NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY

BHOPAL

CRIMINAL LAW I
OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
CHAPTER VIII IPC (SECTION 141-160)
Vth TRIMESTER

Submitted To: Submitted By:

Asst.Prof. Divya Salim Rashi Ratna Baksh
2017BALLB51
Hrishika Netam
2017BALLB53

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Our vocabulary falls short on words to express our hearty gratitude towards our
Criminal law professor Ms. Divya Salim who gave us the opportunity to work upon such an
astonishing project which helped us in enhancing our thinking skills . Also, I’d like to thank the prestigious
library of NLIU with the material (books) of which we were able to supplement our project work.
we want to take out this moment to lastly (but certainly not the least) thank our parents and
The Almighty under whose blessings we were able to conclude this project. We acknowledge the
support of all the aforesaid and start with our project.

Thank You.

Rashi Ratna Baksh

Hrishika Singh

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................4
2. Objectives.......................................................................................................................4
3. Part A : Unlawfully Assembly......................................................................................4 -8
4.Part B : Riot.................................................................................................................9-12
5. Part C : Affray............................................................................................................13-13
6. Relevant Cases...........................................................................................................14-21
7. Conclusion......................................................................................................................22
8. Bibliography and Reference............................................................................................23

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 INTRODUCTION

“The purpose of a government is to make it easy for people to

do good and difficult to do evil `
-William Gladstone

The offences of public tranquillity are offences which are not only against the person and property of an
individual but also an offence that is against the state. Tranquillity is the quality or state of being tranquil. These
offences are group offences which are generally committed by the large number of persons resulting to
disturbance of public tranquillity. The public tranquillity is the group of persons doing an activity that causes
the disturbance of the peace in the society. These offences are classified into four categories as unlawful
assembly, rioting, common object and affray. For the development of the society, there must be peace in the
society. But these offences are injurious of the public peace. Chapter viii of IPC provides for various sections
which deals with offences against public tranquillity.

OBJECTIVES
 To study about the offences of public tranquillity
 To analyse the punishments given for offences relating to public tranquillity

PART- A

Unlawful Assembly (section 141-145, 149,150, 157, 158)

141. Unlawful assembly.—An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the
Unlawful common object of the persons composing that assembly is—
(First) — To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1[the Central or any State Government or
Parliament or the Legislature of any State], or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such
public servant; or
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(Second) — To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
(Third) — To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
(Fourth) — By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of
any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other
incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or
(Fifth) — By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not
legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation.—An assembly which was
not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.

142.Being member of unlawful assembly —Whoever, being aware of facts which render any assembly an
unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful
assembly.

143. Punishment.—Whoever is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.

144. Joining unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapon.—Whoever, being armed with any deadly
weapon, or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, is a member of an
unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both.

145. Joining or continuing in unlawful assembly, knowing it has been commanded to disperse.—Whoever
joins or continues in an unlawful assembly, knowing that such unlawful assembly has been commanded in the
manner prescribed by law to disperse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.—
If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is
guilty of that offence.

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150. Hiring, or conniving at hiring, of persons to join unlawful assembly.—Whoever hires or engages or
employs, or promotes, or connives at the hiring, engagement or employment of any person to join or become a
member of any unlawful assembly, shall be punishable as a member of such unlawful assembly, and for any
offence which may be committed by any such person as a member of such unlawful assembly in pursuance of
such hiring, engagement or employment, in the same manner as if he had been a member of such unlawful
assembly, or himself had committed such offence.

157. Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly.—Whoever harbours, receives or assembles, in any
house or premises in his occupation or charge, or under his control any persons, knowing that such persons have
been hired, engaged or employed, or are about to be hired, engaged or employed, to join or become members of
an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to six months, or with fine, or with both.

158. Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly or riot.—Whoever is engaged, or hired, or offers or
attempts to be hired or engaged, to do or assist in doing any of the acts specified in section 141, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or
with both, or to go armed.—and whoever, being so engaged or hired as aforesaid, goes armed, or engages or
offers to go armed, with any deadly weapon or with anything which used as a weapon of offence is likely to
cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The essential condition to give rise to an unlawful assembly is that it should consist of at least five or more
persons, who should meet for a common object. All need not have the same object but it is enough, if the
common object is developed subsequently. An assembly of less than five is not an unlawful assembly within the
meaning of section 141and cannot form the basis of the offence 1. The mere fact that some among the accused
persons are not brought to trial, and thereby reduces the number of persons below five, this will make section
141 inapplicable, unless there are some other unidentified or unnamed persons involved in the commission of
crime.

