ELECTION LAWS - LIST OF ADDITIONAL
This will not only discourage nuisance
CASES
1. People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 242211, June 26,
2019  223705, August 14, 2019
From the foregoing, it is clear that the accused bears the
burden of proving that he is armed with a written
authorization from the COMELEC itself which
otherwise permits him to carry and possess a firearm
during election period. Section 32 is explicit that a mere
license to possess or carry a firearm will not suffice. A
written authorization from the COMELEC is an
indispensable requirement. Here, Soriano failed to prove
that he had the written authority required under the OEC
and R.A. No. 7166. As a matter of fact, the COMELEC
issued a certification which confirmed that Soriano
neither applied for nor was he granted an exemption
from the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting
firearms or other deadly weapons during the election
period. As such, the Court finds no reversible error on
the part of the CA when it affirmed his conviction.
2. Zapanta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 233016,
March 5, 2019
This Court holds that petitioner was not able to
sufficiently show that voters can clearly identify
that his chosen nickname pertains only to him. The
affidavits he presented are not enough to show that
he had been using the name “Alfred” or that he is
publicly known by that name. Moreover, despite
being given an opportunity to counter private
respondent’s allegations, petitioner failed to deny
that he had no campaign materials using the name
“Alfred Zapanta,” or present evidence to the
contrary. He merely banked on his membership in a
political party to support his claim that he had a
bona fide intention to run for office. Association to
a political party per se does not necessarily equate
to a candidate’s bona fide intent; instead, he or she
must show that he or she is serious in running for
office. This, petitioner failed to demonstrate.
Additionally, private respondent is more recognized
by his constituents as “Alfred Zapanta,” being an
incumbent city councilor who was running for
another term.
Here, the Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes
for petitioner alone should be counted in favor of
private respondent; if there are votes for both
petitioner and private respondent in the same ballot,
then only one (1) vote should be counted in the
latter's favor.
candidates, but will also prevent the
disenfranchisement of voters.
3. Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
By banning partisan political activities or
campaigning even during the campaign period
within embassies, consulates, and other foreign
service establishments, regardless of whether it
applies only to candidates or whether the
prohibition extends to private persons, it goes
beyond the objective of maintaining order during
the voting period and ensuring a credible election.
To be sure, there cart be no legally acceptable
justification, whether measured against the strictest
scrutiny or the most lenient review, to absolutely or
unqualifiedly disallow one to campaign within our
jurisdiction during the campaign period.
Most certainly, thus, the challenged provision,
whether on its face or read with its IRR, constitutes
a restriction on free speech that is greater than what
is essential to the furtherance of the governmental
interest it aims to achieve. Section 36.8 of R.A. No.
9189 should be struck down for being overbroad as
it does not provide for well-defined standards,
resulting to the ambiguity of its application, which
produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free
speech and expression, and ultimately, resulting to
the unnecessary invasion of the area of protected
freedoms.46
For the foregoing reasons, this Court declares
Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as amended by R.A.
No. 10590, unconstitutional for violating Section 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
4. Velez v. People, G.R. No. 215136, August 28,
2019
The law imposes the prohibition against the release,
disbursement and expenditure of public funds to prevent
public officials and employees from utilizing
government resources to influence the voters in their
choice of candidates for the forthcoming elections. It
ensures that public funds and properties are insulated
from political partisan activities and that government
works shall not be used for electioneering purposes. It
also seeks to prevent incumbent public officials from
enjoying undue advantage of government resources over
which they have easy and convenient access to bolster
their campaign. Thus, it would be more in keeping with
the object and purpose of the prohibition to disallow the
release, disbursement and expenditure of public funds
for all social welfare and development projects and
activities1 regardless of whether the activity is
undertaken by the DSWD itself or the, LGU concerned.
