Indus Treaty: A Different View

Author(s): Ramaswamy R. Iyer

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 29 (Jul. 16-22, 2005), pp. 3140-3144
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4416904 .
Accessed: 22/03/2011 00:40

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=epw. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Economic and Political Weekly.

http://www.jstor.org
 India-Pakistanwater disputes

andPakistan.It even survivedthe serious

Indus Treaty: A Different View deteriorationin the relations between
the two countries following Kargil. It
was also the practice until recently to
TheIndus WatersTreatyof 1960 has been hailedfor decades express satisfactionat the fact that the
as a modelfor conflict-resolution.However, there has always been provisionsof thetreatyhadnot
arbitration
so far been invoked, but that recordis
a measureof dissatisfaction with the treatyfor differentreasons in
changingnow.
both India and Pakistan. In light of the improvedpolitical climate
and resumptionof talks between the two countries, this article Dissatisfaction in India
finds hope in a constructiveand cooperative approach to settle and Pakistan
the existing Indus water disputes. Itfavours a renegotiationof Thatfavourableview of the treatyas a
the treaty ratherthan its abrogation. successfulinstanceof conflict-resolution
is prevalentto a largeextentin Indiaand
RAMASWAMYR IYER regardingthe exchangeof dataon project Pakistanaswell,butthereis alsoa measure
operation,extentof irrigatedagriculture, of dissatisfactionwith the treatyin both
hepurposeof thispaperis topresent and so on. The treatyfurthermandated countries.Thereis a body of opinionthat
to the readersan understandingof certaininstitutionalarrangements:there thedivisionof watersunderthetreatywas
the IndusWatersTreaty(IWT)of was to be a permanentIndusCommission unfair,but the unfairnessalleged in one
1960 thatis somewhatdifferentfromthe consisting of a commissionereach for country is the exact opposite of that
generallyprevalentviews,Indian,Pakistani Indiaandfor Pakistan,andtherewere to allegedin the other country.There are
and international:and to show that dif- be periodicalmeetingsandexchangesof extensivewritingson the subjectin India.
ferences such as those relating to the visits. Provisionswere includedfor the ThePakistanidissatisfaction withthetreaty
Baglihar and other projects are the resolutionof the differencesthat might have also found expression in various
inevitableoutcomeof, andarealmostbuilt arise.(Questions,if any arose,wereto be articlesin the media,includingone in the
into, the treaty. resolvedwithinthecommission;if agree- issue of Economic and Political Weekly,
mentcouldnot be reachedat thecommis- February26, 2005.
Historical Background sion level, the matterwas to be referred Quite apartfrom the question of the
to the two governments;if theytoo failed sharingof the watersin termsof percent-
In 1947thelineof partitionof theIndian to reach an agreement,the 'question' ages, the real difficulty from the Indian
subcontinentcut across the Indus river would become a 'difference' to be pointof view is thatcertainprojectsthat
system,leadingto the disruptionof well- referredto a NeutralExpert (NE). The India has plannedon the westernrivers
establishedirrigationsystems.The newly NE's findingson the differencesreferred are stalled because of Pakistan'sobjec-
createdPakistanfelt thatit was vulnerably to him wouldbe final andbinding.If the tions. One such project,the Salal Hydro-
dependenton Indiangoodwill,andin fact, NE decidedthatthe matterwas in fact a electricProjecton theChenab,was under
therewas a disruptionof flows in April 'dispute',it would have to go to a Court prolongeddiscussionsat the commission
1948 throughan act of the provincial of Arbitration.)The treatyalso included level and laterbetween the two govern-
Punjabgovernment,thoughNehruinter- the provision of internationalfinancial ments, and was eventuallyaccepted by
vened and rectified this. Negotiations assistance to Pakistanfor the develop- Pakistan(with some agreedchanges) in
begansoon thereafter,and were tortuous mentof irrigationworksfor utilisingthe the1970s.However,differencesoverother
anddifficult.Prolongedtalksbetweenthe watersallocatedto it, and Indiatoo paid projects- Tulbulor Wullar,Bagliharand
two governments,assistedby the World a sum of ? 62.06 millionas laid down in Kishenganga- are still unresolved.The
Bank,ledto thesigningof theIndusTreaty the treaty. workon Tulbulwasstopped15 yearsago,
in 1960.Thewater-sharing underthistreaty and has not been resumed.On Baglihar,
(ignoringthedetailsgiven in the Annexes Pakistanhasinvokedthearbitration clause
