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396 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY, VOL. 46, NO. 3, AUGUST 2004

Susceptibility of Electronic Systems to High-Power

Microwaves: Summary of Test Experience
Mats G. Bäckström, Member, IEEE, and Karl Gunnar Lövstrand, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—For more than a decade, the Swedish Defence Au-

thorities have, in cooperation with Swedish industry and other
countries, studied the effects of high-power microwave (HPM)
radiation on electronic systems. Testing at high-field levels has
been carried out on military equipment as well as on civil equip-
ment, such as cars, computers, and security systems. From these
studies, it is concluded that the distance for HPM sabotage
can reach about a kilometer. Experience from system testing
has, besides giving information about system susceptibility, also
demonstrated the need for a careful pre-analysis of the system
under test. This is due to the fact that high-level testing, in most
cases, includes only a small fraction of the threat parameter
space, such as test frequencies and irradiation angles.
Index Terms—High-power microwaves (HPM), immunity
testing, intentional electromagnetic interference (intentional
EMI), radiated susceptibility.

Fig. 1. Example of a “home-built” source for intentional electromagnetic

I. INTRODUCTION interference (IEMI).

I N RECENT years, growing attention has been paid to the

threat posed by high-power microwaves (HPM), and other
kind of high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) environments,
against the function of important electronic systems of the civil
infrastructure. Targets, conceivable for a terrorist attack, could
be telecom, radio/television, power networks or traffic control,
financial systems, computer networks, etc. While the HPM
threat has been recognized for rather a long time by the military,
the threat against civil systems, private as well as public, has
started to gain wider attention only during the last five years or
so. Special sessions on intentional electromagnetic interference
or Intentional EMI, have been arranged at several conferences,
see, e.g., [1] and [2].
There are several reasons why the threat against civil sys-
tems has to be taken with great seriousness. One is, of course,
the seemingly never-ending increase of electronics in all types
of systems, including mission- and safety-critical systems such
as aircraft flight control systems and anti-locking braking sys-
tems of modern cars. Another reason is that in many cases, con-
trary to the military scenario, it is possible for the perpetrator
to come close to the system under attack. This means that the
terrorist need not to have access to military HPM weapons, it
will suffice to get hold of, e.g., a radar transmitter or even (if the
distance is very short) simple “home-built” devices, see Fig. 1.
Manuscript received August 6, 2003; revised March 14, 2004. This work was
supported by the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Defence Material
Administration.
M. G. Bäckström is with the Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI, SE-581
11 Linköping, Sweden (e-mail: mats@foi.se) .
K. G. Lövstrand is with the Swedish Defence Material Administra-
tion (FMV), Testing Directorate, SE-580 13 Linköping, Sweden (email:
karl-gunnar.lovstrand@fmv.se).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TEMC.2004.831814
0018-9375/04$20.00 © 2004 IEEE
Finally, another very important reason for the concern is the fact
that most civil equipment essentially lacks immunity require-
ments against this type of threat. At microwave frequencies the
legal EMC requirements, e.g., the European Community (CE)
requirements in the European Union, usually stop at 2 GHz,
and below that frequency the required immunity levels are very
modest, of the order of some tens volts per meter. There is, to the
authors’ knowledge, only one major exemption to this, namely
civil aircraft and helicopters, which are designed to withstand
the very harsh radar environments at airports. In [3] the envi-
ronmental levels, at which aircraft and helicopters have to be
able to operate safely, are given. The peak fields at microwave
frequencies are typically several kilovolts per meter with a max-
imum (for rotorcraft) equal to 7.2 kV/m between 4 and 6 GHz.
The effects of HPM on electronics may result in upset or, at
higher levels of irradiation, even permanent physical damage.
Upset (i.e., interference or disturbance) is caused by false
in-band signals, usually originating from envelope detection
of the HPM due to nonlinear effects in the electronic compo-
nents. The upset may be temporary, i.e., the equipment returns
spontaneously to full function after the irradiation, or it may
cause permanent failure of the function, i.e., the equipment will
require a manual restart or reset. Permanent damage seems usu-
ally to be caused by thermal effects or electrical breakdown in
the circuits. In this case, the damaged component or equipment
has to be repaired or replaced.
