DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ERROR EFFECTS

ON STRUCTURAL RELIABILITY
By Bruce Ellirtgwood, 1 M . ASCE

ABSTRACT: A majority of structural failures and associated damage costs are

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due to errors in planning, design, construction, and utilization, rather than sto-
chastic variability in construction material strengths and structural loads. Re-
cently developed probability-based load and resistance factor design methods
treat uncertainties due to inherent randomness and modeling more rationally
than is possible with current design methods, but still do not take errors in
design and construction into account. Any meaningful attempts to reduce fail-
ure rates will need to deal with this issue. This paper reviews the status of
design and construction errors in structural safety studies, summarizes some
simple mathematical tools for their analysis, and demonstrates why errors are
so difficult to treat in codified design.

INTRODUCTION

Safety checking procedures and probability-based load and resistance

factor design criteria that have been developed in recent years (5,13,17,24)
address failures that result from stochastic variability in loads and
strengths. Modeling errors introduced by the use of structural mechan-
ics formulations that are based on idealizations of structural and material
properties also are taken into account. Both current and proposed prob-
ability-based safety checks can screen out failures due to uncertainty ef-
fectively if the load and resistance factors (or allowable stresses) are set
conservatively. Thus, it is not surprising that structural failures rarely
occur because of chance occurrences of unfavorably high design loads
and low design strengths (4,27).
However, a majority of structural failures and damage costs, in ordi-
nary construction, at least, occur as a consequence of errors in planning,
design, construction, and utilization (26). Unforeseen circumstances and
conceptual, analytical, or executional errors can occur even when com-
petent organizations and qualified personnel are involved in design and
construction and when accepted methods of quality assurance and con-
trol are employed. Errors are difficult to quantify, inasmuch as their source
is human imperfection. The involvement of the human element removes
the solution to the error problem (at least partially) from the realm of
statistics, probability, and reliability theory.
Failures due to error have not been considered in the reliability anal-
yses and probabilistic design methodologies that have been developed
recently (5,13,17,24). Reliability analyses are based on customary stan-
dards of design, construction, utilization, and quality assurance. The
probabilistic models on which they are based describe uncertainty (sta-
'Research Prof., Dept. of Civ. Engrg., The Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore,
MD 21218-2699. -
Note.—Discussion open until July 1,1987. To extend the closing date one month,
a written request m u s t be filed with the ASCE Manager of Journals. The m a n u -
script for this paper was submitted for review a n d possible publication o n May
15, 1986. This paper is part of the Journal of Structural Engineering, Vol. 113,
No. 2, February, 1987. ©ASCE, ISSN 0733-9445/87/0002-0409/$01.00. Paper N o .
21284.

409

J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 tistical regularity) under a set of presupposed conditions (8). Minor de-
viations from the nominal values used in design are considered to be
part of this uncertainty. However, errors generally cannot be related to
the random deviations in the design variables that the present reliability
analyses take into account, and it is not useful to view them in this light
(4). The safety factors in design codes were never intended to apply to
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such errors. An error is not simply an extreme value of one of the load
or resistance variables used in the reliability analysis or in design. Rather,
the error corresponds to a different event entirely, one that may change
the probabilistic models that are applicable and the relevant limit state
as well. Thus, calculations of probability of failure that take into account
only chance occurrences of higher-than-design loads in combination with
lower-than-design resistances are not realistic. Moreover, attempts to in-
clude error by adjusting the distributions of the basic variables or factors
of safety generally are ineffective because they do not attack the root of
the problem (22).
This paper reviews the current state of knowledge concerning errors
that may lead to failures of structural systems, and considers how such
errors might be taken into account in evaluating structural reliability.
Although systematic procedures to mitigate errors ultimately should be
included in the management of structural safety, these have not been
developed within the limited scope of this review.

