the stability of the Balkan provinces. This essay
argues that a major financial crisis is responsible for the downfall of Maurice and
the collapse of the Danube frontier after 602. Maurice inherited a depleted treasury
and a war conducted on two fronts, in the Balkans and the East. A careful analysis
of the emperor’s monetary policy during his long reign reveals a chronic shortage of
cash, which the emperor tried to solve through a series of unsuccessful reforms. The
body of coin finds from the Northern Balkans shows an abrupt decline in the coin
supply during the second decade of Maurice’s reign, when Roman armies were once
again active in the Danube region. The state’s inability to provide adequate supplies
and regular payments to the soldiers led to the mutiny of 602. The emperor’s decision
to force his army to spend the winter in enemy territory was simply the last straw that
broke the soldiers’ loyalty to the emperor.
Keywords: Maurice Tiberius, Thracia, Illyricum, limes, donativa, overstriking, follis,
solidus.

Introduction

“Precipices of dangers surround me; the emperor’s command is hard to escape;

it is both impossible to oppose and even harder to obey. An avaricious manner brings
forth nothing good; avarice is the citadel of evils”.1 This desperate speech attributed by
Theophylact to Petrus, the emperor’s brother and commander of the Balkan army
during the fateful autumn of 602, synthesizes the popular opinion on Maurice’s
personality. His reputation had gone from bad to worse in the years immediately

 University of Alabama in Huntsville, History Department, USA; andrei.gandila@uah.edu.

1
Theophylact VIII, 7.2 (trans. Whitby).

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 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS

preceding the mutiny of the Danubian army, as the emperor allegedly refused to
ransom the Roman prisoners held by the Avars and failed to provide famine relief
during a severe shortage of food in Constantinople.2 The population was so enraged
that Maurice had to endure a public humiliation being greeted in the street with
insults, including the stinging “Maurice the Marcianist” on the eve of his deposition.3
Although Maurice enjoys a much more sympathetic assessment in modern
historiography, the extent of the financial hardship during the last two decades of the
6th century remains poorly documented. Through an analysis of Maurice’s monetary
policy, this essay attempts to shed new light on the emperor’s decisions and their
consequences for the future of the Balkan provinces. The numismatic corpus of finds
from the Northern Balkans will provide additional insight into the state of the frontier
region and the transdanubian Barbaricum during a time of profound uncertainty.
The reign of Maurice marks the end of the ancient world order and brought
sweeping cultural transformations to which Professor Teodor has devoted a lifetime
of research.4 Far from being a miserly ruler, Maurice was a pragmatist who consciously
sacrificed his reputation to restore the health of the state finances. Although he failed
to devise a long-term solution, his dangerously unpopular reforms indicate that few
alternatives were available at the time. In retrospect, the Balkan disaster sealed the fate
of the Eastern Roman Empire as the mutiny of Phocas triggered a final and devastating
conflict with Persia, followed immediately by the rise of the Caliphate whose rapid
expansion swept through the ashes of the two great ancient empires.

2
Theophylact VIII, 4.11-13, for the famine; Theophanes, A.M. 6092, following John of Antioch V,
218b, for the prisoners. Theophylact does not mention the prisoner crisis; this is either a
deliberate omission or a mere rumor which the Byzantine historian found too slanderous to
mention. This is a source of skepticism for WHITBY 1988:123, although KAEGI 1981: 109-110
gives credibility to the accusation.
3
Theophanes, A.M. 6094; Theophylact VIII, 9.3; GRAEBNER 1982: 181-188. Marcianist heretics
argued against helping the victims of barbarian attacks and against charity in general; such an
attitude displayed by Maurice enraged the conservative Christian population used to acts of
imperial charity and the prompt ransoming of prisoners, well documented in the 6th century
Balkans; see, for instance, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Novella CXX, Cap. 9 and Novella LXV.
4
For the use of numismatic sources, see especially TEODOR 1997.

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 Andrei Gândilă

The Balkans under Maurice

In the Balkans the Empire faced imminent dangers from the Avars settled in
Pannonia and the Slavic tribes living north of the Lower Danube frontier.5 When
Maurice acceded to the throne the Slavs had already been ravaging the Balkan
provinces for several years, a loot and plunder spree that would continue unabated
until 584.6 In the Western Balkans the strategic fortress of Sirmium fell in 582 and
northern Illyricum became once again Achilles’ Heel in the defense of the Balkans after
the Avars gained a strategic bridgehead across the Danube and control over the Sava
valley.7 At least two armies were required for the protection of the Danubian
provinces, but the emperor struggled for an entire decade to patch together the
semblance of a defensive force by transferring troops from Armenia and Italy. This had
been a serious issue since Tiberius II’s aggressive recruiting policy in the region in the
mid-570s when the eastern campaign placed heavy demands on the imperial
resources.8 With the Persian front taking precedence, the 580s turned out to be a
disastrous decade for the Balkans.9 Indeed, the region had not been in such a
vulnerable position since the Ostrogothic threat, if not further back to Attila’s Huns.
In 583 the Avars launched a powerful offensive meant to suppress the Roman
defenses in Northern Illyricum and further east into the Thracian diocese. While
Maurice was celebrating his consulship, the Khagan wintered in the vicinity of
Anchialus forcing the emperor to raise the tribute to 100,000 solidi. In 584/5 the
Romans had to deal with another devastating series of Slavic incursions into a region
already suffering from the consequences of the recent Avar onslaught. The fact that
the Slavs advanced all the way to the Long Walls indicates that Maurice could not rely
on any troops to maintain order in the Balkans and keep the invaders at a reasonable
distance from the capital. Although the Slavic danger in Thrace was reduced by a
counteroffensive led by Comentiolus, the Roman weakness would have been readily

5
For the chronological reconstruction of events during the reign of Maurice, see LIEBESCHUETZ
2007: 117-129; CURTA 2001b: 90-107; WHITBY 1988: 142-165.
6
John of Ephesus VI.25.
7
In the 6th century Sirmium passed from the Goths (504), to the Gepids (536), the Romans (567),
and finally to the Avars (582).
8
Evagrius V.14.
9
Described as a “disaster” at LIEBESCHUETZ 2007: 117-120. However, his statement that “the
whole line of Danube fortresses had been lost” appears exaggerated in light of the numismatic
evidence, for which see MADGEARU 2006: 167, Fig. 5.

