Different Groups, Different Strategies: How Interest Groups Pursue Their Political Ambitions

ISSN 0080 – 6757
© 2008 The Author(s)

Journal compilation © 2008 Nordic Political Science Association
Different Groups, Different Strategies:

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How Interest Groups Pursue Their

Political Ambitions
Anne Binderkrantz*
The article compares the political activities of different types of interest groups. Drawing on
data from a survey of all Danish national interest groups, it demonstrates significant variation
in the strategic choices of different types of groups. Groups with corporative resources direct
much attention towards influencing the bureaucracy. They possess resources valued by officials
and therefore have good options for utilizing a strategy targeting the administration and seeking
corporatist integration. By contrast, public interest groups are more likely to use publicly visible
strategies in which affecting the media agenda plays a central role. By engaging in such strategies,
public interest groups can demonstrate a high level of engagement to their diffuse membership.
Furthermore, the goals of public interest groups are typically conducive to pursuit through
public strategies. A third category of other groups is incorporated in the analyses as a point of
reference to establish patterns of strategy use. While there are clear differences between groups
with regard to most strategies of influence, different types of groups are equally engaged in a
parliamentary strategy. Interacting with Parliament seems to be important for groups integrated
in corporatist structures as well as for those relying more on public strategies.
Introduction
All democracies witness political activities by a true plethora of interest
groups. Groups lobby politicians, they interact with the bureaucracy and
they seek to affect public opinion through media campaigns and membership
mobilizations. However, different groups do not necessarily have the same
opportunities to actually be heard. Even though an impressively wide range
of causes and concerns are promoted, only some of these efforts lead to
policy changes. The question of which groups are most capable of advancing
their causes is fundamental to understanding the functioning of democracy.
In this light, it is no surprise that it has been on the agenda of political science
for more than a century (Baumgartner & Leech 1998).
* Anne Binderkrantz, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Bartholins Allé

331, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. E-mail: asb@ps.au.dk
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008 173

The literature has provided a variety of answers. Upon observing the

diversity of groups active in American politics, early pluralists concluded
that all groups have opportunities to promote their causes. Perhaps groups
were not exactly equal in these attempts, but resources and power were
sufficiently dispersed to merit a positive evaluation of the interest group
system (Bentley 1949 [1908]; Dahl 1961; Truman 1951). Later American
research modified this picture. Empirical studies found some types of groups
to be much more active than others, and access to the political system
was described as structured and resource-dependent (McConnell 1966;
Schattschneider 1960).
In the European literature, the focus on the privileging of certain groups
became even more pronounced (Schmitter 1974). Scandinavians found a
particularly important source of inspiration in Stein Rokkan’s distinction
between a numerical and a corporative channel. Rokkan emphasized the
importance of the corporatist channel, where interest groups negotiate with
the state (Rokkan 1966, 166). The first wave of corporatist-inspired research
in Scandinavia documented a widespread integration of interest groups in
public decision making and scholars focused on establishing which groups
were prominent participants in corporatist structures. Later research,
however, has been more concerned with the possible decline of corporatism. In
the last decades, corporatist structures have been rupturing (Blom-Hansen
2000). At the same time, other channels of influence have become more
important. Lobbying Parliament has gained in prominence (Binderkrantz
2003), and interest groups direct much attention towards influencing the
media – a third channel only mentioned in passing by Rokkan (1966, 109).
These developments have led scholars to characterize the political process
in Scandinavian countries as increasingly pluralistic (Blom-Hansen 2000;
Christiansen & Rommetvedt 1999; Hermansson et al. 1999).
This situation suggests a new angle on the question of which types of
interests are represented in the political system – an angle consistent with
Rokkan’s original distinction between different channels. Rather than asking
which groups are integrated through corporatist structures, it is relevant to
ask whether different types of groups utilize different channels of influence.
In other words, are the same groups predominant in the corporative channel,
the numerical channel and the media channel, or do different channels
present different kinds of groups with opportunities to make their voice
heard?
The research in this article contributes to answering this question. The
article distinguishes between four different strategies of influence. Two of
these strategies consist of directly approaching decision makers in the
bureaucracy and in Parliament, respectively. The two other strategies
represent more indirect means of seeking influence by getting the attention
of the media, or by mobilizing group members and supporters. It is argued
174 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

that different types of groups exhibit different patterns of strategy use. Some
groups – primarily those related to the private or public labor market –
possess resources that are central to the corporatist strategy of targeting the
bureaucracy. Other groups are more inclined to use indirect strategies
because they appeal to the public interest and therefore prefer publicly
visible strategies. These hypotheses are investigated based on a survey of all
national Danish interest groups. The findings suggest that the existence of
different channels of influence entails options for different types of groups to
have their voices heard.
Why Different Strategies Appeal to Different

Types of Groups
Different Strategies of Influence: A Framework
Prior to discussing possible variations between types of groups in the use of
strategies, it is necessary to outline a general framework of strategies that
interest groups might turn to in their attempts to influence politics. As
mentioned above, Stein Rokkan in 1966 called attention to the existence of
a corporatist channel alongside the numerical or parliamentary channel.
According to Rokkan, in the numerical channel, votes count in the choice of
governing personnel, while resources count in the corporatist channel, and
thus in the actual policies pursued by authorities. Even though Rokkan is
famous for this two-tier distinction, he explicitly acknowledged the potential
importance of a third channel: the mass media (Rokkan 1966, 106–7). From
an interest group perspective, this opens up three potential strategies of
influence: one of targeting bureaucrats and ultimately seeking corporatist
integration, one of lobbying politicians and parties and one of influencing the
media. Rokkan’s main errand was to emphasize the importance of the
corporatist channel, but the framework is well-suited to an open-ended
investigation of variation between groups in the use of these channels.
While Scandinavians customarily employ Rokkan’s vocabulary, other
strands of the interest group literature distinguish between an insider
strategy of close consultation with political and administrative actors and an
outsider strategy based on public appeals through the media and mobilization
of group members and citizens (Gais & Walker 1991, 103; Jordan & Maloney
1997, 181; Kollman 1998, 23). The insider strategy partly resembles the
corporative channel, but also incorporates elements of a strategy directed
towards parliamentary actors. The terms ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ reflect
a tendency to equate status as insider or outsider with the use of different
strategies (Maloney et al. 1994, 181). However, it is preferable to distinguish

