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Review: Building up New Bogeymen

Author(s): Stephen M. Walt
Reviewed work(s):
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring, 1997), pp. 176-189
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BUILDING UP NEW
BOGEYMEN
THE CLASHOF CIVILIZATIONS
AND THE REMAKINGOF
WORLDORDER
bySamuelP. Huntington
367 pages,NewYork:Simon& Schuster,
$26.00

M. Walt
byStephen

TheClashof Civilizations
amuelHuntington's andthe
Remakingof WorldOrderis an ambitiousattempt to
formulatea conceptualframework that can help citizens
and policymakersto makesense of the post-Cold War
world.Insteadof focusingon powerand ideology-as we
did duringthe Cold War-Huntington's paradigmemphasizes
culturalcompetition.
Huntington's centralthesisis straightforward.
"Inthe post-Cold
Warworld,"he writes,"themostimportant distinctionsamongpeo-
ples arenot ideological,political,or economic.They arecultural."
Identitiesandloyaltiesareshiftingfromthe stateto the broader cul-
turalentityof "civilization,"
andthisshiftis creatinga radicallydif-
ferentworldorder."Forthefirsttimein history," he maintains, "global
politicshas becomemultipolar andmulticivilizational."As a result,
conflictsbetweencivilizationswill be morefrequentthan conflicts
withinthem,and"themostpervasive, important,anddangerous con-
flictswill... [be]betweenpeoplesbelongingto differentculturalen-
tities."
Thereareat leastthreereasonswhyTheClashof Civilizations is
to a
likely enjoy longer shelflife than some othereffortsto formulate

S T E P H E N M. WA L T is a professorof politicalscienceand masterof the

socialsciencecollegiatedivisionat the Universityof Chicago.His latestbookis
RevolutionandWar(CornellUniversity Press,1996).

177
 N'

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ILLUSTRATION
BY MACDONALD
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176
FOREIGN POLICY

a post-ColdWarparadigm. First,Huntingtonpresentshis argument

withgreatskillandwith a keeneye forthe aptanecdote.Hunting-
ton hasalwaysbeenan adroitconceptualizer, andhis knackforsub-
suming diverse into
phenomena simple and memorable frameworks is
evidentthroughoutthe book. He is also a masterof the scholarly
soundbite, as in his observationthat "in Islam,God is Caesar;in
ChinaandJapan,Caesaris God;in Orthodoxy,God is Caesar'sju-
niorpartner." These stylisticfelicitiesmakethe book a livelyread
andgreatlyenhancethe seductiveness of its argument.
Second, culturalexplanations verymuchin voguethesedays,
are
whetherthe subjectis foreignpolicy,educationalperformance, gen-
derroles,or familyvalues.Huntington's arguments arethusin step
with currentintellectualfashions,even if manyintellectualswill
probably recoilfromsomeof his conclusions.
Third,Huntington'sargumentspossessa powerfulprimafacie
We all knowthatculturaldifferencescan fostermisun-
plausibility.
derstanding andsuspicion,andeven a superficialreadingof history
revealsthatgroupsfromdifferentculturalbackgrounds havefought
on countlessoccasions.A briefreadof anynewspaper seemsto offer
furthersupportfora culturalperspective: "Western" Croats,Muslims,
and"Orthodox" Serbsareat oddsin Bosnia;MuslimsandHindus
arequarreling overKashmir; "Orthodox" RussiansandArmenians
havebeenfightingMuslimChechensandAzerbaijanis; andtrouble
maynowbe brewing between China and its various non-Sinic neigh-
bors.At firstglance,therefore,recenteventsseemto be remarkably
in syncwithHuntington's assertions.
Yetdespitethesestrengths, thebook'scentralthesisdoesnotstand
up to closescrutiny.
Huntington doesnotexplainwhyloyalties aresud-
denlyshiftingfromthe levelof nation-states of
to that "civilizations,"
andhe doesnot explainwhythisallegedshiftwillleadto greaterin-
conflict.Moreover,
tercivilizational someof hiscentralclaimsarecon-
tradictedby both and
historical contemporary evidence.Finally,Hunt-
ington's focus on the broad concept of civilization has led him to
overlookor obscurethe farmorepotentroleof nationalism. As a re-
sult,TheClashof Civilizations is an unreliable guideto the emerging
worldorderanda potentiallydangerous blueprint forpolicy.

