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End-2018 Outlook: Assessing The Fallout From Trade Tensions, Rising Geopolitical Risks, and EM Vulnerabilities
End-2018 Outlook: Assessing The Fallout From Trade Tensions, Rising Geopolitical Risks, and EM Vulnerabilities
See end pages for analyst certification and important disclosures, including investment banking relationships.
Charts are taken from presentations from Global equities, economics, rates, FX, commodities, US fixed income and EM research groups.
Agenda
Page
Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and
1 1
sanctions
2 US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down 10
3 EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight 24
4 Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links 35
Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions
1
Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions
YTD 1m
Brent Crude 14.4%
2.5%
S&P 500 7.6%
0.7%
JPM USD Index 4.2%
1.4%
US HY 1.9%
0.3%
Euro HY -0.3%
-0.4%
-0.6%
Euro HG -0.4%
US Treasuries -0.9%
0.7%
EM Local Markets (Local Currency) -1.2%
-1.5%
US HG -2.0%
0.3%
EM Corporates (Hard Currency) -2.5%
-0.7%
European Equities -4.0%
-4.4%
EM Sovereigns (Hard Currency) -4.7%
-1.4%
EM FX -6.2%
-3.4%
Japanese Equities (Topix) -6.9%
-3.1%
Gold -8.4%
-0.9%
EM Local Markets (USD) -12.0%
-7.0%
-12.1%
EM Equities -5.7%
JPM Base Metals Index -15.2%
-4.1%
-20% -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Neither trade wars nor impeachment chatter has dented Trump’s approval rating
President Trump’s approval rating (%) versus S&P 500 and President Trump’s approval rating is between Nixon’s 25% and
NFIB Small Business Confidence Clinton’s 60% level when their sagas began
Both indexed to 100 at Nov 2016 election Number of daily news stories mentioning Trump impeachment versus average Trump approval
rating across polls
Source: J.P. Morgan Source: J.P. Morgan, Gallup, Bloomberg, Real Clear Politics
3
Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions
Market reactions to political and trade tension headlines have become more frequent and
prominent in recent weeks
2
01-Mar Steel & Aluminum Tariffs Announced 4.8 6
1
Report on China IP practices released; S&A
22-Mar 3.5 2
0 Implemented
Oct-17
Apr-18
May-17
Jun-17
Jul-17
Aug-17
Sep-17
Nov-17
Dec-17
Jan-18
Feb-18
Mar-18
May-18
Jun-18
Jul-18
Aug-18
Source: J.P. Morgan. Note: Duration is the number of days the news story frequency
exceeded 2.5-sigma above the mean
Source: predictwise.com 4
Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions
Market reaction to major trade tension headlines have been generally short-lived to date,
with EM and commodities most impacted
104
102
100 INDU
98
S&P 500
96
94
90
16-Mar 31-Mar 15-Apr 30-Apr 15-May 30-May 14-Jun
6
Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions
Risk premium on USD/CAD around NAFTA hope and fear appear to be around +/- 2%
when controlling for rate spreads and other macro factors
4%
Risk Premium on USD/CAD
3% In-principle agreement
deadline passed,
Oct'17 NAFTA US-China escalates
pullout threats
2%
1%
0%
-1%
-2%
In-principle
agreement hopes
-3%
Aug-16 Feb-17 Aug-17 Feb-18 Aug-18
8
Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions
TWD
PHP
ILS
CLP
COP
NOK
BRL
GBP
JPY
KRW
INR
RON
USD
NZD
AUD
CHF
HUF
PEN
PLN
IDR
EUR
CAD
MYR
MXN
ZAR
CNY
CZK
THB
RUB
TRY
SEK
9
Agenda
Page
1 Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions 1
2 US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down 10
3 EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight 24
4 Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links 35
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
10
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
Vulnerabilities in the backdrop: Synchronicity in global growth faded in 1H18, with the
divergence between DM and EM particularly striking
Global GDP, growth and breadth Relative breadth of global growth and the USD
Source: J.P. Morgan Source: J.P. Morgan, *USD projection assumes stable from current value
11
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
0
Mar-13 Dec-13 Sep-14 Jun-15 Mar-16 Dec-16 Sep-17 Jun-18 Mar-19
Source: J.P. Morgan Source: J.P. Morgan, Bloomberg; Note: Solid boxes represent latest estimates/forecasts; dotted
lines and hollow boxes represent original forecasts as of end-May
Net weight on the dollar from our economic momentum
Leveraged funds continue to build out net long USD positions
framework*; %
$50 Net USD weight in economic momentum framework