between group activities and group status as the latter is largely ascribed to
interest groups by decision makers.
The research reported in this article builds on a fourfold typology of interest
group strategies inspired by Rokkan’s work as well as by the literature on
insider versus outsider strategies. A main distinction is made between direct
strategies, where groups approach public decision makers, and indirect strat-
egies, where influence on policy is sought in less direct ways. In addition to
two direct strategies of targeting either administrative or parliamentary
actors, the framework includes two indirect strategies: a media strategy,
where group efforts are directed towards the media, and a mobilization
strategy, where members or citizens are mobilized. These four influence
strategies are overall approaches that groups might follow in their pursuit of
political goals. Empirically, strategies can be observed as combinations of
specific activities or tactics (Berry 1977, 212; Grant 2000a, 410).
Focusing on strategies of influence, this research departs somewhat from
earlier Scandinavian interest group studies. Previous research has most often
used the interaction between groups and public decision makers – primarily in
the corporative channel – as the analytical point of departure (Blom-Hansen
2001). In contrast, the focus on interest group strategies places interest
groups and their strategies at center stage. Even though the analytical point
of departure differs from earlier Scandinavian research, it should be clear
from the discussion that the research questions are in continuation of the
research tradition inspired by Rokkan’s seminal work. It is worth noting
that the focus on group strategies does not imply that interest groups are
unconstrained in their strategic choices. Groups have some degrees of
freedom, but their use of different strategies of influence is constrained by
internal as well as external factors (Jordan & Maloney 1997, 184; Smith 1990,
319–20). Notably, access to the corporative channel depends on whether
groups are privileged by decision makers.
The choice of analytical focus has three advantages: First, it avoids making
prior assumptions as to which channels of influence are most important. This
is particularly important in a context where corporatism has been rupturing
and other means of influence on the rise. Second, it enables an investigation
of variation between groups in strategic choices. Such an investigation is the
main focus of this article. Third, the differentiation between status and strategy
makes it possible to distinguish between privileges conferred on groups by
decision makers and group actions.
Different Groups, Different Strategies?

The universe of interest groups includes representatives of almost every
conceivable group of people or viewpoint. Trade unions organize employees
in various sectors, business groups organize companies and other groups

organize people based on shared characteristics such as being elderly, disabled,

student or user of welfare benefits. On top of this, a wide range of groups
draw members based not on any objective characteristic, but on shared
attitudes. These public interest groups work to further all sorts of concerns,
ranging from broad policy agendas to narrow single issues. Categorizing
this broad spectrum of groups into theoretically interesting categories is
complicated. Nevertheless, this section seeks to order the diverse universe of
groups into subcategories by pointing to two main features that can be
expected to affect the use of different influence strategies.
First of all, however, it is necessary to define the concept of interest groups
and to distinguish interest groups from other types of political actors. Interest
groups are defined as membership organizations working to obtain political
influence. Group members can be individuals, firms, governmental institutions
or even other interest groups.1 Interest groups are distinguished from
political parties by not running for office in general elections – although
some groups have indeed crossed the line and run for election. Limiting the
study to membership groups is in accordance with the tradition in the
Scandinavian literature, where for example, individual business firms
seeking political influence are treated separately from interest groups
(Christiansen & Nørgaard 2003a; Hermansson et al. 1999). It also follows the
suggestion by the British political scientist Grant Jordan and his collaborators
to distinguish between interest groups defined as membership organizations
and other actors seeking political influence (Jordan et al. 2004, 205–6).
Having provided a definition of interest groups, it is now time to define
subcategories. In order to explain variation in strategic choices it is fruitful
to differentiate between: groups with corporative resources, public interest
groups, and other groups. Interest groups with corporative resources can be
expected to rely heavily on a strategy of targeting bureaucrats, while public
interest groups are likely to place emphasis on the publicly visible indirect
strategies. With regard to the parliamentary strategy, it is less clear from the
literature what to expect. The literature also has less to say about the category
of other groups. However, in the empirical analysis these groups can be used
as a reference for establishing whether the two other types of groups exhibit
the expected patterns of strategy use. The remainder of this section discusses
the definitions of group types as well as the expected relations between
group type and use of strategies of influence.
Corporative Resources: Controlling the Economy and the

Public Production
The corporatist literature provides the backbone of the argument that some
interest groups possess certain resources that enable them to be particularly
active towards the bureaucracy. According to corporatist authors, the most

significant trait in interest group influence is the privileged, institutionalized

integration of some groups into public decision making. Privileged integra-
tion of groups structures their possibilities of action, as they have excellent
options for engaging in a continuous and intensive use of the administrative
strategy (Christiansen et al. 2004, 298; Feltenius 2004, 30; Smith 1993, 72).
Such integration reflects an exchange of resources between interest groups
and state actors. Interest groups want political influence, while bureaucrats
– and the politicians who ultimately control the bureaucracy – have an interest
in building a relationship to groups who control valuable resources (Blom-
Hansen & Daugbjerg 1999, 14).
The idea that group resources are central to corporatism can be found in
the writings of many corporatist authors. For example, Stein Rokkan (1966,
106) argues that ‘what really counts [in the corporative channel] is the capacity
to hurt or to halt a system of highly interdependent activities’. Although more
general resources such as finances or staff might also be relevant – and will
be controlled for in the empirical analysis – the resources discussed in this liter-
ature are directly related to the type of interest group. In particular, the parties
in the labor market have consistently been stressed as being the quintes-
sential participants in corporatism. Business groups represent the firms that
control societal production, whereas trade unions have the power to paralyze
society through strikes. Incorporating these groups in policy making can also
legitimize public policy in the eyes of group members, and hence groups can
be instrumental in implementing policy (Blom-Hansen & Daugbjerg 1999,
11–2; Gullberg & Helland 2003, 25 – 6; Rokkan 1966, 106–7; 1975, 220).
The possession of corporative resources is not limited to the private sector.
Groups organizing public sector personnel or organizations have equally
good opportunities to attain privileged integration (Christiansen &
Rommetvedt 1999, 198). The literature talks of ‘public sector corporatism’,
implying that groups representing public employees are intensely involved in
decision making and implementation within the public sector (Christensen
1997, 393–5; Christiansen & Nørgaard 2003b, 74; Jensen 2004). Furthermore,
associations of public sector institutions such as schools or museums as well
as associations of local public authorities are likely to be privileged (Johansen
& Kristensen 1982, 200–1). These groups represent members who control
large parts of the production in the public sector and therefore have resources
that are highly relevant when seeking integration into corporatist structures.
To sum up, corporative resources consist in the ability to affect the
economy as well as the production of public service. Interest groups possess
these resources because they represent particular groups in the private or
public sector. Groups with such resources are more likely to obtain a privileged
position in corporatist structures and can therefore be expected to rely more
on the administrative strategy than other groups. Specifically, this means that
business groups, trade unions and associations of public sector institutions

and authorities are expected to utilize this strategy particularly intensively.