178
 ReviewEssay

A BLUEPRINTFOR POLICY?
begins by defining a civilizationas the "highest
Huntington
cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of
cultural identity. . . . defined by . . . language, history,
religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-
identificationof people."Drawingupon the workof historianssuch
as William McNeill, FernandBraudel,CarrollQuigley,and Oswald
Spengler, Huntington identifies six contemporary civilizations
(Hindu, Islamic,Japanese,Orthodox, Sinic, and Western) and two
possible candidates (African and Latin American). Five of these
eight civilizationshave a dominantcore state (India,Japan,Russia,
China, and the United States), but the African, Islamic,and Latin
American civilizationsdo not.
According to Huntington, the futureworldorderwill be shaped
by several powerfultrends. First, the era of Western dominance is
coming to an end, and several non-Western states are emergingas
greatpowersin their own right. Second, these new greatpowersin-
creasinglyrejectWesternvalues in favorof theirown culturalnorms,
and the continuing decline in the West's material superioritywill
erode its culturalappealeven more.Thus, Huntingtonrejectsthe be-
lief that modernizationis leading to culturalconvergencebetween
the West and "therest."Third, as differentcivilizationsbecomemore
tightly connected by marketsand media and as universalistideolo-
gies like Marxism-Leninismor liberalismcease to commandbelief,
the broadculturalvalues embodiedin each civilizationwill become
more importantas sourcesof personaland political identity.Taken
together, these trends herald the emergence of a new multipolar
worldin which each of the greatpowersis the core state of a differ-
ent civilization.ForHuntington,the end of the Cold Waris the crit-
ical historicaldivide between the old worldof national rivalriesand
the new worldof clashingcivilizations.
What will worldpoliticslook like in this multipolar,multiciviliza-
tional world?Huntingtonrecognizesthat statesremainthe keyactors
in worldpolitics,but he believesthat they increasinglydefine theirin-
terestsin civilizationalterms.As a result,"theycooperatewith andally
themselveswith stateswith similaror common cultureand are more
often in conflict with countries of different culture."Or, as he sayselse-
where, "alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are

179
FOREIGN POLICY

givingwayto alignments definedbycultureandcivilization."

Itfollowsthatconflictswilloccureitherin "cleftcountries"--de-
finedas stateswherelargesegmentsof the populationbelongto dif-
likeUkraine--orin the "fault-line
ferentcivilizations, wars"thatoc-
cur alongthe boundariesbetweentwo or morecivilizations.The
latterconflictsarelikelyto be especiallycomplex,as local antago-
niststryto rallysupportfromtheirculturalbrethrenandespecially
fromthe corestate(if thereis one). The chiefdangeris the possi-
bilitythatone or moreof these"fault-linewars"will escalateinto a
great-power conflictthattranscends boundaries.
civilizational
Forthe West,twodangersareespeciallysalient.The firstis Islam,
wherea demographic explosion,a culturalresurgence, andthe ab-
senceof a strongcorestatecombineto createa highpropensityfor
conflict.HuntingtonrecognizesthatIslamis deeplydividedandrel-
ativelyweak(its shareof worldeconomicproductis less than one-
fourththatof theWest),butthesefactsdo not affordhimmuchcom-
fort.Indeed,he seesIslamandtheWestasverynearlyat waralready,
observingthat"dedicated Islamicmilitantsexploitthe opensocieties
of the Westandplantcarbombsat selectedtargets.Westernmilitary
professionals exploitthe open skiesof Islamanddropsmartbombs
on selectedtargets."He believesthatthe challengefromIslamis in-
herentlyculturalandlikelyto be prolonged.

is anunreliable
TheClashofCivilizations
worldorder
guidetotheemerging anda
potentially
dangerous forpolicy.
blueprint
The secondchallengearisesfromAsia,andespecially fromChina.
If the Islamicthreatis partlya reflectionof the unrulyenergiesof
millionsof mobilizedyoungMuslims,the Asianthreatderivesfrom
the orderanddisciplinethathasfueledAsia'seconomicascendance.
Asian societies are rejectingthe individualisticculture of the West,
their economic success has reinforcedtheir self-confidenceand de-
sire for greaterglobal influence, and Huntington sees a clash of in-
terests-and thus, a clash of civilizations-as virtuallyinevitable.

