Goldilocks and the South China Sea: Why Vietnam is hedging with the United

States against a rising China.

Introduction

When Richard Samuels1 raised the prospect of a ‘Goldilocks Consensus’ in regards

to Japan’s relationship vis à vis China, he was positing the idea that Japan should
hedge. Samuels identified a need for Japan to grow stronger whilst avoiding growing
sufficiently powerful as to pose a threat to China, while simultaneously positioning
itself not too close and not too far from the United States, its security guarantor. In
short, Japan should aim to get the relationship ‘just right’, hence the faerie—tale
analogy.2 Moving further south within Asia, an examination of the evolving
relationship between Vietnam and China shows this is precisely the strategy Vietnam
is adopting vis à vis China, albeit within an entirely different security dynamic. In
essence, Vietnam's hedging strategy, comprising what Goh has defined as a form of
“triangular politics”3 between Vietnam, China and the United States, is a strategy
predicated on working for the best whilst preparing for the worst.4 It is a strategy
that seeks to combine a mixture of balancing, containment, engagement and
enmeshment as a form of insurance against an uncertain strategic future.5

For the relationship between Vietnam and China is complex, comprising deeply
embedded historical and cultural factors, which have developed over centuries.
Originally a suzerain or vassal state of China for over 1,000 years6, Vietnam was
forcibly occupied by China’s Han dynasty in 111 BC until finally breaking free from
China's Tang dynasty in AD 9717. For over 1,000 years it had remained a key

                                                                                                               
1
Richard J. Samuels, 'Japan's Goldilocks Strategy', The Washington Quarterly, 29/4 (2006).
2
A reference to the traditional British faerie tale of Goldilocks and the Three Bears, first penned by
Richard Southey after centuries of British oral tradition.
3
Evelyn Goh, 'Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia', International Security, 32/3
(2008), 138.
4
Kuik Cheng-Chwee, 'The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising
China', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30/2 (2008), 159-185, 171, in ProQuest Central [online database].
5
Evelyn Goh, 'Understanding "Hedging" In Asia-Pacific Security', PacNet, 43 (August 31, 2006).
6
Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies
(Washington D.C.: East-West Center 2005), 19., Robert D. Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China
Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), 51.
7
Robert D. Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific.

  1
southern outlier of Sinic culture8, and though it regained its independence from
China as a separate entity and achieved autonomy as a separate state in 971, this was
not a formal institutionalised conception of post—Westphalian state sovereignty9 as
we know today, for border skirmishes and clashes with China continued until, with
Vietnam's defeat of the Ming army in 1427, China's southern border with Vietnam
was finally stabilised.10 Both states’ cultures have heavily influenced the other’s,
reinforcing the dyadic relationship existing between the two. Sinic influences can be
seen in many of the earliest remains from Vietnam’s Cham culture11, and though to an
external observer, the cultural similarities between Vietnamese and Chinese may
seem overwhelming, to the Vietnamese, burdened, as Kaplan has stated, by “the
narcissism of small differences”,12 the subtle but important distinctions between the
two are anything but, and it is these granular differences which greatly inform both
cultures’ distinct identities.

Though the relationship between these two states remains notably asymmetric13, with
China being by far the dominant power, it is also dyadic14, with both states retaining
their ability to influence each other, politically, strategically and economically, as well
as culturally. Growing economic ties and multilateral enmeshment, as we shall see,
have made it so. This asymmetry, as Womack has noted, results in each state
perceiving the bilateral relationship differently15 from their opposing and unequal
positions of power, reflecting the power imbalance inherent in the structure. As the
smaller side in the relationship, it is possible Vietnam at times misconstrues China's
actions as overly threatening, reflecting what Kaplan has identified as Vietnam's
constant fear of Chinese domination,16 itself a byproduct of centuries of Sino—
Vietnamese conflict. Similarly, it is also likely that China at times pays
correspondingly less attention to its relationship with Vietnam, as a consequence of

                                                                                                               
8
Ibid.
9
Brantly Womack, 'Asymmetry and China’s Tributary System', The Chinese Journal of International
Politics, 5 (2012), 43.
10
Ibid.
11
Robert D. Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, xix.
12
Ibid. 58.
13
Brantly Womack, Asymmetry and China’s Tributary System.
14
Ibid. 49.
15
Ibid. 46.
16
Robert D. Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, 56.

  2  
being a greater power and having larger, economically and strategically more
important relationships on which to focus its attention. Nevertheless the tensions
these imbalances create continue to persist, and remain a key factor pushing Vietnam
to quietly seek security assurances from the United States and their ASEAN partners
to offset the security threat they perceive in a rising and increasingly assertive China,
particularly in relation to their ongoing maritime territorial disputes with China in the
South China Sea.