1
Amar Singh v State of Punjab AIR (1987)SC 826; Subran Subramaniam v State of Kerala AIR (1993)3 SCC32
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Object must be one of those specified in section 141:
(i) Overawe the Central or a state government or its officers;
(ii) To resist the execution of legal process;
(iii) Commission of mischief, criminal trespass or any other offence;
(iv) Forcible possession and dispossession of property;
(v) Illegal compulsion.

Section 142 provides for two circumstances to define who can be a part of unlawful assembly:
(i) The person is aware of the facts that making such an assembly is unlawful one;
(ii) Despite this knowledge, whoever intentionally joins the assembly or joins the assembly or continues
in it.
In such circumstances, he is held to be a member of unlawful assembly, Such persons become a member at
anytime and in any manner; however, once he has knowledge about the unlawful nature of the assembly and
continues to be a part of it, he becomes liable for all the acts of the assembly.

A member of an unlawful assembly is punished with imprisonment for term up to six months or with fine or
with both as stated in section 143.

Section 144 creates an aggravated form of the offence created under section 143 while section 145 provides
punishment for joining or continuing with an unlawful assembly that has been commanded to disperse. The
punishment mentioned under section 144 can be imposed on a member if he was:
(i)A member of an unlawful assembly;
(ii)Armed with deadly weapon, or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death.

Here, the element of knowingly continuing to remain part of the assembly despite being commanded to disperse
is crucial to proving the offence as per section 1452.

2
Girdhara Singh v Emperor 1922)Lah 135; Jagmohan v State of Orissa (1977) Cr Lj1394 (Ori)
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According to section 149 Common object can develop at the beginning of the assembly or during the course of
incident. A clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly must be given where the court convicts
any person(s) of an offence with the aid of Section 149. The evidence discussed must not only show the nature
of the common object, but also that the object was unlawful. The emphasis is on common object.
Before the court is satisfied that a person was a member of unlawful assembly, it must be clearly shown either
from his active participation or otherwise, that he shared the common object of the assembly A person, who is a
member of the unlawful assembly, is made guilty of the offence committed by another member of the same
assembly, in the circumstances mentioned in the section, although he had no intention to commit that offence
and had done no overt act except his presence in the assembly and sharing the common object of that assembly.
Therefore, when the accused are acquitted of riot and the charge for being members of an unlawful assembly
fails, there can be no conviction of any one of them for an offence which he had not himself committed.

There must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed and if it is found that the same
was committed to accomplish the common object, every member of the assembly will be liable for the same.
It was clarified that section 149 fastened vicarious liability on persons; it ought to be strictly construed.
Common object has to be essentially inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case, the nature and
number of injuries inflicted, manner of executing the common object and so on. Each individual need not be
shown to have committed some specific act.
Section 149 along with section 34 incorporates the principle of vicarious liability and holds a person liable for
an offence, which he might not have actually done, by reason of his being a member of unlawful assembly.
Although section 149 is wider as compared to section 34. Both section deals with liability for constructive
criminality, i.e., liability, for an offence not committed by the person charged. Section 149 creates a specific
offence and deals with the punishment of that offence alone. There is a difference between object and intention,
for though their object is common the intention of several members may differ and indeed may be similar only
in respect that they are all unlawful. While the element of participation in action according to section 34 is
replaced in section 149 by membership of the assembly at the time of committing the offence.

Section 150 deals with the case of those who are neither abettors of, nor participants in, the offences committed
by an unlawful assembly. The persons who are physically absent in an unlawful assembly but who engage or
hire or employ other persons to join or become member of an unlawful assembly.

Section 157 reveals that the section refers to some unlawful assembly that may take place in the future, and not
that one which has already happened. Therefore, an act of harbouring, receiving or assembling persons who , in

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the past, had joined or likely to have been members of an unlawful assembly, does not amount to an offence
under section 1573. The first part provides for an imprisonment for a term up to six months, or fine or both for a
person who hires himself or assist in carrying of unlawful objects; while the second part offers a higher penalty
or persons who after hiring himself or voluntary in assisting a member of unlawful assembly is found armed
with a deadly weapon. In such a case he may be sentenced to an imprisonment for a term up to two years, or
fine or both.

