JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT by Atty. Anselmo S.

Rodiel IV
1. Concepts
1. Judicial power
1. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice:
1. To settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable (TRADITIONAL CONCEPT); and
2. To determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (EXPANDED POWER)
(Sec. 1(2), Art. VIII)
2. Who exercises judicial power?
1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. (Sec. 1(1), Art. VIII)
2. The Court, sitting en banc or in Division, acts as a collegial body
as it exercises judicial power through the collective action of its
individual members. (FASAP v PAL, 2018)
3. Although the Chief Justice is “primus inter pares,” he cannot
legally decide/overturn a case on his own. (Complaint of Arrienda
Against Justice Puno, 2005)
1. “Primus inter pares” means the first among equals.
2. Judicial review
1. Judicial review means the power of the courts to test the validity of
executive or legislative acts in light of their conformity with the
Constitution. (Angara v Electoral Commission, 1936)
2. From the requisites of judicial review, the first two are the most
important. (Belgica vs. Ochoa)
3. Requisites (ALEL)
1. Actual case or controversy (COSCo - Conflict of legal rights;
Opposite legal claims; Susceptible of judicial resolution;
COnjectural)
1. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is
one which involves a CONFLICT of legal rights, an assertion
of OPPOSITE legal claims, SUSCEPTIBLE of judicial
resolution.
2. It cannot be conjectural or anticipatory, or that which seeks
to resolve hypothetical cases/cases based on assumptions/
render advisory opinions.
3. Related to this is the requirement of "ripeness.” Hence, it is a
prerequisite that an act had been performed by either branch,
causing adverse effects on the individual challenging it,
 3.

before a court may come into the picture." (Francisco v HOR,

2003)
4. Also, the case must not be moot or academic. A moot and
academic case is one that CEASES to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of SUPERVENING EVENTS, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. (Gunsi v
Commissioners, 2009)
1. Exceptions: (VPGR)
1. Grave Violation of the Constitution;
2. Paramount Public interest;
3. Guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
4. Capable of Repeating yet evading review. (Garcia v
Executive Secretary, 2009)
1. There are two (2) factors to be considered
before a case is deemed one capable of repetition
yet evading review:
1. Evading - The challenged action is in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to
its cessation or expiration; and
2. Repeating - There is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action
(Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 223505, October 3, 2017).
2. Locus standi
1. He must have a PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement
2. Exceptions:
1. Transcendental importance - the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed when public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance.
2. Facial challenges involving free speech - Such as void-
for-vagueness and overbreadth. The rule on locus standi
does not apply. (Spouses Romualdez v COMELEC,
Separate Opinion, Carpio)
3. Third party standing - Requisites: (ICA - Injury; Close
relation; Ability hindrance of 3rd party)
1. Injury suffered by litigant - The litigant must suffer
an injury-in-fact, giving him or her a "sufficiently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
1.

dispute
2. Close relation to party in interest - The litigant must
have Close relation to a third party (who has that
personal and substantial interest)
3. No ability - Hindrance to third party’s ABILITY to
protect his right/interest
1. Illustration of third party standing: White Light
Corporation v City of Manila, 2009
1. In this case, there is a challenge on Ordinance
7774, which is an ordinance prohibiting short-
time admission in hotels/motels/inns
2. Here, the motel owners are the litigants. The
third parties are the customers of the motels.
3. Injury - There is injury-in-fact on the motel
owners because their income suffered
because of the ordinance. It is clear that the
business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely
on the patronage of their customers for their
continued viability which appears to be
threatened by the enforcement of the
Ordinance.
4. Close relation - there is close relation
between the motel owner and the customers
(who are the persons with personal and
substantial interest)
5. Hindrance/No ability to protect their rights
- There is hindrance on the part of the
customers because people would be reluctant
in filing the petition due to suspicion from
their partners.
2. Another illustration of third party standing:
Craig v Boren
1. The United States Supreme Court held that a
licensed beverage vendor has standing to
raise the equal protection claim of a male
customer challenging a statutory scheme
prohibiting the sale of beer to males under
the age of 21 and to females under the age of
18. The United States High Court explained
that the vendors had standing "by acting as
advocates of the rights of third parties who
seek access to their market or function.
