People v. Tibayan, G.R. Nos.
209655-60, [January In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals
14, 2015]
FACTS:
Tibayan Group Investment Company,Inc. (TGICI) is
an open-end investment company registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In
2002, SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and
its subsidiaries. TGICI was selling securities to the
public without a registration statement in violation of
Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as "The
Securities Regulation Code," and that TGICI
submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit before the
SEC. Thus, SEC revoked TGICI’s corporate
registration for being fraudulently procured. The
foregoing led to the filing of multiple criminal cases for
Syndicated Estafa against the incorporators and
directors of TGICI. According to the prosecution,
private complainants were enticed to invest in TGICI
due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the
assurance that they will recover their
investments. After giving their money to TGICI,
private complainants received a Certificate of Share
and post-dated checks, representing the amount of
the principal investment and the monthly interest
earnings, respectively. Upon encashment, the checks
were dishonored, as the account was already closed,
prompting private complainants to bring the bounced
checks to the TGICI office to demand payment.
TGICI office closed down without private
complainants having been paid and, thus, they were
constrained to file criminal complaints against the
incorporators and directors of TGICI.
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having
conspired with the other TGICI incorporators to
defraud private complainants.
RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting
Tibayan of 13 counts and Puerto of 11 counts of
Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of
the RPC in relation to PD 1689. CA modified accused
appellants’ conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa.
ISSUE: WON the accused-appellants were guilty of
syndicated estafa?
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
The elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or
other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315
and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or
swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or
more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
"samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.
TGICI’s modus operandiof inducing the public to
invest in it on the undertaking that their investment
would be returned with a very high monthly interest
rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-
5.5%). Under such lucrative promise, the investing
public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI.
However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI
knew from the start that TGICI is operating withoutany
paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can
pay the assured profits to its investors, they cannot
comply with their guarantee and had to simply
abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA
correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the
other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to
engage ina Ponzi scheme, resulting in the
defraudation of the TGICI investors.
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment
fraud that involves the payment of purported returns
to existing investors from funds contributed by new
investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by
promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to
generate high returns with little or no risk. In many
Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting
new money to make promised payments to earlier-
stage investors to create the false appearance that
investors are profiting from a legitimate business. It is
not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme,
which works only as long as there is an ever
increasing number of new investors joining the
scheme. It is difficult to sustain the scheme over a
long period of time because the operator needs an
ever larger pool of later investors to continue paying
the promised profits toearly investors. The idea
behind this type of swindle is that the "con-man"
collects his money from his second or third round of
investors and then absconds before anyone else
shows up to collect. Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only
last weeks, or months at the most.
In this light, it is clear that all the elements of
Syndicated Esta/a, committed through a Ponzi
scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a)
the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more
than five (5) people, including herein accused-
appellants, made false pretenses and representations
to the investing public - in this case, the private
complainants - regarding a supposed lucrative
investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit
money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same,
private complainants invested their hard earned
money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors
of TGICI ended up running away with the private
complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's
prejudice.
Gonzaga v. People, G.R. No. 195671, [January 21,
2015]
FACTS:
Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his
motorcycle to bring his two (2) minor children,
Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry
Inguito (Cherry), to school. While they were
ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their
proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota
Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser)driven by Rogelio was
swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite
direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his
motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its
proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. In order to
avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left,
but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the
same direction and collided head-on with the
motorcycle.
Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the
motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the
Land Cruiser, while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were
thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on
the side of the road causing injuries to their legs.
Siblings Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann Aquino, who
were traversing the same road aboard their own
motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims
togetheron the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy.
Bocboc, while Rogelio remained inside the Land
Cruiser.
The victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital
of Maramag where they were treated. Operations
were performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and
Dionesio, Sr., but the latter eventually expired.
Cherry’s leg was placed in a cast and she was
confined in the hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr.
The provincial prosecutor filed an Information
charging Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property "with the aggravating
circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot
to the injured party such help that was in his hands to
give. In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was
driving the Land Cruiser on his proper lane.
RTC found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property punishable under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263 of the RPC, but was
reconsidered reducing penalty to four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, with the same civil liabilities. CA reinstated
the original Decision wherein he was imposed penalty
of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight(8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as
maximum, and the same civil liabilities.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly reinstated the RTC’s
original Decision?
HELD/RATIO: No.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the
RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the
negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that
there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained
of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the
act must be something more than a mere negligence
in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required.
Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of
others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes
has been held to involve a conscious choice of a
course of action which injures another, either with
knowledgeof serious danger to others involved, or
with knowledge of facts which would disclose the
danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the
inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious
indifference to the consequences of the conduct
which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of
mere negligence and imprudence under the operation
of the penal law, without regard to whether the private
offended party may himself be considered likewise at
fault.
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly
found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the
wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of
the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr.
and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and
Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred
was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc
where the Inguitos were bound and descending
towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was
going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such
circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As
a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary
care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of
speed commensurate with the conditions
encountered, as this would enable him to keep the
vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using
the highway.
Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2) years,
driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
may appear from the opposite direction at any minimum of said penalty should be taken from arresto
moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
other circumstances such as the occurrence of the its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1)
accident on or near a curve, as in this case, day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
constitutes negligence. Consequently, the Court finds Consequently, the Court finds a need to modify the
that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus,
driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
while approaching the curve where the incident two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum,
happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional in its
aswell as civilly accountable for the material damages maximum, as maximum.
resulting therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA and
the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the
collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA
Decision made no mention as to the presence or
absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph
of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty
next higher in degreeupon the offender who "fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as
may be in his hands to give." Based on case law, the
obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on
the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type
and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and
place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b)
requires adequate proof.

