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CHAPTER VI The foregoing are the modes in which a thing is

divided according to itself. When it is divided
according to accident, however, it may be divided as
Division is the first section of the thing. Thus, for
substance into accidents, as when I say that some men
example, the animal is divided rational and irrational.
are white and some black— for men are substance,
Redivision is the second section of the same thing. For
while white and black are accidents. Or it may be
example, the animal is redivided into apod, biped and
divided as an accident into substances, as when I speak
quadruped—apod, as a fish; biped as a man or a bird;
of animate white things and inanimate white things—
quadruped, as an ox, horse, or other such. Subdivision
for the white is an accident, while the animate and
is the section of the already divided-off branch. For
inanimate things are substances. Or it may be divided
example, the animal is divided into rational and
as an accident into accidents, as when I say that some
irrational, and then the rational into mortal and
cold things are white and dry, while others are black
immortal. Now, the first thing is divided into two
and wet— for the cold and the white, the black, and the
branches: the rational and the irrational. It is the
wet, and the dry are all accidents. There is still another
division of one of these branches, namely, the division
mode of division, which is that of things which are
of the rational into mortal and immortal, that is
derivative (af enoj, from one) and those which are
subdivision. Division and redivision are not used in all
relative (proj en; to one). Things are derivative as m
cases. However, when every thing is not covered by
the case of a medical book or a medical instrument
the first division—as, for example, when the animal is
deriving from medicine; for from one thing, medicine,
divided into rational and irrational, the biped is found
medical things arc named. On the other hand, a
both among the rational and the irrational animals—
healthful drug or healthful food are relative because
then of necessity we redivide, that is to say, we make a
they relate to one thing, namely, health, Of the things
second division of the same thing, and we say: ‘The
which are derivative, some derive from some cause—
animal is divided into apod, biped, and quadruped.
as the man’s image is said to be from the man as from
a true cause; whereas others are as having being
For a similar reason, there are eight modes of
invented by someone, as the medical scalpel, and the
division. Thus, everything that is divided is divided
like.
either according to itself, namely, according to
substance, or according to accident. If it is divided
Now, this is the general division according to
according to itself, then it is either as a thing or as a
which everything that is divided is divided. It is either
term. If it is divided as a thing, then it is either as genus
as genus into species, or as species into individuals, or
into species, as when you divide the animal into
as a whole into parts, or as an equivocal term into its
rational and irrational, or as species into individuals, as
various meanings, or as substance into accidents, or as
man into Peter and Paul and all other individual men,
accident into substances, or as accidents into accidents,
or as a whole into parts. This last division is twofold,
or as the derivatives and relatives. There are some who
being either into like or unlike parts. Now, a thing is of
deny the division of species into individuals, because
like parts whenever its sections admit of the name and
they say that it rather is an enumeration, since all
the definition of the whole and of each other. For
division is into two, or three, or, rarely, into four. But
instance, when flesh is divided into several pieces,
the species is divided into an unlimited number of
each portion is called flesh and admits of the definition
individuals, because the number of individual men is
of flesh. On the contrary, the thing is of unlike parts
unlimited.
whenever the part cut off will not admit either of the
name or of the definition, whether of the whole or of
One must furthermore know that that which is by
the parts. Thus, should you divide Socrates into hands
nature prior and posterior, as well as that which is more
and feet and head, the foot cut off from Socrates would
and less, is not found to be divided into parts by any
neither be called Socrates nor his head, nor would it
mode of division. However, that which is by nature
admit of the definition either of Socrates or of his head.
prior and posterior, and that which is more and less,
Or division may be as that of an equivocal term into its
fall under derivatives and relatives—whence their
various meanings. This, again, is of two kinds, because
classification.