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 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS

apparent and the emboldened Slavs soon turned their attention to the rich provinces
of Macedonia and Greece. Thessalonica, the second largest city of the empire, was
assaulted in 586 and many Greek cities suffered as testified by the literary,
archaeological, and numismatic evidence.10
The situation was desperate enough for the emperor to order the construction
of a defensive line beyond Adrianople whose purpose was to protect Constantinople
(586). “Maurice’s Ditch” did nothing to protect the Danubian provinces and it also
turned out to be insufficient for preventing enemy access into the capital’s
hinterland.11 However, it remains indicative of the emperor’s defense strategy and
inability to take the military initiative in the Balkans during the 580s. In 586/7 the
Avars launched an offensive eastward which led to the fall of frontier fortresses in
Dacia Ripensis, Moesia II, and Scythia.12 After sacking Tropaeum the Avars turned
south towards Marcianopolis and wintered in Dobrudja, encouraged by the Empire’s
passivity. Fearing a direct attack on Constantinople, Maurice transferred troops from
Italy and Armenia for a counteroffensive in 587. Local recruits of dubious quality
joined an otherwise large army led by Comentiolus in an attempt to outmaneuver the
Avars and force them to abandon their campaign. The Roman general succeeded in
stabilizing the situation in the eastern Balkans, but the Illyrican provinces remained
exposed and vulnerable to Avaro-Slavic attacks, while the Roman defensive position
in Moesia Prima was in the danger of being completely shattered. In 588 the Avars
invaded Thrace once again with the intention of threatening Constantinople and
conquered Anchialus. It is not clear whether the Khagan seriously hoped to conquer
the Byzantine capital or was simply looking to extort more money knowing that the
emperor’s prestige could be seriously bruised by his inability to secure the city’s
immediate hinterland.13 In any case, Maurice bought the Avar retreat with eight
kentenaria of gold (57,600 solidi).14

10
CURTA 2011: 16-18, for the events and Ch. 2-3 for the evidence.
11
This “Maginot Line” was easily by-passed by the Avars in 588; WHITBY 1988: 155.
12
MADGEARU 1996: 43-47. For the archaeological evidence from the Danube region, see
ALADZHOV 2016: 259-277.
13
The emperor’s standing had already been shaken by the recent events; see Michael the Syrian
X.21. The Khagan’s defying act of donning the robes of empress Anastasia dedicated to a church
in Anchialus was a symbolical act of exposing the emperor’s weakness by mocking imperial
authority: “whether the emperor likes it or not, this is what royalty has bestowed on me” (Fr.
trans. Chabot). It is perhaps for this reason that Maurice made an equally symbolical trip to
Anchialus two years later, where he remained for fifteen days; Theophylact VI, 3.5.
14
Michael the Syrian X.21. Theophylact (VI, 5.16) only mentions a “small sum”.

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 Andrei Gândilă

Despite some Slavic incursions there was much less military activity in the
Balkans from 589 to 593. No doubt the Khagan was aware of the latest developments
on the eastern front where the war had turned into Maurice’s favor. In 591 peace was
restored in the east on the emperor’s terms and Maurice could celebrate what would
turn out to be his finest achievement. In one of the greatest diplomatic feats of Late
Antiquity, Maurice carried out his plan brilliantly and recovered much of the losses
suffered in the previous decades. Most importantly, he restored Byzantine prestige in
the East and established a paternalistic relationship with the Persian monarch which
remained undisturbed until the emperor’s death. Unfortunately for the fate of the
Balkans, when Maurice finally turned his attention to his northern provinces the seeds
of destruction had already been deeply planted into the fragile Danubian frontier.15
Still, the Avars remained relatively quiet anticipating a massive transfer of experienced
Roman troops from the eastern front to the Balkans.16 Indeed, the campaign led by
Priscus in 593 reestablished some Roman control on the Danube. For the first time in
six decades the Romans took the military initiative and crossed north of the Danube
to attack the Slavs.17 Following the tactics described in the Strategikon, the Roman
army ravaged the Slavic lands and took significant booty, one that Maurice seemed
particularly anxious to receive.18 The Lower Danube was further secured by another
campaign led by Petrus, the emperor’s brother, in 595.
Having achieved some measure of stability in the Thracian diocese the Romans
could once again focus on their most vulnerable area in Moesia I.19 Without the ability
to strike a decisive blow, the defensive activity of the Roman army forced to maneuver
across the Balkans was bound to achieve only limited success. In 597 the Avars took
advantage of another Roman retreat to launch an eastward campaign which led them
to Tomis on the Black Sea coast where the army of Priscus remained trapped for
months. Further maneuvering offered the Avars another opportunity to threaten
Constantinople knowing that the emperor would be forced to buy them off with gold.

15
For an overview of the events during this decade, see recently DELGADO 2016: 457-472.
16
Theophylact V, 16.1.
17
The last Roman campaigns north of the Danube had been led by Chilbudius in the early 530s,
for which see Procopius VII, 14.3-6.
18
On dealing with the Slavs, see Strategikon XI.4. On spoils of war, see SHLOSSER 1994: 102-107.
At least in the Middle Byzantine period the custom was for the emperor to receive one-sixth of
the booty from his victorious army as a token of loyalty; for a discussion, see KAEGI 1981: 105.
19
For Early Byzantine fortifications in Danubian Illyricum, see ŠPEHAR 2012: 46-51. For coin
circulation in this region under Maurice as evidence of continued occupation, see IVANIŠEVIĆ
2010: 450.

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The presence of the eastern army in the Balkans was clearly intimidating to the Khagan
who seemed content to extract as much money as possible from the emperor.
Furthermore, the Khagan officially accepted the Danube as the natural frontier
between Romans and Avars, a clear sign of weakness.20 That Maurice was not happy
with the arrangement is made clear by the swift preparations for another offensive in
599.21 After a very long time we find two different Roman armies operating in the
Balkans, led by Comentiolus and Priscus, respectively, with the goal of spreading panic
into the heartland of the Avar power on the Middle Danube.22
In 602, when Maurice ordered the army to spend the winter in enemy territory
north of the Danube, the Empire seemed to be in the best military position since the
age of Justinian, with an Avar confederation on the verge of collapsing, its soldiers
defecting to the Romans, and a fragmented Slavic world in disarray after the recent
campaigns. Yet, in retrospect the presence of an experienced Roman army in the
Balkans since 592 did not produce the desired impact. It took seven years before the
first real tour de force could be set in motion in the Danube region and the results were
more important for bolstering the army’s morale and curbing Avar ambition. Without
a decisive victory against the northern barbarians, the emperor’s capital of prestige
gained after the success recorded in Persia was growing thin. The mutiny of 602 did
not occur contrary to the course of the war, nor was it an unfortunate tragedy; it took
shape in the context of a deep financial crisis which plagued Maurice’s Balkan decade,
a topic to which we will now turn.

