KANT'S THREE CRITIQUES: A SUGGESTED

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
by A. C. Genova, Wichita/Kansas

It has been often acknowledged that the philosophy of Kant, in one way or
another, is the originative source of several, recent philosophical developments.
Perhaps, in this regard, one thinks at first of the pragmatic and positivist
themes which have dominated much of British and American philosophy over
the last fifty years. But even in the case of the young Wittgenstein, the influence
of Kant is manifest, and this has given rise to some interesting possibilities con-
cerning the relation of some of Kant's basic ideas and the school of linguistic
analysis. Moreover, the somewhat improved Status of the study of phenomenology
in America and England has reinforced the importance of understanding Kant's
doctrine of categories, method of reflexive analysis and notion of transcendental
consciousness. Even a cursory examination of the works of Husserl, Heidegger
and Sartre would verify this claim. Accordingly, recent scholarship on Kant has
been formidable *. It is äs if Kant, in modern times, has replaced Aristotle äs a
kind of intellectual reference System which has the unique property of arousing
that rieh variety of philosophical reactions which usually signifies a new era in
philosophical thought.

1. An Organic Approacb to Kant

It is not our purpose to discuss the complex interrelationships between the

philosophy of Kant and later philosophies, nor are we directly concerned here
with an evaluation of Kant's original views. We do want to suggest a rather
different way of approadiing Kant's thought, viz., the development of an analyti-
cal framework which will isolate Kant's fundamental principles of unity and the
conditions of connection with their respective fields and each other. Too often,
philosophers are familiär with only one aspect of Kant's thought (almost invariab-
ly a portion of one of the first two Critiques). This is easily understandable and
no doubt useful, but I would argue that it is impossible to grasp adequately any
part of Kant's philosophy apart from the whole. For example, what Kant says
about knowledge in the first Critique becomes fully significant only after a care-
ful study of the third Critique. The problem then, is to propose an approadi to
1
See M. J. Scott-Taggart's Recent Work on the Philosophy of Kant, in American
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 3 (1966), No. 3, pp: 171—209.

35
Kant which will somehow guarantec that the organic unity of the critical philo-
sophy will not bc ignorcd on the assumption that a specific aspect could be under-
stood indcpcndently of other aspects whidi, at first sight, appear irrelevant. The
validity of the approadi we shall suggest, will depend on its success in identifying
the general structure and organic interrelation of the three Critiques, the ana-
logous set of problems which concerned Kant in each of his inquiries, and the
continuity which characterizes the three Critiques äs a single, connected argument.
Indeed, there is no short cut for the "thorny path" of the Critiques, and the very
extent and apparent redundancy of Kant's prose probably serve äs his own best
commentary, However, the plethora of intellectual thicket and highly technical
terminology seem to indicate the usefulness of a somewhat different perspective in
the attempt to clarify and Interpret Kant's thought. Kant himself says in regard
to the first Critique: "It will be misjudged because it is misunderstood, and mis-
understood because men dioose to skim through the book, and not to think
through it — a disagreeable task, because the work is dry, obscure, opposed to all
ordinary notions, and moireover, longwinded" 2. Now, to some extent, the Pro-
legomena corrects this; but even here he argues that the latter's main value is äs
an analytical sketch, useful äs a sequel and not äs an introduction to the larger
synthetical work 3.
According to Kant, all three Critiques are synthetical structures each of which
progressively determines a science which is unique in the fact that it uses no special
data other than the elements of reason itself, demonstrating from these original
elements, in abstracto, the existence, laws, and organic unity of that science. Com-
pared with the first Critique, the Prolegomena begins with the fact of a priori
synthetic truth which can be exhibited in concreto, and regressively proceeds to
the only conditions of its possibility, thereby preparing for and pointing to what
needs to be done for the ordered justification and determination of a science of
pure reason. Clearly these are alternative methods of inquiry into the conditions
of a science, and not a method of interpreting, clarifying, or examining an estab-
lished science. A somewhat similar Interpretation is justified for Kant's Fundamen-
tal Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in relation to the second Critique 4.
In any event, neither of these shorter works presents a logical framework that
could help the Student of Kant "think through" the Critiques from the standpoint
of the transcendental philosophy äs an organic whole. We will present the general
framework of an Interpretation which begins with a given organic whole which is
itself Kant's transcendental philosophy, and attempt to abstract a logical structure
which can also metaphorically be thought of äs a spatio-temporal model. Rather
than restricting our presentation to the actual order of Kant's arguments äs pre-
sented in the Critiques, our organization will conform to the general perspective
2
Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Futurc Metaphysics, ed. Dr. Paul Carus (La
Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1955), Introduction, p. 8.
3
Ibid., p. 11.
4
Fundamental Principles, Preface, p. 10. (Rosenkranz pagination)

