Transcendental Arguments

Author(s): T. E. Wilkerson
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) , Jul., 1970, Vol. 20, No. 80, Special Review
Number (Jul., 1970), pp. 200-212
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association
and the University of St. Andrews

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2218393

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 200

TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS1

BY T. E. WILKERSON

1. Consider the following argument: 'I am conscious of a series

representations, ordered in time. But I can be conscious of them only i
can ascribe them to myself, which in turn is possible only if I can distingui
myself (and my states) from what is not myself (or my states)-that i
only if I can distinguish subjective from objective. But this distinctio
clearly, can be made only if I can apply concepts of the objective-whi
in turn requires that the world at least exhibits an ordering sufficient
support such application. In short, I am conscious of a series of represen
tions only if I can describe an objective world, as subject to some kind
law-governed ordering, independent of my perceiving it '.
This argument is a more watertight, more rigorous version of Kan
central argument in the Critique of Pure Reason from the empirical un
of apperception to the law of universal causality: it contains none of t
psychological apparatus of the Transcendental Deduction, and makes n
attempt to reconstruct the utterly irrelevant and misguided " time-orders "
argument of the second Analogy. From an historical point of view
represents the most important transcendental argument of the Critiqu
connected series of answers to the questions Hume had raised in his analy
of personal identity and causation. From a general philosophical point
view it is a fair model of the sort of argument Kant used (or might ha
used) to demonstrate each of the synthetic a priori principles he was co
cerned (or should have been concerned) to demonstrate.
Both in this argument, and throughout the Critique, we encounter
number of logical expressions-particularly 'only if' and 'necessary con
dition of ... that . .'-which connect the various stages in the argument
And it is peculiar that, while there has been considerable discussion of t
status of each of the fundamental premisses, and of the conclusion, of t
argument (and arguments like it), there has been little or no discussion
the logical form of the argument itself. There has been lengthy discussi
for example, of the status of the principles of substance and causality (sy
thetic ?, a priori ?, both ?, neither ?), and of the fundamental assumpti
of empirical self-consciousness; there has been little discussion of t
exact logical connection between the principles and the assumption. Pe
haps it has not always been appreciated that there are two problems, t
first about the status of each of the premisses and the conclusion, and
second about the status of the entire argument from premisses to conclusion

1I am grateful to Prof. P. F. Strawson for his comments on an earlier draft of th

paper.

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 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS 201

But it is clear that there are two distinct problem

quite possible to derive synthetic conclusions from
analytic argument.
In so far as anyone has considered the second p
vailing opinion appears to be that such argument
that is, that they can be shown, by appropriate subst
of logical truths. I wish to argue that they are no
if' in question is not the ' only if' of logical necess
to follow Kant's argument through the Transcende
reflecting on the meanings of certain expressions
It is important to realize that the problem is rat
might at first appear, for at least two reasons. Fir
trying to dispel Humean doubts about causation,
that there not only is, but must be an a priori connec
existences ", if experience is to be possible at all.
not formally valid, Hume may be entitled to com
priori connection between distinct existences has b
by invoking a synthetic a priori connection betwe
He is entitled to demand an independent account
neither that of material implication, nor that of enta
Secondly, a more general point: the issue is not
student of Kant, but is fundamental to many mo
cussions. There are numerous examples in modern
kind of transcendental argument, of a more or less co
son's argument in Chapter 2 of Individuals, that
objects in space, or of objects in a dimension analo
in the following chapter that I can self-ascribe, on
states of consciousness; Bennett's claim in Rational
presupposes ability to employ a concept of time; W
I can refer to a sensation by the use of 'S ' only i
' '; Malcolm's argument in Dreaming that I can in
concept of a dream only if I have some public crit
than my own avowals on waking; and so on. At le
ments are normally regarded as valid: but it is n
formally (i.e., deductively) valid, that expressions
condition of ... that. . .' can be straightforwardly
like '. . . entails . . .'. The Kants, Strawsons, Benne
Malcolms of this world stand or fall together : if it c
argument is not formally valid, theirs (even if val
invalid; if we can introduce a notion of non-logica
support Kant's transcendental argument, it will also b
its more modern analogues.