 4. Citizen - when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
5. Taxpayer - he is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
1. When is taxpayer suit available?
1. Tax law
2. Expenditure of public funds
6. Legislator - he is allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.
3. Earliest possible opportunity
1. As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal. This rule, which is subject to exceptions, is applicable
to criminal cases. (Robb v People, 1939)
1. The Supreme Court has held that the requirement that the
constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity
refers ONLY to raising the issue in a competent court.
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman before which
proceedings against Hipolito were had is not a competent
court but only an administrative body. Hence, Hipolito
may still raise the issue of constitutionality before the
Court of Appeals. (Estarija v Ranada, 2006)
4. Lis mota
1. Lis mota means the MAIN ISSUE OF THE CASE.
2. It is a well-settled maxim that an issue of constitutionality
should be AVOIDED whenever possible, unless it is very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
5. Previous petitions challenging the intended burial of the mortal
remains of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani were dismissed
by the Supreme Court. Marcos was finally laid to rest at the LNMB
around noontime of Nov 18, 2016. Petitioners argue that the burial
of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the
effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of
revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the
abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the
letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post-
 dictatorship charter" and a "human rights constitution." Does the
Court have authority to check and override the President’s
decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB?
1. No, Court has no authority to check and override the
President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB. The
President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in
accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Judicial power covers only the recognition, review or
reversal of the policy crafted by the political departments
if and when a case is brought before it on the ground of
illegality, unconstitutionality or GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION (i.e., blatant abuse of power or capricious
exercise thereof). The determination of the wisdom,
fairness, soundness, justice, equitableness or expediency
of a statute or what "ought to be" as a MATTER OF POLICY
is within the realm of and should be addressed to the
legislature. If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-
determining branches of the government, specifically the duly
elected representatives who carry the mandate of the popular
will, may be exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect
positive changes. No matter how well- meaning, the Court can
only air its views in the hope that Congress would take notice
(Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017).
1. The answer is in the meaning of judicial power, not in the
requisites of judicial review.
2. Remember that judicial review are just requisites in
order to determine if the Court will hear the petition.
3. The judicial power is the legal basis to determine if the
law/governmental act will be held unconstitutional,
i.e., grave abuse of discretion.
6. One day after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9372 "An Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,"
Samahang XYZ filed a petition assailing the said law’s
constitutionality. XYZ alleged that they were tagged as militant
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and the National People’s Army (NPA). In addition, they
claim that sporadic “surveillance” is being conducted in their
persons. The tagging, according to them, is tantamount to the
effects of proscription without following the procedure under the
law. Will the petition prosper?
1. No, the petition will not prosper because petitioners fail to
present an actual case or controversy.
2. The power of judicial review has four requisites: (a) there must
 2.
be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
3. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. A reasonable certainty
of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional
interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a
constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the
Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.
4. Here, petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic
"surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist
fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution.
From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function (Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc v. Anti-Terrorism
Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
4. Operative fact doctrine (EPUE - EFFECTS of unconstitutional law,
PRIOR to declaration, is UNDISTURBED for EQUITY/FAIR)
1. The operative fact doctrine provides that, when a law or
governmental act is declared unconstitutional, its EFFECTS, prior
to the declaration, may be left UNDISTURBED as a matter of
EQUITY and fair play. (League of Cities v COMELEC, 2010)
2. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. (Yap v Thenamaris, 2011)
1. Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) issue
1. We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the
adoption and implementation of the DAP. Unless the
doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser
and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients
could be required to undo everything that they had
implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario
would be enormously burdensome for the Government.
Equity alleviates such burden. (Araullo v Aquino III, 2014)
3. Congress passed RA No. 1234, providing that producers of certain
graded films be entitled to incentives equivalent to the
amusement tax imposed and collected on the graded films by
cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and other highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines.