The Court has perused the records and found

contradictory testimonies presented by the
prosecution and the defense on this
matter.1âwphi1 Considering however, that Cherry
herself admitted that the victims were first loaded on
the Land Cruiser before they were transferred to Kgd.
Dadivas’s vehicle, the Court is inclined to sustain
Rogelio’s claim that he tried to extend help to the
victims, but when he started the engine with the
intention to go to the hospital, he discovered that the
vehicle had no brakes. Hence, in imposing the proper
penalty on the accused, the qualifying circumstance
under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC
should not be considered.

Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of

Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of
the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC
provides that when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime, in this case,
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.

Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless

imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle results in the
death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall
be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in
People v. Balute y Villanueva, G.R. No. 212932,
[January 21, 2015]
FACTS:
SPO1 Manaois was on board his owner-type jeepney
with his wife Cristita and daughter Blesilda. While the
vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted area due to
heavy traffic, two (2) malepersons, later on identified
as Balute and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster),
suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, with
Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and
saying "putang ina, ilabas mo!" Thereafter, Balute
grabbed SPO1 Manaois’s mobile phone from the
latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of
his torso. SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his own
firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was
unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to the
ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital
where he died despite undergoing surgical operation
and medical intervention.
Information was filed before the RTC charging Balute
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
In his defense, Balute denied having any knowledge
of the charges against him.1âwphi1 He maintained,
inter alia, that he was at the shop of a certain Leticia
Nicol (Nicol) wherein he worked as a pedicab welder.
RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, CA
affirmed Balute’s conviction with modification in that:
(a) the aggravating circumstance of treachery was no
longer considered as the prosecution failed to allege
the same in the Information; (b) the civil indemnity
was increased to ₱75,000.00 in view of existing
jurisprudence; (c) the ₱6,000.00 compensatory
damages, representing the value of the mobile phone,
was deleted in the absence of competent proofof its
value, and in lieu thereof, actual damages in the
aggregate amount of ₱140,413.53 representing SPO1
Manaois’s hospital and funeral expenseswas awarded
to his heirs; and (d) all the monetary awards for
damages are with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) p.a. from the date of finality of the CA Decision
until fully paid.
ISSUE: WON CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction
for Robbery with Homicide?
HELD/RATIO: Yes
In People v. Ibañez, the Court exhaustively explained
that "[a] special complex crime of robbery with
homicide takes place when a homicide is committed
either by reason,or on the occasion, of the robbery.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1)
the taking of personal property belonging to another;
(2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as
used in its generic sense, was committed. A
conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor
and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but
the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery." Homicide is said to have been committed by
reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it
was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the
escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession
by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of
the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s
finding that the prosecution was able to establish the
fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took
the latter’s mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him,
resulting in his death despite surgical and medical
intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and
Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the one
who committed the crime as opposed to the latter’s
denial and alibi which was correctly considered by
both the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving,
as it is well-settled that "alibi and denial are
outweighed by positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive
on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the
matter." This is especially true when the eyewitnesses
are the relatives of the victim – such as Cristita and
Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1
Manaois, respectively – since "[t]he natural interest of
witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing
the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them
from implicating persons other than the true culprits."
In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted
Balute of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the
RPC, as amended. However, the Court deems it
appropriate to adjust the award of moral damages
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 in order to conform
with prevailing jurisprudence. Further, the Court also
awards exemplary damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00 in favor of the heirs of SPO1 Manaois due
to the highly reprehensible and/or outrageous conduct
of Balute in committing the aforesaid crime.
People v. Sumili, G.R. No. 212160, [February 4,
2015]
FACTS:
PDEA received a report from a confidential informant
that Sumili was selling shabu. Acting on the same,
SPO2 Edgardo Englatiera (SPO2 Englatiera)
dispatched SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug (SPO2
Cabahug) to conduct surveillance on Sumili, which
confirmed the truth and veracity of the aforesaid
report. The buy-bust team headed to the target area.
Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached Sumili’s
house to buy shabu. After Sumili let the poseur-buyer
in, the latter gave the pre-arranged signal that the
sale has been consummated. Almost immediately, the
buy-bust team stormed the house but Sumili escaped
by jumping through the window, throwing the marked
money at the roof beside his house. The poseur-
buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to
SPO2 Englatiera, who marked the same with "DC-1,"
representing the initials of SPO2 Cabahug. SPO2
Englatiera then prepared a request for laboratory
examination and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel
Carlito Ong (NUP Ong) to bring the sachet together
with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so on
the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was
already closed. It was only two (2) days after the buy-
bust operation, that NUP Ong was able to bring and
turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Upon examination, it was confirmed that
said sachet contained 0.32 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
In his defense, Sumili denied selling shabu. He and
his daughter claimed that he was a fishball vendor,
and that on the date and time of the incident, he was
at the market buying ingredients.
RTC found Sumili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and
accordingly, sentenced him to life imprisonment, and
ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of
₱500,000.00.
The RTC found that a buy-bust operation indeed
occurred where Sumili sold the seized sachet to the
poseur-buyer. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: whether Sumili’s conviction for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld?
HELD/RATIO: No.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
following elements must concur: (a) the identities of
the buyer and the seller, object, and consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
corresponding payment for it. As the dangerous drug
itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus
delicti of the crime, it is thereforeessential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able
to account for each link in the chain of custody over
the dangerous drug, fromthe moment it was seized
from the accused up to the time it was presented in
court as proof of the corpus delicti.Elucidating on the
custodial chain process, the Court, in the case of
People v. Cervantes [(600 Phil. 819, 836 [2009])],
held:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be.1âwphi1In context, this
would ideally include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’ possession,
the condition in which it was received, and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain. x x x.
To expand, Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the
"chain of custody rule" outlining the procedure that the
apprehending officers should follow in handling the
seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and
evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the
apprehending team that has initial custody over the
seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and
take photographs of the same in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom such items were
seized, orthe accused’s or the person’s representative
or counsel, a representative from the media, the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official
who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and
(b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for
examination purposes. While the "chain of custody
rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid
officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as
jurisprudence nevertheless provide that
noncompliance with the requirements of thisrule will
not automatically render the seizure and custody of
the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance; AND(b)
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. Hence, any divergence from the
prescribed procedure must be justified and should not
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds
that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of
the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili due
to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus,
militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