SOURCES OF DESIGN/CONSTRUCTION ERROR

Errors occur in all phases of the building process: planning, design,

construction, and utilization. In the most general sense, it is useful to
think of error as the agent that causes things to go wrong (22). More
specifically, an error is an unintended departure from accepted practice
(32) or a fundamental avoidable mistake (10). Errors are caused by peo-
ple as a result of influences that are not considered properly. There can-
not be a precise definition of what is "gross" error, as there is uncer-
tainty within the bounds of what is considered "acceptable practice."
Errors may be considered "gross" depending on their impact on per-
formance. Not all errors are dangerous, and some that are not may ac-
tually contribute to structural safety (29).
Buildings and Bridges.—Most of the available data on errors pertain
to ordinary construction. In one study involving an examination of causes
of 23 major structural accidents (7), eight basic causes were cited: (1)
Inadequate consideration of uncertainty in design variables; (2) errors in
methods of structural analysis, particularly where behavior is not well
understood (e.g., loads not understood, neglect of torsion); (3) extreme
hazards not considered (floods, explosions, earthquake, tornado); (4)
failure modes not understood (galloping, etc.); (5) failures modes rec-
ognized but not treated properly; (6) errors during construction (e.g.,
site control, management, communication); (7) financial OT political pres-
sures on personnel; and (8) misuse or willful abuse.
Human error is an element in all eight of these causes. Expanding on
this basic study, 22 causative factors were listed (7), and it was noted
that human error in applying existing technology is the predominant
factor in causing accidents.
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J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 A simpler classification system for errors (32) identified three basic types
of error (and the human characteristics giving rise to them) as: (1) Errors
of concept (stupidity, ignorance); (2) errors of execution (carelessness,
forgetfulness, negligence); and (3) errors of intention (venality, irre-
sponsibility).
The first type includes loads not envisioned, incorrect assumptions,
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and incorrect analytical modeling. Discovery of new potentially active

faults, failure to consider soil-structure interaction, and nonlinear ma-
terial behavior or large deformation behavior fall into this category. The
second type includes calculation or detailing errors, mistakes in reading
drawings and specifications, and defective workmanship. Finally, the
third type includes unwarranted shortcuts to save money, substitution
of components that may not be equivalent to those originally specified,
and acceptance of marginal workmanship in order to maintain construc-
tion schedules.
Several studies have attempted to quantify sources of error and to in-
dicate their relative importance in the building process. The limited error
statistics that have been published in these studies are incomplete and
biased. Errors caught in time may not be reported; only errors resulting
in severe damage may be reported; the data cover a diversity of cases
that may not all be applicable to particular structures. Much of the avail-
able data are reported voluntarily and are not a random sample. Failure
data can be used, however, to identify technical and organizational de-
fects in the building process and to indicate directions for additional re-
search. A summary of data from these studies is given in Table 1.
As an indication of the importance of the error problem, a general
review (3) of published failure data indicated that only about 10% of
failures were traceable to stochastic variability in loads and capacities;
the remaining 90% were due to other causes, including design and con-
struction errors, modeling and analysis uncertainties, etc. A similar re-
view of European failure data (21) indicated that 22% of failures are caused
by stochastic variability, but did not indicate what part of the remaining
78% was caused by error.
Two surveys of error in reinforced concrete structures have been con-
ducted in the United States (16) and in Canada (2) during the past de-
cade. The results of these two surveys are remarkably consistent with
one another. Most design errors involved mistakes or misconceptions of
structural behavior, particularly inadequate consideration of details in
joints, shrinkage, and temperature effects. Most construction errors in-
volved improper installation of reinforcement. The most common struc-
tural elements involved were slabs (where punching shear failures were
prevalent), beams, and connections.
A survey of structural failures in buildings in the U.K. (published in
Ref. 43 and summarized in Ref. 27) revealed that grossly inadequate ap-
preciation of loading conditions or behavior of structure and connections
due to lack of experience or ignorance were involved in over 80% of the
instances of design error. Rupture or instability seemed to be the most
common limit states (about 70% of failures reported), with walls and
slabs being the most common structural elements involved. An exami-
nation of approximately 800 cases of structural failures in Europe (25,26)
revealed that 75% of the instances of damage and 90% of the cost of

411

J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 TABLE 1.—Incidences of Error in Building Process by Phase
Utilization
including
Planning Con- mainte-
and de- struction nance Other" Total
Reference sign (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

CEB 157 (1983) 50b 40c 8 — 98
Matousek (1982) 45d 49 6 — 100
Taylor (1975) 36' 12' — — —
Yamamoto and Ang (1982) 36 43 21 — 100
Rackwitz and Hillemeier (1983) 46 30 23 — 99
AEPIC 67 33 — — 100
Melchers, et al. (1983) 55 24 21 — 100
Fraczek (1979) 55 53 — — 108s
Allen (1979) 55 49 — — 103s
Hadipriono (1985) 19 27 33 20 99
Hauser (1979) 37 35 5 23 100
Gonzales (1985) 29 59 — 13 1016
"Includes cases where failure cannot be attributed clearly to any one factor and
may be due to several of them.
b
Broken down as planning 25%; design 25%.
c
Broken down as materials 15%; execution 25%.
d
Broken down as planning 11%; design 34%.
'Identified as design, not planning.
'Does not differentiate between construction and utilization.
8
Multiple errors for single failure.

