Personality and Individual Differences 147 (2019) 28–32

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

Socio-cognitive biases are associated to belief in neuromyths and cognitive T

enhancement: A pre-registered study
⁎
Michiel van Elk
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This study identified the psychological and cognitive factors that predispose people to believe in neuromyths
Neuromyths (e.g., the belief that we only use 10% of our brain) and in cognitive enhancement (e.g., the belief that brain
Cognitive enhancement stimulation devices can enhance cognition). A new scale to measure belief in neuromyths and cognitive en-
Cognitive biases hancement was developed and validated. Belief in neuromyths was related to a more intuitive (compared to an
Brain pictures
analytical) thinking style, a stronger need for cognitive closure, a simpler view of epistemic cognition, en-
Intuitive and analytical thinking
dorsement of a fixed mindset, and it was inversely related to scientific literacy. Belief in cognitive enhancement
was specifically related to the endorsement of a growth mindset. No clear effect of the presence or absence of
brain pictures on credibility ratings for neuroscientific explanations and intuitive thinking was found. These
findings suggest that belief in neuromyths and cognitive enhancement is a multifaceted phenomenon and that
interventions to foster public understanding of neuroscience could be aimed at affecting thinking styles.

1. Introduction neuroscience experts endorse neuromyths to a great extent (Macdonald,

Why do so many people believe that we only use a limited capacity
of our brain? Consider the case of a man who uses a brain-training
application on his smartphone to activate his hidden mental potential.
Or take the example of a woman who willingly subjects herself to a
commercially available brain stimulation device for cognitive en-
hancement. Why are people so mesmerized by the potential of new
neuroscience techniques that they are willing to subject themselves to
extensive neurofeedback programs or even willing to sacrifice their
autonomy for the promise that their brain will ultimately be enhanced?
To answer these questions it is important to better understand why
so many people believe in ‘neuromyths’, i.e., incorrect conceptions of
and beliefs about the human brain (e.g., the widespread belief that
people use only 10% of their brain capacity, or the myth that the left
hemisphere is for analytical and the right hemisphere for intuitive
thinking; cf., Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, & Jolles, 2012; Furnham,
2018; Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2010, 2011; Pasquinelli,
2012). It has been found for instance that between 50% and 70% of
teachers in primary and secondary school believe in neuromyths
(Dekker et al., 2012; Düvel, Wolf, & Kopiez, 2017) and teachers apply
ideas related to neuroeducation in their teaching (i.e., by tailoring their
teaching style to the modality most suited to the student's preferred
learning style, e.g., the visual or auditory modality). But even
Germine, Anderson, Christodoulou, & McGrath, 2017). Belief in neu-
romyths is partly supported and reinforced by popular media reports
(Macdonald et al., 2017) that often refer to neuroscientific evidence in
an illegitimate way. It has also been suggested that complex and col-
orful renderings of a human brain can increase the credibility and
perceived quality of scientific information (McCabe & Castel, 2008),
while others have argued that this effect might be small or even non-
existent (Michael, Newman, Vuorre, Cumming, & Garry, 2013;
Schweitzer, Baker, & Risko, 2013). Belief in cognitive enhancement can
result in an excessive burden for parents to provide the optimal cir-
cumstances for their child's brain development (O'Connor & Joffe,
2013) and even in unwarranted advice regarding parenting practices
(e.g., the Mozart-effect; cf., Bangerter & Heath, 2004). Moreover, the
popular use of brain-based explanations of human behavior increas-
ingly raises ethical issues related to individual responsibility (e.g., ‘my
brain made me do it’; Farah, 2002; Roskies, 2006), which becomes even
more prominent with the introduction of neurostimulation techniques
that may provide a perfect ‘excuse’ for the externalization of one's ac-
tions (Hoogeveen, Schjoedt, & van Elk, 2018).
Despite the wide media coverage of neuroscience findings and the
large number of grants that have been awarded to brain-based projects
(e.g., the Human Brain Project; Markram, 2012), surprisingly little at-
tention has been paid to the biases underlying our expectations about