xxx

NUP Ong failed to do [bring the sachet to PNP Crime

Laboratory] within 24 hours after the buy-bust
operation as he only delivered the sachet to the PNP
Crime Laboratory on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days
after the buy-bust operation.No other than SPO2
Englatiera and NUP Ong attested to these facts
intheir respective testimonies xxx

To justify the delay inthe turn-over of the corpus

delicti, SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong insist that the
PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed on June 7,
2006, and since it was a Friday, the delivery of the
seized sachet was only done on June 9, 2006.
However, contrary to their claims, June 7, 2006 is not
a Friday, but a Wednesday. Thus, if the PNP Crime
Laboratory was indeed closed on June 7, 2006, the
delivery of the seized sachet could have easily been
done on the next day, or on June 8, 2006, instead of
doing it two (2) days after the buy-bust operation. This
glaring fact, coupled with the absence in the records
as to who among the apprehending officers had
actual custody of the seized sachet from the time it
was prepared for turn-over until its delivery to the
PNP Crime Laboratory, presents a substantial and
unexplained gap in the chain of custody of the alleged
shabu seized from Sumili. Undoubtedly, the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.

It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions

involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs
which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls
for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that
they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the
acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable
doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this case.

In sum, since the identity of the prohibited drugs had

not been established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, Sumili's conviction must be immediately set
aside.
People v. Palma y Varcas, G.R. No. 212151
(Resolution), [February 18, 2015]
FACTS:
Jay Hinlo a.k.a. "Inday Kabang" (Hinlo), Palma,
Senido, Pedroso, and one Joemarie Dumagat
(Dumagat) were drinking at the house of Senido when
the latter informed the others of the plan to rob the
house of Spouses Freddie (Freddie) and Judy Ann
(Judy Ann) Clavel (Sps. Clavel). Palma, Senido, and
Hinlo were tasked to enter the house, Dumagat would
act as a look-out at the back of the house where a
sugar cane field was located, and Pedroso would wait
at the highway with a tricycle.
As they entered the compound of the house, they
destroyed the knob of the kitchen door and gained
entry where they took certain valuable items including
video compact discs, a microphone and two leather
bags. Freddie woke up to go to the bathroom which
was located outside his bedroom and as he opened
the bathroom door, Senido, who was hiding inside,
assaulted him and the two wrestled. Then, Hinlo
approached Freddie and with the use of a bladed
weapon, stabbed the latter on his abdomen which led
to his untimely demise. Thereafter, Palma, Senido,
Pedroso, Hinlo, and Dumagat hurriedly escaped and
left behind part of the items they took on the railroad
located behind the property. Shortly thereafter, the
police arrived and recovered the two leather bags
where the compact discs and microphone were
placed.
An Information was filed charging Palma, Senido,
Pedroso, Hinlo, and Dumagat with the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. Dumagat
was discharged as an accused to be a state witness.
In their defense, Palma and Senido denied having
any knowledge of the charges against them.
RTC convicted accused-appellants as charged and,
accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. CA affirmed accused-appellants’
conviction and ordered the immediate arrest of Hinlo
who remains at large.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly upheld the conviction
of accused-appellants for Robbery with Homicide?
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
In People v. Uy, the Court explained that the elements
for the crime of robbery with homicide are: (a) the
taking of personal property is committed with violence
or intimidation against persons; (b) the property
belongs to another; (c) the taking is animo lucrandi or
with intent to gain; and (d) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, homicide was
committed.1âwphi1 A conviction requires that the
robbery is the main purpose and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life, but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s
conclusions finding that accused-appellants were all
armed with knives when they broke into the house of
the Sps. Clavel, took certain personal properties, and,
in the course thereof, stabbed Freddie, resulting to his
death. This is supported by the testimony of the state
witness, Dumagat, who presented a detailed,
consistent, and credible narrative of the incident and
positively identified accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime.
It is settled that the positive identification of accused-
appellants prevails over their defense of alibi
considering that in this jurisdiction the latter is
considered as inherently weak and, thus, cannot
outweigh the testimony of eyewitnesses establishing
that accused-appellants committed the crime.
Moreover, conspiracy having been established, when
a homicide takes place by reason of or on occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
whether they actually participated in the killing, unless
there is proof that there was an endeavour to prevent
the killing.
In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted
herein accused-appellants as charged and
accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the
accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.
With respect to the crime for which herein accused-
appellants are convicted, civil indemnity in the amount
of ₱75,000.00 is granted without need of evidence
other than the commission of the crime, moral
damages in the sum of ₱75,000.00 is granted
automatically in the absence of any qualifying
aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the
sum of ₱30,000.00 is granted where the
circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible conduct of the offenders, and where the