Under Sec. 14 thereof, all revenue from the amusement tax on the
 graded film shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors,
operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within
30 days from the termination of the exhibition to the Philippine
Film Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax
to the producers of the graded film within 15 days from receipt
thereof. Such legislative grant of tax incentives was however
declared by law to be unconstitutional, having been enacted in
violation of local fiscal autonomy. On the date of finality of the
decision, the Cebu City alone is entitled to the taxes which it
should have collected under the Local Government Code.
The City of Cebu argues that a law which is declared
unconstitutional produces no effect and is deemed not to have
been enacted at all. Thus, the Philippine Film Council and the
producers must remit the taxes due to all LGUs. However, the
latter argue that they should not be required to refund under the
doctrine of operative fact. Decide.
1. Philippine Film Council and the producers are correct. It is a
well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it;
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. An exception to the above rule, however, is
the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It applies when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Here, to order the return of all
the amounts remitted to the Film Council and given to the
producers of graded films, by all of the covered cities, actually
amounts to hundreds of millions, if not billions. To order the
Film Council and producers to refund the incentives would
certainly impose a heavy, and possibly crippling, financial
burden upon them who merely, and presumably in good faith,
complied with the legislative fiat subject of this case (Film
Development Council of the Philippines vs. Colon Heritage
Realty Corp., G.R. No. 203754, October 15, 2019,
Resolution)
5. Political question doctrine
1. Political question is a question of policy or wisdom (exercised by
the PEOPLE (political) or DEPARTMENT (discretionary)).
(Congressman Garcia v Executive Secretary, 2009)
1. It is to be exercised by the PEOPLE in their primary political
capacity, or
2. It has been specifically delegated to some other
DEPARTMENT, with DISCRETIONARY power to act. (Tañada v
 2.

Cuenco, 1957)
2. As a rule, political questions cannot be interfered with by courts.
3. As exception, when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, it becomes a
justiciable question.
1. It has been settled that the expanded certiorari or prohibition
is the proper remedy to question the act. (Jardeleza v Sereno,
2014)
1. An example of grave abuse of discretion is infringing upon
the freedom of speech. (Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC,
2015, Leonen)
4. Does judicial restraint apply in our courts?
1. No, because the Court would be shirking from its DUTY
vested under Art. VIII. Hence, the Court must exercise the
power of judicial review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. (Francisco v HOR, 2003)
2. Judicial independence and autonomy; Constitutional Safeguards
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by
Legislature
2. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment
(Sec. 2, Art. XI) or a petition for quo warranto against an illegible public
official for acts committed prior to the appointment. (Republic v Sereno,
2018)
1. From 1986 to 2006, X served as a member of the faculty of the ABC
University College of Law, a state university. While being employed as
such, X was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
government in two international arbitrations from 2003 to 2006. After
a break from government service, X was appointed Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court in 2010. When the position of the Chief Justice
was declared vacant in 2012, X was required to submit all previous
SALNs (up to December 31, 2011). However, X submitted only the
SALNs from the end of 2009 up to December 31, 2011 when he was
appointed Associate Justice. And in lieu of his SALNs from his
previous government service, he submitted a clearance from ABC
University College of Law, attesting that he has been cleared from all
administrative responsibilities and accountabilities. According to X, his
government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, and
thus it is reasonable to consider them impossible to be retrieved.
Nonetheless, X’s nomination has been accepted. He was appointed as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 2012. In 2017, an impeachment
complaint was filed by Atty. Y against Chief Justice X, alleging that he
failed to make truthful declarations in his SALNs. Meanwhile, the
Office of the Solicitor General initiated a quo warranto proceeding
 against Chief Justice X on the ground that the latter failed to show
that he is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3),
Article VIII of the Constitution. Is a quo warranto proceeding a proper
remedy to remove Chief Justice X, an impeachable officer?
1. Yes, Chief Justice X may be removed via a quo warranto
proceeding. Sec. 2 of Art. XI of the Constitution provides that The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment. The
term “may” denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having
a mandatory effect. Therefore, the Constitution allows the
institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable
officer. The rule therefore is that an act or omission committed
prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official's qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo
warranto petition. However, acts or omissions, even if it relates to
the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but which may either be impeachment
if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018). In this case, Chief Justice X was
shown to have been remiss in submitting all his SALNs prior to or
at the time of his appointment, which failure goes into the very
qualification of integrity. Hence, Chief Justice X may be removed
via a quo warranto petition.