Finally, it does not escape the attention of the Court that
petitioner signed a letter dated April 29, 1998 requesting
Atty. Vicente Zaragoza, the Election Officer of Silay City,
to allow them to continue with the implementation of the
city's livelihood program. This fact implies that, at the very
outset, petitioner knew that its loan assistance project was
among the prohibited activities enumerated in Section
261(v), hence the need for a request for exemption. It is
likewise interesting to note that when the defense presented
the letter-request before the court, the RTC found that the
letter-request was not acted upon by the election officers
authorized to grant the exemption. Certainly, the inaction of
the authorized election officers to grant the letter-request
for exemption cannot be considered as their tacit consent or
approval to the release and disbursement of government
funds for the said loan assistance. Petitioner, however,
proceeded with the approval and signing of the
disbursement vouchers despite knowledge that the loan
transactions were covered by the election ban. For these
reasons, the Court finds no compelling reason to warrant
the reversal of the August 30, 2013 CA Decision convicting
petitioner of violation of Section 261(v)(2) of the OEC.
5. Marquez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 244274,
September 03, 2019
Marquez here was disqualified not on the basis of the
similarity of his name with another senatorial candidate,
a ground explicitly provided for in Section 69 of the
OEC, but for the sole reason that he failed to show proof
of his financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign.
This, however, has already been proscribed following
Our ruling in Maquera.
We already declared in Maquera v. Borra (Maquera),
that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be
made to depend upon the wealth of the candidate. We
held that the State cannot require candidacy for a public
office to be conditioned on the ability to file a surety
bond equivalent to the one-year salary of the position
sought. This is a constitutionally impermissible property
qualification. Maquera 's rationale applies with equal
cogency in this case. The COMELEC cannot condition a
person's privilege to be voted upon as senator on his or
her financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign.
Quite obviously, the financial capacity requirement is a
property requirement.
6. Fermin v. Bedol, A.C. No. 6560, September 16,
2019 
Based on the foregoing provision of law, the declaration
of failure of election and the calling of special elections
shall be decided by the majority vote of the members of
the COMELEC en banc. In this case, the COMELEC en
banc issued a Resolution dated July 27, 2004 declaring
the failure of election and the holding of a special
election on July 28, 2004. However, prior to the issuance
of the said Resolution, respondent, as the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, had already issued
the following, to wit: Notice dated July 23, 2004 of the
special election to be done on July 28, 2004; Invitation
dated July 25, 2004 for conference at his office in
Cotabato City; and Notice dated July 26, 2004 informing
that the canvassing of votes shall be held in Shariff
Aguak, Maguindanao.
Respondent's act of issuing those notices ahead of the
issuance of the COMELEC en banc Resolution calling
for a special election was not in compliance with the
procedures under the law and the COMELEC rules.
7. Cumigad v. People, G.R. No. 245238, August
27, 2020
The filing of a joint SOCE jointly reflecting the
expenditures of an individual candidate and his political
party is not allowed under the Omnibus Election Code
nor RA 7166. The reason is simple. Since the standard
for allowable expenditures for one (P3.00) is different
from the other (P5.00), joining them in one SOCE will
ce1iainly breed confusion. In any event, petitioner's
Schedilile of Contributions Received29 and Schedule of
Expenditures30 attached to his SOCE did not specify
which contributions and/or expenses pertained to
petitioner as a candidate and which ones pertained to his
political party.
8. Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo,  P.E.T. Case No. 005,
October 15, 2019
9. Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 225709, February
14, 2018 
In order to secure a conviction of an accused based on
these provisions, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the
person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or
other deadly weapons; (b) such possession occurs during
the election period; and (c) the weapon is carried in a
public place. Notably, it is essential that possession of
the deadly weapon in a public place be established
beyond reasonable doubt.
 10. Francisco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 230249,
April 24, 2018
The Court is in concurrence with the observations of
Commissioners Luie Tito F. Guia and Ma. Rowena
Amelia V. Guanzon that the evidence on record
sufficiently proved that the expenditure for the road
repair is exempted from the prohibition under Sec.
261(v) of the OEC. Private respondent Nieto was able to
show with competent evidence that the bidding for and
the award of the subject project were regular and done
consistent with existing laws. The charge for illegal
contribution under Sec. 104 of the OEC has even less leg
to stand on. There was no contribution to speak of since
it was established that the asphalting work was a
government project and not a contribution.