This paper presents results from investigations on HPM sus-
ceptibility of unprotected (unshielded) electronic systems car-
ried out in Sweden during the last decade. It also shows that the
results can be explained rather well from knowledge about sus-
ceptibility of electronic components and field-to-wire coupling.
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BÄCKSTRÖM AND LÖVSTRAND: SUSCEPTIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS TO HPMs: SUMMARY OF TEST EXPERIENCE
Fig. 2. Coupling of the HPM radiation can occur either via antennas and sensors, denoted front-door coupling, or as back-door coupling, i.e., through imperfect
shields of enclosures or cables.
Furthermore, problems in connection to investigations of sus-
ceptibility and verification of hardness of complex systems are
discussed. Finally, expected distances of action for HPM sabo-
tage are derived and recommendations for future activities are
issued.
II. HPM COUPLING TO SYSTEMS
The HPM energy couples to the interior electronics of a
system through two generic paths, front-door coupling and
back-door coupling, see Fig. 2, here defined as follows:
1) Front-Door Coupling: The HPM radiation couples to
equipment intended to communicate or interact with the
external environment. Hence, they cannot easily be fully
shielded against microwave radiation without loosing or
severely degrading their function. Examples are antennas
and sensors. We subdivide it into the following.
a) Front-Door Coupling, first order: The frequency of
the HPM radiation coincides, at least partly, with the
working frequency of the equipment. An example is a
telecom base-station irradiated in its pass band.
b) Front-Door Coupling, second order: The fre-
quency of the HPM radiation does not coincide with
the working frequency of the equipment. An example
is a radio antenna.
2) Back-Door Coupling: The HPM radiation couples
through imperfections (apertures) in an electromagnetic
shield, giving rise to a diffuse and complex field pat-
tern within the shielded structure. The apertures can be
unintentional or intentional. Examples of the latter are
holes for drainage and ventilation. The radiation may
also couple directly to an external wire connected to a
component or a subsystem. The reason to define such a
wire as back-door coupling and not as a second-order
front-door coupling is due to the fact that the wire could
be shielded without degrading its function.
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397
III. INVESTIGATIONS ON SYSTEM SUSCEPTIBILITY
A. General
Research on HPM effects, as well as other electromagnetic
effects, such as lightning and nuclear electromagnetic pulse
(NEMP), has been carried out by the Swedish Defence Research
Agency, FOI (formerly FOA), the Swedish Defence Material
Administration, FMV, and the Swedish defence industries
during the last decades. A rather comprehensive knowledge
has been gained from HPM testing of systems and compo-
nents. This shows some very general trends for unshielded
equipment (civil equipment and military equipment for which
the protection, if available, has been removed). These trends
concern failure levels for upset and for permanent damage,
their frequency dependence, dependence of angle of incidence,
of pulse repetition frequency (PRF), etc. The testing has been
carried out using low-level coupling measurements as well as
immunity testing at intermediate and high levels. The immunity
testing at intermediate level has been made in semi-anechoic
rooms and in reverberation chambers. The high-level testing
has, in most cases, been carried out using the MTF), located at
the Saab aircraft facility, Linköping, Sweden [4], see Fig. 3.
IV. THE SWEDISH MICROWAVE TEST FACILITY
The MTF was designed by the U.S. Company TITAN Beta
and delivered early 1993 to Aerotech Telub, who operates the
system for the Swedish Defence Material Administration, FMV.
It was mainly specified and designed for aircraft high-intensity
radiated fields (HIRF) testing. The overall requirement on the
system was to generate a subset, at five spot frequencies, of the
worst-case environment for Swedish fighter aircraft. The HIRF
environment for Swedish and international air operations has
been mapped in terms of the mean and peak radiation intensity
in the radio and radar bands, as a function of frequency [3].
