JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA

The Muslim Personal Law, Shariat Application Act, 1937

Islamic Jurisprudence Assignment 
Submitted by 

Name : Hritikka Kak

Student ID : 201901747

B.A. LL.B. (IIIrd Semester) (Regular) 

Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia 

Submitted to : Dr. Ghulam Yazdani, Associate Professor (Faculty

of Law, Jamia  Millia Islamia, New Delhi) 

(November 10, 2020)

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher

Dr. Ghulam Yazdani who gave me the golden opportunity to do this
wonderful project on the topic The Muslim Personal Law, Shariat
Application Act, 1937, which also helped me in doing a lot of research
and I came to know about so many new things. I am really thankful to
sir for his guidance and support. Secondly, I would also like to thank
my parents and friends who helped me a lot in finishing this project
within the time period. I am making this project not only for marks but
to also increase my knowledge.
Thank You
 CONTENTS

 Abstract
 Introduction
 Definition of a Muslim
 History
 Custom or Sharia?
 Categories of Muslim in India
 Bohoras
 Memons
 Khojas
 Extent of application of the Shariat Act
 Intestate Succession
 Gifts, Confidence, Trust Property and Wakfs
 Marriage and Divorce
 Special property of Females and Guardianship
 Desires, Acceptance and Heritages
 Conclusion
 Bibliography
 ABSTRACT
Shariat Act could also be referred to as the Muslim Personal Law. It extends to the entire of the Republic of
India. If any statute has any clauses that could contradict the spirit of the act, it will still stand. On all
questions about intestate succession, it will stand correct. This covers the separate property of women,
including personal property inherited or received under a contract or donation, or other provisions of
personal law. Marriage, wedding dissolution, like talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, preservation,
dower, guardianship, donations, trusts and trust funds, and wakfs are the law of settlement in situations
whereby Muslims are parties. The Shariat Act specifies that in a situation where both sides are Muslims,
Muslim law shall be the rule for decision if the case includes any of the following questions, such as
intestine succession, women's special property, marriage, marriage dissolution, preservation, dower,
guardianship, loan, confidence and trust, Wakff. If all sides in the situation are Muslims, then the Muslim
Personal Rule shall be enforced. Any person who satisfies all the prescribed authority that he is a
Muslim , that he’s capable and efficient to contract within the meaning of section 11 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 , that he’s a resident of the territories to which this Act extends may by declaration
within the prescribed kind and filed before the prescribed authority declare that he wishes to get the
advantage of the provisions of this section, and thereafter the provisions of section 2 shall apply to the
declarant and all his minor kids and their descendants as if in addition to the matters enumerated,
adoption, wills, and legacies were also specified. Where a declaration is refused by the appointed
authority, a person willing to make the same proclamation may appeal to an office which may be
assigned in that name by a general or special order of the State Government, and that officer may, if he
is convinced that the appellant is entitled to make the declaration, order the prescribed authority to
approve the declaration.
 MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW IN INDIA
INTRODUCTION
In India, not the whole body of Muslim law is valid, but rather a section of it is extended by the
courtesy of the State to Muslims. It is to denote this body of law in replacement of Islamic or Muslim
law that many scholars have used the word "Muhammadan law." It has been branded by some as
Anglo-Muhammadan law. Yet it seems more fitting to call it Indo-Muslim law, or Muslim law as a
summary. The word 'Muhammadan statute' is a misnomer and gives a very incorrect meaning. Fyzee
clearly contends that the faith practised by the Prophet was Islam, not Muhammadanism; and Muslims
are not Muhammadans, the ones who believe in it. The section of Islamic Civil Law, which is
applicable in India to Muslims as a personal law, is meant by Muham Madan law (however). His logic
is hard to agree with. If, according to his own statement, Islam's believers are known as Muslims, not
Muhammadans, so their personal rule should be known as Muslim law, irrespective of the fact that the
term Muhammadan law has been favoured by some writers and judges. Fyzee happens to be one of
them, and the middle-aged lady referred to by Fowler correctly deserves to be branded as a 'pedant'.
Article 44 of the Constitution of India addresses the development, as part of the Directive Principle of
State Policy, of the Uniform Civil Code. But India's complexity and variety of religions, sects, and sub-
sects make it difficult for such a code to be formulated. The personal laws of the major faiths observed
in the nation have been codified into numerous statutes. The Muslim Personal Law Shariat application
act, 1937, is the provision regulating Muslim (or Mahomedan) people in their personal legislation. The
Act came into effect on October 7, 1937, and is valid in India. It extends to any Muslim of either school
or sect. "Section 2 of the Act categorically states that in the case of personal matters , especially those
relating to inheritance, special property of women, marriage, marriage dissolution, preservation, dower,
guardianship, grants, trusts and trust property, and wakfs," Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) is the rule of
judgement in cases where the parties are Muslims. The expression "where the parties are Muslims" was
drawn from the Practices of the Civil Courts. As a synonym for Muslim Personal Law, the term
Shariat1 is used in the Statute. It can definitively be said to consist of the express sanctions of the Holy
Book of the Qur'an; of the rules adopted by the Prophet's experience or Sunna; and of the views of
Islamic jurists.