11. Reyes v. HRET, G.R. No. 221103, October, 16, 
2018
Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence
of at least one Justice and four members of the Tribunal
to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all
the Justices are present, at least two members of the
House of Representatives need to be present to constitute
a quorum. Without this rule, it would be possible for five
members of the House of Representatives to convene
and have a quorum even when no Justice is present. This
would render ineffective the rationale contemplated by
the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions for
placing the Justices as members of the HRET. Indeed,
petitioner is nitpicking in claiming that Rule 6(a) unduly
favors the Justices because under the same rule, it is
possible for four members of the House of
Representatives and only one Justice to constitute a
quorum. Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not
make the Justices indispensable members to constitute a
quorum but ensures that representatives from both the
Judicial and Legislative departments are present to
constitute a quorum. Members from both the Judicial
and Legislative departments become indispensable to
constitute a quorum. The situation cited by petitioner,
that it is possible for all the Justice-members to exercise
denial or veto power over the proceedings simply by
absenting themselves, is speculative. As pointed out by
the HRET, this allegation also ascribes bad faith, without
any basis, on the part of the Justices.
12. Sevilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 227797,
November 13, 2018
Petitioner contends that the intention to vote for
private respondent was absent in the ballot marked
as Exhibit “I” and hence, should be considered as a
stray vote. The Court begs to differ. The
COMELEC En Banc correctly credited the
contested ballot in favor of private respondent based
on the Idem Sonans Rule. The aforesaid rule states
that when a name or surname incorrectly written
which, when read, has a sound similar to the name
or surname of a candidate when correctly written
shall be counted in such candidate’s favor. The
Idem Sonans Rule is particularly provided for under
Section 211(7) of the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Section 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots.—
In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every
ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is
clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The
board of election inspectors shall observe the
following rules, bearing in mind that the object of
the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s
will: x x x x 7. A name or surname incorrectly
written which, when read, has a sound similar to the
name or surname of a candidate when correctly
written shall be counted in his favor.
In the present case, the name “Nanie G” written on
the space allotted for Punong Barangay in the
questioned ballot was validly credited to private
respondent. “Nanie” undoubtedly sounds like the
name of private respondent, i.e., “Ranie.”
Moreover, the surname of private respondent, i.e.,
Gupit, starts with a G. While the Court notes that
there was a candidate for Barangay Kagawad under
the name of “Nanie” Ballangca y Gubat, such fact
alone is insufficient to invalidate the ballot. As
pointed out by the COMELEC First Division,
counting the questioned ballot in favor of private
respondent is in line more with the basic principle
that the primary objective of ballot appreciation is
to discover and give effect to, rather than frustrate,
the intention of the voter.
With respect to the ballot marked as Exhibit “F,”
petitioner alleges that it should have been counted
in his favor based on the Neighborhood and Intent
Rules. The Neighborhood Rule states that, where
the name of a candidate is not written in the proper
space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of
the office for which he is a candidate, the vote
should be counted as valid for said candidate.
13. Anacta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 219352,
November 14, 2018
In Davao City Water District v. CSC, 201 SCRA 593
(1991), the Court categorically ruled that local water
districts are government-owned or -controlled
corporations with original charter. Under Section 3(b) of
P.D. No. 198, petitioner, as the Municipal Mayor of
Borongan in 2005, was the appointing authority or the
person empowered to appoint the members of the Board
of Directors of the Borongan Water District. Petitioner
knew that when he appointed Alconaba, who ran and
lost under his ticket in the May 2004 elections, the latter
was covered by the one (1)-year prohibition and thus not
qualified for appointment to any public office. Clearly,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in finding petitioner guilty
of the crime of unlawful appointments defined and
penalized under Article 244 of the RPC.