amount of actual damages for funeral expenses
cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts
to prove them, temperate damages in the sum of
₱25,000.00 may be granted in lieu thereof. In
addition, the Court also imposes on all the monetary
awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
People v. Casas y Vintulan, G.R. No. 212565,
[February 25, 2015]
FACTS:
Casas, accompanied by a certain "Ron-Ron" (Ron-
Ron), went to a certain taho factory looking for a
certain Jesus. Failing to find the person he was
looking for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck it into
a pail used for making taho. Consequently, Eligio, an
employee of the taho factory, confronted Casas,
saying to the latter, "Benjie[(referring to Casas)], bakit
ang yabang mo? Kung hindi mo makita ang kalaban
mo, dapat hanapin mo na lang." Casas replied "Gusto
mo ito? (referring to his knife)." Eligio told Casas to
get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron.
Eligio and Casas then had a fistfight. During the
ensuing melee, Casas took the knife from Ron-Ron
and stabbed Eligio twice while the latter was fleeing.
Casas, during his continued pursuit of Eligio, then ran
into Joel, who, for his part, tried to help Eligio with the
use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face
first on the floor, and was prostrate. There and then,
Casas stabbed him twice, the first blow entering his
back and exiting at the front of his torso, and the
second blow hitting the left side of his abdomen.
Casas managed to overtake Eligio, and stabbed him
again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill
him, Eligio grabbed a plastic stool and hit Casas on
the head with it, forcing the latter to drop the knife and
cease the attack.
PO1 Silverio R. Fuentes (PO1 Fuentes) claimed that
he was riding his motorcycle on the date of the
incident when he met PO3 Eduardo Fronda (PO3
Fronda) who asked for assistance as the latter saw a
bloodied male. The two immediately proceeded
towards the victim, who turned out to be Casas, and
asked him what happened. The latter replied that he
had just stabbed someone. After confirming that there
was indeed a stabbing incident nearby, PO1 Fuentes
and PO3 Fronda arrested Casas.
Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the
RTC charging Casas of the Murder of Joel Tabile y
Gulla4 (Joel) and the Frustrated Murder of Eligio5 Ruiz
y Ricardo6 (Eligio). Casas admitted that he stabbed
both Joel and Eligio but interposed self-defense to
justify his actions. RTC convicted Casas of Murder (of
Joel) and Attempted Homicide (of Eligio). CA affirmed
conviction.
ISSUE: WON Casas’s conviction for the crimes of
Murder and Attempted Homicide should be upheld?
HELD/RATIO: Not entirely. He is guilty of Homicide
(of Joel) and Attempted Homicide (of Eligio).
Essentially, Casas, in a sudden change of theory from
the denial of his demurrer, banks on the justifying
circumstance of self-defense in order to overturn his
conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted
Homicide. The statutory basis therefor is Article 11 (1)
of the RPC which reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.— The following do
not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
After a careful review of the records, the Court is
satisfied that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
correctly pronounced that the above-mentioned
requirements were not present in this case. It is
significant to point out that upon invoking the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, Casas assumed the
burden of proving the justification of his act with clear
and convincing evidence. This is because his having
admitted the killing required him to rely on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of
the prosecution’s evidence, which, even if it were
weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his
admission.
Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful
aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which is
a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law
puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim
committed unlawful aggression against the person
who resorted to self-defense. As shown by the
records, it was Casas who was actually the
aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife,
brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay
prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was
fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and
overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot
successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression.
Verily, for unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude,29 as against the
one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary
happened in this case.
xxx
This notwithstanding, the Court, however, disagrees
that Casas should be convicted of the crime of Murder
with respect to the incidents in Crim. Case No.
136842, i.e., the death of Joel, considering the
prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of
treachery. The Court expounds. The elements of
Murder that the prosecution must establish are: (a)
that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed
him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated
in Article 248 is treachery.1âwphi1 Under Article 14 of
the RPC, "[t]here is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." In
other words, to appreciate treachery, it must be
shown that: (a) the means of execution employed
gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed, treachery
cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
In People v. Se, the Court explained that the essence
of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and
unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest
provocation on the latter’s part. The victim must not
have known the peril he was exposed to at the
moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that
the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in,
and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed
as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of
treachery cannot be appreciated.
xxx
In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued
between Eligio and Casas. Joel, seeing that Casas
had stabbed Eligio, wanted to help the latter by using
