BPI vs.
IAC to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it
A contract of depositum was entered into by
Garcia, on behalf of COMTRUST (BPI),
wherein he received US $3,000 (foreign
exchange) from Zshornack for safekeeping.
Later on or over five months later, Zshornack
demanded the return of the money but the
bank refused alleging that the amount was
sold and transferred to her current account.
Arguments:
COMTRUST (BPI): The parties entered into a
contract of depositum which banks do not
enter into. Thus, Garcia exceeded his powers
when he entered into the contract on behalf of
the bank, hence, the bank cannot be liable
under the contract.
Issue: WON the contract entered into is a
contract of depositum.
Held:
Yes. The situation is one contemplated in Art.
1962 of the NCC:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another, with the obligation of safely keeping it
and of returning the same. If the safekeeping
of the thing delivered is not the principal
purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but
some other contract.
Note: But because the subject of the contract
here is a foreign exchange, it is covered by
Central Bank Circular No. 20 which requires
that, “All receipts of foreign exchange by
any resident person, firm, company or
corporation shall be sold to authorized agents
of the Central Bank by the recipients within
one business day following the receipt of such
foreign exchange.”
Since the document and the subsequent acts
of the parties show that they intended the bank
later to Zshornack, who alleged in his
complaint that he is a Philippine resident, the
parties did not intend to sell the US dollars to
the Central Bank within one business day from
receipt. Otherwise, the contract
of depositum would never have been entered
into at all.
In other words, the transaction between
Zshornack and the bank was void having been
executed against the provisions of a
mandatory law (CB Circ No. 20). Being in pari
delicto, the law cannot afford either of them
remedy
BPI vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained
in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a
peso current account. An application for a
dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia
branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a
certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion,
Garcia indicated that the amount was to be
charged to the dolar savings account of the
Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the
name of the purchaser of the dollar draft.
Comtrust issued a check payable to the order
of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the
withdrawal from his account, he demanded an
explainaiton from the bank. In its answer,
Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the
withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto
Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he
encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check
for P8450 issued by the manila banking
corporation payable to Ernesto.
Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner
and respondent bank is a deposit?
Held: The document which embodies the
contract states that the US$3,000.00 was
received by the bank for safekeeping. The
subsequent acts of the parties also show that
the intent of the parties was really for the bank
to safely keep the dollars and to return it to
Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack
demanded the return of the money on May 10,
1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract
defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another, with the obligation of safely keeping it
and of returning the same. If the safekeeping
of the thing delivered is not the principal
purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but
some other contract.
CA Agro Industrial Development Corp., vs
Court of Appeals
Petitioner and the spouses Ramon and Paula
Pugao entered into an agreement whereby the
former purchased from the latter two (2)
parcels of land. Among the terms and
conditions of the agreement were that the titles
to the lots shall be transferred to the petitioner
upon full payment of the purchase price and
that the owner's copies of the certificates of
titles thereto, and that title shall be deposited
shall be deposited in a safety deposit box of
any bank. Petitioner and the Pugaos then
rented Safety Deposit Box of private
respondent Security Bank and Trust Company.
Thereafter, a certain Mrs. Margarita Ramos
offered to buy from the petitioner the two (2)
lots. Mrs. Ramos demanded the execution of a
deed of sale which necessarily entailed the
production of the certificates of title. In view
thereof, Aguirre, accompanied by the Pugaos,
then proceeded to the respondent Bank to
open the safety deposit box and get the
certificates of title. However, when opened in
the presence of the Bank's representative, the
box yielded no such certificates.
Issue:
Is the contractual relation between a
commercial bank and another party in a
contract of rent of a safety deposit box with
respect to its contents placed by the latter one
of bailor and bailee or one of lessor and
lessee?
Held:
The contract for the rent of the safety deposit
box is not an ordinary contract of lease as
defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code.
However, We do not fully subscribe to its view
that the same is a contract of deposit that is to
be strictly governed by the provisions in the
Civil Code on deposit; the contract in the case
at bar is a special kind of deposit. It cannot be
characterized as an ordinary contract of lease
under Article 1643 because the full and
absolute possession and control of the safety
deposit box was not given to the joint renters
— the petitioner and the Pugaos. The guard
key of the box remained with the respondent
Bank; without this key, neither of the renters
could open the box. On the other hand, the
respondent Bank could not likewise open the
box without the renter's key. In this case, the
said key had a duplicate which was made so
that both renters could have access to the box.