1
Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet (Hadith and Sunna), prescribing both
religious and secular duties and sometimes retributive penalties for lawbreaking. It has generally been supplemented by legislation
adapted to the conditions of the day, though the manner in which it should be applied in modern states is a subject of dispute
between Muslim traditionalists and reformists.
Where one argument which is known as Consensus or Ijma agrees with the view of separate jurists. At
other times, an analogical deduction is drawn, known as Qiyas, where the views do not align. The
object of the Act is to grant the Shariat a superior role and remove the personal practises of various
Muslim communities in India. Clear uniformity is foreseen in the implementation of personal rules to
Muslims.

DEFINITION OF A MUSLIM
The courts have addressed the void and given a clear and rational interpretation, as the Shariat Act does
not expand on who a Muslim is. In the case of Madras 2, determined by two judges (one an European
and the other a Hindu), it was established that any person who professes the religion of Mahomedan,
that is, recognizes that there is only one God, and that Mahomed is His prophet, is a Mahomedan. It is
not necessary for a Muslim to be born a Muslim; it is appropriate whether, by occupation or
converting3, he is a Muslim. Faith relies upon beliefs, according to the doctrine of Islam. A believer
may renounce Islam just as Islam may be acknowledged by an unbeliever. It is not necessary that he
may practise, or be an orthodox believer in that faith, any special rituals or ceremonies.

It was quite clearly founded in the leading case of Abdool Razack v. Aga Mahomed 4 that no court
would assess or evaluate the validity of religious belief. If the individual professes the Mahomedan
religion in the manner that he believes the unity of God and Mahomed's prophetic character, it is
appropriate. After closely studying the principles of Ahmadiyyas, Ahmadiyyas were considered
Muslims for the reason of this Act as the High Court and found that they believed in the two basic
ideologies of Islam. Unless he renounces the Mahomedan religion, an individual born a Mahomedan
remains a Mahomedan5. Such a revocation does not amount to the simple acceptance of any Hindu
worship forms. Such a conversion must not be a cheerful one in the event of a conversion to Islam. In
the case of Skinner v. Orde6, a Christian-practicing Helen Skinner developed a relationship with John
Thomas John, a Christian married to a working Christian wife. John and Helen went through the
conversion ceremony to the Muslim faith in order to legalise their marriage. It was held by the Privy
Council that such a marriage was of uncertain authenticity. Conversion is considered a crime under the
law for such a reason and would not be allowed by the courts. However, the relevance of a formal
practice remains.
2
Narantakat v. Prakkal (1922) 45 Mad. 986, 71 I.C. 65, ('23) AM'. 171
3
Abraham v. Abraham (1863) 9 M.I.A. 195, 239-40.
4
(1894) 21 I.A. 56, 64.
5
Bhagwan Bakhsh v. Drigbijai (1931) 6 Luck. 487, 132 I.C. 779, ('31) A.O. 301.
6
(1871) 14 M.I.A. 309.
It may be said in India that there are three distinct groups of Muslims:

i. First are the ordinary Muslims to whom Muslim rule applies, as a whole,
ii. Secondly are the Muslims who are not subject in all respects to Islamic rule but are regulated in
such matters by tradition, such as the Khojas, the Gujarat Sunni Bohoras, the Broach Molesalam
Girasias and the Kuchchh Pirpanthis.
iii. And third group is the amphibious communities, such as the Meos of Rajputana (Rajasthan) and
the Satpanthis of the Central Provinces (Madhya Pradesh), which cannot be said to be either
completely Hindu or entirely Muslim.

HISTORY

The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, XXVI of 1937 is by far the most important
legislation in the closing years of British rule 1 India The Act almost abolished the legal authority of
custom among the Muslims of British India for reasons best stated in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons. The Act7 implicated was introduced by the British government in pre-Independent India. As a
matter of strategy, they applied it to Indian Muslims. This policy was the result of the adoption of a
custom adopted from the Indian Mughal rulers who introduced Hindu and Islamic rules to their
subjects in line with their own beliefs to protect and guarantee the practise of their own religion for
both of these groups. This British 'non-interference' strategy was determined by three key factors. First
of all, they did not hope for any break from the past. Secondly, their primary concern was to preserve
protection in social situations in order to promote trade. Thirdly, they have no inclination to mess with
their subjects' moral sensibilities. As early as 1772, when Warren Hastings' scheme for the
administration of justice was executed by the East India Company 8, it was established that maulvis and
pandits would attend the courts to expound the law and assist in the administration of justice.
Furthermore, it was laid down in Section 27 of the 1780 Rule that, 'In all cases concerning succession,
marriage and caste, and other religious purposes or structures, the rules of the Koran with respect to the
Mahomedans, and those of the Shaster with respect to the Gentoos, the laws of the Koran with respect
to the Mahomedans and those of the Shaster with respect to the Gentoos shall apply.'

The goal of continuing the Shariat Act of 1937 after Independence is to restore the rule of Islam to all
Muslim groups living in India, and to abolish customs contrary to the Shariat. It has been the sacred
hope of the Muslims of India for many years that Customary Law should never take the place of
7
The Muslim Personal Law, Shariat Application Act, 1937
8
Asaf A.A. Fayzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law 42
Muslim Personal Law in any situation. In the newspapers as well as on the platform, the matter has
been agitated constantly. About the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, The largest Muslim religious authority
accepted the appeal and called the attention of all concerned to the immediate need to enact a move to
that effect. Customary law is a misnomer in that it has no sound foundation on which to stand and is
rather responsible for constant modifications which should not be assumed to achieve the certainty and
definition that must be the hallmark of all legislation at some point in the future. The status of Muslim
women is simply disgraceful under the so-called Customary Law. As the Muslim Women's
Organisations have condemned the Customary Law, they argue that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
should be made applicable to them as it adversely affects their rights. The implementation of the
Muslim Personal Law would immediately elevate them to the status of which they are naturally
entitled. In addition, if it were enacted, the present measure will have a very beneficial impact on
society, as it will guarantee certainty and clarification of the public's shared rights and responsibilities.
In the form of a true code, Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) exists and is too well known to acknowledge
any uncertainty or to require any great labour in the form of study, which is the key feature of
Customary Law.'

CUSTOM OR SHARIA?

Despite any tradition or use to the contrary, Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) is the rule of judgement in
cases where the parties are Muslims. The first portion of this section specifically abrogates customs
which are outside the Shariat's authority. There are, however, some cultures which have maintained
customary law to some degree after their conversion and are regulated by it. Abdul Hussein v. Sona
Devi9 is the leading case on the issue of tradition. It was related to the estate of Mir Hussein Ali Khan
of Talpur, a Sindhi nobleman, who died without leaving a dilemma or a widow. The son of a deceased
brother was satisfied that the sister of the deceased or her son had no claim on the property and that he
was entitled to succeed alone, as there was a family tradition whereby sons and sisters removed
daughters from male paternal property. The appellant's point was that the simple rules of Muslim law
were customarily overridden in this case and, thus, the sister and her son had to be removed.

