G.R. No.

124392 February 7, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FEDERICO ABRAZALDO @ "PEDING," Accused-Appellant.

For automatic review is the Decision 1 dated November 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal
Case No. 95-01052-D, finding accused-appellant Federico Abrazaldo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity and P27,000.00 as actual damages, plus costs.

In the Information dated August 3, 1995 filed with the trial court, Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of murder
committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about July 15, 1995 in the evening at barangay Pogo, Municipality of Mangaldan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a bolo, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed DELFIN GUBAN Y GUINTO inflicting upon him
a stab wound which caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659." 2

Upon arraignment, Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 3 Forthwith, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
presented as its witnesses Rosendo Fajardo, SPO1 Ramie Petrache, SPO2 Roberto Fernandez, Dr. Alberto Gonzales and Gregorio
Guban. Accused-appellant and his sister, Marites Abrazaldo, took the witness stand for the defense.

The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution witnesses are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, Accused-appellant, then
intoxicated, 4 attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the post of the latter’s house. 5 The incident was
reported to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the
barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his
uncle, "I will kill you!" Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant coming out of Quinto’s house with blood oozing from his forehead. 6 At
that time, the place was well lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist Accused-Appellant. However, for unknown
reason, Accused-appellant and Guban shouted at each other and grappled "face to face." Accused-appellant pulled out his knife,
stabbed Guban at the abdomen 7 and ran away. When Fajardo got hold of Guban, the latter said, "I was stabbed by Feding
Abrazaldo." 8 Fajardo, together with the other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where he
was operated by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But after a few hours, Guban died. Dr. Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal
Certificate stating that the cause of death was "stab wound, epigastrium, massive hemothorax right." 9

Gregorio Guban, the victim’s father, testified that he was the one who spent for his son’s funeral expenses. For the burial, he spent
P10,000.00; 10 for the 10-day funeral wake, P10,000.00; 11 for the 9th day novena, P3,000.00; 12 and for the hospitalization,
P4,000.00, 13 or a total of P27,000.00.

On July 16, 1995, Fajardo learned that the knife used by accused-appellant in stabbing Guban was in Salay, Pangasinan. Together
with SPO2 Roberto Fernandez, Fajardo went to the house of Francisca Velasquez, Accused-appellant’s aunt, and recovered the knife.
14

Invoking self-defense, Accused-appellant presented a different version. On July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening, he was
making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. 15 His wife Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin and
Christelle were with him. Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who was then drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, "Get out
Feding I will kill you!" 16 When accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards his
house and got his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife, followed him and they grappled for its possession. In the course
thereof, both fell down. 17 It was then that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit him. Accused-appellant did not know which part
of Guban’s body was hit. Thereafter, he got the knife in order to surrender it to the police. 18

Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is his brother. 19 On July 15, 1992, at about 6:00 in the evening, Accused-
appellant, Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in a "drinking spree." 20 At about 10:00 o’clock in that evening, Accused-appellant
caused trouble at the house of his uncle, Bernabe Quinto. 21 He attempted to hack his uncle, but instead hit the post of the latter’s
house. 22 While running away from his uncle’s place, he bumped an artesian well, causing a wound on his forehead. 23
Afterwards, Accused-appellant killed Guban. 24

On November 15, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Federico Abrazaldo @ Peding guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic 7659, and in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed while the public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties
and that the crime was committed at nighttime, which aggravating circumstances are not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, Accused Federico Abrazaldo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death.

"Accused Federico Abrazaldo is ordered to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban. Accused is
also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the total sum of P27,000.00 as actual expenses, plus costs.

"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

In appreciating treachery and the aggravating circumstances under paragraphs (5) and (6) of Article 14, 25 Revised Penal Code, the
trial court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We now come to the issue of whether or not evident premeditation was present. The prosecution’s evidence is wanting on this
point. However, there is no question that there was treachery as the accused embraced Delfin Guban and suddenly stabbed him
with knife. The victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack. The deceased was stabbed without any
warning. He was given no chance to defend himself. Treachery, therefore, qualifies the killing of the victim and raises it to the
category of murder.