180
 Review Essay

Huntington'sprescriptionsfollow directly from his basic frame-

work. In a worldcharacterizedby civilizationaldivisions, he favors
greaterpolitical,economic,and militaryintegrationamongthe mem-
ber states of the West; advocatesexpandingNATOto include other
Westernstates (such as the Czech Republic,Hungary,and Poland);
and wants to bringLatin America into the Westernfold while pre-
venting JapanfrommovingtowardChina. Becausethe Sinic and Is-
lamic civilizationspose the greatestthreats,the West shouldalso ac-
cept Russianhegemonyamongthe Orthodoxcountriesand striveto
limit the growthof Sinic and Islamicpower.On the home front, the
United Statesmustpreventadvocatesof "multiculturalism" fromun-
dermining the West's cultural traditionsand encourageimmigrants
to embraceWesternvalues. Huntingtonalso warnsthat Westernin-
terventionin the affairsof other civilizationswill be "thesinglemost
dangeroussourceof instability,"but he does not suggestthat we ab-
stain fromsuch activitiesentirely.
This summarydoes not do full justice to Huntington'soften in-
sightfulanalysis.He neatly debunksclaims of culturalconvergence
and bolstershis own argumentswith numerousexamplesof cross-cul-
turalconflict. His analysisof the dynamicsof "fault-line"conflicts is
especiallyintriguing,as is his discussionof the conflictive character
of contemporaryIslamicsocieties.The civilizationalparadigmhas the
merit of simplicity,and it seems to make sense of some important
contemporaryevents. So why not simplysend a copy of the book to
everyhead of state, legislator,and senior governmentofficial in the
West and girdour loins for the kulturkampf that lies ahead?
To fully graspwhy The Clash of Civilizationsshould not become
the blueprintfor U.S. (let alone "Western")foreignpolicy,we must
first considerwhat worldpolitics was like in the past. Doing so will
highlight how Huntingtonbelieves it is changing and help us to see
the flaws in his argument.

DISSECTING THE THESIS

What wasworldpoliticslike priorto the end of the Cold

War, which Huntington identifies as the starting point
for the new era of cultural competition? For the past
200 yearsor so, states-and especiallythe greatpowers-have been
the key actors in world affairs. It was generally recognized that

181
FOREIGN POLICY

someof these statesbelongedto differentcivilizations,but nobody

argued that these differences mattered very much for
understandinginternationalpolitics. Cultural differencesdid
matter, but their main political expression took the form of
nationalism.The beliefthat distinctculturalgroups-or nations-
shouldhave their own state provedto be an extremelypowerful
political ideology,and it reinforcedthe state system that has
existedsincethe mid-17thcentury.
Great-power conflictwasa commonoccurrencethroughoutthis
period. Wars occasionallyarosefor essentially"cultural" (i.e., na-
tionalist)reasons, most notably in the War of ItalianUnification
(1859)andthe warsof Germanunification(1864,1866,and 1870).
Forthe mostpart,however,great-power conflictresultedfromthe
combination of fear,greed,andstupiditythatis characteristic of life
in the anarchicworldof international politics.
Accordingto Huntington,great-power conflictbefore1990was
if
largely, not entirely,intracivilizational.
In his words,"foroverfour
hundredyears,the nation-states of theWest-Britain,France,Spain,
Austria,Prussia,Germany, theUnitedStates,andothers-constituted
a multipolarinternational systemwithinWesterncivilization andin-
and
teracted,competed, fought wars with each other."Thischaracter-
izationis wrong,however, becauseit omitsthe twonon-Western great
powers(JapanandRussia)that "interacted, competed,andfought
wars"withthe West(andwithothers)duringthesefourcenturies.
WithJapanandRussiaincluded,whatdoesthe historicalrecord
show?Therehave been fourhegemonicconflictssince 1800 (the
NapoleonicWars,WorldWarI, WorldWarII, andthe ColdWar),
all of whichinvolvedstatesfromtwoormorecivilizations. Moreover,
mostof the otherwarsinvolvinggreatpowers(includingtheircolo-
nialwars)wereintercivilizational aswell.Thus,Huntingtonis wrong
to claimthat"inthe post-ColdWarworld,forthe firsttimein his-
tory,globalpoliticshasbecomemultipolar andmulticivilizational."
Amongotherthings,thiserrorcastsdoubton Huntington's claim
that the end of the ColdWarconstitutesa radicalhistoricalwater-
shed.It alsomeansthathe cannotusepastintercivilizational warsas
supportforhis own thesis,because these various conflictsdid not
arisefromthe culturalor "civilizational" differencesthat Hunting-
ton now sees as central to worldpolitics.
At this point, one begins to suspect that Huntingtonhas merely

