Special Proceedings (35 Pages) Rule 64 – Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the

Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit

Rule 62 - Interpleader
Case Title Page
Case Title Page (1) Pates v. COMELEC G.R. No. 184915, June 30 2009 30
(1) RCBC v. Metro Container Corp. GR 127913, Sept 13 2001 2 (2) Paa v. CA G.R. No. 126560, December 4, 1997 31
(2) Lim v. Continental Devt Corp GR L-41818 & 41831, Feb 18 3 (3) Lokin v. COMELEC G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012 31
1976 (4) Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. COA G.R. No. 33
(3) Sy-Quia v. Sheriff of Ilocos Sur 4 213525, January 27, 2015
(4) Pagkalinawan v. Rodas 4 (5) Osmea v. COA G.R. No. 188818, May 31, 2011 34
(5) UCPB v. IAC GR 72664-65, Mar 20 1990 5 (6) Pormento v. Estrada G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010 35
(6) Del Carmen v. Sps. Sabordo GR 181723, Aug 11 2014 6
(7) Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. GR 136409, Mar 14 2008 6
(8) Arreza v. Diaz GR 133113, Aug 30 2001 7
(9) Baclayon v. CA GR 81932, Feb 26 1990 8
(10) Beltran v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp. GR L-25138, 8
Aug 28 1969
(11) Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Won 9

Rule 63 – Declaratory Relief

Case Title Page

(1) Malana v. Tappa GR 181303, Sept 17 2009 11
(2) Velarde v. Social Justice Society GR 159357, Apr 28 2004 11
(3) Tambunting, Jr. and Commercial House of Finance, Inc. v. Sps. 15
Sumabat GR 144101, Sept 16 2005
(4) Mangahas v. Paredes GR 157866, Feb 14 2007 15
(5) City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA GR 184203 & 187583, Nov 26 2014 16
(6) CJH Devt Corp. v. BIR GR 172457, Dec 24 2008 17
(7) Ollada v. Central Bank of the Philippines GR L-11357, May 31 1962 18
(8) Republic v. Roque GR 204603, Sept 24, 2013 19
(9) Tanda v. Aldaya 20
(10) PDIC v. CA 21
(11) Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang, 22
Lanao del Sur GR L-28138, Aug 13 1986
(12) DBM v. Manila's Finest Retirees Association, Inc. GR 169466, May 9 22
2007
(13) Sps. Crisologo v. Sps. Centeno GR 20014, Nov 27 1968 26
(14) Ramos v. CA GR 42108, Dec 29 1989 27
(15) Republic v. Batugas GR 183110, Oct 7 2013 28
(16) Tan v. Republic GR L-16108, Oct 31 1961 29

1|R u l e 62-64 case digests

 Rule 62
Interpleader
Case#1
RCBC v. Metro Container Corp.
GR 127913, Sept 13 2001 Kapunan J.
Petitioner: RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
Respondent: METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION
FACTS:
On 26 September 1990, Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON)
contracted a loan from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00).
o secured by a real estate mortgage over a property, located
in Barrio Ugong, Valenzuela.
o LEYCON failed to settle its obligations prompting RCBC to
institute an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against it.
28 December 1992 - After LEYCON's legal attempts to forestall the
action of RBCB failed, the foreclosure took place on 28 December
1992 with RCBC as the highest bidder.
Foreclosure case
LEYCON promptly filed an action for Nullification of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Sale and Damages against RCBC.
RCBC consolidated its ownership over the property due to LEYCON's
failure to redeem it within the 12-month redemption period and TCT
No. V-332432 was issued if favor of the bank.
Unlawful detainer Case (MeTC)
By virtue thereof, RCBC demanded rental payments from Metro
Container Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the property
from LEYCON.
o LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against
METROCAN before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
Interpleader Case
METROCAN filed a complaint for Interpleader against LEYCON and
RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims
among themselves and to determine which among them shall
rightfully receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject
property.
During the pre-trial conference
o trial court ordered the dismissal of the (Unlawful detainer)
case insofar as METROCAN and LEYCON were concerned in
view of an amicable settlement they entered by virtue of
which METROCAN paid back rentals to LEYCON.
2|R u l e 62-64 case digests
o Judgment was rendered which ordered METROCAN to pay
LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises.
The MeTC decision became final and executory.
Dismissal of Interpleader case
METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the case for having become
moot and academic due to the amicable settlement it entered with
LEYCON.
o LEYCON, likewise, moved for the dismissal of the case citing
the same grounds cited by METROCAN.
The two motions were dismissed for lack of merit.
The motions for reconsideration filed by METROCAN and LEYCON
were also denied
CA
METROCAN to seek relief from the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
o LEYCON, as private respondent, also sought for the
nullification of the RTC orders.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition to set aside the orders of
the RTC.
o The appellate court also ordered the dismissal of the case.
RCBC's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.
ISSUE#1: WON THE DECISION OF THE MTC IN THE EJECTMENT CASE BETWEEN
METROCAN AND LEYCON RENDER THE INTERPLEADER ACTION MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.
HELD#1: YES, the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC
rendered judgment whereby the court directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON
"whatever rentals due on the subject premises x x x.”
When the decision in Civil Case No. 6202 became final and executory,
METROCAN has no other alternative left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON.
Thus, METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the interpleader action not
because it is no longer interested but because there is no more need for it to
pursue such cause of action.
It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect
a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of
one liability.7 It requires, as an indespensable requisite, that "conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-
interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants."8 The
decision in Civil Case No. 6202 resolved the conflicting claims insofar as
payment of rentals was concerned.
Issue#2: Whether or not METROCAN unilaterally cause the dismissal of the
interpleader case?
Held#2: Yes.
An action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against
double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.
It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon
the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-
interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.
In the case at bar - When the decision in the Unlawful Detainer case
became final and executory, METROCAN has no other alternative left
but to pay the rentals to LEYCON.
o Precisely because there was already a judicial fiat to
METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue with the
interpleader case.
o Thus, METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the interpleader
action not because it is no longer interested but because
there is no more need for it to pursue such cause of action.
o The decision in the Unlawful Detainer case resolved the
conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals was
concerned.
RCBC was correct in saying that it is not bound by the decision in the
Unlawful Detainer case.
o It is not a party thereto. However, it could not compel
METROCAN to pursue the interpleader case. RCBC has other
avenues to prove its claim.
o It is not bereft of other legal remedies.
o In fact, the issue of ownership can very well be threshed out in
the case for Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and
Damages filed by LEYCON against RCBC.
3|R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#2
Lim v. Continental Devt Corp
GR L-41818 & 41831, Feb 18 1976
FACTS: A complaint for interpleader was filed by Continental Development
Corporation (CDC) against Benito Gervacio Tan and Zoila Co Lim, praying
that said defendants be directed to interplead and litigate their respective
claims over the shares of stock in its possession.
In the books of plaintiff CDC, defendant Tan bought an initial 50
shares and were given an additional 75 by way of dividends or an outstanding
total stock of 125 shares at P250 par value each. Defendant Tan has been
demanding that certificates of stock be released to him but plaintiff has been
unable to do so by reason of vehement and adverse claim of defendant Lim
alleging that said stock actually belong to her deceased mother and denies
defendant Tan’s ownership thereof.
Defendant Tan claims that since the stocks were issued in his name,
this serves as proof of the fact of his ownership over the stocks. Whilst
defendant Lim alleges that said shares of stock were delivered in trust to
defendant Tan for her mother who was the actual owner thereof, and that as
daughter and heir. It should be delivered to her.
CDC alleged that, since both defendants claim ownership of the
shares of stock, is it not in a position to justly and correctly determine the
conflicting claims; that it cannot dispose of the shares of stock as both
defendants threatened to take punitive measure against it should it adopt
steps the may prejudice their respective interest; and that it has no interest
over the subject matter of the complaint.
The trial court of the Manila Court of First Instance dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action invoking Section 35 of the Corporation
Law (Act 1459, as amended). CDC and defendant Zoila Co Lim filed their
respective motions for reconsideration of the trial court's order but the same
were denied, hence, these petitions for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
complaint for interpleader
HELD: YES. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
complaint for interpleader, which practically decided ownership of the shares
of stock in favor of defendant Benito Gervasio Tan. The two defendants, now
respondents in G.R. No. L-41831, should be given full opportunity to litigate
their respective claims.
A cause of action to support a complaint in interpleader exists
whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are made against
a person who has no interest, or whose interest is not disputed by the
claimants. An indispensable requisite being that und, thing, or duty over which
the parties assert adverse claims must be one and the same. And lastly, the
sine qua non condition being that there be two or more claimants to the fund
or thing in dispute through separate and different interests. The claims must be
adverse before relief can be granted.
 Case#3 Case#4
Sy-Quia v. Sheriff of Ilocos Sur Pagkalinawan v. Rodas
GR L-22807 October 10, 1924 GR

Facts: It appears from the record that on February 3, 1915, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco Facts: In an ejectment suit between Manuel Tambunting, plaintiff-respondent, and
and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiangco executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Alfonso Pagkalinawan and Manuel Pagkalinawan, defendant-petitioners, appealed
petitioner, Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their mercantile, establishment, with all the from the municipal court to the Court of First Instance of Manila, the latter court
merchandise therein contained, as security for a debt of P6,000. The chattel mortgage rendered a decision sentencing the defendants to vacate the house in question and to
was duly recorded on the date of its execution and fell due on February 3, 1917. From its pay the plaintiff the rentals. Defendant-petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with
terms it may be inferred that it was the intention of the parties that the mortgagors were the CFI which issued an order setting aside the decision. On motion for reconsideration
to be permitted to sell the merchandise replenishing their stock from time to time and in turn filed by the plaintiff-respondent, an order was issued directing the defendant-
that the new stock brought in should also be subject to the mortgage. petitioners to pay the rentals directly to the plaintiff-respondent and providing for their
ejectment in case of default. Upon petition of the plaintiff-respondent, the CFI of
On May 5, 1924, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco executed another chattel mortgage on Manila ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The defendants sought to
the same establishment and all its contents in favor of the respondent Filadelfo de Leon stay the execution on the ground that they had in the meantime filed with the
as security for the sum of P4,900, which mortgage was recorded on May 4, 1924.
same court an interpleader suit against the plaintiff-responded and one Angel
de Leon Ong, praying that the latter two be ordered to litigate their
On the latter date of the petitioner, in writing, requested the sheriff to take
conflicting claims to the rentals due from the defendants, it appearing that
possession of the mortgaged property and to sell it at public auction under
said defendants received a notice from the Attorney of Angel de Leon Ong
the provisions of section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508). The
advising the defendants to stop paying rentals to the plaintiff-respondent. The
sheriff seized the establishment in question as well as its contents and fixed the
CFI of Manila acceded to the motion for stay of execution, but, proceeded
date of the sale at June 2, 1924. In the meantime Filadelfo de Leon presented
with the execution. The defendants instituted the present petition
an adverse claim to the property by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging
for certiorari and prohibition, seeking from us an order directing Hon. Sotero
that all the goods on which the chattel mortgage of Gregorio R. Sy-Quia was
Rodas, Judge of the CFI of Manila, and Joaquin Garcia, sheriff, to desist from
given had been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon
carrying out the writ of execution.
was executed and that, therefore, the earlier chattel mortgage was of no
effect.
Issue: WON the decision of Respondent Judge was incorrect
Ruling: Yes. It is true that the decision of the respondent judge orders the
The sheriff being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims, suspended
defendant-petitioners to pay the rentals directly to the plaintiff-respondent
the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action under section 120 of the
Manuel Tambunting and provides for their ejectment in case of default. But it
Code of Civil Procedure requiring the two claimants to interplead. Thereupon,
appears that, in connection with the interpleader suit filed by the herein
the present proceeding that the duty of the sheriff to proceed with the sale
petitioners in the CFI of Manila, said rentals were deposited with the clerk of
was a ministerial one and praying that the sheriff be commanded to proceed.
court, of which fact the respondent judge was informed by the petitioners.
Issue: WON the commencement of the Sheriff of the petition for
Such deposits, in our opinion, constitute a bona fide compliance with the
interpleader proper/justified
decision of the respondent judge, since the defendant-petitioners were
warned by Angel de Leon Ong not to pay rentals to the respondent Manuel
Held: Though it, perhaps, would have been better practice for the sheriff to
Tambunting. That there is really a conflicting claim between Angel de Leon
sell the property and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of
Ong and respondent Manuel Tambunting as evidenced by the fact that there
the action of interpleader, we, nevertheless, are of the opinion that the facts
are pending in the CFI of Manila civil case No. 815, between Manuel
shown do not justify our interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay
Tambunting and Angel de Leon Ong and Ong Hoa for the annulment of a
himself open to an action for damages if he sold the goods without the
contract of sale involving the premises in question, and civil case No. 2690,
consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not appear that the
between Angel de Leon Ong and Manuel Tambunting for the ejectment of
petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in such an event. In these
Tambunting from the property which includes the premises held by the
circumstances, his action in suspending the sale pending the determination of
petitioners. Under the law, the latter have a right to file the interpleader suit in
the action of interpleader seems justified. We may say further that in cases
view of the claim for rentals of Angel de Leon Ong; and if the respondent
such as the present, the petition for mandamus should be addressed to the
Tambunting believes that he is legally entitled to said rentals, he is free to
Courts of First Instance rather than to this court. The petition is denied with the
move for withdrawal of the deposits made by the petitioners.
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