"The prosecution has established thru the testimony of Gregorio Guban that at the time of the incident on July 15, 1995, the
members of the barangay tanod, namely: Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Delfin Guban and Alfredo Laceste were performing their duties as
members of the barangay tanod. (See p. 6 tsn September 18, 1995). This is an aggravating circumstance under paragraph 5, Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code. The members of the barangay tanod who are public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their
duties at the time of the stabbing incident. Besides, the incident was committed during nighttime, that was 10:00 in the evening.
Accused took advantage of the darkness of the night for the successful consummation of his plan to kill Delfin Guban."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Accused-appellant, in his Appellant’s Brief, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"I

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE BY THE ACCUSED TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RECOVERY OF THE ALLEGED WEAPON USED IN STABBING VICTIM AT
THE HOUSE OF THE AUNT OF ACCUSED BOLSTERED THE CASE AGAINST HIM DESPITE LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE ITS
VERACITY.

III

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONY EXTRACTED BY THE PROSECUTION FROM DEFENSE
WITNESS MARITESS ABRAZALDO WHICH HAD NO SUFFICIENT BASIS AT ALL.

IV

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE STABBING OF THE VICTIM WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT BASIS TO PROVE THE SAME.

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT TOOK ADVANTAGE OF NIGHTTIME IN CONSUMING
THE ACT.

VI

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT
THAT THE VICTIM WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Solicitor General, in the Appellee’s Brief, asserts that in pleading self-defense, Accused-appellant admitted he killed the victim
and, therefore, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.
Moreover, Accused-appellant’s version of the incident is completely contradicted by the testimony of his sister. Also, the aggravating
circumstance, under par. (5) of Article 14, Revised Penal Code, was clearly established because during the incident, Guban, as the
Assistant Chief Tanod, was on duty and engaged in the maintenance of peace and order.

The Solicitor General though agrees with accused-appellant that there was no treachery. Evidence shows that he and Guban shouted
at each other and struggled "face to face" before the stabbing incident. Thus, the assault was not sudden. Likewise, the Solicitor
General is convinced that accused-appellant did not purposely and deliberately seek nighttime to perpetrate the commission of the
crime.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed
reasonable means to prevent and repel an aggression. On appeal, the burden becomes even more difficult as the accused must
show that the court below committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence. 26

Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden. To show that he was not the unlawful aggressor, he testified that it was
Guban who went to his house, threatened to kill him, 27 hit him with an iron pipe, 28 and attacked him with a knife. 29 We quote
accused-appellant’s testimony, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ATTY. CAMPOS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x           x           x

Q You said a while ago that on July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening you were in your house engaging in fan making, do you
know of any unusual incident that happened during that time?

A Delfin Guban came to my house and he was under the influence of liquor and he shouted at me, sir.

Q And what did Delfin Guban shout at you?

A He said, "Get out Feding I will kill you."cralaw virtua1aw library

Q After this Delfin Guban shouted at you, what happened next?

A When I went out of the house, I was already there infront of the house then he hit me, sir.

Q You said Delfin Guban hit you, what instrument did he use in hitting you?

A He hit me with a pipe, sir.

x           x           x

Q After Delfin Guban hit you with that pipe, what happened next?

A I ran towards my house inside, then got my two children while Delfin Guban followed me inside my house, sir.

Q When Delfin Guban followed you inside your house, what happened again?

A He was holding a knife and we grappled and during that time both of us fell down, sir.

Q When you grappled with Delfin Guban, who was holding a knife, what again happened?

A We grappled for the possession of the knife then we fell down and the knife he was then holding pointed towards him and hit him.
. . . 30" (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing testimony bears not only the vice of falsity but also isolation. It is uncorroborated and even opposed by
Marites, Accused-appellant’s own sister and lone witness. Contrary to his testimony that Guban hit him on his forehead with a pipe,
Marites declared that accused-appellant sustained the wound on his forehead when he accidentally bumped an artesian well.
Instead of fortifying her brother’s defense, she virtually affirmed the prosecution’s story by testifying that he created trouble in their
compound, attempted to kill his uncle Bernabe Quinto and killed Guban. 31

Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is extremely doubtful. 32 In the present case, Accused-appellant’s
tendency to invoke a melange of defenses renders his testimony dubious. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order
to preserve his own life, he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This shows ambivalence. Accident presupposes lack
of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by necessity. 33 Indeed, if there is truth to
either of his claim, his natural course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the authorities.
Certainly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense 34 or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated
considering accused-appellant’s flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore,
that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of
the crime charged. 35