PART- B

Rioting (section 146-148, 152-156)

146. Rioting.—Whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in
prosecution of the common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of
rioting.

147. Punishment for rioting.—Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

148. Rioting, armed with deadly weapon.—Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon
or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

152. Assaulting or obstructing public servant when suppressing riot, etc.—Whoever assaults or threatens to
assault, or obstructs or attempts to obstruct, any public servant in the discharge of his duty as such public
servant, in endeavouring to disperse an unlawful assembly, or to suppress a riot or affray, or uses, or threatens,
or attempts to use criminal force to such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

153. Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot—if rioting be committed—if not committed.—
Whoever malignantly, or wantonly, by doing anything which is illegal, gives provocation to any person
intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause the offence of rioting to be committed,
3
Radha Raman Saha v Emperor AIR 1931 Cal 712
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shall, if the offence of rioting be committed in consequence of such provocation, be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both; and if
the offence of rioting be not committed, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
six months, or with fine, or with both.

154. Owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held.—Whenever any unlawful assembly
or riot takes place, the owner or occupier of the land upon which such unlawful assembly is held, or such riot is
committed, and any person having or claiming an interest in such land, shall be punishable with fine not
exceeding one thousand rupees, if he or his agent or manager, knowing that such offence is being or has been
committed, or having reason to believe it is likely to be committed, do not give the earliest notice thereof in his
or their power to the principal officer at the nearest police-station, and do not, in the case of his or their having
reason to believe that it was about to be committed, use all lawful means in his or their power to prevent it, and,
in the event of its taking place, do not use all lawful means in his or their power to disperse or suppress the riot
or unlawful assembly.

155. Liability of person for whose benefit riot is committed.—Whenever a riot is committed for the benefit
or on behalf of any person who is the owner or occupier of any land, respecting which such riot takes place or
who claims any interest in such land, or in the subject of any dispute which gave rise to the riot, or who has
accepted or derived any benefit there from, such person shall be punishable with fine, if he or his agent or
manager, having reason to believe that such riot was likely to be committed or that the unlawful assembly by
which such riot was committed was likely to be held, shall not respectively use all lawful means in his or their
power to prevent such assembly or riot from taking place, and for suppressing and dispersing the same.

156. Liability of agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit riot is committed.—Whenever a riot is
committed for the benefit or on behalf of any person who is the owner or occupier of any land respecting which
such riot takes place, or who claims any interest in such land, or in the subject of any dispute which gave rise to
the riot, or who has accepted or derived any benefit therefrom, the agent or manager of such person shall be
punishable with fine, if such agent or manager, having reason to believe that such riot was likely to be
committed, or that the unlawful assembly by which such riot was committed was likely to be held, shall not use
all lawful means in his power to prevent such riot or assembly from taking place and for suppressing.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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Section 146 defines the offence of rioting. In order to apply this provision there should have been an unlawful
assembly as defined in section 141, IPC, that force or violence was used by the assembly or by any member of
the assembly thereof in prosecution of the common object of the assembly and finally that an offence has been
committed. The mere intention to use force is not sufficient and that force or violence must have actually been
used by the assembly or by any of its members. Thus, the accused must be entitled to the acquittal when the
common object is not proved by the prosecution4. The essence of the offence of rioting lies in the use of force to
achieve a common purpose. The essential of section 146 are the following:
(i) That the accused persons being five or more in number formed an unlawful assembly;
(ii) That they were animated by a common unlawful object
(iii) That force or violence was used by the unlawful assembly or any member thereof;
(iv) That such force or violence was used in prosecution of their common object5.

In riot concerning land disputes, it should be carefully enquired as to which party was in actual possession of
land in dispute at the time of the riot and not who has the legal claim to it. To ensure a legal claim and
consequent possession, remedy lies in the civil courts. As far as criminal cases are concerned, the party in actual
possession will have the right of private defence and will not be guilty of rioting, but for private defence will be
no excuse if the riot is premeditated.

Section 148 is an aggravated form of the offence of rioting mentioned in Section 146 and punished under
Section 147 IPC. It provides an enhanced punishment for a person who is armed with a deadly weapon while
committing rioting. A mere fact that a person was carrying a deadly weapon while committing rioting makes
him liable for the enhanced punishment as it converts “rioting” (Section 146) into “aggravated rioting” (Section
148). It is an unlawful assembly that used force, if there, along with others, is only one member armed with a
deadly weapon, he alone, and not other unarmed members of the assembly, will be liable under 148 6. Rest of the
members will be liable under 147. Section 148, therefore, cannot be read with provisions of Section 149.