120 USD TWI 130
$40 HF Net USD Positioning
125
$30
60 120
$20
115
$10 0
110
$0
-60 105
-$10
100
-$20
-120 95
6-Jan-15
6-Apr-15
6-Oct-15
6-Jan-16
6-Apr-16
6-Oct-16
6-Jan-17
6-Apr-17
6-Oct-17
6-Jan-18
6-Apr-18
6-Jul-15
6-Jul-16
6-Jul-17
6-Jul-18
12
Source: J.P. Morgan, Bloomberg Source: J.P. Morgan
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
Global trade and US tariff rate Business equipment spending, global ex China
% of global GDP %, boxed proposed tariffs %oya. Model fit based on different sentiment inputs
25 10
7
8
20
Global trade
Stable
6
5
-0.5 std
15 dev
(baseline)
4 Actual
US tariff rate
3
10
2
-1 std dev sentiment
shock from baseline
5 1 0
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: J.P. Morgan Source: J.P. Morgan
13
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
Not yet a trade war: Assessing Global GDP impact of Trump tariffs
*Steel, aluminum, washing machines, solar panels. Source: J.P. Morgan. Source: IMF, OECD, J.P. Morgan
14
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
Confidence is key, and the potential for a larger drag on business sentiment remains a
key risk
Profits 10
8
-8
Capex proxy -5
-16 -10
01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
15
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
Small business focus on regulation and taxes has tended to Federal Register page count has tended to track the US
correspond to major policy initiatives cycle of regulation and deregulation
National Federation of Independent Businesses survey asking small businesses to name their Number of pages published in Federal Register in thousands and as percentage change
single-biggest problem (% of respondents). Red (blue) shading indicates Republican year-on-year. Red (blue) shading indicates Republican (Democratic) Presidencies. 2017
(Democratic) Presidencies observation is H1 annualized.
Source: J.P. Morgan, National Federation of Independent Business Source: J.P. Morgan, Federal Register
16
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
The dark side of Trumponomics awakens by 2020, while US debt will approach 100% of
GDP by 2028E
Trump’s average budget deficits through 2020 would rival Obama’s, without the justification of a global
financial crisis
Average federal budget deficit over each presidency, with red
National debt as fraction of GDP
for Republicans and blue for Democrats
0%
%
Republican average
Kennedy (61-63)
Johnson (63-69)
Nixon (69-74)
Ford (74-77)
Carter (77-81)
Reagan (81-89)
Clinton (93-01)
Bush II (01-09)
Trump (17-20)
Democrat average
Bush I (89-93)
Obama (09-16)
120
CBO
-1% current-law
100 projection
WWII
-2%
80
-2.6% Great
-3% 60 Depression
-3.0%
40
-4%
Civil War WWI
20
-5% -4.8%
0
-5.7% 1790 1840 1890 1940 1990
-6%
17
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
Probability of US recession risks in the near term (12 months) is relatively low, around
22% in our models, rising to >50% by 2020
Near-term (12-month) recession risks look relatively low, around 22% in Longer term recession probabilities
our models 100% Probability of recession within:
High-frequency economic data (e.g., sentiment, auto sales, jobless 4 years
claims) point to little imminent risk 80% 3 years
2 years
Looking out three years, the risk of recession becomes more elevated 60% 1 year
Low unemployment rates can, over time, contribute to late-cycle
symptoms (accelerating prices, lower profits, etc.) 40%
Historically it has proven difficult for the Fed to “soft land” an overheating 20%
economy
So far, contained price pressures have obviated the need for the Fed to 0%
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
step up the pace of tightening
Probabilities of US recession from near-term indicators
Probabilities of US recession from medium-term indicators
(12 months)
Level at 50%
Indicator Probability Current level Indicator 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
probability
Historical average unconditional probability 17%
Consumer sentiment 7% 74.0 64.6 Historical average unconditional probability 17% 33% 46% 57%
Nonmanufacturing sentiment 14% 62.5 52.8 Unemployment rate 43% 69% 83% 92%
Manufacturing sentiment 13% 64.3 50.4
Residential building permits 16% 1322 1105 Unemployment gap 38% 62% 78% 90%
Auto sales 30% 17.4 15.4 Compensation growth 33% 55% 71% 80%
Payrolls 23% 202 -33
Unemployment rate 22% 4.1 4.6 Prime-age male labor force participation 56% 82% 90% 96%
Initial claims 14% 231 262 Margin drawdown from 5-year peak 43% 62% 72% 79%
Senior loan officer opinion survey 3% -1.3 17.1