In other words, a proposition can be formulated as:
Interest groups with corporative resources will use the administrative strategy more than
other groups.
Working for the Public Interest: Demonstrating Activity through

Visible Strategies
The literature often singles out a group of cause or public interest groups.
According to Jeffrey M. Berry (1977, 7), such groups seek collective goods
‘the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the
membership or activists of the organization’. Examples of public interest
groups are environmental or humanitarian groups. Public interest groups can be
expected to be more engaged in the two indirect strategies than other groups.
The argument that public interest groups are more likely to pursue
indirect strategies is based largely on the British and American literature.
Here indirect strategies are seen as more than a fallback option for groups
that are excluded from privileged access to decision-making processes.
Rather, indirect strategies are considered an active choice by groups who see
an advantage in directing their efforts towards public arenas. Specifically, it
is argued that public interest groups will exhibit a high level of engagement
in indirect strategies. Three separate arguments support this proposition.
First, the goals of public interest groups are well suited to being pursued
through indirect strategies. Public interest groups are characterized by
precisely the furtherance of public interests rather than the interests of
particular groups. It is therefore natural to appeal to the population at large.
Whereas the public might be sceptical towards groups who advance special
interests, groups working for different versions of the public interest
are more likely to be seen in a positive light (Grant 2000b, 126; Jordan &
Richardson 1987, 26; Kollman 1998, 51).
Second, many public interest groups can be described as ideological
outsiders (Grant 2000a). Such groups prefer to distance themselves from
authorities in order to retain an uncompromised ideological stance
(Rommetvedt & Opedal 1995, 284). Members of such groups might also see
cooperation with officials as illegitimate and prefer the group to stick to
appealing to the public opinion rather than to flock the halls of power
(Christiansen 1999, 154; Jordan & Maloney 1997, 181–3; Lipsky 1968, 1149;
Rommetvedt 2000, 120).
The third line of argument centers on the need to recruit and maintain a
membership. This is an important priority for all groups (Maloney et al.
1994, 34; Wilson 1973, 8–9). However, this priority has different consequences
for different types of groups. Potential members of interest groups established
for the purpose of obtaining benefits for specific groups typically find

themselves in a common situation, which is decisive for their opportunity to

benefit if the group reaches its goals. They are therefore relatively easy to
identify in organizational locations such as workplaces. Furthermore, interest
groups that recruit their members among particular groups of people will often
be in a monopoly situation when it comes to supplying their members with
certain goods (Dunleavy 1991, 20 –2, 54 –5, 63 – 8; Gais & Walker 1991, 120).
Public interest groups find themselves in a different situation. These
groups appeal to everybody who supports group goals rather than to specific
groups (Berry 1977, 7). Their members share opinions rather than social
characteristics that make them easily identifiable. In order to communicate
with members and potential members, groups therefore have to adopt broad
strategies of communication. They tend to choose strategies suited to capturing
the attention of their diffuse membership and to reinforce the loyalty of
group members (Beyers 2004, 216 –7; Dunleavy 1991, 54–5, 63–8; Gais &
Walker 1991, 105–6). Furthermore, public interest groups will often experience
fierce competition from other groups in their efforts to recruit members.
This underlines the need to demonstrate publicly that the group is active in
pursuing group goals (Dunleavy 1991, 54 –5). The last point about degree of
competition for members is not a characteristic of the group per se, but a
proposition that can be tested empirically. In order to test whether competition
for members is in fact harsher among public interest groups, a measure of
membership competition is therefore included in the analyses.
The above discussion has focused on what might be termed ‘pull’ effects.
The administrative strategy was argued to be particularly well suited for
groups with corporative resources, and the parliamentary as well as the indirect
strategies as being similarly attractive to public interest groups. However,
strategy use might also be explained by ‘push’ effects. Some groups may be
forced to pursue second-best strategies because access to their most preferred
arena is barred. Notably, groups who are denied access to corporatist
institutions might use indirect strategies as a fallback option. Previous
analyses, however, have illustrated that in general, different strategies can be
seen as active choices rather than as fallback options for groups excluded
from participation in corporative institutions (Binderkrantz 2005a). Never-
theless, the question of the balance between push and pull effects, in general
as well as in specific situations, is an interesting challenge for future more
qualitatively oriented research. For now a proposition can be formulated as:
Public interest groups will use indirect strategies more than other groups.
Appealing to Parliament: A Neo-pluralist or Segmented Parliament?

When it comes to the parliamentary strategy, the literature provides less clear
guidance on what differences to expect across type of interest group. Rokkan
argued that different resources were required to make a strong presence

in the numerical and corporatist channel. While corporative resources were

important in interactions with administrative actors, influence in the
numerical channel – although generally deemed rather insignificant – was
related to the ability to affect the electoral fate of parties (Rokkan 1975, 221).
In a more recent contribution, the Norwegian political scientist Hilmar
Rommetvedt places Parliament at center stage in the alleged ‘neo-pluralist’
Norwegian political system. Actors who want influence in such systems need
to appeal to the common good rather than appear as special interests
(Rommetvedt 2002, 40). While it is valid to refer to special interests in
corporative relations, interest groups who want parliamentary influence thus
have to appeal to broader causes. Public interest groups do not work for the
benefit of particular groups and routinely frame their concerns in terms of
the public interest. Following this reasoning, they can therefore be expected
to utilize the parliamentary strategy more than other interest groups
(Binderkrantz 2005b, 81–3).
The argument rests, however, on whether Parliament does in fact function
according to a neo-pluralist logic. A potentially countervailing tendency is
found in the segmentation or specialization of Parliament. In a segmented
Parliament, groups representing ‘special interests’ rather than broad
concerns might find it easier to interact with politicians specializing in
specific policy areas as well. The use of the parliamentary strategy can
therefore be expected to be contingent on the degree to which a specific
Parliament functions in a segmented or neo-pluralist way. With regard to
this, the existing evidence on the Danish Parliament is mixed (Damgaard
2003; Jensen 2002). In light thereof, no specific hypothesis about differences
in the use of the parliamentary strategy will be formulated. Rather the
question will be left open for the empirical analysis to investigate.
Summing up: Categorizing Interest Groups

The preceding discussion has pointed to two important distinctions between
types of interest groups: whether groups possess corporative resources, and
whether groups are public interest groups. It is important to note that there
is no overlap between the category of groups with corporative resources and
that of public interest groups. Interest groups have corporative resources
because they represent particular groups in the private or public sector. They
work specifically to obtain benefits for the groups they represent. By necessity,
groups with corporative resources therefore cannot be public interest
groups. Table 1 presents the three types of groups that can be distinguished
based on the two overall distinctions: groups with corporative resources,
public interest groups, and other groups. Groups in the latter category are
characterized, first, by organizing specific groups who stand to benefit if group
goals are attained, and second, by not possessing corporative resources.