Section 152 stops a person from using force or threatening to use force against a public servant with a view to
deterring him from dispersing an unlawful assembly or suppressing a riot or affray. It holds a person liable to an
imprisonment for a term up to three years or with a fine or with both, if he resists or attempts to resist a public
servant in his endeavour to disperse an unlawful assembly or suppress a riot or affray.

4
State of Uttar Pradesh v Mahendra Singh AIR 1975 SC 455; Prabhakar Shankar Savant v State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 1265,
(1979) Cr L j 856 (SC)
5
Hazara Singh v State of Punjab (1971) 3 SCR 674

6
Haripada Parui v State of West Bengal AIR 1988 Cr Lj (NOC) 3 Cal
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Section 153 provides punishment for a person who, by doing an unlawful act maliciously gives ‘provocation’
to another person to commit a riot7. It brings within its ambit provocative words or acts that do not amount to
instigation or abetment. The words by doing an illegal act connotes that provision of section cannot be invoked
unless the act done by a person was illegal accompanied with knowledge and intent that it would provoke others
to commit riot8. However, it excludes from its operation a mere chance provocation 9. To invoke section 153 the
provocation given must be likely to cause rioting.

Section 154 imposes criminal liability on an owner or occupier of land or a person having an interest in land for
the failure of his servant or manager to give information to the public authorities or to take adequate legal
measures to stop the occurrence of an unlawful assembly or riot upon the land of such an owner or occupier. It
is done for the following omissions of his servant or manager:
(i) Failure to give earliest notice to the public authorities about the unlawful assembly or riot;
(ii) Intentional failure to give notice of the unlawful assembly or riot which was about to be held
(iii) Abstention from taking appropriate measures to suppress an unlawful assembly or riot.

The owner’s liability does not depend upon his knowledge or the riot and intention of his servant or manager.
He is punished for the taking place of an unlawful assembly or riot on his land.

Section 155 and 156 deals with the liability of persons for whose benefit a riot has committed. The former deals
with the liability of the owner of the land on which an unlawful assembly or riot, who has derived benefits from
such an assembly or riot and he or his agent knowing or having reason to believe that such assembly or riot is
likely to take place, has failed to use lawful means within his reach to prevent or suppress it. While the later
section holds an agent or a manager of an occupier or an owner of the land on which a riot has taken place and
from which such an owner has derived benefits responsible for his failure, having reasons to believe that such a
riot is likely to take place to resort to all lawful means within his power to prevent or suppress a riot.

PART C

7
Manzar Sayeed Khan v State of Maharashtra AIR 2007 SC 2074, (2007) Cr Lj 2959 (SC), (2007) 5 SCCI
8
Rahimatalli Mohamedalli (1919) 22 Bom LR 166; Abdullah v Emeror AIR 1919 All 307; Kori v State of Bihar AIR 1952 Pat 138;
State of Madhya Pradesh v Indrasingh AIR 1962 MP 292
9
State of Orissa v RC Chowala AIR 1966 Orissa 192; Aroon Puri v HL Verma 1999 Cr Lj983 (Bom)
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 AFFRAY (SECTION 159-160)

159. Affray.—When two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace, they are said
to “commit an affray”

160. Punishment for committing affray.—Whoever commits an affray, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to one hundred
rupees, or with both.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Affray can be defined as a situation when two or more persons by fighting in a public place disturbs the public
peace. Section 159 assumes the commission of definite assault or a breach of peace. In order to constitute an
affray there must be a fight and it is not a fight when one party is aggressive and the other one is passive, both
the parties are required to participate in the struggle. The following three essentials are required in order to
constitute an affray:
(i) There must be fight between two or more persons
(ii) Fighting in a public place
(iii) Three must be a disturbance of public peace as a consequence10.

The punishment awarded for the commission of an affray is for one month or fine or both.This is a
bailable, cognizable offence which is not compoundable. If an offence is cognizable police has the
authority to arrest the accused without a warrant and to start an investigation with or without the
permission of the court.