2. Kant, unfortunately, offers us very little ass

difficulties. Two things only are clear from perusa

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 202 T. E. WILKERSON

of the Critique and the Prolegom

two possible methods of proof av
and secondly, that his is the synthe
In the Critique of Pure Reason I h
making inquiries into pure reason
determine the elements as well as the
But it is by no means clear what
supposed to be: if it is meant t
analytic and synthetic judgement
" synthetical " proofs will not be d
in the Critique which is relevant
susceptible of at least two obvi
ginning of Section 4 of Chapter
first and most interesting part o
What distinguishes the proofs of tr
other proofs which yield an a priori
the former, reason may not apply i
the object, but must first establish
the possibility of their a priori sy
the concept of an object, I can do so
supplied from outside this concep
which guides my synthesis; and th
mediately from pure intuition. In t
concerned only with concepts of the
of experience. Such proof does not
of that which happens) leads directl
such a transition would be a saltus which could not be justified. The proof
proceeds by showing that experience itself, and therefore the object of experience,
would be impossible without a connection of this kind. Accordingly, the proof
must also at the same time show the possibility of arriving synthetically and
a priori at some knowledge of things which was not contained in the concepts
of them.8

The passage may be interpreted, without strain, in either of two ways (b

not both): first, it might be construed as claiming that transcendental
arguments of the kind under discussion are deductively invalid (" arrivin
synthetically and a priori at some knowledge of things which was not co
tained in the concepts of them ") ; secondly, it might be taken as claimi
that such arguments are deductively valid (i.e., "analytic" in the moder
sense)-the logical cement which deductively binds premisses to conclusio
being " the possibility of experience ". A third interpretation even is ava
able-namely, that Kant confused the two problems I distinguished earlier
and that, instead of discussing the logical status of his transcendental proofs,
he was rather discussing the status of the synthetic a priori principles which
were to be proved-the relation between " the given concept (for instance
of that which happens)" and " another concept (that of a cause) ".
Discussion of Kant's intentions is unprofitable here : it is more important
to attack the general problems rather more directly. I propose now to
attack the claim that Kant's argument (and arguments like it) are analyt
that the only relevant difference between it and other (deductively valid
2Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (trans. Beck, New York, 1950), Ak27
(p. 21).
8A782-3=B810-1 (Kemp Smith trans.).

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 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS 203

arguments is the subject-matter. This is Wolff'

Theory of Mental Activity: he sets out to prov
treated, the Critique yields an argument which
advances by a rigorous deduction to the validity of
the other principles of the Analogies. . ..4
Unfortunately, the fruits of his endeavour are
we reflect on the Final Version of the Argumen
presents on pp. 278-9, we see exactly what is wr
that his argument is deductively rigorous (that is,
of step 9 !), we should feel considerable qualms o
namely " 3. The defining mark of objectivity is
In a deductively rigorous argument we may pe
assuming one of the things he is supposed to be
forgive is the solution of the problem in one are
up again in another. Consider proposition 3 : str
it is straightforwardly false, for the defining mark
is existence independent of any particular awarenes
Necessary connection has nothing at all to do wit
sions like 'object', 'objective', etc. But waivin
assuming that proposition 3 is true, it is not analyt
the status of the entire transcendental argumen
our problems one stage further back. Instead of
of a transcendental argument, we must clarify the
premiss which, though true, is not logically true !
Not all Kant commentators support Wolff in his
of the Analytic is indeed analytic. Weldon, for
not :

Can it be proved that the validity of the pure concepts, especially 'space',
'time', 'substance ' and ' causality' is a necessary condition of self-conscious-
ness, not just a ' presupposition' of it ? I do not see how this could be proved.
All that can be done is to restrict and pervert the meaning of 'self-conscious'
in such a way as to make the conclusion a truth of language.6
Unfortunately, he draws the very peculiar conclusion that the main argu-
ments of the first part of the Critique may best be regarded as attempts to
elucidate the presuppositions of Newtonian physics and Euclidian geometry,
rather than to show the necessary conditions of a possible experience (in a
weaker sense of' necessary condition ').
The notion of a possible experience invites an interesting and character-
istically Kantian suggestion which, if accepted, will perhaps resolve diffi-
culties in at least one case-the case with which we began, the argument
of the Analytic. Kant actually invokes the notion of a possible experience
as the ground of the necessity of each of his synthetic a priori principles :
. . although we can never pass immediately beyond the content of the concept
which is given us, we are nevertheless able, in relation to a third thing, namely
possible experience, to know the law of its connection with other things, and to
4R. P. Wolff, op. cit. (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 56.
5T. D. Weldon, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Oxford, 1958), p. 179.