Durables and structures share of GDP 28% 44% 58% 72%
Composite probability from near-term indicators 12%
Background risk from medium-term indicators 46% Composite probability from medium-term indicators 46% 73% 88% 99%
Probability including background risk 24% Composite from near and medium-term indicators 24% 57% 76% 91%
Current US imbalances are ample but not glaring and concentrated in the government
and non-corporate sectors
Interest / Income
Debt / GDP Gap
4 4
Debt / Assets
Average
3 3
yrs
Sector
2 2
1 1
0 0
Total private nonfin. 16% 17% 16% 37% 1% 13% 12% 16% -1 -1
-2 -2
..Household 13% 16% 13% 20% 1% 23% 15% 14% -3 -3
55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15
..Total nonfin. bus. 58% 59% 56% 63% 68% 30% 17% 50%
Source: S&P, Federal Reserve, BLS, J.P. Morgan
....Corporate 69% 72% 74% 66% 47% 23% 25% 54% US equity prices and the business cycle
Cumulative return throughout the cycle; x-axis is % of expansion or recession completed
....Noncorporate 43% 53% 30% 43% 85% 85% 18% 51%
200%
Total government 51% 49% 47% 26% 97% 86% 36% 56% 160%
Current Cycle
..Federal gov. 75% 66% 77% 32% 95% 53% 28% 61% 120% (11 years)
Average
..State and local gov. 5% 8% 13% 15% 32% 22% 41% 19% 80%
40%
Source: BEA, Federal Reserve, J.P. Morgan. Expansions Recessions
Figures represent the percent of the time since 1980 that the indicated leverage metric has
been below its current level. "Gap" measures are calculated as difference from 10-year
0%
average. "Income" refers to disposable personal income for households, net operating surplus
0% 50% 100%
plus depreciation (similar to EBITDA) for corporate business, proprietors income and rental % of expansion or recession completed
income plus interest payments for noncorporate business (similar to EBIT), and current Source: J.P. Morgan
receipts for government. But when aggregated across multiple sectors, a comparable
EBIT-like measure of income is used: pre-tax personal income for households, net operating 19
surplus for corporate business, and the same measure as above for noncorporate business.
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
3 5.9
2 6.9
7.4
1 7.9
8.4
0 8.9
96 97 99 01 02 04 06 07 09 11 12 14 16 17 19
Source: J.P. Morgan
20
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
Output gap and core inflation, developed G4 labor shortages surveys and
% of potential GDP %oya DM wages
3 2.1
Core inflation ST. dev from 2010-pres average %oya
2 1.9 3 4
1
0 1.7
-1 1.5 Labor shortages
-2 2
1.3
-3
-4 Output gap 1.1
3
-5 0.9
1
00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Source: J.P. Morgan
21
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
%oya 6
6 Underlying
compensation per 4
hour
-2
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Source: J.P. Morgan
2
Measures of US core inflation
%6m, saar
2.8
Core CPI
2.4
0
2.0
1.6
1.2
-2 0.8 Core PCE
97 02 07 12 17 0.4
Source: J.P. Morgan
10 12 14 16 18
Source: J.P. Morgan
22
US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down
G-4 central bank balance sheet G-4 central bank balance sheet
12m chg as of Dec, bn USD
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Trillion USD 12m chg, tn USD Fed -11 -28 -13 -369 -467 -357
16 2.5
ECB 298 845 1413 231 -144 -136
Rest of world
8 0.5 3
2
6 0.0 US
Flow 1
4 -0.5 0
09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: Fed, ECB, BoJ, BoE, J.P. Morgan. Source: J.P. Morgan
23
Agenda
Page
1 Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions 1
2 US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down 10
3 EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight 24
4 Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links 35
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
5000 60
4200
Total EM 50
3400
2600
40
1800 ...ex China Debt
1000 30
200 Equity
00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20
Source: J.P. Morgan. Includes non-financial corporates and financial institutions
10
-20
0
Turkey…
Malaysia…
Hungary…
Poland…
Argentina gov't
Poland gov't
Colombia gov't
Hungary corps
Israel corps
Czech corps
Mexico corps
Malaysia corps
Poland corps
Hungary gov't
Turkey corps
Chile corps
Korea financials
Korea corps
Russia corps
Brazil corps
SA corps
-30
Jan 16 Jul 16 Jan 17 Jul 17 Jan 18
Source: IIF global debt monitor, J.P. Morgan. Excludes Hong Kong and Singapore Source: J.P. Morgan; IIF
24
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
EM vulnerability metrics
CPI (%oya); All else (% of GDP). Latest. *Based on simple average of indicator ranks.