RELEVANT CASES
10
K. Ranganna S/O K. Narasappa v State, 2010 Cr Lj 1275(AP)
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  Vijay Pandurang Thakkar & Ors V. State of Maharashtra AIR 2017 SC 897CRL.A. NO. 1305
OF 2011

FACTS
1. On 24.10.2002, elections for Village Panchayat, Badegaon took place. The appellants were supporting
Samata Party and four of their candidates got elected in the said elections. On the other hand, Deshmukh Group
was representing Shetkari Shet Majoor Party and five of their candidates were elected in the said elections.
Shetkari Shet Majoor Party was led by Vijay Deshmukh and Samata Party was led by Bhujangrao Choudhary.
Two days after the elections.

2. On 26.10.2002, the incident in question took place. As per the prosecution, members of the group of accused
persons hatched a conspiracy to eliminate leading members of Deshmukh family for taking revenge of their
defeat in Gram Panchayat election and in furtherance of their common object, committed the murder of Ashok
Deshmukh and attempted to commit murder of PW-9 and PW-8 respectively, assaulted (PW-6, PW-7, PW-13,
PW-10 and PW-11 respectively), pelted stones on the houses of PW-12 and PW-16 respectively and damaged
the scooter of PW-4 . The incident was witnessed by seven injured witnesses and four eyewitnesses.

3. The prosecution examined, altogether, 26 witnesses. Out of these, PW-6, PW- 7, PW-8, PW-9, PW-10, PW-
11 and PW-13 were the injured eyewitnesses and PW- 2, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-18 were eyewitnesses who did
not suffer any injury in the incident. Other witnesses are the doctors (who examined the injured persons and
conducted postmortem of the deceased Ashok Deshmukh), Investigating Officer, Executive Magistrate, Panch
and other witnesses. On the other hand, defence examined 16 witnesses in all.It may be pointed out that there
was no dispute that death of Ashok Deshmukh was homicidal in nature and the testimony of the doctors on this
account is not under challenge. However, in respect of those who suffered injuries, dispute was as to whether
injuries were such that there was an attempt to murder these persons.

JUDGEMENT

In all these appeals, there are 21 number of appellants who are all convicted for the offences punishable under
Sections 302, 307, 324, 336, 427, 506-II, 148 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
the 'IPC') by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur vide his judgment dated 05.02.2010, which is substantially
upheld by the High Court vide impugned judgment dated 24.01.2011. Judgment of the High Court in the
14
criminal appeals, that were filed by the appellants, allowed the appeals in part thereby altering the charge under
Section 307 IPC to Section 324 of the IPC. However, rest of the conviction recorded by the trial court has been
maintained.

The remaining accused persons were acquitted. Findings of the trial court are summarised by the High Court in
the impugned judgment in the following manner:

(a) Accused No. 4 Pandhari N. Khandal, Accused No. 10 Vijay P. Thakre, Accused No.13 Kailas Bhoyar,
Accused No. 14 Ashok S. Pimparamule, Accused No. 18 Narayan Kothe, Accused No. 19 Baban Karale,
Accused No. 20 Marotrao Gawande, Accused No. 23 Chandrashekhar Khorgade and Accused No. 30 Dilip S.
Chachane were identified to be present and participating in various acts of assault.

(b) The accused possessed, and have used deadly weapons, such as big size sticks and medium size sticks
(Ubharis and Zodpas etc.)

(c) The accused constituted unlawful assembly.

(d) The witnesses depose that the members of the unlawful assembly of accused persons proclaiming that they
wanted to eliminate the main persons from Deshmukh family, because of the acrimony which they had due to
defeat in the Panchayat election.

(e) Aspects, namely motive and intention, both were proved.

(f) The testimonies of the witnesses were adequate to prove the commission of offence charged and stood to the
test of trustworthiness. The omissions relied upon by the defence were neither crucial or material, nor were
omissions at all.

State as well as the complainant had filed the appeals against those who were acquitted, which were dismissed
by the High Court. The High Court noted that defence of the appellants was that it was a case of stampede,
though no attempt was made to explain as to how the stampede could have occurred. The fact of homicidal
death and other injuries were not disputed. The enmity between the parties and commotion were also not in
dispute. Therefore, one has to proceed on the basis that incident in question took place wherein certain persons
belonging to Choudhary Group attacked the persons of Deshmukh family. The most vital question that becomes
important in these circumstances is as to whether unlawful assembly had been formed by the convicted persons
with common object of causing death of Ashok who lost his life in the said attack. The High Court has taken
15
note of the injuries as revealed in the postmortem report which the deceased suffered and noted that the cause of
death is one head injury.