The Privy Council held that the tradition had not been developed and made a variety of useful
observations on Muslim customs and their effect on society. "The court claimed that it is clearly
obligated on the petitioner to show the tradition and also that" it is from the nature of special uses that
change the ordinary law of succession that they should be ancient and unchanging. "It was further
9
1917) 45 I.A. 10, 45 Cal. 450, 43 I.C. 306.
observed that in such cases, while the in defense of his case , the appellant will be able to adduce a
variety of striking cases, its reputation is decreased as influential members of the family involved
dispute the tradition exists. With respect to the validity of a custom, in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath 10, the
Supreme Court laid down an important guideline. Wanchoo, J. "We have to judge the reasonableness
of the law in the light of the constitutional rights conferred on the citizens of this country for the first
time by the Constitution and which were not there when the courts might have found the
reasonableness of the custom, if any, in the context of things then prevalent," said the majority on the
bench. In addition, in the case of Aga Khan case, it was concluded that prior rulings where tradition
was recognized as binding are valuable pieces of evidence, but their logic may not be binding; the court
must jealously analyze the custom set up and must be careful not to be deceived by pitfalls because of
being unfamiliar with social environments.

CATEGORIES OF MUSLIMS IN INDIA

There is a certain category 11 of Muslims in India, as stated earlier, who are permitted to maintain
certain parts of their customary law. We may put the two Shia Ismaili communities of Khojas and
Bohoras and the Sunni Hanafi group of Memons under this grouping. These three, communities can be
found in many Indian cities, but are primarily clustered in the Maharashtra and Gujarat states. While
these groups are numerically limited, owing to their significance as trade communities, they frequently
become embroiled in litigation.

 BOHORAS :- The term 'bohora' means 'a trader.' And true to their name, the Bohoras are a
worldwide trading group that carries out their business. In India, they are mainly focused in
Maharashtra and Gujarat, the western provinces. The Bohoras are also Shia Ismailis, like
Khojas. They are referred to as the 'Western Ismailis,' while the 'Eastern Ismailis' are the Khojas.
They are further separated into the sects of Daudi and Sulaimani. The Bohoras frequently
engage in disputes as trade communities, but their system of jurisprudence is not well known.
In some ways, it is identical to the Maliki School. Their chief legal authority is Qadi Numan's
"Da'am al-Islam." The Da'i-e-Mutlaq, however, holds the highest place as the head of the party.
While he is meant to be the Imam's advisor, the Da'i is the supreme representative of religion for
all practical purposes, as the Imam is considered to be shielded from sight. In matters of
inheritance and succession, the Bohoras were often regulated by their customary law similar to

10
http://document.manupatra.com/SupremeCourt/
11
Supra n. 1, at 102 and 103
 Hindu law. But that was the case until the 1937 passage of the Shariat Act. This strict
community of Muslims has since been held to the same Shari'ah laws as all the others in India.
 MEMONS :- In India memons are found of two different types. One of the two types of
memons found in India is the Cutchi Memons. The other type is that of the Halai Memons. The
term "memon" is actually derived from the word "mumin" meaning a believer. The Cutchi
Memons, like the Khojas, have converted from the Hindu trade communities. They are strict
practitioners of the Sunni faith, however, and follow the school of Hanafi. Until 1920, the Hindu
rules of succession and inheritance regulated the nation. The implementation of the Cutchi
Memon Act in 1920 made it possible for the religion to subject itself in all respects to Muslim
rule by making a declaration to that effect. In 1937, they enjoyed a status similar to the Khojas
under the Shariat Act. They will maintain the right to dispose of the remainder of their property
with respect to guardianship succession. This right was, however, stripped away by the 1938
Cutchi Memons Act. This Act allowed the Cutchi Memons to be regulated by theHanafi control
on all subjects. After Democracy, again, the tables have turned. The Shariat Act, 1937 takes
precedence over all others. So, once again, like all other groups in India, the Cutchi Memons are
under the rule of Muslim law.
 KHOJAS :- The Khojas of the Nizari branch are Ismaili Shia. They are believers of the Aga
Khan12, who in all religious affairs is the head of the society and is called the 'Hazar Imam.'
These were originally Hindus, but they have eventually come under the impact of Orthodox
Islam after their conversion after the Muslim invasion of Sind and Cutch. Today, among the
Khojas, we can see three sub-sects: the majorities are Ismailis who follow Aga Khan; a smaller
group professing the Shiite Ithna Ashari faith; and believers representing the minority of the
Hanafi school of Sunni regime. The Khojas were primarily ruled by Muslim law prior to the
Shariat Act, except in matters of inheritance and succession, where they were governed by
Hindu law.
They were to be regulated by Muslim law in terms of intestate succession under the Act, but
they maintained the earlier right to disable all their property with respect to decedent's
succession. However, if a Khoja makes a declaration according to Section 3(1), Muslim law,
including decedent's succession, would refer to it in its entirety.