The microwave text facility (MTF) features were based on the
knowledge of the microwave operational environment for civil
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398 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY, VOL. 46, NO. 3, AUGUST 2004
Fig. 3. The Swedish MTF. Photo: Aerotech Telub AB, Linköping, Sweden.
and military systems. Also, research work indicated some de-
sirable features of the MTF design such as need for a certain
exposure area, pulse and burst length, pulse duration, and repe-
tition rate.
Aircraft testing requires a high efficiency of the test system.
Thus, it was necessary to find reliable and flexible test system
solutions. This added system mobility and all weather opera-
tions capability to the requirements
A. General MTF System Data
The MTF is mobile and contained in a 12 m ISO container,
see Fig. 3. It is powered by a 230-V, 540-kVA, AC, diesel gen-
erator. The generator is installed on an ordinary trailer.
The capability of the system consists of five microwave
sources at fixed frequencies in the L, S, C, X, and radar
bands. Parameters, such as the PRF, the pulse and burst length,
and the output power, can be varied. The generator data
maximum characteristics are given in Table I. The data are
for normal outdoor operation, without the pulse compression
system (PCS) for the S band and without the Cassegrain an-
tennas (CA), see Section IV-D. All maximum characteristics
cannot be attained simultaneously, e.g., the maximum PRF
cannot be attained at maximum pulse length.
The MTF is remotely controlled from a shielded control
trailer, which is also equipped with optical monitors and a
measurement system for recording the generated environment
having real-time resolution of individual generated microwave
pulses.
B. System Data for Outdoor Testing
For outdoors HIRF testing of tied aircraft with engines run-
ning, the system is equipped with 30 horizontally and 15
vertically sweeping antennas.
The diagonal horn antenna patterns were decided for a test
object distance of 15–25 m. The radiation footprint at the test
distance was specified to have a diameter of at least 10 wave-
lengths and should well cover any access door of an aircraft. At
15-m distance, the 3-dB beamwidth is 2.8 m at 1.3 GHz, 2.4 m
at 2.857 GHz, 2.0 m at 5.71 GHZ, 1.6 m at 9.3 GHz, and 1.1 m at
15.0 GHz. Horn antennas with dielectric lenses were designed
to meet the required antenna pattern. The near-field limit of the
antennas is 12 m or less.
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The radiation polarity can be shifted between vertical and hor-
izontal mode.
C. System Data for Indoors Testing
For indoor use, another set of antennas can be used having
less gain but with a near-field limit of 1 m. The indoor system
can thus generate extreme field intensities at 1–3-m distance.
At 1-m distance, the following maximum field strengths can
be reached: L-band, 120 kV/m; S-band, 160 kV/m (PCS,
420 kV/m); C-band, 110 kV/m and -band: 30 kV/m.
D. HPM Testing
For HPM-test purposes a PCS was integrated in the S-band
system. The pulse compressor consists of two tuned cavities.
The saturation time constant of each cavity is about 10 s. The
cavities can be pumped by the S-band klystron with 4.5- s long
pulses at a maximum PRF of 300 Hz. Triggering is achieved
by phase shifting the microwave input to one cavity. The two
cavities then interact constructively at the output. The pumped
energy in the cavities empties into the output waveguide to the
antenna with a declining pulse having a 0.4- s time constant.
The pulse compressor amplifies the 20 MW S-band generator
output by 8 dB. In practical operations, 140-MW output power
is thus achieved at a repetition rate of a maximum 300 Hz with a
pulse length of 0.4 s. Bursts of 10-s duration can be generated.
Cassegrain antennas having 37- and 40-dB gain, respec-
tively, can replace the S- and C-band horn antennas. Realistic
HPM-effects have thus been demonstrated at distances of
100–200 m, where peak field strengths of many kV/m, and a
PRF of 300 Hz–1 kHz. The Cassegrain antennas are shown in
Fig. 4.
