1nc – da

Obama is preventing a veto proof majority on Iran now due to his direct
investment of capital
Everett, 1/21/15 – politics reporter for Politico (Burgess, “Democratic Iran hawks hesitate on
overriding Obama” Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/iran-senate-democrats-
barack-obama-114467.html?hp=r1_4)

Republicans are eager to rumble with the White House over sanctions on Iran, but they may
have trouble getting President Barack Obama’s Democratic critics to go along. A day after Obama vowed to veto
any bill that could jeopardize nuclear talks with Tehran, Republicans were working on two pieces of legislation that could move in
But it quickly became clear that
conjunction with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to Congress on Feb. 11.
Republicans have a problem: Senate Democrats who might not like Obama’s policies on Iran but
may not be ready to override their president, especially after the forceful arguments he made in
the State of the Union. In interviews Wednesday, several Democrats who had supported a previous version of Iran
legislation sponsored by Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) said they are reconsidering their positions. Meanwhile, a previous version of an Iran
bill offered by Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) did not have any Democratic co-sponsors. Last week, at
the Senate Democratic
retreat in Baltimore, Obama forcefully made a case against further Iran legislation . He did the same thing
Tuesday night in front of millions of Americans, saying he would veto any sanctions legislation because it would “all but guarantee
that diplomacy fails.” Obama’s words appear to be sinking in . “I’m considering very seriously the very cogent
points that he’s made in favor of delaying any congressional action,” said Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.). “I’m talking to
colleagues on both sides of the aisle. And I think they are thinking, and rethinking, their positions in light of the points that the
“The president
president and his team are making to us.” Asked if he’s spoken directly to Obama about Iran, Blumenthal said:
and his staff are in touch with all of us.” Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) said he is actively weighing the president’s
position against Warner’s own belief that Congress needs to keep pressure on Iran. Even the hawkish Sen. Robert Menendez (D-
N.J.), who said Wednesday that the administration’s comments sound “like talking points straight from Tehran,” was noncommittal
on whether he would again co-sponsor Iranian sanctions legislation that he once led. “I have no idea yet,” Menendez said. The issue,
said Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, is one of timing. While Democrats and Republicans alike want to be tough on Iran, the
president’s party is more open to giving Obama some breathing room. “There’s overwhelming support to toughen up the sanctions,”
said Schumer, a member of Democratic leadership who co-sponsored sanctions legislation last year. “The question is when. At times
in the past the president asked for a little time, until March. That’s something people are looking at.” Kirk’s bill would impose new
sanctions if diplomatic talks fall apart or Iran violates an interim deal. Corker’s would allow Congress an up-or-down vote to reject
or approve any final deal between the U.S. and its allies and Iran. Sources familiar with the process in both chambers said
Republicans have made no final decision on which bill will provide the base for the legislation. Another option is merging versions of
the two bills, though Corker doubted that would happen. The House is also working on new sanctions legislation. A decision is
expected in the near future, with a vote perhaps as early as February , given the support Iran legislation
enjoys from Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio). On the GOP bill to
approve the Keystone XL oil pipeline, Obama swiftly came out with a veto threat because it was clear not
enough Democrats in Congress would vote to override him. That’s not the case for Iran: Sixty
senators publicly supported sanctions legislation in the last Congress, but it was widely believed that
more Democrats would have voted for the bill if it had come to the floor . Senate Minority Whip Dick
Durbin (D-Ill.) said the vote would be a nail-biter if it were held today . But he expects enough
Democrats to have Obama’s back to reject an override , whether on tightening sanctions or requiring
congressional approval for a nuclear deal. “If I had to be pushed, I’d guess there’s at least 34 that would say: ‘This is
premature, we should wait,’” Durbin said in an interview. “If there’s anything that we would do that would jeopardize the
negotiations, I think many Democrats would oppose it.” Republicans think Democrats are bluffing and will be unable to oppose
hardline legislation on Iran, whatever form it takes. But they acknowledge that it’s
a tricky calculus to get to 67
votes when the president is leaning so hard on Democrats to hold the line , which might
require legislation quite different from what’s been proposed so far. “At some point, we’re going to get to the magic 67 and be able to
override this veto,” said Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn (R-Texas). “We’re in the process of figuring out what that would look
like to command the broadest possible support in the Senate. And then we’ll have that debate with the president.” Of course, the
GOP may have further problems getting to 67 thanks to defections from Sens. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and
Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), who have stayed away from new sanctions legislation. “While negotiations are going on, I worry that we will
fracture our coalition,” Flake said of Western nations that have coordinated on Iran negotiations and sanctions. “I want to keep that
coalition together.”

Ocean policy drains capital – causes partisan fighting and spills over to other
legislation
David Helvarg, award winning environmental journalist and Executive Director of Blue
Frontier, 2-14-2014 http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/198361-the-
oceans-demand-our-attention DA: 6/4/14

The latest battle over the future of America’s ocean frontier is being fought out in a seemingly
unrelated bill in Congress . Democratic Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (R.I.) recently introduced his National
Endowment for the Oceans rider to the Senate version of the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), which funds the Army
Corps of Engineers to work on dams, dredging and flood control. The Endowment would establish a permanent fund – based on
offshore energy revenue – for scientific research and coastal restoration. On the House side Tea Party Republican
Rep. Bill Flores (Texas) has a rider to cancel out any funding that might allow the Army Corps to participate in the
Obama administration’s National Ocean Policy, which he claims would empower the EPA to control the property of his drought-
plagued constituents should any rain (generated by the ocean) land on their rooftops. One rider represents a constructive
addition and the other a paranoid partisan impediment to an ocean policy aimed at coordinating federal
agencies in ways that could reduce conflict, redundancy and government waste, “putting urban planning in the water column,” in the
words of former Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen. Allen, who coordinated federal disaster response to
Hurricane Katrina and the BP oil blow out understands the importance of working together when responding to a disaster. And like
it or not, overfishing, pollution, coastal sprawl and climate change have created an ongoing disaster in our public seas. Unfortunately
progress towards a major reorganization of how we as a nation manage and benefit from our ocean continues to
advance with all the deliberate speed of a sea hare (large marine snail). In 2004 ocean conservationists
held their first ‘Blue Vision Summit’ in Washington D.C. It was there Rep. Sam Farr (D-Calif.) called for a “Big Ocean Bill,” to
incorporate many of the recommendations of the 2003 Pew Oceans Commission and 2004 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, the
first blue ribbon panels to examine the state of America’s blue frontier in over three decades. During his presidency, George W. Bush
established major marine reserves in the Pacific, but otherwise ignored his own federal commission’s recommendations along with
those of the Pew group headed by future Secretary of Defense (now retired), Leon Panetta. As a result America’s seas continue to be
poorly managed by 24 different federal agencies taking a piecemeal approach to their oversight under 144 separate laws. In the fall
of 2008, Oregon State marine ecologist Dr. Jane Lubchenco met with then President-elect Obama in Chicago. There, he offered her
the job of running The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and she suggested he promote an ocean policy
based on the two commissions’ recommendations that he agreed to do. By the time of the 2009 Blue Vision Summit it was clear
Congress had become too polarized to pass major ocean reform legislation at the level of the Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts of the last century. Still, activists gathered there were thrilled to hear the new White House Council on
Environmental Quality Chair, Nancy Sutley, announce plans for a new National Ocean Policy initiative by the Obama
administration. This was followed by a series of six public hearings over the next year held in different parts of the country. Ocean
conservationists were able to mobilize thousands of people and 80 percent of public comments favored moving forward with a policy
of ecosystem-based regional planning for ocean uses.