damage were due to h u m a n error. Apparently, most instances of serious

damage are attributable to errors.
Special Facilities.—Long-term experience w i t h c o m m o n design a n d
construction methods has made it possible to identify many sources of
error in ordinary construction. However, there is only limited experience
with structures in nuclear plants, offshore construction, and other spe-
cial facilities, a n d one cannot be confident that all likely sources of error
even have been identified (20,40). A survey (41) of malfunctions iden-
tified in abnormal occurrence reports for nuclear plants in the United
States concluded that about 36% could be attributed to design error a n d
12% to faulty installation, fabrication, a n d maintenance. Causes for the
remaining 52% were not identified. Welding problems were involved in
24% of all construction efficiency reports (18), a n d bolt installation prob-
lems were also common.
Even tightly regulated design and construction programs can produce
poor results in terms of structural performance, however (42). There ap-
pears to be a consensus that m a n y of the factors that contribute to error
in ordinary construction are also factors that are important in special
facility structures. Indeed, errors in basic concepts, in analyses based on
computer codes that are difficult or impossible to validate indepen-
dently, and in assumptions regarding designs for extremely rare events

412

J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 TABLE 2,—Causes of Error

Ignorance, Reliance
negligence, Insufficient on Other
carelessness knowledge Forgetfulness, others sources Total
Reference (%) (%) mistakes (%) (%) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Matousek (1982) 35 38" 9 6 12b 100

Melchers, et al.
(1983) 24 52 8 2 13 99
"Breaks down as insufficient knowledge 25%; underestimation of influences
13%.
b
Breaks down as unknown situations 4%; other sources 8%.

are likely to be relatively more important in special structures than in

ordinary building construction.
Sources of Error.—A summary of data on where in the building pro-
cess errors occur is given in Table 1. Table 2 summarizes why errors
occur. Reports documenting structural failure data are difficult to com-
pare because the classification of errors tends to be different in each re-
port. Moreover, the references in Table 1 draw, to a degree, on the same
aggregate of failure information, but different investigators may not in-
terpret the data in the same manner. Despite the limitations in the data
and difficulties in their interpretation, the results of these surveys are
reasonably consistent, and some general observations can be made that
would appar to be valid for a wide range of construction.
The occurrence of errors is divided nearly evenly between the design
and construction phases of the building process. Failures due to mate-
rials, use, or maintenance are relatively uncommon. Relatively few fail-
ures result from inaccurate selection of design loads and resistances or
because of insufficient factors of safety. Calculation blunders are only a
minor source of design error and usually are detected in design checking
and review. Nor are preparation and interpretation of working drawings
and contract documents major sources of error. Instead, fundamental
misconceptions regarding structural behavior and lack of attention to
boundary or support conditions appear to be the most serious source of
design error. "Unimaginables" appear to account for only a very small
percentage of failures. There are almost always antecedents for failures
(27,39), but often the design engineer is not aware of them. Although
one might expect that field erection is the stage of construction where
the chance of gross error is greatest, none of the surveys bear this out.
Instead, the separation of design and construction activities and the dif-
fusion of responsibility in the construction process have created signif-
icant communication problems and resulted in many of the errors in
construction (15).

MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF DESIGN/CONSTRUCTION ERRORS

Mathematical models for analyzing errors and their effects on the

building process rationally should include the following elements: (1)
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J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 The identification of likely error-causing scenarios; (2) the percentage of
errors that are detected and corrected by quality assurance programs;
and (3) the possibility that undetected errors cause structural defects,
which may subsequently lead to damage or failure. Only simple models
are consistent with the current state of knowledge and available data.
A simple model of the effect of error on structural reliability can be
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developed from the event tree shown in Fig. 1. Let F = event of failure
of a structure or structural component; F = Fs U Fe, in which Fs = failure
due to stochastic variability in loads and capacities, and Fe = failure due
to error (we assume, naively perhaps, that these are the only alterna-
tives). Let E = event that error occurs and is undetected. Invoking the
theorem of total probability, the probability of failure, P(F), can be ob-
tained as
P(F) = [P(Fe\E) + F(FS\E)]P(E) + P(FS\E)P(E) (1)
in which E = event that a gross error does not occur; and P(F\E) = prob-
ability of failure on the condition that event E occurs. Eq. 1 emphasizes
that failures due to stochastic variability are possible even when errors
occur and are undetected; moreover, failure modes might differ for fail-
ures due to stochastic variability and for those due to error. However,

P(E)-P(F | E )

Failure due to error

/ P(E)-P(F s E)
X
^ Failure due to
J~\. stochastic variability

E /Error ^ ^ No failure
/ occurs \.