and Appendices)was quite simple: the Views of the of the for the first time. A NE has
three western rivers (the Jhelum, the Prevailing Treaty treaty
alreadybeenappointedandhe hasalready
ChenabandtheIndusitself)wereallocated begunhis work.Thefinaloutcomeof that
International View
to Pakistan,and the three easternrivers process has to be awaited.The process
(the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej) were Internationally,the IWT, 1960 is re- mightend with the NE's findings(which
allocatedto India.Indiawas not allowed gardedas a successfulinstanceof conflict- will be final and binding)on the points
to build storageson the rivers allocated resolutionbetweenthe two countriesthat of difference,or if he finds that thereis
to Pakistan, except to a very limited haveotherwisebeenlockedin conflict.It a 'dispute', it might go to a Court of
extent.Restrictionswere also imposed is customaryto drawattentionto the fact Arbitration. Kishenganga is currentlyunder
on the extension of irrigationdevelop- that the treaty has remained in place discussion,and at the time of writingit
mentin India.Therewerealso provisions despite the three wars between India has been reportedthat the two sides are

3140 Economicand Political Weekly July 16, 2005

trying to find a common ground by the end
of July 2005.
Unhappiness in J and K
All those projects are in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir. There is much un-
happiness in the state at the fact that the
restrictions placed on India in relation to
the western rivers make it virtually impos-
sible for J and K to derive any benefits by
way of irrigation, hydroelectric power,
navigation, from the waters of the Jhelum
and Chenab rivers. Successive J and K
governments and legislatures have com-
plained that the treaty did not take care of
the interests of the state. That feeling is
shared by the people, media, academics
and others in the state. From time to time
there have even been calls for a scrapping
of the treaty.
Post-Kargil Calls for Abrogation
The dissatisfaction in some quarters in
India with the water-sharing proportions,
and the sense of frustration at the stalling
of projects, were aggravated in 2002 by
the harm that Pakistan was perceived to
be inflicting on this country through
what came to be known as 'cross-border
terrorism'. This resulted in the advocacy
by some commentators of the abrogation
or re-negotiation of the treaty. One does
not know whether any such proposal
was ever considered at the governmental
level or not, but no such move was actually
made. The relations between the two
countries have since shown signs of
improvement.
II
SomeQuestions
From that brief account of the treaty and
the prevailing views about it, let us pro-
ceed now to a consideration of some of
the questions that arise.
Successful Conflict Resolution?
First, is the treaty really a successful
example of conflict-resolution?The answer
has to be 'yes and no'. One must give due
credit to the fact that the treaty has man-
aged to survive three wars, that the Indus
Commission has continued to meet even
when the political relationshipbetween the
two countries was extremely bad, and that
at the working level the relationship be-
tween the officials of the two countries has
been marked by cordiality. However, the
Economic and Political Weekly July 16, 2005
water-sharing under the treaty was (as
mentioned earlier) a simple division of the
rivers, with no continuous water-sharing
on the same river. The treaty itself was
doubtless the resolution of a conflict, but
once the treaty was signed, there was
nothing much thereafter to 'operate'. The
high praise of the IWT as a successful
instance of conflict-resolution seems some-
what exaggerated. Echoing E M Forsteron
democracy, one might say that two cheers
are quite enough for the IWT, and that
three cheers are not called for.
Surgery on the River System
Secondly, what the treaty did was to
carry out a surgery on the river-system,
dividing it into two segments, one for
Pakistan and one for India. The 'surgery'
on the river-systems (Indus in the west,
Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghnain the east)
was, of course, a part of the surgery on
the subcontinent. That surgery is now a
fact of history. However, without entering
into a discussion of that division, it must
be noted that in deciding whether the
subcontinent should be divided, little if
any attention was paid to the fact that
major river-systems were going to be cut
across. That did not figure as a factor in
the decision-making but was only consid-
ered later as a consequence of a decision
taken on other grounds.