The High Court further summarised his conclusion in para 50 of the judgment which reads as under: 50. The
fact that the evidence brought by the prosecution, tested from any point of view and permutations and
combinations leads to the conclusion that:-

(1) It was an unlawful assembly.

(2) It gathered after pre-conceived common object of eliminating the members of Deshmukh family and group.

(3) The assembly was equipped with deadly weapons, such as Ubharis, Zodpas etc.

(4) Unlawful assembly dealt a fatal assault on Ashok.

(5) Unlawful assembly dealt a violent and brutal assault on other injured witnesses, namely PWs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11 and 13

 State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramlal Devappa Rathod and Ors. AIR (2015) CRA 1957

FACTS

A group of persons holding sticks, axes, swords and stones assaulted deceased who was injured; his family
members who tried to intervene were also assaulted. Deceased ran towards a cluster of houses of his family
followed by the mob. Pleas of the family to the mob were ignored. Deceased took refuge in the house of his
uncle, but members of the mob removed the roof tiles and caught him. Deceased was taken to a field where he
was assaulted and mutilated with various lethal weapons. Members of the mob also ransacked his house.
Deceased was taken to the hospital was declared dead. PW1, brother of deceased, informed the police about the
incident, pursuant to which an FIR was registered. He named 34 persons from the mob, attributing overt acts to
some of those named. PW-18, CPI, visited the scene of the crime and collected evidence, retrieving stones with
blood stains and statements of several witnesses. Subsequently, 34 persons were charged with offences under
the IPC.

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At trial, PW1 mentioned arrival of the mob, but could not verify if accused were among them. Similarly, PW2,
PW3, PW4, PW6, PW8 and PW9 were declared hostile for not supporting prosecution's case. PW5 stated that
family members had sustained injuries and that his house was set on fire, but could not name the accused.
However, PW12, wife of deceased, gave a detailed description of the mob, naming several persons part of it.
She narrated the incident vividly and described specific acts of accused in beating the deceased, demolishing the
house and assaulting others. PW12 identified Respondents as those involved. The trial court found PW12's
testimony to be natural, free from doubt and well supported by other material on record, including the spot
panchnama and the fact that the houses where deceased had taken refuge were found to have been damaged and
burnt. Observing that though it would be unsafe to rely on the evidence of witnesses who speak in general and
omnibus way without any specific reference to the overt acts committed by them, the Court held PW12's
testimony to have dispelled the same, having given specific names of accused and attributed specific overt acts
to them. Thus, on the basis of her testimony, the trial court convicted the Respondents under Section 302 read
with 149 of the IPC and acquitted the remaining accused. On Respondents' appeal, High Court noted that
though PW12 deposed that she had tried to save her husband, she had not received injuries in the process.
Relying on Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court determined PW12's evidence and other corroborating
evidence to be insufficient to convict the Respondents, and acquitted them.

JUDGEMENT

1.The deposition of PW12 Sarojini shows that while Tanaji was being pursued and assaulted, her attention was
focussed in so far as her husband was concerned, which is quite natural. Except referring to the initial blow
which was given to Bhanudas, her testimony concentrates only upon those who were primarily responsible for
having pursued and assaulted her husband. All the stages as stated above and the acts at each stage are
corroborated by other material on record. Though declared hostile on the issue of identity of assailants, other
prosecution witnesses also lend support to prosecution's case. Medical evidence on record lends complete
support to the version as unfolded according to PW12. Out of a large body of 34 accused, she named only nine,
attributing clear specific roles to them. If the incident went on for some length of time, it lends complete
credibility to the version of PW12 in terms of opportunity to observe salient features and the stages of the
incident. Further, there is nothing to entertain any doubt about her capacity and available opportunity to observe
the features of the incident. PW12, like other prosecution witnesses did not want to come and depose as a
witness. Despite summons having been issued by the Trial Court she failed to appear. Her presence had to be
secured by way of warrant issued by the Court and as such her presence in the police station cannot be termed

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as excuse for tutoring. That there are no physical injuries on her person is itself no ground to reject her
testimony. Thus, though she is the sole witness, her evidence is completely reliable and trustworthy.