CA Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation vs CA GR No. 90027. March 3,
1993
CA Agro (through its President,
Aguirre) and spouses Pugao entered into an
agreement whereby the former purchased two
parcels of land for P350, 525 with a P75, 725
down payment while the balance was covered
by three (3) postdated checks. Among the
terms embodied in a Memorandum of True
and Actual Agreement of Sale of Land were
that titles to the lots shall be transferred to the
petitioner upon full payment of the purchase
price and that the owner’s copies of the
certificates of titles thereto shall be deposited
in a safety deposit box of any bank. The same
could be withdrawn only upon the joint
signatures of a representative of the petitioner
upon full payment of the purchase price. They
then rented Safety Deposit box of private
respondent Security Bank and Trust Company
(SBTC). For this purpose, both signed a
contract of lease which contains the following
conditions:
13. The bank is not a depositary of the
contents of the safe and it has neither the
possession nor control of the same.
14. The bank has no interest whatsoever in
said contents, except herein expressly
provided, and it assumes absolutely no liability
in connection therewith.
After the execution of the contract, two (2)
renter’s key were given to Aguirre, and
Pugaos. A key guard remained with the bank.
The safety deposit box has two key holes and
can be opened with the use of both keys.
Petitioner claims that the CTC were placed
inside the said box.
Thereafter, a certain Mrs. Ramos offered to
buy from the petitioner the two (2) lots at a
price of P225 per sqm. Mrs. Ramose
demanded the execution of a deed of sale
which necessarily entailed the production of
the CTC. Aguirre and Pugaos then proceeded
to the bank to open the safety deposit box.
However, when opened in the presence of
bank’s representative, the box yielded no
certificates. Because of the delay in
reconstitution of title, Mrs. Ramos withdrew her
earlier offer and as a consequence petitioner
failed to realize the expected profit of P280 ,
500. Hence, the latter filed a complaint for
damages.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint
CA: Affirmed
Issue:
Whether or not the contractual relation
between a commercial bank and another party
in the contract of rent of a safety deposit box is
one of bailor and bailee.
Ruling:
Yes.
The contract in the case at bar is a
special kind of deposit. It cannot be
characterized as an ordinary contract of lease
under Article 1643 because the full and
absolute possession and control of the safety
deposit box was not given to the joint renters –
the petitioner and Pugaos.
American Jurisprudence:
The prevailing rule is that the relation
between a bank renting out safe-deposit boxes
and its customer with respect to the contents
of the box is that of a bail or bailee, the
bailment being for hire and mutual benefit.
Our provisions on safety deposit boxes
are governed by Section 72 (a) of the General
Banking Act, and this primary function is still
found within the parameters of a contract of
deposit like the receiving in custody of funds,
documents and other valuable objects for
safekeeping. The renting out of the safety
deposit boxes is not independent from, but
related to or in conjunction with, this principal
function. Thus, depositary’s liability is
governed by our civil code rules on obligation
and contracts, and thus the SBTC would be
liable if, in performing its obligation, it is found
guilty of fraud, negligence, delay or
contravention of the tenor of the agreement.
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO v.
GREGORIO DE LA PEÑA
Plaintiff is the trustee of a charitable bequest
made for the construction of a leper hospital
and that Father Agustin de la Peña was the
duly authorized representative of the plaintiff to
receive the legacy. The defendant is... the
administrator of the estate of Father De la
Peña.
1898 the books of Father De la Peña, as
trustee, showed that he had on hand as such
trustee the sum of P6,641
In the same year he deposited in his personal
account P19,000 in the Hongkong and
Shanghai
Bank at Iloilo.
Shortly thereafter and during the war of the
revolution, Father De la Peña was arrested by
the military authorities as a political prisoner,
and while thus detained made an order on said
bank in favor of the United States Army officer
under whose charge he... then was for the
sum thus deposited in said bank. The arrest of
Father De la Peña and the confiscation of the
funds in the bank were the result of the claim
of the military authorities that he was an
insurgent and that the funds thus deposited
had been collected by him for... revolutionary
purposes. The money was taken from the
bank by the military authorities by virtue of
such order, was confiscated and turned over to
the Government.
In this jurisdiction, therefore, Father De la
Peña's liability is determined by those portions
of the Civil Code which... relate to obligations.
Issues:
WON Father dela Pena (or his estate) is liable
for the funds lost while in trust.... trust funds
Ruling:
By placing the money in the bank and mixing it
with his personal funds De la Peña did not
thereby assume an obligation different from
that under which he would have lain if such
deposit had not been made, nor did he
thereby make himself liable to repay the
money at... all hazards. If the money had
been forcibly taken from his pocket or from his
house by the military forces of one of the
combatants during a state of war, it is clear
that under the provisions of the Civil Code he
would have been exempt from responsibility.