It can be and has been argued that di-
viding the river-system into two segments
was not the best thing to do, and that the
better course would have been for the two
countries jointly to manage the entire
system in an integratedandholistic manner.
However, given the circumstances of
Partition and the difficult relationship
between the two newly formedcountries, it
would have been naive to expect that such
a joint integrated cooperative approach
would work. Even now, with the improve-
ment in the political climate and the re-
sumption of talks, one is not sure that the
vision of more enlightened cooperation on
the river system will be easy to realise.
Why Not River-wise Sharing?
If the ideal solution - joint integrated
management of the system as a whole -
was unavailable, then the choice had
necessarily to fall on the second-best
solution. However, one would have ex-
pected that second-best solution to take the
form of a water-sharing of each of the six
rivers constituting the system. That would
surely have been technically feasible. It
would no doubt have been difficult to
operate. Continuous sharing on each river
with joint monitoring arrangementsand so
on might have proved cumbersome, dif-
ficult and productive of endless disputes.
However, would that process have been
more contentiousthanthe presentsituation?
Why then was a division of the system into
two agreed upon? We shall return to this.
Fair Sharing of Waters?
Thirdly, was the sharing of waters fair?
Many in India feel that the allocation of
80 per cent of the waters to Pakistan and
20 per cent to India was an unfair settle-
ment foolishly accepted by the Indian
negotiators; and many in Pakistan argue
that the territoriesthat went to India under
Partitionwere historically using less than10
per cent of the Indus waters, and that the
treaty was generous to India in giving it
20 per cent of the waters. Both are falla-
cious arguments. A share of 20 per cent
is not ipso facto low; on the other hand,
the level of historic use (10 per cent or
whatever) does not necessarily determine
a country's future needs or entitlements.
A multiplicity of factors and criteria have
to be applied, having regard to all the
relevant circumstances; no a priori view
on what is fair is possible. All that one can
say is that when prolonged inter-country
negotiations by teams acting undergovern-
mental briefings lead to a treaty, and the
treatyis approved and signed at the highest
levels, it must be presumed that it was the
best outcome that could have been nego-
tiated under the given circumstances;
either side is then precluded from saying
that it was unfair, unequal, poorly negotia-
ted, etc. If a degree of dissatisfaction with
the treaty arises in the course of operation
of the treaty, that would be a matter for
inter-countrydiscussions within the ambit
of the treaty,ora re-negotiationof the treaty
(we shall return to that question also).
ArbitrationRegrettable?
Is the invocation of the arbitrationpro-
visions a matter for regret? My answer
would be 'No'. The treaty provides for
arbitration.Thatwould also be action under
the treaty, and not a breakdown of the
treaty. If India is convinced that its posi-
tion is correct, it should be able to present
its case strongly to the Neutral Expert, and
eventually to the Court of Arbitration if
that contingency arises. The outcome of
these processes will have to be accepted
by both sides, even if one side has (or both
3141
sides have) reservations on the result. inherent in the nature of the treaty. There projects and 'storages'. What does 'run-
(Presumably the two sides are not pre- are two reasons for that statement, which of-the-river' mean? It means the absence
cluded from continuing their discussions, I proceed to explain. of storage: that is almost a definitional
arriving at an agreement and reporting it point. When we describe a project as 'run-
to the NE or the Court of Arbitration, as Two Basic Factors of-the-river' we are implicitly denying the
the case may be.) existence of any storage. The treaty pro-
(a) A highly technical treaty: The first hibits storages by India on the western
III reason is the density of technical details rivers except to a limited extent, but per-
DifferencesoverProjects in the treaty, which provides ample oppor- mits run-of-the-river schemes subject to
tunities for differences among engineers. certain conditions. However, to describe
How Do the Differences Arise? a scheme as 'run-of-the-river' and then to
It is interesting to compare this treaty with
the Mahakali treaty between India and conclude that there is no storage is a cir-
We now come to the crucial question: Nepal, or the Ganges treaty between India cular argument because the conclusion is
Why are certain differences (Tulbul, and Bangladesh. The latter two are rela- implicit in the premise. The conventional
Baglihar,etc) proving intractable?Broadly tively non-technical documents that are engineering view is that a diversion
speaking, the Pakistani position is that easy to understand, even for non- barrage or a run-of-the-riverhydroelectric
these projects constitute violations of the engineers. On the other hand, while the project, unlike a dam and a reservoir, does
treaty by India; India denies this. Which main part of the Indus treaty is fairly slim not create any storage. However, even run-
party is right? and not too dense, the devil is in the detail:
of-the-riverprojectsinvolve structures,and
That question cannot be easily answered the treaty is accompanied by several any structure on a river does raise the
because we (the general public) are gen- Annexures and Appendices of a highly water level and create a minimal storage.