Financial crisis and the fall of the Danube frontier

Maurice’s monetary policy and the state of the imperial finances during his
reign remain poorly understood. By relying mostly on written sources it is sometimes
assumed that no monetary decline existed during the last decades of the 6th century;
furthermore, it has been argued that the shortage of cash experienced by Maurice at
the beginning of his reign was overcome after the war was successfully concluded in

20
Theophylact VII,15.14.
21
This could have included a military alliance with the Burgundian Franks who requested money
to attack the Avars, but Maurice declined the offer; Theophylact (VI, 3.6-8) records the
emperor’s diplomatic response, but it is likely that he did not trust their intentions.
22
The Romans took prisoners and booty; Theophylact VIII, 3.15 (3,000 Avars, 8,000 Slavs, and
6,200 other barbarians); Theophanes, A.M. 6093 (3000 Avars, 800 Slavs, 200 Gepids, and 2000
other barbarians).

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 Andrei Gândilă

the East.23 The numismatic evidence shows that such assumptions can be misleading.
Three aspects can provide important insight into this question: annual fluctuations in
the supply of bronze coinage to the Danube provinces, the general output of the
imperial mints, and the practice of overstriking old coinage.
Excavations and general surveys conducted in the Northern Balkans have
yielded some 800 single finds of copper coins and 40 gold coins issued under Maurice,
as well as more than 20 hoards of copper and/or gold coins concealed in the Danubian
provinces (Fig. II; Table 1). We are best informed about finds from the provinces of
Scythia and Moesia II in the North-Eastern Balkans, a region with a high density of
settlements well studied by Romanian and Bulgarian scholars (Fig. I).24 A comparative
analysis of the two decades of Maurice’s reign, conveniently divided by the end of the
Persian war in 592, affords the first striking observation.25 Since the Balkans became
the main theater of operations from 592 to 602 we would expect to see a reflection of
this effort mirrored in the numismatic corpus of finds collected from the Danube
region. Yet, the opposite is true. Finds from 582-592 are overwhelmingly dominant in
the northern Balkans, with an average around 80% of the coinage issued under
Maurice (Fig. VI). The same pattern seems to apply to the southern provinces of the
Thracian diocese as well.26 The disparity appears to be higher in fortresses defending
the Lower Danube frontier, some of which did not fully recover after the destructions
from the 580s.27 However, the situation is somewhat uneven as several fortresses
continued to receive coinage in sufficient quantity in the 590s, perhaps having been

23
SHLOSSER 1994: 136-139. For an optimistic assessment, see also WHITTOW 1996: 59-
61.
24
The population of Dobrudja in Late Antiquity was estimated at c. 650,000-800,000, for which
see ZAHARIADE 2006: 140. For the numismatic evidence, see GÂNDILĂ 2003-2005;
GÂNDILĂ 2008; CUSTUREA 2004-2005; MIHAYLOV 2010; recent finds at CUSTUREA,
CLIANTE 2006; CUSTUREA 2008; CUSTUREA 2012.
25
For a similar observation based on finds from Moesia II, see MIHAYLOV 2014: 479.
26
TENCHOVA 2012.
27
Examples include Dinogetia and Troesmis, where coin circulation stops before 592; see
MITREA 1974: 69, no. 64 (591/2); CUSTUREA 2008: 545, no. 206 (591/2). In other cases, coin
circulation resumed in the first decade of the 7th century although coin finds are missing for the
second half of Maurice’s reign, at Hârșova (Carsium): VERTAN, CUSTUREA 1986: 301, no.
1100 (592/3); Murighiol (Halmyris): POENARU 2003: 155, no. 236 (588/9; next coin 601/2);
Novae: MIHAYLOV 2017: 175, no. 727 (594/5); Provadiia: LAZAROV 2001: 49, no. 35 (588/9);
Shumen: ZHEKOVA 2006: 80, no. 311 (591/2).

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 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS

less affected by the previous Avaro-Slavic invasions.28 Although we have less

information from northern Illyricum, the numismatic collection from the National
Museum in Belgrade suggests that the imbalance between the two decades of
Maurice’s reign might be even more pronounced, no doubt because of the proximity
to Sirmium and the Avar center of power on the Middle Danube.29
The monetary profile of the Balkan provinces in the last decades of the 6th
century can only be understood in the wider context of the eastern prefecture. Looking
at the larger samples available from various centers of the Early Byzantine world, such
as Sardis, Pisidian Antioch, Side, Amaseia, Antioch, Caesarea, and Gerasa, we notice
similar discrepancies between the two decades under discussion, 582-592 and 592-
602. In the cases where the situation appears to be more balanced the reason is not a
more efficient supply of coinage from the Propontic mints but a significant influence
of the Syrian mint in Antioch, whose deep monetary footprint can be felt both in Asia
Minor and in the Middle East.30 The results of this overview clearly point to a drastic
reduction in the minting activity of Constantinople, Nicomedia, Cyzicus, and
Thessalonica in the second decade of Maurice’s reign. Indeed, this is all the more
surprising as the emperor turned his undivided attention to the Balkan crisis. For a full
decade the region was accorded top priority status, the kind of attention the Balkans
never received in the 6th century from emperors who were content to keep things
under control on the Danube while concentrating their main efforts elsewhere. This
paradoxical inconsistency between the supply of coinage to the Balkan provinces

28
Capidava and Sacidava are the best examples, for which see CUSTUREA 2004-2005: 496, no.
31; CUSTUREA 2008: 542, nos. 143-144; CUSTUREA, VERTAN, TALMAȚCHI 1999: 355,
nos. 2075-2076; POENARU, OCHEȘEANU, POPEEA 2004: 99, no. 790; 114, no. 893; 115, no.
898; GÂNDILĂ 2006-2007: 118. At Capidava, the main gate and the adjacent tower were
destroyed in the early 580s, a date supported by a recent hoard, after which the fortress enjoyed
a brief recovery; see GÂNDILĂ 2017: 161-174.
29
RADIĆ, IVANIŠEVIĆ 2006: 138-141. We can add here the finds from Viminacium, for which
see IVANIŠEVIĆ 1988: 94, nos. 54-56. At Sirmium Byzantine coin circulation ends with Justin
II, for which see POPOVIĆ 1978: 185.
30
Sardis: BATES 1971: 67-78; Pisidian Antioch: DEMIREL GÖKALP 2009: 74-81; Side: ATLAN
1976: 84-86; Amaseia: IRELAND 1996: 106-107; Antioch: WAAGE 1952: 159-161; Caesarea:
EVANS 2006: 191-194; ARIEL 1986: 142-143; Gerasa: MAROT 1998: 481-483; BELLINGER
1938: 114-116.