Table 1. Categories of Groups
Public interest
Yes No
Corporative resources Yes Not applicable Groups with corporative resources
No Public interest groups Other groups
As can be seen from the table a direct comparison of groups with corpo-
rative resources and public interest groups is not suited to investigating both
the effect of possessing corporative resources and that of pursuing public
interests. Public interest groups and groups with corporative resources differ
in both respects that might influence their use of strategies. As demonstrated
in Table 1, it is, however, possible to test both hypotheses by comparing
groups with corporative resources as well as public interest groups with the
table’s category of other groups. The inclusion of ‘other groups’ in the empirical
analyses is therefore paramount in order to investigate the two hypotheses
advanced above.
Classifying groups into three overall categories is not without problems.
First, all groups included in the category of groups with corporative
resources do not have the same capacity to affect the economy or the
production of public service. However, conceptualizing corporative
resources as an effect of representing particular groups in the economy or
the public sector is consistent with the literature. Second, determining which
groups are public interest groups is not always straightforward as some
groups make broad membership appeals even though they mainly work to
the benefit of more specific groups. For example, some patients’ groups seek
support from the general population even though they work primarily to the
advantage of people with specific diseases.
Short of an in-depth study of the involved groups it is, however, not
possible to make a more fine-tuned classification of groups. The result is a
conservative test of the hypotheses. If a categorization of interest groups
into three broad categories can confirm that groups differ in their use of
strategies of influence, this may be regarded as strong evidence that
group type matters. Nevertheless, further empirical studies based on less
crude distinctions can provide us with important insights into the relation
between type of group and strategic choices.
Research Design
The analysis draws on a survey of all national Danish interest groups.2 All
groups that might possibly be classified as interest groups were contacted.

The questionnaire opened with a series of questions asking groups whether

they worked to influence various aspects of politics. Those who reported no
political ambitions were excluded from the survey. A total of 2,465 groups
were contacted, 70 percent of whom responded. Of the responding groups,
493 indicated that they did not seek any form of political influence. This
leaves 1,229 completed questionnaires from groups working to influence
public policy (see also Binderkrantz 2005a). Interest groups were divided
into subgroups based on information about group names and types of members.
As discussed above, corporative resources are defined as an effect of
group type. The category of groups with corporative resources thus
encompasses trade unions, business groups and groups of institutions and
local authorities. The public interest group category consists of environmental
groups, humanitarian groups, groups working with social issues and other
public interest groups. In order to validate the distinction between public
interest groups and other groups, the respondents were asked whether it was
most accurate to say that the group appealed to everybody supporting group
goals or only to a specific group. The large majority of groups categorized as
public interest groups agreed that their group appealed to everybody who
supported group goals.
The remaining groups were divided into associations of patients,
professional/scientific societies, hobby groups, religious groups, and finally, a
residual category encompassing, among others, groups representing specific
demographic groups such as the elderly. Categorizing these as ‘other groups’
is somewhat problematic. The difficulty of making a clear-cut distinction
between public interest groups and ‘other groups’ has already been discussed.
More particular problems arise with regard to hobby groups and religious
groups as they exhibit characteristics that complicate their categorization.
On the one hand, these groups do not represent particular social or demo-
graphic groups. On the other, however, their political work typically centers
on organizational matters that benefit group members. Furthermore, there is
not much agreement among these groups as to whether they are most
accurately described as appealing to specific groups or to everyone in support
of group goals (Binderkrantz 2005b, 119). As a consequence of this ambiguity,
hobby groups and religious groups were excluded from analysis. This
enables a better test of the hypotheses about variation in the use of different
strategies of influence. After removing these groups, the total number of
groups is 1,081. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the distribution of groups
in different subcategories.
Turning now to the dependent variables – strategies of influence – measures
of these are based on questions asking how often during the last year the
group used a wide range of methods to gain political influence. When
answering this series of questions, respondents were asked to bear in mind
the situation in the policy area in which they were most active. This avoids

asking groups to aggregate their strategic choices across different policy

areas. Each method was weighted (multiplied) by the degree of importance
ascribed to the activity by the group. This is essential because some often-
used activities might be less important in the group’s political work than
other activities used only on rare occasions. For each strategy, the respondents
received their average score on all weighted activities related to the strategy
in question. Measures were recoded to range from 0 to 100. Appendix B
reports the specific questions used to construct these as well as other variables.3
An index was constructed to tap the level of membership competition
experienced by groups. They were asked, for example, how many of the
present members joined within the last year. The analyses also include
several control variables that have been found to affect the pursuance of
influence strategies (Binderkrantz 2005a, 2005b). These include a number of
group characteristics such as the number of political employees working
for the group, whether the group has individuals as members, how much
influence members are accorded, and the scope of policy areas in which the
group is actively working. Furthermore, some variables related to the policy
area in question are included. First, an index is constructed to tap the
politicization of the policy area. Second, the policy areas that the group
reports to be most actively engaged in were divided into those related to general
regulation, specific regulation and public production, respectively. Dummy
variables for the latter two types of policy areas are included in the analyses.
Investigating Variation in Strategic Choices:

Empirical Analysis
After outlining the research design, it is time to venture into the empirical
investigation of the use of different strategies of influence. This section
begins by examining whether similar shares of different types of groups
report using different tactics and strategies. It continues with an investigation
of the extent to which groups combine high levels of engagement in different
strategies. Finally, multivariate analyses test whether the effect of group type
holds when other factors are controlled for.
Variation in Use of Different Tactics and Strategies

Table 2 shows the frequency with which different tactics are used by different
group types. It reports the percentage of each type of group using the tactic
‘often’ or ‘very often’. The overall pattern is one of clear differences between
group types. In accordance with theoretical expectations, the four tactics
associated with the administrative strategy are most commonly used by
groups with corporative resources. For example, a larger share of these

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008
Table 2. The Use of Different Tactics: Percentage Using Tactics ‘Often’ or ‘Very Often’
Groups with Public All

corporative resources interest groups Other groups interest groups
Administrative strategy
Contacting the minister 30.3 26.4 19.1 26.2
Contacting national public servants 50.6 38.7 24.1 40.5
Responding to requests for comments 54.6 23.3 33.4 42.9
Actively using public committees and other bodies 44.2 24.0 29.1 36.2

Parliamentary strategy
Contacting parliamentary committees 23.6 22.7 15.8 21.1
Contacting party spokespersons 24.3 26.9 15.9 22.2
Contacting other members of parliament 12.9 18.9 10.2 13.1
Contacting party organizations 6.3 11.6 3.5 6.4
Media strategy
Paid advertisements in newspapers, etc. 5.2 10.9 6.0 6.4
Writing letters to the editor and columns 28.1 46.6 21.1 29.1
Issuing press releases and holding press conferences 29.7 42.2 18.9 28.5
Contacting reporters 38.5 50.3 24.9 36.3
Publishing analyses and research reports 19.1 13.4 11.7 15.9
Mobilization strategy
Strikes, civil disobedience and illegal direct action 0.2 3.4 0.6 0.9
Legal direct action, public demonstrations and happenings 0.9 12.6 2.5 3.4
Encouraging members and others to write letters to the editor 9.9 31.0 15.6 15.2
Encouraging members and others to contact decision makers 25.6 27.0 24.8 25.6