erally not in possession of all the technical technical and opaque nature. It is these The question then becomes one of the level
details of the projects and are not privy to Annexures and Appendices thatdetermine and acceptability of that storage, and a
the discussions that take place between the the overall character of the treaty. Face- difference of opinion on this is possible,
two governments. Even if we were, our tiously speaking, one could say that this and has, in fact, occurred. Even a run-of-
view of which side is right will be only one is not a treaty between two governments, the-river project can be a big project in-
more opinion, without any authority. It is but a treaty . betweentwo sets of engineers. volving a big dam. What India regards as
really for the two governments to reach an The engineers on the two sides can have 'run-of-the-river' could be in Pakistan's
agreed position, or to seek an arbitration. a field day disagreeing on the meaning and view a 'storage' project. I am not con-
However, we can try and understand precise application of the various technical cerned here with the question of which
how the differences over these projects features and criteria that the Annexures view is correct, but merely illustrating the
arise. To put it very briefly, they arise from and Appendices contain, such as those possibility of technical differences between
different approaches to, and interpreta- illustratively mentioned earlier. The treaty the two sides.)
tions of, various provisions of the main provides a happy hunting ground for tech- (b) Nature of division under treaty: The
text of the treaty, but even more, of the nical disagreements. second reason is the nature of the division
detailed provisions and specifications (One such debate could be over the of waters under the treaty. Having allo-
contained in the numerous Annexures and difference between 'run-of-the-river' cated the western rivers to Pakistan, the
Appendices to the treaty. Ignoring the
complexities involved and simplifying
matters, one may say that Article III (4)
of the treaty basically precludes the build-
ing of any storages by India on the western
rivers, except to a limited extent carefully
laid down in Annexures D and E, which
also specify technical conditions relating INSTITUTEFOR SOCIALAND ECONOMICCHANGE
to engineering structuresandfeatures, such
NagarabhaviPO: BANGALORE-560072
as limits on raising artificially the water
level in the operatingpool, pondage levels,
ADVERTISEMENT NO.NA/1/2005
crest level of the gates (where a gated
spillway is considered necessary), location
of intakes for the turbines, and so on. Applicationsare invitedforone post of AssistantEditor/AssociateEditor,
One can immediately see how differ- two posts of Desk-Top PublishingAssistants (one each reserved for SC
ences arise. One party can claim to be in candidateand GeneralMeritcandidate. The prescribedapplicationformand
full conformity with the criteria laid down other details can be had from Registrarof the Institutefree of cost. The full
in the treaty, and the other party can say advertisement No.NA/1/2005 and the prescribed applicationform can be
thatthis is not the case. That is exactly what
downloadedfromwww.isec.ac.in.Completedapplicationsinall respectshould
has been happening. The technical diver-
reach the undersigned on or before 30th July 2005.
gences between the two sides were doubt-
less rendered more intractable by the bad
R Rameshappa
political relationship between the two
countries in recent years, but it is my view 27th June 2005 Registrar
that the likelihood of differences was

3142 Economic and Political Weekly July 16, 2005

treaty aims at restraining and not facili-
tating Indian projects on those rivers. It is
essentially negative towardsIndianprojects
- particularly,big projects- on the western
rivers, with some limited permissive pro-
visions. India wants to use those permis-
sive provisions to the full. It is aware of
the dissatisfaction in the state of J and K,
and would like to remove that grievance.