That directly trades-off with the political capital necessary to prevent a veto
override on Iran and sustain the deal. Failure causes war with Iran
Beauchamp, 11/6/14 – former editor of TP Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org. He
previously contributed to Andrew Sullivan’s The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also
written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines. Zack holds B.A.s in Philosophy and Political
Science from Brown University and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School
of Economics, now writes for Vox (Zack, “How the new GOP majority could destroy Obama's
nuclear deal with Iran,” http://www.vox.com/2014/11/6/7164283/iran-nuclear-deal-congress)

There is one foreign policy issue on which the GOP's takeover of the Senate could have huge ramifications, and beyond just the US:
Republicans are likely to try to torpedo President Obama's ongoing efforts to reach a nuclear deal with Iran. And they just might pull
it off. November 24 is the latest deadline for a final agreement between the United States and Iran over the latter's nuclear program.
That'll likely be extended, but it's a reminder that the negotiations could soon come to a head. Throughout his presidency, Obama
has prioritized these negotiations; he likely doesn't want to leave office without having made a deal. But if
Congress doesn't
like the deal, or just wants to see Obama lose , it has the power to torpedo it by imposing
new sanctions on Iran. Previously, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid used procedural powers to stop this from happening
and save the nuclear talks. But Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell may not be so kind, and he may have the votes to destroy
an Iran deal. If he tries, we could see one of the most important legislative fights of Obama's
presidency. Why Congress can bully Obama on Iran sanctions At their most basic level, the international negotiations over Iran's
nuclear program (they include several other nations, but the US is the biggest player) are a tit-for-tat deal. If Iran agrees to place a
series of verifiable limits on its nuclear development, then the United States and the world will relax their painful economic and
diplomatic sanctions on Tehran. "The regime of economic sanctions against Iran is arguably the most complex the United States and
the international community have ever imposed on a rogue state," the Congressional Research Service's Dianne Rennack writes. To
underscore the point, Rennack's four-page report is accompanied by a list of every US sanction on Iran that goes on for 23 full pages.
The US's sanctions are a joint Congressional-executive production. Congress puts strict limits on Iran's ability to export oil and do
business with American companies, but it gives the president the power to waive sanctions if he thinks it's in the American national
interest. "In
the collection of laws that are the statutory basis for the U.S. economic sanctions regime on Iran," Rennack
writes, "the
President retains, in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and relax restrictions." The key
point here is that Congress gave Obama that power — which means they can take it back . "You
could see a bill in place that makes it harder for the administration to suspend sanctions ," Ken
Sofer, the Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (where I worked for
a little under two years, though not with Sofer directly), says. "You could also see a bill that says the president can't agree to a deal
unless it includes the following things or [a bill] forcing a congressional vote on any deal." Imposing new sanctions on Iran wouldn't
just stifle Obama's ability to remove existing sanctions, it would undermine Obama's authority to negotiate with Iran at all, sending
the message to Tehran that Obama is not worth dealing with because he can't control his own foreign policy. So if Obama
wants to make a deal with Iran, he needs Congress to play ball . But it's not clear that Mitch
McConnell's Senate wants to. Congress could easily use its authority to kill an Iran deal To understand why the new Senate is such a
big deal for congressional action on sanctions, we have to jump back a year. In November 2013, the Obama administration struck an
interim deal with Iran called the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). As part of the JPOA, the US agreed to limited, temporary sanctions
relief in exchange for Iran limiting nuclear program components like uranium production. Congressional Republicans, by and large,
hate the JPOA deal. Arguing that the deal didn't place sufficiently serious limits on Iran's nuclear growth, the House passed new
sanctions on Iran in December. (There is also a line of argument, though often less explicit, that the Iranian government cannot be
trusted with any deal at all, and that US policy should focus on coercing Iran into submission or unseating the Iranian government
entirely.) Senate Republicans, joined by more hawkish Democrats, had the votes to pass a similar bill. But in February, Senate
Majority leader Harry Reid killed new Iran sanctions, using the Majority Leader's power to block consideration of the sanctions
legislation to prevent a vote. McConnell blasted Reid's move. "There is no excuse for muzzling the Congress on an issue of this
importance to our own national security," he said. So now that McConnell holds the majority leader's gavel, it will remove that
procedural roadblock that stood between Obama and new Iran sanctions. To be clear, it's far from guaranteed that Obama will be
able to reach a deal with Iran at all; negotiations could fall apart long before they reach the point of congressional involvement. But if
he does reach a deal, and Congress doesn't like the terms, then they'll be able to kill it by passing new sanctions legislation, or
preventing Obama from temporarily waiving the ones on the books. And make no mistake — imposing new sanctions or
limiting Obama's authority to waive the current ones would kill any deal. If Iran can't expect
Obama to follow through on his promises to relax sanctions, it has zero incentive to limit its
nuclear program. "If Congress adopts sanctions," Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told Time last December, "the entire
deal is dead." Moreover, it could fracture the international movement to sanction Iran. The United States is far from Iran's biggest
trading partner, so it depends on international cooperation in order to ensure the sanctions bite. If it looks like the US won't abide by
the terms of a deal, the broad-based international sanctions regime could collapse. Europe, particularly, might decide that going
along with the sanctions is no longer worthwhile. "Our ability to coerce Iran is largely based on whether or not the international
community thinks that we are the ones that are being constructive and [Iranians] are the ones that being obstructive," Sofer says. "If
they don't believe that, then the international sanctions regime falls apart." This could be one of the biggest fights of Obama's last
term It's
true that Obama could veto any Congressional efforts to blow up an Iran deal with sanctions.
But a two-thirds vote could override any veto — and, according to Sofer, an override is entirely within
the realm of possibility. "There are plenty of Democrats that will probably side with Republicans if they try to push a harder
line on Iran," Sofer says. For a variety of reasons, including deep skepticism of Iran's intentions and strong Democratic support for
Israel, whose government opposes the negotiations, Congressional Democrats are not as open to making a deal with Iran as Obama
is. Many will likely defect to the GOP side out of principle. The
real fight, Sofer says, will be among the Democrats —
those who are willing to take the administration's side in theory, but don't necessarily think a
deal with Iran is legislative priority number one, and maybe don't want to open themselves up to the
political risk. These Democrats "can make it harder: you can filibuster, if
you're Obama you can veto — you can make it
impossible for a full bill to be passed out of Congress on Iran," Sofer says. But
it'd be a really tough battle, one that
would consume a lot of energy and lobbying effort that Democrats might prefer to
spend pushing on other issues . "I'm not really sure they're going to be willing to take on a fight about an Iran
sanctions bill," Sofer concludes. "I'm not really sure that the Democrats who support [a deal] are really fully behind it enough that
they'll be willing to give up leverage on, you know, unemployment insurance or immigration status — these bigger issues for most
Democrats." So if
the new Republican Senate prioritizes destroying an Iran deal, Obama will have to
fight very hard to keep it — without necessarily being able to count on his own party for support.
And the stakes are enormous: if Iran's nuclear program isn't stopped peacefully, then the most
likely outcomes are either Iran going nuclear, or war with Iran . The administration believes a deal with Iran is
their only way to avoid this horrible choice. That's why it's been one of the administration's top
priorities since day one. It's also why this could become one of the biggest legislative fights of Obama's last two years.