V. RESULTS FROM SYSTEM IMMUNITY TESTING
Investigations on susceptibility to HPM carried out by FOI
and FMV include the following:
• missiles,
• tactical radio link,
• Army radio,
• cars,
• computers,
• telecom stations,
• generic objects.
The main results, regarding back-door coupling of the test of
unshielded electronics can be summarized as follows:
• interference effects are much more prominent at low fre-
quencies (L and S band) compared to the higher frequen-
cies;
• upset starts to occur (L and S band) typically around a few
hundred volts per meter (rms peak field strength);
• permanent damage occurs starting from 15–25 kV/m (seen
only for L and S band);
• permanent damage can occur also with the equipment
turned off.
Other results, however resting on a less comprehensive basis,
are as follows.
• For permanent damage, no clear dependence of the PRF,
has been seen. Thus, it seems that permanent damage is
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BÄCKSTRÖM AND LÖVSTRAND: SUSCEPTIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS TO HPMs: SUMMARY OF TEST EXPERIENCE
TABLE I
FMV MICROWAVE TEST FACILITY, MAXIMUM CHARACTERISTICS, FROM [4]
Fig. 4. Cassegrain antennas for S band, 37 dB (left) and C band, 40 dB .
usually caused by the first pulse of a pulse train. In other
words, there does not seem to be any thermal stacking nor
any gradual erosion (e.g., due to electric discharges) be-
tween subsequent pulses. It should, however, be reminded
that the maximum PRF is 1 kHz.
• The PRF is crucial for some types of disturbances. It seems
that this can normally be related to an operation cycle of a
critical electronic function. In some cases, it rather seems
to be just a statistical effect, i.e., by using a high PRF
the chance is greater to hit an operational cycle at a crit-
ical moment. Low repetition rates show a comparatively
low disturbance probability while high repetition rates can
cause disturbances at low intensities.
• The pulse length is of importance both for upset and
permanent damage. For upset, the susceptibility level,
in terms of field strength, seems to be lower for longer
pulses. For permanent damage the same observation
holds. In the latter case this can, at least in some cases,
be explained by the thermodynamical processes in the
component, the so called Wunch–Bell behavior, see
Section VI.
• The radiation burst length has been of importance for
effects on control systems incorporating slow analogue
functions or inherent recovery such as engine control
systems and missile flight control systems.
This data relates to back-door coupling. For front-door cou-
pling, it is known from studies of military equipment that the
distance of action, for both upset and permanent damage, can
be appreciably larger than for back-door coupling. This holds
true, especially for the case when the equipment works at mi-
crowave frequencies, e.g., a radio-link system (which we de-
note first-order front-door coupling). This aspect was treated in
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399
a study of telecom stations [5]. The coupling from the HPM
source to the antenna port of the receiver was estimated and
compared to experience-based results of the susceptibility of
similar receivers. The result of this estimation was that the re-
ceiver can be permanently damaged at an external field level
around 2 kV/m.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF TEST RESULTS
Basic HPM research has revealed that the pronounced trend
showing lower susceptibility at higher frequencies that is usu-
ally seen in system testing, can be understood from the fact that
“field-to-cable” coupling decreases (as a trend) by the square
of the wavelength [6], see also (3). Furthermore, measure-
ments of component susceptibility show a similar dependence
versus wavelength [7]. This sharp decrease in susceptibility
can, however, in some cases be counteracted by variations in
shielding effectiveness (SE) as function of frequency. The SE,
i.e., the transfer function into a shielded enclosure measured
by a field probe, is usually a rapidly varying function versus
frequency, while its envelope shows a much slower variation.
At microwave frequencies, for moderately or well-shielded
structures, the shielding effectiveness often decreases toward
higher frequencies. The fast variations in SE are due to changes
in the standing wave pattern of the cavity, while the slow vari-
ation of the envelope is due to resonances in the transmission
properties of the apertures causing the leakage [8], [9].