136
or standpoint of Kant's three transcendental principles, i. e., we will take what we
consider to be Kant's three supreme principles äs our primary objects and con-
sider the diverse fields on which they confer rational determination, the manners
and limitations of their application, and their interrelations.
Finally it is important that the reader be forewarned against a certain mis-
understanding regarding our logical scheme äs a whole and Kant's critical method.
Although we are discussing distinguishable parts of Kant's critical philosophy, in
no sense is the logical scheme to be viewed äs containing stages that occur in iso-
lation, rather than in a necessarily interrelated context. Again, the relation be-
tween these parts will not exhibit a temporal process but a logical interdepen-
dency. In short, Kant is not dealing with a temporal process containing isolated
stages, but an organic unity containing logically distinct functions, relations,
and functional parallelisms. Thus, when we talk about parts in terms of spatial
metaphors, one might think of these parts äs "logical photographs" or perspec-
tives. Further, the organic unity will not be a dialectical unity in which the ele-
ments are ultimately identified, but a synthetic unity containing critical distinc-
tions that point to autonomous, though analogous, functions.

2. Five Critical Problems

Kant's Crltlques present three interpretations of what is rational in human ex-

perience. Accordingly, the aim in all three is the establishment of systematic unity
according to justified principles. But "principle" is ambiguous. Kant is looking for
necessary and universal conditions of unity that are constitutive of specific mani-
folds; but what are the domains of the principles and what are the principles?
"Principle" (Prinzip) can be taken in three senses: (1) in terms of use, any
universal rule or premise which determines the condition for the subsumption of
particular cases, comparatively speaking, is a principle, and hence, this includes
all fundamental propositions (Grundsätze) relative to the given manifolds they
determine; (2) a principle without qualification, is defined by its orlgln, and
here, only synthetic knowledge derived from concepts alone qualifies äs a prin-
ciple (Prinzip) 5, i. e., strictly, principles have their origin in pure reason alone,
and have no necessary limitation to any empirical manifold; but (3) "principle"
can also refer to a universal and necessary transcendental function of intelligence,
like eadi of Kant's three supreme principles of the Crltlques (the transcendental
unity of apperception, the autonomy of practical reason; and the purposiveness
of reflective judgement). Now in sense (3), a principle is an absolute "beginning"
— an ultimate condition that must be presupposed for principles in senses (1) or
(2). Only judgements (Urteile), äs formulated knowledge, can be principles in
sense (1) or (2). For example, the transcendental unity of apperception is not it-
self a Grundsatz, but is the intellectual function of unity which is the source of