U.S.-Iran war goes nuclear

Avery 13
John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University
of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash
Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global
Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure
groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global
nuclear war , with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we
should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor
conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the
Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might
be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of
Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also
be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would
certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the dangerous
situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear
weapons would be used,
either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation . Recent research has shown that besides making
large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would
damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown
proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human
civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and
future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.
 1nc – k
The affirmative’s focus on human survival bolsters anthropocentric values, this is
the root cause of genocide, racism, and patriarchy.
Kochi 9 - [species war: law, violence, and animals, Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Sage Journals]
Grotius and Hobbes are sometimes described as setting out a prudential approach, or a natural law of minimal content29 because in
contrast to Aristotelian or Thomastic legal and political theory their attempt
to derive the legitimacy of the state
and sovereign order relies less upon a thick conception of the good life and is more focussed
upon basic human needs such as survival. In the context of a response to religious civil war such an approach
made sense in that often thick moral and religious conceptions of the good life (for example, those held by competing Christian
Confessions) often drove conflict and violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the categories of “survival,”
“preservation of life” and “bare life” are neutral categories. Rather survival, preservation
of life and bare life as
expressed by the Westphalian theoretical tradition already contain distinctions of value – in
particular, the specific distinction of value between human and non-human life . “Bare life” in this sense is
not “bare” but contains within it a distinction of value between the worth of human life placed above
and beyond the worth of non-human animal life. In this respect bare life within this tradition contains within it a
hidden conception of the good life. The foundational moment of the modern juridical conception of the law of war already contains
within it the operation of species war. The Westphalian tradition puts itself forward as grounding the legitimacy of violence upon the
preservation of life, however its
concern for life is already marked by a hierarchy of value in which non-
human animal life is violently used as the “raw material” for preserving human life. Grounded upon,
but concealing the human-animal distinction, the Westphalian conception of war makes a double move: it excludes the
killing of animals from its definition of “war proper,” and, through rendering dominant the modern juridical
definition of “war proper” the tradition is able to further institutionalize and normalize a particular conception of the good life.
Following from this original distinction of life-value realized through the juridical language of war were other forms of human life
whose lives were considered to be of a lesser value under a European, Christian, “secular”30 natural law conception of the good life.
Underneath this concern with the preservation of life in general stood veiled preferences over
what particular forms of life (such as racial conceptions of human life) and ways of living were worthy of
preservation, realization and elevation. The business contracts of early capitalism ,31 the power of white
males over women and children, and, especially in the colonial context, the sanctity of European life over
non-European and Christian lives over non-Christian heathens and Muslims, were some of the
dominant forms of life preferred for preservation within the early modern juridical ordering of
war.

Human centrism allows us to exploit nature, eventually causing extermination of

all life.
Ahkin, 10 – (Melanie Ahkin, Monash University, 2010, “Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of
Rationalism in Val Plumwood’s Critical Ecological Feminism,” Emergent Australian Philosophers, a peer reviewed journal of
philosophy,http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/archives.html DH)

These five features provide the basis for hegemonic centrism insofar as they promote certain conceptual and perceptual distortions
of reality which universalise and naturalise the standpoint of the superior relata as primary or centre, and deny and subordinate the
standpoints of inferiorised others as secondary or derivative. Using standpoint theory analysis, Plumwood's reconceptualisation of
human chauvinist frameworks locates and dissects these logical characteristics of dualism, and the conceptual and perceptual
distortions of reality common to centric structures, as follows.
Radical exclusion is found in the rationalist emphasis on differences between humans and non-human nature, its valourisation of a
human rationality conceived as exclusionary of nature, and its minimisation of similarities between the two realms.
Homogenisation and stereotyping occur especially in the rationalist denial of consciousness to
nature, and its denial of the diversity of mental characteristics found within its many different constituents, facilitating a
perception of nature as homogeneous and of its members as interchangeable and replaceable resources. This
definition of nature in terms of its lack of human rationality and consciousness means that its identity
remains relative to that of the dominant human group, and its
difference is marked as deficiency, permitting its
inferiorisation. Backgrounding and denial may be observed in the conception of nature as extraneous and inessential
background to the foreground of human culture, in the human denial of dependency on the natural environment, and denial
Mélanie Ahkin „Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val Plumwood‟s Critical Ecological
Feminism‟ Emergent Australasian Philosophers Issue 3, 2010 7 of the ethical and political constraints which the unrecognised ends
and needs of non-human nature might otherwise place on human behaviour. These features together create
an ethical
discontinuity between humans and non-human nature which denies nature's value and agency, and
thereby promote its instrumentalisation and exploitation for the benefit of humans .
This dualistic logic helps to universalise the human centric standpoint, making invisible and seemingly inevitable the conceptual and
perceptual distortions of reality and oppression of non-human nature it enjoins. The alternative standpoints and perspectives of
members of the inferiorised class of nature are denied legitimacy and subordinated to that of the class of humans, ultimately
becoming invisible once this master standpoint becomes part of the very structure of thought.12
Such ananthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it
highly ecologically irrational.13 The hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased,
reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non-instrumental value, and impedes the fair and
impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism
creates distributive injustices by restricting
ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature
in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation.
The prudential risks and blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and
humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence
on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large
part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the
significance and survival needs of non-human nature:
The logic of centrism naturalises an illusory order in which the centre appears to itself to be
disembedded, and this is especially dangerous in contexts where there is real and radical
dependency on an Other who is simultaneously weakened by the application of that logic .14
Within the context of human-nature relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure , either through
the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our
species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of the human centric
framework.

The alternative is to de-construct the human-centered societal focus -- our total

rejection of human agency and the continuation of life functions as a thought
experiment that allows us to end the oppression of the status quo.
Kochi and Ordan 2k8 [“An argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7, no 4]

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response
to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention.
For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of
certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically,
to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious
commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies
(think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of
action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive.
Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal
by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating
non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and
remains fully complicit with others. One
response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity
and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this
instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would
be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action
runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final
solution’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of
humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no
longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a
moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the
calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is
normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity
would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of
responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species . By eradicating ourselves we end
the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world . If there is a form
of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at
redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a
new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted
nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a
radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not
being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink
what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not
the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is
the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the
conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then
of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or
non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out
violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm.
Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is
the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an
individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no
matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.
For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience… hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.
 1nc – cp

The United States federal government should propose and commit to ratifying a
protocol for adaptive governance of geo-engineering under the auspices of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This protocol should
require only super-majority approval from the Conference of Parties and should
require periodic re-evaluation of regulations for geo-engineering research and
deployment.

The United States federal government should: facilitate communication about geo-
engineering research between U.S. research organizations and their counterparts
in other nations; push diplomatic discussions over the proposed treaty through
the Department of State; and support dialogue over geo-engineering within the
international research community through the National Academies of Science and
Engineering.

Establishing an international framework through the UNFCC best deters

unilateral action and creates a controlled system for approved research that
leverages the IPCC’s experience.
Michael C. Branson, June 2014. J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Santa Clara University School of Law. “A Green
Herring: How Current Ocean Fertilization Regulation Distracts from Geoengineering Research,” Santa Clara Law
Review 54.1, http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2771&context=lawreview.