This paper will argue that, due to Thayer’s “tyranny of geography’17 – where
Vietnam's shared northern continental border and their long snaking western littoral
coastline bordering the South China Sea have inevitably thrown Vietnam's and
China's interests together – Vietnam is more threatened by China's rise than any
other regional state. As Goh states, “the tyranny of geography renders the two
countries strategic rivals.”18 Consequently, as China continues to rise, this paper
argues that Vietnam will increasingly seek to hedge with the United States,
increasing military and security ties with the western hegemon as part of a nuanced
strategy, which also includes engagement with China (particularly through growing
trade and economic ties); which seeks to enmesh China in multilateral institutions
within the regional security architecture; and which seeks to strengthen its own
security position through a program of military modernisation and selective military
expansion. This nuanced strategy we shall call hedging, which has been defined by
Tran, Vierira and Ferreira—Pereira as:
A purposeful act in which a state seeks to insure its long—term interests
by placing its policy bets on multiple countering options that are designed
to offset risks embedded in the international systems.19

This paper is divided into four parts. Part one examines the historical influences
which inform this strategy. Part two investigates the economic factors underpinning
the importance of ongoing engagement with China. Part three examines the
                                                                                                               
17
Carlyle A. Thayer, 'The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the
South China Sea', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33/3 (2011), 348-369, 349, in ProQuest Central [online
database].
18
Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, 19.
19
Phuc Thi Tran, Alena Vysotskaya G Vieira and Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, 'Vietnam's strategic
hedging vis-a-vis China: the roles of the European Union and Russia', Revista Brasileira de Politíca
Internacional, 56/1 (2013), 170, in ProQuest Central [online database].

  3
theoretical concepts which frame the debate and provide a theoretical lens through
which to examine the strategic possibilities open to Vietnam. Finally part four
discusses the strategic and political factors driving Vietnam to opt for a strategy of
hedging against a rising China.

Historical factors

Numerous scholars have already observed that Vietnam has adopted a nuanced
policy of hedging with the United States against a rising China.20 Regionally, Vietnam
is not alone. As Shekar points out, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has similarly adopted a hedging strategy to counter the rise of China.21
Cheng—Chwee similarly observes that Malaysia and Singapore too have opted for
what he describes as the “middle position” of hedging against China.22 However, in
order to understand how Vietnam has arrived at this policy juncture, it is necessary
first to understand the historical factors underpinning this strategic policy choice.

Opting to hedge with other states and multilateral institutions against a rising China
threat is only a relatively recent development in Vietnam’s history. As has been
previously noted, Vietnam and China have a history of internecine conflict spanning
centuries. However, more recently, from the 1950s to the 1970s, relations between
the two were considerably more cordial. This was a period when Vietnam
bandwagoned with China, a period when relations between the two were
characterised as “as close as lips and teeth”,23 or in Ho Chi Minh’s words, “comrade

                                                                                                               
20
Roy Denny, 'Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?', Contemporary Southeast Asia,
27/2 (2005), 315, in ProQuest Central [online database]., Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The
U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, 23., Le Hong Hiep, 'Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy
against China since Normalization', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 35/3 (2013), 360,361., 0Le Hong
Hiep, 'Vietnam’s strategic trajectory: From internal development to external engagement', Strategic
Insights, 59 (2012), 8., Phuc Thi Tran, Alena Vysotskaya G Vieira and Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira,
Vietnam's strategic hedging vis-a-vis China: the roles of the European Union and Russia, 171,181,182.
21
Vibhanshu Shekhar, 'ASEAN’s Response to the Rise of China: Deploying a Hedging Strategy',
China Report, 48/3 (2012), 262.
22
Kuik Cheng-Chwee, The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising
China, 161.
23
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 338., Carlyle A. Thayer,
'Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest', Asian Survey, 34/6
(1994), 513, 518.

  4  
plus brother.”24 However, this period of amity was not to last. Perceiving the
genocidal actions of Cambodian revolutionary Pol Pot’s murderous Khmer Rouge
forces as an existential security threat, Vietnam invaded neighbouring Cambodia in
1979 and from then on, relations with China soured.25 Moreover, the great—power
politics of this period served to further distance Vietnam from China. Vietnam sided
with the Soviet Union over Cambodia, and both China – who had been steadily
improving their bilateral relations with the United States since President Nixon’s
historic visit to China in 1972 – and the United States subsequently embargoed
Vietnam, with China also invading Vietnam in 1978, supposedly to prevent Vietnam
invading Thailand through Cambodia.26 This posed a security dilemma for Vietnam,
who then turned to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – with whom
they shared a similar communist ideology, particularly since joining the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 197827 – for military support against
China. The Soviets made this support conditional on Vietnam's formalizing their
bilateral relations; consequently in November 1978, Vietnam signed the Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR and Soviet military aid for Vietnamese
actions in Cambodia soared to US$800 million annually, with this figure rising to
US$1.4 billion in 1979 following China’s invasion of Vietnam.28 Hence this period
saw Vietnam balancing with the Soviet Union against their northern neighbour.

Throughout the 1980s, Vietnam maintained its military operations in Cambodia with
Soviet economic and military support, however Vietnam also found itself fighting on
two fronts during this period, as northern border clashes with China continued
unabated.29 Despite pervasive mutual distrust30, Soviet economic aid continued to
flow to Hanoi with this total figure reaching US$1.8 billion in 1986.31
However, from 1989 to 1991, deteriorating economic conditions within the USSR,
marked by increasing domestic food shortages and the eventual collapse of Soviet
                                                                                                               
24
Carlyle A. Thayer, Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest, 513.
25
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization.
26
Ibid. 339.
27
US Library of Congress, 'Vietnam: The Soviet Union', US Library of Congress: Federal Research
Division, (<http://countrystudies.us/vietnam/61.htm>.
28
Ibid.
29
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 339.
30
US Library of Congress, Vietnam: The Soviet Union.
31
Ibid.