a bamboo pole but slipped and fell. As he was lying
prostrate on the floor, Casas delivered the blows that
ended Joel’s life. Under these circumstances, it is the
Court’s observation that Joel was fully aware of the
danger posed in assisting Eligio. xxx Further, acting in
the heat of the moment, and there being no showing
that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from
Joel’s mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the
assailant’s careful reflection, it does not equally
appear that Casas deliberately adopted means in
order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate. Palpably, Casas just happened to
stab Joel as the latter had just slipped on the floor
when the former caught up with him (Joel). Evidently,
this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well
as Joel’s obvious awareness of the danger to his life,
prompts this Court to discount treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. Thus, the Court downgrades
the conviction to the crime of Homicide.
xxx
 In consequence, Casas is instead meted with the
penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with all the concomitant
accessory penalties, for the Homicide of Joel.
The downgrading of Casas’s conviction results in the
deletion of the award of ₱30,000.00 in exemplary
damages. Further, keeping with recent jurisprudence,
the Court is impelled to increase the award of moral
damages from ₱30,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, as well as
delete the award of ₱12,500.00 in actual damages
and, in lieu thereof, award temperate damages in the
higher amount of ₱25,000.00. The Court also
perceives error in the award of ₱37,200.00 in loss of
earning capacity since the established formula thereof
was incorrectly applied.
The formula for the computation of loss of earning
capacity is as follows:
Net earning capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross
Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross
annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the
age of the deceased).
Thus, operating under the established facts as found
by the RTC that Joel was 22 when he was killed by
Casas, and that he had monthly salary of 1,000.00 to
1,500.00 as a utility man, the loss of earning capacity
is computed as such:
Net earning capacity = [2/3(80-22)] x [(1500
x 12) - ((1,500 x 12) x 50%)]
= [2/3(58)] x [₱18,000.00 -
₱9,000.00]
= ₱348,000.00
Accordingly, the award of loss of earning capacity is
increased from ₱37,200.00 to ₱348,000.00 as above-
computed. Meanwhile, the civil indemnity award of
₱75,000.00 stands.
In similar light, the Court modifies the award of moral
damages in Attempted Homicide from ₱10,000.00 to
₱20,000.00 to conform with recent jurisprudence.
Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded, in
both Crim. Case, from the date of finality of judgment
until fully paid.
Benabaye v. People, G.R. No. 203466, [February
25, 2015]
FACTS:
Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye was the Loans
Bookkeeper of Siam Bank Inc. As such, she was
authorized to collect and/or accept loan payments of
Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional receipts
therefor, accomplish a cash transfer slip at the end of
each banking day detailing the amounts of money that
she has received, and remit such payments to Jenkin
U. Tupag (Tupag), her supervisor.
Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan
transactions and thereby found out that fraud and
certain irregularities attended the same. Specifically, it
discovered the non-remittance of some loan
payments received from its clients based on the
provisional receipts issued by its account officers, as
well as the daily collection reports corresponding to
the said provisional receipts. Based on the audit, 853
provisional receipts in the aggregate amount of
₱470,768.00 were issued by Benabaye but were
unreported, and, more significantly, the corresponding
payments were unremitted based on the daily
collection reports on file.
Siam Bank directed Benabaye to explain, among
others, the discrepancies between the provisional
receipts she had issued and the unremitted money
involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final demand
upon her to return the amount of the money involved.
Siam Bank Terminated the employment of both
Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently filed a
criminal case for Estafa before the RTC.
RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b ), and sentenced each of them to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum and ordered to indemnify Siam Bank the
total amount of ₱688,833.00 as actual damages. CA
sustained Benabaye’s conviction.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in sustaining Benabaye's
conviction for the crime of Estafa through
misappropriation?
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
The elements of Estafa under this provision are: (a)
the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the
money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property; (c) the misappropriation,
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (d) demand by the offended party that the
offender return the money or property received.
In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first
element of Estafa through misappropriation has not
been established, insisting that her possession of the
collected loan payments was merely material and not
juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted of the
said crime.
The Court agrees.
Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector
of loan payments from Siam Bank's
clients.1âwphi1 At the end of every banking day, she
was required to remit all cash payments received
together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to
her supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely
passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof
only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an
employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary
cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank
teller, she had no juridical possession over the
missing funds but only their physical or material
possession.
In Chua-Burce v. CA, the Court acquitted therein
petitioner Cristeta Chua-Burce (Chua-Burce) of Estafa
on the ground that the element of juridical possession
was absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court
ruled that she had no juridical possession over the
missing funds.
xxx
Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds
and not, in any manner, an agent who could have
asserted a right against Siam Bank over the same,
Benabaye had only acquired material and not juridical
possession of such funds and consequently, cannot
be convicted of the crime of Estafa as charged. In
fine, the dismissal of the Estafa charge against
Benabaye should come as a matter of course, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charge against her as may be warranted
under the circumstances of this case.
Separately, in light of the foregoing, Benabaye's
supervisor and co-accused in this case, Tupag, who
likewise was not appointed as an agent of Siam Bank
and thus had no juridical possession of the subject
sums, must also be discharged of the same Estafa
charge in view of Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [re: Effect of
appeal by any of several accused.]
People v. Sorin y Tagaylo, G.R. No. 212635,
[March 25, 2015]
FACTS:
PNP intelligence section chief of El Salvador, Misamis
Oriental received a report that Sorin was selling illegal
drugs at his residence; a test-buy was conducted by
the PNP where Sorin sold illegal drugs to a civilian
asset.
The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. PO2
Dador and PO1 Cambangay approached Sorin’s
residence, knocked on the door, and were eventually
let in. They asked if they could buy shabu, and Sorin
responded that each sachet costs 200.00. PO2 Dador
offered to purchase two (2) sachets. After examining
said sachets, each containing white crystalline
substance, PO2 Dador gave Sorin the 400.00 marked
money. PO2 Dador then tapped Sorin on the
shoulder, brought him outside the house where he
and the rest of the buy-bust team introduced
themselves as police officers, and arrested Sorin. The
latter was then brought to the police station.
At the police station, PO2 Dador turned over the
seized items and the marked money to SPO1 Mugot,
who marked the same, prepared the inventory and
request for laboratory examination, and sent the
seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The PNP Crime Laboratory tested the following items:
(a) the sachets seized from Sorin during the buy-bust
operation for the presence of illegal drugs; (b) Sorin’s
hands and the marked money used to purchase the
aforementioned illegal drugs for ultraviolet fluorescent
powder; and (c) Sorin’s urine for the presence of
illegal drugs. The seized sachets tested positive
for shabu, while Sorin’s hands and the marked money
used contained traces of ultraviolet fluorescent
powder. Also, Sorin’s urine tested positive for the
presence of shabu.
For his part, Sorin claimed that the sachets
of shabu were planted by the police officers, and that
no buy-bust operation occurred.
RTC and CA found Sorin guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
ISSUE: WON conviction for violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld?
HELD/RATIO: No.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed
to establish the identity of the substance allegedly
confiscated from Sorin due to unjustified gaps in the
chain of custody, thus warranting his acquittal.
Records bear out that PO2 Dador, i.e., the
apprehending officer who seized the sachets from
Sorin during the buy-bust operation conducted on
November 2, 2005, failed to mark the same and,
instead, turned them over unmarked to SPO1
Mugotwho was the one who conducted the marking;
prepared the request for laboratory examination of the
seized sachets, Sorin’s urine, and the marked money;
delivered the said request, together with the seized
sachets and marked money, to the PNP Crime
Laboratory; and later received the examination
results. PO2 Dador had, in fact, admitted that the
sachets he seized from Sorin were not even marked
in his presence.
xxx We are not unaware that the seized plastic
sachet already bore the markings "BC 02-01-04"
when it was examined by Forensic Chemist
Jabonillo.1avvphi1 In the absence, however, of
specifics on how, when and where this marking was
done and who witnessed the marking procedure, we
cannot accept this marking as compliance with the
required chain of custody requirement. There was
also no stipulation between the parties regarding the
circumstances surrounding this marking. We note in
this regard that it is not enough that the seized drug
be marked; the marking must likewise be made in the
presence of the apprehended violator. As earlier
stated, the police did not at any time ever hint that
they marked the seized drug.
In this case, SPO1 Mugot admitted that he did not
mark the plastic sachets which contained the seized
drugs, but instead placed the marking on the
"transparent plastic cellophane" wherein he placed
the seized sachets. To the Court’s mind, the act of
marking only the cellophane and not the individual
plastic sachets renders the corpus delictihighly
susceptible to tampering, switching, planting, and
contamination of the evidence – the very acts which
the requirement of marking seeks to prevent. As the
cellophane passed hands, it can now no longer be
determined with certainty that its contents have
remained intact, especially considering the dearth of
testimony from SPO1 Mugot that the cellophane was
tightly sealed or, at the very least, secured.
With these lapses unveiled from the foregoing
testimonies, the Court is unconvinced that the chain
of custody rule had been substantially complied with.
Not only did the apprehending officer who had initial
custody over the seized drugs, i.e., PO2 Dador, fail to
mark the same or even witness its alleged marking,
but also the officer to which the marking of the seized
items was attributed to, i.e., SPO1 Mugot, himself
disclaimed that he had done such marking and
admitted that he only marked a transparent plastic
cellophane container, and not the individual sachets
PO2 Dador had turned-over to him containing the
seized drugs themselves. Thus, there is no
gainsaying that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised.
People v. Matibag y De Villa, G.R. No. 206381,
[March 25, 2015]
FACTS:
Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan (Duhan), who just came
from a meeting with the other officers of the
