LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC - CASE DIGESTS

SUBMITTED BY: JOJI MARIE C. PALEC

1. ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003.

Facts:
Soledad Escritor (Escritor) is a court interpreter of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Piñas City since 1999. She has been living with Luciano Quilapio JR (Quilapio), a
resident of Bacoor, Cavite, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and
had a son, eighteen to twenty years old, with him as well. Escritor’s husband died a year before
she entered into the judiciary in 1999, while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Alejandro Estrada (Estrada) requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate Escritor as he
believes that the latter is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it
will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor alleges that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. In fact, after ten (10) years of living together, they executed a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:
Whether or not Escitor should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct.

Held:
No. Escritor invokes the religious beliefs and practices and moral standards of her
religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement with a man not her
legal husband does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held
administratively liable. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in Section 5, Article III of our Constitution, which provides “No law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.  The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.” As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred
of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim.
Thus, the State can only interfere with the exercise religious practices when it has a
compelling interest. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s
interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a
distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind -
the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming that the Office of the
Solicitor General has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the
state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state.
Hence, the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to
the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

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 2. LEUS vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S, G.R. No. 187776, January 28, 2015.

Facts:
Cheryll Santos Leus (Leus) was hired in May 2001 by St. Scholastica’s College
Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic and secretarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite, as an
assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate.
Leus and her boyfriend, which later became her husband, conceived a child out of
wedlock sometime in 2003. When SSCW learned of Leus’ pregnancy, she was advised by Sr.
Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), the Directress, to file her resignation from her employment,
which the latter refused in response. After being directed to explain in writing why she should
not be dismissed, Sr. Quiambao informed Leus in a letter dated June 11, 2003, that her
employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground of serious misconduct, for engaging in pre-
marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof. She stressed that pre-marital
sexual relations between two consenting adults with no impediment to marry, even if they
subsequently married, amounts to immoral conduct. She further pointed out that SSCW finds
unacceptable the scandal brought about by the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock as it ran
counter to the moral principles that SSCW stands for and teaches its students.

Issue:
Whether or not Leus’ pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid ground to terminate
her employment.

Held:
No. The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se,
is "disgraceful and immoral" considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational
institution. However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned
conclusion arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock, without more, is not enough to characterize the petitioner’s conduct as disgraceful or
immoral. There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
The Court does not find any circumstance in this case which would lead the Court to
conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears stressing that
the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no legal impediment to
marry. Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her boyfriend, the father of her
child. Pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to
marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely
public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. Hence, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally
dismissed as there was no just cause for the termination of her employment.

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 3. LOCSIN vs. MEKENI FOOD CORP., G.R. No. 192105, December 9, 2013.

Facts:
In February 2004, Mekeni Food Corporation (Mekeni) a Philippine company engaged in
food manufacturing and meat processing hired Antonio Locsin II (Locsin) as Regional Sales
Manager. In addition to a compensation and benefit package, Mekeni offered petitioner a car
plan, which Locsin accepted. Under which one-half of the cost of the vehicle is to be paid by the
company and the other half to be deducted from petitioner's salary.
When Locsin resigned on February 2006, a total of P112,500.00 had been deducted from
his monthly salary and applied as part of his employee’s share in the car plan. He offered to
purchase his service vehicle but the parties could not agree on its terms, hence, he returned the
vehicle to Mekeni on May 2006. He then made personal and written follow ups regarding his
unpaid salaries, commissions, benefits and offer to purchase his service vehicle. Mekeni replied
that the company car plan benefit applied only to employees who have been with the company
for five years; for this reason, the balance that petitioner should pay on his service vehicle stood
at P116,380.00 if he opts to purchase the same.
On May 3, 2007, petitioner filed against Mekeni and/or its President, Prudencio S.
Garcia, a Complaint for the recovery of monetary claims consisting of unpaid salaries,
commissions, sick/vacation leave benefits, and recovery of monthly salary deductions which
were earmarked for his cost-sharing in the car plan. 

Issue:
Whether Locsin is entitled to a refund of all the amounts applied to the cost of the service
vehicle under the car plan.

Held:
Yes. From the evidence on record, it is seen that the Mekeni car plan offered to Locsin
was subject to no other term or condition than that the former shall cover one-half of its value,
and the latter shall in turn pay the other half through deductions from his monthly salary. Mekeni
has not shown, by documentary evidence or otherwise, that there are other terms and conditions
governing its car plan agreement. There is no evidence to suggest that if Locsin failed to
completely cover one-half of the cost of the vehicle, then all the deductions from his salary going
to the cost of the vehicle will be treated as rentals for his use thereof while working with Mekeni,
and shall not be refunded. Indeed, there is no such stipulation or arrangement between them.
In Elisco Tool, it was made clear that installments made on the car plan may be treated as
rentals only when there is an express stipulation in the car plan agreement to such effect.
Therefore, it was incorrect to assume that, even in the absence of express stipulation, Locsin’s
payments on the car plan may be considered as rentals which need not be returned.
The Court cannot allow that payments made on the car plan should be forfeited by
Mekeni and treated simply as rentals for Locsin's use of the company service vehicle. Nor may
they be retained by it as purported loan payments. In the first place, there is precisely no
stipulation to such effect in their agreement. Secondly, it may not be said that the car plan
arrangement between the parties was a benefit that Locsin enjoyed; on the contrary, it was an
absolute necessity in Mekeni's business operations, which benefited it to the fullest extent. Any
benefit or privilege enjoyed by Locsin from using the service vehicle was merely incidental and
insignificant, because for the most part the vehicle was under Mekeni's control and
supervision. Free and complete disposal is given to the petitioner only after the vehicle's cost is
covered or paid in full. Thus, it is clear that while Locsin was paying for half of the vehicle's
value, Mekeni was reaping the full benefits from the use thereof.
In light of the foregoing, it is unfair to deny petitioner a refund of all his contributions to
the car plan. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, "every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." Article 2142

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of the same Code likewise clarifies that there are certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts
which give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract, to the end that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another. In the absence of specific terms and conditions
governing the car plan arrangement between Locsin and Mekeni, a quasi-contractual relation was
created between them. Consequently, Mekeni may not enrich itself by charging Locsin for the
use of its vehicle which is otherwise absolutely necessary to the full and effective promotion of
its business.

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