5
Critique of Pure Reason, A300, B357.

137
all Grundsätze that determine the lawfulncss of nature and are thereby restricted
in thcir use to possiblc experience; and the autonom/ of reason expresses itself in
acts whosc maxims conform to the moral law — veritably both a Grundsatz and
a Prinzip, because in practical problems, we will have a Prinzip that is not subject
to the transcendental illusions of pure speculative reason. More generally, there is
one general function of unity, viz., Kant's "legislation of reason", whidi originates
laws of nature in its theoretic use, a moral law in its practical use, and no
determinate law at all for reflective judgement, but only indetenninate principles
of purposiveness whidi provide a rational basis for an estimation of lawfulness
without a determinate concept of law.
Now the universality of a formulated principle (Grundsatz or Prinzip) makes
it a rule of unity, and if it is a necessary rule, it is a law. Further, what Kant
calls "transcendental principles" will be universal and necessary functions of unity
which are the conditions for the possibility of organizing a certain indeterminate
field that awaits determination according to formulated rules or laws. So prin-
ciples involve unity (Einheit) among elements between which a transition (Über-
gang) or connection (Zusammenhang) or mediation (Vermittelung) is possible.
I submit that to talk about the Operation and application of principles in any
of the three senses is tantamount to talking about unity and transition. Now
since one concern is with the objectively valid employment (Gebrauch) of in-
telligence and its conditions, we will definitely have to take account of the Kant-
ian Grundsätze. This task, however, is necessarily related to our central concern
with Kant's transcendental principles äs operative functions of intelligence, and
accordingly, it will also be between these latter kinds of Einheit that we want to
trace an Übergang. Actually, these two aspects of the general problem of unity
and transition are inseparably related.
The peculiar relation between Einheit and Übergang can best be illustrated
by looking at the critical problems concerned with theory, practice, and reflective
judgement äs found in the three basic questions Kant has reason ask itself in its
self-examination: (1) Is there such a thing äs pure theoretic reason? (2) Can pure
reason be practical? And (3) Does reflective judgement have a pure independent
principle, and if so, how is it related to theory and practice? These are three diffe-
rent formulations of Kant's general question: How are a priori synthetic judge-
ments possible? And these also give us the three contexts for our analytical frame-
work. Now Kant answers these questions through an analysis of the relevant
elements involved in the cognitive, desiderative, and estimative operations of
mind. But for Kant, every analysis presupposes synthesis, and it is the question
of ultimate synthesis and organic unity that concerns us here.
Now the problem of a priori synthetic truth implies the existence of transcen-
dental functions of unity (principles) which somehow make possible a synthetic
connection between a subject and predicate in judgement. One bäsic problem
then, concerns the way in whidi Kant identifies and justifies the ultimate condi-
tions that give objective validity and unity to their respective manifolds. This is

138
 manifested in his seardi for the "X" that mediates, unifies, and warrants the
pure synthetic judgements that determine the manifolds. We will call this the
problem of identification and justification of the principles, and its solution would
require a taking account of the various means of justification (Rechtfertigung),
i. e., the deductions and expositions which occur throughout the Critiques.
A second problem has to do with Kant's establishment of the relevant mani-
folds for the three transcendental principles. The availability of these manifolds
makes possible the subsequent reflexive analyses which result in the identification
of the principles, their Status äs sources of Grundsätze, and their application.
Every principle of unity must have a relevant context; otherwise, it has no valid
employment. The manifolds of pure Intuition, desire, pleasure and pain, and the
contingent particulars of experience, play an equal part with the principles them-
selves in establishing the possibility of the knowledge of objects, the realization
of ends, the progress of scientific inquiry, the estimates of beauty and sublimity,
and the imputations of finality. Also, if we determine the nature of the appro-
priate context for the principles, we can expect to widerstand more clearly the
origin of the three questions pertaining to a priori synthetic truth.
The deduction of the actuality and objective validity of pure a priori principles
still leaves us with a third problem of unity and transition in respect to the con-
dition necessary for the union of principles with their respective manifolds, i. e.,
the mediation or transition between their formal unity and the heterogeneous
material to which they apply. Correspondingly, this is the problem of appli-
cation (Anwendung) or employment (Gebrauch) — the subsumption of particular
cases under the universal rules, äs implemented by Kant's devices of sdiema, typic,
and symbol.
Moreover, the discovery of constitutive principles also has a negative side, viz.,
the limitations (Beschränkung) imposed on the faculty due to the discipline of the
Critiques. The "Dialectics" of the Critiques show that criticism is both propaedeutic
and cathartic. The antinomies of freedom and necessity, virtue and happiness, sub-
jective and objective taste, mechanism and vitalism, make it necessary to set forth
the critical distinction between noumena and phenomena in different ways — a
distinction that reconciles conflicting elements. Hence, aspects of transition and
unity apply in the way Kant resuscitates reason's self-unity after its encounter
with apparently irreconcilable didiotomies.
The above-mentioned aspects are all internal to eadi of the critical projects.
But there remains an external aspect, viz., the interrelation between the three
transcendental principles themselves. Finally, then, we can ask how unity and
transition apply to the three Critiques themselves, i. e., how reflective judgement
is the source of a principle of transition that unifies transcendental philosophy
into a complete system. This is the culminating point of Kant's inquiry.
The subject-matter of our general framework then, will center on the thred
principles of unity, viz., the transcendental unity of pure apperception, the auto-
nomy of practical reason, and the transcendental purposiveness of reflective

139
judgement; and Kant's complex problem is Einheit and Übergang, in respect to
(1) the manifolds of the principles, (2) the justification of the principles, (3) their
applications, (4) the purgation of pathological aspects, and (5) their interrela-
tion.