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 Andrei Gândilă

during the two halves of Maurice’s reign is the first important sign of financial
breakdown.31
Annual fluctuations in coin supply and circulation can provide even finer
chronological details and allow a better correlation with events known from the
written record. Tiberius II left a legacy of populism and irrational expenditure.
However, if Maurice was to start off his reign on the right foot he had to show some
generosity. The consulship assumed in December 583, although the subject of gossip
surrounding the emperor’s proverbial avarice, led to significant spending.32 The
material evidence of this imperial largesse includes not only the spectacular Kyrenia
girdle, but also more mundane gifts clearly reflected in the output of bronze coinage
during that year.33 In the Balkans, regnal year 583/4 is by far the best documented in
the numismatic corpus of finds (Fig. II). The quinquennial year 587 provides the
second largest spike, the Danubian provinces continuing to be supplied with ample
coin until 590, despite the growing Avar threat (Fig. IV). If we accept that most of the
coins found in the Balkans were lost during this decade, we have to conclude that the
destructive Avaro-Slavic invasions from 583-588 and the poor defense of the region
did not lead to a complete disruption of monetary circulation.
Constantinople, Nicomedia and Thessalonica were the mints directly involved
in the payment of donative grants (Fig. III). The graph suggests that the money was
released in several installments, probably overlapping with the regular salaries as each
of these mints intensified their production in different years: Thessalonica (586/7),
Nicomedia (587/8), and Constantinople (588/9/90), with a minor contribution from
Cyzicus (589/90). The Syrian crisis of 588, well-documented in the sources, might have
been the culmination of several years of financial problems and can explain the
irregular nature of the Balkan payments. Maurice’s edict stipulated a 25% reduction in
military pay, one received with extreme hostility by the troops despite potential

31
To be sure, nothing prevented the earlier coinage of Maurice from circulating in the Balkans
and some of it may have actually arrived in the region in the 590s. However, the reduced activity
of the mints themselves during this later decade is symptomatic of a serious crisis.
32
WHITBY 1988: 18.
33
GRIERSON 1955: 55-70. In the Balkans, the Macedonian hoards labeled Stobi F and Bargala A
include a large number of coins issued in 583 for the celebration of Maurice’s consulship; see
HADJI-MANEVA 2009: 125-126, no. 18; 128-129, no. 23.

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 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS

compensation regulating the length of active service and provisions regarding the
equipment.34 Maurice clearly lacked sufficient cash to cover all his expenses.
The payment of the second donative which coincided with the emperor’s
decennalia was more modest despite the presence of the army in the Balkans. Based
on the local finds, the imperial mints could sustain only half the output realized in 583
for the celebration of the emperor’s first consulship (Fig. III). Furthermore, the central
mint in Constantinople could not even match the output of the provincial mints on
the occasion of the first quinquennial donative. Soldiers received their salaries late or
incomplete. By reducing military pay by 25% in 588, Maurice was hoping to reduce the
flow of cash and gain time in order to devise a more permanent solution as his
decennalia was drawing near and a new spike in expenditure was expected. Not only
that his second quinquennalia was far less impressive than the first, but Maurice found
himself in the position to implement a similar decree in the Balkans in 593/4. The state
budget could not sustain the offensive campaigning required to re-establish the
Byzantine position in the Balkans. An even more drastic reform, this measure
attempted to reduce the cash payment to one third and provide the remainder in
weapons and clothing.35 Although it is not clear how the soldiers received their regular
payments, it would seem that cash was the norm, gold solidi promptly converted into
copper coins for the soldiers’ daily needs.
While it is clear that the treasury was short on cash, it is difficult to determine
whether the crisis affected mostly the copper coinage or also involved the gold.
External payments such as the annual tribute paid to the Avars may have placed a
strain on the treasury, but they are unlikely to have produced such a disastrous short-
term impact.36 This is one more reason to doubt the accusation that Maurice refused
to pay 4 keratia (1 solidus = 24 keratia) for each of his soldiers held captive by the

34
Although most discussions focus on the harshness of the decree as presented by Theophylact
(III, 1.2), Whitby is correct in pointing out that Maurice would have not hoped his army to
accept this drastic measure without receiving some compensation, which can be inferred from
Evagrius VI.4; see WHITBY 1988: 286. Theophylact (VII, 1.7) is otherwise very explicit about
compensation in his description of the Balkan edict from 593/4.
35
Theophylact VII, 1.5-9.
36
Byzantine emperors continued to pay an increasingly large tribute to the Avars at least until the
siege of 626; see POHL 1988: 502; 398, n. 32. If Hendy’s estimations for the imperial budget
under Justinian (4-6 million solidi/year) are anywhere close to reality, a tribute of 100,000
solidi/year, even this late in the century, should not have threatened the financial stability of the
Byzantine state; HENDY 1985: 168-171. Similar conclusion at ILUK 2007: 86-87.