25
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
EM central banks have fallen behind the curve, and end-2018 policy rates are expected to
be higher than previously forecast
120
Czech Rep. 25
Implied by USD Implied by DM rates Actual
India 25 100
Romania 25
80
Russia 25
Mexico 50 60
Indonesia 75
40
Philippines 75
Turkey 125 20
600
Argentina
0
0 100 200 300 600400 EMX HY LY
26
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
15
Taiwan
12
GCC
9
2019E Current Account (% of GDP)
Thailand
Malaysia Korea
3 Russia
Hungary
Czech Republic
China
Poland
0
Egypt Brazil
Peru Chile
Philippines Mexico
India
Indonesia
-3
Colombia
Argentina Turkey
South Africa
-6
-9 -6 -3 0 3
2019E Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)
27
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
Turkey’s external requirements are high and external debt maturing within 1 year or less
is $180bn
Total external financing needs for the year at $232bn External financing needs have risen across years
Current Account deficit (12m-sum, US$bn)
Turkey May-18
External debt maturing within the year (US$bn)
250
Current Account deficit (12m-sum, US$bn) 51 232
Source: CBRT Source: J.P. Morgan, CBRT. External debt maturing within the year is on a remaining maturity
basis irrespective of initial maturity across the public sector, financial institutions and
nonfinancial institutions
28
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
Direct economic linkages to Turkey are low for most countries, but potential impact on
cross-border FX funding stress is more important
Source: J.P. Morgan, IMF, World Bank Source: J.P. Morgan, BIS, World Bank
29
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
Argentina: 2019 gross financing needs still estimated at US$11.3 billion under new
phasing of IMF financial assistance
Notes: Excludes intra-public sector debt services; avg FX assumption: 42 Source: J.P. Morgan
Source: J.P. Morgan
30
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
Argentina Sovereign Exposure History by Investor Type USD/ARS Exposures by Investor Category
8
6 Dedicated Crossover Trading
Dedicated Crossover Trading
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
-6
-6
-8 -8
-10 -10
Aug10 Aug12 Aug14 Aug16 Aug18 Aug-13 Aug-14 Aug-15 Aug-16 Aug-17 Aug-18
Source: J.P. Morgan August EM Client Survey Source: J.P. Morgan August EM Client Survey
31
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
Overall EM technical vulnerabilities are not a major risk, in our view, but risks vary
significantly across EM
AR BR CL CO CZ EG HU IN ID IL KR MY MX NG PE PL RO RU ZA TH TR
Foreign holdings: % of amount outstanding - 12% 12% 25% 40% - 21% 4% 38% 6% 15% 25% 32% - 40% 31% 18% 28% 40% 16% 16%
EM local bonds
Foreign ownership (%): 5y Z-score - -1.5 2.4 1.6 1.1 - -1.4 0.5 0.0 1.9 1.2 -2.0 -1.6 - -0.2 -1.6 -0.4 0.5 1.1 -0.1 -2.2
Dedicated foreign holdings (% of foreign holdings) - 25% 61% 73% 30% - 78% 8% 47% 0% 0% 28% 25% - 69% 28% 82% 60% 43% 57% 51%
Crossover foreign holdings (% of foreign holdings) - 0% 2% 0% 7% - 13% 0% 9% 22% 23% 27% 16% - 0% 28% 0% 8% 19% 22% 0%
Residual foreign holdings (% of foreign holdings) - 75% 37% 27% 63% - 10% 92% 44% 78% 77% 45% 59% - 31% 44% 18% 32% 39% 22% 49%