⁎
University of Amsterdam, Department of Psychology, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129B, 1018WT Amsterdam, the Netherlands
E-mail address: m.vanelk@uva.nl.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.04.014
Received 23 February 2019; Received in revised form 6 April 2019; Accepted 11 April 2019
Available online 24 April 2019
0191-8869/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M. van Elk
brain research and its potential applications. Drawing a parallel with
research on cognitive precursors of supernatural beliefs and pseu-
doscience (Gervais et al., 2017; Maij et al., 2017; Maij, van Schie,
Ploeger, & van Elk, 2019; van Elk, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; van Elk &
Aleman, 2017; van Elk, Bekkering, & Friston, 2015; van Elk, Rutjens,
van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2015; van Leeuwen & van Elk, 2018),
the present pre-registered study tested the hypothesis that neuroench-
antment, i.e., people's beliefs in and expectations about the promises of
neuroscientific findings and techniques, is based on similar cognitive
biases that play a role in religion and spirituality. The aim of this study
was thus to determine why some people are more prone to believe in
neuromyths and in cognitive enhancement than others.
A large-scale survey was conducted in which participants were
presented with different questions related to brain myths (e.g., ‘people
use only 10% of their brain capacity’; ‘the left hemisphere is for in-
tuitive thinking’) and to cognitive enhancement beliefs (e.g., ‘Cognitive
abilities can be boosted through brain stimulation techniques’).
Building on previous research conducted on cognitive biases associated
with different belief systems (e.g., conspiracy beliefs; belief in alter-
native medicine; Maij, van Harreveld, et al., 2017; van Elk, 2013,
2015a, 2015b; van Elk, Karinen, Specker, Stamkou, & Baas, 2016), this
study assessed the relation between socio-cognitive biases and neu-
roenchantment. All hypotheses, the pre-tests, the materials, the sam-
pling and analysis plan were pre-registered prior to the study on the
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/639uk/; the preregistration
itself can be found at: https://osf.io/f8j9x/register/
565fb3678c5e4a66b5582f67).
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Based on an expected moderate correlation of r = 0.33, α = 0.05
and a power of β = 0.80 at least 230 participants are required to detect
an effect. In total 400 participants were recruited through Amazon's
Mechanical Turk platform and participated in a survey assessing their
view and knowledge of the human brain and neuroscience. Participants
provided informed consent for their participation and received a 2$
reward for completing the survey. The study protocol was approved by
the local ethics committee (https://www.lab.uva.nl/lab/ethics; project
id = 2018-SP-8866). A priori exclusion criteria (as specified on the
OSF) were exclusion of participants who did not complete the survey or
who completed the survey in < 5 min, resulting in a drop-out of 14
participants.
2.2. Development of the neuromyths & cognitive enhancement questionnaire
The questionnaire to assess belief in neuromyths and belief in cog-
nitive enhancement was developed and validated by using three in-
dependent pre-tests that are described in more detail on the OSF
(https://osf.io/639uk/ under ‘Pretest and Validation of Neuromyths
questionnaire’). In a first pretest 50 participants completed 25 items
related to neuromyths, cognitive enhancement and brain facts that were
derived from previous studies (Dekker et al., 2012). An exploratory
factor analysis was conducted, indicating that most but not all items
loaded positive on the expected construct. Next, in a second pretest we
asked 12 neuroscience experts from the Brain and Cognition pro-
gramme group at the University of Amsterdam to classify each of the 25
items as a ‘neuromyth’, as ‘cognitive enhancement’ or as a ‘brain fact’.
Based on both pre-tests ambiguous items were removed from the
questionnaire and the classification of the remaining 22 items to the
different subscales was established (see Table 1). In a third pre-test 100
participants completed the survey and by conducting a confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) the expected factor structure was validated, as the
CFA indicated a good model fit. Thus for the present study we used the
22-item version of the neuromyths scale as presented in Table 1. The
29
Personality and Individual Differences 147 (2019) 28–32
Table 1
Scale used to assess belief in neuromyths, cognitive enhancement and brain
facts used in pre-test 3 and in the main study.
Neuromyths
1. Learning problems associated with developmental differences in brain function
cannot be remediated by education.
2. Children are less attentive after consuming sugary drinks and/or snacks.
3. Male brains are biologically better suited for math and science, female brains for
empathy.
4. Children must acquire their native language before a second language is learned. If
they do not do so neither language will be fully acquired.
5. Brain development has finished by the time children reach secondary school.
6. We only use 10% of our brain.
7. Some people are left-brained (logical) and some are right-brained (creative).
8. Mental capacity is hereditary and cannot be changed by the environment or
experience.
9. Drinking (moderate) alcohol kills brain cells.
10. To uncover people's true thoughts, brain scans are more suitable than asking
questions.
11. Playing classical music to infants makes them smarter.
Cognitive enhancement
12. Exercises that rehearse coordination of motor-perception skills can improve
literacy skills.
13. Playing commercial video games improves cognitive performance.
14. You can improve your working memory with yoga exercises.
15. Cognitive performance can be positively affected by using brain stimulation (e.g.,
tDCS).
16. Doing crossword puzzles improves memory.
Brain facts
17. Individuals learn better when they receive information in their preferred learning
style (e.g., auditory, visual, kinesthetic).
18. The anatomic structure of the brain changes through intensive practice of an
instrument.
19. There are sensitive periods in childhood when it's easier to learn things.
20. Production of new connections in the brain can continue into old age.
21. We use our brains 24 h a day.
22. When a brain region is damaged other parts of the brain can take up its function.
reliabilities of the different subscales were as follows: neuromyths,
α = 0.73, cognitive enhancement, α = 0.67 and brain facts, α = 0.61.
The sumscore of the neuromyths and cognitive enhancement subscale
were calculated and were used as the main dependent variables in the
present study. The rationale for including brain facts in the neuromyths
questionnaire was to avoid response bias and to encourage participants
to think carefully about each statement. The items of the neuromyths
questionnaire were presented in random order.
2.3. Demographic variables and cognitive measures
Background variables that were measured included age, gender,
education, occupation, perceived socio-economic status and media ex-
posure (i.e., reading of popular science and exposure to primary sci-
entific articles). Media exposure was measured by asking participants to
indicate how often they read each of the following: (1) Popular scien-
tific texts (e.g. blogs, articles, journals, magazines, online platforms)
and (2) Primary scientific literature (e.g. peer reviewed articles) on a
continuous scale ranging from 0 (never) to 100 (often).
The Need for Cognitive Closure scale was included, consisting of 15
items (e.g., ‘I don't like situations that are uncertain.’) that were com-
pleted on a 6 point scale ranging from 1 = completely disagree to
6 = completely agree; Cronbach's alpha = 0.92 (cf., Roets & Van Hiel,
2011). Epistemic cognition and participants' view on the simplicity vs.
complexity of neuroscientific knowledge was measured using a mod-
ified version of the Discipline-focused Epistemological Beliefs scale
(e.g., ‘In the field of neuroscience, most work has only one right an-
swer.’; cf., Hofer, 2000). Items were completed on a 7-point scale ran-
ging from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely agree, α = 0.82.
Intuitive thinking was measured by using the faith in Intuition scale,
consisting of 12 items (e.g., ‘I trust my initial feelings about people.’)
that were completed on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = completely
M. van Elk Personality and Individual Differences 147 (2019) 28–32