The international framework on ocean fertilization established by parties to the CBD and LC/LP has flaws beyond the frameworks
jurisdictional reach. The CBD and LC/LP fail to consider the motivation of private actors of unilateral ocean fertilization
experiments, and therefore fail to address these motivating factors. By
attempting to combat ocean fertilization
separately under treaties designed solely to protect the environment, the CBD and LC/LP have
divorced ocean fertilization and geoengineering from the larger discussion on climate change .
Delegitimizing ocean fertilization’s role in solving the global climate crisis leaves advocates with no avenue other than to pursue
haphazard projects. The more appropriate venue to address geoengineering experiments and ocean
fertilization—a venue that could move forward on scientific consensus and more effectively deter
private actors—is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Adopted in 1992, the
UNFCCC was designed to act as a jumping point for future protocols. 213 Several protocols, including the Kyoto
Protocol, have already been ratified through the UNFCCC. 214 Parties to the UNFCCC should take advantage of
this framework to address geoengineering. Creating a protocol through the UNFCCC is more beneficial than
the current system for several reasons: First, the UNFCCC can more readily make decisions that
encompass the larger mission of combating climate change , rather than viewing ocean fertilization and other
geoengineering methods as simply an environmental hazard. Second, more states have ratified the UNFCCC, so
its protocols can be more widely discussed and adopted. Third, a proposal through the UNFCCC
would take advantage of the Convention’s enormous scientific capacity embodied in the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and would be more likely to build a
process that explores scientific validity and placates concerned nations and private
individuals considering moving forward with ocean fertilization projects.
Additionally, a protocol under the UNFCCC could more effectively deter private actors . Private
actors conceivably have three motives to pursue. First, private actors attempt to develop
scientific knowledge to fill the gap created by the lack of legitimate scientific experiments in ocean
fertilization. 215 Second, private actors seek profit by trading carbon credits . 216 Third, private actors
strive to keep discussions on climate change in the news and in political dialogue . 217 The
international framework developed by Parties to the CBD and the LC/LP largely ignores all
three motives in its attempt to prevent non-scientific experiments. Because the CBD and LC/LP have goals unrelated to climate
change, they are illequipped to address these motivating factors. The UNFCCC, on the other hand, could more
readily address these three motives because of the significant framework that already exists to
address these issues. A. Creating a Forum for Legitimate Scientific Experiments For geoengineering techniques
to be considered as a viable option, substantially more scientific knowledge is needed to
determine whether they work. 219 Based on current research, it is impossible to determine whether the implementation
of geoengineering techniques outweigh their risks. 220 Unfortunately, the tone set by Parties to the CBD and the LC/LP discourages
all ocean fertilization projects, including those with scientific value. 221 While both the CBD and LC/LP recognize the need for
increased scientific knowledge on geoengineering techniques, the instruments have no intention to promote the growth of this
knowledge. By placing harsh requirements on those who follow the legal framework without providing any incentives, the
Assessment Framework discourages scientific progress. Private actors like Russ George seize upon this lack of scientific progress as
justification for its radical action: if the international scientific community refuses to take ocean fertilization seriously, the future of
the planet requires financially capable actors to intervene and conduct research themselves. If legitimate research teams conduct
fewer legitimate scientific experiments, unilateral experiments could become the only means to collect data. Even projects which
opponents claim are entirely focused on profit attempt to collect scientific data to legitimize their practice. 222 Unfortunately, for-
profit experiments are likely to be illequipped compared to scientific experiments. Creating
an international
framework that supports scientific research would help eliminate uncertainty and allow for
better risk assessment. Providing a structure for increasing scientific knowledge on ocean fertilization experiments, and all
geoengineering methods, would eliminate the justification for unilateral actors to push forward with their geoengineering agenda.
Increased understanding of geoengineering options would further decrease the risk of countries independently implementing
geoengineering projects that have been scientifically proven to be ineffective. Not
only should barriers to scientific
research be reduced, projects that pursue scientific understanding and weigh the environmental
impacts should be rewarded under a geoengineering protocol. The protocol should not automatically ban
commercial experiments if those experiments pursue these same goals in a responsible manner. Including commercial experiments
within the protocol will allow these experiments to contribute to the climate change community, rather than force them to fight
against international currents. 224 Funds should be dedicated to furthering research rather than castigating experiments and then
arguing not enough is known to consider geoengineering. This funding should be in addition to, rather than a reduction from,
current scientific grants on climate change research.225 Uncertainty about geoengineering and ocean fertilization remains a real
concern. The best means to remove this uncertainty is to pursue scientific experiments vigorously today. Conclusive results from
these experiments can take several years, so it is imperative the international community act now before the climate change reversal
becomes dependent on these technologies. 226 The
UNFCCC is the proper instrument to provide funding
and a forum for scientific geoengineering experiments because it already collaborates with a
highly respected scientific body and because more nations are party to the convention . The UNFCCC
Conferences of the Parties already works in collaboration with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the scientific
body that seeks to better understand climate change. 227 While
the IPCC does not conduct any experiments, 228
it is the best equipped scientific body to determine the efficacy of geoengineering experiments .
Working Group I of the IPCC recently released a report that included a paragraph about the lack of knowledge sufficient to make
conclusions about whether geoengineering methods would be effective. 229 Ageoengineering protocol under the
UNFCCC could create a controlled system for necessary scientific research, and could
direct the funds to the most effective experiments based on the recommendations of the
IPCC. B. Closing Carbon Markets to Ocean Fertilization Raising revenue through the generation of carbon credits is often
discussed as the main motivating factor for private actors. Thus, to prevent uncontrolled experiments, it is essential to close off the
availability of carbon credits for projects that pose significant uncertainty and could cause environmental harm. The UNFCCC
already addresses which types of programs do and do not qualify for carbon credits, thus it is in the best position to address whether
ocean iron fertilization should ever qualify, and what qualifications must be met if it were to qualify. 231 The main goal of the Kyoto
Protocol to the UNFCCC was to create commitments by developed nations to reduce or limit their greenhouse gas emissions. 232
Countries that committed to limitations or reductions are known as Annex B parties. 233 But the Protocol also sought to lay the
groundwork for market-based mechanisms that would allow parties to reach these goals with more flexibility. 234 The two major
mechanisms are emissions trading and the Clean Development Mechanism. 235 Through international emissions trading, parties to
the Kyoto Protocol can sell excess carbon units to countries over their limits. 236 Each developed country party to the Kyoto
Protocol agreed to “assigned amounts” of carbon in which they can emit. 237 These levels can be divided into assigned amount units
(AAUs). 238 If an Annex B party uses fewer AAUs than it initially agreed to use, the excess AAUs can be sold to countries emitting
more than their assigned amount. 239 Carbon can also be traded through removal units (RMU) and emission reduction units (ERU).
240 RMUs are created through land use activities such as reforestation. 241 ERUs are generated when an Annex B party conducts an
emission reduction or removal project in another Annex B country, known as a joint implementation project. 242 The Clean
Development Mechanism is a system in which Annex B parties can undertake green projects in developing countries in exchange for