  5
communism, resulted in Vietnam eventually losing all Soviet military and economic
aid.32 Consequently, Vietnam now found itself politically more isolated than ever.
Unable to sustain its operations in Cambodia without Soviet assistance, Vietnam
withdrew its forces. Subsequently, following an historic meeting in southern China in
September 1990 between leaders of the two states, as well as the Communist Party of
Vietnam’s (CPV) Seventh National Congress in 1991 - which historically saw both a
“closing off of multiparty politics”33 and the birth of a new intent for Hanoi to
diversify and multilateralize its foreign relations34 - the CPV embarked on a policy of
normalizing their bilateral relations with Beijing through a strategy of “cooperation—
struggle”, literally “cooperating while struggling” [“vua hop tac vua dau tranh”].35
Historically, 1991 is hence marked as the point where a ‘normalisation ‘ of relations
between Vietnam and China re—commenced.

Vietnam’s historic experiences, as briefly surveyed here, teach us that Vietnam has
learned of the perils of aligning itself too closely with any one major power.36 Firstly
in relation to the USSR, Vietnam’s experiences in balancing with the Soviet Union
“reminded the Vietnamese of the peril inherent in placing too much trust in a foreign
ally.”37 Moreover, in relation to China, as Goh has observed, “Vietnam remains
deeply suspicious of Chinese intentions.”38 Ultimately, its experiences in first
bandwagoning with China, and subsequently balancing with the USSR against
China, have not served its long—term interests. This informs us that Hanoi, through
a combination of the geostrategic realities of its physical geography, its accrued
historic experiences with China, and its more recent economic and political
experiences from aligning with two major powers have fundamentally taught it the
importance of self—reliance as a long—term policy goal. Moreover, Kaplan reminds
us of the ancient Vietnamese proverb: that “distant water can’t put out a nearby
fire”39, which, when taken in the context of Vietnam hedging with the United States,
                                                                                                               
32
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 339.
33
Martin Gainsborough, Vietnam: Rethinking the State (London: Zed Books, 2010), 141.
34
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 341, 342.
35
Ibid. 343.
36
US Library of Congress, Vietnam: The Soviet Union.
37
Ibid., Derek McDougall, 'Responses to ‘Rising China’ in the East Asian Region: soft balancing with
accommodation', Journal of Contemporary China, 21/73 (2011), 1-17, 13, accessed 2014/09/03.
38
Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, 20.
39
Robert D. Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, 63.

  6  
supports the supposition that Vietnam is unlikely to pursue any future foreign policy
position which will make it over—reliant on any one state.

Economic factors

Famously, the CPV’s Sixth National Congress in Hanoi in December 1986 is widely
regarded as the birthplace of Vietnam’s policy of economic renovation (Doi Moi)40.
Effectively marking an economic renaissance of sorts, Doi Moi heralded a radical
rethinking of Vietnam’s economic development by policy leaders in Hanoi. Doi Moi
involved the increased adoption of policies that encouraged private sector
development, encouraged export—oriented trade, welcomed increased foreign direct
investment (FDI), and signaled an increased alignment with more neoliberal—
oriented policies.41 In retrospect, this was even more remarkable when one considers
the historical context of the time, which saw Vietnam in the midst of ongoing military
conflict in neighbouring Cambodia whilst continuing to fight border skirmishes with
China in the north. Significantly, Vietnam's Doi Moi policy has been widely credited
with allowing Vietnam to escape the “poverty trap” and emerge as a “lower middle—
income country in the late 2000s”.42

Perhaps the most significant achievement of Doi Moi has been the deepening
economic ties Vietnam has developed with China. For example, in the four—year
period from 2000 to 2004 alone, Vietnam's trade with China doubled from $2.4
billion to $5 billion43 and from 2004 until the present, China has emerged as
Vietnam's biggest trading partner.44 Significantly, China is also currently the world’s
largest exporting country (with an 11.1% share of world exports) and the world’s
second—largest importing country (with a 9.8% share of global imports). 45 To put

                                                                                                               
40
Martin Gainsborough, Vietnam: Rethinking the State, 1, 2., Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The
U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, 20.
41
Martin Gainsborough, Vietnam: Rethinking the State.
42
Van Tho Tran, 'Vietnamese Economy at the Crossroads: New Doi Moi for Sustained Growth', Asian
Economic Policy Review, 8/1 (2013), 122, in eoh [online database].
43
All figures quoted in this paper in US dollars; Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in
Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, 20.
44
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 345.
45
World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2013 (Geneva: World Trade Organization,
2013), <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its2013_e.pdf>., World Trade