The fact... that he placed the trust fund in the
bank in his personal account does not add to
his responsibility. Such deposit did not make
him a debtor who must respond at all hazards.
We regard such discussion as substantially
fruitless, inasmuch as the precise question is
not one of negligence. There was no law
prohibiting him from depositing it as he did
and... there was no law which changed his
responsibility by reason of the deposit.
The court, therefore, finds and declares that
the money which is the subject matter of this
action was deposited by Father De la Peña in
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation of Iloilo; that said money was
forcibly taken from the bank by the armed
forces of the United
Sates during the war of the insurrection; and
that said Father De la Peña was not
responsible for its loss. The judgment is
therefore reversed, and it is decreed that the
plaintiff shall take nothing by his complaint.
DISSENTING OPINION, TRENT... when De la
Peña mixed this trust fund with his own and
deposited the whole in the bank to his
personal account or credit, he by this act
stamped on the said fund... his own private
marks and unclothed it of all the protection it
had. If this money had been deposited in the
name of De la Peña as trustee or agent of the
plaintiff, I think that it may be presumed that
the military authorities would not have
confiscated it for the reason... that they were
looking for insurgent funds only. Again, the
plaintiff had no reason to suppose that De la
Peña would attempt to strip the fund of its
identity, nor had he said or done anything
which tended to relieve De la Peña from the
legal responsibility which pertains... to the care
and custody of trust funds.
Principles:
Although the Civil Code states that "a person
obliged to give something is also bound to
preserve it with the diligence pertaining to a
good father of a family" (art. 1094), it also
provides, following the principle of the Roman
law, major casus est, cui humana infirmitas...
resistere non potest, that "no one shall be
liable for events which could not be foreseen,
or which having been foreseen were
inevitable, with the exception of the cases
expressly mentioned in the law or those in
which the obligation so declares." (Art. 1105.)
Triple-V vs. Filipino Merchants
Mary Jo-Anne De Asis ate at Kamayan
Restaurant. She drove a car which was
assigned to her by her employer Crispa
TextileInc. (Crispa). She availed of the valet
parking service of petitioner
The car was parked by valet attendant,
Madridano. A few minutes later, they noticed
that the car was gone and its key is no longer
in the box where valet attendants usually keep
the keys of cars entrusted to them.
The car was never recovered so
Crispa filed a claim against its insurer,
resp. Filipino Merchants Insurance
Company (FMICI).P669,500 was given for
the loss of the car.4.) As a subrogee to
Crispa’s rights, FMICI filed an action
for damages against petitioner Triple-V Food
Services.5.) Petitioner argued that the
complaint failed to support allegations
ofrecklessness and negligence committed
in the safekeeping andcustody of the car.
They also said that the parking ticket provided
anexplicit waiver of any right to claim
indemnity for the loss of the car,and that De
Asis knowingly assumed the risk of loss.
RTC ruled in favor of FMICI and ordered Triple
V to pay so Triple V appealed to the CA saying
that it was not a depositary of the car and that
it exercised due diligence and prudence
CA affirmed RTC saying that petitioner
was a depositary and it was negligent in
its duties as a depositary and as an employer
of thevalet attendant
ISSUE:
WON Triple V was a depositary and WON it
was negligent
HELD: Yes, Yes
RATIO:
1. When De Asis entrusted her car,
she expected its safere turn. Thus,
petitioner was constituted as a depositary of
the same car and cannot evade liability
even if she availed of its free valet
parking service.
2. In a contract of deposit, a person receives
an object belonging to another with the
obligation of safely keeping it and
returning the same. A deposit may be
constituted even without any consideration.
3. The waiver a contract of adhesion.
Petitioner must not be allowed to use its
exclusionary stipulation as a shield from
liability. A safe parking space is an
added attraction to the restaurant.
Having said that, customers fully expects the
security of their car while dining.
Note: There was valid subrogation of
rights between Crispa and FMICI. Theft
was covered in the insurance. RTC
and CA ruling affirmed.
DURBAN APARTMENTS CORPORATION v.
