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Kant's conception of the Noumenon

Sadik J. Al-Azm

Dialogue / Volume 6 / Issue 04 / March 1968, pp 516 - 520

DOI: 10.1017/S0012217300034120, Published online: 09 June 2010

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Sadik J. Al-Azm (1968). Kant's conception of the Noumenon. Dialogue, 6,
pp 516-520 doi:10.1017/S0012217300034120

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KANT'S CONCEPTION OF THE NOUMENON*

I N treating of our subject three notions stand out prominently:

the noumenon, the thing-in-itself and the transcendental
object = X. In his commentary on The Transcendental Analytic,
Robert P. Wolff has studied very carefully the question of the
relationship between the notion of a transcendental object and
that of the thing-in-itself.1 He noted and explained the passages
of The Critique in which Kant means by the transcendental object
simply the thing-in-itself and the passages in which he means by
it something different such as "the concept of the ground of the
unity of a manifold of representations in one consciousness."2
There is little to be added, at this time, to Wolff's thorough
investigations of this aspect of the problem.
Concerning the question of the relationship between the notions
of the noumenon and the thing-in-itself, Wolff suggests, in a foot-
note, 3 that strictly speaking, it is not correct to equate them since
the thing-in-itself is a metaphysical term while the noumenon is
an epistemological one. Then Wolff goes on to introduce a little
qualification which has the effect of minimizing, to some extent,
the significance of his suggestion.
In the following pages, I would like to elaborate the case for the
suggested distinction between the noumenon and the thing-in-
itself as forcefully as possible. In fact the thought of this distinction
had occurred to me several years ago, and I think it has greater
significance for the appreciation of the teachings of The Critique
than Wolff seems willing to admit.
Kant treats the subject of the noumenon from two angles: (a)
the noumenon as a positive concept; (b) the noumenon as a
negative concept. (B 307, 308). Now, it is usual and customary in
philosophic discourse to identify the noumenon with the thing-
* In this short study I am limiting myself very strictly to Kant's First
Critique. The text utilized is the Norman Kemp Smith translation.
1
R. P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, Harvard University Press,
1963, pp. 135-150,313-316.
2
Ibid., p. 314.
3
Ibid., p. 95.
 KANT'S CONCEPTION OF THE NOUMENON

in-itself, at least it is not customary to distinguish them clearly and

unmistakably. I would like to emphasize and strengthen Wolff's
suggested distinction between them by holding that it is al-
together a mistake to identify these two notions and to use them
interchangeably regardless of whether we take the noumenon as
a positive or as a negative concept. The thesis that I am going to
attack may be formulated more rigorously in the following
manner:
"The concept 'noumenon' and the concept 'thing-in-itself' refer
to the same objective reality, i.e., they are different terms that
name the same object and therefore, may be used interchangeably
since they have the same purport and meaning."

The Noumenon As A Positive Concept:

According to Kant, one may easily be tempted to argue that
since the categories are not grounded in sensibility, their applica-
bility is not limited to what is given in sensible intuition but may
extend to an intelligible world which may be known without the
mediation of sensibility and intuition. Such an extended applica-
tion of the categories Kant calls the Transcendental Employment
of the Categories as opposed to their legitimate Empirical employ-
ment. The intelligible entities to which one is tempted to extend
the application of the categories are called by Kant "noumena".
In other words according to this claim, noumena are real in-
telligible entities that we know through a non-sensuous type of
intuition.
Kant emphatically denies that such a transcendental applica-
tion of the categories is possible and rejects the suggestion that we
possess some sort of a non-sensuous intuition through which we
can apprehend noumena. (B 308). This whole mode of arguing
is considered by him illusory. In other words Kant completely
rejects the notion of the noumenon as a positive concept. Although
we try to effect a transcendental application of the categories, such
an application has no objective validity since it has no possible
object to which it refers.
Now, we may not identify Kant's concept of the "thing-in-
itself" with the notion of the "noumenon", considered as a positive
concept, for the following reasons:

517
 SADIK AL-AZM

1) Kant rejects the noumenon considered as a positive concept

in the clearest possible terms while at the same time he affirms
unequivocally the concept of the thing-in-itself. (B 307, 309). If
the noumenon is to be considered equivalent to the thing-in-itself
this would mean that Kant is giving up his doctrine of the thing-
in-itself and this seems to me a preposterous claim. Kant very
simply asserts that it is ridiculous to speak of appearance without
there being something to appear and that something is the thing-
in-itself. (B xxvi). Without the thing-in-itself the whole critical
philosophy will have to be re-written.4 Due to the distinctness of
the concept of the noumenon and the thing-in-itself Kant can
consistently reject the former and affirm the latter and this is
precisely what he does. In short the concept of the noumenon in
its positive sense has to be distinct from the concept of the thing-
in-itself simply because Kant rejects the former and asserts the
latter as a cardinal part of his philosophy.
2) Kant asserts that the concept of the noumenon has no
objective counterpart to which it refers. On the other hand he
unequivocally states that the concept of the thing-in-itself does
refer to an objective reality although that reality remains opaque
to our knowledge.
We can state the same point in a more diluted form. Kant can
easily and consistently maintain that noumena, as intelligible
entities, may exist though we have no way of knowing whether
they do or not. But Kant cannot consistently maintain that things-
in-themselves may exist, though we have no way of knowing
whether they do or not. In fact Kant maintains that things-in-
themselves exist though we have no means of knowing them. He
can afford to be a skeptic with respect to the existence or non-
existence of noumena but he cannot afford to be a skeptic with
respect to the existence or non-existence of things-in-themselves.
3) Kant's account of the human understanding requires him to
reject the notion of the noumenon considered as a positive concept.
He states: "The division of objects into phenomena and noumena
and the world into a world of the senses and a world of the under-
standing is therefore quite inadmissible in the positive sense." (B 311).
4
Wolffstresses this point heavily, p. 312.

518
 KANT'S CONCEPTION OF THE NOUMENON

While the division of the world into phenomena and noumena in

the positive sense is inadmissible, (it is admissible in the negative
sense of noumena) the division of the world into appearances and
things-in-themselves in the positive sense is not only admissible but
necessary and essential if we are going to have Kant's critical
philosophy and not some other kind of critical philosophy.

The Notion Of The Noumenon As A Negative Concept:

Kant considered the notion of the noumenon in its negative
sense as an indeterminate concept. It does not give us any knowl-
edge whatsoever. It is a concept of what we do not know, so to
speak. Its function is purely negative in that it marks the limit
beyond which our concepts may not and should not go, if they are
to yield synthetic knowledge. He says: "The concept of a nou-
menon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being ex-
tended to things-in-themselves, and thus to limit the objective
validity of sensible knowledge." (B 310). This I think states in the
clearest possible terms the function that Kant assigns to the
noumenon considered as a negative concept. It is merely a limiting
concept and is therefore of a negative employment and can affirm
of nothing positive.
Now, the notion of the noumenon considered as a negative
concept may not be identified with the concept of the thing-in-
itself for the following reasons:
It has become clear, I hope, that the noumenon in this negative
sense performs a strictly negative function in the body of our
knowledge and in relationship to other concepts. But Kant no-
where states that the concept of the thing-in-itself performs such a
function. On the contrary for Kant this concept of the thing-in-
itself refers to an objective and independent reality, to a brute
fact that cannot be dismissed, notwithstanding the fact that we
have no knowledge about it. The concept of the thing-in-itself
refers to that reality which appears to our minds and any identi-
fication of the concept of the noumenon with that of the thing-in-
itself is confusing a mere negative concept that has no objective
reference with what for Kant exists per se. Surely such a confusion
is inadmissible. The noumenon is a limiting concept; the thing-in-
itself is an unknowable reality; and there is a world of difference

519
 SADIK AL-AZM

between a concept and a real thing. The noumenon is a concept

that results from the limitations of our sensibility, while the thing-
in-itself is independent of our mental constitution and of our
knowledge and its presence distinguishes appearances from sheer
illusions. The noumenon is a strictly epistemological concept; the
thing-in-itself is an ontological concept. Notice the statement: I
cited from Kant. He states that the concept of a noumenon is
necessary to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to
things-in-themselves, i.e., in order to try not to extend our know-
ledge to things-in-themselves we need the limiting concept of the
noumenon. Kant unmistakably is speaking as if the noumenon
and thing-in-itself were altogether different and distinct. The
noumenon as a negative concept arises, according to Kant, due
to an epistemological need and Kant would never consent to
regard the thing-in-itself in this light. If the noumenon functions
as a limit to prevent us from extending our knowledge to things-
in-themselves then such a limit has to be different from what it
limits.
The origins and causes of this confusion that I have tried to
clarify are probably many and I have not explored them. How-
ever, to a certain extent they have to do with Kant's manner of
writing and his tendency at times to speak of the noumenon and
thing-in-itself without drawing all the necessary distinctions.
Furthermore, we find two major dichotomies in Kant: appearances
vs. things-in-themselves and phenomena vs. noumena. Now since
the concepts of phenomena and appearances are often used inter-
changeably as if they had the same meaning and reference one
can easily conclude that, therefore, the other two terms of the
dichotomy also have the same meaning and reference.

SADIK J. AL-AZM
American University of Beirut

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