CIVIL LAW REVIEW

POST-MIDTERMS DOCTRINES

Calalang-Parulan Respondents (children of Pedro in 1st marriage): In their father’s marriage with their mother
v. Calalang Garcia Encarnacion, the spouses acquired a land from their maternal grandmother. It was not registered.
After Encarnacion died, Pedro married petitioner Elvira and had 2 children, including petitioner
Nora. It was during this time that Pedro filed an application for free patent over the land. Before
(Transmission) Pedro died, he sold the land to Nora. Respondents: sale is void since Pedro failed to obtain the
consent of the respondents who were co-owners. As compulsory heirs upon the death of
Encarnacion, the respondents allege that they acquired successional rights over the land. (wrong)

SC: Having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law after the
dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure
became private property and formed part of Pedro’s exclusive property. As the sole and exclusive
owner, Pedro had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora.

Successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code
provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. It is only upon the death of Pedro that his heirs acquired their respective inheritance ,
entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate.

At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed
upon the heirs of Pedro. Absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not
duly supported by valuable consideration, the respondents have no right to question the sale of
the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares.

Llorente v. CA In 1927, Lorenzo, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula got married
in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen. He then filed a divorce against
Paula in California and the same was granted. He married Alicia and had 3 children with her. He
(Succession from/ executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their children and left
wills of Foreign nothing for Paula and had it probated but he died before the probate proceeding was terminated.
Nationals)

W/N the will is valid? Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo
are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law.
In fact, the will was duly probated. The trial court should note that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional
rights to the decedent's national law.

Ancheta v. Sps. Audrey and Richard were Americans who resided in the PH for 30 years. Their adopted
Guersey-Dalaygon daughter is Kyle. Audrey died and left a will, which designated Richard as her sole heir. It was
probated in the Maryland, USA.

Subsequently, Richard married Candelaria. Audrey’s will was also probated on the PH. Richard
died with a will and left his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his shares in A/G Interiors,
which he left to Kyle. His will was also probated in Maryland, USA and in the PH.

In the Settlement of the Estate of Audrey and in accordance with the partition project made by the
Administrator, Richard received ¾ of the Makati Property, while Kyle received ¼ thereof. In the
Settlement of Richard’s Estate, Richard’s Share in the Makati Property was divided as follows: (a)
⅗ to Children; and (b) ⅖ to Candelaria.

Candelaria opposed the allocation because based on the laws of Maryland, “a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left
his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,
shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to her.

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 Candelaria also appealed the Partition of the Estate of Audrey because the laws of Maryland were
disregarded in the distribution of her Estate, since it was intended that Richard will receive her
entire Estate, and not only ¾.

SC: The failure of the administrator Audrey’s Estate according to the terms of her will and as
dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence, the partition can be the subject
of an Annulment of Judgment.

According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s Will - including the
determination of heirs - is governed by her national law. Furthermore, Art. 1039 provides that
capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

In this case, the administrator failed to introduce evidence of the law of Maryland and merely
relied on PH law. This resulted in the total disregard of Audrey’s will. It was only in the CA that
the pertinent law of Maryland was raised. Since the law was undisputed, then Audrey’s and
Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the
project of partition submitted by the administrator. Hence, the Makati property belongs to
Candelaria.

The Court notes that being aliens, Sps. Audrey and Richard are not eligible to own land.
However, if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid. In this case, it was cured by the transfer to Candelaria.

Palaganas v. Ruperta, the testator, is a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen. She left a will which was
Palaganas executed in California appointing her brother Sergio as executor. Later, Ernesto, another brother,
filed in the RTC Malolos a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will. Ruperta’s nephews opposed
the petition for probate, saying that the will cannot be probated in the Philippines without first
being probated in the place of execution (California USA)

SC: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will
can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known
to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will
has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.

Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death
in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

Ureta v. Ureta Ureta Sr. executed deed of sales in favor of his heirs in order to reduce payment of inheritance tax.
When he died, his heirs executed an extrajudicial partition. However, the heirs of the “buyer”,
wanted to enforce the deed of sales. SC ruled that the sale was absolutely simulated.
(Wills: Definition,
Characteristics)
I

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 The Heirs of the buyer argued that even assuming that Ureta's heirs have an interest in the Deed
of Sale, they would still be precluded from questioning its validity since they must first prove that
the sale substantially diminished their successional rights or that their legitimes would be unduly
prejudiced because according to Article 842 of the Civil Code, "one who has compulsory heirs
may dispose of his estate PROVIDED that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code
with regard to the legitime of said heirs." SC disagreed.

Article 842 refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in the case at
bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, Ureta's heirs need not first prove
that the disposition substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their
legitimes.

II

Ureta’s heirs are contending that the buyer’s heirs were just preterited and hence the co-heirs
should just account for the shares of the preterited heirs. SC disagreed.

Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the inheritance. It
consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter
case. Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at
bench, there is no will involved (but a sale rather). Therefore, preterition cannot apply.

