1NC

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The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce Direct
Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of arms to Africa only if the
action conforms with the outcome of a binding national referendum placed on
the 2020 general election ballot. The United States Federal Government should
submit the proposed action for a binding national referendum. The United
States Supreme Court will rule to uphold the decision.
Referendum is substantively distinct from the aff and a thing that could happen
Kilmark 98 (Jeffrey Allan, J.D. Candidate – Arizona State University College of Law,
“Government Knows Best? An Analysis of the Governor's Power to Veto and the Legislature's
Power to Repeal or Amend Voter-Enacted Initiative and Referendum Petitions in Arizona”,
Arizona State Law Journal, Fall, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 829, Lexis)

In addition to reserving the power to propose and adopt laws and constitutional amendments, Arizona
citizens also reserved to themselves the power to approve or reject at the polls any act passed by the
legislature. n22 Under this referendum power, any measure enacted by the legislature may be submitted to the voters by five
percent of the qualified electors or by the legislature itself. n23 To allow voters the opportunity to exercise their referendum power,
legislation does not go into effect until ninety days after the close of the [*835] legislative session. n24 In addition, if legislation is
properly referred to the voters, the measure remains suspended until the next general election. n25 Finally, like an initiative
petition, a
referendum petition takes effect only if it is approved by a majority of the voters voting on
the measure and the Governor proclaims the referendum to be law
 Off
The United States federal government ought to enter into prior and binding
consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over a proposal to
substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of
arms from the United States to Africa and implement the result of that
consultation.
The counterplan is a core question in the literature. Arms trade issues are a
core part of consultations with NATO
Stephen D. Goose, Acting Executive Director, Arms Division, Lotte Leicht, Director, Brussels
Office, 5-18-2000, NATO Should Promote Responsible Arms Sales, This is an open letter to
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Foreign Ministers regarding Promotion of
Responsible Arms Trade Practices." Human Rights Watch,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/05/18/nato-should-promote-responsible-arms-sales#,
Accessed: 3-19-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

We believe NATO has an important role to play in promoting responsible arms trading
practices by its partners and in assisting with the responsible disposal of surplus weapons . We
have engaged in a dialogue with Secretary-General Robertson and his predecessor, Javier
Solana, on this topic. In addition, we have raised concerns about arms-related issues directly
with individual EAPC governments, including by exchanging correspondence with a number of
PfP countries about national arms trade controls and surplus weapons stocks.

We have been pleased to see a growing commitment by NATO and PfP countries, acting through
the EAPC and in other fora, to address the problems posed by the uncontrolled proliferation of
small arms and light weapons. In particular, efforts by the ad hoc EAPC working group on small
arms have led to important action on several fronts, including the development of programs
offered within the PfP framework to assist partner countries with stockpile security and
destruction of surplus weapons (as outlined in a new Partnership Work Program chapter on
small arms), as well as various meetings held to discuss scope for EAPC action on arms export
controls.

We understand that these consultations will be reported at the upcoming ministerials and, in
light of the EAPC's ongoing work on these issues, we'd like to highlight three areas in which we
hope there will be further progress.

Only genuine consultation prevents destruction of the NATO alliance

Judy Dempsey, 12-8-2016, Dempsey is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and
editor in chief of Strategic Europe, From Suez to Syria: Why NATO Must Strengthen Its Political
Role," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/12/08/from-suez-to-syria-why-nato-
must-strengthen-its-political-role-pub-66370, Accessed: 3-19-2020, /Kent Denver-MB
CONCLUSIONS
The Euro-Atlantic community is going through tremendous social and political changes. U.S. leadership under Obama has
fundamentally changed the country’s role as the world’s policeman.

Europe, meanwhile, is divided and weak. Both developments have immense ramifications for the West’s ability to project stability,
influence, and its values. Squaring these values with interests is a perennial challenge, but it is something that NATO has to grapple
with. The challenges facing the alliance have become much more complex and require a plethora of different responses, from the
use of diplomacy backed up by hard power to the development of sophisticated ways to counter cyberwarfare and disinformation.
That is why the alliance’s military role has to be underpinned by a political one.

NATO’s European allies need to ask the United States direct political questions about its long-
term intentions in Europe; its goals in Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighborhoods and the Western Balkans; and
what Asia means for NATO. An increased U.S. focus on the Asia-Pacific would have significant implications for the U.S. role
in Europe if it meant the United States concluding it was time for Europe to take responsibility for its own security. This possibility
should encourage the European members of NATO to begin political discussions about how they should prepare for such a
rebalancing. At
the same time, the United States needs clarity from its European allies about how
they see the future role of the alliance.
That is easier said than done. If these discussions become structured, then NATO ambassadors will have to wait for instructions from
their national capitals before they can contribute. If the discussions are informal, maybe there is more scope for open debates. After
all, political discussions do not have to lead to decisions. The key is to allow for flexibility while stimulating a new culture in NATO
that will encourage national delegations to raise issues even if they are controversial. For far too long, ambassadors have been
inhibited about speaking out or beholden to their capitals or, indeed, to the large member states.

Yet big, fundamental questions can no longer be kept on the back burner. The alliance’s ability to be resilient
determines the West’s future as a political, economic, and security power. NATO must get out of
its niche and explain the politics of its decisions , the politics that it confronts, and the changing nature of political
leadership, which has become prone to short-termism and subject to the vicissitudes of social media. This means having
the confidence to communicate—not to the converted, but to skeptical audiences and
opponents—about NATO’s political role and how the transatlantic relationship has kept the
West safe and secure since 1949.

The Three Wise Men issued a relevant warning to NATO . The alliance, they wrote, “has faltered
at times through the lethargy or complacency of its members; through dissension or division
between them; by putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest. It could
be destroyed by these forces, if they were allowed to subsist. To combat these tendencies,
NATO must be used by its members, far more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine
consultation and cooperation on questions of common concern.” Sixty years on, it is time for
NATO to heed the report.

Preponderance of data proves a strong NATO alliance is key to prevent nuclear

great power war – Trump statements on NATO means we’re on the brink now
Beauchamp 6/12/18 [Zack, MSc from the London School of Economics in International
Relations, senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of
Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy and international relations, “How Trump is
killing America’s alliances”, Vox News,
https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-
g7]flynn

How the weakening of American alliances could lead to a massive war There has never, in human
history, been an era as peaceful as our own . This is a hard truth to appreciate, given the horrible violence ongoing in
places like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, yet the evidence is quite clear. Take a look at this chart from the University of Oxford’s Max
Roser. It tracks the number of years in a given time period in which “great powers” — meaning the militarily and economically
powerful countries at that time — were at war with each other over the course of the past 500 years. The decline is unmistakable:
This data
should give you some appreciation for how unique, and potentially precarious, our historical
moment is. For more than 200 years, from 1500 to about 1750, major European powers like Britain and France and Spain were
warring constantly. The frequency of conflict declined in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the wars that did break out — the
Napoleonic conflicts, both world wars — were particularly devastating. The past 70
years without great power war, a
period scholars term “the Long Peace,” is one of history’s most wonderful anomalies . The question then
becomes: Why did it happen? And could Trump mucking around with a pillar of the global order, American
alliances, put it in jeopardy? The answer to the second question, ominously, appears to be yes. There is significant
evidence that strong American alliances — most notably the NATO alliance and US agreements to defend Japan and
South Korea — have been instrumental in putting an end to great power war . “As this alliance
system spreads and expands, it correlates with this dramatic decline, this unprecedented drop, in
warfare,” says Michael Beckley, a professor of international relations at Tufts University. “It’s a really,
really strong correlation.” A 2010 study by Rice’s Leeds and the University of Kentucky’s Jesse C. Johnson surveyed a
large data set on alliances between 1816 and 2000 . They found that countries in defensive alliances
were 20 percent less likely to be involved in a conflic t, on average, than countries that weren’t. This holds true
even after you control for other factors that would affect the likelihood of war, like whether a country is a democracy
or whether it has an ongoing dispute with a powerful neighbor. In a follow-up paper, Leeds and Johnson looked at the same data set
to see whether certain kinds of alliances were more effective at protecting its members than others. Their conclusion is that
alliances deter war best when their members are militarily powerful and when enemies take
seriously the allies’ promise to fight together in the event of an attack . The core US alliances — NATO,
Japan, and South Korea — fit these descriptors neatly . A third study finds evidence that alliances allow
allies to restrain each other from going to war. Let’s say Canada wants to get involved in a
conflict somewhere. Typically, it would discuss its plans with the United States first — and if America thinks
it’s a bad idea, Canada might well listen to them. There’s strong statistical evidence that countries
don’t even try to start some conflicts out of fear that an ally would disapprove . These three findings all
suggest that NATO and America’s East Asian alliances very likely are playing a major role in preserving
the Long Peace — which is why Trump’s habit of messing around with alliances is so dangerous .
According to many Russia experts, Vladimir Putin’s deepest geostrategic goal is “breaking” NATO . The
member states where anyone would expect him to test NATO’s commitment would be the
Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — small former Soviet republics that recently became NATO members. We can’t predict if
and when a rival like Putin would conclude that America’s alliances seemed weak enough to try
testing them. Hopefully, it never happens. But the more Trump attacks the foundations of America’s
allies, the more likely things are to change. The absolute risk of a Russian invasion of a NATO state
or a North Korean attack on the South is relatively low, but the consequences are so potentially catastrophic —
nuclear war! — that it’s worth taking anything that increases the odds of such a conflict seriously. The crack-up of the West?
The world order is a little like a game of Jenga. In the game, there are lots of small blocks that interlock to form a stable
tower. Each player has to remove a block without toppling the tower. But each time you take out a block, the
whole thing gets a bit less stable. Take out enough blocks and it will collapse. The international order works
in kind of the same way. There are lots of different interlocking parts — the spread of democracy, American alliances, nuclear
deterrence, and the like — that work together to keep the global peace. But take out one block and the other ones might not be
strong enough to keep things together on their own. At the end of the Cold War, British and French leaders worried that the passing
of the old order might prove destabilizing. In a January 1990 meeting, French President François Mitterrand told British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher that he feared a united Germany could seize control of even more territory than Hitler. Some experts
feared that in the absence of the external Soviet threat, Western European powers might go back to waging war with each other.
Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped
shared participation in US
keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a
alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket , preventing these countries from
having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I . But if American
alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up .
America’s partners aren’t stupid. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory
might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America
the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. The worst-case scenarios
for a collapse in the US
alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at
loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s
historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries or any
combination of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And indeed, in the short
run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next
president after Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again. But the truth is that there’s just
no way to know. When a fundamental force for world peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will
hold up. Nothing like this — the leader of the world’s hegemon rounding on its most important allies — has ever happened before.
What Donald Trump’s presidency has done, in effect, is start up another geopolitical Jenga game. Slowly but
surely, he’s removing the blocks that undergird global security . It’s possible the global order survives Trump —
but it’s just too early for us to say for sure. Given the stakes, it’s a game we’d rather not play .

The 2AC must clarify perms beyond tag-lines—competition debates are

complicated and vague perms make them too late breaking to be fair since they
could sandbag explanations for the 2AR.
 Off
The United States federal government ought to:
 begin a process of negotiated rulemaking that includes all affected
parties over US DCS and FMS sold to Africa,
 announce its intention to substantially decrease Direct Commercial
Sales and Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States to
Africa within a year or if by the end of the rulemaking process no
consensus is reached,
 grant authority to the negotiators for the government to make binding
commitments to implement the agreed upon outcome,
 advocate for the same decrease of arms during the process of
negotiation.

Only the counterplan solves.

Gray 15, (Founding Partner, Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC; Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy
Diplomacy, 2008–2009; Special Envoy for European Union Affairs, 2008–2009; Ambassador to
the European Union, 2006–2007; Counselor to the President, 1989–1993; Legal Counsel to the
VicePresident, 1981–1989; former Counsel, Presidential Task Force on Regulator Relief,
UPGRADING EXISTING REGULATORY MECHANISMS FOR TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4739&context=lcp)

The benefits typically associated

with reg-neg include improved information due to the iterative
nature of negotiation and the related incentive to cooperate,74 the increased sense of legitimacy that
parties involved in the drafting process attribute to the resulting rule ,75 closer correlation
between the final rule and the proposed rule,76 the avoidance of litigation,77 reduced delay,78 and
faster adaptation to the new rule by regulated entities involved from the beginning .79
===FOOTNOTE 74 BEGINS===

74. See EDWARD P. WEBER, PLURALISM BY THE RULES: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 126 (1998)
(“The interactive bargaining format is intended to facilitate the flow of information among
interested parties such that innovative bargains can be struck in a timely manner that facilitates
the interests of all players.”); see also Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy
Benefit, 9 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 60, 121 (2000) (“On balance, the combined results . . . of the study suggest that reg
neg is superior to conventional rulemaking on virtually all of the measures that were considered.
Strikingly, the process engenders a significant learning effect, especially compared to conventional
rulemaking; participants report, moreover, that this learning has long-term value not confined to the particular rulemaking.”).
===FOOTNOTE 74 ENDS===

===FOOTNOTE 75 BEGINS===
75. Freeman & Langbein, supra note 74, at 232 (“Most
significantly, the negotiation of rules appears to
enhance the legitimacy of outcomes. [The] data indicate that process matters to perceptions of
legitimacy. Moreover, . . . reg-neg participant reports of higher satisfaction could not be explained
by their assessment of the outcome alone. Instead higher satisfaction seems to arise in part
from a combination of process and substance variables .”). Stakeholder satisfaction is significant because of
“mounting evidence in social psychology that ‘satisfaction is one of the principal consequences
of procedural fairness.’” Id.
===FOOTNOTE 75 ENDS===

===FOOTNOTE 79 BEGINS===

79. WEBER, supra note 74, at 127 (“[B]y

giving stakeholders a direct role in writing the rule, as an ex-EPA
administrator explained, the likelihood is increased that players at the table ‘underst[and]
exactly what [is] meant by the regulation and what [is] expected of them once the regulation [is] final.’”).
===FOOTNOTE 79 ENDS===

Some critics of reg-neg have questioned whether it has actually achieved these benefits in practice.80 But these criticisms turn
on erroneous calculations of the duration of various rule-making proceedings, and unfair
comparisons of traditional rulemaking and reg-neg, which tends, by design, to involve more
complicated and contentious issues than garden-variety rulemaking .81 These critics also point out that
negotiated rulemaking has largely fallen into disuse, but this is not because it is ineffective. Rather, individual agencies perceive
regneg as diluting their regulatory authority, because interested parties are brought into the process during the drafting of a
proposed rulemaking, and agencies are deterred by the up-front cost of reg-neg.82 For its part, OMB perceives rules produced
through reg-neg as less amenable to OMB input because they represent a compromise between the responsible agency and
interested parties.83 But OMB can always review any rule before it is finalized.84 OMB can even participate in the negotiation.85
And the tendency of negotiated rulemaking to attract advance support from outside of the government is a benefit, whether or not
OMB perceives it that way. The
reformulated gasoline rule (RFG) is a good example of reg-neg achieving
a better result than could have been accomplished in the absence of stakeholder input at the
drafting stage.86 Like a rule with transnational implications, the RFG rule was a good candidate for reg-neg
because of its complexity, and because collaboration with affected parties and other regulators
would result in better information than the convening agency could obtain by itself.87 The process
brought together thirty-five interested parties, including oil interests, alcohol fuel producers, environmental advocates, automotive
manufacturers, state-level regulators, and the Department of Energy.
 Off
Congress is focused and barely keeping up with Corona relief to save the
economy and lives, but partisan fights can derail their response
Burgess Everett, 4-12-2020, congressional reporter for politico, ‘Let’s hope to heck that it
works’: Pandemic pressure mounts on Congress," POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/12/congress-coronavirus-pandemic-pressure-178025,
Accessed: 4-12-2020, /Kent Denver-MB
As President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial closed two months ago, 2020 was shaping up to be perhaps the lamest year in
Congress in decades. Some judges would be confirmed, lawmakers would punt on the toughest issues and all eyes would turn to the
presidential election.

Instead, the coronavirus pandemic will define the 116th Congress even more than earth-shaking events that just months ago
seemed to embody the wild days of government under President Donald Trump. The third ever presidential impeachment trial, a
battle over Trump’s unprecedented use of executive power to build his border wall and the longest government shutdown in U.S.
history now all seem quaint.

After that marathon of drama, leaders in both chambers expected a breather heading into the fall, the usual pre-election slowdown.
Now, the House and the Senate are trying to stop the next Great Depression and save thousands
of lives on the fly. The crisis has utterly consumed Congress, changing basically everything about
the way the institution works and its priorities, according to interviews with more than a dozen senators and multiple aides in
both parties.

“These are major, major policy levers that have just never been pulled before,” said Senate Majority Whip John Thune (R-S.D.) of the
$2.2 trillion effort to aid unemployed workers, small business and corporations. “We’ll probably be studying this for some time. And
let’s hope to heck that it works.”

The Coronavirus Congress is sure to go down in history as the most consequential legislature in a generation or more. But
whether the House and Senate can stabilize the economy and fight the disease will shape more
than just lawmakers’ legacies — it’s also likely to determine their fates in November and control
of Capitol Hill.

At-risk lawmakers are trying to push all that to the back of their minds. Many have essentially frozen their
campaigns at the precise moment they would normally be making the election their main focus.

“The thing that we’re trying to do is to try to not think about that. The perceptions and the politics of this are truly
taking a backseat for us,” said Sen. Doug Jones (D-Ala.), who faces an uphill battle for reelection this fall. “I will be judged.
I’m happy to be judged on whatever I say and do at that point come November.”

At times, Congress
has put away its partisan swords to pass massive pieces of legislation to
respond to the disease, including the unheard of unanimous votes for March's "Phase 3"
package. But bad habits die hard: on Thursday, Senate Democrats and Republicans deadlocked over
an extension of small business relief, leaving the timing and scope of the next round of aid
uncertain.

Still, there’s simply no end in sight to the amount of money Congress is likely to dedicate to the crisis before it — and yet some
economists fear Washington is not moving quickly enough to fill the growing hole in the
economy.
The gravity of the situation is just beginning to sink in with elected officials whose lives and jobs have been upended just like the rest
of the public. Lawmakers are now scattered around the country, some stuck in D.C. and others quarantined in their houses. Their
jobs toggle between constituent services and big picture legislative thinking as they pore over grim projections that change hourly.
“The landscape is changing so quickly,” said Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.).
“I don’t know if many of us have had time to even process it,” added Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.).

Caucus meetings are done by conference call. No one knows when Congress will come back for business as usual.

Aides worry about logistics and try to virtually staff their bosses, setting up Skype studios to do TV hits. Some TV stations aren’t even
letting guests inside; Hawley’s outdoor hit on Fox News last week was punctuated by bird chirps piercing the air.

Senators work the phone for hours as they deal with a flood of interest in small business grants and loans, cut deals for medical
supplies and call each other to commiserate and try and plan the next round of trillion-dollar spending.

“We’re really busy,” said Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio), who’s helping broker deals for more supplies and trying to relax restrictions on
new testing in his state and tariffs on goods needed during the pandemic.

“No possible way would I have imagined my making calls to federal officials on a Saturday in spring trying to get more guidance so
that our companies can make protective gear,” said Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.).

Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) has served three terms in the Senate and two terms as governor and done stints as a Cabinet
secretary and university president. But he doesn’t have the luxury of easing into retirement at the end of the year as he finds himself
in the middle of what he calls a “fascinating moment,” if also a dire one.

“I’ve been on the phone until my neck hurts,” Alexander said. “I find myself sort of exhausted at the end of the day from the phone
calls and the discussions I’m having about the present and what comes next.”

Both personally and as legislators, the coronavirus has had widespread consequences on Capitol Hill. Several House members have
been infected and Rand Paul (R-Ky.) became the first senator to test positive, alarming all the Senate Republicans who had come
close to him and thrusting some into quarantine. Alexander lived in one room of his house once he returned home, and his wife in
another.

“It’s surreal,” said a similarly cloistered Sen. Angus King (I-Maine.). “The only time I go outside is when I go for a walk, and then when
I see someone coming toward me, I go off onto the side of the path.”

Amid the panic over Paul’s diagnosis. Thune came down with a headache he couldn’t shake, which he found unusual given that he is
rarely sick. He jumped on a plane and left Capitol Hill amid the final negotiations over the $2.2 trillion rescue package, worried that
he would infect his staff or other senators.

“I don’t get down very often. And when I woke up in the middle of the night with a pounding headache and the next morning was all
kind of feeling sickly, couldn’t get out of bed, I thought: ‘I’m not going to take any chances,’” Thune recalled.

He later tested negative, and the rest of the Senate seems to have avoided widespread infection. But there is considerable unease
among senators about when to return, and many hope that the chamber may be able to operate with a skeleton crew, passing
legislation unanimously.

In addition to the day-to-day effects on senators who are used to being surrounded by staff or on the trail campaigning for their
seats, there have been rapid shifts in power dynamics. The crisis has elevated legislators in normally sleepy positions, most notably
the Senate Small Business Committee, where Chairman Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) has found himself leading the charge for new aid to
businesses.

In the past, some lawmakers have privately sought to escape the committee as their seniority increased. But with small businesses
on the verge of collapse amid lockdown orders across the country, the committee suddenly has some of the most sway in Congress.

“I don’t think any of us anticipated that we’d be the front-and-center committee on this,” said Sen. Bern Cardin (D-Md.), the panel’s
top Democrat.

That committee’s work is now the subject of a widening partisan dispute, in which Republicans want to immediately replenish the
$350 billion Paycheck Protection Program and focus on other needs later, while Democrats say $250 billion more for hospitals and
local governments should be included in any small business measure. The impasse is showing no signs of ending.