4|R u l e 62-64 case digests

 Case#5
UCPB v. IAC
GR 72664-65, Mar 20 1990 FELICIANO, J.:
Facts:
On 23 July 1979, petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) filed in the
CFI of Rizal Branch, Makati, a complaint-in-interpleader against private
respondent Makati Bel-Air Condominium Developers, Inc. (Makati Bel-Air) and
against Altiura Investors, Inc. (Altiura). The subject was a manager's check in
the amount of P494,000.00 issued by UCPB payable to Makati Bel-Air, having
been purchased by Altiura, as part payment on an office condominium unit
where there was a material discrepancy in the area of the office unit
purchased where the unit measured 124.8 sqm and the contract indicated
165 sqm.
UCPB filed a complaint-in-interpleader against Altiura and Makati Bel-Air to
require the latter to litigate with each other their respective claims as to the
reduction of purchase price and over the funds represented by the manager's
check involved, and at the same time asking the court for authority to deposit
the funds in a special account until the conflicting claims shall have been
adjudicated. The court ordered such deposit. Makati Bel-Air filed its answer
and incorporated therein a counter-claim against petitioner Bank and a cross-
claim against Altiura. In turn, Altiura filed an answer to the complaint-in-
interpleader, with motion to dismiss the crossclaim of Makati Bel-Air. Altiura
also filed a complaint for rescission of the contract of sale of the condominium
unit, with damages, against Makati Bel-Air which case was eventually
consolidated with the interpleader case. UCPB filed a "motion to withdraw
complaint and motion to dismiss counter-claim", since Makati Bel-Air in its
answer had alleged that it had cancelled and rescinded the sale of the
condominium unit and had relinquished any claim it had over the funds
covered by the manager's check.
Makati Bel-Air delivered to petitioner Bank the original of the manager's
check. The trial court then issued an order directing the release of the funds
covered by the manager's check to Altiura. The trial court also issued an order
resolving petitioner Bank's motion to withdraw complaint-in-interpleader and
to dismiss counter-claim, declaring that motion to withdraw the complaint-in-
interpleader had been rendered moot and academic by the court's earlier
order.
Makati Bel-Air then went to the respondent appellate court on petition
for certiorari.
The appellate court granted certiorari and nullified the trial court's orders to
the extent that these had dismissed Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim. The
appellate court held that the withdrawal of the complaint-in-interpleader and
its dismissal as moot and academic did not operate ipso facto to dismiss
Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim for the reason that said counter-claim was
based on "an entirely different cause of action from that in the complaint-[in]-
5|R u l e 62-64 case digests
interpleader". In the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Bank
argues that Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim was compulsory in nature and had
therefore been dissolved when the complaint-in-interpleader was withdrawn
and dismissed. Makati Bel-Air argues upon the other hand, that its
counterclaim was not a compulsory one.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COUNTERCLAIM FILED BY MAKATI BEL-AIR SHOULD
BE DISMISSED UPON WITHDRAWAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN INTERPLEADER.
HELD: Yes, the counterclaim must be dismissed.
Under Section 4, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, a compulsory
counterclaim is "one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim." 1 Interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank which had issued a
manager's check is subjected to opposing claims by persons who respectively
claim a right to the funds covered by the manager's check. 2 The Bank is
entitled to take necessary precautions so that, as far possible, it does not
make a mistake as to who is entitled to payment; the necessary precautions
include, precisely, recourse to an interpleader suit.
In the instant case, it will be seen that Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim arose out
of or was necessarily connected with the recourse of petitioner to this remedy
of interpleader. Makati-Bel Air was in effect claiming that petitioner Bank had
in bad faith refused to honor its undertaking to pay represented by the
manager's check it had issued. When the trial court granted petitioner's
motion for withdrawal of its complaint-in-interpleader, as having become
moot and academic by reason of Makati Bel-Air's having cancelled the sale
of the office unit to Altiura and having returned the manager's check to the
Bank and acquiesced in the release of the funds to Altiura, the trial court in
effect held that petitioner Bank's recourse to interpleader was proper and not
a frivolous or malicious maneuver to evade its obligation to pay to the party
lawfully entitled the funds represented by the manager's check. Having done
so, the trial court could not have logically allowed Makati Bel-Air to recover on
its counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bank.
RULING: SUPREME Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review and to
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of respondent appellate court
 Case#6
Del Carmen v. Sps. Sabordo
GR 181723, Aug 11 2014
FACTS:
In 1961, Spouse Suico along with several business partners entered into a business
venture by establishing a rice and corn mill at Mandaue City, Cebu.
They obtained a loan from DBP and as security, 4 parcels of land owned by Sps
Suico and another lot owned Juliana Del Rosario were mortgaged.
Due to failure to pay the loan, DBP foreclose the mortgage.
Spouses Suico and Flores Spouses, substitutes of Juliana Del Rosario repurchased
the property from DBP.
They were able to pay the downpayment and first monthly amortization
but no monthly instalments were made thereafter.
Suico and Flores Spouse sold their rights over the property to Respondent
Spouses Sabordo which was later approved by DBP.
Respondent Restituto Sabordo filed with CFI Negros Occidental an original
action for declaratory relief with damages and prayer for writ of
Preliminary Injuction raising the issue of whether or not Suico Spouses have
the right to recover from respondent Lots 506 and 514.
RTC: in favor of Suico Spouses and directing them to buy back or redeem
the said lots until August 31, 1987.
CA: modified the decision of the RTC by giving Suico Spouses until
October 31, 1990 to exercise their option to buy back or redeem the two
lots.
After the death of Toribio Suico, his heirs discovered that respondent
spouses mortgaged Lots 506 and 514 with Republic Planters Bank as
security.
Petitioner filed a complaint with RTC of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental
to compel respondents and RPB to interplead and litigate between
themselves their respective interests.
Respondents filed an answer with counterclaim praying for the dismissal of
the above complaint on the ground that action for interpleader was
improper since RPB is not laying any claim. RPB filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that there is no valid cause of action.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
ISSUE: WON interpleader is a proper remedy
HELD: NO. There was no valid consignation made by the petitioner.
Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial
authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept
payment, and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. It should be
distinguished from tender of payment which is the manifestation by the debtor
to the creditor of his desire to comply with his obligation, with the offer of
immediate performance. In the case at bar, no tender of payment was made
by the petitioner. Instead, the petitioner prayed that respondent together with
RPB be directed to interplead with one another to determine their alleged
respective rights over the consigned amount.
6|R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#7
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.
GR 136409, Mar 14 2008 NACHURA, J.
Facts:
Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and Subhash and Josephine Pasricha
executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the former leased to the latter
several units of the San Luis Building located in Manila. The Pasrichas agreed to
pay monthly rentals.
They religiously paid the monthly rentals, until one day, they failed to
pay. Despite repeated demands, they continuously refused to pay the rent.
Consequently, Don Luis Dison Realty made a final demand for the payment of
the accrued rentals. For their failure to comply, a complaint for ejectment was
filed by the company through its representative, Roswinda Bautista, before the
MeTC of Manila.
The Pasrichas admitted that they failed to pay the rent, but claimed
that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in the said
company as to the person authorized to receive payment. They added that
they were prevented from using the rooms that they were leasing, except one
room; that they eventually paid their monthly rent for December 1992; that
the company waived its right to collect the rents for July to November 1992,
since they were prevented from using the rooms; and that the complaint for
ejectment was prematurely filed, because of failure to refer the controversy to
the barangay for conciliation.
The MeTC dismissed the complaint for ejectment because of
Bautista’s lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. However, it
considered the non-payment of rentals as unjustified. It held that mere
willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of the obligation; and
that the Pasrichas should have deposited their payment in the name of the
company.
The Pasrichas appealed to the RTC of Manila. It reversed the MeTC
decision and upheld Bautista’s authority to represent the company,
notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her
authority was implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the
company. Also, it ordered the Pasrichas to pay the accrued rents.
The Pasrichas filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari (wrong mode of
appeal to hehe) before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The
Pasrichas filed a MR and filed a motion to inhibit, because of Justice Reyes’
close association with Bautista’s uncle-in-law. It was denied.
The Pasrichas filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. They reiterated
their previous contentions before the MeTC, and added that Don Luis Dison
Realty, Inc. has no standing to sue as a juridical person in view of the
suspension and eventual revocation of its certificate of registration.
Issue:
1. Whether or not a corporation, with a revoked certificate of registration,
may file a case for ejectment
2. Whether or not the failure of the Pasrichas to pay their monthly rentals was
justified on the ground of confusion as to whom payment should be made
Held:
Yes, the SC upheld the capacity of Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. to
institute the ejectment case. Although the SEC suspended and eventually
revoked its certificate of registration in 1995, records show that it instituted the
action for ejectment in 1993. Accordingly, when the case was commenced,
its registration was not yet revoked.35 Besides, as correctly held by the
appellate court, the SEC later set aside its earlier orders of suspension and
revocation of respondent's certificate, rendering the issue moot and
academic.
No, the SC held that the fact that the Pasrichas did not know to
whom payment should be made, is not a sufficient reason for their failure to
pay. If such were the case, their remedy is to consign their payment and file
an action for interpleader. Here, consignation alone would have produced
the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid
the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by
reason of causes not imputable to him.
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to
whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the
property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a
person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
7|R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#8
Arreza v. Diaz
GR 133113, Aug 30 2001 QUISUMBING, J:
Facts:
Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing unit.
In the course of a civil case involving a conflict of ownership between
petitioner Edgar Arreza and Montano Diaz, Jr., Bliss Development Corp filed a complaint
for interpleader. The interpleader was resolved in favor of Arreza. The decision became
final with Bliss Corp executing a Contract to Sell the property to Arreza. Diaz was
constrained to deliver the property with all its improvements to Arreza.
Diaz filed a complaint against Bliss Corp and Arreza. He sought to hold Bliss
Corp and Arreza liable for reimbursement to him of the cost of his acquisition and
improvements on the subject property with interest at 8% per annum.
Arreza filed a MD on the ground of res adjudicata as well as lack of cause of
action, but the MD was denied. The MR was also denied.
Arreza filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA still invoking res judicata. CA
dismissed the petition holding that what was resolved in the civil case, was the issue of
who between Arreza and Diaz has the better right over the property. It did not resolve
the rights and obligations of the parties.
Issue: WON Diaz’ claim for reimbursement against Arreza is already barred by
res judicata - NO
SPECPRO: Whether or not a party in a complaint for interpleader may
still claim reimbursement (not previously claimed in the interpleader case) in a
new civil case - NO
Held: The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in a case for interpleader, the
court shall determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate
their respective claims.
In this case however, the parties in the interpleader case, Diaz and Arreza, did
not pursue the issue of damages and reimbursement although the answer of Diaz did
pray for affirmative relief arising out of the rights of a buyer in good faith. Thus,
according to Diaz, there being no such resolution, no similar cause of action exists
between the prior case and the present case.
As previously stated, in a complaint for interpleader, the court shall determine
the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. BUT such
rights, obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the
aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to Diaz. He
should have filed his claims against Arreza in the interpleader action. Diaz should have
asserted his demand into specific claims for reimbursement. But this he failed to do.
Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, the claim being in the
nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now barred. The judgment in the first action is
conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein and as to any other matter
admissible therein and which might have been offered for that purpose, hence said
judgment is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause.
RES JUDICATA? YES, there is an identity of causes of action between the 2 civil cases.
There being a former final judgment on the merits in the prior case which acquired
jurisdiction over the same parties, the same subject property, and the same cause of
action, the present complaint of Diaz should be dismissed on the ground of res
adjudicata.
 Case#9
Baclayon v. CA
GR 81932, Feb 26 1990 MEDIALDEA, J.
Facts: Petitioners all surnamed Baclayon, Abanes and Abellare filed with CFI-
Cebu a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, and damages,
against spouses Marciano Bacalso and Gregoria Sabandeja of Lot No. 5528 of
the Cebu Cadastre.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Bacalso spouses, declaring
them owners of the subject lots. Upon appeal by the petitioners, the CA
reversed the decision of the trial court.
Respondent elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review but it was
denied.
The petitioners filed a motion for execution of judgment and possession. This
was opposed by the respondents, claiming that they were builders/planters in
good faith, and that necessary and useful expenses must be paid to them.
RTC sided with the petitioners.
Respondents Appealed the order but it was dismissed.
The Petitioners filed a motion for writ of possession and demolition.
Respondents opposed.
Judge Lee issued an order to effect a voluntary removal of the improvements
introduced by the respondents.
The private respondents filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with the respondent court concerning the orders. This was
GRANTED. MR denied.
Issue: whether or not the private respondents should be allowed, in a hearing
supplementary to execution, to present evidence to prove that they are
builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of said
improvements.
Held: No. The rule is well established that once a decision has become final
and executory the only jurisdiction left with the trial court is to order its
execution. To require now the trial court in a hearing supplementary to
execution, to receive private respondents' evidence to prove that they are
builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of said
Improvements, is to disturb a final executory decision; which may even cause
its substantial amendment. It appears that the private respondent's opposition
to the motion for the execution of the judgment, possession and demolition is
their last straw to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment.
Petition granted.
8|R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#10
Beltran v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp.
GR L-25138, Aug 28 1969 TEEHANKEE, J.
FACTS: This interpleader suit was filed on August 21, 1962, by plaintiffs in their own behalf
and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that the two
defendant-government corporations be compelled to litigate and interplead between
themselves their alleged conflicting claims involving said Project 4.
Plaintiffs' principal allegations in their complaint were as follows: Since they first
occupied in 1953 their respective housing units at Project 4, under lease from
the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and paying monthly
rentals therefor, they were assured by competent authority that after five
years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase said units.
On February 21, 1961, the PHHC announced to the tenants that the
management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred
by the PHHC to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in payment
of PHHC debts to the GSIS. In the same announcement, the PHHC also asked
the tenants to signify their conformity to buy the housing units at the selling
price indicated on the back thereof, agreeing to credit the tenants, as down
payment on the selling price, thirty (30%) percent of what had been paid by
them as rentals. The tenants accepted the PHHC offer, and on March 27,
1961, the PHHC announced in another circular that all payments made by the
tenants after March 31, 1961 would be considered as amortizations or
installment payments. The PHHC furthermore instructed the Project Housing
Manager in a memorandum of May 16, 1961 to accept as installments on the
selling price the payments made after March 31, 1961 by tenants who were
up-to-date in their accounts as of said date. In September, 1961, pursuant to
the PHHC-GSIS arrangement, collections from tenants on rentals and/or
installment payments were delivered by the PHHC to the GSIS. On December
27, 1961, the agreement of turnover of administration and ownership of PHHC
properties, including Project 4 was executed by PHHC in favor of GSIS,
pursuant to the release of mortgage and amicable settlement of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings instituted in May, 1960 by GSIS against
PHHC. Subsequently, however, PHHC through its new Chairman-General
Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements and
undertakings previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal
rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contention by both
the Government Corporate Counsel and the Secretary of Justice. Plaintiffs thus
claimed that these conflicting claims between the defendants-corporations
caused them great inconvenience and incalculable moral and material
damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay the monthly
amortizations or payments. They further alleged that as the majority of them
were GSIS policy holders, they preferred to have the implementation of the
outright sale in their favor effected by the GSIS, since the GSIS was "legally
entitled to the management, administration and ownership of the PHHC
properties in question.
On August 29, 1962, the two defendant corporations represented by the
Government Corporate Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action as well as to lift the Court's order designating
the People's First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on
the PHHC lots.
Upon reaching the CA, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing
their suit, contending the allegations in their complaint "raise questions of fact
that can be established only by answer and trial on the merits and not by a
motion to dismiss heard by mere oral manifestations in open court," and that
they "do not know who, as between the GSIS and the PHHC, is the right and
lawful party to receive their monthly amortizations as would eventually entitle
them to a clear title to their dwelling units
ISSUE: WON interpleader is proper in the instant case?
HELD: Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule
63, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14) requires as an
indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part
is not disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant corporations may
have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the management,
administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not
against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is
made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC which was
the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them
any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments.
The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability,
and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover
agreement of December 27, 1961 between the two defendant corporations
are irrelevant to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims,
loosely so-called, are between the two corporations and not against plaintiffs.
Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as
pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations
should be made directly to the PHHC alone.
In fine, the record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by
defendant corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may properly
be compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate among
themselves. Both defendant corporations were agreed that PHHC should
continue receiving the tenants' payments, and that such payments would be
duly recognized even if the GSIS should eventually take over Project 4 by
virtue of their turnover agreement of December 27, 1961. As held by this Court
in an early case, the action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person
who has property in his possession or has an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the
defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims upon the same
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine
who is entitled to the property or payment of the obligation. "The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him
against a double vexation in respect of one liability."
9|R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#11
Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Won
GR L-23851, Mar 26 1976
G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. (Herein referred as the Corporation)
alleged, for its first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims
ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision
rendered in a civil case and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201.
The defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful
owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership
fee certificate 201 issued to him pursuant to an assignment made in his favor
by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz,”
The corporation alleged that the membership fee certificate 201 is null and
void because issued in violation of its by-laws, which require the surrender and
cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before
issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by
its president and secretary,
The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to
interplead and litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment. be
rendered, after hearing, declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of
membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and cancellation
of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.
In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action,
and bar by prescription.
In this appeal, the Corporation contends that the court a quo erred (1) in
finding that the allegations in its amended and supplemental complaint do
not constitute a valid ground for an action of interpleader, and(2) in dismissing
its action instead of compelling the appellees to interplead and litigate
between themselves their respective claims.
The Corporation alleged that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint,
instead of compelling the appellees to interplead because there actually are
conflicting claims between the latter with respect to the ownership of
membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is not Identity of parties, of
subject-matter, and of cause of action and that the complaint should not
have been dismissed upon the ground of res judicata.
On the other hand, the appellees argue that the trial court properly dismissed
the complaint, because, having the effect of reopening civil case 26044, the
present action is barred by res judicata.
The determinative issue, as can be gleaned from the pleadings of the parties,
relates to the propriety and timeliness of the remedy of interpleader.
There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy. What is
here disputed is the propriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the
facts and circumstances obtaining.
ISSUE: (1) WON THE REMEDY OF INTERPLEADER WAS FILED ON TIME
(2) WON THE REMEDY OF INTERPLEADER WILL PROSPER
HELD:
to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that lie has not been made
independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is
already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is
clearly improper and unavailing.
It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is
filed after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the
fund, this being especially true when the holder of the funds had notice of the
conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and had an
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which the
judgment was rendered.
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants
and llaows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later
on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case
at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final
judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead
Tan in the same litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this
interpleader suit cannot prosper because it was filed much too late.