In a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself, Accused-appellant assails Fajardo’s testimony as tainted with consistencies and is "contrary
to the normal course." Accused-appellant cannot invoke these alleged weaknesses in view of the principle that one who pleads self-
defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Even if the prosecution’s
evidence is weak, it is still credible considering accused-appellant’s admission that he killed the victim. It bears emphasis that
Fajardo’s testimony clearly points to him as the culprit. Not only did he pull out his knife, stabbed Guban 36 and ran away. 37
Fajardo also reiterated what Guban uttered to him, i.e., "I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo." 38

As Guban had succumbed to death and his opportunity to divulge the truth on his demise had been lost, we cannot but cast a
quizzical glance on accused-appellant’s uncorroborated testimony. More so, when such testimony was contradicted by his own
witness who happened to be his sister. Standing alone against the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Accused-appellant’s
own account of the killing must necessarily fail. We hold that his guilt has been established to a degree of moral certainty. The trial
court did not err in relying on the testimony of Fajardo, an eyewitness. Time and again, we have said that we will not interfere with
the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. This is so
because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood. 39

However, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that treachery attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Fajardo
testified that accused-appellant and Guban were "grappling with each other" and that prior to the stabbing, they were shouting at
each other. In this scenario, it cannot be said that Guban was unprepared to put up a defense, such as hitting accused-appellant, or
that the latter’s assault was sudden. We quote in verbatim the testimony of Fajardo, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ATTY. CAMPOS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q They were not then fighting?

A They were grappling with each other and then he stabbed Delfin Guban.

x           x           x

Q In fact, they were shouting each other?

A Yes, sir.

Q What were they shouting against another?

A I could no longer understand because it was already night.

Q But they were shouting loudly, am I correct?

A Yes and there were many people." 40 (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. For nocturnity to be properly
appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of the crime and that it was purposely sought for by the offender.
By and itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. 41 In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was offered to prove that
accused-appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness to accomplish his criminal design. In fact, Fajardo testified that there
was a fluorescent lamp sufficiently illuminating the scene of the crime. 42

Neither can we sustain the trial court’s finding that the aggravating circumstance under paragraph (5) of Article 14, Revised Penal
Code, i.e., that the crime was committed in a place where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties, is present.
It must be pointed out that this aggravating circumstance is based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the place
of the commission of the crime, which must be respected. 43 In this case, the crime was committed at the compound of the
accused-appellant where no public function was being held. The arrival of the barangay authorities was precisely due to the trouble
that had commenced prior to the stabbing incident. Clearly, the said aggravating circumstance cannot be considered. Moreover,
under the present Rules, 44 aggravating circumstances must be alleged, otherwise, they cannot be appreciated. Being favorable to
the accused, this new procedure may be given retroactive effect. 45 Except treachery, the other aggravating circumstances
mentioned have not been alleged in the Information.

In the absence of any circumstance that would qualify the crime at bar to murder, Accused-appellant can only be held liable for
homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal.
Considering that there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty
has to be imposed in its medium period, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within
the range of prision mayor, or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The maximum thereof is within the range of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, which is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. 46

On the trial court’s award of actual damages in the amount of P27,000.00, we find the same to be unsubstantiated. To be entitled to
such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. 47 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to
prove the claim for expenses incurred. 48 Gregorio Guban, the father of the victim, who shouldered the expenses for the wake and
burial failed to submit receipts to show the amount of such expenses. 49 However, as the heirs of Guban did actually incur funeral
expenses, we are justified in awarding P25,000.00, not for purposes of indemnification, but by way of temperate damages. 50
Thus, we now hold that where the amount of the actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove
the same, but it is shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate damages may be awarded. Such temperate damages, taking
into account the current jurisprudence fixing the indemnity for death at P50,000.00, should be one-half thereof, or P25,000.00. This
makes temperate damages equal to the award of exemplary damages, which is likewise fixed at P25,000.00 in cases where its award
is justified.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. 95-01052-D is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Federico
Abrazaldo is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the heirs of
the late Delfin Guban P50,000.00 as indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139177               August 11, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALVIN VILLANUEVA, Appellant.

For automatic review is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, stationed in Agoo, La Union, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amounts of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity, ₱600,000 for actual damages and ₱1,000,000 for lost earnings.