PIONEER INSURANCE
Durban Apartments Corporation solely liable to
respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation for the loss of Jeffrey See's
(See's) vehicle.
on April 30, 2002, See arrived and checked in
at the City Garden Hotel in Makati corner
Kalayaan Avenues, Makati City before
midnight, and its parking attendant, defendant
x x x Justimbaste got the key to said Vitara
from
See to park it[. O]n May 1, 2002, at about 1:00
o'clock in the morning, See was awakened in
his room by [a] telephone call from the Hotel
Chief Security Officer who informed him that
his Vitara was carnapped while it was parked
unattended at the parking area of Equitable
PCI Bank along Makati Avenue between the
hours of 12:00 [a.m.] and 1:00 [a.m.];
Vitara was lost due to the negligence of
[petitioner] Durban Apartments and
[defendant] Justimbaste because it was
discovered during the investigation that this
was the second time that a similar incident of
carnapping happened in the valet parking
service of [petitioner] Durban
Apartments and no necessary precautions
were taken to prevent its repetition;... upon
arrival at the City Garden Hotel, See gave
notice to the doorman and parking attendant of
the said hotel, x x x Justimbaste, about his
Vitara when he entrusted its ignition key to the
latter. x x x Justimbaste issued a valet...
parking customer claim stub to See, parked
the Vitara at the Equitable PCI Bank parking
area, and placed the ignition key inside a
safety key box while See proceeded to the
hotel lobby to check in. The Equitable PCI
Bank parking area became an annex of City
Garden Hotel when the... management of the
said bank allowed the parking of the vehicles
of hotel guests thereat in the evening after
banking hours.
Issues:
Ultimately, whether petitioner is liable to
respondent for the loss of See's vehicle.
Ruling:
Article 1962, in relation to Article 1998, of the
Civil Code defines a contract of deposit and a
necessary deposit made by persons in hotels
or inns:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another, with the obligation of safely keeping it
and returning the same. If the safekeeping of
the thing delivered is not the principal purpose
of the contract, there is no... deposit but some
other contract.
Art. 1998. The deposit of effects made by
Art. 1998. The deposit of effects made by
travelers in hotels or inns shall also be
regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels
or inns shall be responsible for them as
depositaries, provided that notice was given to
them, or to their employees, of the effects
brought by the... guests and that, on the part of
the latter, they take the precautions which said
hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised
relative to the care and vigilance of their
effects.
Plainly, from the facts found by the lower
courts, the insured See deposited his vehicle
for safekeeping with petitioner, through the
latter's employee, Justimbaste. In turn,
Justimbaste issued a claim stub to See. Thus,
the contract of deposit was perfected from
See's delivery,... when he handed over to
Justimbaste the keys to his vehicle, which
Justimbaste received with the obligation of
safely keeping and returning it. Ultimately,
petitioner is liable for the loss of See's vehicle.
YHT REALTY CORPORATION VS. CA
FACTS: Maurice Mcloughlin is an Australian
philanthropist, businessman, and a tourist. In
his various trips from Australia going to
different countries, one of which is the
Philippines, he would stay in Tropicana Inn
which is owned by YHT Realty Corp. After
series of transactions with the inn as
depositary of his belongings, he noticed that
his money and several jewelries would be
either reduced or lost. He then decided to file
an action against Tropicana and its
innkeepers. However, the latter argued that
they have no liability with regard to the loss by
virtue of the undertaking signed by Mcloughlin.
Such undertaking is a waiver of the inn’s
liability in case of any loss. The RTC and CA
both decided that such undertaking is null and
void as contrary to
the express provisions of the law. Hence, the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject undertaking
is null and void
HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. Art.
2003 of the Civil Code provides that, the
hotelkeeper cannot free himself from
responsibility by posting notices to the effect
that he is not liable for the articles brought by
the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-
keeper and the guest whereby the
responsibility of the former as set forth in
Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or
diminished shall be void.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. PRES.
JUDGE BENITO C. SE
In accordance with Act No. 2137, the
Warehouse Receipts Law, Noah's Ark Sugar
Refinery issued on several dates, the following
Warehouse Receipts (Quedans): (a) March 1,
1989, Receipt No. 18062, covering sugar
deposited by Rosa Sy; (b) March 7, 1989,
Receipt No. 18080, covering... sugar
deposited by RNS Merchandising (Rosa Ng
Sy); (c) March 21, 1989, Receipt No. 18081,
covering sugar deposited by St. Therese
Merchandising; (d)March 31, 1989, Receipt
No. 18086, covering sugar deposited by St.
Therese Merchandising; and (e) April 1, 1989,
Receipt No. 18087,... covering sugar
deposited by RNS Merchandising.
Subsequently, Warehouse Receipts Nos.
18080 and 18081 were negotiated and
endorsed to Luis T. Ramos; and Receipts Nos.
18086, 18087 and 18062 were negotiated and
endorsed to Cresencia K. Zoleta. Ramos and
Zoleta then used the quedans as security for
two loan agreements - one for
P15.6 million and the other for P23.5 million -
obtained by them from the Philippine National
Bank. The aforementioned quedans were
endorsed by them to the Philippine National
Bank.