NO, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had
already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its
present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already
established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil
case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his
rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one
of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possiblity that the benefits of
the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from
him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment
in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.

The Corporation was aware of the conflicting claims of the appellees with
respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present
interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It
was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet
it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation and to
defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against
it and said judgment has already been executed. It is not therefore too late
for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.
The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an
application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein
to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only
after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of
interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to he entitled

10 | R u l e 62-64 case digests

 Rule 63
Declaratory Relief
Case#1
Malana v. Tappa
GR 181303, Sept 17 2009 CHICO-NAZARIO, J:
FACTS: Petitioners filed a Complaint for Reinvidication, Quieting of Title, and Damages
against Respondents in the RTC of Tuguegarao City. Petitioners inherited the property
from Anastacio Danao who died intestate. During Danao’s lifetime, he allowed
Consuelo Pauig to build on and occupy the southern area of the property and they
agreed that Consuelo would vacate said land when Anastacio or his heirs needed the
same.
Consuelo’s family members continued to occupy the same after her death
and proceeded to build their residences upon the land, despite the demand of
Petitioners to vacate Respondents refused to do so.
Petitioners referred their dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Annafunan West for conciliation, wherein Respondents claimed ownership over the said
land and produced documents to prove the same. Despite the dubious character of
the documents, they constituted a cloud over Petitioners’ property, hence the
complaint in the RTC to remove the cloud upon their title.
The RTC motu propio dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the assessed value of the land was merely P410 as per tax declarations,
hence the RTC decided that the real action involving real property should have been
filed with the MTC.
Petitioners filed an MR claiming that their principal cause of action was for
quieting of title and not reinvidicatoria, and under Sec. 1 of Rule 63, and action for
quieting of title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The RTC denied their MR stating that in the first paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 63,
actions for declaratory relief should be brought before the RTC and the second
paragraph refers to a different set of remedies which must be read in accordance to
R.A. 7691 (Act expanding jurisdiction of MTC).
ISSUE: W/N the action for quieting of title under the second paragraph of Sec. 1
of Rule 63 is under the jurisdiction of the RTC or subject to assessed value of the
property
HELD: The assessed value of the property is controlling in an action to quiet title
to property.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the
general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief a
petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be
brought before the appropriate RTC.
The second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 63 refers to an action for reformation
of an instrument, an action to quiet title, and an action to consolidate ownership. To
determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read
together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
Sec 1 of Rule 63 repeatedly uses the word “may”, the use of the word
may in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates
a mere possibility or option. Hence, B.P. 129 as amended shall be controlling in
regard to jurisdiction over real actions over real property.
11 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#2
Velarde v. Social Justice Society
GR 159357, Apr 28 2004
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June
12, 2003 Decision 2 and July 29, 2003 Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
(Branch 49). 4
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief 5 filed
before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein
Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,
Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano
as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not
the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy
of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to
vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional
provisions . . ." 6
Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a
dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for
Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a
separate Motion for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed
Order, which held as follows:
". . . [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do,
was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether
acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive
portion because a dispositive portion is required only in coercive
reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the
prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants
have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for
a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the
Supreme Court.” 7
The Antecedent Proceedings
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition")
before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS,
a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions, 8 specifically on the separation of church and state; and a
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders
endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the
members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in
these words:
". . .. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to
file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive
 Minister Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their
Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,
filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within
the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of
the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the
common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and
that there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to
submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely
followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss.
Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister
Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence
Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum.
Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting
his Memorandum . . .
". . . the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for
Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie
Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which raised
no new arguments other than those already considered in the
motions to dismiss . . ." 9
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction
over the Petition, because "in praying for a determination as to whether the
actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law." 10 It then
proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition — the
separation of church and state — even tracing, to some extent, the historical
background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at
some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to
any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." 11
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a
dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were
denied by the lower court.
Hence, this Petition for Review. 12
This Court, in a Resolution 13 dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective comments. In
the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties — impleaded as
respondents in the original case below — the opportunity to comment, if they
so desired. cIHSTC
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument. 14
The Issues During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and
classified as follows:
12 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
"A. Procedural Issues
"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it
state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to file
the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
"B. Substantive Issues
"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?
"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited
from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be
banned from campaigning against said candidates?"
Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29,
2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is
DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
Holding:
Procedural Issues:
1. NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court
should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate
facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim.
The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a jusiciable
controversy. Why?
a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people
elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become
beholden to the latter.
b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what
specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein,
and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the
law or the constitution,
c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights (duh, wala ngang
rights na sinabi eh). It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However,
courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. (tantamount to
making laws, remember the questionability of justice panganiban’s guidelines
for article 36 of the family code)
It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to
the breach of rights they were claimed to have committed. As pointed out by
Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? Jaime
Cardinal Sin adds that the election season had not even started at the time
SJS filed its Petition and that he has not been actively involved in partisan
politics. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on
the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral
candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular candidate.
It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an
actionable right.
2. NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation
of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter.
(Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800)
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the
latter.
The court held that the complaint’s failure to state a cause of action became
a ground for its outright dismissal. Why?
The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit
allegation of fact that SJS had a legal right to protect. (trigger for the cause of
action)
In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of action
under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this
exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has
been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending,
imminent or at least threatened.
The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was its mention
of “its (SJS) thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters
and who are keenly interested”. Aside from the fact that this general
averment did not constitute a legal right or interest, the court’s inferred interest
too vague and speculative in character. Rules require that the interest must
be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument.
To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris Secundum and submitted
that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a
claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of
the parties for the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the essential
distinction between a ‘declaratory judgment action’ and the usual ‘action’ is
that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in
order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no
uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded.
(???)
During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents strongly asserted that
13 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan
politics. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition
was filed below would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right
that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.
Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents.
3. NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.
Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned
act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.
SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and has failed to establish how the
resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a
statute must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of.
If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation,
particularly that of Congress' taxing power.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as
a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely
affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the
deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the
presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement
when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or importance
to the people (IBP v Zamora). The Court deemed the constitutional issue
raised to be both transcendental in importance and novel in nature.
Nevertheless, the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the
abbreviated proceedings in the court would prevent the resolution of the
transcendental issue.
Substantive Issues
1. NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the basis therefor.
Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular
No. 1. which states that :
“A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be
rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based,
signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.”
The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of
the contsitution. This was evinced in Yao v. Court of Appeals where Davide,
CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and
fair play.
In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the decisions of
courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which they are based is intended, among other things,
to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of
them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or
the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.
The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment
or analysis thereof) or of the court’s findings as to the probable facts. The
assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the
question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the
constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve.
Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.
The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of
the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final
conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial
judge ends her “Decision” with the clause “SO ORDERED.”
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
14 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning.
It was truly obvious that the RTC’s Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin
precedent because of its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on
which it was based. The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the
decision as a precedent (how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is
no point of factual comparison?).
Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body
(p. 10) of the assailed Decision. Stating “Endorsement of specific candidates
in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation
clause.”
The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal
question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not
conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition.
Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the
circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.
The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards
where the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the
dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor
that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions
presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration
in the body of said order that may be confusing.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a
conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail
over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while
the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.
The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or
obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant proper relief
under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders
issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity
and must be struck down as void.
2. It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount
question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule
that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a
justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of
the parties concerned. (So no answer)