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 204 T. E. WILKERSON

do so in an a priori manner. ... Hume was in error in inferring from the

contingency of our determination in accordance with the law the contingency of
the law itself . . .6

But there is no very good reason why we should not freely adapt
gestion, so that skilful employment of the notion of a possible ex
guarantees the deductive rigour of the argument from the fact of em
self-consciousness to the necessary applicability of each of the s
a priori forms of intuition, on the one hand, and categories, on t
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how the manoeuvre can be
in practice. An initial difficulty is that, for logical purposes, the
a possible experience is ill-formed: the components of an argum
propositions, not concepts. And in formulating a proposition whic
an appropriate reference to the notion of a possible experience, w
say too much, or too little. Consider our main argument and, in p
the fundamental premiss-' I am conscious of a series of represen
ordered in time'. Suppose that the fundamental premiss is conjoin
the following proposition : 'This series of representations consti
possible experience'. It is unclear how exactly the proposition
interpreted. The difficulties centre on the expression 'experienc
can be interpreted in three main ways :
(i) ' experience '=' experience of objects, i.e., outer things ';
(ii) 'experience '=' experience of objects, i.e., outer things, o
in some law-governed way ';
(iii) ' experience '=' a series of states of consciousness '.
If we adopt the first alternative, we can certainly deduce many of
sequences we wish to deduce. But there are at least two distin
backs: on the one hand, we are assuming part of what is to be pro
we are assuming there are outer things. (That is, the argumen
Transcendental Deduction could be reduced to two or three simple sent
On the other hand, our premisses are too weak to license the ded
derivation of the strong conclusion that there are law-governed
outer things. (That is, the argument of the Analogies would be ded
invalid.) For logical purposes the premisses are too weak, because t
not license the inference; for philosophical purposes, they are too
because an argument which assumes what it is designed to prove
interesting.
Similar difficulties afflict the other alternatives : (ii) will certainly
the inference to the strong conclusion that there are law-governe
things, but at the cost of triviality; (iii) will avoid the triviality
not license the inference. Further, both (i) and (ii) (inference-lice
slightly different degrees) are open to the objection I presented
Wolff-that in guaranteeing deductive rigour, we are only pushin
problems one stage further back. For we must ask, what exactly
status of the claim that the series of representations in question co
a possible experience ? If it is a claim about my series of represen
6A766=B794.

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 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS 205

it is irrelevant to a general discussion of any possi

If, on the other hand, it is to serve as a premiss in
must be able to justify it by reference to some ge
necessarily true, in some sense of 'necessarily tr
an interesting fact about all the series of represe
been, that they each constitute a possible experien
be a necessary feature of such a series. The only
serve our logical purposes (e.g., 'Every series of re
constitutes an experience of outer, law-governed t
not obviously) logically necessary. So, instead of a
argument, we are left with a synthetic transcendenta

3. The state of play so far is not calculated to in

efficacy of philosophical argument. The proponent
cendental arguments (if true) are analytically tru
resting certain premisses of the arguments in ques
his opponent faces the rather bleak prospect of ha
of a relation between propositions which is stronger
but weaker than logical entailment. However, we m
effort to dispel the mists of ignorance a little, by
which can be extracted (with a little effort) from
Section 15 of Kant's Analytic. I cannot pretend t
cides entirely with Bennett's argument.
Bennett has argued that Strawson's claim that
be of objects in space can be supported-at the pos
Strawson's model of an auditory world in certain
to consider the status of the claim. And he sugges
straightforwardly analytic (in the way that' Anythin
is analytic), it may be unobviously analytic; the cruci
claim (and claims like it) which distinguishes it f
truths, is that it is a claim about connections betw
between certain categories, rather than about conn
dicatum inest subjecto sort, between concepts. The
of the suggestion for our purposes is highlighted
The most interesting truths which Kant calls syntheti
thing like the status I have claimed for Strawson's th
analytic truths about the conditions under which cert
made, or under which certain concepts have a signific
negative. ... I offer this heuristic rule : ' When Kant c
and a priori, proceed as though he had said that it is
interrelations of the same general sort as Strawson's th
In a fairly obvious but unexciting way, the sugg
the analogues of Strawson's theory are not Kant's s
but rather the transcendental arguments which p
which Kant usually refers as synthetic a priori ar
Aesthetic, and the Principles of Pure Understandin
7J. F. Bennett, op. cit. (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 42-3.