The information that charged appellant for the offense alleged:

That on or about the 16th day of November, 1996, in the Municipality of Rosario, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and being
then armed with a knife, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said knife one OTO-LEO
BINAY-AN BRABANTE from behind, inflicting three (3) stab wounds upon the latter, one of which penetrated his heart, which directly
resulted to (sic) his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Forthwith, trial on the merits ensued. While the prosecution was
adducing its evidence, appellant escaped from detention on October 9, 1997. The lower court thus proceeded with the trial of the
case in absentia in accordance with Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

The facts follow.

On November 15, 1996, at around 12 midnight, Marife Brabante was attending to her duties as cashier of the Highlander Store
owned by her mother, Rita Binay-an, at Barangay Saitan, Camp 1, Rosario, La Union. She was assisted by Cheryl Dapiaoen and
George Bautista. They were about to close the store when appellant, together with a certain Jerry, Teddy and an unidentified
person, arrived. They occupied one of the tables and started drinking the liquor which they brought with them. Appellant then asked
Marife if they could stay until 5:00 a.m. but Marife refused since they were unruly. When the group was about to leave, Cheryl asked
appellant to pay the amount of ₱35 as cover charge. At this point, appellant became angry and threw two bottles of gin on the floor.
Marife’s brother, Orland, who was sleeping in one of the rooms of the store, was awakened by the noise. He went out and told
appellant not to create trouble. But appellant shoved him and left with a warning that he would return to kill somebody. Appellant
got on his tricycle and bumped the door of the store while his companions threw rocks at it.

Meanwhile, Marife’s other brother, Otoleo, got up from his bed and asked Cheryl to go with him to buy balut at the nearby Seven
Star Store, which was only eight meters away from their store. After 30 minutes, appellant returned to Highlander Store with a knife.
He walked past Marife and told her that she was not the one he was going to kill. Appellant went toward the Seven Star Store where
Otoleo and Cheryl were then buying balut. Upon reaching the store, appellant suddenly stabbed Otoleo at the back. The victim
turned to face appellant but the latter again stabbed him twice on the left armpit. Otoleo fell to the ground and appellant ran away.
Marife, who was outside the Highlander Store, rushed to the bloodied body of her brother and hugged him. She brought the victim
to the Rosario District Hospital in Rosario, La Union where he was declared dead on arrival.

Dr. Godofredo Garcia of the Rosario District Hospital, La Union conducted a post mortem examination on the cadaver of Otoleo and
prepared his findings and the death certificate showing the following:

Rigor mortis, stabbed (sic) wound, 2 cm. arm, clavicular area (L), 3 inches deep 2 cm. arm posterior aspect (L), axilla 2 inches;
penetrating wound thru the 5th intercostal space, anterior axillary line with hemothorax (L) lung with clotted blood; penetrating
wound, lung (L), pericardial sac with hematoma, penetrating (L) auricle and ventricle. 3

Rita Binay-an, mother of the victim and owner of the Highlander Store, testified on the civil aspect of the case. She claimed to have
spent the amount of ₱600,000 in connection with the death of her son. According to Rita, Otoleo was a second lieutenant in the
Philippine Marines at the time of his death.

As earlier noted, appellant escaped from prison before the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence. Hence, he
was deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence to dispute the charge. 4

After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on November 20, 1997 convicting appellant of the offense
charged:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the accused ALVIN VILLANUEVA is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of
MURDER as charged in the Information. He is hereby sentenced to DEATH, and to pay ₱50,000.00 for the death of the victim,
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱600,000.00 actual damages, ₱1,000,000.00 in loss of earning and to pay the cost
of the proceedings.

SO ORDERED.5
In his Brief, appellant insists that the trial court erred:

IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE AND HIGHLY INCONSISTENT, IF NOT CONFLICTING, TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ANENT THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION.

II

IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

IN CONVICTING HIM OF MURDER SINCE THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY, EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND
NIGHTTIME ARE WANTING AND IN ERRONEOUSLY CONSIDERING FURTHER THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S ESCAPE AS AN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, THUS THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON HIM MUST BE ACCORDINGLY REDUCED. 6

We shall jointly discuss the assigned errors since they are interrelated.