Case#3
Tambunting, Jr. and Commercial House of Finance, Inc. v. Sps. Sumabat
GR 144101, Sept 16 2005
Facts: A parcel of land was previously registered in the names of respondents, spouses
Emilio Sumabat and Esperanza Baello. Respondents mortgaged it to petitioner Antonio
Tambunting, Jr. to secure the payment of a P7,727.95 loan. Respondents were informed
that their indebtedness had ballooned to P15,000 for their failure to pay the monthly
amortizations. Because respondents defaulted in their obligation, petitioner Commercial
House of Finance, Inc. (CHFI), as assignee of the mortgage, initiated foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property but the same did not push through. It was
restrained by the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan in a complaint for
injunction filed by respondents against petitioners. However, the case was dismissed.
Respondents filed an action for declaratory relief with the CFI of Caloocan City seeking
a declaration of the extent of their actual indebtedness. The CFI fixed respondents
liability at P15,743.83. In compliance with the decision, respondents consigned the
required amount.
Upon foreclosure of the mortage by CHFI, respondents instituted a petition for
preliminary injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, with the RTC of Caloocan
City. However, the public auction scheduled on that same day proceeded and the
property was sold to CHFI as the highest bidder. Respondents failed to redeem the
same. Hence, title to the property was consolidated in favor of CHFI and a new
certificate of title was issued in its name. The RTC issued the assailed decision ruling that
CFI decision fixing respondents liability at P15,743.83 and authorizing consignation had
long attained finality. The mortgage was extinguished. The ten-year period within which
petitioners should have foreclosed the property was already barred by prescription.
They abused their right to foreclose the property and exercised it in bad faith. As a
consequence, the trial court nullified the foreclosure and extrajudicial sale of the
property, as well as the consolidation of title in CHFIs
Issue: WON the CFI decision was final and executory
Ruling: No. Petitioners claim that the trial court erred when it affirmed the validity of the
consignation. taking cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since, petitioners
being already in default in their loan amortizations, there existed a violation of the
mortgage deed even before the institution of the action. Hence, the CFI could not
have rendered a valid judgment and the consignation made pursuant to a void
judgment was void.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order, regulation or ordinance before breach or violation thereof. It may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to
which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the
filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over
the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Here, an infraction of the
mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing of the case in the CFI. Thus,
the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance. Thereof. And in the absence of
jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect.
15 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#4
Mangahas v. Paredes
GR 157866, Feb 14 2007 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of the disputed
property located in Maligaya Park Subdivision, Caloocan City. Private
respondent averred that petitioners constructed houses on the property
without his knowledge and consent and that several demands were made.
This prompted private respondent to refer the matter to the Lupon
Tagapayapa for conciliation. The recourse proved futile and respondent then
filed an ejectment suit before the MeTC.
Petitioners in their answer denied private respondent’s claim and averred that
they have resided in the subject lot with the knowledge and conformity of the
true owner thereof, Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation
(PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by PIADECOs
president in their favor.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation And Motion To Suspend Proceedings on the
ground that the subject property is part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC
of Quezon City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the MeTCs of
Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and demolition of
all occupants of the Tala Estate.
MeTC denied said manifestation and motion. It ratiocinated that the
injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the
territorial boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is not within
the territorial area of same.
Petitioners insisted that they are entitled to the possession of the land because
they have been occupants thereof as early as 1978, long before the property
was acquired by private respondent. They also alleged that private
respondents certificate of title originated from a fictitious title.
In a decision dated 5 October 1999, the MeTC ruled for private respondent,
citing that TCT No. 196025 in private respondents name was an indefeasible
proof of his ownership of the lot and his inherent right to possess the same over
the Certificate of Occupancy by PIADECO.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC which affirmed MeTC in toto. Petitioners
appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. Respondent filed with RTC a motion for execution pending
appeal which was granted.
ISSUE: W/N THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF MUST BE GIVEN DUE
COURSE
HELD:
1. At the outset it must be pointed out that petitioners direct recourse to this
Court via petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For
Provisional Remedy is an utter disregard of the hierarchy of courts and should
have been dismissed outright. A direct recourse of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
In the instant case, petitioners have not offered any exceptional or
compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Hence, the petition
should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.
2. Equally noteworthy is petitioners’ resort to this Court through petition for
declaratory relief. This action is not among the petitions within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which deals
with actions for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e.,
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, the construction or validity of
statute or ordinance. Inasmuch as this enumeration is exclusive, petitioners’
action to declare the RTC order denying their motion to suspend execution,
not being one of those enumerated, should warrant the outright dismissal of
this case.
3. Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the RTC
denying petitioners motion to suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private
respondent of the fruits of his hard-won case. It must be stressed that once a
decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the presiding
judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when subsequent
events would render execution of judgment unjust. Petitioners did not allege
nor proffer any evidence that this case falls within the exception. Hence, there
is no reason to vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.
RULING: The petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court is
affirmed.
16 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#5
City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA
GR 184203 & 187583, Nov 26 2014
FACTS:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 66 in
1972, declaring as government policy the establishment of export
processing zones in strategic locations in the Philippines.
To carry such policy, the Export Processing Zone Authority was
created. The said decree declared that EPZA will be a non-profit
entity, and was also declared to be exempt from taxes.
On March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the
Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA PHP 32,912,350.08 in real
property taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s
properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. The City pointed
out that no provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
specifically exempted the PEZA from payment of real property taxes,
unlike Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 that explicitly provided
for EPZA’s exemption.
Since no legal provision explicitly exempted the PEZA from payment
of real property taxes, the City argued that it can tax the PEZA.
On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, praying that the trial court
declare it exempt from payment of real property taxes.
Pursuant to Rule 63, Section 3 of Rules of Court, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a comment on the PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief.
It agreed that the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property
taxes, citing Sections 24 and 51 of the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National
Government, the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax
the PEZA
under Sections 133(o) and 234(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
In the resolution dated June 14, 2006, the trial court granted the
PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief and declared it exempt from
payment of real property taxes.
ISSUE: WON the RTC jurisdiction to hear and decide on the petition of
declaratory relief by PEZA
against the city of Lapu-Lapu
Ruling:
NO. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and
decide the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu.
A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial determination of
any question of
construction or validity arising from, and for a declaration of rights and duties,
under any of the following subject matters: a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation. However, a declaratory judgment may issue
only if there has been “no breach of the documents in question.” If the
contract or statute subject matter of the action has already been breached,
the appropriate ordinary civil action must be filed. If adequate relief is
available through another form of action or proceeding, the other action
must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief.
In sum, a petition for declaratory relief must satisfy six requisites:
1. subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance;
2. the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction;
3. there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4. there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds"
of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fift
5. the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6. adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.
Thus, the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against
the City. The City
had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment against
the PEZA, in violation of the
PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, the subject
matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had already been breached.
The trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory
relief.
17 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#6
CJH Devt Corp. v. BIR
GR 172457, Dec 24 2008 TINGA, J.
Facts:
President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 to create a Special
Economic Zone in a portion of Comp John Hay in Baguio City. Among the
incentives granted to the new SEZ were the following: exemption from the
payment of taxes, both local and national, for businesses located inside the
SEZ, and tax and duty free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment (Section 3). The BIR and the BOC issued some issuances for the
rules and regulations to be implemented within the Comp John Hay SEZ.
Unfortunately, the Section 3 of Proclamation 420 was declared
unconstitutional by a final decision of the SC en banc in John Hay Peoples
Alternative Coalition vs Lim. In view of that decision, the City Treasurer of
Baguio sent a demand letter to CJH Development Corp., to pay real property
taxes. Later, the BOC demanded the payment of duties and taxes due on all
importations made by CJH from 1998-2004. Likewise, the BIR sent a letter
demanding payment of regular corporate income tax.
CJH filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC of Baguio
City. It questioned the retroactive application by the BOC of the decision of
the SC en banc. It claimed that the assessment was null and void because it
violated the non-retroactive principle under the Tariff and Customs Code.
The OSG filed a MD, on the ground that the remedy of declaratory
relief is inapplicable because an assessment is not a proper subject of such
petition. It further alleged that there are administrative remedies which were
available to CJH.
The RTC dismissed the petition. It held that the SC en banc decision
applies retroactively because the tax exemption granted by Proclamation
420 is null and void from the beginning; that the petition for declaratory relief is
not the appropriate remedy because a judgment of the court cannot be the
proper subject thereof under the exclusive enumeration in Rule 64; and that
CA No. 55, which proscribes the use of declaratory relief in cases where a
taxpayer questions his tax liability, is still in force and effect.
Upon denial of its MR, CJH filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the SC, and raised pure questions of law. It argued that CA No. 55 had
already been repealed by the Rules of Court; thus the remedy of declaratory
relief against the assessment made by the BOC is proper. It added that the
demand letter sent by BOC is a written instrument that may be subject to
declaratory relief under Rule 64.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedy of declaratory relief is proper to obtain relief
against the BIR and BOC assessments / SC en banc decision
Held:
No, the SC held that CA No. 55 is still in effect since it is a substantive
law that has not been repealed by another statute. It effectively removed
from the courts’ the jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief involving
tax assessments. The Court cannot repeal, modify or alter an act of the
Legislature.
Furthermore, the proper subject matter of a declaratory relief is a
deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or the construction or validity
of statute or ordinance. It is really not the demand letter which is the subject
matter of the petition. Ultimately, the SC is asked to determine whether the
decision of the Court en banc has a retroactive effect. A petition for
declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject matter.
In the case of Tanda vs Aldaya, it was held that a court decision
cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words "other
written instrument", for the reason that the Rules of Court already provides for
the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or
clarified (MR, MNT, Motion for Clarificatory Judgment, etc.). One of the
requisites of a declaratory relief is that the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination. This means that litigation is inevitable or there is no adequate
relief available in any other form or proceeding.
Here, CJH is not left without adequate relief. The Tariff and Customs
Code provides for the administrative and judicial remedies available to a
taxpayer who is minded to contest an assessment (such as paying under
protest).
The following are the requisites of for a Petition for Declaratory Relief:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
18 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#7
Ollada v. Central Bank of the Philippines
GR L-11357, May 31 1962 DIZON, J:
Facts:
Felipe Ollada is a CPA. His name was placed on the rolls of CPAs authorized
and accredited to practice accountancy in the office of the Central Bank.
A new requirement was issued by the Import-Export Department of Central
Bank which states that: CPAs need to submit to an accreditation under oath before
they could certify financial statements of their clients applying for import dollar
allocations with its office. Thus, Felipe’s previous accreditation was nullified. Pursuant to
the new requirement, the Import-Export Department issued “APPLICATION FOR
ACCREDITATION OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS” or Form No. 5 and
“ACCREDITATION CARD FOR CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS” or Form No. 6 for CPAs
to accomplish under oath.
Felipe filed a petition for Declaratory Relief to nullify said accreditation
requirement on the grounds that: It was (a) an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the
Board of Accountancy, (b) in excess of the powers of the Central Bank and (c)
unconstitutional in that it unlawfully restrained the legitimate pursuit of one's trade.
Central Bank filed a MD for lack of cause of action. Meanwhile, Felipe applied
for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Central Bank from enforcing the
accreditation requirement until final adjudication of the case. CB manifested that it was
willing to delete the paragraph 13 which required CPAs to answer the query whether
they agreed to follow strictly the rules and regulations promulgated by the Philippine
Institute of Accountants and, if not, to state their reasons therefor; and that it was also
willing to modify paragraph 14 of the same form. The trial court required Central Bank to
submit the proof that it had deleted the paragraphs. Upon Central Bank’s compliance,
the court denied the preliminary injunction. However, despite the deletion, CPAs
applying for accreditation with Central Bank were still required to execute under oath
Form No 6.
The lower court dismissed the complaint holding that after the Central Bank
had eliminated said objectionable features, the petition for declaratory relief has
become groundless.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for Declaratory Relief was
proper - YES
Held: Without deciding the question of whether the petition under
consideration has, in reality "become groundless”, the SC held that the
petition was correctly dismissed.
The SC had already held that, a complaint for declaratory relief will
not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or
violated. Such is the situation in the present case as alleged in the petition.
Felipe himself claims that Central Bank had already invaded or violated his
right and caused him injury — all these giving him a complete cause of action
enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding.
Therefore, the dismissal of the action was proper. In the case of De Borja vs.
Villadolid, the SC held that an action for declaratory relief should be filed
before there has been a breach of a contract, statute or right, and that it is
sufficient, to bar such action, that there had been a breach — which would
constitute actionable violation.
 Case#8
Republic v. Roque
GR 204603, Sept 24, 2013 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Facts: Herein private respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief before
the RTC of Quezon City, assailing the constitutionality of several sections of RA
9372 otherwise known as the “Human Security Act of 2007” which are void of
vagueness (sec 3), violation of right to privacy of communication, violation of
due process, and violation against the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures. Herein petitioner moved to suspend the proceedings, averring
that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372’s
constitutionality have been lodged before the court. However, the case
regarding the constitutionality of RA 9372 was dismissed by the court and no
ruling regarding its constitutionality was given such as in the Southern
Hemisphere case. Herein petitioner eventually filed the subject motion to
dismiss, contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for
declaratory relief. RTC denied the subject motion to dismiss, finding that the
court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372, and that private
respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was properly filed. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
subject motion to dismiss
Ruling: The petition is meritorious
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the abuse
of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
or to act at all in contemplation of law. In this relation, case law states that not
every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The degree of gravity, as above-
described, must be met.
b.) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction;
c.) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
d.) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of
one between persons whose interests are adverse; e.) the issue must be ripe
for judicial determination; and
f.) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding. Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court
observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in
this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show
that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in
immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu
in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general
interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government
could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain
untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials
which were addressed to the general public.40 They, however, failed to show
how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action
geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words,
there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them.
Hence, cannot be said that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. Petition
granted.

Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of
discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found that the
Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern
Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that
private respondents’ petition had met all the requisites for an action for
declaratory relief.
Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether
improper.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for
declaratory relief:
a.) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;

19 | R u l e 62-64 case digests

 Case#9
Tanda v. Aldaya
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS: On April 10, 1948, Appellant instituted in the CFI of Cavite an action for
the annulment of a certain contract of sale with pacto de retro. On May 11,
1949, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the contract valid and
absolving Appellee of the complaint. After a motion to set aside judgment
and a motion for new trial filed by Appellant were denied by the trial court,
Appellant brought the case on appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 23,
1951, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from particularly
with regard to the validity of the contract which is disputed by Appellant. After
the two motions for reconsideration filed by Appellant were denied, the
decision became final and executory and the record was returned to the
court of origin; on November 8, 1951, Appellant initiated the present case for
declaratory relief. Considering that this action is purposeless because, while
outwardly its aim is to seek a declaratory relief on certain matters but in effect
its purpose is to nullify the judgment rendered in the previous case which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the case states no cause of action. In the meantime, Appellee
moved to withdraw the original of Title No. 114 which was presented in the
case as evidence in order that his ownership may be consolidated and a new
title issued in his name it appearing that case has been finally terminated. The
trial court, acting on the two motions, entered an order on June 12, 1953
granting the motion to dismiss and allowing the withdrawal of the original title
as already adverted to in the early part of this decision.
The purpose of the case which gave rise to the present appeal is avowedly for
declaratory relief instituted under Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
which provides that “Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his
rights or duties thereunder.” And, it is claimed, this case comes under its
purview because its purpose is to obtain a clarification of the decision of this
Court in G. R. No. L-3278 which in the opinion of Appellant, is vague and
susceptible of double interpretation. Appellant contends that the words “other
written instrument” should be interpreted as including a court decision
regardless of whether it is final in character or otherwise.
ISSUE: WON a petition for Declaratory Relief can be had to interpret a court
decision regardless of whether or not it has already attained its finality?
HELD: No, the Court do not subscribe to the foregoing view. Evidently, a court
decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words
“other written instrument”, as contended by Appellant, for the simple reason
that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous
20 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to
the expedient prescribed by Rule 66. Thus, if a party is not agreeable to a
decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial court a
motion for reconsideration or a new trial in order that the defect may be
corrected (Section 1, Rule 37). The same remedy may be pursued by a party
with regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court
(section 1, Rule 54, section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 58). A
party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on the
ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of
that remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1, Rule 38. Apparently,
Appellant has already availed of some of these legal remedies but that he
was denied relief because his claim was found unmeritorious.
But the fundamental reason why the decision of this Court in the original case
(G. R. No. L-3278) cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated
upon the principle of res judicata which stamps the mark of finality on a case
which has been fully and definitely litigated in court. This principle is sound. It
avoids multiplicity of actions. It commands that once a case is definitely
litigated it should not be reopened. Thus, it has been held that “The
foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once;
that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties, and those in privity with them in law or estate. It is
considered that a judgment presents evidence of the facts of so high a nature
that nothing which could be proved by evidence aliunde would be sufficient
to overcome it; and therefore it would be useless for a party against whom it
can be properly applied to adduce any such evidence, and accordingly he
is estopped or precluded by law from doing so. Such is the character of an
estoppel by matter of record, as in case of an issue on a question of fact,
judicially tried and decided.” Finding no merit in this appeal, we hereby affirm
the order appealed from, with costs against Appellant.
 Case#10 Petitioner additionally submits that the issue of determining the amount of
PDIC v. CA deposit insurance due respondents was never tried on the merits since the trial
GR 126911, Apr 30, 2003 dwelt only on the determination of the viability or validity of the deposits and
no evidence on record sustains the holding that the amount of deposit due
FACTS: respondents had been finally determined. This issue was not raised in the court
Respondents had 71 Golden Time Deposits(GTDs) in Manila Banking a quo, however, hence, it cannot be raised for the first time in the petition at
Corporation(MBC). HOWEVER, Bangko Sentral of the Philippines issued a bar.
memorandum prohibiting MBC to do business in the Philippines and placed its
assets under receivership. On the next banking day, respondent Jose Abad
pre-terminated his 71 GTDs and redposited the fund into 28 GTDs in larger
denominations. Thereafter, respondent filed their claims for the payment of
the insured GTDs.

Petitioner PDIC argued that the insured GTDs should not be recognized since
they were mere derivatives of respondents previous account balances pre-
terminated at the time the MBC was aslready in serious financial distress.
Under its charter, they contend that they are only liable for deposits received
in the usual course of business.

Consequently, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief against

respondents for a judicial determination of the insurability of respondents. In
turn, Jose Abad SET UP A COUNTER-CLAIM against PDIC whereby they asked
for payment of the insured deposits.
The SC later on ruled in favor of the respondents due to petitioner having
failed to overcome the presumption that it was issued in the ordinary course of
business. The trial court then ordered petitioner to pay the balance of the
deposit insurance to respondents.

MAIN ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in ordering the payment of the deposit
insurance since a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an
executory process- the only relief being granted is a declaration of the rights
and duties.

HELD: NO, the RTC’s action was proper. Without doubt, a petition for
declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process. HOWEVER,
there is nothing in its nature that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in
the same action.

A special civil action is not essentially different from an ordinary civil action,
which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that
the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some
special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such
that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special
civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.