  7
this in perspective, Vietnam’s total share of world trade is considerably less, with a
0.6% share of world exports and also a 0.6% share of world imports.46 However,
examination of Vietnam’s current balance of trade figures highlights the importance
of China as an export market for Vietnam, as well as their major source of imports.
Current trade figures peg Vietnam’s exports to China at $11,094,099,65047 with
imports listed at $31,269,828,96548, revealing a trade deficit of $20,175,729,315. This
$20 billion deficit is significant, for as well as showing the importance of China to
Vietnam as an export market, it more significantly highlights the asymmetry of the
trading relationship. The inescapable conclusion is that in purely economic terms,
China is currently more important to Vietnam than Vietnam is to China. The ongoing
economic challenge for Vietnam will be to increase their economic importance to
China, both as an export market, and as a target for increased FDI, the latter being
particularly important in order to reduce Vietnam's fears that it is losing out to China
in competition for manufacturing contracts, both countries being attractive
investment options for FDI due to their low manufacturing costs.49

Of course, when assessing strategy options available for both sides in the midst of
state sovereignty disputes - such as the tensions currently simmering over maritime
territorial disputes in the South China Sea - it will be increasingly difficult for either
side not to factor the economic aspects of the bilateral relationship into their policy
considerations. Whilst China, as the more powerful state, holds the upper hand in
terms of trade (having a positive trade balance), as China's economic ties with
Vietnam deepen, it will become increasingly difficult for China to use the threat of
reducing trade as a bargaining tool, given the growing number of Chinese industries
relying on Vietnam as a target export market – and the further trade grows, the more
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Organization, Member Information: China and the WTO (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2014),
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN>.
46
World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2013.
47
Vietnam Customs, Statistics of Exports by Country/Territory - Main Exports: September, 2014 (Ha Noi:
Ministry of Finance, September 2014),
<http://www.customs.gov.vn/Lists/EnglishStatisticsCalendars/Attachments/334/2014-T09T-5X(EN-
PR).pdf>, accessed 25 October 2014.
48
Vietnam Customs, Statistics of Import by Country/Territory - Main Imports: September, 2014 (Ha Noi:
Ministry of Finance, September 2014),
<http://www.customs.gov.vn/Lists/EnglishStatisticsCalendars/Attachments/335/2014-T09T-5n(EN-
PR).pdf>.
49
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 345.

  8  
difficult this will become. Moreover, should Hanoi (with a negative trade balance)
choose to broaden its policy of Doi Moi by making Vietnam an increasingly attractive
market for Chinese FDI, this will have the combined effect of further integrating
China into Vietnam's economy, perhaps providing the necessary economic stimulus
to kick start Vietnam's own manufacturing sector, with the ultimate aim of reducing
the balance of trade by increasing Vietnamese exports to China.

However, this will not be easy, as several trade barriers still stand in the way of
deepening bilateral trade relations, including the current total scale of bilateral trade
(which is still relatively small but growing), the asymmetric nature of the trading
relationship (with China having a considerable trade surplus), mutual distrust and
lack of familiarity with the quality of goods each country can produce, and mutual
bilateral cultural aversion.50 From a Chinese perspective, an enduring perception of
Vietnam as culturally and technologically backward, combined with a perception of
widespread poverty has hampered bilateral trade, creating perceptions of reduced
market demand and encouraging an oversupply of outdated and overstocked Chinese
products into Vietnam.51 From the Vietnamese perspective, a perception of Chinese
manufactured goods as cheap but of questionable quality has similarly hampered
further trade deepening.52 Whilst these perceptions are inaccurate on both counts,
they nevertheless signify the sorts of cultural barriers which will need to be overcome
before increased mutual trust and respect can lead to a deepening of market demand.
Encouragingly, recent ministerial releases from Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, detailing Vietnamese President Trương Tấn Sang’s recent visit to China,
have reported bilateral intentions to strengthen “trade cooperation” and increase
Chinese investment in Vietnam.53

Theoretical concepts

                                                                                                               
50
Ning Zhang, 'Research on Trading Relations between China and Vietnam', Journal of Engineering
(JOE), 1/2 (2012), 32, 33.
51
Ibid. 33.
52
Ibid.
53
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Sang's visit to China reaffirms foreign policy (Ha Noi: Vietnam:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 26 2014),
<http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr111027144142/ns130624161507>, accessed 1
November, 2014.

  9
In order to fully discuss the strategic options available to Vietnam to tackle a rising
China, it is first necessary to examine the theoretical concepts that frame this policy
debate. This examination is made more difficult by the fact that, as in many areas of
international relations, there appears to be little consensus on the meanings of many
of the terms used; moreover, many of these terms appear to be used interchangeably.
Fully exploring the complete range of usage of these terms and proposing working
definitions for them is beyond the scope of this paper. Consequently, this paper will
work with the meanings of the terms used as defined by their authors.