homeowners’ association of Twin Villa Subdivision,
was when Matibag confronted Duhan, and
asked, "ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?" Duhan
replied "wala," and without warning, Matibag delivered
a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and causing
him to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his
gun and shot Duhan, who fell face-first on the
pavement. While Duhan remained in that position,
Matibag shot him several more times. PO2 Tom
Falejo, positively identified Matibag and stated on
record that he arrested the latter.
Matibag was charged with murder with the special
aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed
firearm.
RTC convicted Matibag as charged. CA agreed with
the RTC’s findings that: (a) treachery attended the
killing of Duhan as the attack on him was sudden; and
(b) an unlicensed firearm was used in committing the
crime, which is considered as a special aggravating
circumstance.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly upheld the conviction
of Matibag for Murder?
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution must
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a
person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her;
(c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC;
and (d) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that
Matibag, who was armed with a gun, confronted
Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and
shot him on the chest. Although the attack was
frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which
it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to
defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed.
Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange
of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn
Duhan against any impending attack from his
assailant.=The deliberateness of Matibag’s act is
further evinced from his disposition preceding the
moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out,
Matibag was ready and destined to effect such
dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind
when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that
he did so, armed with a loaded handgun. Based on
these findings, the Court concludes that treachery
was correctly appreciated.
This finding of treachery further correlates to
Matibag’s plea of self- defense. Note that by invoking
self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the
commission of the act for which he was charged,
albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of
proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of
Duhan was attended by the following circumstances:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.
xxx
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag
assaulted Duhan negates unlawful aggression in the
sense above-discussed. As mentioned, the
prosecution was able to prove that the attack was so
sudden and unexpected, and the victim was
completely defenseless. On the other hand, Matibag’s
version that he saw Duhan pull something from his
waist (which thereby impelled his reaction), remained
uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered
from the victim. Hence, by these accounts, Matibag’s
allegation of unlawful aggression and, consequently,
his plea of self-defense cannot be sustained. The
foregoing considered, the Court upholds Matibag’s
conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, as charged.
Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information,
should be appreciated in the imposition of penalty.
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, treats the unauthorized
use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the
crimes of homicide or murder as a special
aggravating circumstance.
Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his
firearm, the use thereof was unauthorized under the
purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a
special aggravating circumstance. As a result, the
imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is
reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA
9346, stands proper. To this, the Court adds that
Matibag is not eligible for parole.
People v. Samuya, G.R. No. 213214 (Resolution),
[April 20, 2015]
FACTS:
Florenio Castro (Florenio), Anthony Dumalaog
(Anthony), Jonel Samuya (Jonel), and the victim,
Gabriel Samonte (Gabriel), were sitting outside
Florenio's when Rudy arrived and asked where "Nat-
Nat" was. When Anthony replied that "Nat-Nat" wasn't
there, Rudy approached Anthony and cocked a gun at
him. At that point, Eugene arrived and, without any
warning, shot Gabriel in the chest. Gabriel was able to
run away, and as Eugene was chasing him, Florenio
heard another gunshot. Moments later, Eugene
returned alone and left together with Rudy. Florenio
tried to contact Gabriel and when the latter did not
respond, Florenio went to look for him. Eventually,
Gabriel was found dead in a kangkong swamp.
In his defense, Eugene admitted shooting Gabriel but
claimed that he merely acted in self-defense.
Meanwhile, Rudy denied seeing Gabriel's alleged
attacked on Eugene and admitted that he only heard
the gunshot and saw Eugene holding a gun.
Eugene and Rudy Samuya (Rudy) were charged with
the crime of Murder.
long after. Thus, in view of the long-standing principle
that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect,
the Court concludes that treachery was correctly
appreciated.
xxx
The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic
requirement in a plea of self-defense, either to justify
the commission of a crime or to mitigate the
imposable penalty. Xxx
Here, Eugene claims that he saw Gabriel rushing
towards his direction, armed with a knife. Fearing that
Gabriel was going to attack him, he pulled his own
gun and shot the victim. However, as duly observed
by the RTC and the CA, Eugene's account of events
remained uncorroborated as no witness was ever
presented to support his story. In fact, his co-accused,
Rudy, even denied seeing Gabriel rush towards them,
brandish a knife, and threaten to attack Eugene.
Thus, apart from Eugene's self-serving testimony,
nothing on record supports his claim that Gabriel was
about to attack him.1âwphi1 On this score, Eugene's
plea of self-defense - whether as a justifying or as a
mitigating circumstance - should fail.