But atsome point, the current logjam will break because it simply has to. Nearly everyone in
Congress knows that protracted, weeks-long fights over how to respond to the crisis will not
cut it.
“In many respects, what we’ve done has been miraculous,” said Senate Minority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.).
“We’re rising to the occasion. It’s going to be harder and harder to maintain that status as we
disagree on what’s next.”

Arms sales reductions cause massive fights.

Kane 2019
Alex, is a New York-based journalist who focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
“Here’s Exactly Who’s Profiting from the War on Yemen And how the U.S. could stop weapon
sales if it wanted to.” May/June 2019 https://inthesetimes.com/features/us-saudi-arabia-
yemen-war-arms-sales.html//dmr

Under President Barack Obama’s administration and, now, President Donald Trump’s, the United States has put its
military might behind the Saudi-led coalition, waging a war without congressional authorization. That war has
devastated Yemen’s infrastructure, destroyed or damaged more than half of Yemen’s health facilities, killed more than 8,350
civilians, injured another 9,500 civilians, displaced 3.3 million people, and created a humanitarian disaster that threatens the lives of
millions as cholera and famine spread through the country. U.S. arms merchants, however, have grown rich.
Fragments of the bombs were documented by journalists and HRW with help from Mastaba villagers. An HRW munitions expert
determined the bombs were 2,000-pound MK-84s, manufactured by General Dynamics. Based in Falls Church, Va., General
Dynamics is the world’s sixth most profitable arms manufacturer. One of the bombs used a satellite guidance kit from Chicago-based
Boeing, the world’s second-most profitable weapons company. The other bomb had a Paveway guidance system, made by either
Raytheon of Waltham, Mass., the third-largest arms company in the world, or Lockheed Martin of Bethesda, Md., the world’s top
weapons contractor. An In These Times analysis found that in the past decade, the State Department has approved at least $30.1
billion in Saudi military contracts for these four companies. The war in Yemen has been particularly lucrative for General
Dynamics, Boeing and Raytheon, which have received hundreds of millions of dollars in Saudi
weapons deals. All three corporations have highlighted business with Saudi Arabia in their reports to shareholders. Since the
war began in March 2015, General Dynamics’ stock price has risen from about $135 to $169 per share, Raytheon’s from about $108
to more than $180, and Boeing’s from about $150 to $360. Lockheed Martin declined to comment for this story. A spokesman for
Boeing said the company follows “guidance from the United States government,” while Raytheon replied, “You will need to contact
the U.S. government.” General Dynamics did not respond to inquiries. The State Department declined to comment on the record.
The weapons contractors are correct on one point: They’re working hand-in-glove with the State
Department. By law, the department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs must approve any arms sales by U.S. companies to
foreign governments. U.S. law also prohibits sales to countries that indiscriminately kill civilians, as the Saudi-led military coalition
bombing Yemen did in the Mastaba strike and many other documented cases. But ending
sales to Saudi Arabia would
cost the U.S. arms industry its biggest global customer, and to do so, Congress must cross an
industry that pours millions into the campaigns of lawmakers of both parties. THE CIVILIAN DEATH
TOLL Saudi coalition spokesperson Gen. Ahmed al-Assiri told the press that the Mastaba market bombing targeted a gathering of
Houthi fighters. But because the attack was indiscriminate, in that it hit both civilians and a military target, and disproportionate, in
that the 97 civilian deaths would outweigh any expected military advantage, HRW charged that the missile strikes violated
international law. According to an In These Times analysis of reports by HRW and the Yemeni group Mwatana for Human Rights, the
Saudi-led coalition (including the United Arab Emirates [UAE], a Saudi ally that is also bombing Yemen) has used U.S. weapons to kill
at least 434 people and injure at least 1,004 in attacks that overwhelmingly include civilians and civilian targets. “Most of the
weapons that we have found and been able to identify in strikes that appear unlawful have been U.S. weapons,” Motaparthy says.
“Factories have been hit. Farmlands have been hit with cluster bombs. Not only have they killed civilians, but they have also
destroyed livelihoods and contributed to a dire humanitarian situation.” “The [U.S. government is] now on notice that there’s a high
likelihood these weapons could be used in strikes that violate the laws of war,” Motaparthy says. “They can no longer say the Saudis
are targeting accurately, that they have done their utmost to avoid civilian casualties.” According to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, the United States may not authorize arms exports to governments that consistently engage in “gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.” The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 stipulates that exported weapons may only be used
for a country’s defense. “When a country uses U.S.-origin weapons for other than legitimate self-defense purposes, the
administration must suspend further sales, unless it issues a certification to Congress that there’s an overwhelming national security
need,” says Brittany Benowitz, a former defense adviser for former Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.). “The Trump administration has not
done that.” A HUNDRED-BILLION-DOLLAR CLIENT Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia has ordered U.S.-made offensive weapons,
surveillance equipment, transportation, parts and training valued at $109.3 billion, according to an In These Times analysis of
Pentagon announcements, contracts announced on defense industry websites and arms transfers documented by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute. That arsenal is now being deployed against Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s precision-guided munitions
are responsible for the vast majority of deaths documented by human rights groups. In These Times found that, since 2009, Saudi
Arabia has ordered more than 27,000 missiles worth at least $1.8 billion from Raytheon alone, plus 6,000 guided bombs from Boeing
(worth about $332 million) and 1,300 cluster munitions from Rhode Island-based Textron (worth about $641 million). About $650
million of those Raytheon orders and an estimated $103 million of the Boeing orders came after the Saudi war in Yemen began.
Without these ongoing American-origin weapons transfers, the Saudi coalition’s ability to prosecute its war would wither. “We can
stop providing munitions, and they could run out of munitions, and then it would be impossible to keep the war going,” says
Jonathan Caverley, associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College and a research scientist at M.I.T. The warplanes the United
States delivers also need steady upkeep. Since
the war began, the Saudis have struck deals worth $5.5
billion with war contractors for weapons maintenance, support and training . “The Saudi military has a
very sophisticated, high-tech, capital-intensive military that requires almost constant customer service,” Caverley says. “And so most
of the planes would be grounded if Lockheed Martin or Boeing turn off the help line.” “JUST A PILIING UP OF STUFF” The U.S.-Saudi
relationship has its roots in the 1938 discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, and President Franklin Roosevelt’s energy-for-security deal with
the Saudi monarchy. Today, in addition to oil, U.S.-Saudi relations are cemented by a geopolitical alliance against Iran—and by
weapons deals. Arms exports accelerated under Obama. By 2016, his administration had offered to sell $115 billion in weapons and
defensive equipment to Saudi Arabia—the most of any administration in history. Those arms exports “used to be more of a symbolic
thing, just piling up the stuff,” says William Hartung, director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy.
But experts also say selling the Saudis so many arms incentivized the Arab monarchy to use them in devastating fashion. “If a
country, like Saudi Arabia or the UAE, has no commitment to human rights—whether stated or in practice—it’s no wonder that
those countries would eventually misuse U.S.-sold weapons by committing war crimes,” says Kate Kizer, the policy director of Win
Without War. “The U.S. government should be assuming these weapons of warfare will eventually be used in a conflict, even if one
isn’t going on at the moment.” With the Saudi invasion of Yemen in 2015, the U.S.-Saudi arms pipeline became deadly. Despite
reports that U.S. bombs were killing civilians, the Obama administration’s support for the Saudi
war drew only muted criticism in Washington . “It was Obama’s war, and there was a lot of reluctance in Congress
to take this on, particularly among Democrats,” says Shireen Al-Adeimi, a Yemeni American activist and professor at Michigan State
University. Still, advocates with groups like Win Without War, Just Foreign Policy and the Yemen Peace Project worked to raise
public awareness of the war’s horrors, lobbying Congress and the White House. In May 2016, Obama canceled the delivery of 400
Textron cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia. In December 2016, two months after a Saudi airstrike hit a funeral hall and killed more than
100 people in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, he halted the sale of 16,000 precision guided bombs from Raytheon, a deal worth $350
million. Those two decisions accounted for only a fraction of overall arms sales to the Saudis, and the flow of most weapons
continued unchecked. TRUMP’S BIG PHOTO OPP When Trump took office in January 2017, he made it a priority to strengthen the
U.S.-Saudi relationship, which had taken a hit after Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran. As part of that bid, Trump reversed Obama’s
decision to halt the $350 million Raytheon order. Trump’s first overseas visit, in May 2017, was to Saudi Arabia, a jaunt to strengthen
the alliance against Iran and get Saudi Arabia to sign on to Trump’s plans for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. During that visit, the
United States agreed to sell Saudi Arabia $110 billion in American weapons, with an option for a total of $350 billion over the next
decade. Trump boasted his deals would bring 500,000 jobs to the United States, but his own State Department put the figure at tens
of thousands. On May 20, 2017,
Trump and King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud presided over Boeing’s and
Raytheon’s signings of Memorandums of Agreement with Saudi Arabia for future business. Raytheon used
the opportunity to open a new division, Raytheon Saudi Arabia. “This strategic partnership is the next step in our over 50-year
relationship in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” Raytheon CEO Thomas A. Kennedy told shareholders. “Together, we can help build
world-class defense and cyber capabilities.” The
ink was barely dry before $500 million of the deal was
threatened by a bill, introduced by Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) in May 2017, to block the sale of bombs to
Saudi Arabia. In response, Boeing and Raytheon hired lobbying firms to make their case. In the
end, five Democrats—Joe Donnelly (Ind.), Claire McCaskill (Mo.), Joe Manchin (W.Va.), Bill Nelson (Fla.) and
Mark Warner (Va.)—broke with their party to ensure arms sales continued, in a 53-47 vote. The five had
collectively received tens of thousands in arms industry donations , and would receive another $148,032 in
the next election cycle from the PACs and employees of Boeing and Raytheon. Nelson and McCaskill pulled in $44,308 and $57,230,
respectively. Weapons firms are aided by a revolving door with the Trump administration . Then-
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, a former General Dynamics board member, warned Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) that the Rand Paul
bill would be a boon for Iran. Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan served as a senior vice president of Boeing prior to coming
to the Defense Department, though it’s unclear whether he’s championed U.S.-Saudi arms deals. The Wall Street Journal reports
that, in 2018, State Department staff, voicing concerns about the war on Yemen, asked Secretary of State Mike Pompeo not to
certify that civilian deaths were being reduced. Their concerns were overridden by the department’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs,
which argued such a move could put billions of dollars in future arms sales in jeopardy. The bureau is led by Charles Faulkner, a
former Raytheon lobbyist. CONGRESS WAKES UP In October 2018, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia took center stage in
Washington, when Saudi agents murdered and dismembered journalist Jamal Khashoggi in their country’s consulate in Istanbul.
Khashoggi, a Saudi Washington Post columnist, had been critical of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The murder forced
Congress to reckon with Salman, who, as defense minister, had launched the Saudi war on Yemen alongside a vicious crackdown on
human rights activists. Suddenly, leading members of Congress, including Graham and other defenders of the U.S.-Saudi
relationship, were alarmed at the prospect of selling more arms to Salman. “The Khashoggi murder really broke the dam on
congressional outrage about what the administration’s conduct has been [toward Saudi Arabia],” says Kate Gould, former legislative
director for Middle East policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. This spring, the Senate and House passed a bill
championed by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) requiring the United States to stop giving the Saudi coalition
intelligence and to prohibit the in-air refueling of Saudi warplanes. It was the first time in U.S. history that both chambers of
Congress invoked the War Powers Act, designed to check the president’s war-making powers by requiring congressional
authorization to deploy troops overseas. Trump vetoed the bill on April 16. Arms expert William Hartung says the current political
climate makes new deals unlikely: “It’d be very difficult [right now] to push a substantial sale of offensive weapons like bombs.
Anything that can be used in the war is probably a non-starter.” Still, billions of dollars of approved weapons are already in the
pipeline. If congressional anger at the Saudis wanes, the arms spigot could reopen. In
February, a bipartisan group of
senators—including Graham and Chris Murphy (D-Conn.)—introduced the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of
2019, which would halt future sales of ammunition, tanks, warplanes and bombs, and suspend exports of bombs that had
been given a prior green light. Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) wants to go even further. In January, he introduced legislation that
would ban all weapons exports to Saudi Arabia, as well as maintenance and logistical support. The bill has 29 cosponsors (most of
them Democrats). “The bottom line is: We know for a fact that they’re bombing school buses, bombing weddings, bombing funerals,
and innocent people are being murdered,” McGovern told In These Times. “The question now is: Are we going to just issue a press
release and say, ‘We’re horrified,’ or is there going to be a consequence?” McGovern says that if a measure like his is not passed,
To pass such bills,
“other authoritarian regimes around the world will say, ‘Hey, we can do whatever the hell we want.’”
Congress members will have to muscle past the arms industry. In Lockheed Martin’s 2018 annual report,
the company warned, “Discussions in Congress may result in sanctions on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” For Jehan Hakim of the
Yemeni Alliance Committee, the ongoing war comes down to the influence of money in Washington . “We
talk to family back home [in Yemen] and the question they ask is, ‘Why? Why is the U.S. supporting the Saudi coalition?’” Hakim
says. “Profiteering is put before the lives of humans.”

New fights on unrelated issues ruin Dem bargaining leverage AND create
blowback that slows relief
Aton and Storrow 4-14, [Adam Aton and Benjamin Storrow are E&E News reporters, Virus
response excludes climate. Get used to it, 2020, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1062867757]

House Democrats have mostly stopped insisting that emergency relief bills address climate.
Renewable energy industries, once poised for a banner year, are now just trying to hold on to
what they have rather than push lawmakers for more.

A dozen sources from Capitol Hill, industry and advocacy said that climate policy still can survive
exclusion from these initial relief packages. Once lawmakers have addressed the unfolding
pandemic, they said, climate policy could more easily find a place in economic stimulus bills.

But some are worried the size and difficulty of the emergency relief packages may carry a heavy
cost for Democrats: The more they have to fight Republicans over medical spending and
oversight, the less leverage they have to fight for big-ticket climate programs.

After failing to include emissions policies in the last $2 trillion coronavirus package, House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) retreated from demanding the next package include
infrastructure.

Some sources described the withdrawal as an indication of what Democrats lose from
"asymmetrical warfare" in which Republicans treat health care aid as a concession.
"If the choice is you could either help hospital workers or you could get climate legislation —
but you can't get both — they're going to pick the hospitals every time. And rightfully so, that's
the right answer," said Brett Hartl, government affairs director for the Center for Biological
Diversity.

Money isn't the problem. Greens and Democrats say they aren't worried that a 13-figure price
tag for coronavirus relief will crowd out billions or trillions more in climate spending. The
government can borrow money with near-zero interest rates, and there's the belief that
Democrats feel more emboldened to deficit spend after Republicans in 2017 enacted a $1.5
trillion tax cut.

A bigger concern is how Democrats can insist on cutting emissions without appearing to stall
economic recovery.

It doesn't seem as if anyone in Democratic leadership is using this crisis to advance climate, one
Democratic Hill staffer said.

Part of that is because Democrats are busy promoting priorities like hospitals and state
agencies. But even so, there's no climate plan waiting for lawmakers to pick off the shelf, the
staffer said, and Democrats don't want to risk blowback for slowing relief programs over a
climate fight they'd likely lose.

Key to health care spending and telemedicine

Tyler Olson, 4-3-2020, What could 'Phase 4' coronavirus bill include?," Fox News,
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/what-could-phase-4-coronavirus-bill-include, Accessed: 4-
16-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

The common theme coming from Republicans and Democrats on a potential "Phase 4" bill is
infrastructure.

“With interest rates for the United States being at ZERO, this is the time to do our decades long
awaited Infrastructure Bill,” Trump tweeted Tuesday. “It should be VERY BIG & BOLD, Two
Trillion Dollars, and be focused solely on jobs and rebuilding the once great infrastructure of our
Country! Phase 4.”

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said in
a joint statement Thursday that the infrastructure they would most like to see rebuilt the is
American health care infrastructure, which is being seriously tested during the coronavirus
pandemic.

"The number one priority is addressing this health crisis, which requires a Marshall Plan to
rebuild our health care infrastructure on a continental scale and ensure the resources are there
to test and treat everyone who needs it," they said.

According to a release from Pelosi's office on Wednesday, health care infrastructure may include
building "community health centers" and boosting telemedicine.
That solves this and future pandemics
Price-Smith et al., PhD, Chair of the Political Science Deparment, Colorado College, advisor
for the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the US Department of Defense, served as
advisor to the United States Institute of Peace, the United Nations Development Program, the
World Bank, the US Environmental Protection Agency, ‘16

(Andrew, Joseph M. Rosen, M.D., Professor of Surgery, Geisel School of Medicine, Luis Kun, PhD,
Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (2011-2015)
at the National Defense University, Robyn E. Mosher, Geisel School of Medicine, Dartmouth
College, Elliott Grigg, Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine University of Washington, Seattle
Children’s Hospital, Christian Macedonia, Lancaster General Health, Penn Medicine, Julien
Klaudt-Moreau, Geisel School of Medicine, Dartmouth College, “Cybercare 2.0: meeting the
challenge of the global burden of disease in 2030,” Health and Technology, June, Volume 6,
Issue 1, pp 35–51)

2.6.1 Surveillance and contact tracing

As EVD began to spread across the affected West Africa region in 2014, identifying cases and
then tracking them became paramount in stemming the tide of the infection. In contrast to
many disasters, which are bounded, pandemics based on infections fail to recognize
international borders or other normal boundaries. In order to contain this disease as it spread,
we would have required scalable and sustained responses. These include:

1) Early recognition, coordination, and collaboration among affected nations and regions;

2) Understanding the disease penetration and transmission dynamics with surveillance and
contact tracing;

3) Utilization of existing technologies in information processing and communication (such as

mobile phones) to aid in better understanding the tempo and spread of the disease.

These systems, coupled with research activities, early diagnostics, tracking and mapping
capabilities (especially in a mobile population), risk factor assessment and treatment
effectiveness, become essential to decision-makers in implementing effective control and
treatment measures [45].

Given the penetration of mobile phones in Africa, individuals seeking information about the
disease, including where to refer themselves or family members for care, could provide
important information regarding the potential spread of the illness. Geographic location of
callers is often mandated to be available to emergency services in times of crisis. However, in
humanitarian context situations, such processes may not have the regulatory precedent to be
implemented, potentially hindering the response effort. During the EVD outbreak, Sierra Leone
deployed caller location services within its 117 Ebola Response Centers. Two projects were
implemented concurrently:

1) Cell tower locations were supplemented by information collected by 117 call operators, and
2) Real-time location services of callers were deployed rapidly to support emergency services’
response efforts.
Privacy issues did occur, though these were in part addressed with software solutions [46].

Typically, once a potential contact with a patient occurs, tracking them is a paper-based system involving data collection forms, data aggregation from local sites, data entry into
a database, data aggregation on a regional scale, data review and reporting, and finally report submission to national decision-makers. Such a process can be especially
challenging not only within the context of the area from which the epidemic surged, but also given the 21-day incubation period of EVD.

In 2014, a team designed and implemented a smartphone-based contact tracing system that was linked to data analysis and visualization. The project, started in Conakry,
Guinea, eventually expanded into five prefecture regions over six months, tracking more than 9000 individuals. The system was based upon the CommCare mobile application
and was integrated with Tableau, a business intelligence software using protocols publically available from the CDC as well as the WHO. The contact software was designed to
not only intake information on affected persons, but also to track their movements using time stamps and data location. Dashboards helped to display the information and
performance of the collection methodology. Data validation occurred with test comparisons with paper-based systems, eventually approaching 90 % agreement [47].

2.6.2 Education and information dissemination

Health information technology (HIT) using electronic health records (EHR) has developed with
mostly passive utilization for providers to get real-time information on medications, laboratory
and imaging results, and to provide a method of documenting care. Its use in emerging illnesses
or disasters such at EVD is less well described. Once available, providers did embrace HIT in
caring for patients suffering from the EVD disease. The WHO and the CDC actively disseminated
current information on diagnosis, treatment and supportive care, such as the proper use of
personal protective equipment. However, while EHRs helped support individual episodes of
care, they proved less helpful in sharing that information during the outbreak. One problem that
occurred was the concept of “technology-induced error” where critical data that may have
proved useful in tracking the disease or evaluating it on a population basis was hindered by the
non-standard placement of the information in the EHR [48].

Symptom monitoring apps and other mobile applications were less well developed during EVD,
with the exception of outbreak tracking maps. Ushahidi did develop a mapping tool to track the
disease using crowd-sourced data. Also, the International Red Cross sent two million text
messages each month in an effort to spread current knowledge [49]. One challenge in the
development and usage of such tools, however, stems from mobile phone penetration in Africa.
While mobile phone use is extensive throughout much of Africa, smartphone availability is less
so, estimated in January 2014 at 12 % [48].

ClinPak is a US-developed, Nigeria-implemented mobile EMR system designed to track a

patient’s medical history, active medical problems and associated treatments in a point-of-care
platform. It has been successfully implemented in Nigeria for improving maternal health, but
found a new use during the EVD outbreak. Important espe cially early in the outbreak was
information dissemination; ClinPak supported the development of other mobile apps to help
disseminate EVD information [49].

Potential next steps that might be useful to streamline the use of EHRs and apps include:

1) Standardize the methodology in programming data in EHRs and apps;

2) Create and improve apps’ functionality;

3) Remove constraints on data input for contextualized diagnosis (e.g., using the open.fda.gov
model), and

4) Make information and usage available at point of care [50].