false to 5 = completely true, α = 0.91 (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, &
Heier, 1996). Scientific Literacy was measured using 8 items (e.g., ‘It is
the father's gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl.’),
probing participant's general scientific knowledge (Kahan, 2012). Par-
ticipants had to indicate for each statement whether it was true or false
and the sumscore of the number of correct answers was taken as a
measure of scientific literacy. Finally, endorsement of a growth vs. a
fixed mindset was measured using the implicit theory of intelligence
scale, consisting of 14 items (Abd-El-Fattah & Yates, 2006). Seven items
were related to belief in a fixed mindset (e.g., ‘You are born with a fixed
amount of intelligence’), and 7 items to belief in a growth mindset (e.g.,
‘You can develop your intelligence if your really try’). The items were
combined in a continuous scale, with low values indicating a fixed view
of intelligence and high values a fluid view of intelligence.
different variables are presented in Table 3.
3.2. Confirmatory analyses
3.2.1. Regression analyses: predicting belief in neuromyths
When predicting belief in neuromyths, the first model including the
demographic variables was only marginally significant, F(4,
381) = 2.38, p = .051, R2 = 0.024 (see Table 4). When including the
different cognitive biases in Step 2, the model was significant, F(9,
376) = 12.96, p < .001, R2 = 0.24. As can be seen in Table 4, a sim-
pler epistemological understanding of neuroscience, more intuitive
thinking and endorsement of a fixed mindset predicted a stronger belief
in neuromyths. Increased scientific literacy was related to a reduced
belief in neuromyths.