RTC convicted Eugene as charged; Rudy, on the

other hand, was acquitted on account of the
prosecution's failure to prove that he conspired with
Eugene in shooting Gabriel. CA affirmed Eugene’s
conviction.

ISSUE: WON CA correctly upheld Eugene's

conviction for Murder?

HELD/RATIO: Yes

In order to convict a person charged with the crime of

Murder, the prosecution must establish beyond
reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the
accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not
constitute Parricide or Infanticide.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that

Eugene's attack on Gabriel was so swift and sudden,
and without any warning. Eyewitnesses testified that
immediately upon his arrival and without any
exchange of words, Eugene pulled out his gun and
shot Gabriel. As the RTC and CA aptly pointed out,
although the attack was frontal, it was so sudden and
unexpected which made it impossible for Gabriel to
defend himself The gunshot wound on Gabriel's chest
caused massive bleeding which led to his death not
People v. Balcueva y Bondocoy, G.R. No. 214466
(Resolution), [July 1, 2015]
FACTS:
AAA just returned home from school and since
Balcueva (father) did not want her to leave the house,
she decided to just take an afternoon nap. At that
time, Balcueva asked AAA's siblings to leave the
house and thereafter, approached AAA who was lying
in bed, removed her shorts and underwear, and
threatened to spank her if she told anybody about this
incident. Balcueva then removed his shorts and
underwear, mounted AAA, restrained her hands, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA resisted and
even told Balcueva that she was having her
menstruation, but Balcueva simply told her to keep
quiet and that it was better as she will not get
pregnant. While Balcueva was ravishing AAA, the
latter's sister sought the help of their neighbor, who
then peeped through a hole, interrupting Balcueva in
his dastardly act. Thereafter, AAA's sister and their
neighbor reported the incident to the barangay hall,
which led to Balcueva's apprehension.
As correctly ruled, AAA's clear, categorical, and
unwavering testimony reveals that she was indeed
raped by Balcueva, her own father.1âwphi1 Suffice it
to say that Balcueva's flimsy defense of denial and
alibi cannot prevail over AAA's positive and
categorical testimony and identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crime. Verily, a young girl would not
concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at
the hands of her very own father, allow the
examination of her private part, and subject herself to
the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her
motive was other than a fervent desire to seek
justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA
would testify against her own father, imputing to him
the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen.
Anent the penalty to be imposed on Balcueva, the R
TC and the CA properly sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole

For his part, Balcueva interposed the defense of

denial and alibi.

A criminal information was filed before the RTC

charging Balcueva of raping his biological daughter.

RTC found Balcueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of Qualified Rape and accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON Balcueva's conviction for Qualified

Rape should be upheld?

HELD/RATIO: Yes.

The elements of Qualified Rape under the foregoing

provisions are as follows: (a) the victim is a female
over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim either through force,
threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.

A perusal of the. records discloses the presence of

the aforesaid elements in this case. Thus, the RTC
and the CA committed no reversible error in
convicting Balcueva of the crime of Qualified Rape.
Comerciante y Gonzales v. People, G.R. No.
205926, [July 22, 2015]
FACTS:
Agent Radan of the NARCOTICS group and P03
Calag were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area
while on their way to visit a friend. Cruising at a speed
of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two men -
later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick
Dasilla  (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper
and unpleasant movements," with one of them
handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the
sachets may contain shabu, they immediately
stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla At
a distance of around five meters, P03 Calag
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested
Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance from
them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that
said sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. 
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a
demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC,
thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's
failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC
considered his right to do so waived and ordered him
to present his evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag
was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a
notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he
and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a
jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken
to a police station.
RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165,
and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine in
the amount of ₱300,000.00. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's
conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
9165?
HELD/RATIO: No.
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) [Rule
113] to operate, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and ( b) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.  On the
other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact
just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of
the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely
required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself
witnesses the crime; while in Section (b), he knows
for a fact that a crime has just been committed. 
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant
case reveals that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag
himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour
when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing
around and showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he
decided to effect an arrest.
Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even
assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to
identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a
distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per
hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets
held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no
other overt act could be properly attributed to
Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03
Calag that the former had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily,
the acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter cannot in any
way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if
Comerciante and his companion were showing
"improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03
Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in
order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
As to stop and frisk allegation of law enforcers:
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s
acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter do not constitute
criminal acts.1âwphi1 These circumstances are not
enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal
activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for
P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the
former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made
on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest
nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized
from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since
the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.