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 206 T. E. WILKERSON

permanence and causality)-truths

" the conditions under which certain distinctions can be made" at all. It
is, for example, the argument from empirical consciousness to the princ
of causality which is the analogue of Strawson's argument from ou
experience to the spatial ordering of objects.
As I observed, the point is unexciting : a more important considerati
is that Bennett's argument suggests an entirely new approach to our pro
lem. By reflecting on one of his examples (which is designed to distingu
the applicability of 'square' from the utility of the "square "/"no
square " distinction) we might freely interpret his argument as follow
First, a certain amount of philosophical patter: following Sommers,8 w
may distinguish between the concept red (the predicate 'is red') and th
category Ired/ (the predicate 'is /red/'). Those and only those things a
red which are red; those and only those things are /red/ which are eith
red or not red-that is, those and only those things which can significant
(i.e., truly or falsely) be said to be red. For example, pillar-boxes, tomato
and Tudor roses are all red; all these and blackbirds, bluebottles and gree
gages are /red/-for they can all significantly (truly or falsely) be said t
be red or not red. Thoughts, Magna Carta and the synthesis of the manifold,
however, are not /red/, because putative statements such as 'this thoug
is red ', 'Magna Carta is not red ', 'the synthesis of the manifold is red
are not significant-are neither true nor false. (Such individuals can, of
course, be significantly said to be /red/ or not-/red/!) Thus, whereas ' x
red' is equivalent to 'It is true that x is red ', the corresponding catego
claim, ' x is /red/', is equivalent to 'It is significant (or intelligible) to describ
x as red '.
Now, as it happens, all our ordinary obviously analytic statements are
of the form :
(i) ' x is red only if x is coloured' (and, of course, '. ... .only if x
is /coloured/')
or ' x is square only if x is rectangular '
or ' x is conscious of representations only if x is conscious'.
But there are two other kinds of statement we might make:
(ii) 'x is /red/ only if x is coloured '
or ' x is /square/ only if x is rectangular'
or ' x is /conscious of representations/ only if x is conscious ',
and (iii) 'x is /red/ only if x is /coloured/'
or ' x is /square/ only if x is /rectangular/'
or 'x is /conscious of representations/ only if x is /conscious/'.
I would suggest that the transcendental claims in which we are interested
are of the form of (ii) or (iii), rather than of (i); that it is because they are
of the form of (ii) and (iii) that they are not obviously analytic; and, most
importantly, that we seem to have encountered certain difficulties. For,
whereas one of the statements in group (ii) (' x is /square/ only if x is rec-
8Cf. Fred Sommers, " Types and Ontology " (Phil. Review, 1963).

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 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS 207

tangular') is not only synthetic but false, the co

groups (i) and (iii) are analytically true ! Similarl
of representations/ only if x is conscious' is syn
is /conscious of representations/ even when com
statements in groups (i) and (iii) are analyticall
Let us call statements like 'x is red' (-statemen
'x is /red/ ' /(/-statements. y-statements are c
ments about the truth of y-statements; /p/-stat
are equivalent to statements about the intelligib
ments. Our general difficulties are due to the f
ment will entail the corresponding /(/-stateme
/red/') the converse is not true (' x is /red/ ' do
greengages are /red/). Our particular difficulties ce
transcendental argument in which we are intere
the form of (ii) above, and some of the form of
our problem if we restate the argument with w
p- and /<p/-statements:
First Version:
(a) I am conscious of a series of representations, ordered in time.
(b) I am /conscious of representations/ only if I /self-ascribe them/.
(c) I /self-ascribe them/ only if I /distinguish subjective from objec-
tive/.
(d) I /distinguish subjective from objective/ only if I /apply concepts
of objects/.
(e) I /apply concepts of objects/ only if the world exhibits a law-
governed connectedness.
It is very striking that all reference to my being able to do such and such
(apply concepts of objects, etc.) has been eradicated from the original argu-
ment, in favour of an implicit reference to my doing such and such's being
intelligible, to its being significant to say something of the form 'I self-
ascribe representations ', or 'I apply concepts of objects '. We could, if
necessary, spell out the whole argument again, in terms of intelligibility.
Second Version :
(a) I am conscious of a series of representations, ordered in time.
(b) It is intelligible to say that I am conscious (or not) of representa-
tions, only if . .., etc.
In the interests of brevity, I shall resist the urge to do so !
If the argument set out above, (a)-(e), can be shown to be (unobviously)
analytic, we have grounds for supposing that transcendental arguments in
general are analytic, that they demonstrate
.. .unobvious analytic truths about the conditions under which certain dis-
tinctions can be made, or under which certain concepts can have a significant
use, affirmative or negative.9
Unfortunately, although such a solution of our problems is attractively
neat, it is not available to us. For it is quite clear that the argument I have
9Bennett, op. cit., p. 42.