182
 Review Essay

given a new label to an old phenomenon:Sometimesstates with dif-

ferent culturalbackgroundsfight with one another.Such a view re-
ceives supportfrom Huntington himself, when he writes that "the
sourcesof conflict between states and groupsfromdifferentciviliza-
tions are, in largemeasure,those which have alwaysgeneratedcon-
flict between groups:control of people, territory,wealth, and re-
sources,and relativepower."Yethe clearlybelievesthat somethingis
differenttoday,or why bother to formulatea new paradigm?
The novel featureis a shift in personalidentities.He still regards
statesas the key actorsin worldpoliticsbut arguesthat the end of the
Cold Warhas been accompaniedby a profoundshift in the locus of
political loyalty.In a directchallenge to the concept of nationalism,
he assertsthat both the elites and the masseswill increasinglyiden-
tify with otherstatesin theirspecificculturalgroupand that this shift
in identities will largelyeliminate conflict within each civilization
while exacerbatingtensions between them.
It is importantto recognize how fundamentaland far-reaching
this claim is. For the past 2,000 years or so, assortedempires,city-
states, tribes, and nation-states have repeatedly ignored cultural
affinitiesin orderto pursueparticularselfish interests.These politi-
cal unitshave alwaysbeen willingto fightothermembersof theirown
civilization and have been equallywilling to ally with groupsfrom
differentcivilizationswhen it seemed advantageousto do so. Hunt-
ington now claims that states are going to act very differently,how-
ever, and will place culturalvalues aboveall others.
Yet Huntington never explains why loyalties are shifting in the
manner he depicts. He assertsthat globalizationand the increased
contact between different cultures have made broadcivilizational
identitiesmore powerful,but he providesno theory explainingwhy
this is the case. Why are "civilizational"loyaltiesnow trumpingna-
tionalism?Why is cultureor ethnicity no longerfocusedon the state,
but on the broadernotion of "civilization"? Huntingtonprovidesno
answerto these questions.
Not only is an answerlacking, but many of his examples of in-
creasing cultural assertivenessare not about "civilizational"con-
sciousnessat all. To supporthis claim that the end of the Cold War
led to a global"identitycrisis,"for example,he notes that "questions
of national identity were actively debated ... [in] Algeria, Canada,
China, Germany,Great Britain, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Mo-

183
FOREIGN POLICY

rocco,Russia,SouthAfrica,Syria,Tunisia,Turkey, Ukraine,andthe
UnitedStates."Mostof these "questions of identity"arosefromna-
tionalistmovementsratherthan fromany"civilizational" affinity,
however,andthusdo not supporthis thesis.
Moreover, althoughTheClashofCivilizations devotesroughly300
pages to a cultural of
analysis world politics,Huntingtonneverex-
plainswhyconflictis morelikelyto arisebetweencivilizations than
withinthem.He suggeststhatculturalvaluesarenot easilycompro-
misedandthatpeople"naturally distrustandseeasthreatsthosewho
aredifferentandhavethe capability to harmthem."Yetevenif these
propositions arecorrect-and I am inclined to agreewithhimon the
last one-they do not explainwhyintercivilizational conflictswill
shapethe futureworldorder.
Culturaldifferencesdo not causewarby themselves,justas cul-
turalsimilaritiesdo not guarantee harmony. Indeed,one couldargue
that culturaldiversitymakesconflictless likely,provideddifferent
groupsarefreeto establishtheirown politicalandsocialorders.As
Huntington's own analysisof "cleftstates"suggests,culturalclashes
aremostlikelynotwhenseparate groupscomeintocontact,butwhen
members of differentculturesareforcedto live in the samecommu-
nity.Once again,manyof Huntington's morecompellingexamples
of culturalconflictcomefromlocal settingsratherthan fromtrue
clashes.Butthe waysin whichmembersof different
"civilizational"
culturesinteractwithina singlecommunityarequitedifferentfrom
the waysin whichwholecivilizations interacton a globalscale.
Finally,the evidencein favorof Huntington's thesisis quitethin.
As we haveseen,pastexamplesof intercivilizational conflictdo not
support his because
thesis, these were simply conflictsof interestbe-
tweenstatesandnot the resultof "civilizational" differences.Given
thatHuntingtonseesthe civilizational paradigm asrelevantonlyfor
the post-ColdWarperiod,we haveroughlysix yearsof experience
withwhichto evaluatehis claims.Whatdoesthe recordshowthus
far?
Huntingtonsupportshis argument by referenceto numerous ex-
amplesof contemporary politicalleaders employing cultural or even
civilizationalrhetoric.Not surprisingly, he takesthesestatementsat
facevalueandregardsthemas persuasive evidenceof growingcivi-
lizationalaffinities.But the question is not just what Lee KuanYew
or MuammarQadaffisay,becausetalk is cheap and political rhetoric