2.4. Experimental manipulation
We conducted an experimental manipulation to investigate whether
brain pictures increase the credibility of a popular science article and
make people more prone to intuitive compared to analytical thinking.
To this end we presented participants with a short story on the neural
correlates of the LSD experience (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014): one group
of participants read the story accompanied by an illustrative and col-
orful brain picture, while the other group read the story without a
picture.
Following the story participants were asked to what extent they
found the neuroscientific explanation of the LSD experience credible
and we measured intuitive thinking, by using a variant of the cognitive
reflection task (CRT-2; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the two different experimental con-
ditions. The presentation of the different questionnaires was also ran-
domized throughout the study, but the experimental manipulation and
the subsequent dependent measures were presented at the end of the
survey.
2.5. Analysis
Two separate regression analyses were conducted with the belief in
neuromyths and the cognitive enhancement scales as dependent vari-
able. To analyze the effect of the experimental manipulation on the
credibility rating and intuitive vs. analytical thinking a MANOVA was
conducted with group as between-subjects factor, and the credibility
rating and the summed CRT score as dependent variables.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptives
An overview of the different variables, including demographics and
the scales is presented in Table 2. The correlations between the
Table 2
Descriptives for the different variables that were included in the study.
3.2.2. Regression analyses: predicting belief in cognitive enhancement
When predicting belief in cognitive enhancement, the first model
including the demographic variables was significant, F(4,
381) = 6.345, p < .001, R2 = 0.05: media exposure was a significant
predictor of belief in cognitive enhancement (see Table 5). When in-
cluding the different cognitive biases in Step 2, the model was sig-
nificant, F(9, 376) = 8.36, p < .001, R2 = 0.17. As can be seen in
Table 5, more intuitive thinking, viewing neuroscientific knowledge as
simple and endorsement of a growth mindset predicted a stronger belief
in cognitive enhancement.
3.2.3. Experimental manipulation: effect of presence or absence of brain
pictures on credibility and analytical thinking
When including all 386 participants in the analysis we found that
participants in the brain picture condition tended to rate the entropic
brain hypothesis as somewhat more credible (mean = 3.40, SD = 1.00)
than participants in the control condition (mean = 3.20, SD = 1.00),
although this difference was non-significant, t(384) = −1.94, p = .053,
d = −0.197. Participants in the brain picture condition also tended to
give more intuitive answers on the CRT (mean = 3.00, SD = 1.48)
compared to the control condition (mean = 3.29, SD = 1.34), t
(354) = 1.93, p = .054. When using a Bayesian analysis for the cred-
ibility ratings, we found a BF10 of 0.684, indicating that the data was
almost two times as likely under H0 compared to H1. Similarly, for the
CRT, we found a BF10 of 0.70, indicating that the data was more likely
under H0 compared to H1.
When including faith in intuition as a covariate in the analysis, we
did not find the predicted interaction between condition and intuitive
thinking on the credibility ratings, (F1, 382) = 0.49, p = .49.
Participants scoring high on intuitive thinking tended to give higher
credibility ratings to the story overall – irrespective of condition, F(1,
382) = 7.09, p = .008, η2 = 0.02. Similarly, for the overall CRT score
the interaction between condition and intuitive thinking was not sig-
nificant, F(1, 352) = 0.17, p = .68. As one might expect, participants
scoring high on intuitive thinking had lower scores (i.e., more intuitive
responses) on the CRT task, F(1, 352) = 6.41, p = .012, η2 = 0.02.
3.3. Exploratory analyses

Mean SD Range
Participants who read the page representing the entropic brain ex-
Age 37.27 11.77 18–70 planation in < 40 s were excluded in an exploratory analysis, as this
Education 4.70 1.13 2–7 interval was considered too short to read the complete text. The text
SES 4.50 1.94 0–10 consisted of 365 words, resulting in an estimated reading time of about
Media exposure 38.12 24.48 0–100
1.5 min. Following this exclusion criterion, 144 participants were in-
Belief in neuromyths 41.59 14.29 0.73–96.91
Cognitive enhancement 61.43 14.15 1.60–100.00 cluded in the condition without a brain picture and 132 participants in
Brain facts 71.45 12.99 18.00–100.00 the condition with a brain picture. The credibility ratings were higher
Need for cognition 3.92 0.89 1.00–5.80 for participants who were presented with a brain picture (mean = 3.42,
Epistemological understanding 3.50 0.74 1.36–6.07 SD = 1.00) compared to the group without a brain picture
Faith in intuition 3.49 0.74 1–5
(mean = 3.17, SD = 0.97), t(274) = −2.12, p = .035, d = −0.26.
Growth vs. fixed mindset 0.82 0.72 −1.14–3.00
Scientific literacy 5.91 1.18 3.00–7.00 There was no effect of the experimental manipulation on CRT scores
(p = .453).