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 Andrei Gândilă

Khagan.37 From a numismatic standpoint, if there was any crisis in the issue of solidi
that would be impossible to trace because the Constantinopolitan solidi of Maurice
cannot be dated with precision within his long reign, after the 583 consulship.38 On
the other hand, an intensification in the issue of lightweight solidi may indicate that
alternative strategies were implemented in order to avoid a serious crisis; lightweight
solidi are not very common in hoards, but among single finds from the Danubian
provinces and Barbaricum light issues account for 42% of Maurice’s total number of
solidi (Fig. VIII).39
The treasury could not rely on a constant supply of metal and the cycle of
taxation was probably disrupted to the point where the circulation pool could no
longer be controlled efficiently. After the initial series of Slavic attacks in the 570s
Tiberius was forced to remit the taxes owed by certain regions in the Balkans and it is
likely that the problem only worsened during the reign of Maurice.40 After a last
moderate spike in 594/5 mint output declined sharply until 602. There are very few
coins in the northern Balkans dated between 595 and 602 at a time when the imperial
armies conducted their most successful campaigns north of the Danube.41 The

37
Theophanes, A.M. 6092. Georgius Monachus (IV, 225=PG 110, 817) later claimed that the
Khagan held 12,000 prisoners, a decidedly unrealistic figure. Even so, the ransom would have
amounted to only 2,000 solidi, which the emperor could certainly afford.
38
Hahn’s tentative dating based on the evolution of the iconography of the bust from large in the
580s to small in the 590s, although plausible, remains in the realm of numismatic speculation
in the absence of definitive hoard evidence; HAHN, METLICH 2009: 46.
39
Light solidi have been found in the Danubian provinces at Vinik (near Niš), Shumen, Constanța,
and Ulmetum and in Barbaricum at Makó-Mikócsa-halo, Nyíregyháza-Kertgazdaság,
Tiszakeszi, and Drobeta, in most cases associated with the Avars; see CRNOGLAVAC 2004:
106, no. 151; ZHEKOVA 2006: 80, nos. 299-300; VERTAN, CUSTUREA 1983: 310, no. 745;
POENARU, OCHEȘEANU 1983-1985: 193, nos. 22-23,25; OBERLÄNDER-TÂRNOVEANU
2002: 132, n. 70; SOMOGYI 2014: 238. The hoards that include light solidi of Maurice are
Provadiia and Sadovets; Trésors, no. 52, 243.
40
Novella CLXIII. Although the Balkans had never been the main supplier of taxes to the treasury,
a deeply impoverished economy could not sustain the ample military campaigns of the 590s.
For the state of the rural economy, see POULTER 2004; CURTA 2001a.
41
With the exception of the half-follis from Enisala, all the finds from these years have been
recorded in Danubian fortresses and large towns on the Black Sea coast; OBERLÄNDER-
TÂRNOVEANU, MĂNUCU-ADAMEȘTEANU 1982: 117, no. 19. Several hoards in the
Northern Balkans have a closing date between 594 and 598 and reflect the eastward offensive
of the Avars in 597-598, which led them to Tomis on the Black Sea coast (Table 1). Such late
coins are more common north of the Danube, in Barbaricum, possibly as a result of the
campaigns led into enemy territory. Finds are known from Bacău, Gogoșu, Ostrovu Mare, and
the Byzantine fortresses at Sucidava and Drobeta, for which see BUTNARIU 1983-1985: 217,
no. 11; 221, no. 104; 227, no. 60; VÎLCU, NICOLAE 2010: 307, no. 45; OBERLÄNDER-

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 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS

emperor’s second consulship in 602 coincided with his vicennalia, probably a

deliberate decision meant to reduce the expenditure.42 Although all mints issued
coinage in abundance to support these special events, very few coins arrived in the
Northern Balkans. For instance, the mint of Thessalonica whose operation was closely
connected to the military needs of the Balkan provinces issued coinage in larger
quantity than in any other year since the previous quinquennial celebration. Still, more
coins from this year can be found in distant provinces from Asia Minor and Syria-
Palestine than in the Danube region.43
The analysis of the mints supplying coinage to the Balkans can provide
additional information. The most active mint is Constantinople covering c. 50% of all
coin finds (Fig. VII). Although it did not issue any folles, the mint of Thessalonica
comes second, because of its strategic involvement in the minting of coin to support
the regular payments as well as the quinquennial largesse. Since 565 the mint output
of Thessalonica witnessed significant spikes when the ruling emperor had to provide
the customary grants which the army expected on quinquennial celebrations. This is
indirect proof of the fact that such largesse was in fact dispensed in copper coin at the
current exchange rate between the gold solidus and the copper follis. The combined
contribution of Nicomedia, Cyzicus and Antioch barely surpasses the output of
Thessalonica destined for circulation in the Danubian region. The mint of Antioch
which accounts for 5% of the finds is more of an exotic component of the local
monetary economy and some of this coinage might have been brought to the Balkans
by the soldiers transferred from the eastern front in 592. Indeed, only 26% of this
coinage is dated after 592 despite the significant output of Antioch in the decade after

TÂRNOVEANU 2002: 132, n. 70; 133, n. 72. Several other coins were found in Oltenia, the
exact finding place being unknown, for which see OBERLÄNDER-TÂRNOVEANU 2002: 133,
n. 78. The hoards from Unirea and Horgești were probably concealed in Barbaricum in the
same historical context; Trésors, no. 355, 366.
42
Maurice took the consulship in July before his upcoming vicennalia celebration (August 14);
festivities in February celebrating his son’s marriage had placed an additional burden on the
treasury; Chronicon Paschale, 693 (Bonn).
43
Only four coins have been published, found during archaeological excavations at Noviodunum,
Halmyris, Fetislam, and Justiniana Prima, for which see JANKOVIĆ 1981: 214; IVANIŠEVIĆ
1990: 264, no. 37; POENARU, NICOLAE, POPESCU 1995: 138, no. 60; POENARU 2003: 155,
no. 241. In other parts of the Byzantine world Thessalonican issues from 601/2 have been found
at Antioch, Ashqelon, Caesarea, Mount Nebo, and Salamis; see WAAGE 1952: 160, no. 2190;
SOKOLOV 2001: 217, no. 10; EVANS 2006: 191, no. 2448; LAMPINEN 1992: 172, no. 105;
KIRKBRIDE 1941: 283, no. 63; CALLOT 2004: 49, no. 333.