EM FX positioning: current score 2.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 3.7 -1.8 1.9 2.1 -2.2 -3.4 0.8 1.9 2.0 0.6 0.2 -2.7 1.0 -0.2 -1.4 -0.7
EM FX positioning: 5y Z-score 0.6 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 0.3 1.3 -0.2 -0.9 0.4 0.1 -1.0 0.4 -1.2 1.6 0.6 -0.5 -1.4 0.2 0.7 1.3 -0.6
EM rates positioning: current score -0.2 2.0 -1.7 0.1 -2.9 2.7 -1.1 1.0 2.8 -0.9 0.0 -0.9 2.4 0.4 1.2 -2.8 -2.1 0.7 1.7 -3.2 -1.9
EM rates positioning: 5y Z-score 0.0 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5 0.0 1.3 1.0 -0.9 0.5 0.0 1.4 1.0 -0.6 1.4 1.0 -2.5 -1.1 -0.3 0.7 0.3 -1.6
EM sovereign positioning: current score 5.0 -1.9 -3.6 -2.6 -3.4 2.6 -2.1 - 0.9 - -2.7 -4.7 -1.5 1.7 -3.5 -5.2 -1.8 -1.6 -0.8 -3.4 -0.8
EM sovereign positioning: 5y Z-score 1.2 -0.6 -0.7 -2.0 -1.5 1.8 -1.7 - -1.5 - 0.5 -0.7 -1.5 1.8 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.1 1.7 0.9 0.5
32
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
Recent EM outflows have reduced risks of further unwinds, but EM positioning has not
been significantly reduced, and inflows to year-end are likely to be modest
Recent EM debt outflows have only partially reversed the Foreign holdings of EM local currency government bonds
inflows seen in Jan-Apr 2018 remain near all-time highs despite YTD outflows
USD billion
160 EM Equity Retail
EM Bond Retail Latin America EMEA EM EM Asia ex CN
140 800
-$17bn
120
100 -$11bn
700
80
60
40 600
20
0
500
Jan-17
Feb-17
Mar-17
Apr-17
Jun-17
Jul-17
Aug-17
Sep-17
Oct-17
Nov-17
Dec-17
Jan-18
Feb-18
Mar-18
Apr-18
Jun-18
Jul-18
Aug-18
May-17
May-18
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
-150
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Source: J.P. Morgan, EPFR Global Source: J.P. Morgan, official sources
33
EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight
EM hard currency sovereign issuance in seasonal lull while EM corporate technicals track
significantly lower
EM hard currency sovereign issuance; USDbn EM hard currency corporate issuance; USDbn
(US$ bn) 2016 2017 2018YTD 2018F
US$bn 2016 2017 2018YTD 2018F
Gross issuance (a) 326 482 245 442
a Gross issuance (b + c) 145.8 178.9 115.9 157.8
Estimated cash flows (b = c+d) 204 257 170 267
b New issuance 130.1 156.0 107.9 149.8 Amortizations (c) 118 173 111 175
c Taps 15.6 23.0 8.0 8.0* Coupons (d) 86 83 59 92
Net issuance (e = a-c) 208 309 134 267
d Estimated cash flows (e + f) 74.8 93.7 63.5 89.6
Net financing (f = a-b = e-d) 122 225 75 175
e Amortizations 32.8 46.5 28.7 38.6
Tender/Buyback/Calls (g) 55 83 59 66
f Coupons 42.1 47.2 34.8 50.9
Net issuance after
g Buybacks 9.8 8.1 6.4 6.4* 153 226 76 201
tender/buyback/calls (j = e-g)
h Net issuance (a - e - g) 103.2 124.3 80.9 112.8
Net financing after
67 142 17 109
i Net financing (h - f) 61.1 77.1 46.1 61.8 tender/buyback/calls (k = f-g)
Source for all charts: J.P. Morgan, Bloomberg
34
Agenda
Page
1 Tail risks are becoming the base case scenario as markets are reacting to trade tensions and sanctions 1
2 US growth continues to be revised up as other regions are revised down 10
3 EM vulnerabilities remain in the spotlight 24
4 Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links 35
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
Geopolitics have raised tail risk but have historically driven more volatility than trend, but is the impact
becoming more durable?