2.6.3 Discussion

According to the CDC, current estimates put the total number of cases at approximately 24,797
with about 8764 deaths since March 2014 [51, 52]. While the number of new cases has flattened
out since the peak early summer of 2015, the crisis continues nearly two years after it began.
Many fault the WHO for its mismanagement of the crisis during its earlier stages. Had there
been a more concerted international effort at the onset of the crisis we may not have seen such
a dramatic increase in the total number of cases. It is important to note that many of the cases
seen outside of West Africa were the result of healthcare workers returning to their country of
origin. Cybercare could have tracked all of the cases and allowed a more timely response to the
disease outbreak.

With communicable diseases, we do not have the luxury to evacuate the patients in large
numbers. We need to isolate diseased patients, treating them in place with either isolation (if
they are infected) or quarantine (if they have had contact with infected individuals). Cybercare
provides the electronic tools to allow this treatment to happen. The use of telemedicine and
robotics is crucial to treating at a distance, allowing quarantine and isolation of individuals who
are infected or exposed to the disease. If we transport these patients, we risk infecting the rest
of the country or the world. This is what we began to see in Ebola in West Africa where
individuals traveled out of the country with this highly deadly communicable disease.

In the future we need a healthcare system in place to treat pandemics when Ebola or Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infect individuals who travel internationally.
The system will need to be able to stop the spread of disease with vaccines (i.e., make vaccines
rapidly with new technologies to produce large quantities in weeks rather than months; deliver
vaccines with robotic-controlled drones); treat exposed or infected patients with isolation or
quarantine; and track patients with both communicable disease as part of the pandemic, and
non-communicable chronic diseases like diabetes that require ongoing treatment. The system
should also anticipate a pandemic by examining susceptible populations, determining if any
individuals are infected, and treating them early. Prior pandemics such as SARS had lower
transmission and death rates than Ebola, whose mortality is extremely high.

Cybercare is ideal for remotely treating a pandemic because it provides telemedicine for
treatment at a distance, along with aggressive task shifting, and the technology for advanced
quarantine and isolation with robotics. As medical responders set up 11 hospitals in West Africa
for Ebola, we could have positioned key technologies. An example: IVs were crucial in Ebola to
reduce the fatality from 80 to 40 %. Yet, placing an IV in an Ebola patient is very dangerous for a
pandemic provider (personal quote, Tom Crabtree). We could have placed explosive ordnance
robots at those hospitals as remote-controlled nurses. Robot nurses already exist [53]. We need
to teach the robots to place intravenous lines and care for patients in situations where the risk
of provider infection is so high — this will certainly be possible before 2030.
Travel is very dangerous in a pandemic of Ebola or even SARS. Patients need to know and believe that by staying in place they will receive the best care possible. This will protect
those across borders from becoming infected. In 2030, our response to pandemics will dramatically improve with Cybercare.

3 Conclusion: the way forward

Cybercare will provide the foundation for healthcare delivery in the future. It is based on seven pillars of information technology (genomics; telemedicine; robotics; simulation,
including virtual and augmented reality; AI; the EMR; and smartphones) that support three key paradigms. We will shift care from treatment to prevention, from specialist to
generalist, and from the hospital to the home. Cybercare could help enhance private health and public health; address the GBD with treatment for communicable illnesses; and
help the aging population cope with their chronic illnesses in the developed world.
Cybercare is already accomplishing many of the goals we outlined almost a decade ago [3]. Medical providers are available in some drugstores (we envisioned this in 2008, and it
is now a reality), and via telemedicine (this was in early stages in 2008, and is now widely implemented). Many patient-monitoring devices and cell phone apps exist to collect
health data for the use of both patients and providers.

Over the next 15 years, we will see a dramatic acceleration in the use of technology in health
care. By 2030, we expect that much of what we have predicted in this paper will be in place in
the US healthcare system and in the Global healthcare environment. Telemedicine is the oldest,
best-known Cybercare technology, but that is rapidly changing as technologies evolve and
merge. For example, telemedicine is now being done on a smartphone. New technologies will
develop that enhance this model. Information fusion and techniques for management (of big
data, information, knowledge and wisdom) promise to play a central future role in the
prevention and detection of the burden of disease as well as its remediation. Oracle has
implemented this technology in Indonesia, Singapore, and Australia [26].

Disease spread causes extinction

Fox 2018 (Maggie Fox, 4/4/2018, How to stop 'nightmare bacteria' from spreading across the
U.S.," NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/nightmare-bacteria-are-
trying-spread-u-s-cdc-says-n862436, Accessed: 4-4-2018, /Kent Denver-MB)

“Nightmare bacteria” with the power to resist most antibiotics are popping up across the U.S.,
but new, aggressive policies can help stop them from spreading, federal health officials said
Tuesday. A new program for testing suspect bacteria turned up unusual antibiotic-resistance
genes 221 times in 2017, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported. And 11
percent of people screened for these superbugs carried them, even though they had no
symptoms, the CDC said. “CDC’s study found several dangerous pathogens, hiding in plain sight,
that can cause infections that are difficult or impossible to treat,” said the CDC’s Dr. Anne
Schuchat. “While they are appearing all over the place, an aggressive approach can snuff them
out.” Antibiotic-resistant germs kill more than 23,000 Americans a year. They evolve quickly,
developing mutations that let them evade the effects of antibiotics. If they are not stopped
fast, they spread. Worse, the antibiotic-resistant DNA can be carried in little cassettes of genetic
material called plasmids that bacteria can slip in their entirety to one another and to other
species of bacteria. It’s already happened several times in the U.S. — and when one superbug
gives new powers to a different superbug, the result can be an infection that is impossible to
treat. “Once antibiotic resistance spreads, it is harder to control—like a wildfire,” the CDC said
in a statement. The World Health Organization has labeled antibiotic resistance a “fundamental
threat” to humanity.
 Off
The defense industry is insulated from most of the damage from Corona
because it depends of defense purchases
Choi Jin-Myung, 4-3-2020, analyst of NH Investment & Securities. Defense Industry: Relatively
Unharmed vs. Other Industries," Business korea,
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=43657, Accessed: 4-2-2020,
/Kent Denver-MB

Amid the worldwide spread of Covid-19, the global economy continues to plummet . However,
due to the nature of the defense industry, for which market size is determined by the scale of
national defense expenditure, Covid-19’s impact on defense sector plays should be relatively
limited.

Despite expanding macro uncertainties, defense industry share price decline looks excessive

The recent phenomenon of defense industry share prices moving in step with the Kospi
represents a novel development. Historically, defense industry beta (relative to the Kospi) has
remained within the -1~0 range, with sector share prices holding relatively steady regardless of
economic conditions or the stock market environment.

In particular, we note that deterioration in the defense industry share price average (-38.1%
YTD) has significantly outpaced the decline of the Kospi (-20.2% YTD) this year. As its business
structure should make the defense industry relatively less vulnerable compared to other sectors,
we view the recent drop in defense share prices as indicating the severity of current market
distortions.

Against this backdrop, we believe that the recent Covid-19-related market plunge is not an
accurate reflection of the scale of damage being incurred by individual industries, and that as a
result, opportunities to benefit from a rapid rebound may appear once the stock market begins
to normalize.

Defense industry insulated from Covid-19 effects; investment attractiveness rising as earnings
growth continues

While it is difficult to predict when the Covid-19 crisis will subside or when the market will
recover, we positively evaluate the attractiveness of the defense industry for the following
reasons:

1) There should be little direct damage from the Covid-19 outbreak;

2) Sector dividend growth is ongoing, and dividend yields will likely surge due to the recent
share price plunge;

3) With its long-term growth momentum remaining intact , ongoing industry growth is
anticipated.
However, we note that some effects are to be felt at the civil businesses that sector players are
operating alongside their defense businesses. Accordingly, we recommend looking at firms with
a low portion of civil (especially passenger airplane) business and companies with high captive
sales portions.

The plan is a surprise arms restriction that decks the stock market
Atsushi Tago is Associate Professor of International Relations at Graduate School of Law, Kobe
University and Gerald Schneider is Professor of International Politics at the University of
Konstanz, Germany, “The Political Economy of Arms Export Restrictions: The Case of Japan”,
Japanese Journal of Political Science, Sept 20 12,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233780864_The_Political_Economy_of_Arms_Expor
t_Restrictions_The_Case_of_Japan

6. Conclusion This
article provides additional empirical evidence to support the existing argument which
connects political decision-making processes to the ups and downs the political economy of arms
export restrictions of the defense industry on the stock market (e.g. Schneider and Troeger, 2006; Bechtel
and Schneider, 2010). While previous studies suggested that a change of political leadership in Japan did not affect financial markets
(Ling and Wang, 2007), this Q1 article shows that markets are nevertheless influenced by political
announcements and decisions which directly affect the ordering book of the industry. The analysis
particularly shows that mainly surprising news in the form of leaks that lead to increases in the return of armament producers.
However, investors carefully consider whether a producer will really be ready for conquering foreign markets once the anticipated
policy changes become effective. The defense sector did not only react to positive news. The announcement by Defense Minister
Ohno in January 2000 that the policy would not be relaxed was unsurprisingly met
by a negative market reaction. The
analysis suggests more generally that financial
market reactions allow us to measure the redistributive
effects of real and of attempted policy reforms. The failure of many studies to obtain clear evidence in favor of the
thesis that some investors profit from increased tensions in the international scene is mostly due to the high level of temporal
aggregation in which these studies are conducted. The analysis suggests that security policy measures have economically
modest but politically salient economic repercussions also for a still largely pacifist society like the Japanese one. Finally,
econometric analyses of financial markets increase the transparency of the political and economic decision-making process. The
demonstration of how much investors into the armaments industry profit from individual
political decisions making helps to qualify a discussion which frequently fluctuates between
demonization and extenuation.

Lost contracts deck defense companies, defense stocks, and primacy

Arjun Sreekumar, 3-27-2020, Arjun Sreekumar is a Senior Consultant in the Aerospace,
Defense, and Security team of a reputed global growth consulting company. He also leads the
defense research teams in Europe and India. Views expressed here are personal and do not
represent the views of the company, How COVID-19 Will Impact the Defense Industry," No
Publication, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/how-covid-19-will-impact-the-defense-industry/,
Accessed: 4-2-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

Tough Choices Ahead, Perhaps

While the defense industry is currently not affected as much as many other industries, we need
to keep in mind that defense contracts are very high-value contracts and a potential loss of
business due to a COVID-19 related worst-case scenario could mean that companies lose out on
anticipated sales worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Companies may have to make tough
decisions on how the business may be conducted in the future.

Maintaining all assembly lines and an active workforce in the face of reduced sales is a
challenging situation defense companies could face. At this point businesses are faced with
tough questions: Do they maintain the workforce level or trim it at the risk of losing capable
people? Do they delay payments to vendors? Do they turn to governments for help? Do they
divert R&D budgets toward paying salaries at the risk of losing technological edge? Do they
relocate production sites? How will they maintain shareholder confidence? Defense companies
must work on future-proofing themselves and must be prepared with answers to such questions
in order to deal with the uncertainties stemming from shocks caused by the pandemic.

Secondary Effects Due to Stock Price Declines

A look at the stocks of defense companies that manifest visible shocks from the pandemic
paints a worrying picture. From February 10 to date, Lockheed Martin’s stock price has fallen by
around 28 percent, Leonardo’s by 55 percent, Thales’ by 33 percent, and Fincantieri’s by 32
percent. Shares of some defense companies are currently trading at their lowest prices in the
past five years. While trading in secondary markets does not directly affect incomes of
companies, we need to be wary about its indirect consequences. Companies that planned to
issue shares in the primary market to fund capital investments may have to hold off as low share
prices are detrimental to successful public offerings. Business expansion plans will have to be
deferred. Another more worrying consequence of this could be a potential loss of control or a
takeover if other entities buy out cheap shares. Defense companies may have to resort to share
buybacks in order to prevent such events from happening, in turn resulting in more expenses
and loss of liquidity for the firm, at a time when thriftiness is the need of the hour.

That causes nuclear war, the US needs as large of a lead as possible.

Thomas H. Henricksen 17, emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 3/23/17, “Post-
American World Order,” http://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order

The tensions stoked by the assertive regimes in the Kremlin or Tiananmen Square could spark a political or
military incident that might set off a chain reaction leading to a large-scale war. Historically, powerful
rivalries nearly always lead to at least skirmishes, if not a full-blown war. The anomalous Cold War era spared the
United States and Soviet Russia a direct conflict, largely from concerns that one would trigger a nuclear exchange
destroying both states and much of the world. Such a repetition might reoccur in the unfolding three-
cornered geopolitical world. It seems safe to acknowledge that an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia will persist in their
geo-strategic ambitions. What Is To Be Done? The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George
Orwell outlined in “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the
totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one
that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union. What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating
competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and economically strong, the United
States will have the resources to deter its peers’ hawkish behavior that might otherwise trigger a
major conflict. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic chess match with Russia and
China will prove tense and demanding —since all the countries boast nuclear arms and long-range
ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners ,
something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously. There can be little room for error
in fraught crises among nuclear-weaponized and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as
they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a waiting game in which each power
looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a collapse, as happened to the Soviet
Union.
 Off
Biden wins now
Chris Cillizza, 4-8-2020, CNN Politics Reporter and Editor-at-Large, covering national politics
including the White House, Why Joe Biden starts as the general election front-runner," CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/08/politics/joe-biden-donald-trump-general-
election/index.html, Accessed: 4-9-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

(CNN)With Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders' decision to end his campaign on Wednesday, it's now
official: Former Vice President Joe Biden will be the Democratic presidential nominee this fall.

And Biden starts the general election against President Donald Trump as the front-runner --
albeit not a huge one.

Start with polling. A new Quinnipiac University national poll released Wednesday afternoon put
Biden at 49% to Trump's 41%.

That's broadly consistent with the Real Clear Politics average of all general election matchups
between the two; RCP shows Biden with an average of a 6-point lead over Sanders.

But the presidential election isn't a national popular vote, you will say. And remember what
happened in 2016, you will note.

True! But neutral political handicappers also give Biden a small but discernible edge over
Trump in the race to 270 electoral votes.

As the Cook Political Report's Amy Walter wrote in late March:

"Biden starts with a slight lead in the Electoral College math. Right now, 232 electoral votes sit
in Lean/Likely or Solid Democrat. On the GOP side, 204 electoral votes are in the
Lean/Likely/Solid Republican column. There are six states (and one congressional district) in
Toss-Up: Arizona, Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Nebraska's
2nd district. Those add up to 102 Electoral votes."

Around that same time, Stu Rothenberg, founder of the Rothenberg Political Report, concluded
much the same thing as he wrote:

"The President is an underdog now in his bid for a second term. That doesn't mean he can't
win. It simply means that he is in a more difficult place than he was before, in part because
Democrats have united behind a consensus candidate who has potentially broad appeal."

As Rothenberg rightly notes, things change! Four years ago, polls and Electoral College
handicapping would have suggested Hillary Clinton was a clear favorite -- and we know how that
turned out.

But that's in the fuzzy future. And we are very much in the present right now.
The Point: If today is rightly understood as the first day of the 2020 general election, then as
of day one, Joe Biden is more likely to be elected president on November 3 than Donald
Trump.

The plan is broadly popular and a win for Trump

Kelsey Reichmann, 7-22-2019, How do Americans feel about US arms sales? Not great.,"
Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2019/07/12/how-do-
americans-feel-about-us-arms-sales-not-great/, Accessed: 2-24-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

WASHINGTON — Congress is still divided on the decision to continue selling weapons to Saudi
Arabia, and it turns out the American public feels a similar way.

According to a new public opinion poll, 70 percent of Americans oppose arms sales to other
nations and see the transactions as a threat to national security. However, when it comes to
the U.S.-Saudi relationship, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 50 percent of
Americans feel the alliance weakens U.S. national security, while 45 percent say it does more to
strengthen national security.

“Saudi Arabia has long been viewed as a valuable security partner for US grand strategy in the
Middle East. As such, it has received significant military aid and equipment from the United
States,” the think tank said in its findings.

As for opposition to U.S. arms sales in general , the poll found that this view crosses traditional
partisan lines: 75 percent of Democrats, 70 percent of Independents and 62 percent of
Republicans expressed a lack of safety associated with arms sales. “Overall, 20 percent say
arms sales make no difference to US safety, while just 9 percent say they make the US safer,”
the think tank reported.

Plan is a win for Trump that helps in with swing voters in 2020
William A. Galston, 2-5-2020, William A. Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Brookings
Institution’s Governance Studies Program, where he serves as a Senior Fellow. Prior to January
2006 he was the Saul Stern Professor and Acting Dean at the School of Public Policy, University
of Maryland, director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, founding director of the
Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), and executive
director of the National Commission on Civic Renewal, co-chaired by former Secretary of
Education William Bennett and former Senator Sam Nunn. A participant in six presidential
campaigns, he served from 1993 to 1995 as Deputy Assistant to President Clinton for Domestic
Policy. State of the Union: A preview of Trump’s reelection strategy," Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/02/05/state-of-the-union-a-preview-of-trumps-
reelection-strategy/, Accessed: 3-8-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

As President Trump strode toward the podium to deliver his 3rd State of the Union address,
there was broad agreement across party lines about the kind of speech that would best serve
his political interests.

The address would be upbeat and affirmative, in sharp contrast to the dark “American carnage”
address he delivered as he took office in January 2017. It would underscore the progress Mr.
Trump believes the country has made under his leadership. A key theme would be “promises
made, promises kept”—on taxes, trade, regulation, immigration, and religious liberty, among
other matters. He would focus on economic growth and job creation, where he receives the
highest marks from the electorate. And he would argue that his foreign policy has kept our
country safe while shifting more of the financial burden away from American taxpayers and
toward our allies in Europe and East Asia.

An effective speech would also look forward to 2020 and beyond. The president would highlight
issues—such as prescription drug prices and infrastructure—on which bipartisan progress could
be made, even in an election year, while offering a vision of what can be accomplished during
the next four years.

The tone of the speech would be healing. The president would say, as he has before, that he was
not elected to do small things and that making big changes has aroused unavoidable
controversy. Mirroring Bill Clinton’s State of the Union address in 1999, Mr. Trump would say
nothing about his ongoing Senate trial on two articles of impeachment, and he would keep
overtly partisan jabs to a minimum.

Overall, a president who has consistently stirred up his base at the expense of expanding his
appeal would extend a rhetorical olive-branch to his adversaries in an effort to improve his
standing with the swing voters whose choices could spell the difference between victory and
defeat in November.

This speech would call upon President Trump to display self-restraint and magnanimity, not the
qualities for which he is best known. Could he bring himself to deliver it?

This was, almost to the letter, the speech President Trump delivered. He rattled off key
accomplishments—tax cuts, regulatory reduction, and “fair and reciprocal” trade agreements.
He took credit for a strong economy, record-low unemployment, rising labor force participation,
the growth in American factories, and record oil and gas production. He also claimed credit for
replacing NAFTA, declaring “I keep my promises.”

President Trump emphasized his view that these measures were helping all Americans,
including women, African Americans, veterans, disabled workers, and even those with less than
a high school diploma. We are, he claimed, “in a blue-collar boom.” Other promises kept, he
said, included 100 miles of the southern border wall with another 500 miles to follow, and the
total reconstruction of the U.S. military.

In social policy, the president focused on measures likely to be popular with voters across
party lines. Vocational and technical training in all high schools, reducing the cost of prescription
drugs and other medical services, and increased investment in the fight against opioid addiction,
Alzheimer’s, and AIDS. He touted paid family leave for federal workers and an increase in the
child tax credit and promised new investments in infrastructure, including rural broadband.

There were combative moments of course. The president promised to protect the Second
Amendment, ban late-term abortions, and attacked sanctuary cities. He castigated Medicare for
All proposals, vowing that “We will never let socialism destroy American healthcare.”
Perhaps the most surprising element of the speech was President Trump’s repeated outreach to
African Americans, from record funding for HBCUs (historically black colleges and universities) to
invocations of Frederick Douglass and Harriet Tubman, to his salute to a ramrod straight
centenarian, one of the last of the Tuskegee Airmen. This may signal an all-out effort to reduce
Democrats’ margins among African Americans in key states.

All in all, President Trump’s speech represented the case he intends to take to the American
people in his re-election campaign. By not mentioning Democrats’ efforts to impeach and
remove him from office, by minimizing partisan jabs and focusing on proposals that could
command support across partisan, class, and ethnic lines, he tried to take the edge off what
has been a combative presidency and present himself as a leader who cares about all
Americans, not just the base he has tended so assiduously during the first three years of his
presidency.

The strategy behind the speech represents Mr. Trump’s best chance to broaden his appeal and
win re-election—assuming that he can adhere to its tone and not blow it up with a series of
provocative tweets down the road. If he sticks to the tone of the speech it remains to be seen
whether it will induce enough swing voters to set aside their reservations about his character
and conduct and focus instead on the promise of a less conflictual second term.

Trump 2020 victory locks in catastrophic climate change

PAUL STARR is a professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton and a winner of the
Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction. He is the author of Entrenchment: Wealth, Power, and the
Constitution of Democratic Societies. May 2019, Trump’s Second Term," Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/05/trump-2020-second-term/585994/,
Accessed: 4-25-2019, /Kent Denver-MB

Of all the questions that will be answered by the 2020 election, one matters above the others: Is
Trumpism a temporary aberration or a long-term phenomenon? Put another way: Will the
changes brought about by Donald Trump and today’s Republican Party fade away, or will they
become entrenched?

Trump’s reelection seems implausible to many people, as implausible as his election did before
November 2016. But despite the scandals and chaos of his presidency, and despite his party’s
midterm losses, he approaches 2020 with two factors in his favor. One is incumbency: Since
1980, voters have only once denied an incumbent a second term. The other is a relatively strong
economy (at least as of now). Alan Abramowitz, a political scientist at Emory University who
weights both of those factors heavily in his election-forecasting model, gives Trump close to an
even chance of reelection, based on a projected 2 percent GDP growth rate for the first half of
2020.