3. Three Critical Dimensions

We must now turn to considerations of form. It has already been mentioned that
we are seeking a logical framework constructed from the standpoint of the organ-
izing principles of the Critiques. Now there is a progression from Critique to
Critique — a process of self-examination that leaves an openness or void after
each critical enterprise, and a corresponding filling of the void in the succeeding
Critique. In the theoretic inquiry, the given empirical manifold is what is open,
i. e., is indeterminate and awaiting a principle of determination, and the establish-
ment of this principle, in turn, leaves open the possibility of transcendental free-
dom. Then the practical inquiry yields a principle that determines the manifold
of desires, and thereby makes freedom actual. Kant's first two inquiries result in
two justifiable legislations of reason. However, the whole field of particular and
contingent nature is still an undetermined void except that the principles of pure
understanding determine its necessary universal form. And it is here that the
transcendental principle of judgement will provide a rule and a method for in-
vestigating the particular laws of nature, etc., and also a Standard of taste that
will give aesthetic determination to an indeterminate manifold of feeling. More-
over, after the first two inquiries, we can also conceive of a gap or interval be-
tween the realms of nature and freedom (the sensible and the supersensible), i. e.,
between the subject-matters of the first two Critiques themselves. But again, it
will be reflective judgement that furnishes an independent principle of transition
between nature and freedom by pointing to an inherent analogy between theory
and practice — an indeterminate "äs if" connection that yet can be justifiably
thought. In the theoretic analysis, there is a discrepancy between the interest of
the understanding and reason; in the practical analysis, the empirically condi-
tioned desires are in conflict with the moral law; but in judgement, there will be
a "fit".
Now the general organization of our suggested approach will take its cue from
this discontinuous progression, and accordingly, our analytical framework must
involve three interrelated contexts and treat the various dimensions and aspects
of the above-mentioned complex problem of Einheit and Übergang in each of
these contexts corresponding to the three Critiques.
More specifically, the analytical framework will be an organization of func-
tions of unity and transition, exhibiting Kant's ultimate conditions of unity (the
three transcendental principles) äs they operate in the theoretic, practical, aesthetic,
and teleological contexts. In addition, we have already suggested that each of
these contexts can be metaphorically considered äs having three "dimensions". We

140
 can examine (1) the "vertical" relation between the pure and empirical in respect
to each of the primary elements or aspects of the respective cognitive, desiderative,
and affective faculties of mind at any point along the horizontal axis; (2) the
"horizontal" relation between a determining principle and the object it deter-
.mines; and finally the (3) "reflexive" or "transcendental" dimension which con-
sists of an analysis of self-consciousness in which Kant's transcendental principles
are exhibited äs necessarily presupposed operative functions of intelligence, and
which would result in the recognition that the horizontal and vertical perspec-
tives are themselves only aspects and consequences of these autonomous and
analogous functions of unity. Let us briefly elaborate eadi dimension.
The vertical axis primarily refers to epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic
levels or states of consciousness. It does not directly refer to objects, but rather
to the relation between the pure and empirical mental states or elements that de-
termine objects. Generally, "vertical" refers to an ascending order of objectivity
and necessity, and therefore involves higher and higher degrees of the transcen-
dental self-determination of reason. This dimension demonstrates that in all con-
texts, the empirical elements must be conditioned by the pure elements if there is
to be objectivity.
The horizontal axis does not center on levels or elements of cognition, desire,
or feeling, but poles of a single formal unity — two sides (inner and outer, sub-
jective and objective) of a completed pbjectively valid experience. Thus, this
dimension refers to the bipolar relation between the unity of a principle and its
relevant object, and deals with problems of application, subsumption, and the
location of a middle term that can ground the transition between a formal prin-
ciple and its concrete manifold. The primary consideration here is not that
empirical functions logically entail pure functions, but how and through what
the relevant principles can be applied.
Finally, the reflexive dimension is the perspective of universal selfconscious-
ness — a general reflection upon the third kind of principle, and to this extent,
it exhausts the complete scope of our analytical framework because it transcends
all frameworks. How indeed can one talk about the transcendental which is never
an object of knowledge, action, or reflective judgement, but is always that by
and through which one always does whatever is "done" in any of the senses of
"doing"? It is the universal presupposition of all uses of intelligence, and can be
exhibited only by the Kantian method of a critical reflection upon its diverse
operations.
Now this last dimension, if it suggests an Isolation of ultimate principles äs
direct objects of knowledge, would be impossible. The ultimate conditions of
rational determination cannot themselves be treated in the same way äs their
corresponding objects. The fundamental faculties of the mind cannot be known
or defined, but merely exhibited by means of reflexive analyses of their opera-
tions and functions, and these analyses are the Critiques themselves. In regard
to the transcendental unity of consciousness,'for example, Kant would say that