We take the risks of rising trade tensions seriously, if not literally, as only US$34 billion of tariffs (rising to
US$50 billion by Aug 23) have gone into effect so far with US$20 billion coming from non-Chinese companies.
If US actions and responses (trade and non-trade) are contained to the existing legal frameworks, such as
Sections 232 and 301, the economic impact would remain modest, totaling less than 0.1% of US GDP and
0.2% of China’s GDP.
J.P. Morgan economists estimate a -0.25% impact on global GDP if we consider all of the trade sanctions
being discussed by US policymakers (US$450 billion tariffs on China and Section 232 on Autos).
Attributing the trade-related news flow (positive or negative) to the performance of the US equity market, we
estimate the impact on US equities to be negative 5-7% (with a margin of error of +/-1%), which translates into
US$1.25 trillion of value destruction for US companies at the current US equity market capitalization. This is
about two-thirds of the value of the total fiscal stimulus.
We estimate GBI-EM returns to be -3%pt lower (if global GDP falls -0.25%) or up to -6%pt in a stress case (if
global GDP falls by a larger -0.5%). For EM sovereigns, we estimate a +32bp impact on EMBIGD spreads, or
up to +65bp in a stress case.
Risk premium on USD/CAD around NAFTA hope and fear appear to be around +/- 2% when controlling for rate
spreads and other macro factors.
CNY depreciation faces limitations given China’s fragile balance of payments. We estimate that a 5% increase
in CNY depreciation expectations (proxied by the change in the year-ahead NDF rate) can induce US$375
billion in outflows.
35
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
China represents growing share of global machinery and electronics exports, while US is
a major destination for Chinese outward FDI
China’s share of global and US imports (2016), selected goods Global share of machinery and electronics exports
% %
China ODI to the US by sector, 2017 China ODI to the US by sector, 2011
Direct effects of the 301 impact are still small as a broad range of sectors have spillovers
to other countries
AUTO 0.9%
TELE 82.2%
CLTH 37.2%
OFFC 90.7%
PETR -6.7%
COMM 3.8% Total
ELEC 63.8%
China
PHAR 0.2%
MNFR 111.2%
FNTR 57.1%
0
3.0%
MY TW TH KR SG CN ID
Source: National sources, J.P. Morgan calculations. Indirect is via China. Source: OECD, J.P. Morgan
37
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
$100bn increase in China’s imports from the US by 2020 is likely, but a $200bn increase
would be very challenging, if not impossible
Top 10 US exporting sectors to China, 2017
Transportation equipment 278.4 29.5 10.6 77.2 1,024.0 Integrated circuits 8542 260.9 5.3 2.0
Computer and electronics 208.0 17.1 8.2 70.1 423.0 Petroleum oils 2709 163.3 4.4 2.7
Chemicals 192.6 15.2 7.9 73.2 837.3 Iron ores 2601 76.4 0.0 0.0
Non-electrical machinery 133.7 9.3 7.0 72.7 387.6 Phones 8517 47.8 1.6 3.3
Petroleum products 84.0 1.2 1.4 78.4 518.7 Cars 8703 49.9 10.6 21.3
Other manufacturing 80.5 3.2 4.0 79.3 154.5 Liquid crystal devices 9013 37.1 0.4 1.1
Agricultural products 68.9 15.9 23.1 / 421.3 Soy beans 1201 39.6 12.4 31.2
Foods 64.0 3.3 5.2 81.6 1,000.0 Semiconductors 8541 28.2 0.6 2.2
Electrical equipment 59.5 3.3 5.5 76.8 122.5 Automatic data processor 8471 25.9 1.40 5.3
Primary metal 56.4 2.3 4.0 68.2 235.7 Motor vehicle parts 8708 27.1 2.3 8.5
Source: USITC, Federal Reserve Board, BEA, J.P. Morgan Source: General Administration of Customs of China, UNComtrade, USITC, J.P. Morgan
38
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
Source: CPB world trade monitor, J.P. Morgan Source: CPB world trade monitor, national sources
39
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
Exports to the US of high-end manufactures Trump administration tariffs: announced and potential