2.Certain weapons with blood stains recovered immediately on the day after the incident, made pursuant to the
disclosure statements of the accused need not be proved through the deposition of the panchas; testimony of the
investigating officer can provide sufficient support. The fact that the recoveries were made soon after the
incident is a relevant circumstance and it is accepted that the recoveries can be considered against the
Respondents as one more circumstance.

3.In Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court reasoned, "that was that they gave their account of the incident
substantially in similar terms and did not assign particular parts in respect of overt acts to any of the assailants
except Laxmi Prasad accused No. 1." In attributing vicarious liability to all those constituting a mob, regardless
of whether they had common intent or not or were ordinary bystanders, the court was cautious and cognizant
that no particular part in respect of an overt act was assigned to any of the assailants except Laxmi Prasad, in
that case. It is in order to consider "whether the assembly consisted of some persons who were merely passive
witnesses and had joined the assembly as a matter of idle curiosity without intending to entertain the common
object of the assembly", the court observed that participation as a member of the unlawful assembly ought to be
spoken by more than one witness in order to lend corroboration. The test adopted in that case was only to
determine liability of those accused against whom there was no clear allegation of having committed any overt
act but what was alleged against them was about their presence as members of the unlawful assembly. The test
was not to apply to cases where specific allegations and overt acts constituting the offence are alleged or
ascribed to certain named assailants. If such test is to be adopted even where there are specific allegations and
overt acts attributed to certain named assailants, it would directly run counter to the well known maxim that
"evidence has to be weighed and not counted" as statutorily recognized in Section 134 of the Evidence Act,
1872.

4.Nothing in Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh qualifies the principle that conviction can be founded upon the
testimony of even a single witness if it establishes in clear and precise terms, the overt acts constituting the
offence as committed by certain named assailants and if such testimony is otherwise reliable. The test adopted
in that case is required to be applied while dealing with cases of those accused who are sought to be made
vicariously responsible for the acts committed by others, only by virtue of their alleged presence as members of
the unlawful assembly without any specific allegations of overt acts committed by them, or where, given the
nature of assault by the mob, the court comes to the conclusion that it would have been impossible for any

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particular witness to have witnessed the relevant facets constituting the offence. The test adopted in Masalti v.
State of Uttar Pradesh as a rule of prudence cannot mean that in every case of mob violence there must be more
than one eyewitness.

 The State of Maharashtra V. Respondent: Daulat Dashrath Koshare and Ors. AIR 2017 CRA
1040 OF 2002
FACTS

The respondents - accused were police constables attached to City Police Station, Malegaon. The incident took
place at Idgah ground, Malegaon, during a practice session, where platoons of police were practicing for the
Independence Day parade, during the recess, both the accused were joking and jesting and suddenly they started
fighting with each other. Both of them sustained injuries. The Drill Instructor (PW 3) lodged a complaint
against the accused at the Police Station in Malegaon. A crime was registered against the accused under Section
160 of IPC. The accused were sent for medical examination to the Hospital. The Investigating Officer carried
out panchanamas of the accused and of the spot of the incident. After obtaining sanction from the
Superintendent of Police, to prosecute the accused, the accused was arrested. A charge-sheet was filed against
the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 160 of the IPC. The pleas of the accused under
Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were recorded. Both the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed
to be tried. The prosecution examined 8 witnesses.
PW 3 - was a Police Drill Instructor and the complainant and a eye witness. In the examination, PW 3 has
stated that there was a practice session at Idgah ground. The accused had participated in the practice session. He
states that there was a break of 5 minutes when he heard shouting from the drill participants about some
bleeding. He stated as he was in-charge of the practice parade, he rushed to the spot and saw bleeding in the
right ear of accused No. 1. there was scuffle between accused Nos. 1 and 2. The accused deposes that the reason
for scuffle between the accused was some joking and jesting between them after which there was a quarrel. In
the cross-examination, he denied that the legs of two drillman can be entangled and that there was a possibility
that one may sustain injury to his ear by the shoulder badge of other drillman. He has admitted that the
complainant did not mention that there was shouting about bleeding. In the cross-examination, he also states
that there is no document to show that Idgah ground is a public place and says that the Idgah ground may be a
private property, however, the same is used for public functions and thus used as a public place.