EXTENT OF APPLICATION OF THE SHARIAT ACT

12
Aga Khan case (1866) 12 Bom. H.C.R. 323. Held: followers of Aga Khan are neither Sunni, nor Shia of the Ithna
Ashnari school.
The Shariat Act explicitly notes that wherever all sides to a conflict are Muslim, the Sharia will
adjudicate them. However, where only one party is Muslim and the other party is a member of any
other religion, the defendant's rules and uses should be enforced. The Shariat laws are not currently
enforced in their lifetime; only a provision is made applicable and can be divided into three divisions,
which are those specifically ordered to be applied to Mahomedans by the Legislature, such as the rules
of succession and inheritance. Those that are applied to Mahomedans, such as the laws of the
Mahomedan law of Pre-emption, as a matter of right, dignity and good faith. Those that are not
implemented at all, though the parties are Mahomedans, such as the Mahomedan Criminal Law and the
Evidence Law of Mahomedan. The only sections of Mahomedan law that are applicable to
Mahomedans by the courts in India are those mentioned in the provisions. (i) & (ii). In other ways, the
Mahomedans in India are regulated by the general law of India and, in particular, the usage of the term
is not deemed to mean any difference, the Mahomedan law suitable for each sect would be applied.
Among the two sects of Muslims (Sunni and Shia), the Sunni sect constitutes the vast majority in India.
There are four Sunni law schools which are: Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Shaf'ei. Hanafi School
believers are the majority of Muslims living in the Indian subcontinent. The Sunni jurists consider each
of these sub-schools similarly orthodox. Equality is so strongly founded that on a certain point of law,
it is open for the adherents of one school to accept the view of jurists belonging to another school. It is
also likely that, of his own free will, a Maliki can at some point in time become a Hanbali. In
adjudicating the conflict of such an person, this could produce some uncertainty. In the case of
Muhamad Ibrahim v. Gulam Ahmed13, this matter was resolved as early as 1864. It was established that
a Hanafi woman may choose a husband on achieving a majority without regard to the wishes of her
father or guardian. In addition, a Muslim woman who observes any of the four sub-schools may choose
to belong to whichever sub-school she wants. According to the rules of that sub-school, all her future
acts would then be adjudicated. Consequently, if he supports that perspective, a Hanafi qazi may decide
a case according to Shaf'ei law, or he may pass the case to a Shaf'ei qazi.

In effect, provided that the Sunni School of Law has four sub-schools, each appellant will be assessed
according to the law he or she follows. Specifically, Section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937 lists the
following personal matters in which Muslim rule is to be applied : (a) intestate succession, (b) special
property of women, (c) marriage and divorce, (d) maintenance, (e) dower, (f) guardianship, (f) gifts,
(g)property of trusts and confidence, and wakfs.