Conducting petitions 0.7 7.5 2.2 2.3
Arranging debate meetings and conferences 40.6 49.1 49.7 44.9
Note: The table reports answers to the question: ‘How often during the last year has the group engaged in these activities?’ Groups were asked to
bear in mind the situation in the policy area in which it was most active. Groups had the option of answering: “never”, “occasionally”, “often” or
“very often”. The numbers in bold indicate the type of group using the tactics most frequently. N = 1,021–1,038.
185
Table 3. The Use of Different Strategies of Influence. Mean
Administrative Parliamentary Media Mobilization

strategy strategy strategy strategy
Groups with corporative resources 46.7*** 26.0 29.7** 17.1**

Public interest groups 31.7 27.6 36.1*** 26.6***
Other groups 33.5 21.1** 24.7** 20.0**
All interest groups 40.1 24.8 29.2 19.6
Note: Differences between groups has been tested using a Bonferroni test. The stars indicate
that the mean is significantly different from that of both the two other groups. Levels of
significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001. N = 1,028–1,035.
groups has frequent contacts to public servants. These findings support

the expectation that trade unions, business groups and associations of
institutions and authorities are better able to attain a central role in corporatist
structures and therefore have better options for using the administrative
strategy.
Turning to the three other strategies, the pattern is remarkably different.
Public interest groups score highest on 12 out of the 15 different tactics
listed. There are two exceptions to this pattern. Groups with corporative
resources report to contact parliamentary committees as well as publishing
analyses and research reports more often than public interest groups. The
category of ‘other groups’ have the highest use of only one tactic: arranging
debate meetings and conferences. Regardless of these exceptions, the analysis
provides ample support for the expectation that groups with corporative
resources direct much attention towards influencing the administration,
whereas public interest groups engage more in other influence strategies.
Besides the contrast in use of different tactics, it is interesting to note that
the three subtypes of groups do not seem to be equally active overall – notably,
‘other groups’ report the lowest use of more than half of the activities. When
explaining patterns of strategy use, it is therefore important to distinguish
between effects of differences in the overall level of political activity and
differences in the strategies employed given a certain level of activity. In this
article, the ultimate interest centers on the last question, which will be
treated more thoroughly in relation to the multivariate analysis appearing
later in this section.
First, however, it is time to turn from the level of individual tactics to that
of strategies of influence. Table 3 displays average index scores for different
group types on indexes constructed to reflect use of the four strategies. Not
surprisingly, the above conclusions are sustained. Groups with corporative
resources obtain a score of 46.7 on the administrative strategy, which is
significantly higher than the scores of 31.7 and 33.5 by the two other group

types. The picture with regard to the two indirect strategies is clearly different.
Public interest groups score highest, and the average score for these groups
is significantly different from the average scores of the two other groups. An
interesting difference between the two indirect strategies is that groups with
corporative resources come second in use of the media strategy, while they
use the mobilization strategy even less than the ‘other groups’ category.
Turning to the parliamentary strategy, the evidence is somewhat more
mixed. With an average index score of 27.6, public interest groups exhibit the
highest level of engagement in activities that target parliamentary actors.
This is significantly different (though only at the 0.01 level) from the score
of 21.1 achieved by ‘other groups’. However, groups with corporative
resources use this strategy about as intensively as public interest groups. In
fact, the difference between these two types of groups is not significant.
Although these groups differ in their contact to bureaucrats, they seem quite
alike when the parliamentary channel is analyzed separately.
To sum up, the administrative strategy is quite dominant in the political
work of groups with corporative resources. These groups supplement their
use of the corporative channel with activities directed towards Parliament,
but as for the indirect strategies, they clearly lag behind public interest
groups. It might be speculated that groups with a privileged position in
corporatist structures have to focus at least some attention on maintaining
good relationships with parliamentary actors, while they can better afford to
lay low in terms of mobilization activities because of the results obtained in
corporative relations to bureaucrats.
On the other hand, public interest groups can hardly afford to ignore the
highly visible activities associated with the indirect strategies. Consequently,
they expend much effort on activities that target the media and on mobilizing
members, and they clearly distance themselves from other groups in their
use of these methods. They also maintain high levels of parliamentary activities,
while their engagement in the administrative strategy cannot be statistically
distinguished from that of other groups. The political engagement of public
interest groups thus stands in clear contrast to that of groups with corporative
resources.
Combinations of Different Strategies

The analyses above established a picture of considerable variation in strategy
use between group types – a picture that largely supports the theoretical
expectations. Yet another aspect can be added by investigating whether
groups combine high levels of engagement in different strategies. While each
strategy of influence has so far been treated separately, Table 4 therefore
lists combinations of ‘low’ and ‘high’ scores on different strategies. Every
interest group received either a ‘low’ or a ‘high’ score on strategies, depending

188

Table 4. Combinations of ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Scores for Different Group Types (Percentages)
Administrative strategy
Mobilization Media Parliamentary
strategy strategy strategy Low score High score
Low score Low score Low score Groups with corporative resources: 16.7 Groups with corporative resources: 8.6
Public interest groups: 10.5 Public interest groups: 2.3
Other groups: 29.2 Other groups: 3.6
High score Groups with corporative resources: 3.6 Groups with corporative resources: 6.4
High score Low score Groups with corporative resources: 4.3 Groups with corporative resources: 2.3
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008
High score Low score Low score Groups with corporative resources: 2.3 Groups with corporative resources: 2.6
High score Low score Groups with corporative resources: 1.3 Groups with corporative resources: 3.9
Other groups: 5.5 Other groups: 4. 2
Note: N = Groups with corporative resources: 533, public interest groups: 172, other groups: 308.
on whether the group index score is lower or higher than the median for all
groups. In the table, interest groups are distributed according to their score
on all four strategies. That makes it possible to analyze which combinations
of ‘low’ and ‘high’ scores are most common for each group type.
Some combinations of strategies are very widespread, while others are
seen less often. Combinations of either ‘low’ or ‘high’ scores on all strategies
are quite common. This reflects differences in the general level of political
work between groups. Some are simply more active across the board than
others. More interesting are the differences between group types in the
tendency to combine strategies. The largest contrast is found between public
interest groups and groups with corporative resources.
In the upper right corner of the table, we see that public interest groups
with low levels of engagement in the mobilization strategy, the media
strategy and the parliamentary strategy are not likely to exhibit a high score
on the administrative strategy. For groups with corporative resources,
however, the same combination of low scores is more compatible with a
high score on the administrative strategy (2.3 compared to 8.6). The category
of other groups looks mostly like the public interest groups, although
the contrast between these and groups with corporative resources is less
pronounced.
On the contrary, when looking at interest groups with a high score on all
strategies but the administrative (the lower left corner), it is unlikely that
groups with corporative resources score low on the administrative strategy.
For public interest groups, this is clearly an option in that a rather large share
of them exhibit the combination of a low level of activities targeting the
bureaucracy and high scores on the other three strategies. Almost four times
as large a share of the public interest groups fall within this category (16.3
compared to 4.1). For other groups, the corresponding share is 6.2, signifying
that the main contrast here is between public interest groups and the two
other types of groups.
For public interest groups, it is possible to be engaged intensively in a wide
range of activities without emphasizing contacts to bureaucrats. On the other
hand, public interest groups are unlikely to combine low levels of activities
related to the indirect and the parliamentary strategies with high levels of the
administrative strategy. The opposite can be said about groups with
corporative resources, who prioritize the administrative strategy and for the
most part engage in other strategies in combination with the administrative
one. It is particularly interesting to note that even though public interest
groups and groups with corporative resources use the parliamentary strategy
to similar degrees, groups with corporative resources primarily use this
strategy in combination with the administrative one, whereas public interest
groups are more likely to focus on Parliament when not interacting with the
bureaucracy.