Ortega v. Two years after his arrival from the United States, 80-year old Placido wed 28-year old Josefina. In
Valmonte a little more than two years’ time, Placido died. In his will, he appointed Josefina as his executrix
and bequeathed unto her 1⁄2 of his properties. Leticia opposed the will attacking the mental
capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator
(Testamentary was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
Capacity)

SC: Will is valid. mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age,
will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a
valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he
is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property.

Fraud must be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents
of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the
deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he
would not have made.

Further, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
"because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged
on the same occasion."

Baltazar v. Laxa Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was “magulyan” or forgetful so much
so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed that Paciencia
was not only “magulyan” but was actually suffering from paranoia.
(Testamentary
Capacity)
The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render
him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. A testator is
presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove
otherwise lies on the oppositor.

There was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before
the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind
lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However, no substantial evidence was presented by them

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 to prove the same.

Abada v. Abaja 1. W/N the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the
testator; -

(Notarial Wills;
Formal NO. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language
Requirements) or dialect used in the will.This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-
Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada
knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However,
Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently
proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.

2. W/N the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws; - YES.

An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the
facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. The SC rules to apply the liberal
construction in the probate of Abada's will.

Abada's will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is
reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of
the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for
presentation of evidence aliunde.

The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:

The so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to
serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the
dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the
document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a
probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the
existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law.

Azuela v. CA A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written
is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

In this case, there was admission that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages of
the will. A space was allocated for the insertion of the number of pages, but it was never filled in.
The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the
document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the
testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of
sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the
top of the following sheets or pages.

CONTRA Singson v. Florentino, the court allowed the probate of the will even if the attestation did
not state the number of pages of the will. However, the same was found in the body of the will.

Although the Code allows for substantial compliance under Art. 809, the rule must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself (JBL Reyes).

Omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting
to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to
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 probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the
will itself.

Furthermore, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the
signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the
notary public. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since
the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negates their participation.

The signing of the left-hand margin signifies, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the
page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation
clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation
clause itself.

Lastly, the will is void because of the lack of an acknowledgment. A jurat is not similar to an
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own
free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the
criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance
that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons
he/she had designated in the will.

Lee v. Tambago Manuel Lee charged respondent Atty. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics
of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament. The will only had 2
witnesses and there was an absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial
witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was
attested by only two witnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This
is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code
likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.

Lopez v. Lopez The will is 8-paged but the acknowledgment states that it is only 7 pages. SC disallowed this
stating that it is not substantial compliance.

The substantial compliance rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself i.e. whether all the pages are consecutively
numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But
the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each
other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in
the probate proceedings.

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages

Tanchanco v. Tanchanco is assailing the probate of a will partially on the grounds of noncompliance with the
Santos formalities of wills as the attestation clause omitted the number of pages. Issue: WON probate of

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 will is proper? Yes

Ratio: To constitute substantial compliance in accordance with Art 809, the defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. In the instant case, the attestation
clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages comprising the will. Nevertheless,
the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission by stating that the will has five
pages. This constitutes substantial compliance in accordance with Art 809 of the Civil Code.

Other doctrines:

Fact - Subscribing witnesses were lawyers at the law firm where the notary worked

SC: Immaterial. They are not disqualified under Art 821 even if they all worked at the same law
firm at the time. These lawyers would not risk their professional licenses by knowingly signing a
document which they knew was forged or executed under duress.

Roxas v. de Jesus W/N the date “FEB ./61” in Bibliana’s holographic will validly complies with Art. 810 - YES

(Holographic
wills; formal req)
SC: As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of
its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance.

Rivera v. IAC Jose Rivera claims to be the son of Venancio Rivera who died intestate. Adelaido claims that Jose
is not his father’s son and that his father died with 2 holographic wills.

W/N Jose Rivera can contest the authenticity of the holographic will? NO.

Because he was just a stranger. SC said that Jose Rivera’s father is a different Venancio Rivera
since he did not ask for support from the Venancio Rivera the father of Adelaido. Also the mother
of Jose did not even file for bigamy. Being a total stranger to the family of Venancio Rivera, he
cannot contest the sufficiency and authenticity of the holographic will.

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found
them to have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article
810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses
required under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned. Being a
mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not
have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses

Dy Yieng Seangio Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
v. Reyes conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
(Testamentary property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself . In other
Dispositions) words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

The document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo
to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect

Vda. De Perez v. Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, became American citizens and
Tolete established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. Dr. Cunanan executed a last will
and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the
time of his death "wheresoever situated". In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed

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(Joint Wills) all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. Four
days later, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same
provisions as that of the will of her husband.

Soon after, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that
gutted their home. Evelyn’s (wife) mother filed for reprobate of the will. This was opposed by
Rafael on the ground that New York will should govern.