certified emission reductions (CERs). 243 These projects are designed to reduce GHG emissions, and developed countries can use
this reduction, in the form of CERs, to meet emission reduction goals. 244 Further, the projects help to include developing countries
in the solution for climate change, providing them with technological benefits but not imposing any specific emission requirements.
245 While the mechanisms that generate RMUs, ERUs, and CERs provide Annex B parties greater flexibility in reaching their
emission reductions and limitations, the types of projects which qualify to create these “offsets” largely do not include ocean
fertilization projects. In initially creating regulated carbon markets, the international community was cautious about which types of
carbon reduction activities would be eligible for carbon credits. 246 For example, joint implementation projects are eligible for ERUs
only if they meet the definition of “removals by sinks” described in Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol. 247 These
paragraphs limit the definition of sinks to afforestation and reforestation. 248 An executive board must approve any new types of
carbon sinks, which is unlikely to happen in the near future for any geoengineering method. 249 While the provisions of the Kyoto
Protocol already substantially address the limitations of carbon credits in international markets, the Protocol and the UNFCCC are
more limited in their ability to control voluntary markets. Since the vast majority of carbon credits are traded on regulated markets,
the current provisions of the Kyoto Protocol already substantially limit the profitability of ocean fertilization. 250 However, because
regulated markets are unavailable to geoengineering experiments, private actors have turned to private, or voluntary, markets as a
means for profit. 251 Voluntary markets have grown rapidly with the increase in public concern and awareness about carbon
footprints. 252 These markets are available for individuals and companies who wish to assuage their conscience or green their
image. 253 They impose fewer requirements regarding the credits that end up on them, but the credits carry a lower sale value than
credits available through regulated markets. 254 Those who wish to profit from carbon credits today may have the opportunity to
bypass the limitations of the Kyoto Protocol by trading on the voluntary carbon trading market. 255 These voluntary markets have
very few rules about what types of projects qualify for carbon credits. Currently, voluntary markets have hesitated in generating
carbon credits through ocean fertilization experiments. 256 Because the main buyers on these markets are those looking to enhance
their green image, internationally condemned projects are unlikely to become widely accepted. 257 Nonetheless, increasing prices of
carbon credits and the hope that these markets will open when the theory has a larger scientific consensus continues to motivate the
commercial ocean fertilization industry. 258 If voluntary markets continue to grow, regulating voluntary carbon markets may be
necessary to deter for profit projects. 259 To ensure that the voluntary carbon market does not provide for a means of profit, efforts
could be made to prevent groups from purchasing carbon credits generated from ocean fertilization projects. A
geoengineering protocol under the UNFCCC could easily include provisions that seek to limit
the use of unapproved geoengineering methods for the generation of carbon credits on voluntary
carbon markets. Such a provision would likely be uncontroversial and readily followed by the
voluntary carbon markets seeking a positive public image. Additionally, a geoengineering
protocol under the UNFCCC could establish specific guidelines as to what projects, if any, would
be eligible for carbon credits. Even if the international community reaches the likely conclusion that no ocean fertilization
experiments are eligible for carbon credits, a definitive statement about why ocean fertilization and other geoengineering
experiments are currently not eligible, paired with opportunities for further research, could alter the eligibility of carbon credits for
ocean fertilization on private markets. C. Including Ocean Fertilization within the Climate Change Dialogue While the idea of
geoengineering being part of the climate change strategy has increased as efforts to mitigate climate change have stalled, discussion
over ocean fertilization by the CBD and the LC/LP was entirely separate from the goal to take the most effective action to combat
climate change. Because
the regulation of ocean fertilization has been determined by two
international conventions focused on environmental hazards, ocean fertilization has only been
discussed as a hazard rather than a potential solution to climate change . Further, it sets a precedent for
the international community to regulate other forms of geoengineering haphazardly and without comparing or analyzing the risk of
any methods. The role of geoengineering in a comprehensive solution to climate change has remained largely unanswered. 260 The
focus of the discussion by parties to several international conventions was to strongly urge for a greater scientific foundation
illuminating benefits and drawbacks before allowing for widespread implementation of climate engineering techniques. 261 The
CBD and LC/LP fail to tackle the problems of geoengineering as a whole. By solely focusing on the environmental impacts of ocean
fertilization projects, the CBD and LC/LP cannot facilitate a substantive discussion that identifies acceptable geoengineering
projects. Further, not including this discussion as part of the comprehensive climate change solution frames ocean fertilization and
geoengineering as unworthy of any discussion. Many continue to argue geoengineering techniques detract from solving the critical
problem of dramatically reducing emissions, while others who previously opposed climate engineering now seek a strategy utilizing
both mitigation and climate engineering. 263 These strong differences of opinion are exactly why States already committed to
combating climate change should concurrently consider all methods of geoengineering. Because the CBD and the LC/LP analyze
ocean fertilization as a problem separate from the larger climate change solution, focusing solely on preventing harm to the oceans,
the opportunity for a broader discussion of geoengineering in the climate solution is missing. The practicability of individual
geoengineering techniques should not be decided ad hoc, separate from the larger picture of combatting climate change. Nor should
a single method of geoengineering be singled out without balancing its effectiveness compared to other geoengineering approaches.
Because climate change is an international problem, the solution should be discussed as much
as possible by the parties to the UNFCCC, the cohesive body already formed to tackle these
issues, rather than allowing parties to unrelated treaties establish different standards for
different geoengineering techniques. CONCLUSION Ocean fertilization, like any geoengineering method, poses real
and unknown risks to our planet. But so does inaction on climate change. The CBD and LC/LP decisions include boiler plate
language concluding that research into ocean fertilization must be pursued, but also limit channels through which to conduct
beneficial research. The goal of the CBD and the LC/LP to prevent damage caused by hazardous dumping is honorable. But, in
the CBD ban on
reality, the efforts fail to comprehensively protect against fringe experiments like that of Russ George. Instead,
ocean fertilization and the LC/LP Assessment Framework significantly slow the pace of
legitimate research and distract from a serious discussion about the risks and benefits of ocean
fertilization and geoengineering methods in combatting climate change. A geoengineering treaty
or protocol offers the best route for such a discussion. The UNFCCC is particularly equipped to
tackle the problem because it includes nearly every country in the world. 264 A geoengineering treaty
would allow for a wide ranging discussion about whether geoengineering proposals outweigh the risk they impose. Further, such a
treaty would allow for discussion about all methods of geoengineering, which would allow States
to work together in determining which geoengineering techniques should be the most rigorously
pursued, and which are too dangerous to pursue. Similarly, in the preliminary research stages, States could
determine how to allocate resources to research most economically. Until nations sit down for real discussions to
support risk assessments of ocean fertilization experiments, rogue environmentalists will likely
continue to act as a distraction using the lack of international progress as a rationale for their
actions.
Adaptive governance framework best facilitates cooperation and norm creation ---
avoids the conflict created by full consensus regimes.
Albert C Lin, July 2009. University of California, Davis. “Geoengineering Governance,” Issues in Legal
Scholarship 8.1.