In examining the theoretical underpinnings of the bilateral relationship between

Vietnam and China, a useful starting point is to focus on its asymmetric nature. Given
the great disparity in size between the two countries, their relationship is a classic
example of large state—small state relations. According to Womack’s theory of
asymmetry, in any asymmetric power relationship between states, the smaller side is
always “more exposed than the larger side”54, a difference which, according to
Womack, affects every facet of the relationship.55 As already discussed, this
imbalance causes each side to perceive the relationship differently, often leading to
each side mis—reading the intentions of the opposing side, depending on their
position of power within the relationship. As Womack states:
The smaller side is, hence, likely to see a mortal threat when the larger
side wants only to solve the crisis and return to more important
concerns.56

Accordingly, each of the two sides in the relationship differs in the ultimate objectives
it seeks from the relationship. Typically, the smaller side seeks recognition from the
larger of their own autonomy as a state and crucially seeks assurances of non—
interference and domination of its own affairs and interests from the larger state.57
Contrastingly, the larger side seeks reassurance from the smaller side of its status as
the real source of power within the relationship and seeks deference from the smaller
state, though as Womack notes, a crucial distinction exists between deference and
                                                                                                               
54
Brantly Womack, Asymmetry and China’s Tributary System, 45.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid. 46.
57
Ibid. 47, 48.

  10  
obedience, deference being premised on autonomy – not predicated on obedience.58
Crucially, when these two competing objectives can be balanced, a state of mature
asymmetry within the relationship is reached. As Thayer observes:
Mature asymmetry exists when the weaker state gives deference to the
more powerful state in return for the stronger state’s recognition of the
weaker state’s autonomy.59

This concept of balancing the provision of deference in return for a recognition of

autonomy has been categorized by Hong—Hiep as “a dichotomy of deference and
defiance”60 broadly in keeping with Vietnam's stated policy of “cooperation—
struggle”.

With this understanding of the meanings and implications of asymmetric interstate

relations reached, it is useful now to turn to theories that examine ways in which
states can choose to handle such relations, as these will differ. Options available to
states can vary between the two extremes of bandwagoning – where a state aligns
itself closely with a larger, more powerful state in the hope of “increasing (its)
security and influence”61, to balancing – where a state sides with another more
powerful state against a larger state it perceives as threatening, in order to reduce its
sense of exposure and increase its sense of security. Typically and realistically, given
the growing enmeshment of bilateral and multilateral relations brought about by the
forces of globalization, interstate relations are more complex than these two extremes
would suggest, and states choose neither of these two polarizing positions. Rather,
states typically choose positions which combine elements of both balancing and
bandwagoning, with these positions identified by many scholars as existing within a
spectrum commonly referred to as the balancing—bandwagoning continuum.62
However, as Acharya, Hong—Hiep and Goh all point out, even the balancing—

                                                                                                               
58
Ibid.
59
Carlyle A. Thayer, The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China
Sea, 348.
60
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 334.
61
Andrew Heywood Global Politics (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 236.
62
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization., Kuik Cheng-Chwee, The
Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China., Evelyn Goh, Understanding
"Hedging" In Asia-Pacific Security., Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia., Roy
Denny, Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?, Amitav Acharya, 'Will Asia's Past be its
Future?', International Security, 28/3 (2004), 152.

  11
bandwagoning continuum concept has its limitations as a theoretical construct, with
Goh dismissing it as a “simplistic dichotomy”63 and Acharya concluding:
The balancing—bandwagoning continuum is too limited to capture
the range of choices a state has in responding to a rising power.64

Acharya’s observation is particularly compelling in relation to Vietnam’s foreign

policy position vis à vis China, given the complex cultural, historic, economic and
security considerations which bind these two countries together. Hence, a growing
body of work is articulating states’ positions in their bilateral relationships with other
states as increasingly consisting of “hedging”, a position which contains elements of
balancing and bandwagoning, but which also factors in recognition of bilateral
trading relationships, engagement in multilateral institutions and regional security
architectures, modernization of domestic military capabilities, increasing reliance on
external security guarantors and growing bilateral diplomatic ties between states.

Hong—Hiep firmly believes Vietnam is hedging with the United States against a
rising China, and has identified four components to this hedging strategy, which he
has usefully aligned with Vietnam's strategy of “cooperation—struggle” previously
surveyed. These four components consist of:
1. Economic pragmatism.
2. Direct engagement.
3. Hard balancing.
4. Soft balancing65.

The first two components of this strategy are seen as representing the ‘cooperation’
side of the strategy and involve Vietnam pursuing positive relations with China.
‘Economic pragmatism’ refers to the policy of pursuing a deepening of economic
engagement with China, in order to promote domestic economic development. Whilst
‘direct engagement’ refers to a posited aim of shaping China's behavior by engaging
China via an expanding serious of bilateral mechanisms in order to promote mutual
communication and trust, usually through scheduled regular high—level dialogues.66
Conversely, the second two components are seen as representing the ‘struggle’ side of
                                                                                                               
63
Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia, 117, 118.
64
Amitav Acharya, Will Asia's Past be its Future?, 152.
65
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 345-360.
66
Ibid. 346-350.