It, therefore, formulates projects such as
Salal, Tulbul. Baglihar, Kishenganga, and
so on. However, the treaty requires India
to send all the technical details of such
projects to Pakistan in advance, and that
is when the trouble starts.
Pakistanregardsthe western rivers as its
rivers under the treaty, and tends to look
with jaundiced eyes at any attempts by
India to build structures on those rivers.
Structures give control, and Pakistan is
reluctant to agree to India acquiring a
measure of control over those rivers that
standallocatedto Pakistan.The treatygives
Pakistanvirtually a veto power over Indian
projects on the western rivers, which
Pakistan tends to exercise in a stringent
rather than accommodating manner.
Adversarial Situation Created
by Treaty
Pakistan is apprehensive of the struc-
tures in question enabling India either to
reduce water flows to Pakistan or to
release storedwaters andcause floods. The
Pakistani objections are thus partly water-
related and partly security-related. The
Indian position is that the security fears
are misconceived as India cannot flood
Pakistan without flooding itself first and
thatits capacity to reduce flows to Pakistan
is very limited. The argument goes on.
Thus, though the treaty did resolve the
water-sharingissue, it created a potentially
adversarialsituationin relationto the Indian
use of the western rivers.
Divergent Approaches
The Indian and Pakistani approaches to
Indian projects on the western rivers are
bound to be fundamentally different. The
Indian engineers would tend to plan and
design projectson the westernriversexactly
as they would anywhere else, but try to
make them conform to the criteria laid
down in the treaty and Annexures D and
E. As professionals, theirorientationwould
be to plan and design techno-economically
sound projects that would yield the best
benefits in the given physical circum-
stances. In doing so, they would doubtless
Economic and Political Weekly July 16, 2005
keep in mind the limitations imposed by
the treaty, but that would be under-
standably a secondary consideration:
techno-economic considerations would
come first. (Fortunately, the need for
techno-economic soundness is recognised
in the treaty.)
On the other hand, in their examination
of the Indian plans and designs, the Pa-
kistani engineers would be primarily con-
cerned with protecting Pakistan's interests
under the treaty and not with the necessity
for or viability of the Indianprojects. They
would tend to start from the treaty provi-
sions and limitations as the governing
and paramount considerations, and treat
techno-economic considerations as
secondary. They may possibly be nega-
tively inclined and may try to find
grounds for rejecting the Indianproposals.
Even if they are not negatively inclined,
they may apply the treaty criteria far
more stringently thantheir Indiancounter-
parts, and suggest changes, modifications
or alternatives that may appear techno-
economically less sound or less attractive
to the latter.
The upshot is that Pakistan tends to
accuse India of planning works that are
violative of the treaty, withholding infor-
mation, and not cooperating in a resolu-
tion of the difference, and India com-
plains about what it perceives as Pakistan's
negativism and deliberate obstruction of
any effort by India to utilise even the
limited rights given to it on the western
rivers.
There is a further political dimension
to these differences that must be kept in
mind. One can speculate - and this is no
more than speculation - that Pakistan is
perhaps not keen on letting these projects
go forward because (a) they are in what
it regards as disputed territory,and (b) the
benefits of the projects would go to J and
K under Indian auspices. Hence, (presum-
ably) the stalemate. Tulbul, Baglihar, etc,
might not have provedso difficult to resolve
if they had been located not in J and K
but elsewhere. However. Pakistan did at
one stage let Salal proceed under certain
conditions; that has not happened in the
case of Baglihar or Kishenganga, for
whatever rason.
IV
Allocation:WhyDidIndia
Agree?