141
thc condition of determinant judgemcnt cannot itself be made the object of deter-
minant judgemcnt. Thcrc arc only two ways in which the fundamental faculties
of intclligence can bc treated: (1) by means of a Kantian critical reflexive ana-
lysis; and (2) metaphorically, ranging from Kant's own occasional personifi-
cations of reason and his running metaphor about the art of architecture, to our
occasional reliance on a spatial metaphor in the present discussion. Consequently,
äs opposed to our vertical-horizontal analysis whiA will constitute a two-dimen-
sional framework of the elements of consciousness and their respective fields, our
"transcendental" or "reflective" dimension will actually be an exercise in self-
consciousness — a becoming reflexively aware of the basic functions of intelli-
gence äs necessary presuppositions and rational determinants of objectivity, by
taking account of their activities and consequences. This amounts to a "recalling"
or bringing back of the horizontal and verticai dimensions to their source äs
aspects of the legislation of a seamless organic whole, viz., the unity of reason.
Now in an important sense, äs in Kant's Critiques themselves, this "transcenden-
tal" dimension is necessarily present throughout our complete discussion, although
for purposes of exposition and emphasis, it could also be identified äs a separate
problem, viz., the examination of transcendental principles in tenns of their uni-
versal necessity, special kinds of unity, ineffability, ramifications, consequences,
importance, self-justifying character, and their difference from other related
notions (like self-intuition, the logical ego, the Jdeas of reason, etc.). In short,
our "transcendental" perspective is really the permanent position or standpoint
of the reader of our analytical framework or logical map, not a part or dimension
of the framework. Thus, if it is a dimension, it might be thought of äs "meta-
dimension" — the "standpoint" where one is inescapably located, and which can
be exhibited only by reflection upon its various operations. Let us now try to
apply these general dimensions to the structure of the Critiques.
The theoretic problem of knowledge is directly approadied from two per-
spectives. The first perspective refers to the relation between the transcendental
elements and the empirical elements involved in an act of cognition 6. And accord-
ingly, Kant treats the successive determination of the verticai relation between
the transcendental level and the empirical level äs manifested by (1) the sensibi-
lity (Sinnlichkeit), äs to its empirical use in its receptivity for given sense-data,
and its transcendental use äs the source of the pure forms of intuitions; (2) the
imagination (Einbildungskraft), in respect to the relation between the empirical
synthesis of the Imagination and the transcendental synthesis; and (3) the under-
standing (Verstand), regarding the relation between empirical apperception and
transcendental apperception. The second perspective refers to the relation be-
tween the unity of apperception and the unity of the object, äs mediated by the
Imagination7. Consequently, Kant treats the horizontal connection between the