  12  
the strategy and represent Vietnam preparing for negative relations with China.
‘Hard balancing’ is used by Hong—Hiep to refer to the process whereby Vietnam
safeguards its security by modernising and expanding its military forces to protect
against possible Chinese aggression.67 Whilst ‘soft balancing’ is used to shore—up
Vietnam's security in two ways: firstly by strengthening bilateral ties with major
regional powers, and secondly by tactical engagement with regional multilateral
institutions.68 To this end, Vietnam appears to strategically categorize its relationships
with regional states according to the status it places upon them, using the terms
‘strategic partnerships’, ‘comprehensive strategic partnerships’ and ‘comprehensive
partnerships’ to delineate these relationships, although it remains unclear precisely
what these appellations signify.69 What is clear is that states with whom Vietnam
pursues such partnerships all fit into one or more of four distinct categories, which he
identifies as:
1. Influential political powers.
2. Economic powerhouses.
3. Strategically useful military powers.
4. Countries able to provide strategic assistance in the management of Vietnam's
South China Sea dispute with China70.

According to Hong—Hiep, by pursuing a deepening of ties with such countries,

Vietnam hopes to increases its regional diplomatic and political influence, strengthen
its domestic economy, modernize and expand its military capabilities – thus
improving its ability to use the threat of military intervention as a deterrent, and
strategically improve its ability to oppose Chinese aggression in the South China Sea
through military and multilateral engagement.71

As well as hard—balancing and soft—balancing, scholars of international relations

additionally refer to internal and external balancing. Both Hong—Hiep and Thayer
agree that internal balancing refers to a state modernizing and expanding its domestic

                                                                                                               
67
Ibid. 351-356.
68
Ibid. 356-360.
69
Ibid. 357.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.

  13
military capabilities.72 In this sense this usage of the term equates with hard—
balancing, as described above. Additionally, Hong—Hiep and Thayer’s usage of the
term ‘external balancing’ appears to be in agreement, referring to a state forming
alliances with two or more other states to counter future aggression from a potential
adversarial state,73 a definition which also equates with that some scholars use for the
concept of soft balancing. Finally, Cheng-Chwee uses the term ‘indirect balancing’ to
further qualify the concepts of external balancing and soft balancing as outlined.
According to Cheng-Chwee, external/soft balancing refers to a specific or direct
military threat to state security74 and would, by implication, be more accurately
ascribed as ‘direct balancing’. Accordingly, indirect balancing applies when a state
makes military preparations to address “diffuse uncertainties by forging defence
cooperation and by upgrading its own military”75, a fine but subtle distinction that
effectively serves to cloud the discussion given the lack of consensus of the discursive
terminology used.

Another take on the concept of indirect balancing is provided by Evelyn Goh, who
claims Southeast Asian states including Vietnam are engaged in indirect balancing
against China which can be distinguished by three separate characteristics:
1. A building of the threat of the use of United States military force as a
deterrence against the use of force by China by “facilitating a continued US
preponderance in the region”.76
2. Engagement in a three—way political process that she describes as a form of
“triangular politics” between the member state, China and the United States.
3. A process of engagement she defines as “omni—enmeshment” which involves
engaging China in regional multilateral institutions and the regional security
architecture77.

Goh further develops her concept of “omni—enmeshment”, claiming that as well as

pursuing “multiple strategic relationships with major powers in the region”,78
                                                                                                               
72
Ibid. 335; Carlyle A. Thayer, 'The Structure of Vietnam-China Relations, 1991-2008', paper given at
3rd International Conference on Vietnamese Studies, Hanoi, Vietnam, December 4-7, 2008, Hanoi,
24.
73
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 335., Carlyle A. Thayer,
The Structure of Vietnam-China Relations, 1991-2008, 24.
74
Kuik Cheng-Chwee, The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising
China, 170.
75
Ibid.
76
Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia, 136.
77
Ibid. 133-139.

  14  
Vietnam is attempting to bind China in a form of “superpower entrapment”79 by
engaging China in multilateral institutions such as ASEAN, ASEAN Plus, the Asian
Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in the hope that such
institutional membership will have a socializing effect on China and act as a
constraint and moderating influence on future aggression and expansionary
behaviour by China in the South China Sea.

In contrast to the above authors, whose various analyses all attempt to pin Vietnam’s
approach to handling China’s rise to one particular strategy – albeit a complex and
mixed strategy, in the case of Goh - Vuving asserts that Hanoi’s approach to Beijing’s
rise and growing threat has not been characterised by one particular strategy, nor by
a “pattern of shifting from one strategy to another.”80 Rather, Vuving identifies four
different “pathways” or strategies Vietnam uses and sees Vietnam’s position as being
more fluid rather than grounded in any one particular tactical approach. According to
Vuving, Vietnam’s tactical/strategic position vis à vis China can shift between these
different tactical pathways, with a different weighting given to each, depending on
the particular political dynamic of the time. The four ‘pathways’ Vuving identifies
consist of:
1. Solidarity – referring to a shared Marxist-Leninist ideology between leaders
in Hanoi and Beijing.
2. Deference – involving recognition of the implications of Womack’s theory of
asymmetry, deference as used by Vuving refers to Vietnam pursuing its own
interests whilst remaining cognizant of China's superior status within the
power structure.
3. Balancing – consisting of ‘external balancing’ involving the cultivation of
security relationships with major powers against China, and ‘internal
balancing’ involving Vietnam improving its own state of military
preparedness.
4. Enmeshment81 - involving a process of increasing bilateral economic
interdependence with China and interlocking China in a mix of state and
non—state regional interests in situations “that are favourable to Vietnam”.82

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
78
Ibid. 126.
79
Ibid. 129.
80
Alexander L. Vuving, 'Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam's China Policy: A Changing Mixture of
Pathways', Asian Survey, 46/6 (2006), 823, in ProQuest Central [online database].
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid. 807-810.