Appellant questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses Marife Brabante and Cheryl Dapiaoen as their testimonies were patently
inconsistent and conflicting on material details. Appellant points out the following inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies of Marife and Cheryl:

(1) Marife first testified that appellant and his group arrived at the Highlander Store at around 12 midnight 7 but later on
declared that they arrived at around 12:45 a.m.8

(2) Marife stated on direct examination that her brother, Orland, did not go out of his room when appellant became
unruly.9 On cross-examination, however, she admitted that Orland went out of his room. 10

(3) Marife averred that appellant had three companions when he entered the Highlander Store. 11 On the other hand, Cheryl
testified that appellant had four companions at that time. 12

(4) Marife insisted that appellant’s companions were nearby and laughing when he stabbed Otoleo. 13 This was contrary to
Cheryl’s testimony that appellant’s companions were merely observing the incident . 14

(5) Marife claimed that she rushed to help her brother, Otoleo, when he fell down, 15 while Cheryl declared that she had to
call Marife to inform her that Otoleo was stabbed by appellant. 16

While the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses differed in some respects, the aforementioned inconsistencies and
discrepancies referred to collateral and minor matters. The details cited by appellant such as the exact time of their arrival at the
store, the number of companions he had at the time he entered the store and the demeanor of his companions when he stabbed
Otoleo, are all insignificant and inconsequential considering that they had nothing to do with the main scope of the inquiry — the
murder allegedly committed by appellant. Further, a miscalculation of time is too flimsy a reason to discredit a witness, especially
where the exact hour is not an essential element of the offense, as in this case. Likewise, since several months had passed before
Marife and Cheryl recounted their story before the trial court, it was impossible for them to have a total recall of the incident.

Indeed, neither inconsistencies on trivial matters nor innocent lapses affect the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their
declarations. On the contrary, they may even be considered badges of truth on material points in the testimony. 17 The testimonies of
witnesses must be considered and calibrated in their entirety and not in truncated portions or isolated passages. 18 In the instant
case, the testimonies of Marife and Cheryl were clearly consistent vis-a-vis the substantial aspects of the crime, i.e., the
identification of appellant as the perpetrator of Otoleo’s death and the manner by which the crime was committed.

Although it is incumbent on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, to justify acquittal based
on such ground, the doubt should relate to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. 19 Discrepancies should touch on significant
matters crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Conversely, inconsistencies in details irrelevant to the elements of the crime
are not grounds for acquittal.20 Besides, as held in numerous decisions, when there is no evidence that the principal witness for the
prosecution is moved by improper motives, such witness is entitled to full faith and credit. 21 Certainly, Marife and Cheryl, in
identifying appellant as the assailant, had no other motive than to seek justice for the death of Otoleo.

It should also be noted that the testimonies of Marife and Cheryl were corroborated on material points by the expert testimony of
Dr. Garcia who conducted the post mortem examination on the body of Otoleo Brabante. He declared:

PROECUTOR CATBAGAN:

Q: And what was your finding in the person of the victim?

 A: Post mortem examination reveals that the victim is already rigor mortis. There is stabbed (sic) wound in the arm,
clavicular area left armpit. And the most fatal wound is in the armpit. The penetrating wound entering the heart and the
lungs. There is a presence of clotted blood in the left lung. And the pericardial sac with hematoma, the cause of heart
cardiac, left uricle and ventricle.

Q: How many wounds were there, doctor?

A: There were three wounds.

Q: And how deep are those wounds?

A: The two wounds in the left is 3 inches deep and the left axillary penetrating and almost left the heart and fatal wound. So
that caused the death.

Q: Could you determine by those wounds what was the weapon used?

A: Sharp bladed weapon, sir.

COURT:

Q: Is it bladed?

A: Yes, sharp pointed bladed weapon, sir.

PROSECUTOR CATBAGAN:

Q: By the location of the wounds, could you determine the position of the assailant at the time he hit the victim?

A: The assailant is at the back because of the posterior arm, while this axilla, the fatal wound is on the side. So when the
assailant is raising hand he thrust and injured him at the side. Supposing the assailant is right handed the possibility is in
front or on the side.22

Clearly, the physical evidence amply reinforced the testimonies of Marife and Cheryl that appellant stabbed Otoleo with a hunting
knife, once at the back and twice at the side. Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent testimony of the truth and rates high in the
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.23

The case of the prosecution was greatly strengthened by appellant’s escape from confinement during trial and by his failure to turn
himself in despite subsequent conviction by the trial court. It was only on November 2, 1998, one year after the trial court had
promulgated its decision, when appellant was finally recaptured. 24 It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent
evidence of guilt and culpability, and, when unexplained, flight is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 25 It
must be stressed nonetheless that appellant’s conviction in this case was premised not on this legal inference alone but on the
overwhelming evidence presented against him. The witnesses’ positive identification of appellant and narration of the circumstances
of the victim’s death were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the physician who examined the victim’s body, and by the
autopsy report. These considerations convince the Court beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.