So far, much of the concern about the long-term effects of Trump’s presidency has centered on
his antidemocratic tendencies. But even if we take those off the table—even if we assume that
Trump continues to be hemmed in by other parts of the government and by outside institutions,
and that he governs no more effectively than he has until now—the impact of a second term
would be more lasting than that of the first.
In normal politics, the policies adopted by a president and Congress may zig one way, and those
of the next president and Congress may zag the other. The contending parties take our system’s
rules as a given, and fight over what they understand to be reversible policies and power
arrangements. But some situations are not like that; a zig one way makes it hard to zag back.

This is one of those moments. After four years as president, Trump will have made at least two
Supreme Court appointments, signed into law tax cuts, and rolled back federal regulation of the
environment and the economy. Whatever you think of these actions, many of them can
probably be offset or entirely undone in the future. The effects of a full eight years of Trump
will be much more difficult, if not impossible, to undo.

Three areas—climate change, the risk of a renewed global arms race, and control of the
Supreme Court—illustrate the historic significance of the 2020 election. The first two problems
will become much harder to address as time goes on. The third one stands to remake our
constitutional democracy and undermine the capacity for future change.

In short, the biggest difference between electing Trump in 2016 and reelecting Trump in 2020
would be irreversibility. Climate policy is now the most obvious example. For a long time, even
many of the people who acknowledged the reality of climate change thought of it as a slow
process that did not demand immediate action. But today, amid extreme weather events and
worsening scientific forecasts, the costs of our delay are clearly mounting, as are the
associated dangers. To have a chance at keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius —
the objective of the Paris climate agreement—the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
says that by 2030, CO2 emissions must drop some 45 percent from 2010 levels. Instead of
declining, however, they are rising.

In his first term, Trump has announced plans to cancel existing climate reforms, such as higher
fuel-efficiency standards and limits on emissions from new coal-fired power plants, and he has
pledged to pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement. His reelection would put off a
national commitment to decarbonization until at least the second half of the 2020s, while
encouraging other countries to do nothing as well. And change that is delayed becomes more
economically and politically difficult. According to the Global Carbon Project, if decarbonization
had begun globally in 2000, an emissions reduction of about 2 percent a year would have been
sufficient to stay below 2 degrees Celsius of warming. Now it will need to be approximately 5
percent a year. If we wait another decade, it will be about 9 percent. In the United States, the
economic disruption and popular resistance sure to arise from such an abrupt transition may be
more than our political system can bear. No one knows, moreover, when the world might hit
irreversible tipping points such as the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which would
likely doom us to a catastrophic sea-level rise.
 Off
The United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct
Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States to
all nations in Africa except for Ethiopia.
Specifically, Ethiopia’s on the brink – but United States security assistance is key
Cameron Evers 19 (Cameron Evers, Senior Intelligence Analyst at WorldAware, Inc., a global
risk firm, where he advises a Fortune 500 financial company on geopolitical risk. Previously,
Cameron researched for US and Africa-based consultancies and publications with an emphasis
on revolutionary movements, civil-military relations, and regime change. He has given talks on
African politics within the US government and universities. He holds a master’s degree in
International Policy from the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs.8-
16-2019, "Coup-proofing Ethiopia: How the United States Can Promote Stability in an Important
African Partner," Modern War Institute, https://mwi.usma.edu/coup-proofing-ethiopia-united-
states-can-promote-stability-important-african-partner/, Accessed: 11-14-2019 /Kent Denver-
YBJL)

In June, an attempted coup in Ethiopia centered principally in the northern region of Amhara temporarily threw
the country into turmoil—and left the army’s chief of staff dead . Against that backdrop, there is
credible concern about the risk of further instability surrounding the upcoming 2020 general
elections. Ethiopia’s reformist prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (commonly referred to simply as “Abiy”), likely faces his greatest
challenge yet. Following a 2018 assassination attempt on his life, a brief mutiny at his office three
months later, and most recently, June’s regional coup attempt, Ethiopia’s’ deteriorating ethnic
relations risk pose a challenge to Abiy’s stated goal of a more unified Ethiopia . The country has been a
longtime partner of the United States, and it is in the US interest to help stem the tide of growing instability
there. To do so, the United States must boost its diplomatic, economic, and defense cooperation. Today,
the risk of a coup is elevated , as research shows that attempted coups increase in likelihood once an
attempt has been made. Moreover, while the source of the instability in Ethiopia emanates chiefly from its regions, both
the near-mutiny and the latest attempted coup had reverberations that reached deeply into the
capital—the army chief of staff was killed in Addis Ababa in the June incident—presenting a clear threat to Abiy. Ethiopia’s
sprawling, 138,000-strong military force is one of the largest, most diverse, and most powerful
armies in Africa. And it is not immune from the ethnic tensions that affect the Ethiopian
population more broadly—a fact that must be accounted for in any effort to help build stability in the country. A
preventative approach is needed, and US assistance can play an important role. Foreign aid from
the United States can directly support coup-proofing via increased training and funding for
Ethiopia’s federal defense and intelligence services . Given the linkages between military
structure, effectiveness, defense spending, and coup risk, the United States should enhance
assistance and training to the Ethiopian armed forces. This, as research demonstrates, must be done with an
eye toward simultaneously increasing political and social stability. Perhaps the most notable example of successful US-supported
coup-proofing in Africa is the case of Egypt. During the 1950s, the CIA trained the young regime of Egyptian
President Gamal Nasser, blocking coup attempts from rival elements ranging from communists
to Islamists, some of which also had links inside the military. The CIA’s efforts were ultimately
successful, and Egypt—while officially unaligned during the Cold War—resisted pressure to formally enter the Soviet Union’s
official orbit for several decades, eventually becoming one of the largest recipients of US aid. The recent relatively
diminished US-Ethiopia military cooperation has the potential to grow substantially . Between 2016
and 2019, US economic and security aid has decreased, along with arms sales and military training activities. However, a positive,
yet unclear relationship still exists. At the Africa Land Forces Summit on June 28, US Army Maj. Gen. Roger L. Cloutier,
commander of US Army Africa, reaffirmed a strong US commitment to relations with Ethiopia without providing details on current
arrangements. The recent 2018 Post-Conflict Recovery Course is one example of positive collaboration. Ethiopia hosted US Africa
Command’s Justified Accord military exercises in July, signaling an opportunity for future military cooperation and opportunity to
bolster bilateral military ties. Through economic-driven diplomacy, the
United States can also support Ethiopian
stability by signaling strong US commitment to Ethiopia’s current government and organizing in-
country consultations. A high-level diplomatic visit to Ethiopia by either Secretary of State Mike Pompeo or Deputy Secretary
of State John J. Sullivan would demonstrate this type of support to Ethiopia’s internal stakeholders. The presence of a senior US
official would be a dramatic improvement to the limited amount of high-level engagements between the United States and Abiy
administration up to this point. Economic summits make the most sense for high-level envoys; the White House’s new Prosper Africa
initiative, announced in December 2018, could offer an effective vehicle for US support. These measures would communicate an
image of strong US-Ethiopian ties to the general population, and most importantly, make it clear to the Ethiopian government and
its opponents that the United States fully supports a stable and democratic Ethiopia. As I traveled through the country in March
2019 and spoke with ordinary Ethiopians, there was a marked enthusiasm for the country’s recent economic growth and optimism
that the threat of civil war and conflict had diminished. Unlike many leaders who stand to benefit by the backing by foreign powers,
Abiy also appears to enjoy local support. The United States has an opportunity to capitalize on this support by enhancing its
cooperation efforts ahead of the general elections next May. Elections
in vulnerable countries bring with them a
range of potential triggers for both violence and the threat of anti-government instability. The
US diplomatic and military expenditures required to assist in protecting against these outcomes
will be dwarfed by the cost of potentially losing a united Ethiopia and a key ally.

Failed and fragile states cascade – just a single collapse destroys regions
Seth D. Kaplan 17 (Seth D. Kaplan, is a professorial lecturer in the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, where he teaches a class on
political risk. He is also senior adviser for the Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) and a
consultant to organizations such as the World Bank, USAID, and United Nations. The author
wishes to thank Paul Stares of the Council on Foreign Relations for generating many of the
original ideas in this essay during a series of conversations in the spring of 2016., 1-26-2017,
"Weak States: When Should We Worry?," American Interest, https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2017/01/26/weak-states-when-should-we-worry/, Accessed: 11-15-2019 /Kent
Denver-YBJL)

Effects of the Risk Cascade The risks emanating from fragile states are especially hard to assess
because, as already noted, their most important components are often second-, third-, or even later-
order effects that combine to create a large impact . Risk cascades exist because some events
have a way of rippling across countries, institutions, non-state actors, supply chains, markets,
and populations often in a nonlinear fashion. This does not mean “everything is connected to everything else”—
what Hegel called the phenomenology of fools, because it negates any prospect of usefully prioritizing causality. But many things are
related to many other things, and by prioritizing causality accurately we can know a good deal more about them than we do now.
While all risks produce multiple-order effects, risk
cascades are particularly important in fragile states
because the social and institutional fabric is susceptible to relatively mild shocks or stresses that
would not harm more resilient systems. As such, just as companies must analyze how risk cascades through an entire
value chain, the U.S. government should analyze how risk cascades through the entire governance system and economy in any
country that might be affected. The Libyan conflict presents a graphic example. The
fall of Qaddafi created a power
vacuum that has contributed to the destabilization of much of the Sahel , affecting countries
from Mauritania to Chad and beyond; it strengthened Boko Haram, which is fighting four
governments; it led to terror attacks and worries in relatively stable countries such as Côte
d’Ivoire and Senegal; it spread weapons to groups seeking to overthrow the Egyptian state; it
spread terror to Tunisia, which has had an especially devastating effect on the economy of the
one success story of the so-called Arab Spring ; and it produced a steady stream of refugees
seeking safe haven in Europe. Along with the refugees from Syria, these have, in turn, contributed to a weakening of the
European Union and the rise of right-wing parties across the continent. And the cascade is ongoing.13 The myriad problems
that affected Mali, a relatively stable country before the fall of Qaddafi, became much more
acute when the fallout from Libya settled on it. Social exclusion, weak institutions, a
dysfunctional democracy, and a restive military led, when combined with the weapons
proliferation and the expansion of secessionist and extremist claims produced by Libya’s
vacuum, to a collapse of state authority in Mali’s north, a coup d’état in Bamako, and ongoing
violence. Only an international intervention prevented either a radical Islamist takeover of the
Malian state or its territorial dismemberment . The rest of the Sahel is similarly affected, if not to the same degree…
yet. But debates over whether to intervene in Libya and to what extent to be involved after the fall of Qaddafi paid little heed to the
larger implications for a dozen or so neighboring countries.14 The risks from fragile states come in many forms:
Fragile states can transmute their instability across borders. The conflicts in Syria and Libya have
destabilized their neighbors. The genocide in Rwanda continues to haunt the eastern DRC . Conflict
in West Africa and the Balkans in the 1990s spread from country to country, sometimes involving the same actors. Terrorist
groups can use fragile states as bases from which to threaten other countries. The Islamic State
uses its base in Syria and Iraq to plot attacks overseas . Boko Haram started in Nigeria but now
threatens four countries. Criminal gangs and networks feed on state weakness to smuggle goods, trade weapons, grow or
ship illicit drugs, and so on. The gains they make can be used to spread violence and corruption across borders, as has happened in
the Andes and Central America. The instability they foment can drive refugees to safer harbors, producing trails of migrants such as
those who flee Central America for the United States. Poor infrastructure, road blockages, and instability
can easily disrupt
trade routes and natural resource supplies, raising prices, reducing competitiveness, and
disrupting supplier and customer networks. The war in Mozambique hurt countries that depended on its ports for
trade. Middle Eastern wars have hurt Turkish trade . Somali piracy has raised costs for those
shipping near the Horn of Africa. Instability in the Niger Delta has periodically cut supplies, increasing world oil prices in
the process. Economic meltdown in Venezuela threatens all the countries that depend on its largesse for oil and aid. Conflict can
lead to the loss of markets and remittances. Eritrea lost by far its largest export market due to the war with Ethiopia in the late
1990s. Instability in Côte d’Ivoire, the most dynamic country in Francophone West Africa, hurt all of its neighbors. The drop in oil
prices has hurt not only countries overly dependent on oil (for example, Nigeria, Gulf states, Angola, Russia) but also those whose
remittances or export earnings depend on those countries (for example, Central Asia, poorer Middle Eastern countries, Niger, Togo,
and Benin). Changes in the discourse around ethnicity, religion, politically acceptable behavior (for example, coup d’état), and so on
can spur bad behavior or radicalization in nearby countries. Islamism has spread across the Middle East partly as a response to its
weak state system and changes in regional discourse over religion. Sectarian discourse has also proliferated in recent years, acting as
destabilizing force in some cases. Norms around democracy have changed, encouraging leaders in some weak democracies (for
example, Turkey, Thailand) to reduce restraints on their authority. Refugees
from conflict or weak economies
increase the stress on social services, prices, job markets, and ethnic dynamics . Syrian refugees
risk destabilizing Jordan and Lebanon and have had a major impact on European politics.
Diseases such as Ebola and Zika can spread because of weak healthcare systems in fragile states,
disrupting economies, weakening states, and draining budgets. Ebola affected three countries in West
Africa in 2015 and threatens to return. Concerns about infectious diseases having a far larger
impact on the world are growing. State weakness can encourage neighborly interventions that
spread instability or even weaken the countries doing the intervening . The second Congo War
(1998-2002) involved as many as nine African countries, as well as approximately twenty separate armed groups. Sometimes called
the Great War of Africa or the African World War, it threatened to destabilize a large swathe of the continent.
Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and other fragile states in its region drain its coffers of
resources without necessarily increasing its security.
 off
The United States Federal government should
- substantially increase funding for research and development in basic
technologies and technological infrastructure for private sector American
companies
- substantially increase stimulus packages to every American
- substantially reduce military presence in Africa
- support the development of a new international digital currency standard
- substantially increase climate financing
- substantially increase its investment in nuclear fusion technology, offshore
windfarms, and solar panels
- substantially increase sustainable development initiative aid to developing
nations
- support Chinese development of the One Belt, One Road initiative
 Case
Growth causes extinction—undermines biodiversity and invisible boundaries
necessary to sustain life. It’s not sustainable.
Asghedom Ghebremichael 16, Research Economist, The Environment and Natural Resources,
Department of Natural Resources, Government of Canada, “Frontiers of the Biosphere Inhibit
Perpetual Economic Growth: Exploring Pathways to Genuine Sustainable Development,” Journal
of Environmental and Social Sciences, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2016,
http://www.opensciencepublications.com/wp-content/uploads/ESS-2454-5953-3-125.pdf
Nature has its own set of rules, solidly grounded in laws of physics and chemistry, and emergent principles of geology and biology,
which are not artificial constructs. The natural rules are real, and they govern human well-being. Earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
eruptions, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, droughts, famines, civil conflicts, wildfires, poverty, and disease epidemics demonstrate
dramatically that our planet Earth is at risk. Moreover, the outbreak of novel diseases, such as Ebola and AIDS, in socially,
economically, and ecologically impoverished regions is a clear signal of the global predicaments of inequality and poverty. These
natural and anthropogenic disasters are clear indicators of ecological overshoot, meaning
anthropogenic disturbances beyond the carrying capacity of ecosystems that lead to ecological
crash, causing an eventual die-off, hence environmental disasters [3]. The frequency, scale, and adverse effects of these challenges
must be of great concern to humanity.¶ “Human alteration of the Earth was substantial and growing, transforming
between one-third and one-half of the global land surface; CO2 concentration in the atmosphere increased by nearly
30% since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution; more atmospheric nitrogen was fixed by humanity than
by all natural terrestrial sources combined ; humanity consumed more than half of all accessible surface-
freshwater; and about one-quarter of the bird species on Earth were driven to extinction” [4]. The UN’s
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment [5], a global landmark study, which involved more than 1,360 scientists, technical experts, and
policy makers from around the globe, summarized its findings as follows (paraphrased): (i) although living standards of “the few”
have improved over the past two centuries, human
activity is putting such strain on nature, undermining the
Earth’s capacity to support current and future generations; (ii) we are living beyond our means: the
current gains in enhanced quality of life have come at a considerable cost to health and integrity of ecosystems on which human
well-being depends; (iii) if we act now, we can avoid irreversible damage to ecosystems and to our
well-being; and (iv) we can no longer treat Nature’s bounty as free and limitless. ¶ The information summarized in Table
1(Ecological Foundations section below) makes it all clear that human well-being depends on the life sustaining multiple services of
ecosystems. Furthermore, a team of renowned scientists from N. America, Europe, Australia and the Scandinavian countries
identified the following nine ecological thresholds, which define “the safe operating space for humanity”: (i) climate change, (ii) rate
of terrestrial and marine biodiversity loss, (iii) human interference with the natural cycles of nitrogen and phosphorus, (iv)
stratospheric ozone depletion, (v) ocean acidification, (vi) global freshwater consumption rate, (vii) land-use-change, (viii) chemical
pollution, and (ix) atmospheric aerosol loading. The team concluded that humanity
was approaching to the
boundaries for freshwater consumption, land-use-change, ocean acidification, and interference with
the global phosphorus cycle, while the boundaries for climate change, biodiversity loss, and
interference with the nitrogen cycle have already been transgressed [6]. An urgent call for an
anthropogenic balancing act not to transgress ecological thresholds is in order. Halting short-sighted excessive anthropocentric
activities that lead to overexploitation of natural resources is imperative. The naturally imposed limiting frontiers, the ecological
thresholds, must be respected and protected. ¶ Rooted in the doctrine of laissez-faire, neoliberalism promotes perpetual
economic growth (PEG), which means unfettered expansion of an economy’s productive capacity realized through enabling
institutional arrangements. But, PEG is inherently not compatible with ecological integrity, environmental
quality, and genuine sustainable development (GSD). Drawing on the findings , conclusions, and recommendations of
Rockström’s team [6], I define GSD as a dynamic process by which human well-being is improved in an inclusive, a just, and an
environmentally safe operating space, achieved through inventions, innovations, diffusion, and adoption of appropriate technologies
as well as learning-by-doing.¶ GSD is in a stark contrast with the highly publicized and politicized concept of sustainable development
(SD) of the UN’s Brundtland Commission, which is also known as World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)
(1987) [7]. The highly generalized and vague definition of SD is: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:
(1) the concept of “needs”, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overwhelming priority should be given;
and (2) the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet
present and future needs”. Our Common Future, p.143. ¶ Given all its good intentions, the WECD failed to explain the consequences
of PEG strongly. Unfortunately, SD’s exact definition continues to be globally politicized and linked always to strategic policy goals
and objectives one would like to talk about. SD does not give any specific guidelines pertinent to alleviation of the human
predicaments associated with inequality, poverty, perversely globalized markets, destruction of the health and integrity of
ecosystems, and climate change.¶ Research questions, goal, and organization of the paper¶ What are the theoretical and practical
foundations of the PEG doctrine? Are PEG and GSD compatible? Addressing these questions has become a persistent challenge to
both social and natural scientists. The overarching goal of this article is to demonstrate the incompatibility of PEG with GSD. ¶ Rooted
in neoclassical microeconomic theory, neoliberalism advocates for PEG, which is unfettered expansion of an economy’s productive
capacity in the finite, materially closed (except the constant inflow of solar energy), and non-growing biosphere [8]. For this doctrine
to be realized, neoliberal economists prescribe globalized perfectly competitive markets, where multinational corporations play the
dominant economic games against all policies and strategic practices of GSD. ¶ Let me be clear at the outset. As a trained economist,
who went through the grueling processes of acquiring a PhD, I understand the importance of all the fundamentals of microeconomic
and macroeconomic theories. My argument is against the misuse and, in some case, abuse of these scientific theories to promote
personal ideological perceptions. I am motivated to add my “voice” to those voices of many preeminent scholars, whose extensively
published works inspired me to learn more on the adverse effects of neoliberalism on ecological integrity and human well-being [6,
8-12].¶ The paper is organized into six sections: this introduction, ecological foundations for GSD, the fallacies of the PEG doctrine,
anthropogenic effects on ecological integrity, selected pathways to GSD, and concluding remarks and policy recommendations, in
that order.¶ Ecological Foundations of Genuine Sustainable Development¶ In this section, I summarize the ecological foundations of
GSD, using taxonomy of the following key scientific terms: ecological principles of holism, biodiversity loss, sustainability, resilience,
ecological integrity, biogeochemical processes, carrying capacity, and overshoot. ¶ Principles of holism¶ Ecological principles of holism
mean that everything is interconnected with everything. This can be summarized by the dictum: “A whole is more than the sum of
its parts or members”. The totality of the whole of any living system-biological, social, or economic-is not fully embodied in its
individual parts or members. Wholes have properties that are not present in any of their separate parts; they emerge only when the
parts are combined together, forming mutually reinforcing synergistic nexus, in a coherent whole; and the specific properties of
individual parts disappear when they are part of the whole.¶ Thus, relationships among the parts of wholes matter; when
relationships change, the whole is changed. For example, water,
air, and soil are polluted with chemical and
biological waste, because we humans fail to appreciate the importance of their holistic relationship with Nature and thereby
with our well-being. Respiratory problems, cancer, food poisoning, and general poor health as well as the cost of healthcare are
some of the consequences of ignoring the imperatives of holism. ¶ Government policies that influence agriculture, forestry, mining,
manufacturing, labor relations, capital investments, employment, economic growth, all have direct and indirect impacts on the
natural environment-locally, nationally, and globally. We
have no way of knowing how large or small our
individual or collective adverse effects may be , but understanding the ecological principles of holism is necessary
condition to preserve ecological integrity and foster human well-being.¶ Consequences of biodiversity loss¶ Biodiversity (i.e.,
biological diversity) is the number, variety and variability of genes, populations, species, communities, ecosystems, and ecological
processes. Biodiversity
underpins the multiple services of ecosystems that sustain human well-
being; is the foundation of resilience of life on Earth; and an integral part of the fabric of all the world‘s cultures. It is
a common knowledge of the science of ecology that no feature of Earth is more complex, dynamic, and varied than the layer of
organisms that occupy its surfaces and its seas; and no
feature is experiencing more dramatic changes at the
hands of humans than this extraordinary, singularly unique and beautiful feature of the Earth, biodiversity. Critical
ecological processes (i.e., ecosystem functions) that depend on prevailing scale of biodiversity at the
ecosystem level influence plant productivity, soil fertility, water quality, atmospheric chemistry, and
many other local and global environmental conditions that ultimately affect human welfare.¶ Substantial
changes have already occurred, especially local and global losses of biodiversity. The primary cause has been widespread human
transformation of once highly diverse natural ecosystems into relatively species-poor managed ecosystems. Recent studies suggest
that such reductions in biodiversity can alter both the magnitude and the stability of ecosystem
processes, especially when biodiversity is reduced to the low levels typical of many managed natural systems. We humans ought
to remind ourselves that barren deserts are capable of supporting very little life (if any), because they lack biological diversity.
Ecosystems that completely lack diversity have no high quality, low entropy, energy left to
support life.¶ Diversity enables living systems to adapt and evolve to accommodate their ever-changing
natural environment. Even if we do not understand fully the specific nature of a threat, it should be clear that loss of biodiversity
represents a growing threat to the future of human life on Earth. There
is no way of knowing how many more
species can be lost before the ecological balance is tipped toward extinction of all species.
Decline causes transition---crisis fundamentally changes entrenched models of
growth and empowers societal mindset shifts that generate momentum for
degrowth
Derk Loorbach 16, director of DRIFT and Professor of Socio-economic Transitions at the
Faculty of Social Science, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “The economic crisis as a game
changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions,” Ecology and
Society, Volume 21, Issue 4, 2016, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art15/
Meanwhile, many political and public debates seem to be primarily concerned with standard, relatively short-term, economic issues,
such as monetary losses, stop-and-start economic growth, increasing unemployment, falling real estate prices, failing banks, virtually
bankrupt nations, and how to get back on course to economic growth. The standard responses when national governments are
struggling to get their economies healthy again are mostly about inducing more money, austerity measures, and introducing
financial regulations, all often part of a broader financial–economic logic (Stiglitz 2010). The
dominant focus on fighting
economic deficits and problems at the expense of investing in social and ecological deficits—
thereby failing to address persistent problems in these areas —can be argued to be a short-term
strategy to prop up an inherently unmanageable system. Examples are the support of system banks with public
money and the green growth strategy (OECD 2009, 2013a). Transition theory (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012) suggests that
such short-term fixes are typical regime-based strategies to sustain existing structures, cultures, and practices, and to fend off the
threats of more radical systemic change.¶ The transition perspective suggests that most regular policy and governance strategies
essentially reproduce existing systems and, by definition, do not address the root causes of problems that are embedded in the
same structures and cultures that determine how solutions are framed and implemented. Such path-dependent
development optimizing existing institutional structures will inevitably lead to recurring crises
and ultimately a more disruptive, shock-wise structural change of an incumbent regime. Transition
studies thus argue that solutions that address symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes
tend to reinforce a lock-in and result in further emergent problems (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010,
Schuitmaker 2012). We argue that the underlying causes and mechanisms of the economic crises have not been thoroughly
analyzed, let alone addressed through effective policies. In a globalized economy, fundamental changes will not likely come from
actions by (national) governments or incumbent businesses, as these are inherently intertwined with and dependent upon the
currently still dominant financial–economic systems and their governance. The need for alternative economic approaches,
discourses, and systems is increasingly emphasized (Schor 2010, Simms 2013, Jackson 2013, van den Bergh 2013, Schor and
Thompson, 2014). Even though the benefits of liberalization are still significant, it seems that the transfer of control from
government to markets has substantially diminished possibilities for top-down policy making, adding to brittleness, complexity, and
lock-in (Loorbach and Lijnis-Huffenreuter 2013).¶ In this paper, we take a transition perspective on transformative social innovation
to conceptualize and map the systemic dynamics that have caused the economic crisis, as well as how it influences the dynamics of
social transformation. We explore how the economic crisis might be considered as a phase in a broader
economic transition and which types of changes coincide to develop into this direction. We thus view the economic
crisis not as a phenomenon in isolation within a relatively short time frame, but as an intrinsic
part, or perhaps a symptom, of deeper underlying structural societal changes over the longer
term. The question we seek to address is how the economic crisis interacts with broader societal changes as well as which
dynamics might accelerate or hamper more structural (sustainability) transitions. To this end, we ask when and how a
macrolevel or landscape development like the economic crisis fundamentally changes the
dominant logic, rules, and conditions of incumbent regimes. In other words, when does a macrodevelopment
become a game changer (cf. Avelino et al. 2014)?¶ The paper builds upon theoretical work from the European FP7 project TRANSIT,
which draws on transition theory to develop an empirically grounded theory on transformative social innovation. In this paper, we
introduce the analytical perspective that we developed on transformative social innovation and two empirical examples. Although
our analytical perspective suggests that alternatives and breakthroughs can come from any sector or actor, in this paper, we focus
on the agency of social innovation and civil-society-led initiatives in providing and producing alternatives. The paper was developed
through a number of iterations, workshops, and theoretical synthesizing. To develop our arguments, we build upon insights from
sustainability transitions literature (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012), social innovation research (Mulgan 2006, Murray et al.
2010, Franz et al. 2012, Westley 2013, Moulaert et al. 2013) and other fields aiming to understand the economic crisis. In addition,
we include two empirical cases, transnational networks of social innovation, time banks, and the transition movement. For both
cases, we draw upon a general literature review. ¶ The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, “Economic change or
transition?,” we introduce the economic crisis as a multifarious phenomenon, how we understand it from a transition perspective,
and how it is understood from an economist’s point of view. We illustrate that it is an ambiguous phenomenon that is
simultaneously seen as part of regular changes in that it is part of disruptive or transformative change. In the section “Making sense
of the economic crisis?,” we present a number of alternative perspectives on the economic crisis that put forward particular
fundamental and systemic causes of the economic crisis and how these are translated in so called “narratives of change.” In
“Transformative social innovations,” we highlight two specific social innovation initiatives, time banks and transition towns, which
have an evident transformative claim and potential, and reflect upon how such transformative social innovations relate (themselves)
to the economic crisis. In “Reconceptualizing societal transformations and the role of the economic crisis,” we synthesize our
findings and argue that the concepts of game changers and narratives could help to unpack the landscape and better understand
how macro- and microlevels interact to trigger transformative changes at the mesolevel. In conclusion, we address the need for a
better understanding of the transformative impacts of the different shades of change (in coevolution) vis-é-vis the restorative
dynamics associated with incumbent regimes.¶ ECONOMIC CHANGE OR TRANSITION?¶ The economic crisis has an empirical basis in
factual events and economic statistics, but is also a social construct. In a narrow sense, the term economic crisis refers to the
worldwide recession of 2007–2008, which changed economic circumstances and investors’
outlooks and caused governments to nationalize and/or invest in failing banks and to stimulate
the economy inter alia through bail outs, expansion of the money supply (quantitative easing), and
low interest rates. It changed the lives of many whose employment or work conditions were
drastically affected (Melike 2014). It also made many observers much more critical about capitalism
and the stability of markets, especially financial markets (Murphy 2011, Stephan and Weaver 2011, Rifkin 2014,
Weaver 2014). In Europe, the economic crisis was accompanied by (perceptions of) a debt crisis, a
banking crisis, and a euro crisis, all interrelated . The financial crisis, debt crisis, bank crisis, neo-liberal crisis, and
global financial collapse are not just different names but also refer to different, albeit closely related, empirical phenomena.
Importantly, the perception and representation of such phenomena in crisis terms can give scope for motivating and/or justifying
responses.¶ This
economic crisis has led to measures and dynamics with profound impacts on
society. Impacts that hardly could have been predicted or anticipated proactively in an objective
and neutral way. As most of the formal and institutional measures originate from either governmental or financial institutes, it
is to be expected that these favor nondisruptive and reinforcing measures that shift the cost of recovery toward society and
strengthen even more the potential for financial–economic growth. The resulting austerity measures and state budget cuts put
pressure on public sector employment, transfer payments, and social welfare systems, contributing to rising unemployment and
underemployment among young and old, and lower disposable incomes for many in society. The state investments in the recovery
of the banking system as well as budget cuts in welfare, health care, and education have been put forward as necessary to restabilize
the economy and return to economic growth as before. Although
the economy now seems on a path to
recovery, many of the social and ecological tensions and challenges still persist. ¶ From a
countermovement perspective, the dominant measures have mainly strengthened incumbent regimes and even made more
apparent the need for structural change. This
becomes apparent by a growing dissatisfaction with
capitalism, a lack of trust in financial institutions, and an increasing pressure on democratic
political institutions (Castells 2010, Murphy 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). These in turn focus attention on
the meaning and quality of life, which can intensify individuals’ desires to live in a more
responsible and meaningful way as citizens, workers, and consumers, which again are accompanied by an
increasing attention to social value creation (based on the attention to these issues in magazines and business literature) (see
O’Riordan 2013).¶ Over 70 years ago, Polanyi (1944) described countermovements as critical responses to the rise of liberal market
economies in the interwar period. Polanyi argued that countermovements tend to include both progressive and regressive forces,
and he related the rise of fascism as part of a double countermovement in reaction to the rise of liberal market economy (Worth
2013). Similarly, contemporary counternarratives do not only include progressive sustainability-oriented ideas, but also more
regressive ideas as manifested in populist and/or extremist political parties. Moreover, counternarratives and grassroots movements
are also not always easily discernible from mainstream discourses. Although discourses on, e.g., solidarity economy can be
constructed as counternarratives, they have considerable overlaps with mainstream policy discourses on the “Big Society” (UK) and
“the participation society” (The Netherlands). When comparing discourses on the circular economy and the sharing economy, one
can find differences in the former being partly associated with a corporate movement (see, e.g., McKinsey and the Ellen McArthur
Foundation) the latter being more associated with grassroots social movements (e.g., Peerby). Different discourses are intermingled,
changing over time, forming double movements (Polanyi 1944), or rather multilayered narratives of change. ¶ We use here narratives
of change as an accessible and short summary of discourses on change and innovation (Avelino et al. 2014). Social
(counter)movements, such as the environmental movement or the antiglobalization movement, can be experienced as
counternarratives of change. These social movements “struggle against pre-existing cultural and institutional narratives and the
structures of meaning and power they convey” (Davies 2002:25). They achieve this partly through counternarratives, which “modify
existing beliefs and symbols and their resonance comes from their appeal to values and expectations that people already hold”
(Davies 2002:25). This challenges us to expand beyond the hegemonic mainstream narrative on, e.g., the economic crisis, by
including a discussion of counternarratives around the new economy. ¶ Thus, we see a double device of addressing the economic
crisis through measures to prevent the breakdown and restabilization of the existing system, and the rise of counternarratives and
movements that find legitimacy in exactly these processes and measures. From antiglobalization or Occupy
movements, we can discern a loss of trust in the dominant economic model of the growth
society and its associated livelihood model where most material needs are satisfied through impersonal market
exchange. The formalized and impersonal market exchange is questioned, resulting in concepts
such as sharing, reciprocity, generalized exchange, or restricted exchange (see Befu 1977, Peebles 2010
for an overview). Although the mainstream discourse is still about how to regain adequate rates of economic growth, an
underlying longer-sighted discourse (i.e., counternarrative) is emerging about alternatives for this
growth model. This includes (longstanding and more recent) ideas on degrowth (Schumacher 1973, Fournier 2008),
green growth (OECD 2009, 2013a), or postgrowth (Jackson 2009). These (counter)narratives also question
the market logic that constructs human beings as well as nature as resources and commodities
in the production of goods (Freudenburg et al. 1995).
2NC
condo
 2NC---DDev
Economic crises don’t cause war
Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute
for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation:
Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2597712
Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing
behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory
policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral
cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109
distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately
twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic
normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between
foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes),
as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic
downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from
economic troubles.
Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination

I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a
military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to
one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual
recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries
terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.

This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson,
J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work
with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat
and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further:

The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military
preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries
take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker
utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3

Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494
to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the
last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5

Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic
crises lead to austerity
pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures . (2)
Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics
that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites
attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats,
economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during
periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from
international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased
investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with
historic rivals. (5) Finally,
during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as
capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold
heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer
conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while
also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.
 2NC Impact
Growth causes extinction—that’s Gebremichael--

1. Invisible boundaries—we’ve already crossed the limits for nitrogen,

biodiversity, and climate change-- phosphorus, land use, and water
consumption are on the tipping point—these destroy ecosystems and
undermine the Earth’s capacity to sustain life

2. Biodiversity—growth is causing the 6th mass extinction—biodiversity is key to

fundamental ecosystems which sustain food production, water quality, and the
atmosphere—those are all existential risks

3. Deforestation
Dominik Goldstein 16, “Eliminating deforestation and forest degradation in order to prevent
species from extinction, especially with regard to areas in Asia, Africa and South America,”
http://www.balmun.de/fileadmin/2016/Research_Reports/RR_EC_I_Deforestation.pdf

Deforestation and forest degradation are undoubtedly part of the largest environmental problems
our world is facing today. Of the 16 million square kilometers of forest that once covered the earth’s surface, only 6.2 million
remain up to date. 2.3 million have been destroyed between 2000 and 2012 alone. Not only does this threaten the
balance of local important environmental factors such as water cycles and greenhouse gas
decomposition and harm the economy and society of affected areas, but it also endangers many different
species, as 80% of all biodiversity is found in forests. The entire planet and its population rely
on the fate of forests, it is vital that the issues of deforestation and forest degradation are tackled
thoroughly, however, it can only be achieved through close cooperation amongst all UN member nations.

4. Warming—it turns conflict and makes nuke war inevitable

Jürgen Scheffran 16, Professor at the Institute for Geography at the University of Hamburg
and head of the Research Group Climate Change and Security in the CliSAP Cluster of Excellence
and the Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability, et al., April 2016, “The Climate-
Nuclear Nexus: Exploring the linkages between climate change and nuclear threats,”
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/file/2016/01/WFC_2015_The_Climate-Nuclear_Nexus.pdf

Climate change and nuclear weapons represent two key threats of our time. Climate
change endangers ecosystems
and social systems all over the world. The degradation of natural resources, the decline of water and
food supplies, forced migration, and more frequent and intense disasters will greatly affect population
clusters, big and small. Climate-related shocks will add stress to the world’s existing conflicts and
act as a “threat multiplier” in already fragile regions. This could contribute to a decline of
international stability and trigger hostility between people and nations. Meanwhile, the 15,500 nuclear
weapons that remain in the arsenals of only a few states possess the destructive force to destroy life on Earth
as we know multiple times over. With nuclear deterrence strategies still in place, and hundreds of
weapons on ‘hair
trigger alert’, the risks of nuclear war caused by accident, miscalculation or intent remain
plentiful and imminent.¶ Despite growing recognition that climate change and nuclear weapons pose critical security risks,
the linkages between both threats are largely ignored. However, nuclear and climate risks interfere with each other in a mutually
enforcing way. ¶ Conflicts
induced by climate change could contribute to global insecurity, which, in turn,
could enhance the chance of a nuclear weapon being used, could create more fertile breeding
grounds for terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, and could feed the ambitions among some states
to acquire nuclear arms. Furthermore, as evidenced by a series of incidents in recent years, extreme weather events,
environmental degradation and major seismic events can directly impact the safety and security of nuclear installations. Moreover, a
nuclear war could lead to a rapid and prolonged drop in average global temperatures and
significantly disrupt the global climate for years to come, which would have disastrous implications for agriculture,
threatening the food supply for most of the world. Finally, climate change, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy
pose threats of intergenerational harm, as evidenced by the transgenerational effects of nuclear testing and nuclear power accidents
and the lasting impacts on the climate, environment and public health by carbon emissions.

5. Soil erosion—it outweighs war

George Monbiot 15, author and investigative reporter, “We’re treating soil like dirt. It’s a fatal
mistake, as our lives depend on it,” 3/25/15,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/treating-soil-like-dirt-fatal-
mistake-human-life

Imagine a wonderful world, a planet on which there was no threat of climate breakdown, no loss
of freshwater, no antibiotic resistance, no obesity crisis, no terrorism, no war. Surely, then, we would be out of major
danger? Sorry. Even if everything else were miraculously fixed, we’re finished if we don’t address an issue
considered so marginal and irrelevant that you can go for months without seeing it in a newspaper. ¶ It’s literally and – it seems –
metaphorically, beneath us. To judge by its absence from the media, most journalists consider it unworthy of consideration. But all
human life depends on it. We knew this long ago, but somehow it has been forgotten. As a Sanskrit text written in about 1500BC
noted: “Upon this handful of soil our survival depends. Husband it and it will grow our food, our fuel and our shelter and surround us
with beauty. Abuse it and the soil will collapse and die, taking humanity with it.”¶ The issue hasn’t changed, but we have.
Landowners around the world are now engaged in an orgy of soil destruction so intense that, according to the
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, the world on average has just 60 more years of growing crops. Even in
Britain, which is spared the tropical downpours that so quickly strip exposed soil from the land, Farmers Weekly reports, we
have “only 100 harvests left”.¶ To keep up with global food demand, the UN estimates, 6m hectares (14.8m acres) of new
farmland will be needed every year. Instead, 12m hectares a year are lost through soil degradation. We wreck it,
then move on, trashing rainforests and other precious habitats as we go. Soil is an almost magical substance, a living system that
transforms the materials it encounters, making them available to plants. That handful the Vedic master showed his disciples contains
more micro-organisms than all the people who have ever lived on Earth. Yet we treat it like, well, dirt. ¶ The techniques that were
supposed to feed the world threaten us with starvation. A paper just published in the journal Anthropocene analyses the
undisturbed sediments in an 11th-century French lake. It reveals that the
intensification of farming over the past
century has increased the rate of soil erosion sixtyfold.¶ Another paper, by researchers in the UK, shows that
soil in allotments – the small patches in towns and cities that people cultivate by hand – contains a
third more organic carbon than agricultural soil and 25% more nitrogen . This is one of the reasons why
allotment holders produce between four and 11 times more food per hectare than do farmers.¶
Whenever I mention this issue, people ask: “But surely farmers have an interest in looking after their soil?” They do, and there are
many excellent cultivators who seek to keep their soil on the land. There are also some terrible farmers, often absentees, who allow
contractors to rip their fields to shreds for the sake of a quick profit. Even the good ones are hampered by an economic and political
system that could scarcely be better designed to frustrate them.¶ This is the International Year of Soils, but you wouldn’t know it. In
January, the Westminster government published a new set of soil standards, marginally better than those they replaced, but wholly
unmatched to the scale of the problem. There are no penalities for compromising our survival except a partial withholding of public
subsidies. Yet even this pathetic guidance is considered intolerable by the National Farmers’ Union, which greeted them with bitter
complaints. Sometimes the NFU seems to me to exist to champion bad practice and block any possibility of positive change. ¶ Few
sights are as gruesome as the glee with which the NFU celebrated the death last year of the European soil framework directive, the
only measure with the potential to arrest our soil-erosion crisis. The NFU, supported by successive British governments, fought for
eight years to destroy it, then crowed like a shedful of cockerels when it won. Looking back on this episode, we will see it as a
parable of our times.¶ Soon after that, the business minister, Matthew Hancock, announced that he was putting “business in charge
of driving reform”: trade associations would be able “to review enforcement of regulation in their sectors.” The NFU was one the
first two bodies granted this privilege. Hancock explained that this “is all part of our unambiguously pro-business agenda to increase
the financial security of the British people.” But it doesn’t increase our security, financial or otherwise. It undermines it. ¶ The
government’s deregulation bill, which has now almost completed its passage through parliament, will force regulators – including
those charged with protecting the fabric of the land – to “have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth”. But
short-term growth at the expense of public protection compromises long-term survival. This “unambiguously pro-
business agenda” is deregulating us to death.¶ There’s no longer even an appetite for studying the problem. Just one university –
Aberdeen – now offers a degree in soil science. All the rest have been closed down.¶ Thisis what topples civilisations.
War and pestilence might kill large numbers of people, but in most cases the population recovers. But lose
the soil and everything goes with it.¶ Now, globalisation ensures that this disaster is reproduced
everywhere. In its early stages, globalisation enhances resilience: people are no longer dependent on the vagaries of local
production. But as it proceeds, spreading the same destructive processes to all corners of the Earth ,
it undermines resilience, as it threatens to bring down systems everywhere.¶ Almost all other issues are
superficial by comparison. What appear to be great crises are slight and evanescent when held up against the steady
trickling away of our subsistence.
 2N AT: Prolif
Even if prolif occurs, no impact.
John Mueller 18. Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior Research
Scientist at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute Nov/Dec 2018
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter

HOW ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM? Great powers are one thing, some might say, but
rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go nuclear, it’s game over—which is why any
further proliferation must be prevented by all possible measures, up to and including war. That logic might
seem plausible at first, but it breaks down on close examination. Not only has the world already
survived the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of the craziest [most reckless] mass murderers
in history (Stalin and Mao), but proliferation has slowed down rather than sped up over time.
Dozens of technologically sophisticated countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have
done so. This is because nuclear weapons turn out to be difficult and expensive to acquire and
strategically provocative to possess. They have not even proved to enhance status much, as many expected they
would. Pakistan and Russia may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan’s prestige be
increased if it became nuclear? Did China’s status improve when it went nuclear—or when its economy grew? And would anybody
really care (or even notice) if the current British or French nuclear arsenal was doubled or halved? Alarmists have misjudged
not only the pace of proliferation but also its effects. Proliferation is incredibly dangerous and necessary to
prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and lead them to dominate their region. The
details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but the general idea seems to be that once a
country has nuclear weapons, it can use them to threaten others and get its way, with nonnuclear countries
deferring or paying ransom to the local bully out of fear. Except, of course, that in three-quarters of a century, the United States
has never been able to get anything close to that obedience from anybody, even when it had a nuclear monopoly. So why should it
be true for, say, Iran or North Korea? It
is far more likely that a nuclear rogue’s threats would cause its rivals to
join together against the provocateur—just as countries around the Persian Gulf responded to Saddam’s invasion of
Kuwait by closing ranks to oppose, rather than acquiescing in, his effort at domination.
 2NC AT: War
Economic crises don’t cause war
Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute
for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation:
Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2597712
Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing
behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory
policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral
cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109
distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately
twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic
normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between
foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes),
as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic
downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from
economic troubles.
Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination

I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a
military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to
one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual
recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries
terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.