SC: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:

“Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or
in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside
of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will
has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the
first and law requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. The necessity of
presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

SC: The separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case
at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the
same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical
considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation

Roberts v. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, executed two wills in California. One will disposed of
Leonidas his Philippines estate and the second disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. A court in
Utah admitted to probate the two wills. One of the heirs then filed an INTESTATE proceeding
here in the Philippines. Thereafter, a TESTATE proceeding was filed by another co-heir. In the
(Allowance and testate proceeding, an heir filed a MTD stating that the testate proceeding should be dismissed on
Disallowance of account of a pending intestate proceeding or that, the testate should be consolidated in the
Wills: Mandatory intestate proceeding.
Character)

The MTD should be dismissed. A testate proceeding is proper because Grimm died with two wills
and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.” The
probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be the one that
should consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.

Heirs of Lasam v. In an unlawful detainer case, the MTCC ruled that the heirs of Lasam had a better right to possess
Umengan the subject property on the basis of a will allegedly executed by their mother.

SC held this was wrong. Under Art 838, “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.” Hence, Isabel Cuntapay's last
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 will and testament, which has not been probated, has no effect whatever and petitioners cannot
claim any right thereunder.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder

Maloles v. Phillips Dr. De Santos’ ante mortem probate of his will was granted by Makati RTC Branch 61. He died
days later. De Los Reyes filed for the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 65, which ordered
the consolidation of both cases. Maloles: probate proceedings before Branch 61 did not terminate
(Scope of probate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos and that the proceedings must
proceedings) continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees. (wrong)

SC: In cases for the probate of wills, the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for
the courts to decide after the testator's death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
dispositions. Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos, there was nothing else for
Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will.

Jardeleza v. Sps Ernesto Jardeleza filed an action against Sps Melecio Jardeleza in relation to parcels of land.
Jardeleza The case was raffled to Branch 33. During the pendency of the case, Ernesto (plaintiff) died.
Probate proceedings were commenced in Branch 38 where Teodoro, one of the defendants, was
appointed as administrator of the estate. Teodoro, as the administrator, filed a MTD in the Branch
33 case alleging that Melecio (other defendant) was also an heir of Ernesto (plaintiff), thus the
reconveyance in Branch 33 should be heard by Branch 38. The MTD was granted by Branch 33.

SC ruled that Branch 33 erred in granting the MTD since the jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of a will of
a deceased person and does not extend to the determination of a question of ownership that arises
during the proceedings. Branch 33 failed to consider that any ruling as to ownership by Branch 38,
being a probate court, is merely provisional in character. This is true whether or not the property
is alleged to belong to the estate,

unless the claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they agree to submit the
question for determination by the probate or administration court and the interests of third
parties are not prejudiced;

or unless the purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties should be included in
the inventory, in which case the probate or administration court may decide prima facie the
ownership of the property, but such determination is not final and is without prejudice to the
right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.

Mayor v. Tiu As a rule, the question of ownership was an extraneous matter which the probate court could not
resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should, or
should not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.

It can only determine whether they should, or should not, be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be overseen by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

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 In this case, the subject property was registered in the name of a third person. The probate court
should have recognized the incontestability accorded to the Torrens title. If a property covered by
Torrens title is involved, "the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of
the property itself is in the persons named in the title. Furthermore, a certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. Hence, the property in question should have been excluded.

Ignacio v. Reyes Angel Reyes and Oliva R. Arevalo filed a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
their father Florencio Sr. Thereafter, Teresa became the administratrix and thereafter executed
several lease contracts over properties in Baguio City. Respondents filed before the RTC three
complaints for partition, annulment of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio
properties. They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner
of the properties and leased the same to the other parties without their conformity. They averred
that, as co-owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the properties
aforementioned. RTC manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court
regarding the possible distribution of the subject properties. Intestate Court denied respondent’s
motion. CA annulled order of intestate court.

SC: Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited as it relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of
the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to
belong to the estate.

Furthermore, the doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality" applies
with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.

The co-ownership of the said properties by virtue of the certificates of title is a common issue in
the complaints for partition filed before the Baguio RTC. Thus, the intestate court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction over the subject properties since its
jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. Any decision that the intestate court would render on the title of the properties would at
best be merely provisional in character, and would yield to a final determination in a separate
action.

Gregorio v. The appointed administratrix submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the
Madarang decedent's estate but omitted some lands for the reason that it was donated in favor to one of the
decedent's children during his lifetime.

(Exceptions)
The exclusion is not proper. Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides: "Every compulsory
heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter,
by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition"

By express provision of law then, the lots which was alleged to have been donated by the
decedent and his wife to their son, should not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of
the decedent.

Aranas v. Emigdio (decedent) owned several real properties during his lifetime which he assigned in favor
Mercado of Mervir Realty in exchange for shares of stocks in the latter. When the administratix (wife of
Emigdio and President of Mervir Realty) submitted an inventory of Emigdio’s properties, it
didn’t include such real properties. Upon motion of one of the heirs, the RTC directed the
administratix to conduct a re-inventory and include the real properties, considering that the
properties were still registered in the name of Emigdio and the transfer was made in

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 contemplation of death.