Do Differences Between Groups Persist when Controlling for

Other Variables?
Until now, analyses have included only type of interest group as the inde-
pendent variable. This has the advantage of providing an easily interpreted
– and descriptively correct – picture of the extent of variation between
groups in strategic choices. It is possible, however, that the results look
different if other variables are included. For example, some types of interest
groups might posses more general resources than others, which might
account for differences in strategic choices. If this is so, it will not change the
conclusion that there is variation across group types, but it will necessitate a
re-evaluation of the causality linking group type to influence strategies. A
multivariate analysis enables an investigation of this and other questions.
Such a multivariate analysis can be conducted in several ways. The most
straightforward approach would be to perform separate analyses of the four
strategies. However, the interest here is not to explain the level of engagement,
but rather the strategic choices given a certain engagement. Therefore, each
strategy’s share of total group activity is analyzed. Alongside group type
these analyses include the variables discussed in the research design section.
Results of the four analyses are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Beginning with the negative findings, it turns out that group type does not
contribute to explaining the share of group activities directed towards
Parliament. This is in line with the above results where public interest groups
and groups with corporative resources were found to use the parliamentary
strategy in almost similar measure. The descriptive difference found between
other groups and public interest groups and groups with corporative
resources is not present in the regression analysis. This might be due to
differences in resources or it may simply be caused by a generally lower level
of engagement on the part of other groups.
The type of group does make a difference for the prioritizing of the three
other strategies. As expected, corporative resources make a difference in
contacts to the administration. Groups with corporative resources also direct
a smaller share of their activities towards the media and mobilizations than
other groups. Public interest groups, on the other hand, expend more of their
efforts on affecting the media, but less on contacting the administration
compared to other groups. These groups also mobilize more than other
groups, but contrary to expectations the difference is not statistically
significant. The overall bag of evidence is mixed. While expectations about
the role of corporative resources are supported, public interest groups are
only found to direct more of their attention than other groups towards the
media and less towards bureaucrats. When measured as share of total
engagement in the four strategies, they do not mobilize significantly more
than the reference category of other groups.

Table 5. Regression Analysis of Administrative versus Indirect Strategies. OLS
Unstandardized Standard Standardized

coefficients error coefficients
Constant 52.191 1.946

Interest group type:
– Group with corporative resources 5.777*** 1.441 0.143
– Public interest group −8.813*** 1.822 − 0.161
– Other group Ref. Ref. Ref.
Membership competition − 0.213*** 0.034 − 0.191
Individuals as members −5.023*** 1.433 − 0.111
R2 0.17
Note: The dependent variable is the administrative share of the use of the total use of the
administrative strategy, the media strategy and the mobilization strategy (administrative
strategy/(administrative + media + mobilization strategy). The model includes variables
significant at the 0.01 level or better. N = 987.
A clearer picture of the variation in strategic choices can be obtained by

juxtaposing the administrative strategy and the two indirect strategies.
Table 5 presents an analysis of the use of the administrative strategy as a
share of the administrative, the media and the mobilization strategies.
The parliamentary strategy is not included in this analysis because of the
lack of variation in its use between groups. Naturally, some of the informa-
tion contained in the four separate analyses discussed above is lost in the
transformation to one-regression analysis. However, this analysis is well
suited to sum up the main results in terms of factors affecting choice of
strategy.
The model contains only those variables that significantly influence the
share of administratively targeted activities (at the 0.01 level). This leaves
four variables in a model that explains 17 percent of the variation in the
share of administrative strategy. Even though the model leaves most of
the variation unexplained, this must be interpreted as a fairly high level of
explanatory power for an analysis of the choice of strategy given a certain
level of overall engagement in the involved strategies.
It should by now come as no surprise that groups with corporative
resources devote a large share of their activities to targeting the administra-
tion. Public interest groups, on the other hand, direct a much smaller share
of their activities towards the administration than other groups. In fact, when
comparing groups with corporative resources and public interest groups
directly, the difference in administrative share is almost 15 percentage
points. By inference, the opposite pattern is present for the use of indirect
strategies as a share of these and the administrative strategy. The analysis
confirms the expected effect of group type on choice of strategies of influence.

Groups with resources valued in corporative relations direct much attention

towards interacting with bureaucrats. Public interest groups use indirect
strategies intensively and are particularly focused on making their presence
felt in the media. Even though the multivariate analyses do not sustain
a difference with regard to the parliamentary strategy, the overall picture is
one of profound variation between different types of groups.
The theoretical reasoning concerning the choice of strategies by public
interest groups gains further support by the inclusion of other variables.
While most variables turn out to have no significant effect on the choice of
the administrative strategy instead of the indirect strategies, membership
competition and having individuals as members both make a difference.
Groups experiencing a high degree of membership competition are less
likely to spend much effort on influencing bureaucrats and are – vice versa
– more likely to engage in indirect strategies. This is in line with the picture
of indirect strategies as well suited to demonstrate to members and potential
members that the group is politically active. As discussed above, this is
actually the most direct test of whether the reasoning regarding the relation
between indirect strategies and membership recruitment holds.
Finally, groups with individuals as members have a smaller share of use of
the administrative strategies. Again this can be interpreted as reflecting the
need to recruit members through visible strategies. While other types of
members such as companies, other interest groups or institutions are often
easy to contact directly, individuals must be regarded as the type of members
that are most likely to be reached only through publicly visible strategies
involving media campaigns and membership mobilizations. On top of the
results that directly confirm the effect of group type on strategy choice,
the results with regard to other variables therefore lie in continuation of the
theoretical reasoning.
Conclusion
This article pitted different types of interest groups against each other in an
attempt to explain why groups use certain strategies of influence rather than
others. A division of groups into three broad categories was demonstrated
to have considerable leverage in explaining strategic choices. Groups
with corporative resources direct much attention towards influencing the
bureaucracy. Public interest groups are more likely to use publicly visible
strategies where affecting the media agenda play a central role. A third
category of other groups was incorporated in the analyses as a point of
reference for establishing patterns of strategy use.
Different strands of the literature are relevant in explaining these results.
Scandinavian corporatism focuses mainly on interaction between groups and