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 Andrei Gândilă

the restoration of peace in the east.44 In what concerns the main denominations, the
majority of the coins found in the Danube region are folles and half-folles (Fig. IX).45
Unlike the preceding decades, the number of half-folles is superior, no doubt because
of the activity of Thessalonica.46 In addition, the market economy of the Balkans, as
rudimentary as it was at the end of the 6th century, still required the availability of small
change. About 7% of Maurice’s coinage is represented by decanummia (¼ follis) and
pentanummia (⅛ follis), many of them found in large settlements on the Black Sea
coast. At Tomis, for instance, decanummia cover 15% of the sample, more than twice
the average for the Northern Balkans as a whole.47.
Finally, the practice of overstriking provides important evidence of financial
crisis (Pl. I). Overstriking is a procedure which the mint can turn to in order to produce
new coinage by re-stamping the old one cycled back through taxation and other state-
directed economic activities. It is essentially an emergency procedure of by-passing
the standard process of recycling the metal and cutting fresh blanks according to the
current weight standard. It can be prompted by the need to issue a large number of
coins very fast or it can become necessary during a shortage of metal. Both possibilities
will be explored below. Although overstriking was occasionally practiced in the 6th
century, more conspicuously at the mint of Thessalonica after 562 when Justinian’s
provincial system of denominations was replaced with standard issues, this was never
meant to become a general strategy of introducing new coins in circulation.48 An
alarming increase in overstrikes starting in the late 580s betrays a state of crisis and
confusion at the imperial mints. It is an excellent indicator of financial hardship due
to the precise dating of copper coins and can reveal fluctuations in the payment of
salaries and quinquennial grants.
Quinquennial donatives are particularly visible in the activity of the eastern
mints after the accession of Justin II. Justinian had abandoned the practice of showing
generosity on these occasions, if we give credit to Procopius’ statement in the Secret

44
WAAGE 1952: 159. In Palestine, Antioch was the dominant mint under Maurice and the
situation appears to be similar in Arabia; BIJOVSKY 2012: 288, Fig. 109; MAROT 1998: 127;108,
Table 20.
45
The gradual disappearance of lower denominations seems to be a widespread phenomenon, as
even the monetary economy of a strongly urbanized region like Palestine came to be dominated
by folles and half-folles during the reign of Maurice; see BIJOVSKY 2012:2 87-288, Table 52.
46
MIHAYLOV 2008: 280, Table 3; GÂNDILĂ 2008: 318, Table 5.
47
ISVORANU, POENARU 2003: 157.
48
GÂNDILĂ 2018: 436-441.

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 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS

History, but Justin II felt compelled to repay the loyalty of his soldiers by granting them
quinquennial donatives in 570 and 575.49 Although these were clearly occasions when
the mints were pressured to increase their output, under Justin II officials resorted to
overstriking only on a limited scale.50 Likewise, Tiberius II, who celebrated a lavish
consulship in 579 and issued consular folles on a wider flan than the current standard,
did not find it necessary to restrike some of Justinian’s large coinage in order to sustain
his unusually large expenditure.
However, overstriking became a common phenomenon documented from the
first year of Maurice’s reign (Fig. V). The emperor was clearly a pragmatist when it
came to economic matters and it is likely that the financial state of the imperial
treasury offered him no alternative. There is little evidence of overstriking recorded
for the celebration of his first consulship, a sign that the primary motivation was not
haste but a poor supply of metal and perhaps the inability to withdraw the old coinage
with sufficient regularity so as to maintain a smooth process of recycling and re-
minting. Overstriking intensified in the years preceding the first and second
quinquennial celebrations. It became more common from 589 to 592, a sign that the
financial crisis had worsened and the emperor was unable to devise a long-term
solution.51 The reform attempted in 588 ended in rebellion and the emperor’s response
was to intensify the process of overstriking. For regnal years 8-10, Constantinople and
Nicomedia were ordered to overstrike old folles, while Thessalonica overstruck some
of its older half-folles. The fact that the folles chosen for overstriking are most often
those of Justinian is not an accident. Justinianic folles were significantly larger, some
of them twice as heavy as the coinage of Maurice. The large flans were clipped down
to size before overstriking and additional metal was gained as a result (Fig. X). This is
yet another piece of evidence pointing to a crisis in the supply of metal.52 Despite its

49
For a discussion, see HENDY 1985: 646-647. On imperial donativa, see more recently
MORRISSON 2012: 25-46. Quinquennial spikes in the production of bronze coins are evident
in 570 and 575, for which see GÂNDILĂ 2009: 205, fig. B.
50
Thessalonica issued a particularly large number of overstrikes for the emperor’s decennalia
celebration in 575.
51
The best documented overstrikes are found in large collections but sometimes catalogues of
finds from the Northern Balkans mention overstruck issues from these years; see, for instance,
MITREA 1974: 69, no. 59,62; GOGU 1999-2001: 295, no. 17; POENARU, OCHEȘEANU,
POPEEA 2004: 104, no. 822. For overstrikes in public and private collections, see DOC
33e2,53c,54d; BMC 45,54; BNP 16; CEC 11.33,11.38,11.40,11.43-44,11.47,11.50,11.139-141.
52
Unfortunatelly mining in the Byzantine world remains poorly documented despite some
progress made since Vryonis’s pioneering study more than half a century ago; VRYONIS 1962;
EDMONDSON 1989; SAVVIDES 2000; LÓPEZ SÁNCHEZ 2015.

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 Andrei Gândilă

undeniable benefits, the reform of Anastasius placed a significant burden on the

imperial mints. Bronze coins weighing 18-22 g had not been issued in the Roman
world since the time of the Principate, the Late Roman economy relying on small
change. After eight decades of continuous production of large folles, marked by an
inflationary spiral under Justin II, intensive hoarding, and regular attrition, the
government could no longer sustain the same levels of mint output.53 It is not a
coincidence that the practice of overstriking initiated under Maurice became almost
a norm under Phocas and Heraclius.54 It is also not a coincidence that the scale of
overstriking diminished considerably from Heraclius to Constans II, when the size of
the follis was reduced to a fraction of its 6th century predecessor.55
Much fewer overstrikes were issued in the years preceding the third
quinquennial donative, whose scale was very reduced. In the next five years the
Propontic mints as well as Thessalonica witnessed an unprecedented low output,
facing an almost complete breakdown. Hardly any coins are known in the northern
Balkans for regnal years 598/599 and 600/601.56 It is not clear whether the monetary
economy was drifting aimlessly or Maurice’s officials deliberately reduced the activity
of the mints in order to ensure that enough coinage was issued on the occasion of the
emperor’s vicennalia and consulship in 602.57 It is equally probable that the emperor