\. P(E)-P(F|E)

P(E)'P(FSI'B)

Failure due to
stochastic variability

No failure

N . P(E)-P(F|E)

FIG. 1.—Event Tree Analysis of Failure (F = Fs u Ft)

414

J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 it is common to make the assumption that structures that contain errors
never fail as a consequence of stochastic variability in loads and strengths,
and thus that P(FS\E) ~ 0. Then, dropping the subscripts e and s for
convenience (31,33,44)
P(F) = P(FE) + P(FE) = P(F\E)P(E) + P(F\E)P(E) (2)
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in which it is understood that FE = failure due to error; and FE = failure

due to stochastic variability in loads and strengths.
This formulation can be carried a step further in detail (35). Consid-
ering the possibility of r hazard scenarios, the failure due to error can
be written as
r
FE = u (F n t>, n o,) (3)
1=1

in which O, = event that the ;'th error occurs; and D, = event that the
r'th error is detected (and repaired). The probability of failure due to er-
ror is then
r
P FE
( ) = E P(F|AO,)P(A|0,)P(0,) (4)
1=1

Note the equivalence of event E and the event (D, fl Of) in Eqs. 2
and 3.
These simple models all contain the important notions of error con-
sequence, detectability (and correction), and resulting consequence. Eqs.
1-4 show that structural safety can be managed by controlling the in-
cidence of errors [limiting P(E)], by controlling the impact and conse-
quences of the errors on structural performance (limiting P(F\E) by de-
signing the structure to tolerate and absorb the effect of errors), or by a
combination of these strategies.
The probability P(F\E) in Eq. 2 is the classical failure probability treated
in reliability analyses conducted to date. Recently developed probability-
based load and resistance criteria (11,13,17) have been selected so as to
be consistent with a prescribed target value of P(F\E). The terms P(F\E)
and P(E) remain to be evaluated. Error survey results summarized pre-
viously indicate that these latter terms dominate P(F).
Evaluation of P(E).—The probability of undetected error, P(E), is a
function of the level of inspection and checking. If the errors occur only
rarely in time, the error occurrence can be modeled as a Poisson random
point process (30,44) and (dropping subscript i for convenience, cf. Eqs.
3 and 4)
P(0) = XT (5)
in which X = mean rate of occurrence of error during time period T. If
the probability that the error is not detected is q = 1 - P(D), then
P(E) = P(D 0 0) = q\T (6)
If quality assurance programs can be modeled as a series of n statis-
tically independent control stops (35), the error probability P(E) is
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J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 P(E) = P(0) ] 1 [1 - P0,)] (7)

in which P(0) = XT = probability of error when no checks are made;

and P{Dj) = probability that error is detected (and corrected) at the ;'th
control stop. Comparing Eqs. 6 and 7, we see that II [1 - P(D ; )] = q.
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Evaluation of P(F\E).—Reliability analyses incorporating effects of er-