SC: The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator,
but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.

Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

Morales v. Morales prayed for the probate of Alfonso’s will. RTC dismissed: Morales expressly admitted that
Olondriz Francisco (illegitimate son) is an heir of Alfonso; (2) Francisco was clearly omitted from the will;
and (3) based on the evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited.

(exceptions to
scope) SC: The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is limited to
questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will's
formal validity and due execution.

However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.
When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even
before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.

The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition
annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the will,
resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. The decedent's will, no matter how valid it may
appear extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the
intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be superfluous.

Codoy v. Calugay Respondents are devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased. They filed a
petition for the probate with the RTC and they attested to the genuineness and due execution of
the will. Petitioners filed an opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and illegible. Calugay
(Grounds for presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners filed a demurrer to
Disallowance) evidence. RTC granted the demurrer and denied the petition for probate of respondents. CA
reversed the RTC’s ruling citing the decision in the case of Azaola v. Singson which states that
witnesses are not needed in the probate of holographic wills.

SC: Witnesses are needed in the probate of a holographic will. We are convinced, based on the
language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a
mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the
word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility
of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will
is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of
the deceased.

Baltazar v. Laxa In the probate proceedings of the Will of Pacencia, oppositions were filed claiming that: Paciencia
was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute
the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo (sole instituted heir) or by
some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that
assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that
Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.

SC: A testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will and the

Page 10 of 23
 burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies
on those who oppose the probate of her will. The oppositors claim that Pacencia was already
“ulyanin,” when she executed her will. However, the state of being forgetful does not necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind.

The exception to the presumption of sanity - if the testator, one month, or less, before making his
will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must
prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval - does not apply.

To be of sound mind, it shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character
of the testamentary act.

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

The failure of all the subscribing witnesses and the notary public to testify in court is not a ground
for the disallowance of the will. A testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting
witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the
court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although
they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.

JLT Agro Inc. v. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all
Balansag or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the total omission of a
compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. But there is no preterition where the testator
(Preterition) allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a
forced heir

In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter
vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is
premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence
of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs
from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in
the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line. Hence, the total
omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for
preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.

Morales v. ESSENTIALLY: Preterition applies to illegitimate compulsory heirs.

Olondriz

Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies,
devises, or advances on his legitime.

- In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from
the testator's inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.

- In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir,
legatee, or devisee.

- As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless
Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion
of his preterition

Mayuga v. Mayuga alleged that Perfecto (decedent) had left 2 estates with a total area of 574 square meters,
Atienza both located at Odiongan, Romblon; that respondents were able to secure free patents over both
lots based on a “Confirmation Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate” allegedly executed by
Perfecto which confirmed the partition; and that she was preterited.

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(Preterition)

SC: In order that there be preterition, it is essential that the heir must be totally omitted. Total
omission means that the omitted compulsory heir receives nothing under the will, whether as
heir, legatee or devisee, has received nothing by way of donation inter vivos or propter [nuptias],
and will receive nothing by way of intestate succession.

Although Araceli was a compulsory heir in the direct descending line, she could not have been
preterited. Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As contemplated in Article 854, the presence of a will is
necessary. Secondly, before his death, Perfecto had properties in Limon, Rizal which was almost
50 hectares, part of which was developed for residential and agricultural purposes, and in
Odiongan. Araceli could not have been totally excluded in the inheritance of Perfecto even if she
was not allegedly given any share in the disputed two lots.

Rabadilla v. CA Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution
and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the
(Requirements for fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and
Substitution) without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given
any effect.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason
of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease,
incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed
in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.

In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and
to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is
in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the
near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to
preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."
Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will
only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of
the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article
863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix
intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver
100 piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Rabadilla’s inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as
a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the
obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near
descendants. The manner of institution of Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in
nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the
efficacy of such institution.

Ramirez v. (SPANISH YUNG CASE)

Ramirez

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 Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default
of the heir originally instituted."

There are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious,
reciprocal, and fideicommissary. According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four
classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the
fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two."

In this case, the fideicommissary substitution is void because the substitutes are not related to the
first heir. It has been clarified that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from
the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent
of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.

Kilayco v. Tengco The late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento" (in Spanish). She died without any issue
leaving said "testamento" with her niece, Eustaquia Lizares. Eustaquia filed a petition for the
settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the CFI. The court declared the
will probated and appointed Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. After the
finality of the probate and partition, petitioners Kilayko (Sisters of the testator) filed a case for
reconveyance of property given to Eustaquia under the will. They base their claim on a supposed
fideicommissary substitution under the will of Lizares

SC:It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such
heir should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary
substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under
Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator.