53
40% of the 6th century hoards concealed before the accession of Maurice were lost under Justin
II and Tiberius II and that must have created a serious problem for the state’s continued ability
to supply copper coinage in sufficient quantity; see CURTA, GÂNDILĂ 2012: 96-103. The
disruption of copper mining in Illyricum may have contributed to the crisis; for Late Roman
mines in this region, see DUŠANIĆ 1995.
54
By the second decade of the 7th century most of the old 6th century coinage had been withdrawn
for overstriking; this process is reflected in the large hoards from Solomos and Sardis; Trésors,
nos.187,300. The hoard from Sofia is an exception and illustrates the growing isolation of the
Balkan provinces; Trésors, no. 229a.
55
The folles of Constans II were four to five times lighter than the large folles of Justinian. For 7th
century overstriking, see DOC II/1:218-219.
56
In Scythia only one coin from 598/9 was found, at Sacidava; POENARU, OCHEȘEANU,
POPEEA 2004: 115, no. 898. Several more finds are known from the northern bank of the
Danube, at Drobeta and Sucidava, for which see OBERLÄNDER-TÂRNOVEANU 2002: 132,
n. 70; BUTNARIU 1983-1985, 227, no. 61; VÎLCU, NICOLAE 2010: 307, no. 45. The only issue
from 600/1 known in the northern Balkans was found at Capidava, for which see GÂNDILĂ
2006-2007: 118, no. 158.
57
By taking a second consulship Maurice was probably hoping to defuse some of the tension
accumulated during the recent riots caused by a shortage of food; Theophylact VIII, 4.11-13;
5.1-4.

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 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS

was hoping to compensate with the booty taken from enemy territory.58 The successful
campaigns conducted in the last years of the century can be seen as desperate attempts
to gain resources as much as they were necessary for re-establishing the balance of
power on the Danube frontier.59 In any case, the consular year 602 witnessed the most
dramatic activity of overstriking since the reform of Anastasius in 498. Based on the
known examples from large private and public collections around 40% of the consular
(and regular) folles issued that year are overstruck.60 Several more examples can be
drawn from the corpus of finds from the Northern Balkans and the real number is
probably higher given the typical rough fabric of late 6th century Byzantine bronze
coins which sometimes conceals the undertype.61
All these facts reveal an unprecedented breakdown of the monetary economy
in the Balkans as a result of long years of warfare, neglect, and poor administration, a
severe crisis which may be too easily overlooked by emphasizing the occasional
victories against the Slavs and Avars registered by Petrus, Priscus, and Comentiolus in
the 590s. Theophylact attributed the mutiny of 602 to Maurice’s avarice and most
historians emphasize the growing tension in Constantinople and the Balkans and the
emperor’s inability to defuse it. Whitby was certainly correct in pointing out that
ordering the army to spend the winter north of the Danube was a sound strategic
decision of keeping the momentum of the campaign that had weakened the Avar
confederation and the Slavic tribes.62 However, the growing discontent in the army
camp was fueled by financial crisis and the emperor’s lack of solutions. Whatever
booty was taken during the last successful campaigns could perhaps restore the
morale, but could not replenish the state budget. Maurice’s decision to force the army
to winter in enemy territory in 602 was the last straw that broke the soldiers’ loyalty
to the emperor.63

58
Theophylact VI, 8.3-8.
59
The controversy over the proper way of splitting the spoils taken from Ardagast in 593, which
brought the Balkan army on the verge of mutiny, is a case in point; Theophylact VI, 7.6-7.
60
Out of a total of 66 coins in large collections, 26 are overstruck; see DOC 44c,109a1,109a3,109b2;
BMC 68-69; BNP 12,35-36; KOD 830,901,919; CEC 11.69-70,11.72-73,11.78,11.152. In
addition, I have recently had the privilege to study the unpublished collection of the American
Numismatic Society in New York which has twenty coins from regnal year XX-XXI, eight of
which being overstruck.
61
CUSTUREA 2004-2005: 495, no. 5, pl. I/5; RADIĆ, IVANIŠEVIĆ 2006: 138, no. 484;
POENARU, OCHEȘEANU, POPEEA 2004: 110, no. 857.
62
WHITBY 1988: 165-169. See also SHLOSSER 1994: 73.
63
For the growing discontent in the army, see KAEGI 1981: 101-119.

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 Andrei Gândilă

Conclusion

In 582 Maurice inherited an empty treasury, a state of hostility on multiple

frontiers, and a population spoiled by his irresponsible predecessor. There could
hardly be more inauspicious conditions to accede to the throne. Despite uncertainty
on all fronts, Tiberius dazzled his people with heavy consular expenditure. Having
spent all the money left in the treasury by Justin II, Tiberius was compelled to open a
strategic reserve account inherited from Anastasius.64 Maurice had few options to
replenish the treasury and could not afford to ignore the needs of the army. As an
officer himself, Maurice knew that loyalty and discipline among the rank and file rested
on a deep-seated mentality that the army had to be provided for adequately; otherwise
soldiers remained loyal to the state, but not to the commander-in-chief.65 Faced with
economic adversity, Maurice did not attempt to increase taxation lest he become even
more unpopular, but tried to achieve stability through a strategy of austerity and
discipline. In the end, Maurice cannot be accused of avarice as he acted in no way
different from any political leader forced to weather a financial crisis by imposing
austere measures. Regarding Maurice’s personality, Gregory the Great suggested that
the emperor’s intentions were rarely obvious to the ones close to him.66 While
Gregory’s usual diplomatic tone when referring to the imperial family can leave room
to multiple interpretations, it is possible that the emperor lacked the necessary
communication skills to allow his high officials, the army, and the population at large
to understand his motivations. It is, however, unlikely that the emperor failed to grasp
the unpopular implications of his measures; he simply had no choice.67 Be it as it may,
Maurice’s difficult character does not make him responsible for the crisis and we do

64
John of Ephesus V.20.
65
The tendentious remark of Michael the Syrian who claims that Maurice neglected the armies
and gave them no pay ignores the real financial crisis; so may have his generals who threatened
the emperor, according to the same 12th century historian; see Michael the Syrian X.24.
66
Registrum epistolarum III.62. Gregory the Great was close to the imperial family, being the
godfather of Theodosius, the emperor’s son and heir. The Pope’s assessment made Shlosser
conclude that Maurice was something of an “enigma even to people near him”; SHLOSSER
1994:46.
67
PREVITÉ-ORTON 1960: 203, “His fault was too much faith in his own excellent judgment
without regard to the disagreement and unpopularity which he provoked”. On the other hand,
the fact that many generals were the emperor’s relatives or favorites must have reflected poorly
on the emperor himself, who could be accused of abandoning merit in favor of nepotism.