21 | R u l e 62-64 case digests

 Case#11
Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur
GR L-28138, Aug 13 1986 YAP, J
FACTS: The municipal council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, enacted
Municipal Ordinance 45-46 pursuant to Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. It
imposed a “Police Inspection Fee” of P.30 per sack of Cassava starch
produced and shipped out of Malabang.
The validity of said ordinance was questioned by Matalin Cocount
Inc., in a petition for declaratory relief filed with the CFI of Lanao del Sur
against the municipal council. Alleging that said ordinance was ultra vires
being violative of the Local Autonomy Act, unreasonable, oppressive, and
confiscatory. A motion for preliminary injunction was also filed but it was
denied, however, the court ordered that the taxes imposed may be paid
under protest.
Purakan Plantation Company was allowed to intervene in the action.
(It produced cassava starch in Balabagan and transport them to Malabang
to ship them by sea but had to refrain by reason of the tax imposed.)
The CFI rendered a decision stating that said ordinance was null and
void, ordering the refund of the payments made, and enjoining and
prohibiting respondents from further collecting the taxes. Thus, respondents
appealed to the SC.
Respondents aver that the trial court committed an error by ordering
a refund in the same action for declaratory relief and that the trial court
should have ordered petitioners to file an ordinary action to claim the refund
after the declaratory relief has become final by filing the proper pleadings
and converting the hearing into an ordinary action under Sec. 6 of Rule 63.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim in an action
for declaratory relief
HELD: No. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such
pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final termination of the
case "a breach or violation of an .. ordinance, should take place.”
In the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred
since petitioner paid the taxes under protest since the trial court did not issue
an injunction for the payment and merely ordered that said taxes should be
paid “under protest” during the pendency of the action for declaratory relief.
Respondents' contention, if sustained, would in effect require a
separate suit for the recovery of the fees paid by petitioner under protest.
Multiplicity of suits should not be allowed or encouraged and, in the context
of the present case, is clearly uncalled for and unnecessary.
22 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#12
DBM v. Manila's Finest Retirees Association, Inc.
GR 169466, May 9 2007
Facts:
In 1975, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 765 was issued constituting the
Integrated National Police (INP) to be composed of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) as the nucleus and the integrated police forces as
components thereof. Complementing P.D. No. 765 was P.D. No. 1184 3 dated
August 26, 1977 (INP Law, hereinafter) issued to professionalize the INP and
promote career development therein.
On December 13, 1990, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975, entitled "AN ACT
ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," hereinafter referred to as PNP Law, was enacted. Under Section 23
of said law, the Philippine National Police (PNP) would initially consist of the
members of the INP, created under P.D. No. 765, as well as the officers and
enlisted personnel of the PC. In part, Section 23 reads:
SEC. 23. Composition. — Subject to the limitation provided for in this
Act, the Philippine National Police, hereinafter referred to as the PNP,
is hereby established, initially consisting of the members of the police
forces who were integrated into the Integrated National Police (INP)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 765, and the officers and enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
A little less than eight (8) years later, or on February 25, 1998, R.A. No. 6975 was
amended by R.A. No. 8551, otherwise known as the "PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE REFORM AND REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1998." Among other things,
the amendatory law reengineered the retirement scheme in the police
organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel, under the new law, stood to collect
more retirement benefits than what INP members of equivalent rank, who had
retired under the INP Law, received.
The INP retirees illustrated the resulting disparity in the retirement benefits
between them and the PNP retirees as follows: 4
Retirement Rank Monthly Pension Difference
INP PNP INP PNP
Corporal SPO3 P3,225.00 P11,310.00 P8,095.00
Captain P. Sr. Insp. P5,248.00 P15,976.00 P10,628.00
Brig. Gen. P. Chief Supt. P10,054.24 P18,088.00 P8,033.76
Hence, on June 3, 2002, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, all INP
retirees, spearheaded by the Manila's Finest Retirees Association, Inc., or the
MFRAI (hereinafter collectively referred to as the INP Retirees), filed a petition
for declaratory relief, 5 thereunder impleading, as respondents, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the PNP, the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Docketed in the RTC as Civil
Case No. 02-103702, which was raffled to Branch 22 thereof, the petition
alleged in gist that INP retirees were equally situated as the PNP retirees but
whose retirement benefits prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6975, as
amended by R.A. No. 8551, were unconscionably and arbitrarily excepted
from the higher rates and adjusted benefits accorded to the PNP retirees.
Accordingly, in their petition, the petitioning INP retirees pray that a —
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT be rendered in their favor, DECLARING with
certainty that they, as INP-retirees, are truly absorbed and equally
considered as PNP-retirees and thus, entitled to enjoy the SAME or
IDENTICAL retirement benefits being bestowed to PNP-retirees by
virtue of said PNP Law or Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by
Republic Act 8551, with the corollary mandate for the respondents-
government agencies to effect the immediate adjustment on their
previously received disparate retirement benefits, retroactive to its
effectivity, and with due payment thereof.
The GSIS moved to dismiss the petition on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
cause of action. On the other hand, the CSC, DBM, NAPOLCOM and PNP, in
their respective answers, asserted that the petitioners could not claim the
more generous retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6975 because at no time
did they become PNP members, having retired prior to the enactment of said
law. DBM, NAPOLCOM and PNP afterwards filed their respective pre-trial
briefs.
The ensuing legal skirmish is not relevant to the disposition of the instant case.
The bottom line is that, on March 21, 2003, the RTC came out with its decision 6
holding that R.A. No. 6975, as amended, did not abolish the INP but merely
provided for the absorption of its police functions by the PNP, and accordingly
rendered judgment for the INP retirees.
On April 2, 2003, the trial court issued what it denominated as Supplement to
the Decision whereunder it granted the GSIS' motion to dismiss and thus
considered the basic petition as withdrawn with respect to the latter.
From the adverse decision of the trial court, the remaining respondents,
namely, DBM, PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC, interposed an appeal to the CA
whereat their appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78203.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 7, 2005, 7
affirmed that of the trial court upholding the entitlement of the INP retirees to
the same or identical retirement benefits accorded upon PNP retirees under
R.A. No. 6975, as amended.
23 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its equally
assailed resolution of August 24, 2005, 8 herein petitioners are now with this
Court via the instant recourse on their singular submission that —
ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
We DENY.
HELD: In the main, it is petitioners' posture that R.A. No. 6975 clearly abolished
the INP and created in its stead a new police force, the PNP. Prescinding
therefrom, petitioners contend that since the PNP is an organization entirely
different from the INP, it follows that INP retirees never became PNP members.
Ergo, they cannot avail themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to
PNP members under R.A. No. 6975 and its amendatory law, R.A. No. 8551.
HDIATS
A flashback at history is proper.
As may be recalled, R.A. No. 6975 was enacted into law on December 13,
1990, or just about four (4) years after the 1986 Edsa Revolution toppled down
the dictatorship regime. Egged on by the current sentiment of the times
generated by the long period of martial rule during which the police force,
the PC-INP, had a military character, being then a major service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and invariably moved by a fresh constitutional
mandate for the establishment of one police force which should be national
in scope and, most importantly, purely civilian in character, 9 Congress
enacted R.A. No. 6975 establishing the PNP and placing it under the
Department of Interior and Local Government. To underscore the civilian
character of the PNP, R.A. No. 6975 made it emphatically clear in its
declaration of policy the following:
Section 2. Declaration of policy — It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the State to promote peace and order, ensure public safety
and further strengthen local government capability aimed towards
the effective delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the
establishment of a highly efficient and competent police force that is
national in scope and civilian in character. . . . .
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily
for the performance of police functions. Its national scope and
civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force
shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active
members of the [AFP]. (Emphasis and word in bracket supplied.)
Pursuant to Section 23, supra, of R.A. No. 6975, the PNP initially consisted of the
members of the police forces who were integrated into the INP by virtue of
P.D. No. 765, while Section 86 10 of the same law provides for the assumption
by the PNP of the police functions of the INP and its absorption by the former,
including its appropriations, funds, records, equipment, etc., as well as its
personnel. 11 And to govern the statute's implementation, Section 85 of the
Act spelled out the following absorption phases: DACcIH
Phase I — Exercise of option by the uniformed members of the [PC], the PC
elements assigned with the Narcotics Command, CIS, and the personnel of
the technical services of the AFP assigned with the PC to include the regular
CIS investigating agents and the operatives and agents of the NAPOLCOM
Inspection. Investigation and Intelligence Branch, and the personnel of the
absorbed National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) of the
Department of National Defense to be completed within six (6) months from
the date of the effectivity of this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel
from the INP, PC, AFP Technical Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM Inspection,
Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall have been covered by official
orders assigning them to the PNP, Fire and Jail Forces by their respective units.
Phase II — Approval of the table of organization and equipment of all bureaus
and offices created under this Act, preparation and filling up of their staffing
pattern, transfer of assets to the [DILG] and organization of the Commission, to
be completed within twelve (12) months from the effectivity date hereof. At
the end of this phase, all personnel to be absorbed by the [DILG] shall have
been issued appointment papers, and the organized Commission and the
PNP shall be fully operational. DASEac
The PC officers and enlisted personnel who have not opted to join
the PNP shall be reassigned to the Army, Navy or Air Force, or shall
be allowed to retire under existing AFP rules and regulations. Any
PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the twelve-month
period from the effectivity of this Act, retire and be paid retirement
benefits corresponding to a position two (2) ranks higher than his
present grade, subject to the conditions that at the time he applies
for retirement, he has rendered at least twenty (20) years of service
and still has, at most, twenty-four (24) months of service remaining
before the compulsory retirement age as provided by existing law
for his office.
Phase III — Adjustment of ranks and establishment of one (1) lineal roster of
officers and another for non-officers, and the rationalization of compensation
and retirement systems; taking into consideration the existing compensation
schemes and retirement and separation benefit systems of the different
components of the PNP, to ensure that no member of the PNP shall suffer any
diminution in basic longevity and incentive pays, allowances and retirement
benefits due them before the creations of the PNP, to be completed within
eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act. . . . .
Upon the effectivity of this Act, the [DILG] Secretary shall exercise
administrative supervision as well as operational control over the transferred,
merged and/or absorbed AFP and INP units. The incumbent Director General
of the PC-INP shall continue to act as Director General of the PNP until . . .
24 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
replaced . . . . (Emphasis and words in brackets supplied.)
From the foregoing, it appears clear to us that the INP was never, as posited
by the petitioners, abolished or terminated out of existence by R.A. No. 6975.
For sure, nowhere in R.A. No. 6975 does the words "abolish" or "terminate"
appear in reference to the INP. Instead, what the law provides is for the
"absorption," "transfer," and/or "merger" of the INP, as well as the other offices
comprising the PC-INP, with the PNP. To "abolish" is to do away with, to annul,
abrogate or destroy completely; 12 to "absorb" is to assimilate, incorporate or
to take in. 13 "Merge" means to cause to combine or unite to become legally
absorbed or extinguished by merger 14 while "transfer" denotes movement
from one position to another. Clearly, "abolition" cannot be equated with
"absorption."
True it is that Section 90 15 of R.A. No. 6975 speaks of the INP "[ceasing] to
exist" upon the effectivity of the law. It ought to be stressed, however, that
such cessation is but the logical consequence of the INP being absorbed by
the PNP.
Far from being abolished then, the INP, at the most, was merely transformed
to become the PNP, minus of course its military character and complexion.
Even the petitioners' effort at disclosing the legislative intent behind the
enactment of R.A. No. 6975 cannot support their theory of abolition. Rather,
the Senate and House deliberations on the bill that eventually became R.A.
No. 6975 reveal what has correctly been held by the CA in its assailed
decision: that the PNP was precisely created to erase the stigma spawned by
the militarization of the police force under the PC-INP structure. The rationale