The trial court, in imposing the death penalty on appellant, found that treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime attended the
commission of the crime. It also considered appellant’s escape from detention as an aggravating circumstance.

The court a quo properly appreciated treachery against appellant which qualified the crime to murder, as evidenced by the salient
parts of Marife’s testimony, thus:

COURT:

Q: Did you see Alvin Villanueva was armed when he approached you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What is that arm or what kind of arm is that?

A: Rambo knife, sir.

Q: Can you describe this Rambo knife?

A: The length is long, like this (Witness demonstrating the length more than a foot and bladed knife).

ATTY. SAN JUAN:

 Q: So when you saw them running towards your brother, what happened next?

A: He suddenly stabbed him at the back, sir.

Q: What else happened?

A: And he also stabbed at the left armpit.

COURT:

Q: Demonstrate how? (Witness going down from the witness stand and demonstrate (sic) how the accused stabbed Otoleo
Brabante. Witness thrusting the knife).

A: Then Alvin Villanueva stabbed Otoleo at the back with his right hand. Then the brother turned to face the assailant and
the assailant thrust the victim at the left armpit.26

It was clearly established that appellant attacked the victim suddenly, without warning and from behind, and when the unarmed
victim tried to face appellant, the latter stabbed him again twice on his left armpit, thus giving the victim no time to flee or to
prepare for his defense or enable him to offer the least resistance to the sudden assault. Treachery exists when the means, method
or manner of attack employed by the accused assures no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might
take.27

We do not, however, agree with the trial court that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime in this case. The
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation must be established with equal certainty and clearness as the criminal act itself. It
must be based on external acts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning. In this case, no
sufficient evidence exists to show that the requisites of evident premeditation were present, to wit: (a) the time when the offender
decided to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he held on to his determination to commit it; and (c) a sufficient
lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and for his conscience
to overcome the resolution of his will after he decided to hearken to its warnings. 28 This circumstance cannot be appreciated against
appellant as no evidence was adduced to show that the killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part.
There was no proof that, when appellant went to the Highlander Store, he already had plans to kill Otoleo. Neither was there any
evidence of the time when the intent to commit the crime was engendered in the mind of appellant. Likewise, the time interval of
30 minutes between the altercation at the Highlander Store and the actual assault on Otoleo was too brief to have enabled
appellant to ponder over the consequences of his intended act.

The trial court also erred in appreciating nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. At the outset, it should be noted that the
circumstance of nighttime was not alleged in the information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. And even if alleged, nighttime cannot properly be considered in this case because, although the crime was committed
late at night, there was no evidence that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or that it was specially sought by the
offender to ensure the commission thereof, or that the offender took advantage of it for impunity. 29 The record does not show that
appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness when he assaulted Otoleo Brabante. The prosecution established no more than
the simple fact that the crime was committed at night.

Moreover, the lower court improperly considered appellant’s escape from detention as an aggravating circumstance. The
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive 30 and flight is certainly not one of
those specified in said article.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death.
Inasmuch as the crime was not attended by any aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon appellant must be the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.31

The award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity should be upheld without need of proof, the same being in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence and the policy of the Court. 32

However, we do not find the grant of ₱600,000 for actual damages to be properly substantiated by evidence. The trial court based
its award mainly on the testimony of the victim’s mother and on the submitted list of expenses allegedly incurred in connection with
the death, wake and burial of the victim. The award of actual damages may not be made on the basis alone of a handwritten
enumeration of the supposed expenses incurred.

The recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo33 allows the grant of temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000 if there is no evidence of
burial and funeral expenses. This is in lieu of actual damages as it would be unfair for the victim’s heirs to get nothing, despite the
death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot produce any receipts. We also ruled there that temperate and actual
damages are mutually exclusive in that both may not be awarded at the same time, hence, no temperate damages may be granted if
actual damages have already been granted.

In the present case, only the amount of ₱13,100 was supported by receipts. 34 Ordinarily, this is all Otoleo Brabante’s heirs should be
entitled to by way of actual damages. However, we find this anomalous and unfair because the victim’s heirs who tried but
succeeded in proving actual damages to the extent of ₱13,100 only, would be in a worse situation than, say, those who might have
presented no receipts at all but would now be entitled to ₱25,000 temperate damages.