14. People v. Ting, G.R. No. 221505, December 05,
2018
he following shall be guilty of an election offense:
x x x x (w) Prohibition against construction of public
works, delivery of materials for public works and
issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices.—
During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, any
person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public
works, except for projects or works exempted in the
preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of
treasury warrants or any device undertaking future
delivery of money, goods or other things of value
chargeable against public funds. x x x From the
foregoing, it can be deduced that subparagraph (b) above
is violated when: (1) any person issues, uses or avails of
treasury warrants or any device forty-five days preceding
a regular election or thirty days before a special election;
(2) the warrant or device undertakes the future delivery
of money, goods or other things of value; and (3) the
undertaking is chargeable against public funds.
It must be noted that May 5, 2004 was also the date
when the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the
registration of the sale and the issuance of new TCTs in
its name. But the RTC ruled that even if the title was
already issued in favor of the City Government of
Tuguegarao, it does not follow that payment was made
on the same day because as the Law on Sales provides,
payment of the purchase price is not a condition for the
transfer of title, in the absence of stipulation to the
contrary. Thus, the courts below found that since the
dorsal side of the instrument bears the date “May 18,
2004” as the date of payment annotated by the drawee
bank, which is beyond the prohibited period, respondents
cannot be held liable. It must be emphasized, however,
that actual payment of the purchase price is not an
element of the offense charged herein. To repeat, the
subject provision expressly states that a person shall be
guilty of an election offense if he or she issues, uses, or
avails of treasury warrants or other devices undertaking
the future delivery of money, goods, or other things of
value chargeable against public funds. Clearly, the
offense is committed even if the payment or the delivery
of money was made after the prohibited period. Hence,
that the check was encashed on May 18, 2004, or after
the prohibited election ban period, does not render
respondents innocent of the charges against them.
15. Rulloda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198,
January 20, 2003 
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in
petitioner’s favor can not be counted because she did not
file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was
the only candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is
refuted by the Memorandum of the COMELEC Law
Department as well as the assailed Resolution No. 5217,
wherein it indubitably appears that petitioner’s letter-
request to be allowed to run as Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a
certificate of candidacy.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality
of votes in the contested election. Technicalities and
procedural niceties in election cases should not be made
to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.
16. Sanchez v. Eduardo, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1322,
July 17, 2001
The Omnibus Election Code mandates the resolution of
election protests involving barangay positions within
fifteen (15) days from the filing thereof. By his own
admission, respondent failed to comply with this
mandate. Complainant’s election protest was filed on
May 22, 1997. On November 6, 1997, after the filing of
numerous pleadings, respondent dismissed the election
protest. He reasoned that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction, because complainant had failed to follow
some jurisdictional and procedural requirements.
Complainant then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
November 14, 1997; on April 16, 1998, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. To date, and by his
own admission, respondent judge has not resolved the
case.
17. Tan v. Crislogo, G.R. No. 193993, November
8, 2017
To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens
who have “reacquired” from those who “retained”
Philippine citizenship,41 coupled with the legal effects
of renunciation of citizenship, Section 2 of R.A. No.
9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive
application of the law. R.A. No. 9225 contains no
provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as
regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized
citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the
said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the law
would readily reveal that only those falling under the
second paragraph of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born
citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign
country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be
considered as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship.
Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost
would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino
would still be considered a Philippine citizen when in
fact he had already renounced his citizenship.
18. PADPAO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 223505,
October 03, 2017
In Republic Act (RA) No. 5487, it is the Philippine
National Police (PNP) that exercises general supervision
over the operation of all private detective and watchman
security guard agencies. It has the exclusive authority to
regulate and to issue the required licenses to operate
security and protective agencies. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) does not encroach upon this
authority of the PNP to regulate Private Security
Agencies (PSAs) — as it merely regulates the bearing,
carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly
weapons by PSAs and all other persons, during election
period.
As to the nature of the right to bear arms, the Court
ruled: The right of individuals to bear arms is not
absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance of
peace and order and the protection of the people against
violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the
right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in
harmony with these constitutional duties.