6
Ibid., A95; A97; A99—A130.
i'Ibid., A131—A160; B170—B207.

142
knower, his knowledge, and the pbjects known, with a view to showing that
the analysis culminates in a final "collapse" or identification of these formal
distinctions and unities, resulting in a single organic unity 8.
The concept of freedom has the function of actualizing the laws of freedom in
the sensible worid. One consequence of Kant's first Critique is that practical
freedom, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God are possible, but
we have no means of giving "reality" or objective significance to our concepts of
them. Kant's second Critique then, must move from the indeterminacy of tran-
scendental freedom to the determinacy of freedom in action. Kant shows how
practical reason can fill the speculative void concerning the supersensible, by
actually determining the concept of a supersensible nature under laws of free-
dom according to purely rational principles that specify an unconditioned end.
Thus, our analytical framework must be adapted to a different subject-matter,
viz., a manifold of desires that become unified and regulated by the moral law.
Corresponding to the sensible matter in the theoretic inquiry, what is given in
the practical is different; we are not dealing with an unconditioned condition
of thought for the knowledge of objects, but with an unconditioned condition of
actions for the realization of ends, which are the "objects" of action. Consequently,
the deduction, application, and dialectic of reason will have a different character,
correlated to this new employment of reason; and moreover, the direction of the
analysis is, äs Kant says, reversed 9.
Accordingly, the dimensions of the practical problem will be analogous to the
theoretic dimensions. Our vertical perspective concerns the general relation be-
tween pure and empirical will with respect to the various elements relevant to
the faculty of desire äs manifested by (1) the "practical sensibility" in reference to
pure and empirical incentives (Triebfeder) to action, (2) the faculty of dioice
(Willkür) regarding actions chosen for the sake of duty or inclination, and (3)
practical reason (Wille) äs a source of principles and concepts of pure or empiri-
cal practical reason10. Our horizontal perspective will be found in the progression
from the moral law through maxims to concrete actions for morally necessary
and determinate ends u. And here, in examining the connection between the agent,
his action, and his ends, Kant trys to establish and clarify a parallelism between
natural and moral philosophy in that both are concerned with laws and objects,
and there is an analogous identificition or "collapse" because the moral end-ob-
ject is action according to the moral law which determines it12.
For Kant, the understanding is a faculty of rules involving universal concepts
which legislate over the realm of nature. Reason is a faculty of principles involv-

8
Ibid., A105; A108—AHO; A251, B304; B136—B138; B164—B165.
9
Critique of Practical Rcason, pp. 113, 183—185, 219—221. (Rosenkranz pagination)
10
Ibid., pp. 176—183, 186—188, 195—205, 208—218; Also, Fundamental Principles
pp. 16—18, 47—53, 70—71.
11
Ibid., pp. 190—194.
« Ibid., pp. 157—166, 176—194, 218—223.

143
ing universal ideas whidi leglslatc ovcr the realm of freedom. Both are objective
projcctions whosc rcspectivc analyses havc different diaracters. Reason and under-
standing both havc objective manifolds — two correlated, parallel domains which
exhibit non-interference and independence. But reflective judgement will only
have a "dwelling-place", a realm, if you will, between freedom and necessity.
There can be no categories or legislative principles here because Kant, in this con-
text, is dealing with what has been left undetermined by the first two Critiques,
viz., the empirical particulars qua particulars. We are given a kind of latitude
or contigency having regulative rather than constitutive principles and involving
free-play. But yet the empirical particulars, in their relation to the subject, are
presented in such a way that it becomes apparent that nature acts "äs if" it were
designed to conform to reason and understanding. In other words, we have a
purposiveness without purpose, a unity without a determinate condition of unity;
a necessary subjective assumption, not objective legislation — an assumption
which operates äs if it were constitutive of a manifold. The problem lies in the
fact that we are presented with a certain latitude and we react with a certain
aptitude; and Kant establishes an independent ground for the adaptedness and
conformity that will explain this apparent harmony between the intelligible and
the empirical.
How then, will our approach take account of Kant's third inquiry? Now in one
crucial sense, the operations of reflective judgement are analogous to those of
understanding and reason, and hence, vertical and lateral relations are formally
the same äs they are in the theoretic and practical contexts — although having a
very different meaning because reflective judgement is neither the cognition nor
the realization of an object. Briefly, for aesthetic judgement, if the form of a
given object is so constituted in Intuition that its apprehension in Imagination
agrees with the representation of an undetermined concept of understanding, there
then results a harmony of faculties that is associated with a certain feeling of
pleasure and the object is called beautiful; or again, if the formlessness of the
given object produces a feeling of purposiveness in the subject so that its at-
tempted apprehension by Imagination agrees with an undetermined concept of
reason, there results a feeling of pain, äs it were, and we describe the experience
äs sublime. Aesthetic judgement then, is analogous to but yet different from the
determinate judgements of reason and understanding; for it is when the formal
conditions of theoretic and practical judgements are aesthetically fulfilled but
without determinate concepts (i. e., without an actual theoretic or practical de-
termination), that judgement becomes reflective and a feeling of harmony results
in the subject13. A similar, though unique, analogy can also be indicated for the
teleological judgement. Thus, from this point of view, we need not independently
isolate the vertical and horizontal relations in our third context because the essen-