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208 T. E. WILKERSON

set out in (a)-(e) above is neither

it is not self-contradictory to asser
tations, ordered in time, but to
part) the representations exhibi
perhaps, be plausible to claim, af
meanings of the expressions use
ible to suppose that (b) and (c) a
step of all, from a claim about
the world, is fairly evidently syn
consistent counter-example to
given, by complicated brain-sur
and sufficient for him to count a
been put into an entirely chaoti
he identifies every feature of th
perceives a whole series of enti
subject-independent) states of af
member of the series in any si
comfort the example causes us
logically inconsistent: it does no
his stock of concepts would be s
description of the series, and to
ceivings, on the one hand, and wh
the objects of his perceivings are

4. Again, in pausing to review

little cause for congratulation, b
rehearse the stages of the argum
is a prima facie a priori connect
of certain (i.e., transcendental) a
evidently the relation of entailm
ments can be formalized accordi
the Wolffian schema) at least on
ponents standing in the a prior
suggestions, one extracted fro
designed to show that the a prio
argument) is in fact the relation
still with us: although in philos
interesting to travel hopefully t
that our arrival is to be postponed
We might begin our final assau
by reflecting on a comment in
has been discussing the claim th
possible only if it is possible fo
objective world, ordered in cert
awareness of it. It is objected th

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 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS 209

an entirely non-objective experience-a series of

relation whatever to any objective states of affairs.
But of course it is not enough that, equipped with th
are equipped with, we can form such a picture. What
the picture contains in itself the materials for the conception of itself as
experience.10
We can perhaps best utilize the suggestion by returning to the First Version
of our argument. I said that it was a restatement of the original argument,
in terms of the intelligibility of certain distinctions or categories, relative to
certain others. But we might now translate out the reference to intelligibility,
and talk of there being the materials for such and such a distinction, in a
world which is so-and-so. One feature of the First Version will still survive:
since we are talking about the utility of certain categories rather than of
certain concepts (of /red/ rather than of red), the " /red/ " terminology will
continue to offend the eye.
Third Version:
(a) I am conscious of a series of representations, ordered in time.
(b) The materials for my /being conscious of representations/ are not
present in a world in which I do not /self-ascribe them/.
(c) The materials for my /self-ascribing them/ are not present in a
world in which I do not /distinguish subjective from objective/.
(d) The materials for my /distinguishing subjective from objective/
are not present in a world in which I do not /apply concepts of
objects/.
(e) The materials for my /applying concepts of objects/ are not
present in a world which does not exhibit a law-governed con-
nectedness.
Two brief comments on the Third Version : first, the intrusion of negative
particles should not be in the least disturbing-I have merely contraposed
the original statements of the First Version. Secondly, it is interesting how
much more plausible the transcendental argument begins to seem when we
eliminate phrases like ' necessary ', ' only if', ' cannot. . .', etc. !
There is something obviously right, and something obviously wrong, in
the Third Version of our argument. What is right is the implicit acknow-
ledgment that the philosophically interesting question is not 'What con-
cepts do we employ ? ' but rather 'Under what conditions can we have the
concepts we employ . ' or ' What makes it natural that we have the concepts
we employ ? '. It is true, but philosophically boring, that it is logically
possible for a self-conscious subject to have experience of an entirely chaotic
world, or to have an entirely sense-datum experience. It is true and philo-
sophically important that the (contingent) conditions for self-consciousness
include the existence of a law-governed world of external objects.
What is wrong with the Third Version becomes clear if we compare it
with the First Version-for certain crucial features of transcendental claims
which were implicit in the First appear to have been lost in the Third.
10Op. cit. (London, 1966), p. 109.