The typical upset level of a few hundred volts per meter (L
and S band) is consistent with measured data of the receiving
cross section of wires together with data from measurements of
component susceptibility [6], [7], [9]. The antenna area, , i.e.,
the receiving cross section, for a wire is given by [10]
(1)
where is the gain, the polarization mismatch factor, the
impedance mismatch factor, the directivity, and the antenna
efficiency, represents the ohmic losses of the antenna (
for the lossless case). and depend on the angle of incidence
(expressed in spherical angles , ) of the radiation incident on
the test object. For simplicity, we assume that . Using
average values for and , i.e., and , we
get
(2)
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400 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY, VOL. 46, NO. 3, AUGUST 2004

represents the isotropic antenna area for a lossless and

impedance matched antenna. Given these assumptions the
power picked up by a wire equals

(3)

where is the power density and is the electric field

strength of the incident field. is the wave impedance of free
space.
Considering L- and S- band frequencies, i.e., 1–4 GHz, we
get, for V/m, that –0.9 W. The re-
sults [7] on the susceptibility of some electronic components
show a large variation between technologies and manufacturers. Fig. 5. Measured damage level as function of pulse length for input transistor
Also, for analogue components the susceptibility also depends in a radio link system.
on the application. Taking this into account, a typical suscepti-
bility level seems to be around 10–100 mW. Thus, we see that
this figure is roughly in accordance with the estimate derived
from system testing of . In this crude calculation we just
consider the component level, i.e., we have not taken effects on
systems level into account, such as the influence of PRF.
It should be mentioned that we have seen upset levels as low
as 15 V/m at 1.3 GHz. This happened when the electronic con-
trol module in a public bus engine was irradiated at 200-Hz PRF,
50% duty cycle, causing the engine to stop.
Results reported by others are largely in agreement with
the susceptibility levels given above. In [17] susceptibility
tests of personal computers (PC) were reported. The tests
were performed between 1 and 4 GHz up to a field level
of 100 V/m. Various polarizations and angles of incidence
were used. Three different types of modulation were used:
continuous wave, amplitude modulation (AM, 80%, 1 kHz)
and repetitive PRF 217 Hz, 50% duty cycle). Upset levels Fig. 6. Permanent damage of input transistor. Finger width is approximately
down to 30 V/m were reported. The results claimed to be 1 m. Photo (SEM): C. Afzelius, FMV.
most interesting were as follows [17]:
• disruption (upset) occurred only at specific repeatable fre- in the adiabatic region the energy required for damage is con-
quencies; stant while in the region where thermal equilibrium prevails the
• disruption occurred only for specific polarizations of the power level of the pulse is constant, i.e., the pulse energy is
incident field; directly proportional to the pulse length. The Wunch–Bell be-
• disruption almost only occurred as a hard fault, i.e., the havior was demonstrated in the test of a radio link system. In
computer had to be rebooted in order to regain operation. this test, microwave pulses were injected into the antenna port
Recently reported tests on PCs suggest that new PCs are more up to permanent damage of the first transistor. A plot of the de-
immune to microwave radiation than older ones [21]. An expla- pendence of the level of damage on pulse energy is shown in
nation could be the more severe requirements on emission levels Fig. 5. A picture of a damage of the input transistor is shown in
that were introduced some years ago. Fig. 6.