184
 Review Essay

serves manyfunctions.The real issue is what these leaders(or their

countries) will actuallydo, and how much blood and treasurethey
will devote to "civilizational"interests.
On this point, the record of state behaviorsince 1990 does not
lend much supportto Huntington'sargument.Considerthe 1991 Per-
sian Gulf war.Huntington'sparadigmpredictsthat conflictsbetween
civilizationswill be morefrequentand intense than conflicts within
them. Yet in the Gulf war,Iraqattackeda fellow Islamicstate, only
to be repulsedby a coalition of Westernand Islamicstates,with tacit
supportfromIsrael.Huntingtontries to salvagehis thesis by arguing
that most IslamicpopulationsactuallyfavoredIraq,but, even if this
were true, it merelyunderscoresthe fact that state interestsmattered
more than looselyfelt and politicallyimpotentloyaltiesto a particu-
lar"civilizational" entity.In the Gulf war,in short,civilizationaliden-
tities were irrelevant.
What aboutBosnia,where Muslims,"Western"Croats,and "Or-
thodox" Serbs were at war from 1991 to 1995? Although some as-
pects of the Bosnian tragedyare consistent with Huntington'sargu-
ment, the overall picture is a striking refutation of it. More than
50,000 U.S.-led troops were deployedto Bosnia in 1996, but they
were not there to defend Western (in this case, Croatian) culture.
Rather, they were there primarilyto protect Muslims. Indeed, al-
though severalIslamiccountriesdid send modest amountsof aid to
the Bosnian Muslims,the Westernstates ultimatelydid far morefor
them than did their Islamicbrethren.Similarly,Russiaofferedsome
rhetoricalsupportto the Serbs, but it backedawayfrom its "Ortho-
dox"brethrenwhen SerbianbellicositymadeBelgradean unappeal-
ing ally. Even the Westernstates failed to line up accordingto cul-
turalcriteria,with Britainand Francebeingmoresympatheticto the
Serbs,Germanybackingthe Croats,and the United States reserving
most of its supportfor the Muslims.
What about the Rwandangenocide and the subsequentcarnage
in Zaire?Huntingtonis not certain whethera true"Africanciviliza-
tion"exists, but it is abundantlyclearthat these bloodlettingsdid not
arise from a clash of civilizations.And, as in the earlierhumanitar-
ian missionin Somalia,outsideassistanceis beingprovidedby mem-
bersof other civilizations,once againirrespectiveof the culturalcri-
terion Huntingtonnow claims is paramount.
Thus, conflict and cooperationdo not observethe civilizational