behind the passage of R.A. No. 6975 was adequately articulated by no less
than the sponsor 16 of the corresponding House bill in his sponsorship speech,
thus:
By removing the police force from under the control and supervision of military
officers, the bill seeks to restore and underscore the civilian character of
police work — an otherwise universal concept that was muddled up by the
martial law years.
Indeed, were the legislative intent was for the INP's abolition such that nothing
would be left of it, the word "abolish" or what passes for it could have easily
found its way into the very text of the law itself, what with the abundant use of
the word during the legislative deliberations. But as can be gleaned from said
deliberations, the lawmakers' concern centered on the fact that if the entire
PC-INP corps join the PNP, then the PC-INP will necessarily be abolished, for
who then would be its members? Of more consequence, the lawmakers were
one in saying that there should never be two national police agencies at the
same time. cIHSTC
With the conclusion herein reached that the INP was not in fact abolished but
was merely transformed to become the PNP, members of the INP which
include the herein respondents are, therefore, not excluded from availing
themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees under Sections
74 17 and 75 18 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551. It may be that
respondents were no longer in the government service at the time of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6975. This fact, however, without more, would not pose
as an impediment to the respondents' entitlement to the new retirement
scheme set forth under the aforecited sections. As correctly ratiocinated by
the CA to which we are in full accord:
For sure, R.A. No. 6975 was not a retroactive statute since it did not impose
a new obligation to pay the INP retirees the difference between what
they received when they retired and what would now be due to them
after R.A. No. 6975 was enacted. Even so, that did not render the RTC's
interpretation of R.A. No. 6975 any less valid. The [respondents'] retirement
prior to the passage of R.A. No. 6975 did not exclude them from the
benefits provided by R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551, since
their membership in the INP was an antecedent fact that nonetheless
allowed them to avail themselves of the benefits of the subsequent laws.
R.A. No. 6975 considered them as PNP members, always referring to their
membership and service in the INP in providing for their retirement
benefits. 19
Petitioners maintain, however, that NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 8, 20
particularly Section 11 21 thereof, bars the payment of any differential in
retirement pay to officers and non-officers who are already retired prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. SAHIaD
The contention does not commend itself for concurrence.
Under the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8551), the application of rationalized
retirement benefits to PNP members who have meanwhile retired before its
(R.A. No. 8551) enactment was not prohibited. In fact, its Section 38 22
explicitly states that the rationalized retirement benefits schedule and
program "shall have retroactive effect in favor of PNP members and officers
retired or separated from the time specified in the law." To us, the aforesaid
provision should be made applicable to INP members who had retired prior to
the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. For, as afore-held, the INP was, in effect,
merely absorbed by the PNP and not abolished.
Indeed, to bar payment of retirement pay differential to INP members who
were already retired before R.A. No. 6975 became effective would even run
counter to the purpose of NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 8 itself, as expressed in
its preambulatory clause, which is to rationalize the retirement system of the
PNP taking into consideration existing retirement and benefit systems
(including R.A. No. 6975 and P.D. No. 1184) of the different components
thereof "to ensure that no member of the PNP shall suffer any diminution in the
retirement benefits due them before the creation of the PNP." 23
Most importantly, the perceived restriction could not plausibly preclude the
respondents from asserting their entitlement to retirement benefits adjusted to
the level when R.A. No. 6975 took effect. Such adjustment hews with the
constitutional warrant that "the State shall, from time to time, review to
25 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
upgrade the pensions and other benefits due to retirees of both the
government and private sectors," 24 and the implementing mandate under
the Senior Citizen's Law 25 that "to the extent practicable and feasible,
retirement benefits . . . shall be upgraded to be at par with the current scale
enjoyed by those in actual service." EcAISC
Certainly going for the respondents in their bid to enjoy the same retirement
benefits granted to PNP retirees, either under R.A. No. 6975 or R.A. No. 8551, is
Section 34 of the latter law which amended Section 75 of R.A. No. 6975 by
adding thereto the following proviso:
Section 75. Retirement benefits. . . . : Provided, finally, That retirement pay
of the officers/non-officers of the PNP shall be subject to adjustments
based on the prevailing scale of base pay of police personnel in the
active service.
Then, too, is the all familiar rule that:
Retirement laws should be liberally construed in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance and hopefully,
even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-being of
government employees may be enhanced. 26
The petitioners parlay the notion of prospective application of statutes, noting
in this regard that R.A. No. 6975, as amended, cannot be applied
retroactively, there being no provision to that effect.
We are not persuaded.
As correctly found by the appellate court, R.A. No. 6975 itself contextually
provides for its retroactive application to cover those who had retired prior to
its effectivity. In this regard, we invite attention to the three (3) phases of
implementation under Section 85 for the absorption and continuation in the
service of, among others, the INP members under the newly-established PNP.
IHEDAT
In a further bid to scuttle respondents' entitlement to the desired retirement
benefits, the petitioners fault the trial court for ordering the immediate
adjustments of the respondents' retirement benefits when the basic petition
filed before it was one for declaratory relief. To the petitioners, such petition
does not essentially entail an executory process, the only relief proper under
that setting being a declaration of the parties' rights and duties.
Petitioners' above posture is valid to a point. However, the execution of
judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not necessarily indefensible. In
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation[PDIC] v. Court of Appeals, 27
wherein the Court affirmed the order for the petitioners therein to pay the
balance of the deposit insurance to the therein respondents, we categorically
ruled:
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory
 relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same
transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil
action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action,
which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except
that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their
fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil
suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if
they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules
governing special civil actions. 28 IHEaAc
Similarly, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang,
Lanao del Sur: 29 the Court upheld the lower court's order for a party to refund
the amounts paid by the adverse party under the municipal ordinance
therein questioned, stating:
. . . Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such
pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final termination of
the case "a breach or violation of an . . . ordinance, should take place." In
the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The
petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the
ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief
action was still proper because the applicability of the ordinance to future
transactions still remained to be resolved, although the matter could also
be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid . . . In its
petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason
of the enforcement of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was
forced to pay under protest the fees imposed pursuant to the said
ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner
was that the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to
respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The
inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to
by the respondents in their answer. During the trial, evidence of the
payments made by the petitioner was introduced. Respondents were thus
fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would happen
if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
The Court sees no reason for treating this case differently from PDIC and
Matalin. This disposition becomes all the more appropriate considering that
the respondents, as petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for the immediate
adjustment of their retirement benefits which, significantly, the herein
petitioners, as respondents in the same court, did not object to. Being aware
of said prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logical consequence if,
as it turned out, a declaratory judgment is rendered in the respondents' favor.
At bottom then, the trial court's judgment forestalled multiplicity of suits which,
needless to stress, would only entail a long and arduous process. Considering their
obvious advanced years, the respondents can hardly afford another protracted
proceedings. It is thus for this Court to already write finis to this case. WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the CA,
respectively dated July 7, 2005 and August 24, 2005, are AFFIRMED.
26 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#13
Sps. Crisologo v. Sps. Centeno
GR 20014, Nov 27 1968
Facts: Spouses Francisco Crisologo and Consolacion Florentino filed in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur an ex parte petition for consolidation of
ownership in them as vendees a retro of two parcels of land on the ground
that the vendors, the spouses Isaac Centeno and Asuncion Aquino, have
failed to exercise their right of repurchase within the periods stipulated in the
two contracts of sale with pacto de retro.
On January 28, 1955, the court a quo granted the petition. The vendors filed a
motion to set aside the Order of January 28, 1955, and on July 27, 1956, the
court a quo granted the motion on the ground that the movants had not
been duly notified of the hearing. On motion by the petitioners to set aside
the Order of July 27, 1956, on the ground that the vendors had been notified
by registered mail of the hearing, the lower court, by its Order of February 27,
1957, granted the motion and set aside the Order of July 27, 1956. The
vendors appealed the Order of February 27, 1957, to the Court of Appeals. On
June 27, 1958, the Court of Appeals set aside the lower court’s Order of
February 27, 1957, after holding that the vendors had not been legally notified
of the petition and the hearing, and the Order of January 28, 1955, was a
patent nullity.
The Court of Appeals remanded the record to the lower court for reopening.
After being served with summons, the vendors filed their answer alleging that
the two contracts of sale with pacto de retro were really intended as
equitable mortgages as securities for usurious loans. After trial, the lower court
rendered its decision on October 26, 1960, holding that respondents’
allegation was substantiated by their evidence. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the respondents. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court on
questions of law.
Petitioner-appellants contend that the lower court erred in not finding that the
Order of January 28, 1955 was valid, final and executory, and that all
proceedings thereafter taken, including the vendors’ appeal to the Court of
Appeals and its decision rendered in said appeal setting aside the Order of
February 27, 1957, and remanding the case for reopening as well as the
proceedings thereafter taken, including the decision of October 26, 1960, are
null and void.
Issue: WON the petitioner is correct
Ruling: No. The judgment of the lower court of October 26, 1960, is hereby Case#14
affirmed Ramos v. CA
(1) Article 1607 of the Civil Code which provides that: "In case of real property, GR 42108, Dec 29 1989 J. REGALADO
the consolidations of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the
vendor to comply with the provisions of Article 1616 shall not be recorded in FACTS:
the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been In January 1959, private respondent Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her
duly heard."contemplates a contentious proceeding wherein the vendor a brother, petitioner Oscar D. Ramos, the amounts of P 5,000.00 and P 9,000.00
retro must be named respondent in the caption and title of the petition for in connection with her business transaction with one Flor Ramiro, Fred Naboa
consolidation of ownership and duly summoned and heard. and Atty. Ruperto Sarandi involving the recovery of a parcel of land in
Tenejeros, Malabon. The said amount was used to finance the trip to Hawaii of
In the instant case, the caption and title of the petition for consolidation of Ramiro, Naboa and Atty. Sarandi. As security for said loan, Adelaida Ramos
ownership named the vendees as petitioners, but did not name the vendors executed in favor of petitioners two (2) deeds of conditional sale of her rights,
as respondents, the said vendors were not duly summoned and heard. In view shares, interests and participation over a land registered in the name of their
thereof, the Order of January 28, 1955, was a patent nullity having been parents, Valente Ramos and Margarita Denoga, now deceased; and another
issued contrary to the contentious proceeding contemplated in Article 1607 of land registered in the names of Socorro Ramos, Josefina Ramos and Adelaida
the Civil Code, and the lower court not having acquired jurisdiction over the Ramos. Both properties were located in Paniqui, Tarlac.
persons of the vendors;
Upon the failure of said private respondent as vendor a retro to exercise her
(2) The judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Order of February right of repurchase within the redemption period, aforenamed petitioner filed
27, 1957, and in consequence thereof the Order of January 28, 1955, as a a petition for consolidation and approval of the conditional sales. The court
patent nullity on the ground that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction granted the approval and consolidation of said lots. Private respondents had
over the persons of the vendors because they had not been summoned is res been and remained in possession of these properties until sometime in 1964
judicata on the question of nullity of said orders; and when petitioner took possession thereof.