bureaucrats. This literature can explain the strategic choices of groups with
corporative resources. The basic argument is that corporative integration
takes place as part of a resource exchange between groups and governmental
actors. Groups want influence and decision makers want access to group
resources. Groups with valuable resources therefore attain a privileged
position and increased options for utilizing the administrative strategy. This
article has focused only on the link between the type of resources emphasized
as particularly important by corporatist authors and the choice of strategy,
but the results lend support to this line of reasoning.
Groups with corporative resources do not refrain from engaging in other
forms of activities. In fact, their level of engagement in the parliamentary
strategy is statistically indistinguishable from that of public interest groups.
This squares well with the emphasis on the importance of Parliament in
recent literature (Binderkrantz 2003; Christiansen & Rommetvedt 1999).
Danish authors argue that the privileged integration of groups in bureau-
cratic decision making takes place in ‘the shadow of Parliament’. Politicians
have the ultimate say on the involvement of groups, and all actors are well
aware of the necessity of finding a parliamentary majority to back up results
of interactions in the corporative channel (Christiansen et al. 2004, 290–3).
In this context, it is plausible that groups who rely heavily on their contacts
in the administration supplement these with parliamentary contacts in order
to secure a continued central role in dealings with bureaucrats. The analysis
of combinations of strategies demonstrates that for groups with corporative
resources, a high score on the parliamentary strategy typically goes hand-in-
hand with a high score on the administrative strategy.
For public interest groups, the corporative channel does not loom nearly
as large. With regard to Parliament, their level of engagement is comparable
to that of groups with corporative resources. The most striking result con-
cerning public interest groups is that they evidently cannot afford to ignore
the media arena. Media activities account for a larger share of the political
work for public interest groups than for other groups. They also utilize the
mobilization strategy more than others, but the difference is not significant
in the multivariate analysis of mobilization share.
Three different arguments were advanced to account for the preference
for indirect strategies on the part of public interest groups. First, because
they work for public interests, it is natural for them to appeal to the population
at large through publicly visible strategies. Second, many public interest
groups are ideological outsiders whose members prefer their group to keep
at arm’s length from authorities. And third, public interest groups need to
use highly visible strategies in order to convince their diffuse membership
that supporting the group is worthwhile. It is not possible to distinguish
between these three lines of argument based on the present analyses.
However, the effects of membership competition and of having individuals

as members found in the analysis support the postulated relation between

the employment of indirect strategies and the need to recruit and maintain
members.
Even though the analyses in this article build on a large-scale survey, it
only includes Danish interest groups. It is therefore appropriate to consider
the possibilities of generalizing the empirical findings to other settings. Short
of further empirical studies, a number of tentative conclusions can be made.
The balance between different channels of influence is likely to vary across
time and between countries. For example, the use of the parliamentary
channel will depend on the power of Parliament vis-à-vis the government.
Also, the importance of corporative resources can be expected to depend on
the degree of integration of organized interests into administrative decision
making and thus to vary between countries and over time. Finally, while
the specific balance between channels of influence and the importance of
different resources is likely to vary across context, there is reason to expect
the underlying logic of a systematic relation between group type and use of
strategies to be more prone to generalization. In any political system where
groups have some degree of access to different channels of influence, variation
across group types is likely.
Interest group strategies are, at the bottom line, worth our attention
because of the results groups achieve by engaging themselves in such strategies.
Likewise, differences between group types in use of strategies are important
because they might teach us about power differentials in the universe of
interest groups. Even though the article has not investigated whether groups
are successful in their attempts to influence politics, some conclusions can be
made in regard to the question of interest group power.
Overall, the variation in strategy use across group types supports a
pluralist image of the political process. Corporative resources are relevant
in regard to the administrative strategy, but other types of groups not
possessing such resources are more dominant when it comes to affecting the
media. The validity of this conclusion rests on whether different strategies
are likely to yield returns in terms of political influence. Political influence
involves many aspects and it is likely that different strategies will be effective
in obtaining different kinds of influence. Corporatism has argued that
privileged integration of interest groups leads to tangible advantages for
the privileged groups. Other studies illustrate how groups are – at least
sometimes – successful in changing political priorities through media
campaigns or mobilizations. Based on the literature, different strategies can
be regarded at least as potentially effective. However, it remains to be
systematically investigated to what extent groups succeed in their political
endeavors. Hopefully, this article has demonstrated that a wide range of
strategies need to be analyzed if an accurate picture of the balance between
different group types is to be established.

Appendix A. Group Distribution and Regression

Analyses
Table A1. Distribution of Groups in Survey
Group type Percentage of groups
Groups with corporative resources

Trade unions 21.2
Business groups 25.0
Groups of institutions 6.3
Public interest groups
Environmental groups 3.0
Humanitarian groups 5.1
Social issue groups 3.1
Other public interest groups 5.6
Other groups
Associations of patients 9.6
Professional/scientific societies 14.6
Other interest based 6.5
All groups (N) 1,081
Table A2. Regression Analyses of Shares of Total Activity. Unstandardized Coefficients
Administrative Parliamentary Media Mobilization

strategy strategy strategy strategy
Constant 42.459 13.504 24.213 19.825

Group with corporative resources 5.157*** 1.521 −2.625* − 4.053***
Public interest group −7.063*** 1.108 3.992** 1.963
Other group Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Political employees (transformed) −0.987 3.416** 5.356*** −7.785***
Individual members −3.679** −0.820 1.354 3.145***
Membership competition −0.174*** 0.020 0.141*** 0.013
Membership influence 0.112*** 0.012 −0.121*** −0.003
Specific regulation −3.036 −2.582* 3.135* 2.484
Public production −1.862 1.087 −0.440 1.216
General regulation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Scope of areas −0.104* 0.084** −0.047 0.067*
Politicization −0.045 0.024 0.050 −0.029
R2 0.172 0.058 0.118 0.131
Note: Dependent variables are the relevant strategy’s share of the total use of all strategies.
Example: administrative strategy/(administrative + parliamentary + media + mobilization
strategy). Levels of significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 ** 0.001. N = 886.