  15
Whilst it is clear that researchers’ use of the theoretical concepts examined here
varies, and that these concepts are frequently used interchangeably and in
contextually different ways, these concepts nevertheless provide a useful theoretical
framework to examine the strategic and political factors driving Vietnam to opt for a
hedging strategy against a rising China.

Political and strategic factors

Vietnam finds itself caught firmly between conflicting historic, economic and security
imperatives vis à vis their relations with China. Vietnam’s experiences in
bandwagoning with China from the 1950s through to the 1970s, then balancing with
the Soviet Union against China until the end of the Cold War have taught it to be
wary of being overly reliant on great powers to provide for their security needs.
Vietnam's normalisation of relations with China in 1991 did not prevent China from
announcing a new law on territorial waters which reiterated Chinese claims to the
islands of the South China Sea in February 1992,83 nor did this normalisation prevent
China from invading and landing troops in the Spratly Islands (claimed by Vietnam)
later that same year.84 Such experiences have taught Hanoi to be suspicious of Beijing
– reinforcing longstanding cultural biases towards the Chinese – whilst also
reinforcing a realist interpretation of international relations: that states will always
pursue their own interests ahead of those of other states, regardless of the strength of
bilateral relations and regardless of existing treaties or agreements to which they may
be a signatory.

Residual cultural aversion towards the Chinese within Vietnam, combined with a
growing Vietnamese nationalism effectively rules out Vietnam siding too closely with
China into the future, and certainly rules out bandwagoning as a policy option. This
rising Vietnamese nationalism and growing anti—Chinese sentiment within Vietnam
has been exacerbated this year by Chinese actions in the South China Sea, such as
the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) moving of an oil—
drilling rig (HD 981) into maritime waters within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone
                                                                                                               
83
Carlyle A. Thayer, Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest, 525.
84
Ibid.

  16  
(EEZ)85. However, Vietnam's current economic situation, while slowly improving,
has a long way to go to catch up to China, let alone to the rest of the developed world.
The World Bank’s 2013 GDP per capita figures86 lists Vietnam with a GDP of
US$1,911 per person, compared to China’s US$6,807 per person. Australia’s listed
GDP of US$67,468 per person serves to illustrate just how big the gap is and these
figures, combined with China's status as Vietnam's largest export market and largest
source of imported goods87 provides Vietnam with a powerful economic imperative to
maintain strong bilateral relations with China. Such imperatives effectively rule out
Vietnam's balancing too strongly against China as a policy option tool.

While such analysis would seem to point towards Vietnam’s opting for a middle—
ground policy position towards China, the very idea that states can simply opt for a
policy position somewhere along the conceptual balancing—bandwagoning
continuum is, (as Acharya and Goh conclude), too simplistic88 and ignores the
complex realities and options of modern international relations. Since the end of the
Cold War, a prominent feature of international relations has been the growth in
multilateral institutions (MLIs) and arguably, in no region of the world have MLIs
proliferated so much as within Asia. Such MLI proliferation has provided Vietnam
with a range of new tactical opportunities to pursue a strategy of binding China to
commitments and obligations laid down by these MLIs, as well as exposing them to
the normative effect it hopes multilateral engagement with such institutions provides.
This strategy, variously referred to in the literature as engagement, enmeshment,
omni—enmeshment and even “superpower entrapment”89 implies that a state’s
expansionary and potentially aggressive military tendencies can be moderated by the

                                                                                                               
85
Gregory B. Poling Ernest Z. Bower, 'China-Vietnam Tensions High over Drilling Rig in Disputed
Waters', Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), (7 May),
<http://csis.org/publication/critical-questions-china-vietnam-tensions-high-over-drilling-rig-disputed-
waters>., Le Hong Hiep, 'Oil rig incident means Vietnam–China relations face a new test', East Asia
Forum: Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific
<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/05/21/oil-rig-incident-means-vietnam-china-relations-face-a-new-
test/>.
86
World Bank, 'GDP per capita (current US$)', World Bank, (2013),
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>.
87
Vietnam Customs, Statistics of Exports by Country/Territory - Main Exports: September, 2014., Vietnam
Customs, Statistics of Import by Country/Territory - Main Imports: September, 2014.
88
Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia, 117, 118., Amitav Acharya, Will
Asia's Past be its Future?, 152.
89
Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia, 129.

  17
coercive effect of collective multilateral engagement. Thus it is through such
mechanisms that Vietnam hopes to moderate China's growing territorial incursions in
the South China Sea and bring its actions into accord with the expectations of other
regional states, particularly when it comes to resolving maritime sovereignty claims.