We therefore rule that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000, as in this case, the
award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of
actual damages proven exceeds ₱25,000, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the
receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.

Likewise, we cannot sustain the grant of ₱1,000,000 for loss of earnings. No document whatsoever was submitted to support such
an award. The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven. 35 In
this case, Rita Binay-an, mother of the victim, merely declared that her son was a second lieutenant in the Philippine Marines but
gave no statement of her son’s monthly salary. Thus, the trial court simply presumed the amount of Otoleo’s earnings. Since the
prosecution did not present any evidence of the current income of the victim, the indemnity for lost earnings was speculative and
must be rejected.

Moral damages cannot also be awarded because no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, was presented by the prosecution to
support it. As to exemplary damages, the law is clear that they can be recovered in criminal cases only when the crime is committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances,36 none of which was present in this case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Alvin Villanueva is found guilty of
murder and is accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of ₱50,000
as civil indemnity and ₱25,000 as temperate damages. The award for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is deleted.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173476               February 22, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules
of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found
guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005. 1

Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated
him.

The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo,
Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B.
Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the
hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30
am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a
minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time. 2

As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued.
He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.

After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:

The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon
with his left arm encircled around Bolanon’s neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which
caused Bolanon’s death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estaño, the victim’s
uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the
hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who
stabbed him.3

The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected his attack

against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the victim on the latter’s neck and stabbing the
victim with the use of his right hand," Salafranca did not give Bolanon "any opportunity to defend himself." 4 The RTC noted
inconsistencies in Salafranca’s and his witness’ testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his residence the day after the
incident and had stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been hiding, there would be
no reason for him to immediately leave his residence, especially because he was also working near the area. 5

The RTC disposed thus:

With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and
punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code with the
presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other
aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru
the City Jail Warden of Manila.

He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00 representing death indemnity.

There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, 7 citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to
Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza. 9 It stressed that Salafranca’s denial and
his alibi of being in his home during the incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight
after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt. 10
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal lacks merit.

Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded
that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of witnesses at trial
rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique and unequalled position of observing their deportment during
testimony, and of assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a substantial reason to
justify the reversal of the assessment made and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such
assessment and conclusions,11 considering that the CA as the appellate court could neither substitute its assessment nor draw
different conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary
matters that would alter the result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence, the
Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great
weight and respect.13

Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The
lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill
motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the truth. 14

Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had "encircled his left arm over the neck (of
Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one
encircling the blow towards below the left nipple." 15 Relying on Mendoza’s recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the
RTC found treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CA’s concurrence because
Mendoza’s eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The
method and means Salafranca employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an
aggressive physical control of the latter’s movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on
the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code, 16 treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right
after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:

Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?

A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.

Q What time was that?

A 12:50 a.m.

Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?

A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."

Q What did you do?

A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.

Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?

A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod Salafranca.

Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How long have you known him?

A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."

Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Will you look around and point him to us?

A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)

COURT

When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?

A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just suffer more.

Q What happened when you told him that?

A He kept silent.

Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?

A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.

Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?

A He was brought to Emergency Room.

Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?

A He was pronounced dead.17

It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help right after being
stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that
on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estaño that his assailant had
been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estaño to advise
him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired
and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of
the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after
the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to
the hearsay rule.18

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when
the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c)
that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19

All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the
person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab
wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for
the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from
circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his
physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying
declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.21

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the
assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the
taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His
utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The
statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and
which are admissible when illustrative of such act." 22 In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations
that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. 23 The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made
by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 24 The
test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,
and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 25

We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of ₱50,000.00. We declare that the
surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when death
occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages. 26

We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which were different from the death indemnity. 27 The
death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the
mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim. 28 Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of
the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that
would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is reasonable
as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, 29 we are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and
proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience
having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.1âwphi1 It is
inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such
violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love,
affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. 30

The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate
damages. It is already settled that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated by receipts,
temperate damages of at least ₱25,000.00 are warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny
them compensation by way of actual damages.31

Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." 32 The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way
of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."33 Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the
victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant
circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v. Catubig: 34

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad
or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the
other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying,
in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be
due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.

For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of ₱30,000.00 is deemed reasonable and proper, 35 because we think that
a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the
awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of 6%
per annum from the finality of this decision.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.