Appendix B. Measures of Variables

Each index included in the analyses is based on a number of questions.
Depending on their answer to a given question, groups were given from one
to four points. Indexes were constructed by assigning the mean score on the
relevant questions to each group. Respondents who – due to missing answers
– had scores on less than half of the questions included in an index construction
were excluded. Where nothing else is reported, groups could answer: ‘not at
all’, ‘a little’, ‘to some degree’ or ‘to a high degree’.
Strategies of Influence
Indexes for strategies of influence are based on answers to the following
question: ‘Below is a list of activities that interest groups can engage in to
gain political influence. Again, we ask you to bear in mind the situation in
the policy area in which the group is most intensively involved. We ask you
to indicate both how important the activities are when the group seeks
political influence and how often within the last year the group has engaged
in the different activities’. The activities included in the four indexes are
reported in Table 1. With regard to importance, groups could respond: ‘not
important’, ‘less important’, ‘important’ or ‘very important’. With regard to
frequency possible answers were: ‘never’, ‘occasionally’, ‘fairly often’ or
‘very often’. The indexes have values of Kronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.70
to 0.85.
Political Employees
The number of employees working with politics. After visual inspections
of the relation between the number of political employees and the use
of strategies, the variable has been logarithmically transformed to:
ln(ln(number of political employees + 2.718)).
Individuals as Members
A dummy variable indicating whether groups have individual persons as
members.
Membership Competition
The measure of member competition is based on the following questions:
• ‘How many of the present group members have joined within the last
year?’

• ‘How large a part of the potential members have actually joined the
group?’
Groups could answer: ‘a small part’, ‘a significant part’, ‘most’ or ‘almost

everybody’. With regard to the second question, points were given in reverse
order. Answers to the following two questions were included in the index as
well. ‘How well do the following statements characterize the group?’
• ‘The number of members fluctuates from year to year.’
• ‘Other interest groups are competing for the same members.’
Kronbach’s alpha: 0.50.
Membership Influence
The measure of membership influence is based on the following questions:
‘How well do the following statements characterize the group?’
• ‘The statutes of the group give group members influence on the political
work of the group.’
• ‘In reality, group members have influence on the political work of the
group.’
• ‘Members participate actively in the political work of the group.’
• ‘There are internal fractions or groupings who disagree on group policy.’
• ‘There are contested elections for central positions in the group.’
Specific Regulation and Public Production

Dummy variables indicating whether the group is most active in a policy area
that can be characterized as general regulation, specific regulation or
public production. General regulation includes policy areas related to: the
environmental/energy, justice, foreign policy, integration, the European
Union, taxes and money/finance. Specific regulation includes: labor market,
agriculture, business and city/housing. Public production includes: health,
education, culture, social policy, science, church, traffic, defense and local
areas.
Scope of Areas
The questionnaire included a list of twenty policy areas and asked groups
how active they were within each of these. For each area, groups answering
‘very active’ were given three points, those that were ‘active to some degree’
two points, and ‘slightly active’ groups, one point. Those indicating that they

were not involved in the policy area at all or did not answer the question
were given no points. The measure of the ‘scope of areas’ adds together
group scores for the twenty policy areas.
Area Politicization
The index of politicization of a policy area is based on the question: ‘How
well do the following statements characterize the policy area in which the
group is most intensively involved?’
• ‘There are other interest groups with whom the group typically agrees.’
• ‘There are other interest group with whom the group typically disagrees.’
• ‘The policy area is characterized by high levels of media attention.’
• ‘The policy area is characterized by high levels of attention from
politicians.’
• ‘The policy area is characterized by high levels of attention from the
general public.’
NOTES
1. A small number of groups without formal membership can be considered functional
equivalents to membership groups and are therefore included in the study. These
groups typically have volunteers rather than members.
2. The survey was conducted in 2004 and has previously been reported in a dissertation on
interest group strategies (Binderkrantz 2005b).
3. Factor analyses show that activities associated with an administrative, a parliamentary
and a media strategy, respectively, can be described meaningfully by a one-dimensional
measure (the analyses result in only one factor with an eigen-value above 1). With
regard to the mobilization strategy, the analysis results in one factor with an eigen-value
of 2.6 and a second factor with an eigen-value of 1.2 – the second factor distinguishing
between conventional and confrontational tactics of mobilization. However, the first
factor captures a much larger percentage of the variance than the second, all activities
have high positive scores on the first factor and all activities are positively correlated.
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Different Groups, Different Strategies: How Interest Groups Pursue Their Political Ambitions

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Different Groups, Different Strategies: How Interest Groups Pursue Their Political Ambitions

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ISSN 0080 – 6757

© 2008 The Author(s)

Different Groups, Different Strategies:

How Interest Groups Pursue Their

* Anne Binderkrantz, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Bartholins Allé

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008 173

The literature has provided a variety of answers. Upon observing the

174 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

Why Different Strategies Appeal to Different

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008 175

Different Groups, Different Strategies?

176 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

organize people based on shared characteristics such as being elderly, disabled,

Corporative Resources: Controlling the Economy and the

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008 177

significant trait in interest group influence is the privileged, institutionalized

178 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

and authorities are expected to utilize this strategy particularly intensively.

Working for the Public Interest: Demonstrating Activity through

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008 179

themselves in a common situation, which is decisive for their opportunity to

Appealing to Parliament: A Neo-pluralist or Segmented Parliament?

180 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

in the numerical and corporatist channel. While corporative resources were

Summing up: Categorizing Interest Groups

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Table 1. Categories of Groups

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The questionnaire opened with a series of questions asking groups whether

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008 183

asking groups to aggregate their strategic choices across different policy

Investigating Variation in Strategic Choices:

Variation in Use of Different Tactics and Strategies

184 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

Groups with Public All

Journal compilation © 2008 Nordic Political Science Association

© 2008 The Author(s)

Table 3. The Use of Different Strategies of Influence. Mean

Administrative Parliamentary Media Mobilization

Groups with corporative resources 46.7*** 26.0 29.7** 17.1**

groups has frequent contacts to public servants. These findings support

186 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

Combinations of Different Strategies

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Journal compilation © 2008 Nordic Political Science Association

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Do Differences Between Groups Persist when Controlling for

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Table 5. Regression Analysis of Administrative versus Indirect Strategies. OLS

Unstandardized Standard Standardized

Constant 52.191 1.946

A clearer picture of the variation in strategic choices can be obtained by

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Groups with resources valued in corporative relations direct much attention

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as members found in the analysis support the postulated relation between

194 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

Appendix A. Group Distribution and Regression

Table A1. Distribution of Groups in Survey

Group type Percentage of groups

Groups with corporative resources

Table A2. Regression Analyses of Shares of Total Activity. Unstandardized Coefficients

Groups with corporative resources 46.7* 26.0 29.7 17.1**