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 JUDGEMENT

Considering the evidence on record, the trial Judge has come to a conclusion that the offence punishable under
Section 159 of the IPC cannot be said to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Firstly, that the Idgah ground was
not proved to be a public place and secondly for the reason that there was no breach of public peace by the
scuffle between the accused. The trial Judge has also held that there is nothing on record to show that the
injuries which were caused to the accused, were caused by the accused to each other. Accordingly, the learned
trial Judge has acquitted the accused of the offence punishable under Section 160 of the IPC. It was so
dismissed.

 Bhupesh and Ors.Vs. The State of Maharashtra AIR 2018 CRL.A.180 and 181 of 2016

FACTS

The incident of murder of Jitendra Marotrao Gawande on 10-1-2013 in the Seven Hills Bar and
Restaurant ("the said Bar") at Sakkardara, Nagpur, is not in dispute. The story deposed by Raghuveer
Ramesh Vallabhdas, the Manager of the said Bar, is that on the date of the incident at about 5 to 5.30
p.m., four persons entered the said Bar and one of them came to his counter and made a demand for a
peg (liquor), which he gave it to him in the glass. The other three persons were standing behind him and
all of them were looking outside the door again and again, giving an impression of waiting for
someone's arrival. After some time, a big white car came, from which one person (victim) alighted and
entered the said Bar. There were altercation between the four persons and the victim who came in the
car, which resulted into quarrel. Out of four persons, two persons started assaulting the victim by means
of knife and rest two went outside. The victim, who was assaulted, fell down, the assault continued and
thereafter two assailants left the said Bar and the victim was lying in a pool of blood, the waiters in the
said Bar, were also the eye-witnesses to an incidentRaghuveer informed the incident on phone to the
police. Rupali Bawankar, working as PSI at Sakkardara Police. she found the victim lying in a pool of
blood and he was dead. She arranged two panchas and prepared the inquest panchanama. In the wee
hours of 11-1-2013, the accused Nos. 1 and 2 were arrested and investigation was handed over API
Vitthal Salunke. He arrested the accused No. 3 Laxmikant, accused No. 4 Amol Mandale, and accused
No. 5 Bhupesh alias Rinku Tichkule vide arrest panchanama at Exhibits 176 t0 178.
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 JUDGEMENT

All the accused persons are convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Sections
120-B and 149 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC") apart from the offences under Sections 147, 148, 506-B
and 149 of IPC in relation to the murder of one Jitendra Marotrao Gawande on 10-1-2013 between 5.30
p.m. and 6.30 p.m. in the Seven Hills Bar and Restaurant at Sakkardara, Nagpur. All of them are
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 120-B
and 149 of IPC with fine of Rs. 2,000/-, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year with
fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 147 of IPC, and to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two years for the offences punishable under Sections 506-B and 149 of
IPC with fine of Rs. 5,000/-. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. The accused are held
guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Sections 120B and 149 apart from the
offences under Sections 147, 148 and 506B of IPC. The offences under Section 147 deals with
punishment for rioting, Section 148 deals with rioting, armed with deadly weapon, and Section 149
makes every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common
object. Section 120B of IPC deals with punishment for 'criminal conspiracy', as defined under Section
120A of IPC. therefore, dismiss all these appeals.

CONCLUSION
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The India penal code punishes the offences against the public tranquility. The public tranquility is the criminal
offences and it is injurious to the public peace for the development of the society. The study has the statistical
data about the offences against the public order is different years and discussed systematically. These offences
are injurious to public peace. Disturbing peace in the society creates inconvenience in the society. Tranquility
are the group offences committed by the group of people in the society. As per the provision when a large
number of people are affected then destroys the public peace which may turn into the offence against the public
tranquility. These offences are punished by the IPC strictly and imprisonment is given with fine. Thus the
offences relating to public tranquility are strictly punished by IPC. These offences affect the public peace and
leads to disorder in the society. Thus by the alternative hypothesis the Indian penal code strictly punishes the
offences against public tranquility.

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 BIBLOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

1. The Indian Penal Code, 1860

2. P S A Pillai (Revised by: Dr K I Vibhute) 13th Edition 2017
3. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal ( Revised by: Dr. Varsha Vahini ) Student Edition
4. K.D. Gaur ( Forword by : J. V.N. Khare ) 3rd Edition
5. http://indiankanoon.org.
6. http://www.manupatrafast.in
7. http://www.advocatekhoj.com
8.http://www.livelaw.in

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