3. The Supreme Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction under Sec. 5
(Sec. 2, Art. VIII)
4. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when undermines
security of tenure (Sec. 2, Art. VIII) The treatment is different from
executive departments because the judiciary is independent.
5. Its appellate jurisdiction cannot be increased without its advice and
concurrence. (Sec. 30, Art. VI)
1. Sec. 14 of the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770) is unconstitutional
2. Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
 3. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure question of law.
4. The first paragraph is ineffective because it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. Under the Constitution, the Court has the power
to “promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.”
Hence, the issuance of an injunction, which is a provisional remedy to
protect or enforce rights, cannot be prohibited by law. Otherwise, the
Congress will encroach upon the rule-making authority of the Court,
which will then violate the doctrine of separation of powers. (Morales
v CA and Binay, 2015)
5. The second paragraph is unconstitutional because it increased the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice or
concurrence. (Morales v CA and Binay, 2015)
6. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all its courts and
personnel thereof. (Sec. 6, Art. VIII)
7. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline the judges/
justices of inferior courts. (Sec. 11, Art. VIII)
1. The first clause, which is “shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts,” did NOT intend that all administrative disciplinary cases
should be heard by the Court en banc. This would result in an
absurdity. Hence, if they are not for dismissal, they can be heard in
division.
2. The second clause is “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations.” In this
instance of dismissal, the administrative case must be deliberated
upon and decided by the Court en banc itself. (People v Judge Gacott,
1995)
8. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure (Sec. 2(2), Art.
VIII)
9. Appointments to the Judiciary are always permanent. Temporary/Acting
appointments can undermine the independence of the Judiciary. (De
Castro v JBC, 2010)
10. Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy
11. Appropriations cannot be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year; After approval, they shall be
automatically and regularly released
12. The salaries of justices and judges cannot be decreased during their
tenure;
13. The members of the Judiciary cannot be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII)
This does not include ex-officio positions held by Justices.
14. The Supreme Court, alone, has the power to promulgate rules for
pleading, practice, procedure in all courts, admission to the practice of
law, and the Integrated Bar. (Estipona v Lobrigo, 2017)
15. The Supreme Court may order temporarily detail of judges
16. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary, in accordance with Civil Service Law (Sec. 5(6), Art. VIII) This
means appointees OTHER than justices and judges.
1. “Administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof”
1. Hence, the President cannot remove justices, judges, and court
personnel from their position. Only the Supreme Court has that
power.
2. The Court ruled that the Ombudsman may NOT initiate or
investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office
against the judge. He must first indorse/defer the case to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action. (Fuentes v Ombudsman-
Mindanao, 2001)
3. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine
for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and
court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved
therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For,
aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this
matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for
and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court,
because in determining whether an administrative matter is
involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities
but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in
the case of Maceda v. Vasquez. (Judge Caoibes v Ombudsman,
2001)
1. Hence, if a person files an administrative case against a judge
or court personnel with the Ombudsman, the same must be
dismissed. (Maceda v Vasquez, 1993)
4. The House of Representatives Committee on Good Government
and Public Accountability (House Committee) conducted an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, pertaining to the use by the Provincial
Government of Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on
locally manufactured virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other
than that provided for by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7171. When they
refused to answer or when they answered that they could no
longer remember, they were cited in contempt and ordered
detained. Petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondent House Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General before
the CA. While the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before
the CA, petitioners filed an Omnibus Petition with the Supreme
Court. Petitioners insist that the Habeas Corpus Petition then
pending before the CA can be transferred to the Court stressing
that the Court exercises administrative supervision over all courts
as provided under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Further, citing People of the Philippines v. Gutierrez, et al.,
petitioners likewise argue that the administrative power of the
Court to transfer cases from one court to another is based on its
inherent power to protect the judiciary and prevent a miscarriage
of justice. Are the petitioners correct?