This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson,
J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work
with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat
and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further:

The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military
preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries
take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker
utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3

Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494
to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the
last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5

Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic
crises lead to austerity
pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures . (2)
Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics
that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites
attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats,
economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during
periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from
international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased
investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with
historic rivals. (5) Finally,
during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as
capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold
heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer
conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while
also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

No GPW
Fettweis 17 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane
University, Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, 2017, "Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New
Peace," Security Studies 26:3,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?journalCode=fsst20,
Accessed: 11-7-2017 /Kent Denver-NK)

Competing Explanations

The publication of Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature in 2011 brought the New Peace into
popular consciousness to some degree, but general recognition remains rather low. The data
might suggest that the world is much safer, but Americans know better: a 2009 poll found that
nearly 60 percent of the public—and fully half of the membership of the elite Council on Foreign
Relations—actually considered the world more dangerous than it was during the Cold War.20
Among academic and policy experts, however, the phenomenon is well known, if controversial,
and a debate over potential explanations has been raging for some time. A number of major and
minor factors have been cited over the years that might help account for the New Peace.

First, nuclear weapons came into existence about the same time that the great powers stopped
fighting one another, which a number of scholars suggest is no coincidence.21 Faith in the
pacifying effect of nuclear weapons led a few prominent realists to suggest that an efficient way
to spread stability would be to encourage controlled proliferation to non-nuclear states.22 This
idea found little purchase. Instead, proliferation momentum slowed considerably after the end
of the Cold War: the world has the same number of nuclear states in 2016 that it did in 1991
(eight), having lost one (South Africa) and gained another (North Korea). Perhaps that number is
sufficient to generate widespread fear of generalized war and overall systemic stability

Second, modern integrated markets contain powerful incentives for peace . While economic
considerations are not the only ones that states must weigh when war looms, to the extent that
they affect decisions, in this postmercantilist age they do so in a uniformly pacific direction. In
the 1970s, neoliberal institutionalists argued that modern levels of economic interdependence
provide strong incentives for states to resolve disputes peacefully.23 It is almost always in the
interest of states today, if they are rational and self-interested, to cooperate rather than run the
risk of ruining their economies, and those of their main trading partners, with war. The
globalization of production, as Stephen G. Brooks has argued, is a powerful force for stability
among those countries that benefit from the actions of multinational corporations.24
Furthermore, today’s highly mobile investment dollars flee instability, providing strong
incentives for states to settle both external and internal disputes peacefully. As Secretary of
State Colin Powell once told a Ugandan audience, “money is a coward.” 25 Overall, globalization
has been accompanied by an evolution in the way national wealth is accumulated. The major
industrial powers, and perhaps many of their lessdeveloped neighbors, seem to have reached
the rather revolutionary conclusion that territory is not directly related to national power and
prestige.26

Third, the new peace has risen alongside the number of democracies in the world. While the
widely tested and debated democratic peace theory is not universally accepted in the field, the
hundreds of books and articles that have been written on the subject over the past thirty years
have been sufficient to convince many that democracies rarely fight one another.27 Since most
of today’s great powers practice some form of democracy, perhaps it should be unsurprising
that conflict has been absent in the global north.

Fourth, a number of scholars have suggested that regimes, law, and institutions shape state
behavior, and can serve to inhibit aggression.28 Some major theorists of the New Peace,
including both Andrew Mack and Joshua S. Goldstein, give UN peacekeeping primary credit for
the decline in warfare.29 At the very least, there is convincing evidence that wars do not recur
with the same frequency as in the past, a phenomenon for which the UN can certainly take a
degree of credit.

These potential explanations suffer from the same general weakness: stability exists where the
influence of their independent variable is weak or absent. There are no nuclear states in Central
or South America, for example, but those regions have been virtually free of interstate war for
many decades. The relative decline of civil wars and ethnic conflict around the globe since the
end of the Cold War also is not a product of nuclear deterrence. The democratic peace theory
might help explain why there have been no intra-West wars, but it cannot account for the
pacific trends among and within nondemocratic states. Africa and other areas of the Global
South are also experiencing historically low levels of armed conflict, which suggests that
economic growth and interdependence might not be the sole determinants of peaceful choices
by leaders.30 With many of these potential explanations, there is another problem: the
direction of causality is not clear. It is just as plausible to suggest that peace preceded, and then
abetted, the rise of the other factors.31 Democracy and economic growth might be the results
of stability, rather than the other way around. The rise in peacekeeping has only been possible
because of increased great power cooperation. These phenomena may well be related, but just
not in the way that their proponents suggest.

A number of other explanations have been proposed. Pinker discussed a series of “rights
revolutions,” especially including those of children and women that, in addition to several other
factors, may well have contributed to the decline of war.32 Others have suggested that
demographics may be playing a decisive role, either through aging populations or declining
birthrates in the Global North.33 Finally, perhaps the most prominent explanation for the
decline of war integrates all of the above, suggesting that they contribute to a change in the
way people view conflict itself. Together these factors may have combined to alter the way
people think about warfare, removing the romance and glory and replacing it with revulsion and
dishonor. Ideas, when widely held, can become norms that shape and limit state behavior.34
We’d survive nuke war.
Denkenberger, et al, 17—Tennessee State University, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute
(David, with D. Dorothea Cole, Mohamed Abdelkhaliq, Michael Griswold, Allen B. Hundley, and
Joshua M. Pearce, “Feeding Everyone if the Sun is Obscured and Industry is Disabled [Shut
Down],” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 21, (2017), 284–290, dml)

A number of catastrophes could block the sun, including asteroid/comet impact, super volcanic eruption, and
nuclear war with the burning of cities (nuclear winter). The problem of feeding 7 billion people would
arise (the food problem is more severe than other problems associated with these catastrophes).
Previous work has shown this is possible converting stored biomass to food if industry is present. A number of risks could
destroy electricity globally, including a series of high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMPs) caused by nuclear weapons, an
extreme solar storm, and a super computer virus. Since industry depends on electricity, it is likely there
would be a
collapse of the functioning of industry and machines. Additional previous work has shown that it is
technically feasible to feed everyone given the loss of industry without the loss of the sun. It is possible that
one of these sun-blocking scenarios could occur near in time to one of these industry-disabling scenarios. This study analyzes food
sources in these combined catastrophe scenarios. Food
sources include extracting edible calories from killed leaves,
growing mushrooms on leaves and dead trees, and feeding the residue to cellulose-digesting animals such as cattle
and rabbits. Since the sun is unlikely to be completely blocked, fishing and growing ultraviolet (UV)
and cold-tolerant crops in the tropics could be possible. The results of this study show these
solutions could enable the feeding of everyone given minimal preparation, and this preparation should be a high
priority now.

Counter-forcing solves—means only a few million at best die.

Mueller 9—Woody Mueller, Chair of National Security Studies, Professor of Political Science at
Ohio State University, Cato Senior Fellow, 2009 (“Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from
Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda,” Google Books, October 5th, p. 8)

To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations
as societal annihilation, a full-out attack with hundreds, probably thousands, of thermonuclear bombs
would be required. Even in such extreme cases, the area actually devastated by the bombs' blast and
thermal pulse effective would be limited: 2,000 1-MT explosions with a destructive radius of 5 miles
each would directly demolish less than 5 percent of the territory of the United States, for example.
Obviously, if major population centers were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when
such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, a
number of studies were conducted to
estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks . One of the most prominent of these
considered several probabilities. The most likely scenario--one that could be perhaps considered at least to
begin to approach the rational--was a "counterforce" strike in which well over 1,000 thermonuclear weapons
would be targeted at America's ballistic missile silos, strategic airfields, and nuclear submarine bases in
an effort to destroy the country’s strategic ability to retaliate. Since the attack would not directly target
population centers, most of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates that from 2 to 20
million, depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first month.15 That sort of damage, which
would kill less than 10 percent of the population, might or might not be enough to trigger words like “annihilation.”
 2NC AT: Sustainable
Collapse by 2050 is inevitable--rebound effects, lack of decoupling, large
environmental footprints from renewables, resource overconsumption, and a
lack of viable technology make growth unsustainable
Giorgos Kallis 18, ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,
environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, formerly Marie
Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at
Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in
Greece, et al., 5/31/18, “Annual Review of Environment and Resources: Research On
Degrowth,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43, p. 296-298
3. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE LIMITS OF GREEN GROWTH ¶ Although driven by political, institutional, and discursive processes,
growth is also biophysical. The economic process converts energy, resources, and matter to
goods, services, and waste (34). In theory, it seems possible to decouple material throughput from
economic output by improving the resource efficiency of production. Ecological economists, however,
argue that in practice absolute decoupling is unlikely , even though relative decoupling is common (34).
Efficiency should not be confused with scale (35): The more efficiently we use resources, the
lower they cost, and the more of them we end up using (36). This is, in essence, growth. Just as
increases in labor productivity lead to growth and new jobs, not to less employment, increases in
resource productivity increase output and resource use (37). Capitalist economies grow by using more
resources and more people, more intensively. Accelerating this is unlikely to spare resources. ¶ Growth can
become “cleaner” or “greener” by substituting , for example, fossil fuels with solar power, or scarce,
environmentally intensive metals with more abundant and less intensive metals . But new
substitutes have resource requirements, and life-cycle impacts that cross space and time . Energy is
a vital source of useful work (38); growth has been possible because fossil fuels did things human labor alone could not do. Ending
the use of fossil fuels is likely to reduce labor productivity and limit output (34). Solar
and wind power are constrained
only by their rate of flow, but unlike fossil fuels, they are diffuse—more like rain than a lake (3). To collect and
concentrate a diffuse flow of energy, more energy is necessary and more land is required. The
EROIs (energy returns on energy investment) of renewable energies are between 10:1 and 20:1, compared
to more than 50:1 for earlier deposits of oil and coal (39). An economy powered by a diffuse energy
flow is then likely to be an economy of lower net energy and lower output than one powered by
concentrated stocks (3). Land use for solar or wind also competes with the use of land for food
production, and rare materials are necessary for infrastructures and batteries that store their
intermittent flows, with significant environmental effects .¶ Historical data corroborate ecological
economic theory (40). Ayres & Warr (38) find that the use of net energy after conversion losses explains a
big portion of the United States’ total factor productivity and economic growth . At the global
level, GDP and material use have increased approximately 1:1. Carbon emissions have increased
somewhat slower than GDP, but still have increased (34). This is unlikely to be a coincidence.
Exceptions may exist, but cross-panel data analysis shows that overall, 1% growth of a national economy is associated with 0.6% to
0.8% increase in its carbon emissions (41) and 0.8% growth in its resource use (42). ¶ Global
resource use follows
currently the “collapse by 2050” scenario foreseen in the “Limits to Growth” 1971 report (43–45). Domestic
material use in some developed OECD economies has reached a plateau, but this is because of
globalization and trade. If we take into account imported goods, then the material requirements
of products and services consumed in OECD countries have grown hand in hand with GDP, with
no decoupling (46). For water use, the effects of growth overwhelm any realistic savings from
technologies and efficiency (47); water footprints have increased even in regions such as California where
water withdrawals were stabilized (40). ¶ Carbon emissions in some EU (European Union) countries have been
declining, even after trade is taken into account, suggesting some substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner energies. [Although
recession also played a role (34).] These declines are nowhere near the 8–10%, year-after-year reductions
in carbon emissions required for developed nations under scenarios compatible with a 50% chance of
limiting warming to 2◦C (48). Further reductions will be harder to sustain once one-off
substitutions of oil or coal with natural gas are exhausted (34). ¶ Resource use or carbon emissions
are a product of the scale of the economy (GDP) times its resource or carbon intensity (kg/GDP or kgCO2/GDP). With
1.5% annual increase in global income per capita, carbon intensity has to decline 4.4% each year for staying within 2◦C; with 0%
growth, carbon intensity has to fall 2.9% each year (49). In the period 1970–2013, the average annual reduction rate for carbon
intensity was less than 1.5%—and this gets harder to sustain as the share of carbon-intensive economies in global output increases
(49). As Jackson (50) showed in his seminal work, it
is practically impossible to envisage viable climate
mitigation scenarios that involve growth. This calls for research on managing, or prospering, without
growth (50, 51). ¶ Some scenarios deem possible meeting climate targets while sustaining growth,
but these generally assume after 2050 some sort of “negative emissions technology,” geo-
engineering or otherwise. According to a recent Nature editorial, these technologies remain currently
“magical thinking” (52). Clean energy investments can stimulate the economy in the short run,
but in the long run growth may be limited by their low EROIs. Studies suggest that economic growth
requires a minimum EROI of close to 11:1 (53). Less EROI means less labor productivity, and
hence less growth. Indeed, “Limits to Growth” scenarios do not predict growth ending when
resources are exhausted but, rather, when the quality of resources declines to such an extent
that further extraction diverts more and more investment away from productive industry (44).¶
Degrowth is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a concomitant securing of wellbeing.
If there is a fundamental coupling of economic activity and resource use, as ecological economics suggests there is, then serious
environmental or climate policies will slow down the economy. Vice versa, a slower economy will use less resources and emit less
carbon (40). This is not the same as saying that the degrowth goal is to reduce GDP (54); slowing down the economy is not an end
but a likely outcome in a transition toward equitable wellbeing and environmental sustainability. ¶ Advancing a position of “a-
growth,” van den Bergh (54) proposes ignoring GDP and implementing a global carbon price, indifferent to what its effect on growth
turns out to be. Ignoring GDP is a normative position—but at the end, the economy will either grow or not, and if it does not, then
there should be plans for managing without growth. Given how entrenched GDP growth is in existing institutional and political
structures, a-growth approaches must be advanced as part of broader systemic change (55). ¶ Is it possible to secure a decent
standard of living for all while throughput and output degrow? Substantive
evidence indicates that prosperity
does not depend on high levels of production and consumption. Kubiszewski et al. (56) find that the
Genuine Progress Indicator, an indicator that includes environmental and social costs alongside output, peaked in 1978, despite
subsequent global growth. A similar indicator, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, has stayed at the same levels in the
United States since 1950, despite a threefold growth of GDP (57). ¶ Wealthier countries on average have higher levels of life
expectancy and education than poorer ones, but abovea certain level of GDP, income does not make a
difference in wellbeing—equality does. Satisfactory levels of wellbeing are achieved by countries
such as Vietnam or Costa Rica at a fraction (one-third or less) of the output, energy, or resource use
of countries such as the United States. Even the lower levels of resource use of mid-income countries, however, would not be
sustainable if they were to be generalized to the planet as a whole. No country currently satisfies social wellbeing standards while
staying within its share of planetary boundaries, suggesting that radical changes in provisioning systems are necessary (58). ¶
Wealthier people within a country are on average happier than others, but in the long run, overall happiness does
not increase as a country’s income rises (59). Nuances of this income-happiness paradox depend on the sample of
countries included and how one defines and asks about happiness. Within societies, individuals with higher incomes evaluate their
lives as better than others, but do not enjoy better emotional wellbeing (60). Income determines social rank, and rank affects
individuals’ assessments of their lives. Growth
does not change relative rank or relative access to positional
goods (those signifying position) but it does inflate expectations and prices of material goods,
increasing frustration (61). Relative comparisons matter for personal wellbeing in low-income and high-income countries;
for both, the more equally income is distributed, the happier people are (62). Pro-environmental
behaviors and
sharing are also strongly associated with personal wellbeing (63). This suggests that an economic
contraction may not impact wellbeing negatively if accompanied by redistribution, sharing, and value shifts (34).

They’re wrong about all of their environment arguments – decoupling, Kuznets

curve, and tech aren’t possible in a world of growth
-- decoupling only slows degradation-total use of energy, materials, and land disproves EKC
which only accounts for emissions – their studies have a confined geographical scale and don’t
account for displacing/ outsourcing of emissions

-- EKC only happens with strict gov regulations – also k2 tech

--reduced consumption in one field causes increased consumption in another – i.e. CO2 v
biodiversity

Næss 16 (Petter, Prof of Landscape Architecture and Spatial Planning @ Norwegian U of Life
Sciences, “The Illusion of Green Capitalism,” in Crisis System: A Critical Realist and
Environmental Critique of Economics and the Economy, ed. Petter Næss and Leigh Price, p. 173-
91)

Despite the fact that decoupling has been on the sustainability agenda for nearly thirty years, the attempts to compensate,
through increased eco-efficiency and sub- stitution , for the increased pressure against the environment resulting
from eco- nomic growth have only been able to slow down the environmental degradation. Within most
sectors, and for most impact categories, the annual environmental load is higher today than
thirty years ago, both in total and when measured per capita. The accumulated environmental degradation and
resource depletion, for example in terms of concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, extinction of species,
loss of farmland, and exhaustion of finite energy sources and minerals, are far more exten- sive
today than in 1987 when the Brundtland Commission published its sustain- ability report. Admittedly, rising GDP
levels accompanied by reduced emissions have been found for certain pollutants at a local scale.
However, for a number of other types of environmental impacts there is far less evidence of such
decoupling. Minimizing the consequences on one impact category may also sometimes result in
increased environmental load on another impact category . According to Spangenberg (2001), no
indication of an environmental Kuznets curve can be found when using measures accounting
for the total use of energy, materials, and land. During the period 1974–2013, global CO2
emissions increased steadily along with economic growth, while there was non-growth or
reduction in the emissions in three periods of economic downturn (in the early 1980s, 1992, and 2009).
For the first time during the whole forty-year period in which the International Energy Agency has been collecting data on carbon
dioxide emission, 2014 showed no increase in CO2 emissions despite economic growth (IEA. 2015). It remains to be seen whether
the 2014 result, which IEA attributes to greater generation of electricity from renewable sources in China, and increased energy
efficiency and more renewable energy in OECD countries, will continue. Anyway, zero-growth in CO2 emissions is far
from sufficient in a situation where a reduction of 90 percent or more within the next fifty years
is called for in order to avoid "dangerous climate change.” Moreover, without the 3 percent global growth in 2014, the
emissions would probably have decreased instead of remaining constant, as they did in 2009 when the global economy also had a
downturn due to the financial crisis. In a somewhat older study, Azomahou and Van Phu (2001) investigated economic
growth
and CO2 emissions in one hundred countries during the period 1960-1996. Using non-
parametric regressions, they found a correlation between economic growth and increased CO2
emissions among poor countries, middle-income countries, and wealthy countries. Within all
three groups of countries, the CO2 emissions tend to increase with higher gross domestic
products. To the extent that correlations between affluence levels and emissions of some
pollutants (notably NO2, carbon monoxide, and sulfur dioxide) consistent with the EKC hypothesis
have been found, this may in part be due to the limitation of many such studies to a confined
geographical scale (e.g. cities). According to Stem (2004), the total pollution emissions tend to rise with
increasing income rather than follow an inverted U-shaped Curve . Pollution concentrations may still
follow the tune predicted by the EKC hypothesis due to urban and industrial decentralization, taller smoke
stacks, and so forth. Moreover, reduced emission levels in wealthy countries may be a result of
outsourcing polluting industries to third world countries, Another case in point is the fact that the
emission reductions obtained for impact categories where some evidence for the EKC hypothesis can
be found are invariantly resulting from strong governmental regulations. While the EKC
hypothesis is often used in the environmental debate to create an image of a “self-regulatory”
market economy, the empirical examples referred to in supporting this hypothesis were
dependent on precisely the type of regulations that are usually fiercely opposed by its proponents. The
fact that dematerialization to a degree sufficient to counterweight the impacts of economic growth has not taken place until now
does not in itself rule out the possibility of a stronger and more successful dematerialization in the future. The prospects for this still
do not seem very promising in the light of the nearly forty-five years that have passed since the publication of the Limits to Growth
report, and the nearly thirty years since the publication of the Brundtland report. Decoupling growth from environmental
degradation has been on the agenda during the very same period when only partial or local evidence of the EKC hypothesis has been
found. Moreover, many of the lowest-hanging fruits have probably been picked in this period.
Improving eco-efficiency further will often require technologically more challenging and socially
more controversial measures. This may be the reason why some more recent studies indicate that in the
longer term, the Environmental Kuznets Curve tends to be N-shaped instead of following the
originally hypothesized inverted U shape. This suggests that pollution increases as a poor country
becomes industrialized, decreases once a threshold affluence level is reached, and then begins
increasing again as national income continues to increase . In much of the debate about economic growth and
decoupling, there has been a tendency to focus solely on emissions of various pollutants (and in recent
years a rather one-sided concentration on CO2 emissions only), whereas negative environmental impacts
resulting from land take and land fragmentation have tended to be overlooked. The prospects
for decoupling growth from the latter kinds of impacts may be even less bright. This is particularly
the case for the direct impacts on biodiversity, natural areas, food-production, soil, and landscape
qualities from converting undeveloped land into building sites or technical infra- structure such as roads and power plants. The
few studies carried out on loss of biodiversity suggest that further economic growth in an already wealthy
country or region is accompanied by higher biodiversity losses (Mills and Waite, 2009-; Tevie et al., 2011).
Theoretically, it is possible to imagine a “Factor 4" or “Factor 10" reduction of the land use per produced unit by building more
densely and higher, as well as placing most of the buildings in areas that are already technically affected, such as traffic areas and
derelict industrial estates/brownfields. However, unless the new buildings or infrastructure replace existing, less environmentally
favorable parts of the built environment, construction of new, eco-efficient buildings or infrastructure will at best be ecologically
friendly in a relative sense, i.e. compared with environmentally more straining solutions (Xue, 2014; see also Chapter 8). In
the
USA, farmland is reduced ten times faster than the influx of new cultivated land, and in China
the reduction of farmland is 30-40 times faster than the supply of new soil for food production
(Steigan, 201 1). Phosphorus is another natural resource of key importance to food production .
According to Cordell et al. (2009), the peak of phosphorus production may be reached already within 30-
40 years, and the known sources of phosphorus may be exhausted within 50-100 years. Some of
the raw materials used in renewable energy production, such as lithium, are also becoming
increasingly scarce (Defra and BIS, 2012). Along with a number of other so-called rare minerals
(including beryllium, cobalt, and tantalum) used in computers, mobile phones, aircrafts, communication
satellites, andrechargeable batteries, lithium is on the “critical list" identified by a panel of sixty-nine
executives of key global companies in seven different industries (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). Limits to
decoupling What would be required to obtain a decoupling between economic growth and negative environmental impacts strong
enough to avoid continual environmental degradation? First, the decoupling
would need to be absolute, not only
relative (i.e. compared with current practice). The correlation between economic growth and
environmental impacts would have to be zero or negative — it would not be sufficient that the
correlation remained positive but weaker than before . Second, the absolute decoupling would need
to apply to all types of environmental impacts , not only a few selected ones. Decoupling thus would
have to encompass not only greenhouse gases and pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, and soot, but also impacts such as loss of species, encroachments on ecosystems,
deforestation, loss of soil for food production, and shrinking drinking water resources. Third, and
importantly, for several categories of impacts, non-growth of impacts would not be sufficient. This
applies, among others, to greenhouse gas emissions, where present annual emissions are way
above what would be an environmentally sustainable level .