19. Salvador v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 230744,
September 26, 2017
Thus, in construing Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, We
treat the word “and” between “without political party”
and “without support from any political party” as
conjunctive. It means in addition to. The word “and,”
whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full
sentences, must be accepted as binding together and as
relating to one another.23 Applying the foregoing to
Section 13, the proper construction is that the allowable
expenditure for candidates without any political party
and without support from any political party is P3.00.
After all, the word “support,” which is explicitly
provided by the law, is not solely limited to financial aid.
As aforementioned, political parties are designed to
assist a candidate in his desire to win the vote of the
populace. Political parties use its machinery and its
resources to achieve such end. For example, political
parties put up banners or give out leaflets containing the
names of its members for the public to consider. In doing
so, these organizations effectively support each
candidate belonging to its unit.
The law is clear — the candidate must both be without a
political party and without support from any political
party for the P5.00 cap to apply. In the absence of one,
the exception does not apply. Thus, We do not subscribe
with petitioner’s assertion that there is a room for
different interpretation in terms of constructing the
provision of Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, as amended.
To allow Salvador’s contention is to deviate from the
intention of the legislature in enacting the law, as the
same would find all candidates on equal footing, whether
member of a political party or not.
20. Alabnia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 226792, June
06, 2017
In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of
Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did not
win as such. It was only after he filed a petition for
correction of manifest error that he was proclaimed
as the duly-elected Governor. He assumed the post
and served the unexpired term of his opponent from
March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently,
he did not hold the office for the full term of three
years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus,
such period of time that respondent served as
Governor did not constitute a complete and full
service of his term. The period when he was out of
office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his
service as Governor. As he had not fully served the
2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for three
consecutive terms as Governor, there was no
violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran
again in the 2016 elections.
21. Dimapilis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 227158,
April 18, 2017 
In this case, the OMB rulings dismissing petitioner
for Grave Misconduct had already attained finality
on May 28, 2010, which date was even prior to his
first election as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung
Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay Elections.
As above stated, “[t]he penalty of dismissal [from
service] shall carry with it that of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided in
the decision.” Although the principal penalty of
dismissal appears to have not been effectively
implemented (since petitioner was even able to run
and win for two [2] consecutive elections), the
corresponding accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office had
already rendered him ineligible to run for any
elective local position. Bearing the same sense as its
criminal law counterpart, the term perpetual in this
administrative penalty should likewise connote a
lifetime restriction and is not dependent on the term
of any principal penalty. It is undisputable that this
accessory penalty sprung from the same final OMB
rulings, and therefore had already attached and
consequently, remained effective at the time
petitioner filed his CoC on October 11, 2013 and his
later reelection in 2013. Therefore, petitioner could
not have been validly reelected so as to avail of the
condonation doctrine, unlike in other cases where
the condonation doctrine was successfully invoked
by virtue of reelections which overtook and thus,
rendered moot and academic pending administrative
cases.
22. Maturan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 227155,
March 28, 2017
The petitioner has not demonstrated herein how R.A.
No. 7166 could have transgressed the Constitution. On
the contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly
indicates that perpetual disqualification from public
office has been prescribed as a penalty for the repeated
failure to file the SOCE and does not constitute cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment.
We have already settled that the constitutional
proscription under the Bill of Rights extends only to
situations of extreme corporeal or psychological
punishment that strips the individual of his humanity.
The proscription is aimed more at the form or character
of the punishment rather than at its severity.
23. COMELEC v. Mamalinta, G.R. No. 226622,
March 14, 2017
In sum, while Mamalinta may be absolved from
administrative liability for her acts of double
proclamation and unauthorized transfer of the place for
canvassing as such acts were done under duress, she is
nevertheless administratively liable for her premature
proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning candidate on the
basis of an incomplete canvass of votes.
24. Rivera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210273, April
19, 2016 
In a long line of cases and more recently in Reyes v.
COMELEC, et al., 708 SCRA 197 (2013), the Court has
held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as Member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. Since the nominees of CIBAC
National Council have already assumed their seats in
Congress, the quo warranto petition should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
25. Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. v.