1. No. The Court's administrative supervision over lower
courts does not equate to the power to usurp jurisdiction
already acquired by lower courts. Jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus and the adjunct authority to
issue the writ are shared by the Supreme Court and the
lower courts. However, petitioners are without unbridled
freedom to choose which between this Court and the CA
should decide the habeas corpus petition. Mere
concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford the parties
absolute freedom to choose the court to which the
petition shall be filed. After all, the hierarchy of courts "also
serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs.”
2. Administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the
operations of agencies to ensure that they are managed
effectively, efficiently and economically, but without
interference with day-to-day activities. Thus, to effectively
exercise its power of administrative supervision over all courts
as prescribed by the Constitution, Presidential Decree No.
828, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 842, created the
Office of the Court Administrator. Nowhere in the functions of
the several offices in the Office of the Court Administrator is it
provided that the Court can assume jurisdiction over a case
already pending with another court.
3. The import of the Court's pronouncement in Gutierrez is the
recognition of the incidental and inherent power of the Court
to transfer the trial of cases from one court to another of
equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
 3.

securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a

miscarriage of justice, so demands. Such incidental and
inherent power cannot be interpreted to mean an authority on
the part of the Court to determine which court should hear
specific cases without running afoul with the doctrine of
separation of powers between the Judiciary and the
Legislative (Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. Fariñas, et al., G.R. No.
232395, July 3, 2018).
2. “Fiscal autonomy” contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize the resources with the wisdom and dispatch that
their needs require. In short, fiscal autonomy means freedom from
outside control.
1. Thus, the Court En Banc can determine and decide the who, what,
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the Court’s granted power. Any kind of interference
violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary.
(Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of
the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, 2012)
2. As example, vetoing an item in the appropriations bill for the
pension fund of the Judiciary violates fiscal autonomy. Why?
Because that President touched/controlled/interfered with the
funds of Judiciary.
3. “Promulgate rules concerting pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts”
1. The provision prohibiting the issuance of injunction by any court
other than the Supreme Court is unconstitutional because a) the
Congress encroached upon the rule-making authority of the Court
and b) it violated the separation of powers. (Morales v CA and
Binay, 2015)
2. The prohibition on plea-bargaining in drug cases is
unconstitutional. Why? Plea bargaining has been defined as "a
process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval."
3. Hence, plea-bargaining is a matter of procedure, and RA 9165, in
prohibiting plea-bargaining, encroached into the rule-making
power of the Court. (Estipona v Lobrigo, 2017)
4. “Promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law, and the Integrated Bar”
1. The LEB imposed a requirement that law students must become
interns before they take the Bar. Is this valid?
 1. No. It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another
requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship program, is
imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This
requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law
and admissions thereto. (Pimentel v LEB, 2019)
2. The LEB was given the power by RA 7662 for “continuing legal
education.” Is this valid?
1. No. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses, the same
encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the Integrated Bar, which includes the education
of lawyers. The mandatory continuing legal education of the
members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850,
promulgated by the Supreme Court. (Pimentel v LEB, 2019)
3. Can LEB prescribe minimum standards for admission to legal
education?
1. Yes. The LEB's power to prescribe admission requirements
refers only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college
of law and not to the practice of law. Hence, the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court was not encroached.
(Pimentel v LEB, 2019)
4. Does the PHILSAT violate the authority to promulgate rules
admission to the practice of law?
1. No. As stated, minimum standards for admission to school or
college of law does not encroach upon the rule-making power
of the Court (Pimentel v LEB, 2019) However, it violates the
academic freedom of educational institutions.
3. Appointments to the Judiciary
1. Qualifications of members of Judiciary
1. For Justice of Supreme Court: (N-40-15-CIPI)
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. At least 40 years of age; and
3. At least 15 years as a judge or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines.
4. Proven Competence, Integrity, Probity, and Independence. (Sec.
7, Art. VIII)
2. Should a justice of lower collegiate court be a natural-born citizen?
1. Yes, as provided by Sec. 7, Art. VIII)
3. Should a judge be a natural-born citizen?
1. Yes, as provided by BP 129.
4. Competence - he knows the law
5. Integrity - Integrity contemplates both adherence to the highest moral
 5.
standards and obedience to laws and legislations. (Republic v Sereno,
2018)
6. Probity - honesty and decency (Oxford Dictionary)
7. Independence - he is free from outside control
2. Judicial and Bar Council
1. Composition (7)
1. Ex officio members - Chief Justice (Chairman), DOJ Secretary,
and Representative from Congress
2. Regular members - Retired Justice of the Supreme Court, law
Professor, representative of the Integrated Bar, and representative
from the Private Sector.