(3) After the remand to the court below, the proceedings further taken
wherein the vendors were named as respondents and duly summoned and
heard, after which on October 26, 1960, the appealed judgment was
rendered in favor of the respondents, were valid, being in accordance with
the contentious proceeding provided for in Article 1607 of the Civil Code.
On February 28, 1968, private respondent filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Tarlac for declaration of nullity of orders, reformation of instrument,
recovery of possession with preliminary injunction and damages. The
complaint alleged that the deeds of conditional sale are mere mortgages
and were vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence and that
the issued by the probate and cadastral courts, were null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioners, in their answer to the complaint, specifically deny the allegations
of fraud and misrepresentation and interposed as defense the fact that the
questioned conditional sales were voluntarily executed by private respondent
and truly expressed the intention of the parties; that the action, if any, has
long prescribed; that the questioned orders are within the court’s jurisdiction.

The CFI held that the documents purporting to be deeds of conditional sale,
were in fact intended to be equitable mortgages. Petitioners appealed said
decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in all respects the judgment
of the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N THE REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS WERE IN ORDER

HELD: YES, The Court of Appeals, in holding that the two (2) deeds purporting
to be pacto de retro sale contracts are equitable mortgages, relied on the
following factual findings of the trial court,:

27 | R u l e 62-64 case digests


Several undisputed circumstances persuade this Court (that) the questioned
deeds should be construed as equitable mortgages as contemplated in
Article 1602 of the Civil Code, namely: (1) plaintiff vendor remained in
possession until 1964 of the properties she allegedly sold in 1959 to defendants;
(2) the sums representing the alleged purchase price were actually advanced
to plaintiff by way of loans, as expressly admitted by the parties at the hearing
of February 17, 1971, reflected in an Order of the same date: and (3) the
properties allegedly purchased by defendant Oscar Ramos and his wife have
never been declared for taxation purposes in their names.
Such a conclusion is buttressed by the other circumstances catalogued by
respondent court especially the undisputed fact that the two deeds were
executed by reason of the loan extended by petitioner Oscar Ramos to
private respondent Adelaida Ramos and that the purchase price stated
therein was the amount of the loan itself.
The above-stated circumstances are more than sufficient to show that the
true intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of
said debt and, therefore, shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage.
Under Article 1603 of the Civil Code it is provided that 'in case of doubt, a
contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as
an equitable mortgage' in this case, we have no doubt that the transaction
between the parties is that of a loan secured by said properties by way of
mortgage. Hence, we find that Exhibits B and G do not reflect the true and
real intention of the parties and should accordingly be reformed and
construed as equitable mortgages.
Ruling: The instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
28 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#15
Republic v. Batugas
GR 183110, Oct 7 2013
FACTS:
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur.
Azucena was born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September
28, 1941 to Chinese parents.
Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in
Philippine schools.
She then practiced her teaching profession at the Pax High School for
five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years, and in
Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another two years.
Azucena married Santiago Batuigas at the age of 26 (Santiago),a
natural-born Filipino citizen.19 They have five children.
RTC ruled that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines in
accordance with the provisions of the Naturalization Law.
The OSG argued in its Omnibus Motion the presentation of evidence
for the law requires public hearing in naturalization cases.
However, the RTC held that the public was fully appraised of the said
proceedings and was free to intervene.
OSG appealed to the CA contending that Batuguis failed to comply
with the income requirement and that the exparte proceedings
before a commissioner is not a public hearing.
CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: WON the petition for naturalization should be granted
HELD: YES.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under
Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third
option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women
married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which
provides that:
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may
be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to
prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of
their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended,
the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its
intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession
before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take
on her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her
family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five children,
provided them with education, and have all become professionals and
responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both
husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can
resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more
than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she
has known since birth
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified
for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of
making her a part of a truly Filipino family
29 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#16
Tan v. Republic
GR L-16108, Oct 31 1961, LABRADOR, J.
Facts: Eleuteria Tan filed a Petition for Cancellation of Alien Certificate of Registration
for herself and her nine minor children before the CFI of Misamis Occidental. She
alleged that she is the common-law wife of Tan King Pock, a Chinaman, and that their
children were born out of wedlock; that she and her children were registered as aliens;
and that the Commissioner of Immigration refused to cancel their registration as aliens.
The CFI issued an order suggesting that her petition be amended into a Petition for
Declaratory Relief.
Tan obliged and converted her petition. She alleged therein that she is a
Filipino citizen, being the illegitimate child of a Chinaman and a Filipina; and that
subject alien certificates of registration were registered as a mistake. The Solicitor
General filed an answer and asked for a denial of the petition because the petition was
not based upon any of the grounds required by the rules as a ground for declaratory
judgment; and that a proper action should be filed in seeking a judicial pronouncement
of claim for citizenship. The CFI ruled in favor of Tan and declared her a Filipino and
ordered the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the Alien Certificate of Registration
of Tan and her children.
Issue: Whether or not a Petition for Declaratory Relief is proper to declare a
person as a citizen of the Philippines, and to compel the Commissioner of
Immigration to cancel an alien certificate of registration
Held: No, the SC held that the Petition for Declaratory Relief was not proper,
because none of the circumstances provided for under Rule 64 was present in
this case. Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for
the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and
a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an
incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy,
the court may pass upon their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given
status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a
given person is a Filipino.
If the petition be considered as one for declaratory judgment, the
facts do not warrant the filing of the said special civil action. If the petition
seeks to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her and her
children's alien certificate of registration, the Petition for Declaratory Relief
would not lie because such a remedy of cancellation of alien certificate of
registration can only be had by virtue of a judgment of a competent court in
an action where the citizenship of parties is a material matter in issue.
 Rule 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit
Case#1
Pates v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184915, June 30 2009 BRION, J:
Facts:
Rule 64, Section 3: Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within
30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed.
February 1, 2008 — The COMELEC First Division issued the assailed
Resolution
February 4 — The counsel of Nilo Pates received a copy of the
February 1 Resolution
February 8 — Pates filed his MR of the February 1 Resolution (4 days
from receipt of the Resolution)
September 18 — The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying
the MR
September 22, 2008 — Pates received the September 18 Resolution
Thus, the last day for filing of a petition for certiorari would have been
October 18, 2008. (Because from September 22, count 26 days because he
already used the 4 days in filing the MR)
However, it fell on a Saturday thus, the last day for filing was October
20, 2008 — the following Monday. In this case, Pates filed his petition on
October 22 or 2 days late. Hence, the SC issued a Resolution dismissing the
petition for review under Rule 64.
Now, Pates is asking the reversal of the dismissal arguing that he filed
the petition within the fresh period. The "fresh period" refers to the original
period provided under the Rules of Court counted from notice of the ruling on
the MR, without deducting the period for the preparation and filing of the MR.
He pointed out that 3 years after the promulgation of the 1997 Rules,
the SC issued AM 02-03-SC bringing the “fresh period rule”. He argues that the
SC has consistently held that the order or resolution denying the MR or MNT is
considered as the final order finally disposing of the case, and the date of its
receipt by a party is the correct reckoning point for counting the period for
appellate review.
30 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Issue:
Whether or not the fresh period rule applies in Rule 64 - NO
Held:
Pates has not challenged the conclusion that his petition was filed
outside the period required by Section 3, Rule 64. He merely insists that the
fresh period rule, which is applicable to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
should likewise apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under
Rule 64.
However, Rule 64 cannot be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly
refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons.
Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two is Section 3
which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from
notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides),
with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration
deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of
60 days that Rule 65 provides).
Thus, as a matter of law, the SC’s ruling dismissing the petition for late
filing is correct.
Indeed, there were exceptional circumstances in the past where the
SC suspended the operation of the Rules. But these instances are the
exceptions rather than the rule. A party asking for the suspension of the Rules
of Court has the heavy burden of proving that he deserves to be accorded
exceptional treatment. IN THIS CASE, Pates presented no exceptional
circumstance to warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his
petition. He failed to explain why his filing was late. Other than his appeal to
history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should adopt
and apply the fresh period rule to an election case. These omissions are fatal.
Thus, the SC denied this MR.
 Case#2
Paa v. CA
G.R. No. 126560, December 4, 1997 DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: Atty. Paa was the Administrative Officer of the Regional Office of the
DOLE. SOLE Confesor ordered him dismissed for conduct grossly prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, among other things. He bid for reconsideration,
but was unsuccessful, so he appealed to the CSC. The CSC found him guilty of
being “Notoriously Undesirable” and imposed the penalty of dismissal of
service.
He filed an MR, but this was denied. Atty. Paa then filed with the CA a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari Under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The CA denied, saying it was the wrong mode of appeal, which should
be a Petition for Review. He filed the instant petition designating it as one for
“certiorari under Rule 65 or Rule 45 of the ROC.”
ISSUE: WON his mode of appeal was correct (NO)
Held:
Petitioner claims, however, that a petition for review was not his exclusive
remedy, as he could also avail of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65.
If, indeed, petitioner initially believed that he had the alternative remedy of a
special civil action for certiorari which would have been more effective and
adequate, then it was not necessary for him to ask for an extension of time to
file the petition. Under Rule 65 then, he had a reasonable period from receipt
of a copy of the Civil Service Commission resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration within which to file the petition. That reasonable period has
been interpreted to be ninety (90) days.
We are not, however, persuaded that petitioner initially thought of filing a
special civil action. All along, what he had in mind was a petition for review,
as evidenced by his express reference in his motion to a petition for review
under Rule 45 and his indication of the date he received a copy of the
resolution, viz., 29 March 1996, and the last day to file the petition, viz., 13 April
1996, which coincided with the last day prescribed under Rule 45.
It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal, 15 and we find no special nor compelling reasons
why we should make out an exception here.
In any case, even if we were to sympathize with petitioner and permit his
recourse under Rule 65, the end result would remain unchanged since a
perusal of the challenged resolutions of the Civil Service Commission fails to
disclose any grave abuse of discretion on its part
31 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#3
Lokin v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012, SERENO, J.
FACTS: On 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolutio expunging
the Certificate of Nomination which included herein petitioners as
representatives of the party-list group known as Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC). The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution,
prompting Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita F. Planas to file the present Petition for
Certiorari. Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in issuing both Resolutions, praying that they be recognized as the
legitimate nominees of CIBAC party-list, and that petitioner Lokin, Jr. be
proclaimed as the CIBAC party-list representative to the House of
Representatives.
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under R.A.
7941. As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight
graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the country’s public
service. Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking
and governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007
elections On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to
represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a "Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010
Elections." The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who
claimed to be the party’s acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same
day, another Manifestation was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona
Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the party’s vice-president and secretary-
general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued a Resolution giving due course to
CIBAC’s Manifestation, "WITHOUT PREJUDICE …TO the determination which of
the two factions of the registered party-list which filed two (2) manifestations
of intent to participate is the official representative of said party-list. On 19
January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Villanueva,
submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law
Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose.
On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of Nomination,
which included petitioners Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita Planas as party-list
nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as "acting secretary-
general" of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was
unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Expunge
From The Records And/Or For Disqualification," seeking to nullify the Certificate
filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself
as "acting secretary-general," when she was not even a member of CIBAC;
that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were
unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva
who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf. In
another resolution, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered
the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared
respondents’ faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. This was affirmed by
COMELEC en banc. Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in
accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the case would prosper under Rule 64 (Rules of Court)?
HELD: No, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the requisite
period. The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the COMELEC
is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
It must however be noted that the exception referred to in Section 2 of this
Rule refers precisely to the immediately succeeding provision, Section 3
thereof, which provides for the allowable period within which to file petitions
for certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. Thus, while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general
rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they provide for different
reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of 60 days from notice of
judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while Section 3
expressly provides for only 30 days. viz:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition: “...If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than
five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.”
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the
COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010.
This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September 2010.
Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners
to file the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days
or until 28 September 2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this
Court. However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010,
clearly outside the required period. In Pates v. Commission on Elections and
Domingo v. Commission on Elections, we have established that the fresh-
period rule used in Rule 65 does not similarly apply to the timeliness of
petitions under Rule 64.
Based on several considerations, we do not find convenience and uniformity
to be reasons sufficiently compelling to modify the required period for the
filing of petitions for certiorari under Rule 64. While the petitioner is correct in his
historical data about the Court’s treatment of the periods for the filing of the
different modes of review, he misses out on the reason why the period under
Section 3, Rule 64 has been retained. The reason, as made clear above, is
constitutionally-based and is no less than the importance our Constitution
32 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
accords to the prompt determination of election results. In this case, petitioners
do not even attempt to explain why the Petition was filed out of time. Clearly,
they are aware of the applicable period for filing, as they themselves invoke
the remedy under Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65. Hence, there is no
acceptable reason for their failure to comply with the proper procedure.
OTHER ISSUE: But even if this Court were to apply liberality and take
cognizance of the late Petition, the arguments therein are flawed. The
COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the
nomination of party-list representatives. Petitioners contend that the COMELEC
never should have taken cognizance of respondents’ Petition to Expunge
and/or for Disqualification. They have reached this conclusion by
characterizing the present matter as an intra-corporate dispute and, thus,
cognizable only by special commercial courts, particularly the designated
commercial court in this case, the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City. Even as
petitioners insisted on the purely intra-corporate nature of the conflict
between "CIBAC Foundation" and the CIBAC Sectoral Party, they submitted
their Certificate of Nomination and Manifestation of Intent to participate in the
party-list elections. Precisely, petitioners were seeking the COMELEC’s
approval of their eligibility to participate in the upcoming party-list elections. In
effect, they invoke its authority under the Party-List System Act, well within
COMELEC’s jurisdiction. In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it
was expressly settled that the COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve
intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated
power to enforce election laws and register political parties – including intra-
party leadership disputes. A careful perusal of the records readily shows that
Pia B. Derla, who has signed and submitted, as the purported Acting Secretary
General of CIBAC, the Certificates of Nomination of Respondents, has no
authority to do so. Despite Respondents’ repeated claim that Ms. Derla is a
member and officer of CIBAC, they have not presented any proof in support
of the same. We are at a loss as to the manner by which Ms. Derla has
assumed the post, and We see nothing but Respondents’ claims and
writings/certifications by Ms. Derla herself that point to that alleged fact.
Surely, We cannot rely on these submissions, as they are the very definition of
self-serving declarations.
 Case#4
Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. COA
G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the
petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life
insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod,
the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and
subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-
Antique for pre-audit.4 The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of
legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160. Respondent LGU appealed but its
appeal was denied.
Petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. The latter issued its
decision denying the petition,6 holding that under Section 447 and Section 458
of the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are
expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for
barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the
requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184.
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision and filed its motion for
reconsideration. However, the COA denied the motion.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, but the same was dismissed as
earlier stated through the resolution promulgated for the (a) late filing of the
petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified
declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondents
ISSUE: In its motion for reconsideration, the (1) petitioner submits that it filed the
petition for certiorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period
rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals;11 and
(2) that the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service in compliance
with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It admits having overlooked the
submission of a verified declaration;
and prays that the declaration attached to the motion for reconsideration be
admitted by virtue of its substantial compliance with the Efficient Use of Paper
Rule12 by previously submitting a compact disc (CD) containing the petition
for certiorari and its annexes. It disagrees with the Court, insisting that (3) COA
showed and proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in
issuing the assailed decision.
33 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
RULING:
Petitioner did not comply with the rule on proof of service
The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for
certiorari complied with the requirement on proof of service.
The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule
13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service. Section 13 thus
requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall
consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry
receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A
compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if
either or both are not submitted.
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed
by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of
the petition by registered mail “under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453,
70458, 70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages
64-65 of the petition.”14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of
what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters,
not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended the
registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not
substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in
the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the
requirement of proof of service.
Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the
judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of
mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima
facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law
warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final
order.
In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The
petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether
the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the
former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review
from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the
denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is
filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed.
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence,
should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within
the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which
was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December
14, 2012.21 Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt
of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering
that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July
19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014,
which was 25 days too late.
Petition for certiorari further lacked merit
The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit.
The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not sufficiently disclose
how the COA committed grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases
cited by the petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start
with, the supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were
neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an
abuse of discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had
been the main proponent of the Local Government Code in the Legislature,
expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA Commissioners’
own did not matter, for it was the latter’s adjudication that had any value and
decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally officials
entrusted with the authority for that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of
merit.
34 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#5
Osmea v. COA
G.R. No. 188818, May 31, 2011 BRION, J.
FACTS:
The City of Cebu was to play host to the 1994 Palarong Pambansa. In
preparation for the games, the City engaged the services of WT Construction, Inc. and
Dakay Construction and Development Company to construct and renovate the Cebu
City Sports Complex. Osmea, then city mayor, was authorized by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (Sanggunian) of Cebu to represent the City and to execute the
construction contracts.
Osmea issued a total of 20 Change/Extra Work Orders to WTCI, and to DCDC. These
Change/Extra Work Orders were not covered by any Supplemental Agreement, nor was
there a prior authorization from the Sanggunian. Nevertheless, the work proceeded on
account of the extreme urgency and need to have a suitable venue for the Palaro. The
Palaro was successfully held at the Cebu City Sports Complex.
WTCI and DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they performed in the
construction and renovation of the sports complex. A Sanggunian member sponsored a
resolution authorizing Osmea to execute the supplemental agreements with WTCI and
DCDC to cover the extra work performed, but the other Sanggunian members refused
to pass the resolution. Thus, the extra work completed by WTCI and DCDC was not
covered by the necessary appropriation to effect payment, prompting them to file two
separate collection cases before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. RTC found the
claims meritorious, and ordered the City to pay for the extra work performed. The RTC
likewise awarded damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees to WTCI and DCDC.
This decisions were affirmed on appeal, subject to certain modicications. To satisfy the
judgment debts, the Sanggunian finally passed the required appropriation ordinances.
During post-audit, the City Auditor (CA) issued two notices disallowing the payment of
litigation expenses, damages, and attorneys fees to WTCI and DCDC. The CA held
Osmea et al liable for the amounts awarded to WTCI and DCDC in their personal
capacities as this were unnecessary expenses.
Osmea and the members of Sanggunian sought reconsideration with the COA Regional
Office which modified the City Auditors Decision by absolving the members of the
sanggunian from any liability. Said decision was sustained by COA’s National Direcot for
Legal and Adjudication.
Osmea filed an appeal. COA issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the notices of
disallowance. 18 days after the assailed decision, Osmea received a copy of such and
filed a motion for reconsideration. The COA denied Osmeas motion via a Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the remaining 12 days to file Rule 64 petition should be
counted from his actual knowledge of the denial of his motion.
HELD:
Relaxation of procedural
rules to give effect to a
partys right to appeal
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to
 be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of
said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less
than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial
From time to time, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for
the most compelling reasons. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules
must at least be accompanied by an explanation of why the party-litigant
failed to comply with the Rules and by a justification for the requested liberal
construction.
Osmea cites the mandatory medical check-ups he had to undergo as reason
for the delay in filing his petition for certiorari. Due to his weakened state of
health, he claims that he could not very well be expected to be bothered by
the affairs of his office and had to focus only on his medical treatment. He
could not require his office to attend to the case as he was being charged in
his personal capacity.
We find Osmeas reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules. Although
the service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on
June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City,
we consider July 15, 2009 the date he reported back to office as the effective
date when he was actually notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date
of the period to appeal. If we were to rule otherwise, we would be denying
Osmea of his right to appeal the Decision of the COA, despite the merits of his
case.
Moreover, a certiorari petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be
verified, and a verification requires the petitioner to state under oath before
an authorized officer that he has read the petition and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge. Given that Osmea
was out of the country to attend to his medical needs, he could not comply
with the requirements to perfect his appeal of the Decision of the COA.
While the Court has accepted verifications executed by a petitioners counsel
who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading, this was
an alternative not available to Osmea, as he had yet to secure his own
counsel. Osmea could not avail of the services of the City Attorney, as the
latter is authorized to represent city officials only in their official capacity.
Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64 petition
should be counted from July 15, 2009, the date Osmea had actual knowledge of the
denial of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the COA and given the
opportunity to competently file an appeal thereto before the Court. The present
petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within the reglementary period.
35 | R u l e 62-64 case digests
Case#6
Pormento v. Estrada
G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010 CORONA, C.J.
FACTS:
Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in
the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the
general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed
private respondents candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. However, his
petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. However, under the Rules of Court, the
filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not
even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the
position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second
highest number of votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May
2010 elections in view of the prohibition in the Constitution which states that:
"[t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection”
HELD: Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will
be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or
substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon
by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one
of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or
to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the
thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President
who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true
today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.