30
M. van Elk Personality and Individual Differences 147 (2019) 28–32

Table 3
Correlations between the different variables, related to belief in neuromyths and cognitive enhancement and the socio-cognitive biases.
Pearson correlations

Neuromyths CE ME NFC EU FI GvFM

⁎⁎⁎
Belief in cognitive enhancement 0.187 –
⁎ ⁎⁎⁎
Media exposure 0.128 0.227 –
⁎⁎⁎
Need for cognitive closure 0.176 −0.06 −0.096 –
⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎⁎
Epistemological understanding 0.299 0.098 0.168 0.269 –
⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎
Faith in intuition 0.279 0.245 0.068 0.211 0.164 –
⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎⁎ ⁎ ⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎⁎ ⁎⁎
Growth vs. fixed mindset −0.23 0.258 0.106 −0.171 −0.23 0.136 –
⁎⁎⁎ ⁎ ⁎⁎ ⁎⁎ ⁎⁎⁎
Scientific literacy −0.258 −0.106 −0.139 −0.094 −0.141 −0.201 0.013

⁎
p < .05.
⁎⁎
p < .01.
⁎⁎⁎
p < .001.

Table 4 stronger belief in paranormal phenomena (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005;

Regression analysis predicting belief in neuromyths, including demographic Lindeman & Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2016), conspiracy beliefs (Brotherton
variables in Step 1 and the different cognitive biases in Step 2. & French, 2014), skepticism of climate change, vaccination, and genetic
B SE β p-Value modification (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2017), endorsement of
pseudoscience (Majima, 2015) and even acceptance of pseudo-pro-
Step 1 40.36 4.74 0.01 found ‘bullshit’ (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015).
Gender 1.46 1.47 0.05 .32
Belief in a variety of different phenomena, such as conspiracy beliefs or
Age 0.01 0.06 0.01 .85
Education −0.95 0.65 −0.08 .14 paranormal beliefs, are also strongly interrelated (Lobato, Mendoza,
Media exposure 0.04 8.96 0.14 .01 Sims, & Chin, 2014). As such the observed relationships may reflect a
Step 2 18.92 more general propensity or gullibility to accept epistemically un-
Gender 2.51 1.34 0.09 .06 warranted beliefs (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). Our
Age 0.09 0.06 0.07 .13
finding that intuitive thinking, scientific literacy and need for cognitive
Education −0.08 0.59 −0.01 .89
Media exposure 0.06 0.03 0.10 .04 closure predict belief in neuromyths likely reflects a general proclivity
Need for cognitive closure 0.78 0.79 0.05 .32 to answer in a confirmatory fashion to profound-looking pseudo-sci-
Epistemological understand 3.22 0.97 0.17 .001 entific statements. We note however, that we observed differential ef-
Faith in intuition 4.63 0.93 0.24 .000
fects for belief in neuromyths and belief in cognitive enhancement,
Mindset −4.16 0.95 −0.21 .000
Scientific literacy −2.23 0.58 −0.18 .000 indicating that we measured related – though distinct – constructs
(which was also confirmed by the CFA of our scale).
Our findings also extend previous results, by highlighting the role of
Table 5 domain-specific epistemic cognition and people's views on intelligence.
Regression analysis predicting belief in cognitive enhancement, including de- Some people tend to see neuroscientific knowledge as simple – as un-
mographic variables in Step 1 and the different cognitive biases in Step 2. changing facts that are handed down by authority. In contrast, people
B SE β p-Value
with more complex levels of epistemic understanding are aware of the
fact that conflicting opinions may exist on certain issues, although they
Step 1 64.12 4.60 < 0.001 acknowledge that empirical evidence and the use of the scientific
Gender −2.58 1.43 −0.09 .07 method may ultimately lead to more legitimate positions (Kuhn,
Age −0.02 0.06 −0.01 .79
Education −0.70 0.63 −0.06 .79
Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). We found that viewing neuroscientific
Media exposure 0.13 0.03 0.23 .000 knowledge as simple is associated with a stronger endorsement of
Step 2 44.59 8.05 0.000 neuromyths and belief in cognitive enhancement. People who are
Gender −1.66 1.38 −0.06 .23 convinced that neuroscience provides straightforward solutions and
Age 0.04 0.06 0.03 .51
answers are more likely to subscribe to popular scientific conceptions of
Education −0.19 0.61 −0.02 .75