1. Only 1 member from both Houses may sit in the JBC. The
tenor of Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII is unmistakeable. (Chavez v JBC,
2013)
2. The regular members of the JBC shall be appointed by the
President, with the consent of the CoA. (Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII)
2. Powers
1. The JBC has the principal function of recommending appointees
to the Judiciary. It may exercise other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign. (Sec. 8(5), Art. VIII)
1. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
(Sec. 9, Art. VIII)
2. It shall also recommend appointees to the Office of the
Ombudsman and his 5 deputies. (Sec. 9, Art. XI)
3. The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring
that it complies with its own rules.
1. The JBC is an independent constitutional body. (Villanueva v
JBC, 2015)
2. The Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its
assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to
use to determine who to recommend.
3. However, the Court can, under its power of supervision, direct
the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being
performed. (De Castro v JBC, 2010)
4. Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained away by the JBC
1. Hence, despite the nomination of the JBC, a person who was
appointed as Justice without proven integrity can be removed
by quo warranto. (Republic v Sereno, 2018)
 5. The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star
and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an
announcement calling for applications or recommendations for 6
vacant positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. After
screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to the
President 6 separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for
the 6 vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. However, X, who was a
nominee for the 6th vacancy, was instead appointed by the
President to the 1st vacancy. The nominees for the 1st vacancy,
after having been bypassed, assailed the President’s appointment
of X to the first vacancy, insisting that the President could only
choose one nominee from each of the 6 separate shortlists
submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and no other, and
that any appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a
violation of the Constitution. Is the argument correct?
1. No, the argument is not correct. Under Sec. 9, Art. VIII of the
Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges
of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. The power to recommend of the
JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power
to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone
whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in
the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the
President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid.
Here, although X was nominated for the 6th vacancy, his
appointment to the 1st vacancy is not unconstitutional as he
was nonetheless appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the JBC. Hence, the
argument is not correct (Aguinaldo v. His Excellency President
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302, November 29,
2016).
4. The Supreme Court
1. Composition (15)
1. 1 Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof. (Sec. 4(1), Art.
VIII)
2. Powers and functions
1. SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
 1.

certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas

corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue.
4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.
3. Spouses H and W filed Petitions for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer
for TRO and a subsequent Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Supreme Court in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Both Petitions were
assigned to the Supreme Court’s First Division and were raffled to then
Justice X. Despite the lapse of more than five (5) years, Justice X failed to
decide on both Petitions of Spouses. Spouses maintain that Justice X’s
failure to promptly act within 24 months on the Petitions resulted in a
violation of the spouses’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of their
cases. Are the Spouses correct?
1. No. Both the 1987 Constitution (under Article VIII, Section 15) and
 1.
the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court state that the 24-month
period for deciding on or resolving a case is reckoned from the
date of its submission for resolution. This 24-month period does
not run immediately upon the filing of a petition before this Court,
but only when the last pleading, brief, or memorandum has been
submitted. A provision of similar import was written under Article X,
Section11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. It has been ruled in several
jurisprudence that this constitutional provision was merely directory in
nature so that noncompliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment. If the statute had intended such result, it would clearly have
indicated it (Re: Complaint-Affidavit of Elvira N. Enalbes, A.M. No.
18-11-09-SC, January 22, 2019, J. Leonen).
4. QUESTION: Is the decision of the division of the SC appealable to the SC
En Banc?
1. No.
2. Decision of the division of the SC is not appealable to the SC en banc.
3. Decision of a division is actually a decision of the SC.
4. GITO: The Division can establish judicial precedents.