% of GDP, 2017
Source: US Census Bureau, CSD, KCS, DoS, MoF, GAC. Negative sign in Cols 1-4 means currencies are cheap. Source: J.P. Morgan
1Indirect channel refers to EM Asia ex. CN
40
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
China’s monetary and FX response has been substantial, with potential large impacts on
other currencies; recent fiscal response is modest
101
30
99 DM
25 97
Global average EM ex CN
95
20 2-Jan 26-Feb 22-Apr 16-Jun
Source: J.P. Morgan
41
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
China outlook: CNY depreciation has its limits as non-resident flows drove the reversal of
capital outflows while hot money outflows have increased
42
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
10-year yields 2.94 3.10 3.20 3.35 3.40 Euro High Grade (bp over Bunds) iBoxx HG 138 140
US High Yield (bp vs. UST) JPM HY 390 365
Euro area (Refi) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Euro High Yield (bp over Bunds) iBoxx HY 402 400
10-year yields 0.39 0.55 0.75 0.90 1.10
EMBIG Div (bp vs. UST) JPM EMBIG 372 400
United Kingdom (repo) 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00
EM Corporates (bp vs. UST) JPM CEMBI 312 250
10-year yields 1.46 1.45 1.60 1.70 1.85
Equities Current Dec-18
Japan (overnight call rate) -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 S&P 500 2,876 3,000
10-year yields 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 MSCI Europe 1,550 1,720
EM Local (GBI-EM yield) 6.74 6.45 MSCI Eurozone 216 250
Currencies Current Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-19 Jun-19 FTSE 100 7,266 7,900
JPM USD Index 121 122 123 123 123 Topix 1,684 2,050
MSCI EM ($) 1,018 1,230
EUR/USD 1.16 1.13 1.12 1.14 1.17
MSCI China 78 95
USD/JPY 111 109 107 106 105
MSCI Korea 685 790
GBP/USD 1.30 1.26 1.26 1.30 1.32
MSCI Taiwan 409 440
AUD/USD 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.70 MSCI India 1,361 1,500
USD/CNY 6.84 6.88 6.93 6.93 6.98 Brazil (Ibovespa) 76,416 76,900
USD/KRW 1123 1125 1120 1125 1130 Mexico (MEXBOL) 48,535 49,000
USD/MXN 19.25 19.50 19.50 19.25 19.00 MSCI South Africa 1,374 1,615
USD/BRL 4.06 4.10 3.90 3.85 3.80 US Europe Japan EM
USD/TRY 6.43 7.00 8.50 8.00 8.25 Energy 2.9% OW 8.6% N 3.4% N 7.1% N
USD/ZAR 15.14 15.50 16.00 16.50 16.50 Materials -0.9% N -3.9% N -14.8% OW -5.1% OW
Industrials 4.0% OW 0.9% OW -7.7% N -12.9% N
Commodities Current Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-19 Jun-19
Discretionary 16.7% N -2.7% N -5.1% OW -23.4% OW
Brent ($/bbl, qtr avg.) 76.1 68.0 64.0 60.0 64.0
Staples -3.2% N -2.6% UW -0.3% UW -12.7% UW
WTI ($/bbl, qtr avg.) 67.2 60.0 57.0 48.0 58.0
Healthcare 12.8% N 3.8% UW 9.4% UW -3.9% N
Gold ($/oz, qtr avg.) 1,197 1,250 1,380 1,411 1,416
Financials 2.3% OW -7.9% N -10.0% OW -11.0% OW
Copper ($/ton, qtr avg.) 5,911 6,345 6,900 7,600 7,900 Technology 18.5% OW 8.2% OW -7.3% N -9.0% N
Aluminum ($/ton, qtr avg.) 2,008 2,100 2,275 2,290 2,320 Telecom -2.7% N -15.0% N 5.6% UW -15.0% UW
Iron ore (US$/dt, qtr avg.) 68 65 60 Utilities 6.1% UW 2.6% OW 5.4% UW -7.8% UW
Wheat (USc/bu, qtr avg.) 486 530 550 570 550 Real Estate 4.0% UW -1.2% UW -7.4% N -18.2% N
44
Soybeans (USc/bu, qtr avg.) 833 1,020 1,000 1,020 1,040 Overall 9.2% -1.5% -5.1% -10.4%
Source: J.P. Morgan; *Levels/returns/forecasts as of 7 Sep 2018
Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
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Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
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Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
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Implications of Trump trade policies for US-China and supply chain links
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Completed 07 Sep 2018 06:24 PM EDT Disseminated 07 Sep 2018 06:24 PM EDT