In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can
be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally
devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit
the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy

Hilario v. Miranda A Petition for letters of administration was filed involving the properties of decedent. A separate
case was decided which declared that Magdalena was an illegitimate child of decedent. CA ruled
that Magdalena was not an illegitimate child for failure to prove filiation, and thus not an intestate
(Illegitimate heir. SC disagrees.
Children)

Even if Magdalena is an illegitimate child, she is his intestate heir. There is no evidence that
Magdalena was a spurious child. Moreover, Magdalena had been known in the community as one
of Antonio's illegitimate children. The law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment
of his birth. Since the law gave her that status from birth, she had no need to file an action to
establish her filiation. Proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being
questioned.

Imperial v. CA Leoncio had two children: Eloy (illegitimate) and Victor (adopted; legitimate). During his lifetime,
Leoncion conveyed in favor of Eloy a certain property. However, before his death, he filed an
action for the annulment of the sale (in reality a donation). Leoncio and Eloy then entered into a
(Inofficious compromise agreement. Before the judgment could be executed, Leoncio died. Victor was then
Donations) substituted in favor of Leoncio, and he moved for its execution. 15 years after, Victor died and
was survived by natural father, Ricardo. Ricardo then died, and was survived by his children
Cesar and Teresa (private respondents).

Cesar and Ricardo filed an action for the annulment of the sale (donation) between Eloy and
Leoncio, alleging that it impaired the legitime of Victor.

WON the judgment based on the compromise constitutes res judicata, barring the action for
annulment of inofficious donation - NO. No identity of parties and cause of action.

Inofficiousness of donation does not, and could not, form part of Leoncios cause of action in the
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 compromise case. Inofficiousness as a cause of action may arise only upon the death of the donor,
as the value of the donation will then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor -
deceased.

WON the action has prescribed - YES.

No specific prescriptive period is provided for inofficious donations, so the Court applied the
ordinary rules on prescription, specifically that for obligations created by law – 10 years from the
time the cause of action accrues, which in this case, is the donor-decedent’s death. It took private
respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long
prescribed.

Santos v. Alana Santos: Gregorio (their father) donated the 39-sqm lot to him during the lifetime of their father.
Alana: inofficious donation since it was the sole property of their father at the time of his death

(Inofficious
donations) SC: Under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficious if it exceeds this limitation —
no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will.
Inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the donor as the value of donation may then be
contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor deceased.

The donation is inofficious as it impairs respondent's legitime. At the time of Gregorio's death, he
left no property other than the lot now in controversy he donated to petitioner. Gregorio made no
reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and compulsory heir.

Prescriptive period for reduction of donation due to inofficiousness is an action upon an

obligation created by law. The prescriptive period is 10 years reckoned from the death of the
donor-decedent.

Vizconde v. CA Rafael (father) sold Valenzuela Property to Estrelita. Estrelita sold the same. Proceeds earned from
such sale was used to buy a Paranaque property. Vizconde Massacre happened. Estrelita and two
daughters died. Paranaque property given to Lauro petitioner-husband of Estrelita. Rafael died.
(Collation and Respondents want the Paranaque property to be collated because they allege that Estrelita could
Reduction) not have bought the same from their father thus the proceeds which were used to buy the
Paranaque property and the Paranaque property itself are part of the estate of Rafael.

W/N the Paranaque property should be collated? NO. The order of the probate court subjecting
the Parañaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate
proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of
any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. Even on the assumption that collation
is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering
collation of the Parañaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of
deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by
using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply
by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. The order
of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by
Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and
in consideration of P900,000.00, by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no
participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the
Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs.

Doctrines: Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene
in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which
they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the
testator.

Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and
involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the

Page 14 of 23
 decedent.

The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is
presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest making a donation or
gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in
the estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any
expression to the contrary.

Arellano v. Angel died. His heirs are his siblings Amelia, Francsisco, and Pascual. During the Settlement of
Pascual Estate, Francisco and Pascual claims that a parcel of land was donated in favor of Amelia, which
should be considered as an advance on her legitime.

The probate court made a provisional determination that the Donation formed part of the Estate
and is subject to collation.

SC: Collation has two concepts:

1. It is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the
testator to the value of the hereditary estate;

2. It is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the
testator during his lifetime.

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations
may be reduced.

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the
legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.

In this case, the decedent died without any compulsory heir, hence, he was free to donate all his
properties. His donation to Amelia is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable
against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.

Mendoza v. De los
Santos

(Reserva Troncal)

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title;

(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;

Page 15 of 23
 (3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus
by operation of law; and

(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who
belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should
be reserved by the reservor.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the
descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. Article 891 provides
that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant;
rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral relative

Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives

within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the
degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from
which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.

What the RTC should have done, assuming for argument’s sake that reserva troncal is applicable,
is have the reservable nature of the property registered on respondent’s titles. In fact, respondent,
as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on
the title. In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s
wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation.
The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s
rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but
become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.