ror should reflect: (1) Instances where the effect of the error is to modify
the distribution functions of resistances or loads (e.g., increase variabil-
ity in concrete compressive strength); and (2) instances where the pres-
ence of error causes new or additional variables to be added to the limit
state function or causes the function itself to be changed. Let
S ( X i , X 2 , ..., X,„) = 0 (8)
gE(XlfX2/ ..., X„) = 0 (9)
be the limit states when error is absent and present, respectively. Note
that m ¥= n, in general, since different structural variables may be nec-
essary to model the limit state involving error. The conditional limit state
probabilities P(F|E) and P(F\E) can be obtained from Eqs. 8 and 9 by
conventional reliability analysis techniques (13,17).
Evaluation of P(F).—A simple illustration of the effect of design/con-
struction error on overall limit state probability P(F) is presented in this
section to show the difficulties encountered in treating such errors by
traditional safety checks. Observing that P(F\E)P(E) = P(E\F)P(F), Eq.
1 can be rewritten as
P(F)[1 - P(E\F)] = P(F\E)P(E) (10)
so that P(F) = P(F\E)HE (11)
-1
in which HE = P(E)[1 - P(E|F)] may be thought of as a "human error
multiplier" on the classical failure probability; HE may be evaluated ap-
proximately as (44)
HE « [1 - P(ElF)]-1 (12)
The probability P(E|F) in Eq. 12 bears the relative frequency interpre-
tation
. v number of failures involving gross errors
P(E|F) = §-2 (13)
number of failures
Depending on whether P(E|F) = 0.78 (Ref. 21) or 0.9 (Ref. 3), the mul-
tiplier HE on the classical limit state probability varies from 4.4-10. Qual-
itatively, this increase is consistent with available data comparing failure
rates of buildmgs and bridges with failure rates predicted by classical
reliability analysis.
Consider the simplest limit state, g( ) = R - Q, in which structural
capacity R and structural action Q are statistically independent lognor-
mal random variables. The central factor of safety, CFS = mR/mQ, is
given by
CFS = exp {*-»[! - P{F\E)W\ + V2Q)1/2} (14)
416

J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 in which mR, mn = means of R and Q; Vp , VQ = coefficients of variation'
and $ _1 ( ) — inverse cdf of a standard normal variate. The CFS can be
related to the probability-based load and resistance factors presented in
Refs. 5 and 24. The effect on the CFS of changing the failure probability
P(F) from Pi to P2, including error effects, is
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CFS 2 f ,/ P2\ ./ P1
{Vl + V2a)1/2 I (15)

The variation in CFS with P 2 /Pi is s h o w n in Table 3, assuming that P x

= 1CT5 and HE = 5.
The results in Table 3 make it appear as if a simple adjustment to the
CFS (or resistance factor) of approximately 12% will reduce the failure
probability in the presence of design/construction error by a factor of 10
for the typical case w h e n [VR + VQ] = 0.25. This result can be mislead-
ing, and some cautionary notes are warranted:

1. Misconceptions, omissions, deletions and other errors are likely to

change the relevant limit state function completely. By focusing on the
same limit state with only a different target probability, Eqs. 10-13 do
not address this issue. The causality between error and structural be-
havior and failure must be defined more carefully than is possible by
making the simple adjustments to resistance factors suggested by Eq.
15.
2. The dependence of HE on design strategy (safety checking, partial
factors, etc.) is not clear. The implication is that if quality control pro-
cedures remain constant and the target failure probability decreases by
some factor, the necessary overall reliability can be obtained by simply
targeting the load and resistance factors on a conditional limit state prob-
ability that has been decreased by the same factor. Thus, this formula-
tion presumes that HE is independent of the safety check. In fact, there
is likely to be some dependence of HE on the safety check, because
changing the partial factors would aggravate or conceal the effect of er-
rors that, under current safety checks, are at the "threshold of appear-
ance."

It has been suggested (9) that the failure probability due to stochastic
variability [P(FE) in Eq. 1] and failure probabilities due to design /con-
struction errors [P(FE) in Eq. 1] should not be combined into a single
measure of safety, P(F), Rather, the measure of safety should be ex-
pressed as a pair of probabilities, [P(FE), P(FE)], that can be considered

TABLE 3.—Variation in Central Factor of Safety (Pt = 10_1, HE = 5)

CFS2/CFS,
Pl/Pl [VI + V2Q]1/2 = 0.25 [VI + V2QYn = 0.5
(1) (2) (3)
1.0 1.0 1.0
0.1 1.12 1.26
0.01 1.24 1.54
0.001 1.37 1.89

417

J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 as independent from one another. The difficulties illustrated by the sim-
ple example above lend support to this view. Reliability theory provides
a straightforward decision tool for analyzing alternatives in structural
design. However, the error term P(FE), when combined with P(FE),
diminishes the ability of the reliability analysis to discriminate between
alternatives because the term P(FE) dominates the expression for P(F).
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Accordingly, while P(F\E) can be used as a basis for selecting load and
resistance factor criteria for design, P(FE) should be used in choosing
among design concepts, construction procedures, and quality assurance
plans.

STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATION AND CONTROL

The effects of design/construction errors on structural performance and

risk can be mitigated by strategies to reduce their incidence or to reduce
their impact on subsequent structural performance if they do occur. This
two-fold strategy is suggested by the form of Eq. 1.
Recent investigations of structural failures have revealed that those
failures would not have been prevented by the use of more conservative
factors of safety. Thus, attempting to control failures by increasing tra-
ditional factors of safety (3,6) generally will not be effective. Moreover,
gross errors, being rare by definition, cannot be screened effectively by
random checking. Thus, statistically-based quality assurance programs,
which work well in checking material conformance or product integrity
in situations where test replications are possible, cannot be expected to
affect failure rates due to design/construction error. Other quality as-
surance procedures must be employed. Most of these procedures are
aimed at reducing the magnitude of the term P(E) in Eq. 1, and thus at
controlling errors by reducing their incidence. Measures that can be taken
to minimize error effects fall into three general areas (25,26): (1) Tech-
nical; (2) organization and management; and (3) behavior-oriented.
Technical measures include independent reviews of fundamental de-
sign concepts and assumptions, which have been identified at the root
of many failures. Such reviews should be performed on all major proj-
ects (27). Even simple equilibrium and stability checks frequently reveal
fundamental errors in design concepts and assumptions.
Designers should think not only in terms of design limit states and
load combinations but also in terms of hazard scenarios (35). The iden-
tification and formulation of hazard scenarios can be helpful in planning
quality assurance programs (38), even though it may be impossible to
identify all possible hazard Scenarios in a complex structure. Fault and
event trees can be useful analytical tools here. Once likely hazards have
been identified, decisions and steps can be taken at the planning stage
of the project for dealing with the hazard. Such steps might include (11,26):
(1) Eliminate hazard; (2) reduce hazard to acceptable norm; (3) compen-
sate for hazard in design; (4) contain hazard by control and monitoring;
and (5) accept hazard as a known risk. Current project engineering and
safety management emphasize alternatives 3 and 5. However, for severe
accidents, the focus should usually be on alternatives 1 and 2 (12).
Independent control stops should be instituted at key decision points
in the project, especially where responsibility for project phases changes
418

J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 hands (14). Both internal and external control should be instituted on
major projects. Engineers involved with internal control may be familiar
with project details, but they may also be biased. Those involved with
external (independent) control may be less knowledgeable about project
details but, at the same time, more neutral and less influenced by the
work environment. Where public confidence is involved, independent
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external review is essential. However, too many or too complex control

stops also can cause error and can render a structure unbuildable (15,22).
Organization and management measures include written documents
that are intended to ensure that information flows smoothly and that
lines of responsibility are clear to all involved. Several elements appear
to be essential to a successful organization and management plan (38):
(1) The statement of project objectives and structural performance re-
quirements; (2) the organization of design/construction teams; (3) the
definition of project responsibilities; (4) the design documentation; (5)
the formal mechanisms for information flow; and (6) the establishment
of control points and control plans.
These key elements should be spelled out formally in writing as part
of the design and construction documentation, and all parties should be
apprised of them before work commences on the project. They become
increasingly important on complex projects or in new situations, where
experience may be limited or may not be relevant and where common
sense may not prevail.
Behavior-oriented measures involve various steps that can be taken to
improve the attitude of people toward their work and their competence
in accomplishing work-related tasks. These steps would include on-the-
job education and training and a suitable system of rewards and pen-
alties. Such measures are most effective on small projects, where error
prevention lies primarily at the personal level.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Structural codes do not address the error problem, other than through
general quality assurance statements. Current or proposed safety checks
such as LRFD (24) are not developed with errors in mind. Considering
the almost infinite number of ways for error to occur in the building
process, it may be unreasonable to expect that codes will ever be able
to give prescriptive criteria aimed at error reduction.
Nonetheless, public and professional reaction to recent structural fail-
ures has made it apparent that reductions in the rate of occurrence and
the effects of error in the building process would be desirable. Engineers
should recognize that things can and do go wrong. They also should
think in terms of hazard scenarios and how the structural system could
fail, as well as in terms of design loads and resistances. Such perfor-
mance-oriented thinking cannot be mandated by code, but it seems es-
sential if significant reductions in error incidence are to be achieved.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This material is based, in part, on work supported by Brookhaven Na-

tional Laboratory to develop probability-based design criteria. Any opin-
419

J. Struct. Eng. 1987.113:409-422.

 ions, findings and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author
and may not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor.

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