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 MONEY TALKS: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FATE OF THE ROMAN BALKANS

not have sufficient information to argue that a number of viable solutions existed and
the emperor failed to adequately address them.
The Empire in 600 appeared to have finally achieved a point of stability and
security an all fronts, but this image can be deceiving.68 Byzantium suffered from
several chronic illnesses, the worst of which being endemic warfare, overextension,
and financial crisis. The relative calmness enjoyed in 600 was a brief lull announcing
an even greater storm which would sweep away Maurice’s hard-fought
accomplishments in the Balkans and surrender the region to new powers.69 Facing
such hardship, Maurice’s statement in defense of his spending philosophy can only be
described as wise and realistic: “I do not disperse and scatter the money, but collect
and store away, so that I may purchase peace for the state”.70 The price was paid but
peace never came.

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Fig. I. Coins of Maurice found in the Northern Balkans and

the transdanubian Barbaricum.

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SINGLE FINDS:
1. Constanța; 2. Hârșova; 3. Adamclisi; 4. Dunăreni; 5. Măcin; 6. Pecineaga;
7. Isaccea; 8. Topraisar; 9. Canlia; 10. Mangalia; 11. Rasova; 12. Histria; 13. Topalu;
14. Tufani; 15. Castelu; 16. Troesmis; 17. Ulmetum; 18. Capidava; 19. Izvoarele;
20. Lanurile; 21. Murighiol; 22. Nufăru; 23. Dinogeția; 24. Cernavodă; 25. Enisala;
26. Sălcioara; 27. Oltina; 28. Târgușor; 29. Păcuiul lui Soare; 30. Slava Rusă;
31. Niculițel; 32. Fântânele; 33. Silistra; 34. Aradac-Mečka; 35. Bacău; 36. Bârlad;
37. Buzău; 38. Caracal; 39. Čestereg; 40. Craiova; 41. Curtești; 42. Domnești;
43. Drobeta; 44. Fetești; 45. Gherla; 46. Gogoșu; 47. Goicea; 48. Hoghiz-Ungra;
49. Novosilske; 50. Oituz; 51. Orlea; 52. Orșova; 53. Ostrovu Mare; 54. Pavlivka;
55. Popești; 56. Prundu; 57. Râmnicu Vâlcea; 58. Ruginoasa; 59. Shevchenkivka;
60. Sucidava; 61. Vășcăuți; 62. Vasylivka; 63. Zimnicea; 64. Tulcea; 65. Babadag;
66. Aquis; 67. Viminacium; 68. Satu Nou; 69. Novae; 70. Sadovec; 71. Khan Krum;
72. Mogila; 73. Shumen; 74. Preslav; 75. Fisek; 76. Madara; 77. Provadiia;
78. Odurtsi; 79. Kaliakra; 80. Báta; 81. Tiszagyenda-Gói-tó; 82. Gyula; 83. Kölked-
Feketekapu; 84. Makó-Mikócsa-halom; 85. Nyíregyháza-Kertgazdaság; 86. Pécs-
Alsómakár-dűlő; 87. Tiszakeszi; 88. Kladovo; 89. Caričin Grad; 90. Sofia; 91. Niš;
92. Varna.

HOARDS:
1. Troianul; 2. Abritus; 3. Sadovets; 4. Provadiia; 5. Adamclisi; 6. Koprivets; 7. Bela
Palanka; 8. Zhelud; 9. Histria; 10. Varna; 11. Unirea; 12. Veliki Gradac; 13. Bosman;
14. Rakita; 15. Reselets; 16. Caričin Grad; 17. Horgești.

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Fig. II. Fluctuations in the supply of coin to the frontier provinces.

Fig. III. Fluctuations in the supply of coin to the frontier provinces (mints).

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Fig. IV. Coin finds from major centers of the Northern Balkans.

Fig. V. Overstrikes.

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Fig. VI. Chronological distribution. Fig. VII. Mints.

Fig. VIII. Gold denominations. Fig. IX. Copper denominations.

Fig. X. Follis of Justinian from 542/3(?) clipped and overstruck in 591/2 (scale 2:1).

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Hoard Province Number Type Context Latest coin Publication

Troianul Barbaricum 100 [?] AE No 582-602 Trésors 364
Zaldapa Moesia II 7 AV No 583-584 Trésors 82
Sadovets (I) Dacia Ripensis 34 [54] AV Yes 584-602 Trésors 246
Sadovets (II) Dacia Ripensis 18 AV Yes 584-602 Trésors 243
Sadovets (III) Dacia Ripensis 125 AV Yes 584-602 Trésors 244
Sadovets (IV) Dacia Ripensis 7 AV Yes 584-602 Trésors 245
Provadiia Moesia II 4 [30] AV No 584-602 Trésors 52
Adamclisi (I) Scythia 102 AV/AE Yes 584-585 Trésors 63
Koprivets Moesia II 40 AE No 582-583 Trésors 47
Sadovets (V) Dacia Ripensis 50 AE Yes 582-583 Trésors 241
Bela Palanka Dacia 20 AE Yes 584 [?] Trésors 211
Mediterranea
Zhelud Moesia II 83 AE No 585-586 Trésors 61
Histria (I) Scythia 8 AE Yes 589-590 Poenaru 2007
Varna Moesia II 9 AE No 589-590 Ivanov 2012
Adamclisi (II) Scythia 13 AE Yes 590-591 Trésors 64
Histria (II) Scythia 18 AE Yes 593-594 Trésors 71
Histria (III) Scythia 21 AE Yes 594-595 Trésors 72
Unirea Barbaricum 32 AE No 594-595 Trésors 366
Veliki Gradac Dacia Ripensis 108 AE Yes 594-595 Trésors 251
Bosman Moesia I 17 AE Yes 595-596 Trésors 260
Rakita Dacia Ripensis 20 [40] AE No 595-596 Trésors 238
Reselets Dacia Ripensis 26 [31] AE No 595-596 Trésors 239
Caričin Grad Dacia 16 AE Yes 595-596 Trésors 217
Mediterranea
Horgești Barbaricum 58 AE No 596-597 Trésors 355
Histria (IV) Scythia 12 AE Yes 597-598 Trésors 73

Table 1. Hoards from the Northern Balkans ending with coins of Maurice.

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Pl. 1. Overstruck folles of Maurice.

Photo courtesy Early Byzantine Copper Coins. Catalogue of an English Collection,

Ex Officio Books, Manchester, 2016.

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