13
https://indiankanoon.org/doc
 a) INTESTATE SUCCESSION
The primary complaint that the Act aims to address is the customary rule on intestinal succession.
Agnatic succession is the general rule of customary law, which prohibits all women except a widow
and a daughter and only a life interest or merely bare involvement is permitted. This custom has the
extra inconvenience of multiple exceptions being immune to it. According to Hindu law for Khojas,
Cutchi Memons, Halai Memons and Sunni Bohras and Molesalam Girasias, the tradition of agnatic
succession among Muslims prevails mainly in Northern India, but in Western India the Act would
abolish the customary succession law. In the scenario of succession to a tarwad (a small Muslim
community) in Malabar, where the victim belonged to a common family who, despite being Muslims,
followed the tradition of Hindu law, it was held that if the custom were created, there would be no
property left by the victim that could be transferred as intestate succession and there would be no scope
for the Shariat Act application. But if there is a property that may be the focus of intestate succession,
then it is difficult to plead for any tradition that derogates from the laws of Muslim Shariat Law, such
as a custom that merely prohibits women14 from inheritance and succession.
b) GIFTS, CONFIDENCE, TRUST PROPERTIES AND WAKFS
By inserting wakfs, Section 2 had the effect of making wakfs and specifically applicable to Muslim law
in the subjects specified therein, which had to be decided under the terms of previous Acts and
Regulations on principles of equity and good faith. However, it is understood that where the legislation
has so far extended, gifts and family settlements will continue to be subject to customary law on
agricultural land. However, it was held by the Patna High Court 15 that, on account of section 2 of that
Act, the Mahomedan gift rule applies to non-agricultural lands, since the Shariat Act of 1937, and to
agricultural land on the basis of law, equity and good conscience. In cases not protected by the
exception to section 2 of the Statute, the Mahomedan law of gifts now remains as such and not as the
Rule of Justice, equality and good faith. This helps to avoid the problems that may have been
experienced with regard to the application of Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act of 1882.
c) MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Muslim marriage in India is a legal contract between a woman and a male. Marriage dissolution may be
performed at the husband's (talaq), wife's (khula), or joint (mubarat) eg. By mentioning the term talaq,
Talaq helps a Muslim man to legitimately divorce his wife. Some Muslim groups accept triple talaq (or
talaq-i-biddat) as a legal process, stating three talaqs at a time and pledging immediate divorce. Instant
triple talaq was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India on 22 August 2017. After
14
Mohammad Sandhu Khan v Ratnam, AIR 1956 Mad. 144.
15
Bibi Maniran v Mohd. Ishaque, AIR 1963 Pat. 229.
being authorised by the President of India on 31 July 2019, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights
on Marriage) Act, 2019, which ruled instant talaq illegal and invalid, came into effect
unconstitutionally from 19 September 2018. Talaq-i-hasan is observed by other Muslim communities,
where the husband pronounces talaqs in three different occasions, each divided by at least one lunar
month. If after the first or second talaq, or residing with his ex, the husband changes his mind, the
divorce is dismissed. By consensus, the husband can delegate the power to pronounce talaq, called
talaq-e-tafweez, to his wife or to a third party. Section 5 of the 1937 Shariat Act involves divorce-
seeking Muslim women. Subsequently, Section 5 was deleted and replaced by the 1939 Dissolution of
Muslim Marriages Act. In a court of law, Muslim women can seek divorce.

In certain cases16, a wife will file for divorce, such as if the husband's whereabouts have not been
identified for four years. If for two years, the husband has not paid for her care. If the husband has been
sentenced to seven years or more in jails. If after three years, the husband has refused to fulfil his
marital duties. Whether at the time of marriage, the husband was useless and remains useless. If the
husband has been insane or suffered from leprosy or virulent venereal disorder for two years. If the
husband handles the woman with ruthlessness, even if physical abuse is absent. Whether the woman
was married to her parent or guardian until she reached the age of 15 years. If the husband partners or
lives a controversial life with women of ill repute or tries to induce her to lead an unethical life. If the
husband disposes of or forbids her from exercising her legal rights over her land. If in observance of
her religious profession or discipline, the husband obstructs her. Whether he has more than one child,
or if, in compliance with the Qur'an, he does not treat her equitably, or if any other basis accepted as
legitimate for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law is carried out.

d) SPECIAL PROPERTY OF FEMALES AND GUARDIANSHIP

In order to eradicate such commonly followed traditions, this rule has been introduced whereby
property acquired by a female by inheritance or gifts is not deemed to be her unique property, but
returns to the heirs of the last male owner. The terms of the Majority Act, 1875, or of the Guardian and
Wards Act, 1890, would not be covered by the Act.