COMELEC 
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
empowered the Commission of Elections to “[e]nforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.” One of the laws that the
Commission on Elections must implement is Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369,
which requires the automated election system to have the
capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.
Based on the technical specifications during the bidding,
the current vote-counting machines should meet the
minimum system capability of generating a VVPAT.
However, the Commission on Elections’ act of rendering
inoperative this feature runs contrary to why the law
required this feature in the first place. Under Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended, it is considered a policy of
the state that the votes reflect the genuine will of the
People.
By setting the minimum system capabilities of our
automated election system, the law intends to achieve
the purposes set out in this declaration. A mechanism
that allows the voter to verify his or her choice of
candidates will ensure a free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
credible, and informed election. The voter is not left to
wonder if the machine correctly appreciated his or her
ballot. The voter must know that his or her sovereign
will, with respect to the national and local leadership,
was properly recorded by the vote-counting machines.
26. Engle v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 215995,
January 19, 2016
First, the COMELEC Law Department’s “ruling” was
issued only after the filing of petitioner’s CoC. Second,
with respect to the denial of due course to James L.
Engle’s CoC as a nominee of Lakas-CMD and to
petitioner’s CoC as his substitute, the COMELEC Law
Department’s letter is not binding and at most,
recommendatory. It is settled in jurisprudence that the
denial of due course or cancellation of one’s CoC is not
within the administrative powers of the COMELEC, but
rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. We have also previously held that the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, is mandated by the Constitution to hear
and decide such cases first by Division and, upon motion
for reconsideration, by the En Banc. In resolving cases to
deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy,
the COMELEC cannot merely rely on the
recommendations of its Law Department but must
conduct due proceedings through one of its divisions.
Returning to the case at bar, the COMELEC Second
Division only formally ruled on the status of James L.
Engle as an independent candidate and the invalidity of
petitioner’s substitution on July 5, 2013, months after the
May 13, 2013 Elections. Under these premises, the
COMELEC correctly did not cancel petitioner’s CoC on
the ground of false material representation as there was
none.
As may be recalled, petitioner’s deceased husband’s
name remained on the ballot notwithstanding his death
even before the campaign period for the local elections
began on March 29, 2013.30 Yet, he received almost
twice the number of votes as the second placer, private
respondent, in a decisive victory. Since the people of
Babatngon, Leyte could not have possibly meant to
waste their votes on a deceased candidate, we conclude
that petitioner was the undisputed choice of the
electorate as Vice Mayor on the apparent belief that she
may validly substitute her husband. That belief was not
contradicted by any official or formal ruling by the
COMELEC prior to the elections.
27. Javier v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 215847,
January 12, 2016
With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for
disqualifying Javier no longer existed. As we held in
Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 1
(2012), [t]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify
candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in
nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined
to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting
the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice.
To our mind, the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it disqualified Gov. Javier based on a
provision of law that had already been expressly
repealed. Its stubborn insistence that R.A. No. 7890
merely impliedly repealed Section 261(d) despite the
clear wordings of the law, amounted to an arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of judgment.
28. Velasco v. Belmonte, Jr., G.R. No. 211140,
January 13, 2016
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of
a writ of mandamus to compel respondents Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge
and recognize the final and executory Decisions and
Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by
administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering
the latter’s name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In other words, the Court is called upon
to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i)
the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and
(ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are
ministerial in character vis-à-vis the factual and legal
milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the
administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no
longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They
are legally duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling
rendered by this Court and the COMELEC’s compliance
with the said ruling, now both final and executory.
29. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January
11, 2016
In Abenes v. Court of Appeals, 515 SCRA 690 (2007),
this court enumerated the elements for a violation of the
Gun Ban: “1) the person is bearing, carrying, or
transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such
possession occurs during the election period; and 3) the
weapon is carried in a public place.” This court also
ruled that under the Omnibus Election Code, the burden
to show that he or she has a written authority to possess
a firearm is on the accused. We find that the prosecution
was able to establish all the requisites for violation of the
Gun Ban. The firearms were found inside petitioner’s
bag. Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to
carry the firearms outside his residence during the period
designated by the Commission on Elections. He was
carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which
was a public place.