cheaper—creates a cycle of consumption that ensures tech is ineffective

---using tech or decoupling mechanisms reduces prices, which enables purchasing of more fossil
fuels until costs rise again

---costs rising leads fossil fuel companies to finance exploration for new resources thru fracking
which eventually lowers prices

---inevitably causes resource over-extraction and collapse

Pollard 16 – Dave Pollard, Member of the International Transition movement, the

Communities movement and the Sharing Economy movement, regular writer for magazine Shift,
citing Rob Hopkins, Transition Movement co-founder, Asher Miller, Post Carbon Institute
Executive Director, and David Holmgren, founder of the Permaculture Movement, 2016 (“A
Complex Predicament: How Our Energy, Economic and Ecological Systems are Connected,” June
1st, SHIFT, http://howtosavetheworld.ca/2016/06/01/a-complex-predicament-how-our-energy-
economic-and-ecological-systems-are-connected-repost/, AIvackovic)

In addition, there are Jevons Paradoxes inherent in complex systems, that lead to undesired results
that have nothing to do with deliberate human behaviour at all. For example, if we put a ‘carbon tax’ on fuels in the
hope of reducing consumption and encouraging conservation , we may find that the reduced
consumption will temporarily lower prices (as a result of lowered demand). But those lower prices will
enable drivers to buy more gasoline for the same outlay, so they will fill their tanks more often — until that
increased demand enables the gasoline vendors to raise their prices , completing the cycle.

And when the vendors canincrease their prices, they can also economically justify exploring for and
developing more costly, marginal hydrocarbon resources (fracking, deepwater oil, shale oil, tar
sands). That increased supply starts another cycle, since more supply relative to demand tends to
lower prices until the new supply can be fully sold . It’s all a delicate balance.

That is, until affordable oil (and other resources) run out entirely. The energy industry is fond of
telling us there are centuries’ worth of potentially extractable hydrocarbons in the ground. But with the
cost of extraction getting ever higher and the life of each new find getting ever shorter, the amount
that can be extracted at a price consumers can afford is finite, and when it is used up we reach
what Derrick Jensen calls EndGame.

This is where complex systems get especially tricky to explain, because they’re interrelated. What exactly is ‘a price consumers can
afford’? This depends on our economic system, not our energy and resource systems. That system, as I will explain in Part Two of
this series, is hurtling towards its own End Game. But the bottom line is that, as
we come to realize that our
unsustainable industrial growth economy is already hugely overextended (the debts we have
incurred could only ever be repaid if we lived on a planet of infinite wealth and resources), the
entire Ponzi scheme of our markets will collapse, and what ‘consumers can afford’ will plummet.
End Game.

And all of this

economic activity and resource development has pushed atmospheric CO2 and
other global warming gases past what many climate scientists believe is the tipping point, so
that ‘runaway’ climate change, and with it, massive droughts, desertification, fires, storms, water
scarcity, species extinction, pandemics, infrastructure destruction and sea level rise are now, they
say, inevitable in this century – a third End Game. (More about this system in Part Three below).

The very busy diagram on the next page of this article attempts to capture the most essential variables in these three systems –
energy and resources, economy, and climate/ecology, and the three End Games that provide us with no futher possibility for
intervention, and could well precipitate the end of our current globalized human civilization. It’s an expanded version of a chart in
(Transition Movement co-founder) Rob Hopkins’ and (Post Carbon Institute Executive Director) Asher Miller’s excellent paper
Climate After Growth.

It shows some of the major self-reinforcing and self-sustaining ‘feedback loops’ (e.g. how a destabilized climate characterized by
rapid polar and glacial melting leads to increased methane release which in turn leads to more destabilized climate and more
melting, with ‘runaway’ climate change as the result). It also shows the balancing ‘feedback loops’ that currently keep our
energy/resource, economic and climate/ecological systems in ‘net stasis’ – not appreciably changing – for now.

But because of the three End Games, this

stasis is not sustainable. We will, sooner or later, run out of
economically affordable resources. Or we will run out of faith in the possibility of perpetual
economic growth. Or we will face the realities of runaway climate change. All systems collapse when they fall
out of stasis, and all civilizations end. The question is no longer how or whether we can prevent one or any of these
End Games. It is, now, how do we prepare for the consequences of any or all three, as we enter the decades James Kunstler has
called The Long Emergency, and how can we gauge whichever of the three is going to hit us first, and hardest.

And, once collapse comes, how we can learn from this astonishing life experience – from being at this pivotal point in human
evolution – so that those living after the fall will be able to create sustainable, joyful societies (probably very localised, small scale
societies that will, because they will be adapted to place, seem amazingly diverse to those of us living in our current homogeneous
global human culture). And how we can help our descendants draw upon the best of pre-civilization (‘prehistoric’, since in our
arrogance we presume that history only began with our civilization) ways of living, and also on the lessons of (civilization’s) history
and the scientific and technological learning of today’s world, to create future human societies better than we could dream of.
[Graph moved from the top of the article for clarity]

But back to our complex energy/resource system chart. What

this diagram explains is the futility of us trying to
intervene politically or economically to bring about significant, sustained changes in the
systems pushing us inexorably to the End Games . Carbon taxes, energy conservation and
innovation, protests and blockades of dirty energy and resource exploitation are admirable and
necessary, but they cannot hope to fundamentally change the status quo which will ultimately take
us to resource exhaustion. Our entire civilization depends upon the ready availability of cheap
resources that enable us to feed 7.5 billion humans today, and by mid-century 9.5 billion or more, most of whom
will want to live, and hence consume resources, as we do today. If we run out – when we run out – we will find that such a horde
cannot live on what we can produce with the energy of our hands and that of domesticated animals. (The average human can
produce about 0.1 horsepower of energy in sustained manual labour; a car requires 150 hp or so, a train 4,000 hp per engine, an
airplane 60,000 hp, a cargo ship 100,000 hp, a power plant 3,000,000 hp.)

Err neg on every level of the turn---you are cognitively predisposed to neglect
warming impacts, exaggerate decline impacts, AND underestimate alternatives.
David Wallace-Wells 19. National Fellow at New America, deputy editor of New York Magazine.
02/19/2019. “III. The Climate Kaleidoscope.” The Uninhabitable Earth: Life After Warming,
Crown/Archetype.
The scroll of cognitive biases identified by behavioral psychologists and fellow travelers over the
last half century is, like a social media feed, apparently infinite, and every single one distorts and
distends our perception of a changing climate—a threat as imminent and immediate as the
approach of a predator, but viewed always through a bell jar. There is, to start with, anchoring,
which explains how we build mental models around as few as one or two initial examples, no
matter how unrepresentative—in the case of global warming, the world we know today, which is
reassuringly temperate. There is also the ambiguity effect, which suggests that most people are so
uncomfortable contemplating uncertainty, they will accept lesser outcomes in a bargain to
avoid dealing with it. In theory, with climate, uncertainty should be an argument for action—much
of the ambiguity arises from the range of possible human inputs, a quite concrete prompt we choose to process instead as a riddle,
which discourages us. There
is anthropocentric thinking, by which we build our view of the universe
outward from our own experience, a reflexive tendency that some especially ruthless
environmentalists have derided as “human supremacy” and that surely shapes our ability to apprehend
genuinely existential threats to the species—a shortcoming many climate scientists have mocked: “The planet will survive,” they say;
“it’s the humans that may not.” There is automation bias, which describes a preference for algorithmic
and other kinds of nonhuman economic systems unencumbered by regulation or restriction
would solve the problem of global warming as naturally , as surely as they had solved the problems of pollution,
inequality, justice, and conflict. These biases are drawn only from the A volume of the literature —and
are just a sampling of that volume. Among the most destructive effects that appear later in the behavioral
economics library are these: the bystander effect, or our tendency to wait for others to act rather than
acting ourselves; confirmation bias, by which we seek evidence for what we already understand to
be true, such as the promise that human life will endure, rather than endure the cognitive pain of reconceptualizing our world;
the default effect, or tendency to choose the present option over alternatives , which is related to the
status quo bias, or preference for things as they are, however bad that is, and to the endowment effect, or instinct to
demand more to give up something we have than we actually value it (or had paid to acquire or establish
it). We have an illusion of control, the behavioral economists tell us, and also suffer from overconfidence
and an optimism bias. We also have a pessimism bias, not that it compensates—instead it pushes
us to see challenges as predetermined defeats and to hear alarm, perhaps especially on climate, as cries of
fatalism. The opposite of a cognitive bias, in other words, is not clear thinking but another
cognitive bias. We can’t see anything but through cataracts of self-deception. Many of these insights may
feel as intuitive and familiar as folk wisdom, which in some cases they are, dressed up in academic language. Behavioral economics is
unusual as a contrarian intellectual movement in that it overturns beliefs—namely, in the perfectly rational human actor—that
perhaps only its proponents ever truly believed, and maybe even only as economics undergraduates. But altogether the field is not
merely a revision to existing economics. It is a thoroughgoing contradiction of the central proposition of its parent discipline, indeed
to the whole rationalist self-image of the modern West as it emerged out of the universities of—in what can only be coincidence—
the early industrial period. That is, a map of human reason as an awkward kluge, blindly self-regarding and selfdefeating, curiously
effective at some things and maddeningly incompetent when it comes to others; compromised and misguided and tattered. How did
we ever put a man on the moon? That climate change demands expertise, and faith in it, at precisely the moment when public
confidence in expertise is collapsing, is another of its historical ironies. That climate change touches each of these biases is not a
curiosity, or a coincidence, or an anomaly. It is a mark of just how big it is, and how much about human life it touches—which is to
say, nearly everything.
 2NC Transition
Decline causes transition---crisis fundamentally changes entrenched models of
growth and empowers societal mindset shifts that generate momentum for
degrowth
Derk Loorbach 16, director of DRIFT and Professor of Socio-economic Transitions at the
Faculty of Social Science, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “The economic crisis as a game
changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions,” Ecology and
Society, Volume 21, Issue 4, 2016, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art15/
Meanwhile, many political and public debates seem to be primarily concerned with standard, relatively short-term, economic issues,
such as monetary losses, stop-and-start economic growth, increasing unemployment, falling real estate prices, failing banks, virtually
bankrupt nations, and how to get back on course to economic growth. The standard responses when national governments are
struggling to get their economies healthy again are mostly about inducing more money, austerity measures, and introducing
financial regulations, all often part of a broader financial–economic logic (Stiglitz 2010). The
dominant focus on fighting
economic deficits and problems at the expense of investing in social and ecological deficits—
thereby failing to address persistent problems in these areas —can be argued to be a short-term
strategy to prop up an inherently unmanageable system. Examples are the support of system banks with public
money and the green growth strategy (OECD 2009, 2013a). Transition theory (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012) suggests that
such short-term fixes are typical regime-based strategies to sustain existing structures, cultures, and practices, and to fend off the
threats of more radical systemic change.¶ The transition perspective suggests that most regular policy and governance strategies
essentially reproduce existing systems and, by definition, do not address the root causes of problems that are embedded in the
same structures and cultures that determine how solutions are framed and implemented. Such path-dependent
development optimizing existing institutional structures will inevitably lead to recurring crises
and ultimately a more disruptive, shock-wise structural change of an incumbent regime. Transition
studies thus argue that solutions that address symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes
tend to reinforce a lock-in and result in further emergent problems (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010,
Schuitmaker 2012). We argue that the underlying causes and mechanisms of the economic crises have not been thoroughly
analyzed, let alone addressed through effective policies. In a globalized economy, fundamental changes will not likely come from
actions by (national) governments or incumbent businesses, as these are inherently intertwined with and dependent upon the
currently still dominant financial–economic systems and their governance. The need for alternative economic approaches,
discourses, and systems is increasingly emphasized (Schor 2010, Simms 2013, Jackson 2013, van den Bergh 2013, Schor and
Thompson, 2014). Even though the benefits of liberalization are still significant, it seems that the transfer of control from
government to markets has substantially diminished possibilities for top-down policy making, adding to brittleness, complexity, and
lock-in (Loorbach and Lijnis-Huffenreuter 2013).¶ In this paper, we take a transition perspective on transformative social innovation
to conceptualize and map the systemic dynamics that have caused the economic crisis, as well as how it influences the dynamics of
social transformation. We explore how the economic crisis might be considered as a phase in a broader
economic transition and which types of changes coincide to develop into this direction. We thus view the economic
crisis not as a phenomenon in isolation within a relatively short time frame, but as an intrinsic
part, or perhaps a symptom, of deeper underlying structural societal changes over the longer
term. The question we seek to address is how the economic crisis interacts with broader societal changes as well as which
dynamics might accelerate or hamper more structural (sustainability) transitions. To this end, we ask when and how a
macrolevel or landscape development like the economic crisis fundamentally changes the
dominant logic, rules, and conditions of incumbent regimes. In other words, when does a macrodevelopment
become a game changer (cf. Avelino et al. 2014)?¶ The paper builds upon theoretical work from the European FP7 project TRANSIT,
which draws on transition theory to develop an empirically grounded theory on transformative social innovation. In this paper, we
introduce the analytical perspective that we developed on transformative social innovation and two empirical examples. Although
our analytical perspective suggests that alternatives and breakthroughs can come from any sector or actor, in this paper, we focus
on the agency of social innovation and civil-society-led initiatives in providing and producing alternatives. The paper was developed
through a number of iterations, workshops, and theoretical synthesizing. To develop our arguments, we build upon insights from
sustainability transitions literature (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012), social innovation research (Mulgan 2006, Murray et al.
2010, Franz et al. 2012, Westley 2013, Moulaert et al. 2013) and other fields aiming to understand the economic crisis. In addition,
we include two empirical cases, transnational networks of social innovation, time banks, and the transition movement. For both
cases, we draw upon a general literature review. ¶ The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, “Economic change or
transition?,” we introduce the economic crisis as a multifarious phenomenon, how we understand it from a transition perspective,
and how it is understood from an economist’s point of view. We illustrate that it is an ambiguous phenomenon that is
simultaneously seen as part of regular changes in that it is part of disruptive or transformative change. In the section “Making sense
of the economic crisis?,” we present a number of alternative perspectives on the economic crisis that put forward particular
fundamental and systemic causes of the economic crisis and how these are translated in so called “narratives of change.” In
“Transformative social innovations,” we highlight two specific social innovation initiatives, time banks and transition towns, which
have an evident transformative claim and potential, and reflect upon how such transformative social innovations relate (themselves)
to the economic crisis. In “Reconceptualizing societal transformations and the role of the economic crisis,” we synthesize our
findings and argue that the concepts of game changers and narratives could help to unpack the landscape and better understand
how macro- and microlevels interact to trigger transformative changes at the mesolevel. In conclusion, we address the need for a
better understanding of the transformative impacts of the different shades of change (in coevolution) vis-é-vis the restorative
dynamics associated with incumbent regimes.¶ ECONOMIC CHANGE OR TRANSITION?¶ The economic crisis has an empirical basis in
factual events and economic statistics, but is also a social construct. In a narrow sense, the term economic crisis refers to the
worldwide recession of 2007–2008, which changed economic circumstances and investors’
outlooks and caused governments to nationalize and/or invest in failing banks and to stimulate
the economy inter alia through bail outs, expansion of the money supply (quantitative easing), and
low interest rates. It changed the lives of many whose employment or work conditions were
drastically affected (Melike 2014). It also made many observers much more critical about capitalism
and the stability of markets, especially financial markets (Murphy 2011, Stephan and Weaver 2011, Rifkin 2014,
Weaver 2014). In Europe, the economic crisis was accompanied by (perceptions of) a debt crisis, a
banking crisis, and a euro crisis, all interrelated . The financial crisis, debt crisis, bank crisis, neo-liberal crisis, and
global financial collapse are not just different names but also refer to different, albeit closely related, empirical phenomena.
Importantly, the perception and representation of such phenomena in crisis terms can give scope for motivating and/or justifying
responses.¶ This
economic crisis has led to measures and dynamics with profound impacts on
society. Impacts that hardly could have been predicted or anticipated proactively in an objective
and neutral way. As most of the formal and institutional measures originate from either governmental or financial institutes, it
is to be expected that these favor nondisruptive and reinforcing measures that shift the cost of recovery toward society and
strengthen even more the potential for financial–economic growth. The resulting austerity measures and state budget cuts put
pressure on public sector employment, transfer payments, and social welfare systems, contributing to rising unemployment and
underemployment among young and old, and lower disposable incomes for many in society. The state investments in the recovery
of the banking system as well as budget cuts in welfare, health care, and education have been put forward as necessary to restabilize
the economy and return to economic growth as before. Although
the economy now seems on a path to
recovery, many of the social and ecological tensions and challenges still persist. ¶ From a
countermovement perspective, the dominant measures have mainly strengthened incumbent regimes and even made more
apparent the need for structural change. This
becomes apparent by a growing dissatisfaction with
capitalism, a lack of trust in financial institutions, and an increasing pressure on democratic
political institutions (Castells 2010, Murphy 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). These in turn focus attention on
the meaning and quality of life, which can intensify individuals’ desires to live in a more
responsible and meaningful way as citizens, workers, and consumers, which again are accompanied by an
increasing attention to social value creation (based on the attention to these issues in magazines and business literature) (see
O’Riordan 2013).¶ Over 70 years ago, Polanyi (1944) described countermovements as critical responses to the rise of liberal market
economies in the interwar period. Polanyi argued that countermovements tend to include both progressive and regressive forces,
and he related the rise of fascism as part of a double countermovement in reaction to the rise of liberal market economy (Worth
2013). Similarly, contemporary counternarratives do not only include progressive sustainability-oriented ideas, but also more
regressive ideas as manifested in populist and/or extremist political parties. Moreover, counternarratives and grassroots movements
are also not always easily discernible from mainstream discourses. Although discourses on, e.g., solidarity economy can be
constructed as counternarratives, they have considerable overlaps with mainstream policy discourses on the “Big Society” (UK) and
“the participation society” (The Netherlands). When comparing discourses on the circular economy and the sharing economy, one
can find differences in the former being partly associated with a corporate movement (see, e.g., McKinsey and the Ellen McArthur
Foundation) the latter being more associated with grassroots social movements (e.g., Peerby). Different discourses are intermingled,
changing over time, forming double movements (Polanyi 1944), or rather multilayered narratives of change. ¶ We use here narratives
of change as an accessible and short summary of discourses on change and innovation (Avelino et al. 2014). Social
(counter)movements, such as the environmental movement or the antiglobalization movement, can be experienced as
counternarratives of change. These social movements “struggle against pre-existing cultural and institutional narratives and the
structures of meaning and power they convey” (Davies 2002:25). They achieve this partly through counternarratives, which “modify
existing beliefs and symbols and their resonance comes from their appeal to values and expectations that people already hold”
(Davies 2002:25). This challenges us to expand beyond the hegemonic mainstream narrative on, e.g., the economic crisis, by
including a discussion of counternarratives around the new economy. ¶ Thus, we see a double device of addressing the economic
crisis through measures to prevent the breakdown and restabilization of the existing system, and the rise of counternarratives and
movements that find legitimacy in exactly these processes and measures. From antiglobalization or Occupy
movements, we can discern a loss of trust in the dominant economic model of the growth
society and its associated livelihood model where most material needs are satisfied through impersonal market
exchange. The formalized and impersonal market exchange is questioned, resulting in concepts
such as sharing, reciprocity, generalized exchange, or restricted exchange (see Befu 1977, Peebles 2010
for an overview). Although the mainstream discourse is still about how to regain adequate rates of economic growth, an
underlying longer-sighted discourse (i.e., counternarrative) is emerging about alternatives for this
growth model. This includes (longstanding and more recent) ideas on degrowth (Schumacher 1973, Fournier 2008),
green growth (OECD 2009, 2013a), or postgrowth (Jackson 2009). These (counter)narratives also question
the market logic that constructs human beings as well as nature as resources and commodities
in the production of goods (Freudenburg et al. 1995).