the term may signify either the whole of something or
a part of it. It may signify the whole, as does the word
‘dog,’ since this last is used for land-dog, dog-star, and CHAPTER VII
sea-dog, all of which are wholes and not part of an
animal. On the other hand, it may signify a part, as That is by nature prior which is implied in
when the name ‘tongue’ is given to the top part of a something else, while in itself it does not imply this;
shoe, to a part of the flute, and to the organ of taste in and which takes something else away when it itself is
animals, all of which are parts and not wholes. taken away, but is not necessarily taken away when the
other is. For example, animal is by nature prior to man,
for when the animal is taken away so as not to exist,
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then man will necessarily not exist either, because man
is an animal. But, when man is taken away and does
not exist, there can still be an animal —for there would
be the horse and the dog and such, which are certain
kinds of animals. Again, when man is postulated, then
animal is most certainly implied with him, because
man is an animal. But, when the animal is postulated,
man is not necessarily implied, because, on the
contrary, it might be a horse, or a dog, or something of
the sort, for these are animals, too. Therefore, Peter is
not by nature prior to Paul, nor is the rational animal
prior to the irrational. For, when Peter is taken away so
as not to exist, there will still be Paul. Likewise, when
Paul is postulated, Peter is not implied with him; nor,
when Peter is postulated, will Paul be implied. And
neither is Peter more, that is to say, more a man or
more an animal than Paul, nor is Paul more so than
Peter. However, a drug may be found which is more
healthful than another drug, and a book which is more
medical than some other book.
CHAPTER VIII
A definition is a concise statement setting forth
the nature of the thing in question, that is to say, such
expresses in brief the nature of the thing in question.
For example, man is a rational mortal animal capable
of intelligence and knowledge. Now, many men have
discoursed at length on the nature of man, that is, they
have written long and extensive treatises on the
subject. But these are not concise and, therefore, are
not definitions. There are also concise statements, such
as apophthegms, but, since they do not set forth the
nature of a thing, they are not definitions. A name, too,
oftentimes indicates the nature of the thing in question,
but it is not a definition. For the name is one word,
while the definition is a statement, and a statement is
made up of at least two words. (Therefore, the
definition is a name explained, whereas a name is a
term of a proposition, when it is in conjunction.)
The definition is made up of genus and
constituent, that is to say, essential differences. Thus it
is with the definition of animal, for animal is an
animate sentient substance. Here the genus is
substance, while the constituent differences are the
being animate and sentient. The definition may also be
taken from matter and form, as, for example: A statue
is that which is made of bronze and represents the form
of a man. In this case the bronze is the matter, while
the representation of the shape of the man is the form
of the statue. The matter corresponds to the genus and
the form to the specific difference. The definition may
also be taken from subject and purpose. Medicine, for
example, is concerned with human bodies and is
productive of health. Here the subject of medicine is
the human body, whereas its purpose is health.
Now, the description is made up of non-essential
elements, that is to say, of properties and accidents. For
example, man is an animal which is able to laugh,
walks erect, and has broad nails. These elements are
non-essential. For this reason it is called description,
since it outlines, bringing out not the essential
substance but only the things consequential to it. The
descriptive definition is a combination of essentials
and non-essentials, as, for example: Man is rational
animal walking erect and having broad nails.
Definition is the term for the setting of land boundaries
taken in a metaphorical sense. For, just as the boundary
separates that which belongs to one from that which
belongs to another, so does the definition set off the
nature of one thing from that of any other.
Now, the soundness of a definition lies in its
having neither too few nor too many terms, while its
vice lies in its having either too few or too many terms.
A perfect definition is one which is convertible with
the thing defined, while an imperfect one is one which
is not. Neither is that which has too few terms
convertible (nor that which has too many), for, when it
has too many terms, it covers too few things, whereas,
when it has too few terms, it covers too many things.
(And so one may say that nature has discovered a
wonderful device poverty that is wealthy and wealth
feigning poverty.) For example, the perfect definition
of man is: Man is rational mortal animal. Notice how
this is convertible, for every rational mortal animal is a
man and every man is a rational mortal animal. Now, if
one term were to be left out, the definition would cover
too many things. Take it, for example, as ‘rational
animal.’ Here there are too few terms, because I did not
say ‘mortal.’ And it covers too many things, because
man is not the only rational animal; the angel is one,
too. Therefore, it is not convertible. If, on the other
hand, I should say ‘a rational, mortal, literate animal,’
again it is not convertible. For by my saying ‘literate’ it
has received too many terms, while it covers too few
things. This is because it has not defined every man,
but only those men who are literate. Thus, every
rational, mortal, and literate animal is a man, but not
every man is a rational, mortal, and literate animal,
because not every man is literate.
Therefore, those definitions are perfect which are
convertible with the thing defined. Since, however, a
property is also convertible with the thing of which it is
a property— for, if anything is a man, it will be
capable of laughter; and if anything is capable of
laughter, it will be a man— then we must make an
additional specification and say that perfect definitions
are those which are taken from genus and constituent
differences, which are neither deficient nor excessive
in terms, and which are convertible with the thing
defined, In the same way, those are perfect which are
taken from the pairs of subject and purpose and of