 30. Ty-Delgado v. HRET, G.R. No. 219603,
January 26, 2016
Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to
and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy is premised on a
person’s misrepresentation of any of the material
qualifications required for the elective office. This is to
be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office. In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 670
SCRA 572 (2012), we held that if a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment
in a criminal case from running for public office, and he
still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that
he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation that is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. In the present
case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his
certificate of candidacy because he knew that he had
been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that he was
eligible for elective public office constitutes false
material representation as to his qualification or
eligibility for the office.
A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied
due course and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed
to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate
of candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to
valid votes. In both Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections,
670 SCRA 572 (2012) and Aratea v. Commission on
Elections, 683 SCRA 105 (2012), we proclaimed the
second placer, the only qualified candidate who actually
garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of
Mayor. We found that since the certificate of candidacy
of the candidate with the highest number of votes was
void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all, and all his
votes were considered stray votes.
31. Tañada v. HRET, G.R. No. 217012, March 01,
2016
The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in declaring that it has no jurisdiction to determine
whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. If
Wigberto timely filed a petition before this Court within
the period allotted for special actions and questioned
Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy, then it is proper for
this Court to assume jurisdiction and rule on the matter.
As things stand, the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling on
Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy had long become final
and executory. To our mind, it appears that Wigberto’s
petition challenging Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy
filed before the HRET, and now before this Court, is a
mere afterthought. It was only after Angelina was
proclaimed a winner that Wigberto renewed his zeal in
pursuing Alvin John’s alleged nuisance candidacy. It is
not enough for Wigberto to have Alvin John’s CoC
cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation only
leads to stray votes. Alvin John must also be declared a
nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin John’s
votes be credited to Wigberto. Tañada, Jr. vs. House of
Represetatives Electoral Tribunal, 785 SCRA 314, G.R.
No. 217012 March 1, 2016
32. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC,  G.R. No.
221697, March 08, 2016 
A person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
Catholic Church in a municipality where the population
of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a ninety-nine percent (99%)
chance that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if
not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are
Filipinos.
33. Chua v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216607, April
05, 2016
Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her
American citizenship by taking the Oath of
Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the sworn
and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are
separate requirements, the latter being an additional
requirement for qualification to run for public
office. In Jacot v. Dal, 572 SCRA 295 (2008): [T]he
oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225,
does not constitute the personal and sworn
renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic
Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said
oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all
those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign
citizenship is an additional requisite only for those
who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who
seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
With petitioner’s failure to execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship,
petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012. Under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she was
disqualified to run for Councilor in the Fourth
District of Manila during the 2013 National and
Local Elections.
34. Rappler, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702,
April 05, 2016
The presidential and vice presidential debates are held
primarily for the benefit of the electorate to assist the
electorate in making informed choices on election day.
Through the conduct of the national debates among
presidential and vice presidential candidates, the
electorate will have the “opportunity to be informed of
the candidates’ qualifications and track record, platforms
and programs, and their answers to significant issues of
national concern.”10 The political nature of the national
debates and the public’s interest in the wide availability
of the information for the voters’ education certainly
justify allowing the debates to be shown or streamed in
other websites for wider dissemination, in accordance
with the MOA.
Therefore, the debates should be allowed to be live
streamed on other websites, including petitioner’s, as
expressly mandated in Part VI(C), paragraph 19 of the
MOA. The respondent, as representative of the
COMELEC which provides overall supervision under
the MOA, including the power to “resolve issues that
may arise among the parties involved in the organization
of the debates,”11 should be directed by this Court to
implement Part VI(C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, which
allows the debates to be shown or live streamed
unaltered on petitioner’s and other websites subject to
the copyright condition that the source is clearly
indicated.