Essentially then, the intractable differ-
ences arise from the fact that under this
treatyIndiahas limited rightson the western
rivers and cannot undertake projects on
those riverswithoutprovidingall the details
to Pakistan and dealing with Pakistan's
objections. Why did India put itself in that
position? The answer is that if Pakistangot
the near-exclusive allocation of the three
western rivers, India for its part got the
eastern rivers. This was importantfrom the
point of view of the Indian negotiators,
because the water needs of Punjab and
Rajasthan weighed heavily with them in
seeking an adequate allocation of Indus
waters for India. (It is not clear whether
the needs of J and K were a major con-
sideration with them: perhapsthe potential
of and need for hydroelectric power in J
and K could not be fully foreseen at the
time.) As early as in 1953, many years
before the treaty, thinking had begun on
the transfer of waters from the eastern
rivers to Rajasthan through a canal. In the
1950s again, Bhakra Nangal was already
under construction. If the Ravi, Beas and
Sutlej had not been allocated to India,
Pakistan would have had the usual lower-
riparianrights over these rivers, and would
have had to be consulted about these
projects - and, would surely have raised
objections. The projects might not have
come up at all, or might have had to be
substantially smaller. In a sense, one might
say that the allocation of the eastern rivers
to India under the Indus treaty removed
Pakistan from the picture in relation to
these rivers,andretrospectivelylegitimised
the Bhakra-Nangal and Rajasthan canal
projects. The price paid for this was the
sacrifice of rights over the western rivers.
The difficulties that this would lead to in
due course, and the discontent that this
would cause in J and K, were perhaps not
anticipated. Having signed away the west-
ern rivers to Pakistan, India has since been
trying to remedy the situation to the extent
possible within the four comers of the
treaty, and coming up against the contours
of the treaty as well as resistance by
Pakistan.
V
WhereDoWeGofromHere?
If the fact that India has limited rights
on the western rivers makes it very dif-
ficult for it to build projects on those
rivers, what should it do? It could decide
to abide very strictlyby the restraintsplaced
on it by the treaty, and stop trying to
undertake big projects on the western
rivers. If that is not considered possible
or desirable, it could continue t try to
persuade Pakistan that the projects are in
3143
compliance with the treaty, or get a
favourablefinding from the NeutralExpert
or the Court of Arbitration. Alternatively,
it could try and seek a revision of the
treaty.
Abrogation of the treaty is out of the
question, but re-negotiation is a possib-
ility. To revertto a point made earlier, India
could seek a water-sharingon the western
rivers. That would give India a position
vis a vis the western rivers which it does
not have at present. However, there are two
difficulties here. First, Pakistan may not
agree to a re-negotiation, or if it does, it
may want to improve its position on the
western rivers. (Incidentally, some Paki-
stani writers have raised questions about
India's right to talk about the rivers that
flow through J and K, though the Indus
treatyimplicitly recognises this; that ques-
tion too may get raised in the new nego-
tiations.) Secondly, India cannot expect to
restrict the re-negotiation to the western
rivers: the eastern rivers will also be a part
of the agenda. If India wants to seek more
rights on the western rivers, it may have
to give Pakistan some rights on the eastern
rivers. Is that feasible at this stage? Would
that not open a Pandora's Box? I refrain
from spelling out the issues that might
arise if the eastern rivers are opened to re-
negotiation.
(Parenthetically, even an abrogation of
the treaty - apart from the wrongness of
such a course - is not necessarily an
advantageous step for India to take: it may
extinguish Pakistan's special rights on the
western rivers, but that country would
continue to have normal lower-riparian
rights under international law on those
rivers: and its lower-riparianrights on the
easternrivers,now overriddenby the treaty,
would stand revived.)
Having regard to all those complica-
tions, perhaps it would be better to leave
things as they are, and hope that with
improving political relations a more rea-
sonable and constructive spirit will prevail
in the future than in the past. That applies
to both sides. India may legitimately ex-
pect Pakistan to be more positive and
reasonable in its examination of Indian
proposals relating to the western rivers,
but equally, India will have to be scrupu-
lously mindful of the limitations and cri-
teria laid down in the treaty, and not chafe
at them as being unduly restrictive. That
may not appear to be a wonderful or
innovative solution to the difficulties that
have been discussed, but given the com-
plexities involved, nothing better seems
available.