DESIRES, ACCEPTANCE AND HERITAGES

16
 "The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939". indiankanoon.org. Retrieved  2 December  2017
Acceptance, desires and heritages are dealt with in section 3 of the Shariat Implementation Act. It
depends not on the faith of the parties in the case of succession, but on that of the person whose family
law is at issue, that is, the testator. On these topics, customs that contravene the Muslim the act would
not be invalidated. But any affected person will leave the tradition and follow Muslim rule. Adoption is
not recognised by Mahomedan law, but in East and West Punjab there is a tradition of a sort of
adoption which is said to be an heir's nomination 17. In Mumbai, the Khojas can, by will, dispose of all
their property under their customary law. Till the passage of the the Cutchi Memons Act,1938 The
Cutchi Memons could also, by will, dispose of all their land. Still, however, they are regulated by
Muslim rule, even in terms of testate succession.

17
Sardar Bibi v Haq Nawaz Khan, (1934) 15 Lah 96.
CONCLUSION

The Muslim Personal Rule may also be called the Shariat Act. It includes the whole area of the
Republic of India. It would also stand if any statute contains any provisions that may undermine the
intent of the act. It would stand right on all issues concerning intestate succession. This encompasses
women's separate land, including personal property inherited or obtained under a lease or gift, or other
personal law clauses. The rule of settlement in cases in which Muslims are parties is union, marriage
separation, such as talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, preservation, dower, guardianship, gifts,
trusts and trust funds, and wakfs. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Implementation Act, 1937, in
India, covers the enforcement of Islamic principles in personal legal partnerships, but the law does not
prescribe the laws. In different statutes, such as the Muslim Act on Women (Protection of Marital
Rights), 2019, all of these personal matters have been discussed separately. The Shariat Implementation
Act attempts to bring about uniformity in India's protection of the personal rights of Muslims.
However, owing to the presence of various faiths and sub-sects, the Act takes into account the plurality
that exists. Similarly, the varying meanings of the sub-sections are valued in order to protect the
complainant's interests. Specifically, the Act states that the State shall not participate in matters of
personal disputes and that a decision must be passed by a religious authority based on its interpretations
of the Shari'a, that is, the Qur'an, Hadith, Ijma and Qiyas. In view of this rule, a number of cities have
been formed in India as adjudicating bodies known as the 'Sharia Courts.' However, the validity of
these adjudicating bodies has often come into dispute because of some dubious decisions taken by
these adjudicating bodies. Yet the validity of the Act itself has never been questioned. In relation to
simple issues of Muslim personal rule, new demands are made time and again, but Muslim personal
law remains the Personal Rule (Shariat) Act, 1937, as the Chief Authority for securing Muslims the
right to be regulated by their own rules. The position of Muslim women, in few cases, was seriously
undermined by the then prevailing customs. Inheritance in particular had continued to be ruled by
custom, often excluding women, among numerous communities of Muslims. The Shariat Act aimed at
correcting such defects.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Supra n. 1, at 102 and 103

 MB Ahmad,Administration of Justice in Medieval India (Aligarh, 1941).
 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306257234_Muslim_Personal_Law
 D.F. Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law (Lexis Nexis India, 20th edition).
 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1325952//

 Asaf A.A. Fayzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2009,
5th edition).
 https://blog.ipleaders.in/tag/the-muslim-personal-law-shariat-application-act-1937//

 Abdur Rahim, The Principles of Mohammadan Jurisprudence (Irfan Law Book House, New
Delhi, 2006).
 https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2303/1/A1937-26.pdf