What does all of this mean in terms of agreements and institutions for geoengineering governance? First, notwithstanding the
FCCC’s general orientation towards emission reductions, geoengineering
should be addressed within the
structure of the existing FCCC.101 The FCCC identifies as one of its principles that parties “should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind,”102 a premise that encompasses geoengineering governance.
Moreover, theFCCC has already established a forum – the Conference of the Parties – and has at
its disposal technical bodies, such as the IPCC and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice, that can facilitate research, peer review, discussion, and development of
consensus in this area.103 Given the potential substitutability of geoengineering projects for emissions reductions, it makes
no sense to develop an entirely separate international regime to address geoengineering.104 Second, it is critical that geoengineering
be addressed explicitly by the Conference of the Parties, and that it be addressed soon. Failing
to address
geoengineering research needs as well as potential geoengineering deployment heightens the risk that events
will unfold in ways that are less than desirable. One possibility is that there will be
underinvestment in the public good of geoengineering research . Such research is critical to determining
whether geoengineering can provide a viable option – emergency or otherwise – for combating climate change without endangering
human health, the environment, or global security.105 Even if the international community ultimately decides to ban
geoengineering completely or to bar the use of geoengineering projects as a source of carbon offsets, research likely would prove
valuable in facilitating detection and monitoring of covert geoengineering projects.106 Another
possibility, at the other
extreme, is that inattention to geoengineering will allow unilateral geoengineering schemes to
proceed without international oversight or consideration of global ramifications .107 In addition to
countering these risks, addressing governance issues while geoengineering is in its infant stages
minimizes the influence that an established industry or other constituency with vested interests
in geoengineering might have on governance structures and decisions.108 Third, the Conference of the
Parties should confront the risk that geoengineering or similar climate modification techniques could be used as weapons. Here, the
Conference can look to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD), which bans environmental modification for military or hostile purposes.109 Unlike the FCCC, ENMOD does
not command universal assent. Although most of the world’s major powers have ratified the treaty, only 73 countries are parties to
it.110 More importantly, ENMOD is limited in scope: on its face, it prohibits only the intentional use of environmental modification
techniques by one party against another.111 It apparently does not govern attacks by a party state on a non-party state, it does not
authorize affirmative steps to block use of environmental modification techniques by non-states, and it lacks provisions for
penalizing parties that violate its terms.112 Notwithstanding these flaws, the provisions of ENMOD offer a sound starting point for
geoengineering governance. The prospects for achieving consensus on a ban on the use of geoengineering for military or hostile
purposes are probably more favorable than on other aspects of geoengineering. Efforts in this area should of course address the
weaknesses of ENMOD, particularly with respect to verification and enforcement mechanisms, as well as the potential use of
geoengineering techniques by rogue states or rogue actors. Although it is unclear at this time whether such techniques could be
targeted effectively against other countries, securing a ban on the hostile use of geoengineering ultimately may require mutual
promises to defend other parties against such use.113 Fourth, parties
will have to think creatively to develop
mechanisms for making collective decisions on geoengineering and for managing the risk of
unilateral geoengineering. That is, even if agreement can be reached to ban geoengineering as a weapon, the risk remains
that one country or a small group of countries might be desperate enough to undertake a geoengineering project unilaterally,
disregarding the potential harmful impacts on others. Consensus- based decision making, the predominant model for cooperative
international action on environmental matters, is not well-suited for responding promptly to such a scenario. Nor is consensus
formation likely for climate change issues more generally, given the disparity of interests among states, the high costs of responding
to climate change, and the need for rapid adjustments as scientific knowledge changes.114 An
obvious alternative to a
consensus model of decisionmaking would be to adopt nonconsensus processes such as rules
providing for passage of measures by a supermajority.115 Nonconsensus arrangements, however, are rarely
found in international environmental law because countries are often reluctant to yield autonomous control over economic activity
and resource use.116 Objections to nonconsensus decisionmaking are also rooted in legitimacy concerns: in contrast to treaty
commitments, whose legitimacy rests on explicit consent, obligations adopted through nonconsensus processes must be justified by
some other theory.117 There
are nevertheless several examples of treaties that provide for the adoption of
amendments binding on all parties to those treaties via nonconsensus processes . The legitimacy
of these amendments rests on a theory of general consent – i.e., that signatories have consented
to an ongoing system of governance.118 Countries have tended to be more open to these
nonconsensus arrangements where technical matters are at issue or where the range of possible
amendments is limited in nature.119 Although the FCCC does not presently authorize amendments to be adopted in this manner,120
several international environmental agreements do provide for nonconsensus
decisionmaking.121 How might the parties to the FCCC incorporate within the architecture of the FCCC a nonconsensus
process to deal with geoengineering? Of course, the FCCC – a framework convention – contemplates the subsequent development of
One possibility would be
specific protocols to address substantive details, such as those pertaining to geoengineering.122
to develop a protocol that treats geoengineering governance as a series of adaptive management
decisions, rather than as a single binary choice to be made once and for all.123 Geoengineering governance, in
other words, would involve adaptive governance, in which decisionmaking structures would be
put in place to foster adaptive management.124 Breaking up the geoengineering issue into
smaller incremental decisions may make nonconsensus processes more palatable while
facilitating adaptive decisionmaking. Ideally, an adaptive governance approach would promote learning, conceive of
policy choices as an integral part of the learning process, and protect the resilience of the Earth’s climate system by seeking to avoid
decisions that foreclose future options.125 A critical initial question would involve the baseline from which geoengineering
governance decisions would be made. Given
the widespread unease and uncertainty associated with
geoengineering proposals, the international community should begin with a default
presumption against the implementation of any geoengineering project. Such a presumption is also
warranted by the difficulty of reversing course after a geoengineering project has already been operating for many years: suddenly
stopping a long-running aerosol release program, for instance, would almost surely cause a rapid warming that both human and
nonhuman populations would struggle to adjust to.126 Notwithstanding any presumption against geoengineering deployment, an
adaptive governance approach counsels in favor of revisiting that presumption at regular
intervals. Regularly revisiting the issue offers several advantages . First, this would allow the parties to take
account of updated information regarding climate change and its impacts, the success (or lack thereof) of efforts to reduce
emissions, and geoengineering risks and refinements.127 Review of the issue must be sufficiently frequent to allow the parties to
respond to “climate surprises”128 – unexpectedly rapid or large climate changes that are not accounted for in most climate models,
which tend to assume relatively smooth increases in GHG concentrations and temperature. Second ,
a schedule to
periodically reconsider the issue reduces the stakes involved in each vote, thereby
ameliorating the tendency for parties to assume entrenched positions that make
agreement more difficult and increasing the likelihood that parties will be willing to
agree to a nonconsensus decisionmaking process.129 Third, repeated consideration of
geoengineering can foster a continuing international dialogue on the matter. Such a dialogue
essentially would serve as ongoing negotiations that can lead to the building of coalitions
or the formation of consensus on an issue .130 In addition, consistent views or decisions with
regard to the conditions under which geoengineering may be deployed can also promote the
formation of norms and even customary international law to govern the conduct of
nations and institutions with respect to geoengineering.131 If a decision ever were made to proceed with a
particular geoengineering scheme, new procedures and governance mechanisms specific to that scheme would have to be devised.
The international community would need to address the specifics of deployment and the procedures for review and reconsideration,
including an accounting of the risks of discontinuing such a project.132 At
this time, however, those details can wait;
what should command attention in the near- term is a more general framework for managing
geoengineering.