Since normalisation in 1991, Vietnam has steadily increased and deepened its
multilateral involvement and deepened bilateral ties with a range of countries, signing
‘strategic partnerships’ with “Russia (2001), Japan (2006), India (2007), China
(2008), South Korea (2009), Spain (2009), the United Kingdom (2010), Germany
(2011), Italy, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and France (2013) and ‘comprehensive
partnerships’ with Australia, and the United States (2013).”90 Additionally, Vietnam
is a member of 46 international organisations, including APEC, ARF, ASEAN, EAS,
IAEA, IMF, NAM, UN, WHO, WMO and the WTO.91 Such engagement provides
Vietnam with significant multilateral leverage with which to employ its strategy of
binding multilateral enmeshment.

At the heart of Vietnam's security concerns vis à vis China is the escalating growth
rate of China’s military – particularly the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
regional forces within the South China Sea. China’s annual military expenditure is
officially listed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at
US$188.5 billion representing an expenditure of 2% GDP.92 Although falling well
short of the United States’ annual military expenditure of US$640 billion (3.8%
GDP), such spending totals dwarf Vietnam’s annual military expenditure ($3 billion
and 2.3% GDP)93 and as Thayer notes, official Chinese figures concerning Beijing’s
annual military expenditure are widely believed to understate China’s actual
expenditure.94 Moreover the United States, Japan, Australia, Vietnam and other
regional states have expressed concerns about China’s lack of transparency as to the

                                                                                                               
90
Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization, 357.
91
C.I.A., 'CIA World Factbook: East & Southeast Asia: Vietnam', Central Intelligence Agency, (2014),
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vm.html>.
92
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'SIPRI Military Expenditute Database', SIPRI,
(2013), <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database>.
93
All military expenditure figures sourced from SIPRI database: ibid.
94
Carlyle Thayer, 'The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea', Security
Challenges, 6/2 (2010), 71.

  18  
factors driving this military growth.95 Consequently, as the growth of China’s
maritime forces within the South China Sea outstrips that of Vietnam's and other
states’, and as this growth is accompanied by a marked escalation of aggressive
maritime activities by China within the littoral bounds of the South China Sea,
Hanoi’s concerns about a security dilemma within the region continue to grow. Such
concerns are driving Hanoi to pursue its own program of military modernisation and
growth, and nothing signals their intentions in this area more markedly than
Vietnam's recent purchase of six Russian Kilo class submarines (at a cost of US$2.6
billion)96 with Hanoi widely believed to be planning a second tranche of six
submarine purchases by the end of the decade.97 China may be continuing to grow its
regional maritime forces, but it is clear Vietnam too is undergoing a selective program
or military naval expansion tactically targeting China’s rise in a bid to offset China's
expansion and provide a level of deterrence to protect its territorial claims within the
South China Sea.

Conclusion

It is clear Vietnam is employing a hedging strategy to counter China's rise and

growing expansionary activities within the littoral confines of the South China Sea.
To the author, hedging implies a sense of keeping options open, a variable which
would be precluded by a strategy of pure balancing. As surveyed, the economic
imperatives for Hanoi maintaining and growing bilateral relations with Beijing are
clearly crucial, nevertheless these continue to be offset by growing Chinese maritime
incursions which increasingly threaten Vietnam's maritime territorial claims,
especially in relation to the Spratly Islands. Despite Vietnam’s demonstrated plans to
modernize and grow their own naval capabilities, the disparity in size and operational
capabilities between the two countries’ forces continues to present a security dilemma
which can only realistically be countered by Vietnam deepening its relations with the
region’s current hegemon, the United States. Moreover there is evidence that

                                                                                                               
95
Ibid.
96
Ankit Panda, 'Vietnam's China Challenge: Making Asymmetric Deterrence Work', The Diplomat
(Tokyo), <http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/vietnams-china-challenge-making-asymmetric-deterrence-
work/>.
97
Robert D. Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific.

  19
Washington is growing increasingly receptive to the idea of deepening military ties
with Hanoi. Recent statements from United States Secretary of State John Kerry
reveal United States intentions to deepen diplomatic ties with Hanoi,98 while a recent
defence policy dialogue between the two states has expressed Washington’s
intentions to “consolidate and strengthen the comprehensive partnership between
Vietnam and the US.”99

Fundamentally, Vietnam has no option but to hedge with the United States against
China. This strategy accords with its policy of “cooperation—struggle” and whilst
continuing to cooperate with Beijing economically and diplomatically, Hanoi will
continue to struggle with Beijing over sovereignty and security concerns. As strategic
regional rivalry between China and the United States looks set to continue, the
current failure of multilateral mechanisms to effectively deal with China’s disputed
maritime territorial claims leave Hanoi with little option but to seek the security
support that only a dominant hegemon like the United States can provide.

*** *** ***

                                                                                                               
98
Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Secretary Kerry's Statement on Vietnam's National Day
(Washington: Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 30 August 2014),
<http://vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/2014/08/secretary-kerrys-statement-vietnams-national-day>.
99
Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2014 Vietnam - US Defence Policy Dialogue (Washington:
Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 21 october 2014), <http://vietnamembassy-
usa.org/news/2014/10/2014-vietnam-us-defence-policy-dialogue>.

  20  
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