18
Critique of Judgement, Introduction; sec. 35.

144
tial lines of these dimensions will have already been constructed in our theoretic
and practical Frameworks.
However, from another point of view, and in the language of the third
Critique, we can say that (1) the vertical perspective would partly refer to the
pure and empirical aspects of the affective faculty, and consequently, would in-
volve the distinction between pure, disinterested, contemplative feelings of re-
flective pleasure and pathological satisfactions based on an interest in a sensuous
object14; and (2) the horizontal perspective might be viewed äs the relation and
transition between reflective judgement's principle of purposiveness and the mani-
fold of concrete individuals15. But this whole context is complicated by the fact
that Kant treats both aesthetic and teleological judgement in the third Critique.
To be sure, the single transcendental principle of judgement applies to nature äs
well äs to art because, in scientific inquiry, when we construct hypotheses about
how nature "does" things, we thereby regard nature äs artist and the works of
nature äs works of art; while in aesthetic evaluations, we regard art äs an Imita-
tion of nature. The context is even further complicated by the fact that in the
aesthetic aspect, Kant's argument encompasses two points of view, viz., art äs
making things, and art äs the contemplation of what is made. What then, in our
third context, would correspond to our two triads of knower-knowledge-known
and agent-action-end? The problem is complex, for we will have something which
is analogous to both, and yet is different and unique.
But the most pronounced peculiarity of reflective judgement lies in the re-
markable fact that its analysis simultaneously reveals the conditions of unity
and transition between nature and freedom. Kant argues that an indeterminate
concept of the supersensible (Übersinnliche) becomes the source of a tertium quid
which mediates between theory and practice16. The "gap" becomes a bridge.
Natural beauty reminds us symbolically of the good, and sublimity reminds us of
the primacy of practical reason and our supernatural vocation and destiny. Kant
is talking about the aesthetic expression of the good in nature — again something
analogous to both nature and freedom, which is yet "in-between."
We began this section by saying that the Critiques present three interpretations
of what is rational in human experience. What then, is the rational for Kant?
The rational is the synthetic unity of a given manifold according to justified
organizing principles. We have maintained above that Kant's three supreme un-
conditioned conditions of the employment of human intelligence are located in (1)
the spontaneity of the understanding in respect to self-consciousness; (2) the
autonomy of pure practical reason in respect to self-legislation; and (3) the tran-
scendental purposiveness of reflective judgement in respect to self-feeling — some-
times diaracterized äs the "heautonomy of judgement" (the necessity of judge-

14
Ibid., "Analytic of the Beautiful" (BK I); sec. 39.
« Ibid., secs. 17; 57, Remark I; 59.
1
Ibid., Introduction, II, IX; secs. 57, Remark II; 59, 77.

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mcnt's making a law for itself). Furthcr, wc have clairaed that Kaiman principles
are functions of unity and transltion, and have outlined the five basic problems
cntailed in the notion of a transcendental principle. We have also outlined our
general analytic Framework äs it applies to the three contexts in whia Kant seeks
a priori synthetic truth.
In conclusion, (1) A substantial clarification of Kant's thought can be brought
about by emphasizing the central perspective of the three supreme principles of
the Critiques, and constructing an analytical framework within which their
ramifications and implications become, äs it were, simultaneously apparent;
(2) Although we have tried to justify, clarify, and qualify the general point of
view suggested here, it is obvious that our analysis has been somewhat vague and
abstract, and would still require the "filling in" of the argument of Kant's
Critiques; (3) This analysis would support the view that it is the third Critique
which constitutes the key to the füll understanding of Kant's views on theory and
practice, and (4) The resulting Interpretation would both support and give mean-
ing to the necessity and usefulness of Kant's establishing three interrelated tran-
scendental criteria for the determination of objective validity in the spheres of
natural science, aesthetics, and morality. Kant is really talking about the condi-
tions for the exercise of human intelligence, and these conditions are the general
conditions of philosophical inquiry, for they set forth the necessary context in
which philosophic questions, problems, and Solutions find their meaning.

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