It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,that a reservatario becomes, by operation

of law, the owner of the reservable property. In any event, the foregoing discussion does not
detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in dispute.

Orendain v. Estate The decedent made a testamentary disposition in her will which contemplated the creation of a
of Rodriguez perpetual trust in which the income from her properties are to be distributed to the beneficiaries
specified in the will. Almost four decades later, petitioners, who were the named beneficiaries of
the trust, moved to dissolve the trust on the ground that it has already been in existence for more
(Intestate than twenty years.
Succession:
Causes; Basic
Principles) The trust was only valid for 20 yrs. Thereafter, intestacy should apply as the decedent did not
institute an heir. Article 960 of the Civil Code provides that legal or intestate succession takes
place when the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trust's
designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties.

Therefore, the trust on the testatrix's properties must be dissolved and this case remanded to the
lower court to determine the the properties constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within
reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and the intestate heirs of the decedent, with the
nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining properties.

Treyes v. Larlar NOTE: 2020 case abandoning prior doctrines

Heirs of Rosie sought to set aside the affidavit of self-adjudication and the consequent TCTs
issued in favor of Dr Treyes. Dr Treyes filed an MTD, contending that the RTC lacks jurisdiction

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(Need for Judicial over the subject matter because the determination of the status of the legal heirs in a separate
Declaration of specpro is a prerequisite to an ordinary suit such as that in this case.
right of
heirs/Proof of
relationship) The Supreme Court abandoned the cases which required a prior determination of heirship in a
separate special proceeding as a prerequisite.

A party does not seek to establish his/her right as an heir because the law itself already
establishes that status. What he/she aims to do is to merely call for the nullification of a deed,
instrument, or conveyance as an enforcement or protection of that right which he/she already
possesses by virtue of law.

The successional rights of the legal heirs of Rosie are not merely contingent or expectant — they
vest upon the death of the decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to institute an action to
protect their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession and are thus real parties in interest
in the instant case. To delay the enforcement of such rights until heirship is determined with
finality in a separate special proceeding would run counter to Article 777 of the Civil Code which
recognizes the vesting of such rights immediately — without a moment's interruption — upon the
death of the decedent.

Thus, it set the rule, as consistent with the law, as follows:

Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate or for the
determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil
action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other
action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the
necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The ruling of the trial
court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the
nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is
binding only between and among the parties.

Delgado v. Rustia Josefa (decedent) and 5 siblings were the children of Felisa and Lucio (not married). Luis was the
child of Felisa and Ramon (also not married so Luis is a half-blood sibling of Josefa and the 5). Josefa
died. Guillermo (husband of Josefa) executed an affidavit of self-adjudication. When Guillermo
(Bar Between died, the full and half siblings of Josefa filed their claims to the estates of Josefa and Guillermo.
Legitimate/Illegiti
mate Relatives)
SC: All the children born to Felisa out of her relations with Ramon and Lucio were her natural
children. The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them.
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate
relatives.

There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent ,
even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding
succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate
brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all
are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.

Here, the siblings of Josefa were related to her by full-blood, except Luis, her half-brother.
Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of
them are entitled to inherit from Josefa. Since Josefa had heirs other than Guillermo, Guillermo
could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself.

Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died leaving her husband Federico & several grandchildren.
Suntay v. Suntay Respondent Isabel filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor where
she only mentioned 4 heirs: Federico, herself, Margarita, and Emilio II. This was opposed by
Federico, adding Emilio III & Nenita to the list of heirs. Federico likewise filed a Manifestation,

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 nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of Cristina's estate on his behalf, in the
event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of administration.
Federico thereafter died. RTC appointed Emilio III as the administrator. Aggrieved, Respondent
appealed before the CA which ruled in her favor.

Issue: Whether or not Emilio III is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent's estate
than Respondent Isabel. JOINT ADMINISTRATION BY EMILIO III & RESPONDENT ISABEL

The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the
opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of
legitimate relatives;

● Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

● Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as
forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;

● Cristina's properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon
her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

● Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latter's estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedent's estate. As Federico's adopted son, Emilio III's interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent as the interest therein of Respondent Isabel.

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e:
love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the
status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child.

Heirs of Arado v. Raymundo and Joaquina were married. They had a son, Nicolas. Nicolas was married to
Alcoran Florencia, however, they did not bear a child. Nicolas had an affair with Francisca, who gave birth
to Anacleto. Anacleto is married to Elenette.

Raymundo, Nicolas, Florencia, and Joaquina died. The Heirs of Joaquina filed a complaint for
recovery of property against Anacleto and Elenete. They claim that Anacleto was a spurious child
of Nicolas and was not recognized during the latter’s lifetime. Hence, Anacleto is not entitled to
inherit. Furthermore, they allege that when Joaquina died, Anacleto cannot inherit from the
former, hence, her collateral relatives should be her heirs.

SC: Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the legitimate
son of Joaquina. Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner,
such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child.