Unilateral research and experimentation outside of an international governance

framework will spark international tensions and mistrust.
Tanimura 14 (Erin, J.D. Candidate, UC Davis School of Law, B.A. Integrative Biology & History, UC Berkeley
“Geoengineering Research Governance: Foundation, Form, and Forum”, Environs: Environmental Law & Policy
Journal 37 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 167 // AKONG)

3. Unilateral Action by Public and Private Actors Governments and private parties may research and deploy
geoengineering projects unilaterally. Some geoengineering techniques are relatively inexpensive and can be researched
or deployed by few actors. n93 In many ways, this is a benefit: a single country could undertake massive programs to combat climate
change. n94 But not every unilateral actor has purely humanitarian motives; actors may research
geoengineering techniques independently for private financial gain, military advancements, or
nefarious purposes. Ultimately, the potential for unilateral action suggests the potential for
geoengineering experimentation to involve few decision makers but affect a large number of
people. Public and private actors have various motives for undertaking unilateral experimentation and deployment. Likely, many
actors truly wish to find climate change solutions. For example, actors in favor of ultimate deployment may desire to explore
geoengineering unilaterally or within small coalitions to exclude those who would prevent implementation. n95 But both public and
actors benefit in other ways as well. n96 Militaries and "nefarious" actors could use
private
geoengineering techniques for non-peaceful purposes and would thus benefit from unilateral
geoengineering research. n97 Geoengineering methods have varied effects on different regions, lending themselves to
many "possible strategic military uses." n98 Geoengineering research could give militaries "new tools for weather control, such as
the ability to induce droughts in enemy nations or to enhance storms to disrupt enemy operations." n99 But militaries are not the
only actors who could benefit from relatively easy and affordable weather manipulation. n100 Indeed, "a rogue state, a terrorist
group, or even a disgruntled billionaire" could render rivals helpless. n101 [*178] Further, many private actors invest in
geoengineering research because of perceived financial gain. n102 For example, Bill Gates invests in Silver Lining, a marine cloud
brightening program. n103 Similarly, Richard Branson encourages geoengineering innovation through the "Virgin Earth Challenge,"
offering a $ 25 million prize to the company able to create the best "environmentally sustainable and economically viable" CDR
technique. n104 These and other private investors could financially benefit from patents on geoengineering technologies. n105
Further, big oil recently joined the geoengineering research lobby; n106 advances in geoengineering research could lessen pressures
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Finally, some companies believe geoengineering can generate sellable carbon credits. n107 Most
academic discussion in this area concerns the potential for ocean iron fertilization to generate carbon credits. n108 Recent modeling
suggests ocean iron fertilization could generate a large amount of carbon credits and produce a high return on investments if such
techniques ever became recognized in carbon trading markets. n109 Emissions trading systems are not likely to recognize
geoengineering methods as carbon sources anytime soon, n110 but growing private interests indicate that pressure to consider the
option will only increase. Unilateral action with transboundary effects risks exacerbating political
tensions. n111 While scientists may effectively design "subscale field [*179] experiments" to have "demonstrably negligible
environmental and transboundary impacts," the same is less true of large-scale field experimentation. n112 As geoengineering
research moves from modeling to larger field experimentation with transboundary effects, tests
will likely evoke "political sensitivities." n113 Seemingly, both public and private action could spark
international tensions. The risk of unilateral action suggests a central concern in geoengineering
experimentation: unilateral decision making. Ultimately, actors may deploy geoengineering
methods unilaterally. This relates to the risks of moral hazard and technological lock-in. While
careful decision making could lessen those risks, the potential for unilateral experimentation suggests that
few actors - far less than will be ultimately affected - could make critical decisions and
potentially exacerbate them. On one level, unilateral decisionmaking is a potential problem
among nation-states. As discussed above, unilateral geoengineering action by a sovereign
government (or by a citizen of one government) could exacerbate political tensions if it has transboundary
effects. But on another level, unilateral action risks negatively affecting individuals and
populations with no role in the decision-making process. D. Geoengineering Research Demands
International Governance Geoengineering research is an international issue, with risks and
benefits that demand international attention. Research in ocean iron fertilization , sulfur aerosol
injection, marine cloud whitening, and other CDR and SRM techniques will likely have transboundary effects. n114
Even research projects conducted within domestic boundaries could have negative extraterritorial repercussions on climate patterns,
ecosystems, and ultimately human health and well-being. Apart from these tangible effects, geoengineering research risks moral
hazard and technological lock-in. n115 Further, actors
may conduct geoengineering experimentation
unilaterally. n116 Unilateral experimentation - regardless of the underlying motive - could exacerbate
political tensions and affect numerous individuals with no voice in the research decision-making
process. n117 Thus, the risks and potential effects of geoengineering research demand international
governance for research projects with transboundary effects.

That causes war over unilateral geo-engineering experiments.

Rob Bellamy, 9/17/2014. James Martin Research Fellow at the Institute of Science, Innovation and Society at
the University of Oxford. “Safety First! Framing and Governing Climate Geoengineering Experimentation,” Climate
Geoengineering Governance Working Paper Series: 014, http://www.geoengineering-governance-
research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper14bellamysafetyfirst.pdf.

The possible conduct of experiments in the global commons or across national boundaries has
led to interested parties saying ‘let’s work together’ in exerting control over geoengineering.
Collaboration and transparency are widely seen as virtues amongst the corpus’ publications for any form
of governance for geoengineering experimentation . Concerns over exceeding de minimis levels of
experimentation through simultaneous experiments have inspired plans to coordinate experiments: ‘What if a safe amount of
aerosols was agreed, for example, but then several different experiments ran simultaneously within the same region of a country?’
(SRMGI, 2011: 49). ‘Wars [could be] waged over the position and density of the clouds, rainfall
patterns, ocean alkalinity, and volcanic eruptions as confusion prevails over what phenomena
are natural and which are [hu]manmade. Different, often conflicting experiments are sponsored by different
countries’ (US GAO, 2010: 53). 5 The risks of unilateralism in geoengineering experimentation are thus
seen to be very real, with past experiments such as those led by Yuri Izrael in stratospheric aerosol injection ‘illustrat[ing] the
seriousness of… countries unilaterally undertaking atmospheric experiments’ (ETC Group, 2010: 11). Others raise alarm
over the attribution of blame for any harmful impacts of weather events that might be brought
about by unilateral experiments: ‘Rather than making it possible to identify the causes behind
weather extremes in a thermostat–controlled experimental climate, weather event attribution is
likely to aggravate the political and ethical conflicts which [the] technology will have unleashed’
(Hulme, 2014: 103). Under this perspective, such experiments cannot be considered ‘legally,
practically or morally acceptable’ (ibid: 34) without prior inter– governmental discussion
and agreement’ (ETC Group, quoted in FMER, 2011: 114).
 1nc – t
Interpretation --- Ocean Exploration must be an open-ended search --- testing a specific
hypothesis is research.
McNutt, 6 - PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MONTEREY BAY AQUARIUM
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Marcia, Prepared Testimony, UNDERSEA RESEARCH AND OCEAN
EXPLORATION: H.R. 3835, THE NATIONAL OCEAN EXPLORATION PROGRAM ACT OF
2005 AND THE UNDERSEA RESEARCH PROGRAM ACT OF 2005,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg28758/html/CHRG-109hhrg28758.htm)

Ocean exploration is distinguished from research by the fact that exploration leads to questions,
while research leads to answers. When one undertakes exploration, it is without any
preconceived notion of what one might find or who might benefit from the
discoveries . Research, on the other hand, is undertaken to test a certain hypothesis, with the clear
understanding of the benefits of either supporting or refuting the hypothesis under consideration. Often novel discoveries are made
accidentally in the process of performing hypothesis-driven research, but with a purposeful exploration program, those discoveries
are more likely to be appreciated for what they are, properly documented, and followed-up.
Here is a concrete example. One of the greatest surprises in oceanography in the 20th century was the discovery of the hot-vent
communities, deep-sea oases that thrive in sea water geothermally heated to several hundred degrees centigrade. These animals
form an entire ecosystem completely independent of the sun's energy, and their existence opens up huge new possibilities for how
life might be sustained elsewhere in the universe. This discovery led to a host of new research questions. What is the energy source
for this new style of community? How do proteins fold at such high temperatures? By what reproductive strategy do deep-sea vent
organisms manage to find and colonize new, isolated vent systems as the old ones die? These are important questions, but ones that
we would not know enough to even ask had the discovery not happened. And it almost didn't. The shipboard party involved was
entirely geologists and geophysicists. There wasn't a single biologist on board to appreciate the significance of what was to become
the most important discovery in marine biology. Ever. Lacking basic biological supplies, the geophysicists had to sacrifice all of their
vodka to preserve the novel specimens they collected.
Such discoveries don't need to be rare, accidental, or potentially unappreciated with a strong, vigorous, and systematic ocean
exploration program. I created a graphic (Figure 1) to show how NOAA's OE program might ideally relate to the broader ocean
research agenda and to the NURP program.
The upper box is meant to represent NOAA's Ocean Exploration program. New discoveries are made by exploring
new places, and/or by deploying new tools which “see'' the ocean in new dimensions . With roughly
95 percent of the ocean still unexplored, and new tools that image the physics, chemistry, biology, and geology of the ocean at all
scales being developed constantly, the opportunities for discovery are virtually limitless. The greatest strength of having a federal
organization such as NOAA leading this effort is the fact that it can undertake a systematic, multi-disciplinary exploration of the
ocean. However, if I had to identify NOAA's weakness in terms of being the lead agency for this effort, it is the fact that NOAA is not
widely known for its prowess in developing new technology. For this reason, I support the provision in H.R. 3835 that establishes an
interagency task force which includes NASA and ONR to facilitate the transfer of new exploration technology to the program.
 1nc – no war
Err neg – people overestimate the risk of environmental catastrophe
Wilson in’5 (Molly, PhD in Psych from UVA, and JD from UVA, Fordham Environmental Law Review, “ARTICLE:
A BEHAVIORAL CRITIQUE OF COMMAND-AND-CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION”, 16 Fordham
Envtl. Law Rev. 223, Spring, L/N)