185
FOREIGN POLICY

boundaries thatHuntington's thesispredicts.Interestingly, TheClash

of Civilizationsprovidesdecisiveevidenceon preciselythispoint.On
pages256 to 258,Huntington presentstwotableson currentethnop-
oliticalconflictsin orderto demonstrate theconflictivenatureof con-
temporary Islam. These tables also showthatconflictswithinciviliza-
tionsareroughly50 percent morefrequentthanconflictsbetween
them.Thisresultdirectlycontradicts Huntington's corethesis,because
the numberof potential conflictsbetweenmembers of differentcivi-
lizationsis muchgreaterthan the numberof potentialconflictsbe-
tweenmembers of thesamecivilization. Forexample,thereareroughly
20 "Western" stateswithwhichthe UnitedStatescouldfinditselfat
odds,buttherearemorethan175non-Western statesthattheUnited
Statescouldquarrel withaswell.Evenif conflictoccurred on a purely
randombasis,wewouldexpectmostclashesto be between groupsfrom
different"civilizations." Thisgapshouldbe evenmorepronounced if
"civilizational"differencesarea powerfulcauseof conflict,as Hunt-
ingtonposits,butthe evidencehe presentsshowsthatexactlythe op-
positeis occurring.This resultmerelyunderscores the factthatcul-
turaldifferences are of secondary importance explainingtheorigins
in
of globalconflictin the post-ColdWarworld.
TheClashofCivilizations is alsostrangely silentaboutIsrael,which
hasbeena centralconcernforU.S.foreignpolicysinceitsfoundingin
1948.Duringthe ColdWar,U.S. supportforIsraelcouldbe justified
on bothideological andstrategic grounds. Froma culturalperspective,
however,the basisforclosetiesbetweenIsraelandthe "West" is un-
clear.Israelis not a memberof the West(at leastnot byHuntington's
criteria)andis probably becomingless"Western" as religiousfunda-
mentalism becomesmoresalientandasthe Sephardic population be-
comesmoreinfluential. A "civilizational" approach to U.S.foreignpol-
icycanjustifyclosetieswithEuropeans (asthe commondescendants
of WesternChristendom) butnot Israelis. Moreover, giventhatHunt-
ington wants to avoid unnecessary clashes with rival civilizations and
given that U.S. support for Israel is a sourceof tension with the Islamic
world,his civilizational paradigm wouldseemto prescribe a sharpre-
ductionin Westernsupport fortheJewishstate.I donotknowwhether
Huntington favors such a step,butthatis wherethe logicof his argu-
mentleads.Hissilenceon thisissuemayreflectanawareness thatmak-
ing this conclusionexplicitwouldnot enhance the appealof the book,
or Israelmaysimplybe an anomalythat lies outsideof his framework.

186
 Review Essay

In eithercase,however,the issuerevealsa furtherlimitationof the civ-

ilizationalparadigm.

donotcausewarby
differences
Cultural
justascultural
themselves, donot
similarities
guarantee
harmony.
What has gone wronghere?As should now be apparent,Hunt-
ington'scentral erroris his belief that personalloyaltiesare increas-
ingly centered on "civilizations"ratherthan on the nation-state. If
there is a dominant trend in the worldtoday,however,it is not the
coalescing of a half-dozen or so multinationalcivilizations.On the
contrary,the dominant trend is the tendency for existing political
communitiesto split into smallerunits,organizedprimarilyalongeth-
nic or national lines. Being part of some larger"civilization"did not
convince the Abkhaz,Armenians,Azeris,Chechens, Croats,Eritre-
ans, Georgians,Kurds,Ossetians, Quebecois, Serbs, or Slovaks to
abandonthe quest for their own state, just as being part of the West
did not slow Germany'srush to reunify.Thus, it is not civilization
that is thriving in the post-Cold Warworld;it is nationalism.
This neglect of nationalism is the Achilles' heel of the civiliza-
tional paradigm.As Huntingtonhimselfpoints out, "civilizations" do
not makedecisions;they arean abstractculturalcategoryratherthan
a concrete political agency.States, on the other hand, have defined
borders,designatedleaders,establisheddecision-makingprocedures,
and direct control over political resources.States can mobilizetheir
citizens,collect taxes, issue threats,rewardfriends,and wagewar;in
other words,states can act. Nationalism is a tremendouslypowerful
force preciselybecause it marriesindividualculturalaffinitiesto an
agency-the state-that can actuallydo something.In the futureas
in the past, the principal conflicts in the world will be between
states-not civilizations-and between existing states and groups
within them who seek to establishstatesof theirown. Some of these
conflicts will occur acrossculturalboundaries-as in the "fault-line"
areasthat Huntingtoncorrectlyhighlights-but culturaldifferences

187
FOREIGN POLICY

will be at best a secondarycause of conflict.