Heirs of The Court is inclined to believe the version of the defendants that indeed Rufmo Mabborang is
Mabborang v. the son of Sofronia Mabborang by her common-law husband Marciano Escobar and not her
Mabborang brother, neither of the son of the spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria Megabong who begot
eight (8) children, among them is Sofronia Mabborang.The Court takes judicial notice of the belief,
superstitious it of Filipinos that in order to save the child from dying sice all its brothers and
sisters had died as in this case, said child shall be registered as having been begotten by another
couple. This happened in the case at bar when Rufmo was registered as the son of the spouses
Severino Mabborang and Maria Megabong, when in truth and in fact the was the illegitimate son
of Sofronia and Marciano, and therefore grandson of the former spouses.

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 In fine, Rufino not being a child of the spouses Severino Mabborang and Megabong his children
the plaintiffs herein, are not entitled to judicial partition as it is evident that their supposed shares
could have been inherited by their father Rufino or grandmother Sofronia.

It is undisputed that Severino Mabborang and Maria Megabong died in 1938 and 1963,
respectively. Upon their death, their property, or their inheritance as defined in Article 776 of the
Civil Code, was transmitted by operation of law to their surviving children, among them,
Sofronia Mabborang who died in 1978. Rufino Mabborang who died in 1962 , having predeceased
Sofronia, his two (2) sons, herein plaintiffs-appellants inherited the share of Sofronia in
accordance with Articles 902 and 990 of the Civil Code.

As stated by the Supreme Court in Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427: Articles
902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children)
who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In
whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate. The determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be
represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is
legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only
his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier
imposed in Article 992.

Rosales v. Rosales W insisted on getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse X, the son of the
deceased Y. She claims that she is a compulsory heir of her mother in law Y, together with her
son, Z.
(Right of
Representation)
W is NOT a compulsory heir, neither in her own right, nor by right of representation. There is no
provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law. ART. 887 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse, in which case the surviving
spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory hair. It does not apply to the estate of a parent in
law. She also cannot assert the right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her
mother-in-law.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only
inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law.

The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law
either by her own right or by the right of representation.

Article 971 explicitly declares that Z is called to succession by law because of his blood
relationship. He does not succeed his father X (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother,Y, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded.

Reyes v. Sotero Lising died intestate. Chichioco, Lising’s niece, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate. This was opposed by Reyes, adopted child of Lising. For
this purpose, she presented the certification issued by the Municipal Registrar where her adoption
(Order of Intestate decree was registered as well as a Judicial form and certification from the Clerk of Court of the
Succession: RTC which decreed her adoption. The decree of adoption and the certification presented were
contested by Lising alleging fraud and falsification of documents.
Descending Line)

SC: She need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had
already presented before the trial court. These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as
part of the official duties that said public officers perform.

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 Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since
the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered. Such
contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of
nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of a decedent’s estate.

Reyes, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from
inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the
proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the
instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our
pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioner’s adoption.

Bagunu v. Piedad Augusto died without direct descendants or ascendants. Court awarded the entire estate to
Pastora (Augusto’s maternal aunt; 3rd civil degree). Ofelia (daughter of Augusto’s first cousin; 5th civil
degree) assails the order.
(Order of intestate
succession:
Collateral SC: Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
Relatives) concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 is an
absolute rule. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones, except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply.

Pastora, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto excludes Ofelia, a
relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent. In fine, a
maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit
equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative,
excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn,
would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.

Arellano v. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
Pascual liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit.

Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they (collateral relatives) shall
succeed the entire estate of the deceased in equal shares.

Heirs of Soliva v. Sps. Ceferino and Juana owned 3 parcels of land. They had 5 children. When they died, Cenon
Soliva took over the administration of their entire Estate. Severino already received his share in the
Estate of Sps. Ceferina and Juana. He did not repudiate the same. Hence, when the remaining
properties were being distributed, he was excluded. Assailing the CA's decision, Antero argues
(Accretion) that the CA erroneously applied Article 1015 inasmuch as Severino did not repudiate the share in
their parents' inheritance which he received in 1959.

SC: No accretion. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to
the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or cannot
receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his coheirs,
co-devisees, or co-legatees.

A careful reading of this CA ruling would show that the share of Severino was "added" to the
shares of the other heirs, not pursuant to the provisions of Accretion. On the contrary, the CA
added Severino’s share to those of the other heirs because it recognized the fact that Severino has
already received his share.

Severino would have received a total of 1,084 square meters as his share. Considering, however,
that he had already received his share in his parents’ estate in 1959, the CA "added" this supposed
share to those of Severino’s co-heirs – Juana, Cenon, Victoriano, Dorotea and Antero. In effect,
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 each of these heirs would be receiving an additional 216.8 square meters in their respective shares
or a total of 1,300.9 square meters. of Ceferino's inheritance in Parcel 2, as Severino was no longer
entitled to share in its partition.

In effect, the CA simply provided for a clearer and detailed picture of how this distributable
portion of Parcel 2 should be computed and how its partition should be effected.