As already mentioned typical levels for permanent damage
lies around 15–20 kV/m. An extreme exception from this level
VII. LIMITATIONS IN MTF TESTING
was seen for a PC flat screen at a level as low as 100 V/m, at a
PRF of 1 kHz and a frequency of 140 MHz. However, the duty The combination of the frequency variations of SE, coupling
cycle was in this case 50%, i.e., the pulse length was as large to cables, and component susceptibility often means that the
as 0.5 ms. For permanent damage, a dependence of the critical total “transfer function” from incident field to malfunction of an
field level on the pulse length is expected. Damage due to ex- internal component shows a large variation versus frequency. It
cessive heating is described by the Wunch–Bell curve [19]. If can often change tens of decibels across an octave. This con-
the pulse energy required to cause damage is plotted as a func- stitutes a severe limitation for MTF testing since the MTF gen-
tion of pulse length, one can discern three regions. Pulses typ- erates radiation only at one fixed frequency in each of the five
ically shorter than a microsecond give rise to adiabatic heating radar bands. An example is given in Fig. 7, where the measured
while for pulses of the order of a millisecond or longer, the time SE for a radio equipment is compared with the MTF frequen-
is so long that thermal equilibrium is attained. Consequently, cies (dashed bars). Obviously, in this case the L band frequency,
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BÄCKSTRÖM AND LÖVSTRAND: SUSCEPTIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS TO HPMs: SUMMARY OF TEST EXPERIENCE
Fig. 7. Measured SE compared with MTF test frequencies (dashed bars).
1.3 GHz, just miss the dip in the coupling curve. Also, a test fre-
quency at about 3.5 GHz would be desirable since SE is about
0 dB at that frequency.
This problem has to be taken into account by supporting MTF
testing with a comprehensive analysis based on low-level swept
frequency coupling measurements, in combination with knowl-
edge about the susceptibility of the internal equipment. On the
other hand, since these kinds of analyses often involve consid-
erable uncertainties high-level MTF testing is an invaluable tool
for validation of these indirect (low level) methods.
Another weakness with MTF testing, which is rather due to
financial than technical reasons, is the fact that usually only a
very limited number of angles of incidence and polarizations
can be afforded in a test. Extensive, angular resolved, swept fre-
quency coupling measurements on many different types of real
and generic equipment show large variation, typically 20–30 dB
and sometimes 40–50 dB, in coupling as function of angle of in-
cidence [6], [8], [11], [12]. An example of the large variation in
coupling as a function of angle of incidence is shown in Fig. 8.
The polar plot shows the variation of the power, normalized to
the power density of the external field irradiating the test object,
picked up by a field sensor mounted inside. The length of the
test object is about 1 m.
From these kind of measurements it is obvious that the
variation versus angle is “faster” at higher frequencies than
at lower [8]. This is also expected from antenna theory [20].
In [20], the maximum angular sampling increment,
necessary to determine the radiation properties of an antenna
from measured data is given. It can be approximated by
degrees
where and is the radius of the smallest possible
spherical surface circumscribing the antenna. For the size of
the investigated equipment, typically a couple of decimeters
to a meter, the angular resolution thus has, according to (4),
to be at least around 5 at 3 GHz in order to, without prior
knowledge of the receiving pattern, hit the receiving lobes
corresponding to the maximum coupling. This is largely in
accordance with the data from our coupling measurements.
Furthermore, recent results from high-level susceptibility tests
also support the usefulness of (4) [12]. It is also clear that it
is, in general, not possible to guess beforehand what are the
worst angles of incidence, which is illustrated by the fact that
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401
Fig. 8. Angular dependence of the power picked up by an internal field probe.
The 1 m long test object were irradiated by a plane wave at 4 GHz and rotated
in one plane.
those typically vary with frequency [13], [14]. Of course, this
problem of insufficient angular resolution is not unique for
high-level testing, it is a general problem for all plane wave EMC
testing. To some extent, we believe the problem can be solved
by using instead a reverberation chamber for susceptibility
testing. In a reverberation chamber, the statistically isotropic
electromagnetic environment produces an offset from the AC
maximum that is directly proportional to the directivity [8], [14].
Thus, the maximum plane wave response can be simulated by
appropriately adjusting the reverberation chamber test levels in
proportion the (maximum) directivity of the equipment under
test. Note that although the directivity is generally not known
beforehand, recent work suggests that it can be estimated
theoretically [15], see also [8]. A problem that remains to be
solved is to evaluate the importance of the differences in pulse
shape between anechoic and reverberation chambers, due to
the long relaxation time in the latter.