Once again, Huntington'sanalysisimplicitly acknowledgesthis
point. His emphasison the "corestates"within each civilizationreaf-
firmsthe central role of the greatpowers--defined in traditionalre-
alist terms-and he admitsthat "the issues in [core state conflicts]
are the classic ones of internationalpolitics,"such as relativeinflu-
ence, economic and military power, and the control of territory.
When it comes to the greatpowers,therefore,culturedoes not mat-
ter verymuch, and the concept of civilizationlargelydropsout of his
analysis.
The enduringrelevance of the realist, statist paradigmis most
clearlyrevealedat the end of the book, when Huntingtonlaysout a
possiblescenariofor a warbetween China and the West. Severalde-
tails of this imaginedwarare striking.First,it beginswith a Chinese
attack on Vietnam, which by Huntington'scriteriais a clash within
a particularcivilizationalgroup.Thus, WorldWar III is caused not
by a clash of civilizations,but by a clash within one-precisely the
sort of event that increasingculturalaffinitiesweresupposedto over-
come. Second, culturalfactorsplay virtuallyno role either in start-
ing the waror in causingit to escalate;instead, it arisesfroma com-
petition for oil and escalatesbecauseother states are worriedabout
the long-termbalance of power.Third, the subsequentwarfeatures
a numberof importantintercivilizationalalliances (for balance-of-
powerreasons),which furthercontradictsthe claim that culturalfac-
tors are becoming decisive. In short, when he turns awayfrom ex-
pounding his paradigmand describeswhat a 21st-centuryconflict
mightactuallylook like, Huntingtonlargelyignoreshis own creation
and relieson the traditionalprinciplesof realpolitik.

A CALL FOR NEW ENEMIES?

Tn the end, The Clash of Civilizationsand the Remakingof World

Orderis a book replete with ironies. It is ironic that a scholar
ose earlierworks offered brilliant analysesof the role of the
state now offersa paradigmin which states are the handmaidensof
diffuseculturalgroups.It is also ironic that a scholarwho effectively
challenged the "declinist"argumentsmade by Paul Kennedy and
others now goes them one better: Not only is the United States
declining, but so is the rest of Western civilization. And it is surely

188
 Review Essay

ironic that a scholarwho was soundingalarmbells aboutJapanonly

four yearsago is now obsessedwith China and Islam and is calling
for activeeffortsto preserveJapan'sties with the West.1
There maybe a common theme in these ironies,however.Hunt-
ington has alwaysbeen a staunchdefenderof Westerncivilizationin
generaland the United States in particular,and he is clearlyworried
that the hedonistic,individualisticcultureof the West is no longerup
to the challengesit faces.By portrayingthe contemporary worldasone
of relentlessculturalcompetition,therefore,he maybe tryingto pro-
vide us with the bogeymenwe need to keepourown house in order.
He maybe right,and a reaffirmationof certain "Western"values
might be wholly desirable.But even if the West does need new ene-
miesin orderto hold it together,the civilizationalparadigmthat Hunt-
ington has offeredis not a soundbasisfor makingforeignpolicy.Rely-
ing upon an overlybroadcategorylike "civilization" wouldblindus to
the differenceswithinbroadculturalgroupsandlimitourabilityto pur-
sue a strategyof "divideand conquer."Thus, adoptingHuntington's
paradigmmightunwittinglyrobpolicymakers of the flexibilitythathas
alwaysbeen a cardinaldiplomaticvirtue. If the worldis as dangerous
as he seems to think, why limit our optionsin this way?
Moreover,if we treat all states who are part of some other "civi-
lization"as intrinsicallyhostile, we are likely to create enemies that
might otherwise be neutral or friendly.In fact, a civilizational ap-
proachto foreignpolicy is probablythe surestwayto get diversefor-
eign cultures to coordinate their actions and could even bring sev-
eral civilizationstogether againstus. The West is still the strongest
civilizationand will remain so for some time to come. Accordingly,
a civilizationalstrategycould encouragetwo or more civilizationsto
gangup on us, solelyout of a sense of self-preservation.In this sense,
The Clashof Civilizationsoffersa dangerous,self-fulfillingprophecy:
The more we believe it and make it the basis for action, the more
likely it is to come true. Huntingtonwouldno doubtfeel vindicated,
but the rest of us wouldnot be happywith the results.

'For his earlier views, see SamuelP. Huntington, "The U.S.-Decline or

Renewal?" ForeignAffairs67:2 (Winter1988/89);"America's
Changing Strategic
Interests,"Survival 33:1 (January1991); and "WhyInternationalPrimacy
Matters,"InternationalSecurity17:4 (Spring1993).

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