The introduction of this doctrine of irrealia and of so-called “states of affairs”

(existences,
non-existences, possibilities, impossibilities, etc.) was necessary in order to
preserve the
correspondence theory. Brentano was later to give up this doctrine; yet it was
destined to play
a significant role in the philosophical movements that were to grow out of
Brentano’s thought.
The second selection—the fragmentary “Being in the Sense of the True”—
shows the
earlier doctrine in its classic form. One can see that at the time the selection
was written,
Brentano took the linguistically equivalent expressions, “There is someone
contemplating
an A” and “There is an A which is being contemplated” to indicate correlative
entities.
2. The selections presented here are so arranged as to indicate the gradual
emancipation
from both theories—the theory of the adaequatio rei et intellectus and the
theory of
irrealia. Strictly speaking, the lecture on truth contains the key to the
refutation of the
correspondence, or adaequatio, theory. In Section 5 8b we find one
consideration which
would reduce any such theory to absurdity. Brentano here points out—and
again in Part Two
of the book—that every such theory implies that where there is a judgement
constituting
compares the knowing judgement with the thing that is known.1
3. In the first essay Brentano enters into a controversy with Windelband. He
agrees with
Windelband that the Aristotelian theory is not sufficient, but he contends that
Windelband,
in his attempt to free himself from the concept of truth as “being adequate,
suitable, or
appropriate”, goes too far in trying to conceive it in terms of being in “an
agreement with
a rule of thinking”. Windelband thinks that, with this concept of a rule or
norm, he catches
 the essence of Kant’s “Copernican revolution” and that Kant himself had
abandoned the
correspondence theory. Brentano easily shows, with abundant documentary
evidence, that
Windelband has really transformed the views of his master. But Brentano goes
too far in his
critique of Windelband’s “Kantian” theory, for in one important point
Windelband is close
to the later teaching of Brentano: the insightful judgement, i.e., the judgement
as it ought
to be, the judgement which is justified, is taken to be the standard of truth and
falsehood,
of correctness and incorrectness.
In saying that truth consists in a way of thinking which accords with a rule
that ought
to be followed, Windelband is far from being entirely clear. But in saying that
the mind
brings its own norm to consciousness, he is speaking in terms which could
also be used to
express the doctrine on which Brentano had been lecturing for years. Indeed
the following
passage from Windelband’s Präludien (p. 47) agrees with Brentano’s views,
almost to the
letter: “The only thing that philosophy can do is to extract this normative
consciousness
from the flux of our empirical consciousness and to rely upon direct evidence;
it is in this
direct evidence that the normative consciousness, once it has been brought to
light, has
the efficacy and validity which it ought to have for every individual.” But this
is as far
as the agreement goes, for Windelband is unable to distinguish the “ought” of
judgement
from the “ought” of feeling and willing; the fact that a judgement which ought
to be—i.e.,
an insightful judgement—is at the same time a judgement which ought to be
valued adds