Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
Philippines
Gr No. 179987 April 29, 2009
FACTS
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application
for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot
9864-A, Cad-452-D situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and
peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years.
Aristedes Velazco, witness for Malabanan, testified that the
property originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property
owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons- Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban. Upon
Lino's death, his four sons inherited the property and divided
it among themselves. Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had
become the administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons. Magdalena' son Virgilio succeeded them
in administering the properties. Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle Eduardo Velazco, was the property
sold to Malabanan.
Also submitted as evidence was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject
property was "verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land” on March 15, 1982.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan and
granted his application. The Republic interposed an appeal
to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA reversed the RTC and held that under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession
prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. The CA
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified
that the property was declared alienable and disposable only
on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that
date could not be factored in the computation of the period of
possession. The CA based its interpretation on the Court's
ruling in Republic vs. Herbieto. Counted upon when declared as alienable
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court
of Appeals. Thus, it was the heirs of Malabanan who filed an
appeal before the Supreme Court, relying on the Court's
ruling in Republic v. Naguit, which was handed down just
four months prior to Herbieto. Naguit, petitioners argue,
remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the
property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with
respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title
under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration
Decree.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its slope
is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree or both?
RULING
Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or
mineral lands.
Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural;
(b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for
public and quasi-public uses.
Confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of
"by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through
"judicial legalization."
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D.
No. 1073, provides that private persons may validly seek the
registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain subject to the requisites stated
therein:
Sec. 48. Xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When is the 30 year period counted from?
Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073:
First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed
from possession for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12,
1945 or earlier."
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has not been
repealed by the passage of the Property Registration
Decree

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration
Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public
Land Act has remained in effect. It bears observation that
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (CA 141) is virtually the
same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. It
is Section 14(1) of the Decree that operationalizes the
registration of such lands of the public domain.
It is the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the
substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn,
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes
the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title.
Judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title-
limited period to avail
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section
48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period
within which one may exercise the right to seek registration
under Section 48. The provision has been amended several
times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. Under
the current state of the law, the substantive right granted
under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31
December 2020.
Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed
The [OSG] suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne
out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12,
1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and
not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is
in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of
the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property. (Republic v. Naguit)
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section
14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary
pronouncement in Herbieto absurdly limits the application of
the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only
cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior
to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before
that date.
Herbieto and Buenaventura rulings in relation to Section
14(1) are considered obiter
There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Court's acknowledgment that the particular line of
argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed
obiter.
In the subsequent case of Buenaventura, the Court, citing
Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior
to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of
possession..." That statement, in the context of Section
14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as
cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter.
On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in
Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein
the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's
interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the
resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit
or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section
14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
Proof that the land subject of an application for
What is needed to prove alienable? registration is alienable
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, Malabanan presented a certification issued by
the CENRO-DENR stating that the lots involved were "found
to be within the alienable and disposable per map xxx dated
December 9, 1980.” This is sufficient evidence to show the
real character of the land subject of the application. Further,
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence. In the present case, no
opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to
contest the application of appellees on the ground that the
property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land.
Ownership of patrimonial lands by prescription
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil
Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil
Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the
acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public
domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to
acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or
mineral lands.
Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary
prescription of ten (10) years, or through extraordinary
prescription of thirty (30) years. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith, as well as just
title.
Ownership by extraordinary prescription
There are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year
rule:
(1) The first source is Republic Act No. 1942, enacted in
1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable
public lands through possession in the concept of an owner
for at least 30 years. This provision was repealed in 1977
with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12
June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have
invoked the 30-year rule introduced by RA 1942.
(2) The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at
least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription
under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription
under the Civil Code-ordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article
1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse
possession... for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith."
The first source of the 30-year period rule, RA 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for
the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription
under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2).
An express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property has been converted into patrimonial
is required, otherwise, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains incapable of
acquisition by prescription
Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State." For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can
begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law. This
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State,
although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such
and ought to be used only by the Government.
Possession of public dominion property before it
becomes patrimonial cannot be counted for purposes of
prescription
Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to
the Civil Code. As the application for registration under
Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription
under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion
property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify registration.
Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary
prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot
be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But
after the property has been become patrimonial, the period
of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once
the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into
private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods
prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the
property by operation of the Civil Code.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency.
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the
basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is
extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the
Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Section
14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration
allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such
intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
Just title
There are indispensable requisites for ordinary acquisitive
prescription — good faith and just title. The ascertainment of
good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and
528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, provisions that
more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the
purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right."
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission
of ownership, and which would have actually transferred
ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or
defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in
payment. (Tolentino)
Rules of registration and ownership under Section 14(1)
vis-a-vis Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree
Once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the
registration of the property under the Torrens system. It
should be remembered that registration of property is not a
mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
(ownership acquired by judicial confirmation of
imperfect title)
Since Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
(ownership acquired by acquisitive prescription)

Under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode

of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.

Malabanan has not acquired ownership of the lands

either under Section 14(1) nor Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree
The evidence is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidence-the Tax Declarations they presented in
particular-is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as

basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.