35. Abayon v. HRET,  G.R. No. 222236, May 03,
2016
Abayon asserts that even if the HRET had jurisdiction to
annul the elections in the concerned precincts, the latter
nonetheless acted with grave abuse of discretion because
the circumstances did not warrant the nullification of the
results in the contested precincts. He explains that Daza
failed to sufficiently establish that terrorism was so
prevalent in the said clustered precincts that it had
adversely affected the right of the majority of residents
to vote and that made it impossible to differentiate the
valid votes from the invalid ones.
It must be remembered that “[t]he power to declare a
failure of elections should be exercised with utmost care
and only under circumstances which demonstrate
beyond doubt that the disregard of the law had been so
fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is
impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what
are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result
whatsoever, or that the great body of the voters have
been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats
from exercising their franchise.”35 Consequently, a
protestant alleging terrorism in an election protest must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the will
of the majority has been muted by violence, intimidation
or threats.
36. Labao, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212615,
July 19, 2016 
Based on settled jurisprudence, the term ‘“fugitive
from justice’ includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.” In Rodriguez v. Commission on
Elections, 259 SCRA 296 (1996), this Court held
that: The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s
flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously,
there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction.
This Court finds that the pieces of evidence on
record do not sufficiently establish Labao, Jr.’s
intention to evade being prosecuted for a criminal
charge that will warrant a sweeping conclusion that
Labao, Jr., at the time, was evading prosecution so
as to disqualify him as a fugitive from justice from
running for public office.38 Moreover, the dearth of
evidence pointing to such intent hardly justifies the
would-be disenfranchisement of 12,117 innocent
voters of Mambusao, Capiz who voted for Labao,
Jr.
37. Dano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210200,
September 13, 2016
Physical presence, along with animus manendi et
revertendi, is an essential requirement for the acquisition
of a domicile of choice. However, the law does not
require that physical presence be unbroken. In Japzon v.
Comelec, 576 SCRA 331 (2009), this Court ruled that to
be considered a resident of a municipality, the candidate
is not required to stay and never leave the place for a full
one-year period prior to the date of the election. In Sabili
v. Comelec, 670 SCRA 664 (2012), this Court reiterated
that the law does not require a candidate to be at home
24 hours a day, 7 days a week to fulfill the residency
requirement.
 38. David v. SET, G.R. No. 221538, September 20,
2016
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the
bounds of its constitutional competence when it ruled
that private respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified
to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner’s
arguments, there is no basis for annulling its assailed
Decision and Resolution.
Considering our determination that the trial court’s
award of moral damages and attorney’s fees in these
consolidated election cases had no justification in
fact or law and this ground for reversal applies to all
the petitioners, it would be grossly unjust to limit
our ruling only to those who perfected their appeals.

39. Lim-Bungacaras v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.

209415-17, November 15, 2017

Presently, the award of damages in election contests

is provided under Section 259 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which states: SEC. 259. Actual or
compensatory damages.—Actual or compensatory
damages may be granted in all election contests or
in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with
law.

What is patently clear from Section 259 of the

Omnibus Election Code is that only actual or
compensatory damages may be awarded in election
contests. The above provision is a stark contrast to
the aforestated provisions in the past election codes
that expressly permit the award of moral and
exemplary damages. As the Court concluded in
Atienza, the omission of the provisions allowing for
moral and exemplary damages in the current
Omnibus Election Code clearly underscores the
legislative intent to do away with the award of
damages other than those specified in Section 259
of the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., actual or
compensatory damages. Lim-Bungcaras vs.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 809 SCRA
36, G.R. Nos. 209415-17, G.R. No. 210002
November 15, 2016

The failure of the petitioners to adduce substantial

evidence to sustain their election protests does not
necessarily lead to a conclusion that they were
guilty of bad faith in the filing of said cases. Such a
conclusion is conjectural and unjustified under the
circumstances. As held in Andrade v. Court of
Appeals,50 the entrenched rule is that bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach
of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.