Buhay de Roma v. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
CA mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as
an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
(Collation)

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

Roman Catholic A and B are spouses. Upon A's death, B became co-owners of their property with their children. B
Bishop v. remarried. Upon B's death, the second wife C, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the
Prudencio Estate of B. In this Extrajudicial Partition, C acknowledged that the Property was acquired during
B's first marriage but stated that B had no children with his first wife who would inherit the
property. The Property was eventually sold to D and D sold it to the Roman Catholic.
(Partition)

The Extrajudicial Partition is not binding on the children of B. The Extrajudicial Partition did not
validly pass ownership of the whole Property to C. Thus, she had no right to sell the entire lot.
Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) state that all the
children of the deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should participate in the
settlement of his/her estate.Thus, the children of B in his two marriages should be included in the
execution of the Extrajudicial Partition. The children were deprived of their rightful shares in the
estate. Considering that they have neither knowledge nor participation in the Extrajudicial
Partition, the same is a total nullity. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." The Extrajudicial
Partition is void because its purpose or object was contrary to law, which is to exclude their co-
heirs of their rightful share in the estate.

HOWEVER, the nullity of the Extrajudicial Partition does not automatically result in the nullity of
the sales between C, D, and Roman Catholic. The children and C are co-owners of the property
and therefore have full ownership and rights over their pro indiviso shares.C can sell her
undivided interest over the Property and such disposition shall affect only her pro indiviso share.
Thus, when C sold the whole property, only that part belonging to her was legally and validly
transferred.

Casilang v. An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition
Casilang-Dizon of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds
has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property but
simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners.
(Classes of
Partition;
Requirements) In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground
of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by
parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership
were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their
respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in
and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

Cruz v. Cruz A Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was executed by the 5 siblings agreeing that each heir was to
receive an equal portion of the subject property. Respondents discovered that Antonia had two

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 lots as against one each for the respondents and that Amparo and Antonia were able to perpetrate
the fraud by inducing their sibling Concepcion, who was illiterate (finished only Grade 3
elementary), to sign the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, which was in English and without
previously reading and explaining the contents thereof.

SC: This is a simple case of exclusion in legal succession, where co-heirs were effectively deprived
of their rightful share to the estate of their parents — who died without a will — by virtue of a
defective deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition which granted a bigger share to one of the
heirs and was prepared in such a way that the other heirs would be effectively deprived of
discovering and knowing its contents.

Under the law, "[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares." In this case, two of Concepcion's co-heirs renounced
their shares in the subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the remaining co-heirs, in
equal shares as well.

Mayuga v. Antonio and Benjamin were each granted a Free Patent over two lots. Their sister Arceli filed a
Atienza Petition for Cancellation alleging that their Free Patent was obtained through manipulation and
misrepresentation. She wants the court to have the two lots covered by the Free Patents be
divided into three equal parts among them as legal and forced heirs of deceased Perfecto Atienza.

SC held that an Action for Reconveyance and an Action for Declaration of Nullity of the Free
Patent cannot be pursued simultaneously because the former recognizes title issued pursuant to
the free patent as indefeasible while the latter requires allegation that the title was obtained
through fraud or mistake.

The Action for Declaration of Nullity must fail because the presumption of regularity in the
issuance of the title was not rebutted by Arceli. Her allegation of fraud was bare and self-serving.

The Action for Reconveyance must also fail because she neither alleged that (1) she was the owner
of the land, or possessed it in the concept of owner, nor (2) she was illegally divested of
ownership.

Further, she failed to show and prove that she is entitled to ⅓ of the property. The Confirmation
Affidavit executed by Perfecto was not presented so that the Court could make a determination of
its legal import. Assuming that Perfecto indeed owned the two lots and the Confirmation
Affidavit was a Deed of Partition, Perfecto could have legally partitioned his estate during his
lifetime. Under Article 1080 of the Civil Code, "[s]hould a person make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

Since the Civil Code allows partition inter vivos, it is incumbent upon the compulsory heir
questioning its validity to show that his legitime is impaired. Unfortunately, Araceli has not
shown to what extent the Confirmation Affidavit prejudiced her legitime.

Araceli could not also claim preterition by virtue of the Confirmation Affidavit on the assumption
that the disputed two lots pertained to Perfecto's inheritance, he had only three legal heirs and he
left Araceli with no share in the two lots. Although Araceli was a compulsory heir in the direct
descending line, she could not have been preterited. Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As contemplated
in Art. 854, the presence of a will is necessary. Secondly, before his death, Perfecto had properties
in Rizal and Odiongan. Araceli could not have been totally excluded in the inheritance of Perfecto
even if she was not allegedly given any share in the disputed two lots. If Araceli's share in the
inheritance of Perfecto as claimed by her was indeed impaired, she could have instituted an action
for partition or a settlement of estate proceedings instead of her complaint for cancellation of free
patent and reconveyance.

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