Even absent a mindset shift---transition will be forced---crisis causes degrowth

even if unintended by involuntarily ending growth.
Giorgos Kallis 18, ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,
environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, formerly Marie
Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at
Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in
Greece, et al., 5/31/18, “Annual Review of Environment and Resources: Research On
Degrowth,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43, p. 308-309
The fate of such openings will play out amid coevolutionary processes involving institutional organization, technology,
environmental conditions, values, and knowledge (149). Although current worlds seem trapped in continuity,
history is rife with surprise, fueled by the incessant creativity of humans and their ability to
come up with new ways of seeing the world and new forms of living and producing their societies and their
environments (150). ¶ From this perspective, recent debates on the possibility of voluntary paths to degrowth
versus the more probable event of forced reductions provoked by an involuntary crash (10, 77) is
misleading (78). Change is always voluntary and is always enacted through unchosen conditions
(such as the availability of fossil fuels or the thermodynamics of production processes). History is shaped by collective action or
inaction. As
economic growth falters and as the toll of its limits and costs becomes unbearable, a
transition in the direction of something akin to degrowth could emerge from dynamics among
unforeseeable reactions, experiments, adaptations, and political struggles. Such a transition
does not have to be in the name of degrowth . As with the eco-communes of Barcelona that Cattaneo & Gavalda
(107) studied, the reduction of resource use can be the outcome of broader processes of social transformation driven by an ambition
to co-live autonomously and democratically (1). ¶ Incontexts where life under growth is already disastrous for
many people, and threatens to become even more so with climate change and the overshooting
of planetary boundaries, literature reviewed here studies, envisages, and advocates changes in
institutions, policies, values, understandings, and everyday modes of living . Without the voluntary work
to conceive and embody alternative ideas, explanations, practices, and institutions today, an involuntary end to growth
may well lead to a state of continual economic depression in which islands of wealth are
sustained in seas of deprivation, without pretense of democracy and social justice.

Collapse now rather than later is better and delay wrecks the transition.
Foss 14—co-editor of The Automatic Earth, previously a Research Fellow at the Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies (Nicole, “Crash on Demand? A Response to David Holmgren”,
http://www.theautomaticearth.com/crash-on-demand-a-response-to-david-holmgren/, dml)

Holmgren argues that time is running out for bottom-up initiatives to blunt the impact of falling fossil
fuel supply. While simpler ways of doing things at the household and community level could sustain a less
energy dependent world, uptake is limited and time is short. Holmgren points out that during the
Soviet collapse, the informal economy was the country’s saving grace, allowing people to survive
the collapse of much of the larger system . For instance, when the collective farms failed, the population fed
themselves on 10% of the arable land by gardening in every space to which they had access. This kind of self-reliance can be
very powerful, but the ability to adapt is path-dependent. Where a society finds itself prior to
collapse – in terms of physical capacity, civil society and political culture – determines how the collapse will be
handled. Dale Allen Pfeiffer’s excellent book Eating Fossil Fuels, comparing the Cuban and North Korean abrupt loss of energy
supplies, makes this point very clearly. Cuba, with its much better developed civil society and greater flexibility was able to adapt,
albeit painfully, while the rigidly hierarchical North Korea saw very much larger impacts.

Dimitri Orlov has argued very persuasively that the

Soviet Union was far better prepared than the western
world to face such circumstances, as the informal economy was much better developed. The larger system was so
inefficient and ineffectual that people had become accustomed to providing for themselves , and had acquired
the necessary skills, both physical and organizational. Their expectations were modest in comparison with typical westerners, and
their system was far less dependent on money in circulation. One would not be thrown out of a home, or have utilities cut off, for
want of payment, hence people were able to withstand being paid months late if at all and were still prepared to perform the tasks
which kept supply chains from collapsing.

The economic efficiency of western economies, with very little spare capacity in a system
operating near its limits, is their major vulnerability . As James Howard Kunstler has put it, “efficiency is the
straightest path to hell”, because there is little or no capacity to adapt in a maxed out system.
The combination of little physical resilience, enormous debt, substantial vulnerability even to
small a small rise in interest rates, the potential for price collapse on leveraged assets, a relatively small skill base, legal
obstacles to small scale decentralized solutions, an acute dependence on money in circulation and sky high expectations
in the context of widespread ignorance as to approaching limits is set to turn the collapse of the
western financial system into a perfect storm.

Time is indeed short and there will be a limit to what can possibly be accomplished. However,
whatever people do manage to achieve could make a difference in their local area. It is very much worth the
effort, even if the task at hand appears overwhelming. Given that a top-down approach stands very little
chance of altering the course of the Titanic, we might as well direct our efforts towards things
that can potentially be successful as there is no better way to proceed. Reaching limits to growth
will impose severe consequences, but these can be mitigated. Acting to create conditions
conducive to adaptation in advance can make a difference to how crises are handled and the
impact they ultimately have.
Holmgren argues that collapse in fact offers the best way forward, that a reckoning postponed will be
worse when the inevitable limit is finally reached. The longer the expansion phase of the cycle
continues, the greater the debt mountain and the structural dependence on cheap energy
become, and the more greenhouse gas emissions are produced. Considerable pain is inflicted on the masses
by the attempt to sustain the unsustainable at any cost. If we need to learn to live within limits , we should do so
sooner rather than later. Holmgren focuses particularly on the potential for collapse to sharply
reduce emissions, thereby perhaps preventing the climate catastrophe built into the Brown Tech
scenario.
 1NR
Contradictory messages underline the alliance and United States credibility
Shah and Dalton, 2018, Hijab Shah Associate Fellow, International Security Program and
Melissa Dalton Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program, and Director,
Cooperative Defense Project 10-3-2018, Security Cooperation as a National Defense Strategy
Tool," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-cooperation-national-defense-
strategy-tool, Accessed: 3-19-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

The Trump administration has continued the trend seen over the last two U.S. administrations
to burden-share—and increasingly to burden-shift—security requirements onto allies and
partners. However, the U.S. administration’s emphasis on “America First” seems countervailing
to its security cooperation agenda. On the one hand, the NDS specifically states that
strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance is a strategic priority; on
the other hand, President Donald Trump criticizes and questions the utility of the instrumental
NATO mutual defense compact. These contradictions have hampered U.S. credibility in the
eyes of not just current but also prospective allies and partners. As in the Cold War, allies and
partners can be a vital bolstering force against strategic competitors, but only if they are
confident in the durability of the alliance with the United States and not confused by
contradictory messages from the administration.

Err neg, actual consultation is key, the perm undermines US Image

Stanley Sloan, Senior Specialist in Security Policy with the Congressional Research Service, 7-25-
97 [CSM]

Self-confident US behavior has rubbed many Europeans the wrong way . When the Clinton administration
revealed its choice of three candidates - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to participate in the first wave of NATO
enlargement, many allies privately applauded. Even France, which is a strong proponent of including Romania and Slovenia, was not
surprised that the United States and several other allies would only support a smaller group. But the
fact that the United
States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations in making its choice clear,
and then said its decision was non-negotiable, troubled even our closest allies. It strengthened
the hand of those in Europe who claim that the United States is acting like a "hegemonic" power , using
its impressive position of strength to have its way with weaker European allies. One official of a pro-American northern
European country that supports the package of three told me, "We liked the present but were troubled by the way
it was wrapped." US officials say that they wanted to keep the issue within alliance consultations but
that their position was being leaked to the press by other allies. They decided to put an end to "lobbying" for
other outcomes. Their choice to go strong and to go public may be understandable and even defensible. However, the
acknowledged leader of a coalition of democratic states probably needs to set the very best example
in the consultative process if it wants other sovereign states to follow. Perhaps it is just hard being No. 1. US officials have
noted that the United States is "damned if it does, and damned if it does not" provide strong leadership. Perhaps the style of the
NATO decision simply reflects a Washington culture in which the bright and brash more often than not move ahead in the circles of
power. But the style does not work well in an alliance of democracies. Whatever the explanation, US-European relations
would
have been better served by a US approach that allowed the outcome to emerge more naturally
from the consultative, behind-the-scenes consensus-forming process. The final result would have been the
same, and the appearance of a United States diktat to the allies would have been avoided.
4. Sidelines disad – the perm sidelines NATO for US unilateral action that
undermines perception of collective defense
Judy Dempsey, 12-8-2016, Dempsey is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and
editor in chief of Strategic Europe, From Suez to Syria: Why NATO Must Strengthen Its Political
Role," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/12/08/from-suez-to-syria-why-nato-
must-strengthen-its-political-role-pub-66370, Accessed: 3-19-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

The 1956 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO is a must-
read.1 What the foreign ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway proposed sixty years ago is just
as relevant today. The report argued that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which
has greatly enlarged since its establishment in 1949 from twelve to twenty-eight countries, must
be prepared to talk candidly about political issues. Not doing so, the authors urged, would lead
to misunderstandings and mistrust in an alliance in which big members set the agenda without
taking into account the needs and opinions of smaller states.

What prompted the Report of the Committee of Three, also known as the Three Wise Men’s
report, was the Suez Crisis. On October 29, 1956, France and Britain—without consulting NATO
as a whole or the United States in particular—joined forces with Israel to invade Egypt to secure
the Suez Canal as an open trading and commercial route. The invasion was a political defeat for
France and the United Kingdom (UK). It was also a major blow for NATO, as two of the
organization’s leading European members had refused to consult or cooperate with this young
transatlantic alliance. As the report bluntly stated, “an Alliance in which the members ignore
each other’s interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each
other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence. Recent experience makes this
clearer than ever before.”

The signal that the Suez debacle sent to the Soviet Union greatly worried the three authors of
the report—Canada’s Lester B. Pearson, Italy’s Gaetano Martino, and Norway’s Halvard Lange
(see figure 1). While there was some hope of a thaw after the death in 1953 of the Soviet leader,
Joseph Stalin, the authors cautioned against complacency. “We must remember that the
weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major Communist goal,” they wrote.

The Three Wise Men’s proposal that NATO members use the alliance for genuine consultation
and cooperation on issues of common concern was not fully implemented. But the days are long
gone when a NATO ambassador could believe that any member state could go its own way on
defense issues or take a view of politics that is detached from the security environment. As the
Three Wise Men’s report pointed out, “some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political
and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can
guarantee its security and its welfare by national action alone .”

After all, as the authors insisted throughout their report, NATO is not just a military organization
—it is also a political one. But the political dimension is so often sidelined. This is a mistake: at a
time when defense, security, and politics are so closely intertwined, NATO needs to articulate
its political side without hesitation. Yet to this day, the alliance shies away from discussing
controversial issues, from speaking and acting politically, and from taking a stance.
To reinforce its political dimension and its commitment to collective defense, NATO needs to
take seriously the concept of resilience, shore up its relationship with the European Union (EU),
and improve communication by getting out of the alliance’s Brussels bubble. These are
important political steps, the pursuit of which is crucial to make NATO fit to deal with the
threats facing the Euro-Atlantic community.

A. Substantially means without materially qualifications – the perm isn’t a

substantial act because it qualifies the increase
Black’s Law Dictionary 1991

[p. 1024]

Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.

B. Resolved means “determined and firm in intent” – that’s Random House 6.

Means the plan doesn’t prove the resolution if they sever the firm intent.
Random House Unabridged 6 (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved&r=66)
re•solved Audio Help /rɪˈzɒlvd/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[ri-zolvd]

–adjective firm in purpose or intent; determined.

C. Should is certain and has no discretion to change

Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d
311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the
weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense.
HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the
courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not
sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have
squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and
could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v.
State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not
instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that
the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859,
554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction
on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must " and rejected the defendant's argument that the
jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an
instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same
meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of
Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to
convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating
that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).
D. Should is immediate
Summers 94 - Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11-8-1994, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver s
Food Warehouse of Durant,” online:
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes
futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be
governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission
(from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phraseni, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression
of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial
judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give
effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's
language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from
the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my
conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v.
Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True
minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the
view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again
revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by
the statutory policy of this State. [Continues – To Footnote] 14 In praesenti means
literally "at the present time."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the
phrase denotes that which in law is presently or
immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See
Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

E. Substantial is in full existence or certain

Words & Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean
substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation,
reserve, or disguise; in full existence ; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent,
constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal;
opposed to form ; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to
inclusive.

Consult NATO is specifically good. All aspects of arms control are core NATO
issues, we aren’t going to read the whole document but here is a choice line
from NATO themselves (Read Slow)
NATO 2019, Main Website, NATO’s role in conventional arms control," NATO,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48896.htm, Accessed: 3-21-2020, /Kent Denver-
MB

NATO is committed to and attaches great importance to conventional arms control. The
Alliance provides an essential consultative and decision-making forum for its members on all
aspects of arms control and disarmament.
Conventional arms control agreements Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is referred to as a "cornerstone of European security" and
imposes for the first time in European history legal and verifiable limits on the force structure of its 30 States Parties, which stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Since the Treaty’s entry into
force in 1992, the destruction of over 100,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, attack helicopters and combat aircraft) has been verified and almost 6,000 on-site
inspections have been conducted, thereby reaching its objective of creating balance and mitigating the possibility of surprise conventional attacks within its area of application. At the first CFE Review Conference
in 1996, negotiations began to adapt the CFE Treaty to reflect the realities of the post-Cold War era. This process was completed in conjunction with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Summit in Istanbul in 1999. States Parties also agreed to additional commitments, called the Istanbul Commitments. Although the Adapted CFE (ACFE) Treaty went far in adjusting the Treaty to a new
security environment, it was not ratified by Allied countries because of the failure of Russia to fully meet commitments regarding withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, on which
Allies’ agreement to the Adapted Treaty was based. Since 2000 at NATO summits and ministerial meetings, the Allies have reiterated their commitment to the CFE Treaty and have reaffirmed their readiness and
commitment to ratify the Adapted Treaty. During the third CFE Review Conference in June 2006, Russia expressed its concerns regarding ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty and claimed that even the ACFE was
outdated. After the June 2007 Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty, the Russian president signed legislation on 14 July 2007 to unilaterally “suspend” its legal obligations under the CFE
Treaty as of 12 December 2007. In response to these events, NATO offered a set of constructive and forward-looking actions. In 2008 and 2009, consultations were held between the United States – on behalf of
the Alliance – and Russia, but with limited development. Further efforts to resolve the impasse were pursued on the basis of the United States’ initiative, which sought an agreement on a framework for
negotiations on a modernised CFE Treaty, in consultations at 36 between all CFE States Parties and NATO member states not party to the CFE Treaty. The process stalled in the autumn of 2011 because of the lack
of agreement among parties. In a situation where no agreement could be reached to overcome the impasse, towards the end of November 2011, NATO CFE Allies announced their decisions to cease implementing
certain CFE obligations vis-à-vis Russia, while still continuing to fully implement their obligations with respect to all other CFE States Parties. However, in the December 2011 foreign ministers’ communiqué, Allies
stated that these decisions were reversible should the Russian Federation return to full implementation. At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, Allies reiterated their commitment to conventional arms control and
expressed determination to preserve, strengthen and modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments. At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allies
reaffirmed their long-standing commitment to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security and emphasised the importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and
confidence. They underscored that Russia’s unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine has undermined peace, security and stability across the region, and its selective implementation of the Vienna
Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the CFE Treaty have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies called on Russia to fully adhere to its
commitments. On 11 March 2015, the Russian Federation announced that it was suspending its participation in the meetings of the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) on the CFE Treaty, which meets regularly in
Vienna. Vienna Document The Vienna Document (VD), that includes all European and Central Asian participating States, is a politically binding agreement designed to promote mutual trust and transparency about
a state’s military forces and activities. Under the VD, thousands of inspections and evaluation visits have been conducted as well as airbase visits and visits to military facilities; also new types of major weapon and
equipment systems have been demonstrated to the participating States of the VD. In 2019, NATO Allies, together with Finland and Sweden, introduced a new proposal to modernise the Vienna Document. The
proposal aims to restore confidence, build mutual predictability, reduce risks and help prevent unintentional conflict. Open Skies Treaty The Open Skies Treaty is legally binding and allows for unarmed aerial
observation flights over the territory of its participants. So far, more than 1,500 observation missions have been conducted since the Treaty’s entry into force in January 2002. Aerial photography and other
material from observation missions provide transparency and support verification activities carried out on the ground under other treaties. This Treaty provides for extensive cooperation regarding the use of
aircraft and their sensors, thereby adding to openness and confidence. Following long-lasting negotiations the States Parties to the Open Skies Treaty agreed, at the 2010 review conference, to allow the use of
digital sensors in the future. However, these have to undergo a certification process, as foreseen by the Open Skies Treaty. UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) not only feeds global terrorist activities, but also encourages violence, thus affecting local populations and preventing
constructive development and economic activities. SALW proliferation needs to be addressed as broadly as possible and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a well-suited framework for that. The
NATO/EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action contributes to international efforts to address the illicit trade in SALW and encourages full implementation of international regulations and standards,
including the United Nations Programme of Action (UN PoA). The UN PoA was adopted in July 2001 by nearly 150 countries, including all NATO member countries, and contains concrete recommendations for
improving national legislation and controls over illicit small arms, fostering regional cooperation and promoting international assistance and cooperation on the issue. It was developed and agreed as a result of the
growing realisation that most present-day conflicts are fought with illicit small arms and light weapons, and that their widespread availability has a negative impact on international peace and security, facilitates
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, and hampers economic and social development. It includes measures at the national, regional and global levels, in the areas of legislation,
destruction of weapons that were confiscated, seized, or collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of states in identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons. The
UN holds the Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA, in which NATO participates. National delegations from all member states gather every six years to review the progress made in
the implementation of the PoA. Mine action Although not all member states of the Alliance are a party to the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines, they all fully support its humanitarian demining goals.
The Alliance assists partner countries in the destruction of surplus stocks of mines, arms and munitions through a NATO/Partnership Trust Fund mechanism. The EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine
Action also supports mine action efforts through these Trust Fund projects, as well as through information-sharing. In particular, its guest speaker programme provides an opportunity for mine action experts to
share their expertise with the Working Group. These speakers originate from national mine action centres, non-governmental organisations and international organisations and have included high-profile experts,
such as Nobel Laureate Ms Jody Williams, Director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The Group has broadened its focus to also incorporate issues related to explosive remnants of war and cluster
munitions onto its agenda. Convention on Cluster Munitions The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention
concern assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles. It became a legally binding international instrument when it entered into force on 1 August 2010. As of September
2019, a total of 108 had signed the Convention while 107 States Parties had acceded to it. Arms Trade Treaty In July 2012, UN member states gathered in New York to negotiate an arms trade treaty that would
establish high common standards for international trade in conventional arms. After two years of negotiations, the Conference reached an agreement on a treaty text. Governments signed the treaty and after
ratification of 50 states it came into force in December 2014. Since then, over 100 states have ratified the treaty. It establishes common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional
arms. NATO stands ready to support the Arms Trade Treaty as necessary. Trust Fund projects The Partnership for Peace Trust Fund mechanism was originally established in 2000 to assist partner countries with the
safe destruction of stocks of anti-personnel land mines. It was later extended to include the destruction of surplus munitions, unexploded ordnance and SALW, and assisting partner countries in managing the
consequences of defence reform, training and building integrity. So far, NATO has contributed to the destruction of 5.65 million anti-personnel landmines, 46,750 tonnes of various munitions, 2 million hand
grenades, 15.95 million cluster submunitions, 1,635 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), 3,530 tonnes of chemicals and 626,000 SALW, alongside 164.4 million rounds of SALW ammunition. Over the
years, NATO has trained thousands of explosive ordnance disposal experts, giving, for instance, assistance to more than 12,000 former military personnel through defence reform Trust Fund projects. Trust Fund
projects are initiated by a NATO member or partner country and funded by voluntary contributions from individual Allies, partners and organisations. A web-based information-sharing platform allows donors and
recipient countries to share information about ongoing and potential projects. NATO bodies involved in conventional arms control There are a number of NATO bodies that provide a forum to discuss and take
forward arms control issues. Arms control policy is determined within the deliberations of the High-Level Task Force (HLTF) on Conventional Arms Control that was established for CFE and confidence- and security-
building measures (CSBMs). Implementation and verification of arms control agreements fall under the purview of the Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC), including overseeing a designated CFE verification
database. Other fora include the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) and the EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action, in which implementing organisations like the UN, the
European Union, the OSCE, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW – or SEESAC – and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) can share information on projects.
The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) also has a working group for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. However, work of the NRC has been suspended since spring 2014 due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
The NATO School in Oberammergau (Germany) conducts several courses in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. They are related to CFE, VD, Open Skies, weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), SALW and Mine Action. Most of them are also open to NATO’s partners.