Luis T. Ramos and Cresencia K. Zoleta failed
to pay their loans upon maturity on January 9,
1990. Consequently, on March 16, 1990, the
Philippine National Bank wrote to Noah's Ark
Sugar Refinery demanding delivery of the
sugar stocks covered by the quedans
endorsed to it by
Zoleta and Ramos. Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery
refused to comply with the demand alleging
ownership thereof... the Philippine National
Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila a verified complaint for "Specific
Performance with Damages and Application
for
Writ of Attachment
On January 31, 1991, the Philippine National
Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
On May 2, 1991, the Regional Trial Court
issued an order denying the Motion for
Summary Judgment.
the Philippine National Bank filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
On December 13, 1991, the Court of Appeals
nullified and set aside the orders of May 2 and
July 4, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court and
ordered the trial court to render summary
judgment in favor of the PNB. On June 18,
1992, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing... plaintiffs complaint against private
respondents for lack of cause of action and
likewise dismissed private respondents'
counterclaim against PNB and of the Third-
Party Complaint and the Third-Party
Defendant's Counterclaim. On September 4,
1992, the trial court denied PNB's
Motion for Reconsideration.
Private respondents thereupon filed before the
trial court an Omnibus Motion seeking among
others the deferment of the proceedings until
private respondents are heard on their claim
for warehouseman's lien.
Issues:
Can the warehouseman enforce... his
warehouseman's lien before delivering the
sugar stocks as ordered by the Court of
Appeals or need he file a separate action to
enforce payment of storage fees?
Ruling:
Petitioner's submission is on a technicality,
that is, that private respondents have lost their
right to recover warehouseman's lien on the
sugar stocks covered by the five (5)
Warehouse Receipts for the reason that they
failed to set up said claim in their Answer
before the... trial court... private respondents
maintain that they could not have claimed the
right to a warehouseman' s lien in their Answer
to the complaint before the trial court as it
would have been inconsistent with their stand
that they claim ownership of the stocks
covered by the... quedans since the checks
issued for payment thereof were dishonored. If
they were still the owners, it would have been
absurd for them to ask payment for storage
fees and preservation expenses.
Of considerable relevance is the pertinent
stipulation in the subject Warehouse Receipts
which provides for respondent Noah's Ark's
right to impose and collect warehouseman's
lien:
"Storage of the refined sugar quantities
mentioned herein shall be free up to one (1)
week from the date of the quedans covering
said sugar and thereafter, storage fees shall
be charged in accordance with the Refining
Contract under which the refined sugar
covered... by this Quedan was produced. "[6]
Accordingly, petitioner PNB is legally bound to
stand by the express terms and conditions on
the face of the Warehouse Receipts as to the
payment of storage fees.
 Principles:

Even in the absence of such a... provision, law
and equity dictate the payment of the
warehouseman' s lien pursuant to Sections 27
and 31 of the Warehouse Receipts Law (R.A.
2137), to wit:
SECTION 27. What claims are included in the
warehouseman's lien. - Subject to the
provisions of section thirty, a warehouseman
shall have lien on goods deposited or on the
proceeds thereof in his hands, for all lawful
charges for storage and preservation of the...
goods; also for all lawful claims for money
advanced, interest, insurance, transportation,
labor, weighing coopering and other charges
and expenses in relation to such goods; also
for all reasonable charges and expenses for
notice, and advertisement of sale, and for sale
of the... goods where default has been made
in satisfying the warehouseman's lien.
While the PNB is entitled to the stocks of sugar
as the endorsee of the quedans, delivery to it
shall be effected only upon payment of the
storage fees.
Imperative is the right of the warehouseman to
demand payment of his lien at this juncture,
because, in accordance with Section 29 of the
Warehouse Receipts Law, the warehouseman
loses his lien upon goods by surrendering
possession thereof. In other words, the lien
may be lost... where the warehouseman
surrenders the possession of the goods
without requiring payment of his lien, because
a warehouseman's lien is possessory in
nature.

SECTION 31. Warehouseman need not

deliver until lien is satisfied. - A warehouseman
having a lien valid against the person
demanding the goods may refuse to deliver
the goods to him until the lien is satisfied."

Considering that petitioner does not deny the

existence, validity and genuineness of the
Warehouse Receipts on which it anchors its
claim for payment against private respondents,
it cannot disclaim liability for the payment of
the storage fees stipulated therein. As
contracts,... the receipts must be respected by
authority of Article 1159 of the Civil Code, to
wit:

"ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts

have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good
faith."