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 210 T. E. WILKERSON

Consider, as an example, proposit

ials for my /applying concepts of
does not exhibit a law-governed
the emphasis is entirely wrong h
law-governed world in some way
concepts of objects/. It is just n
/such-and-such/ are not in a world
more exciting claim must be mad
and-so that it is not the case tha
a Fourth Version. And in doing so
woolly notion of materials in fav
of material sufficiency (ignorin
is, instead of saying that a law-g
my /applying concepts of objects
governed world is ceteris paribus
objects/. Consider an analogy : it
tighten of its own accord, with
conscientious mechanics, we will, n
the conditions which are materially
-the conditions which make it nat
(e.g., my applying a spanner a
mechanics we might even descri
necessary conditions of the poss
point is that the application and
ficient, ceteris paribus, for the tig
certain assumptions about the str
vention from another source and so on. Likewise, the cetera in the Fourth
Version of our argument will include assumptions about the constitution of
human beings, the absence of, e.g., surgical intervention, and so on.
So our Fourth Version will be as follows:
Fourth Version :
(a) I am conscious of a series of representations, ordered in time.
(b) My /self-ascribing them/ is materially sufficient (ceteris paribus)
for my /being conscious of them/.
(c) My /distinguishing subjective from objective/ is materially suf-
ficient (ceteris paribus) for my /self-ascribing them/.
(d) My /applying concepts of objects/ is materially sufficient (ceteris
paribus) for my /distinguishing subjective from objective/.
(e) A world's exhibiting a law-governed connectedness is materially
sufficient (ceteris paribus) for my /applying concepts of objects/.
And where I have talked of ". . .'s being materially sufficient for . . ."
others may prefer to talk of ". . .'s giving . . . a grip ".
There is still something missing from the Fourth Version-something
implicit in any talk of necessary conditions, of something's being the case
only if something else is the case. It maJy well be true, for example, that on

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 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS 211

Mars the existence of purple fungi is materially

for the Martians' using the concept of an all-p
if it were, we couldn't understand why. It may
different conditions would be materially suffici
/self-ascribing states of consciousness/-but, wit
we are quite incapable of thinking of any save my
from objective/. So, to complete our account of the
with which we began, we must simply suppose t
of the Fourth Version there is added, in parenth
given our conceptual resources, of thinking of
would be materially sufficient (ceteris paribus) '.

5. It would be sanguine to rejoice too freely a

of material sufficiency is perhaps only marginally
of conceptual materials which it replaces. And t
the ceteris paribus clause serves only to sweep o
culties. But most vociferous of all in their attack on our account will be
the tough-minded philosophers who will accuse us of parochialism. It m
well be the case, they will say, that there are peculiar connections betw
certain categories and certain others, both in our own conceptual scheme an
in any conceptual scheme which resembles it in all essential respects : b
we are being excessively parochial if we suppose that all conceptual sche
of which we can coherently conceive must share such features and m
involve such connections. To take an analogy: it may be true that eve
social system so far described is hierarchical, that the notion of a soc
system can " get a grip " only where the notion of a hierarchy can " g
grip "-but this is not to say that all social systems of which we can c
herently conceive must share these features, these connections.
I am inclined to embrace, rather than reject, the charge of parochiali
to this extent: it may be the case that there are fairies at the bottom
my garden, but as long as they remain in an entirely alien conceptual parish
as long as I am unable to describe any possible way in which I might identif
them, might relate their activities to the activities of the people and th
of the everyday world, it is worse than pointless to waste philosophical tim
upon them. Similarly, although one cannot place any a priori restrict
on the types of conceptual schemes which might be developed, one m
restrict one's philosophical attention to those which one can make intelligibl
to oneself. To fabricate logically consistent fairy-stories is not enough:
must be able to understand the activities of the fairies. And this is precisely
the point of the transcendental argument with which we have been c
cerned: it attempts to draw attention to certain connections betw
different parts of our conceptual scheme, connections which we do f
intelligible, and connections which must exist if certain crucial notion
(particularly that of a self-conscious subject) are not to be completely rando
fillings of bits of logical space.

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 212 T. E. WILKERSON

If we are prepared to employ t

we are prepared to regard the mo
of certain connections between di
have grounds for distinguishin
"invalid ". For example, we m
only self-ascribe if we can other-
out certain other conditions w
paribus) for self-ascription-we
things (not necessarily persons)
self-consciousness, and so for t
consciousness. And we would co
valid, because the close connection
and other-ascription just does n
colm's argument in Dreaming, o
about the occurrence of dreams, t
necessarily having a public crite
Conversely, we might accept St
objects in space (or some analog
ality that use of language is pos
possible. In more general terms, w
from "invalid" transcendental a
that all such arguments are ded
A final, cautionary note whic
many may find my constructi
rather unsatisfactory, the cons
are philosophically disastrous.
arguments are not analytic (and
transcendental premisses) and if
philosophy, then most of the in
cussions (of the kind I noted at
will consist either of trivial con
spectacular conclusions derived
transcendental) premisses. I s
Wittgensteins and Malcolms of
refuse to admit any kind of synth
and conclusion of a philosophic
are to be rejected out of hand-
as the Duchess might have observe
relations.

University of Keele.

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