VIII. DISTANCE OF ACTION FOR HPM SABOTAGE
, Based on the investigations referred to above, estimates can
be made of possible distances of action for sabotage using HPM
sources, see Table II. The results are essentially based on tests
made on cars [16] and other unshielded or de-shielded equip-
(4) ment. For front-door effects, the result is essentially based on
the study of a telecom station [5], in which it was concluded
that the receiver can be permanently damaged using a 10 MW
source at a distance of around 1 km.
We consider two cases denoted HPM van (10 MW peak
power) and HPM suitcase (100 kW). Note that military HPM
sources might have output powers of up to tens of gigawatts,
what we consider here is rather a very powerful (10 MW)
radar transmitter. We assume the sources to roughly have the
same pulse parameters as the MTF L- and S-band sources. For
the HPM van we assume an antenna gain of 25 , e.g., a
parabolic antenna with a diameter around 1 m. In Table II, we
also include estimates of distance of action if the equipment
under attack has a SE of 30 dB. One reason for choosing 30 dB
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402 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY, VOL. 46, NO. 3, AUGUST 2004
TABLE II
ESTIMATED DISTANCE OF ACTION FOR HPM SABOTAGE
is that it approximately corresponds to the level of shielding
(protection) that is necessary for the avionics in civil aircraft
and helicopters in order to withstand the radar frequency
HIRF environments. Another reason is that 30 dB is a level of
shielding that can be implemented and maintained by certainly
a careful, but not a too exotic and expensive, design.
In many cases, unshielded equipment might have a certain
degree of protection due to its localization or the way it is
installed. It might, for example, be installed in a building having
thick concrete walls or in a basement below a thick floor of
concrete. In many cases, it may also be installed in such a way
that a terrorist is prevented to come close enough. We have
carried out investigations on telecom stations by measuring
the attenuation, i.e., the shielding effectiveness, from locations
outside the station, from which a perpetrator might park a car
or a truck, to the equipment inside the building [18]. As a
guideline, it was found that glass, plasterboard, and bricks give
almost no attenuation while concrete walls and floors can give
a rather good attenuation, especially if the material is thick. A
comparison was made between three different types of typical
telecom buildings, one built in wood, one using metal plates
riveted together and one using metal plates welded together.
The susceptibility was estimated by measuring the attenuation
of each building and assuming a van equipped with a 2-GHz
10-MW HPM source, antenna gain 30 , to be located 50 m
from the building. From the study, it can be concluded that the
wooden building gives almost no protection, only a few decibels
at 2 GHz. This means that internal equipment, if unshielded,
can be disturbed but probably not permanently damaged. The
building built by riveted metal plates gives an attenuation of
about 10 dB (at 2 GHz), which means a risk for interference
but not for permanent damage. The building built by welded
plates has about 5 dB higher SE than the riveted one. This
means still some risk for interference. In these studies, it was
obvious that an immunity assessment of a complex system
requires a careful investigation of all sorts of points-of-entry;
in the cases referred to here, special attention had to be paid to
leakage via cables and through door seams. It was also shown
that sometimes certain improvements of the protection levels
can be achieved by rather simple means such as conductive
clothing or metallic shutters for the windows. Also a card
reader for admittance control was tested. It was rather easy to
disturb, from 80 V/m and above, but the disturbance did not
result in an error permitting that one could enter the building.
IX. MITIGATION OF THE THREAT
1) Back-Door Coupling. Assuming a protection level of 30 dB
to be adequate, cf. Table II, conventional EMC protection tech-
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niques, such as shielding and filtering, should suffice. As noted,
a protection level of 30 dB is roughly what is needed for civil
aircraft in order to comply with their external environment.
2) Front-Door Coupling. While in-band disturbances (nonper-
manent damage) are difficult to neutralize, permanent damage
effects can be mitigated by use of transient protectors. Out-of-
band disturbances, i.e., second-order front-door coupling, can
be handled by use of filtering, e.g., for radio equipment, or by
use of metallic meshes or thin films for optical equipment. Usu-
ally, protective measures will lead to a degradation of the in-
tended function of the system.