Media exposure 0.09 0.03 0.16 .001 the brain. They are also more willing to believe in the potential to
Need for cognitive closure −1.46 0.82 −0.09 .08 unleash the hidden powers of the mind through brain stimulation
Epistemological understand 2.16 1.00 0.113 .03 techniques.
Faith in intuition 3.67 0.97 0.19 .000 In addition we found that one's view of intelligence as being fixed or
Mindset 4.29 0.98 0.22 .000
Scientific literacy −0.50 0.60 −0.04 .41
fluid (Dweck, 2006) was associated with respectively belief in neuro-
myths and with belief in neuroenhancement. People who viewed in-
telligence and human performance in general as fixed tended to believe
4. Discussion less in the potential of cognitive enhancement – though they endorsed
neuromyths to a greater extent. The view that intelligence is fixed from
The data from our study confirmed most of the pre-registered hy- one's birth on fits well with the contents of neuromyths that also imply
potheses (https://osf.io/639uk/ and: https://osf.io/f8j9x/register/ a deterministic view on human cognitive performance (e.g., ‘Learning
565fb3678c5e4a66b5582f67). Belief in neuromyths was predicted by problems associated with developmental differences in brain function
a high need for cognitive closure, a simple (vs. a complex) view of cannot be remediated by education.’). In contrast, endorsement of a
scientific knowledge, an intuitive (compared to an analytical) thinking growth mindset, i.e., the view that intelligence is a source that can be
style, increased scientific literacy and a fixed mindset. Belief in cogni- cultivated, was positively related to belief in cognitive enhancement,
tive enhancement was predicted by a simple view of neuroscientific while it was negatively related to belief in neuromyths. This illustrates
knowledge, intuitive thinking and a growth mindset. Previous studies that belief in the potential of neurotechnologies, strongly hinges on
have demonstrated a relationship between these cognitive biases and a one's view that the human mind can be ‘hacked’ and improved. The
observation of a differential effect of mindset for belief in neuromyths

31
M. van Elk
and in cognitive enhancement, furthermore demonstrates that our
cognitive enhancement items capture a specific proclivity for belief in
human enhancement – rather than a general gullibility to buy into
popular science explanations.
We failed to replicate previously reported effects regarding the
presence of brain pictures on the perceived credibility of a neuroscience
explanation (Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008). By
using a Bayesian analysis found no evidence for an effect of brain pic-
tures on credibility ratings. We also could find no evidence for the
hypothesis that an intuitive thinking style moderated the relationship
between the effects of brain pictures on credibility ratings. Thus, a
higher-powered study is needed to provide more conclusive evidence
regarding the presence or absence of an effect of brain pictures on
perceived credibility (based on the observed effect sizes of d = 0.2, at
least 1082 participants would need to be included). Future studies
should also consider including additional conditions (e.g., a black-white
instead of a colored rending of the brain; a colorful picture of a different
object) to control for other factors that could potentially contribute to
an effect on the perceived credibility of messages.
5. Conclusions
Thinking style and different socio-cognitive biases selectively pre-
dicted belief in neuromyths and in cognitive enhancement. Changing
people's beliefs in the potential promises and pitfalls of neuroscience
thus requires paying careful attention to people's thinking styles. At the
same time, belief in cognitive enhancement (and a growth mindset)
may hold great promise to exert beneficial effects in different neuro-
cognitive treatments and expectancy manipulations (Hoogeveen et al.,
2018).
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Jasmijn Kruissink, Laura Vermande and
Marissa Woudstra for their help with setting up the study, their creative
insight and ideas and their help with validating the neuromyths ques-
tionnaire. This work was made possible by a grant from the BIAL
Foundation (grant # 076/2016).
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