3144
VI D and E stipulating conditions about
'IndusII'? pondage, placement of spillway gates, and
so on, will not apply to such projects? In
At this stage, we must take note of a other words, does Article VII over-ride the
vision of possibilities of a constructive provisions of Article III and Annexures D
India-Pakistancooperation over the Indus and E? Where in the treaty is there any
going beyond the existing Indus Treaty, basis for such an understanding? There
that B G Verghese has been putting for- are no detailed provisions applicable to
ward under the title of 'Indus II' (The joint projects in the treaty. The treaty is
Tribune,May 25-26,2005). No one would basically about a division, restricting
wish to deprecate such a vision. However, India's rights on the western rivers and
there is a basic difficulty here. If the Indus Pakistan's on the eastern rivers; two iso-
treaty 1960 had been a constructive, co- lated sentences about 'cooperation' and
operativewater-sharingtreaty,it could have about 'undertaking engineering works'
been built upon and taken further; but it cannot change the entire nature of the
is a negative, partitioning treaty, a coda treaty.In my view, the existing Industreaty
to the partitioning of the land. How can offers no scope for the kind of 'Indus II'
we build cooperation on that basis? How that Verghese has in mind. If we want a
can there be any joint projects under the new relationship between the two coun-
treaty as it stands? Verghese cites Article tries on the Indus (and I am at one with
XII which talks about modifications to the Verghese on this) a totally new treaty will
treaty, but that article has no great signi- have to be negotiated; it cannot grow out
ficance: it merely says that the treaty can of the existing treaty; and questions will
be modified by another treaty. Essentially immediately arise about the coexistence of
what this means is that if you want to bring two divergent treaties.
about a change you have to negotiate a new Even if we ignore that aspect, any ne-
treaty.Eve,: without Article XII, thatcould gotiations on an 'Indus II' will provide an
have been done. My point is that a new opportunity for a reopening of all the old
treaty of cooperation would have to be settled issues, and the various difficulties
fundamentally different from the existing mentioned earlier will arise. Perhapswhen
treaty, of division and cannot be built on the Kashmir issue has become a thing of
it. Verghese refers to Article VII about the past, and the relations between India
'Future Cooperation'. but what kind of and Pakistan have ceased to be adversarial,
cooperation does the article envisage? It we can think of a better treaty on the Indus
begins by referring to "common interest in replacement of the existing one; for the
in the optimum development of the rivers" time being, it might be wiser to leave the
and of cooperation towards that end, but existing treaty as it is, and try to bring
proceeds to such instances of cooperation about a more constructive and cooperative
as the establishment of hydrological and approach to its working.
meteorological stationsandsharingof costs
on drainage works. That is a very limited A Final Caveat
understandingof cooperation. Clause 1 (c)
does talk about cooperation in engineering The discussion in this paper has been
works, but Clause 2 reverts to the general with reference to the provisions of the
adversarial relationship embodied in the treaty, the perspectives of the two govern-
treaty (the supply of advance information ments, and the issues that tend to figure
about engineering works to the otherparty, in the talks between them. It does not go
etc). The point is that Article VII, and in into the question of properwater-manage-
particularClause 1 (c), is at odds with the ment in the Indus basin. The waters of the
rest of the treaty.How can a cooperation in Indus are being badly mismanaged on
"the optimum development of the rivers" both sides of the border, as evidenced
and the joint undertakingof "engineering (for instance) by the serious incidence
works on the rivers" be reconciled with a of waterlogging and salinity and the
division of the river system into two seg- intensity of internalwater-relatedconflicts
ments, one for Pakistan and one for India? (interstate/inter-provincial) in both coun-
Hypothetically speaking, if the two coun- tries. With better and saner water resource
tries were to agree to undertake a certain management, the situation in both coun-
project (say Tulbul or Baglihar) jointly, tries may be very different, and conflicts
does that mean that the restraint imposed may diminish or disappear.That, however,
by Article III(4) of the treatyon the building would call for a separate paper. I3
of storages by India on the western rivers,
and the detailed provisions of Annexures Email: ramaswam@vsnl.com
Economic and Political Weekly July 16, 2005