Also, as already noted, protection can sometimes be achieved
by simply locating the equipment at a sufficiently large “elec-
trical” distance from a perpetrator.
X. PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES
Further susceptibility investigations should be carried out on
systems of major importance for the civil infrastructure. This
should include analyses of field penetration and coupling as well
as immunity testing of subsystems. Where possible, threat-level
testing of complete systems shall also be carried out.
Research has to be performed to further evaluate and develop
methods for protection, hardness verification, and analysis of
complex systems. As stated above, in many cases, existing
EMC protection methods are probably sufficient, while some
front-door systems may require new protection methods. Also
the threat, which is system dependent, has to be better defined.
One challenge in analysis and hardness verification is the often
huge complexity of civil systems which makes a statistical
treatment necessary.
XI. CONCLUSION
HPM testing at high-field levels has been carried out on mil-
itary equipment as well as on civil equipment. The test results
can be explained using basic knowledge of field-to-wire cou-
pling and measured susceptibility levels for electronic compo-
nents. From the studies it is concluded that the distance for HPM
sabotage can reach about a kilometer. Experience from system
testing has, besides giving information about system suscepti-
bility, also demonstrated the need for a careful pre-analysis of
the system under test. This is due to the fact that high-level
testing in most cases only includes only a small fraction of the
threat parameter space, such as test frequencies and irradiation
angles. In the future, important systems of the infrastructure
should be investigated. Also, protection methods should be ap-
plied, evaluated, and if necessary, further developed.
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BÄCKSTRÖM AND LÖVSTRAND: SUSCEPTIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS TO HPMs: SUMMARY OF TEST EXPERIENCE
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors acknowledge comments from and discussions
with colleagues at FOI, FMV, and national and international
cooperating organizations.
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Mats G. Bäckström (M’91) was born in Stockholm,
Sweden, on July 27, 1953. He received the M.Sc. de-
gree in engineering physics and the Ph.D. degree in
physics from Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden,
in 1978 and 1985, respectively.
He is currently the Research Director in Electro-
magnetic Effects at the Swedish Defence Research
Agency, FOI, where he is Project Leader for the FOI
projects on high-power microwaves (HPM) protec-
tion and system effects. Before he joined FOI, he was
head of the Electromagnetic Effects group at Saab
Military Aircraft.
Dr. Bäckström is Chairman of the Swedish URSI Commission E, Electromag-
netic Noise and Interference. He is Co-Chairman of the URSI working group on
intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). He has been recognized as an
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Fellow by the U.S. Summa Foundation and has
been the Secretary of the Swedish Chapter of the IEEE Electromagnetic Com-
patibility Society.
Karl Gunnar Lövstrand (M’87–SM’92) was born
at Västerlövsta, Sweden, in 1946. He received the
M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Up-
psala, Uppsala, Sweden, in 1969 and 1973, respec-
tively.
From 1974 to 1981, he was Docent of Electricity
at the High Voltage Research Institute, University
of Uppsala. His research work concerned static
electricity, lightning protection and bio-effects of
electromagnetic fields. Since 1985, he has been
with the Swedish Defence Material Administration
(FMV). His present position is Director of Test and Evaluation. In 1992, he was
appointed to Strategic Specialist in Electromagnetic Effects for FMV. Since
1989, he has been responsible for the high-power microwaves (HPM)-protec-
tion Research and Development of the Swedish Defence. In 1985, he worked
for the FMV Testing Directorate, where he was responsible for the foundation
of the Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NEMP) Test Center. He was the first
head of the NEMP/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Center. Before he
joined FMV, he worked for Saab Military Aircraft, where he was responsible
for the overall EMC Program of the JAS fighter aircraft.
In 1974, Dr. Lövstrand was elected Member of the Swedish URSI, Com-
mission E, Electromagnetic Noise and Interference. He was Cofounder of the
Swedish EMC Chapter of IEEE. In 2000, he was recognized as an Electromag-
netic Pulse (EMP) Fellow by the U.S. Summa Foundation.