While the Love

Canal is an example of an event that was blown out of proportion , sometimes perfectly
horrific events also give rise to the availability heuristic. An example is a plane crash. In the instance of a plane
crash, the difficulty is not that people exaggerate the seriousness of the original event, but rather that the original event is so salient
that it stays with those who hear of it for a long time. Because
an event like a plane crash is easily brought to
mind, people overestimate the frequency of plane crashes. n84 Like plane crashes, certain very
disturbing environmental catastrophes may loom large in the minds of many, who in turn
overestimate the frequency of these types of environmental calamities. Furthermore, if it is easy to think
of an instance of corporate greed or irresponsibility leading to the contamination of a neighborhood or the death of wildlife, [*243]
individuals may assume that this type of irresponsibility is a common trait of similar corporations. The Exxon Valdez oil spill is
one of the most famous environmental disasters. On March 24, 1989 at 12:04 a.m., the Exxon Valdez oil tanker struck a reef in
Alaska's Prince William Sound. A total of 11,000,000 gallons of oil was spilled. n85 Within two months the oil had been swept along
a 470-mile pathway to the southwest. Initial clean-up of the spill took three years at a cost amounting to billions of dollars. n86 The
effect on wildlife was enormous, with the death toll of wildlife amounting to millions. n87 In large part because of media
coverage following these terrible events, millions of people were shocked by the news when it first occurred and, over time, became
familiar with the details. Unlike Love Canal, there is no question that the Exxon Valdez was a tragedy. Like Love Canal,
however, Exxon Valdez and other large-scale environmental disasters pose problems for those who work for and with large
corporations on pollution control. Because
Exxon Valdez has become an easily retrievable instance of a
large corporation causing a massive amount of damage to the environment, it is likely to have
the same impact on views about corporate polluters as a highly publicized plane crash is to have
on people's perceptions about the danger of air travel. When an event occurs that causes the public to
overestimate the likelihood that corporations will cause harm to the environment , it has the effect of
galvanizing environmental interests and creating increased distrust of industry among members of the public. In a situation where
polarization is already driving opposing interests [*244] further apart, n88 this widespread inflated suspicion can add fuel to the
fire. Public outrage, particularly if it is misplaced, n89 can exacerbate antagonism between industry leaders and watchdog groups
who see to it that the public is informed. n90 Hence, the availability bias may well serve to further frustrate attempts to gain
compliance from big business. n91

Yes War—

1. Rapid social, economic, and technological changes make it extremely likely

Mead, 11/16 – James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American
foreign policy at Yale University (Walter Russell, “The Risk of Nation-State Conflict”, The American Interest, 11/16/14,
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/11/16/the-risk-of-nation-state-conflict/) EK

While it is difficult to see into the future at all and impossible to make detailed predictions, everything we know about history and
human development suggests that the
21st century is unlikely to be a quiet time in international
relations. As the preeminent world power, one with global interests and concerns, the United States is
going to have to navigate the next stage in world history deftly. While our goal is and will remain to avoid
major wars by working with our allies and partners to build economic, political, legal and institutional frameworks for lasting peace
among the world’s peoples, it would be dangerous to underestimate the challenges this strategy will encounter. For the foreseeable
future, the United States must work for peace without neglecting the necessary preparations to be ready if our efforts for peace do
not succeed. A careful examination of the past and the factors that will likely contribute to future
change suggests that while national and international conflicts involving significant states and/or engaging the vital interests
of the United States are not inevitable, the danger of future conflicts is troublingly high . The rapid pace of
economic, technological, and social change around the world puts increasing pressure on
existing states and political structures. That is likely to lead to enhanced tension and
conflict within many states as well as between and among states. The relationship between accelerating
social and economic change on the one hand and growing risks of war is not new. At the outset of the industrial revolution,
European powers began to struggle to keep up with the rapid technological development going on in their societies, and with the
attending social forces. They were not, on the whole, all that successful at avoiding bloodshed and political upheaval in their
responses. At the same time as the industrial revolution was providing Europe with untold wealth and the tools to project power
around the globe, it also began to tear at the political and societal seams of European society. As the industrial revolution swept east
and south from its original base in northwestern Europe, ethnic and religious conflicts developed and ultimately broke up the large
multi-ethnic and multi-religious empires of central and eastern Europe and the Middle East (Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German,
Russian) in a mix of catastrophic war, genocide and ethnic cleansing that lasted from roughly 1880 to 1950. Those conflicts
(including both the Kurdish struggle and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) continue today, but anew wave of sectarian and
ethnic tensions stretching east to west from Pakistan to Algeria, and north to south from Crimea to Kenya is taking shape
today. While it is not inevitable that the tragic history of 19th and 20th century Europe and the Middle East will be repeated in this
zone, the parallels are more than troubling, and wars in Syria and elsewhere underscore the
seriousness of the situation in this explosive region. Well beyond this zone of conflict, rapid demographic
change like that taking place in countries such as China and India can lead and in the past has led to greater internal
tension and conflict even when economies are growing and living standards are rising. Mass
urbanization is a revolutionary process that involves great cultural and social change. In China
alone, urbanization has been a driving force behind the lifting of hundreds of millions of people out of extreme poverty, but
urbanization has lifted them at the same time into a new political consciousness and is creating new sources of tension within China
and, consequentially, in the region around it. History tells us that as
people’s material comfort grows, they do not
tend to stop wanting more. In fact, quite the opposite happens as societies move from pre-modern
to modern conditions; people gain the time, educational background and security to turn their attentions to political and
social desires. At the same time, because state policies matter more to people living in modernizing
economies

2. Global complexities make nuclear war a distinct possibility – prefer high

magnitude impacts in spite of low probability
Brooks, 13 – law professor at Georgetown University, a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation, served as a
counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy from 2009 to 2011 and previously served as a senior advisor at the U.S. State
Department (Rosa, “Apocalypse Soon”, Foreign Policy, 2/21/13,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/21/apocalypse_soon) EK

To this, I say: Looking on the bright side is a fine thing in a kindergarten teacher, but it's unbecoming in those of
us who purportedly deal in the grown-up world. The fact that "we're not dead yet" is neither here
nor there. The fact that you've ridden your motorcycle through the rain without a helmet many times before and you're still alive
doesn't make you any less stupid. As Jared Diamond pointed out recently in a New York Times op-ed, even trees that have
been standing for many years can fall down overnight. One of the many cognitive failings of
human beings is that we tend to think tomorrow will be a lot like today . As a day to day heuristic, this is
actually pretty sensible; if you predict that tomorrow's weather will likely be quite similar to today's weather, you'll be right
most of the time. Except, of course, when you're wrong. In the 1930s and 40s, Europe's Jews
assumed that each day would be much like the previous day, and they were right, by and large -- but a whole
series of days that are only marginally different from the previous day can bring you, with surprising speed, to some terrible places.
Setting cognitive errors aside, wedo not, as a nation or as a species, have much basis for assuming that
things will keep on getting better. For that matter, we have little basis for assuming that things that
are crummy now will get fixed, or even stay only as crummy as they are now (as opposed to
getting a whole lot crummier). To keep things in perspective, the cataclysm of World War II was only 70
years ago. World War I was only a century ago. Why would anyone imagine that such
catastrophes -- still alive in the memories of older Americans -- can't happen again? Do we really think the
human species has evolved somehow in the last few decades? Steven Pinker thinks so: In his 2011 book,
The Better Angels of Our Nature, he argues that human violence is in decline , at least if viewed over the last few
centuries. Whether he's "right" or "wrong," however, his
argument is, for present purposes, largely irrelevant. Even if
humans are somewhat less nasty to one another than they used to be, the complexity of our
world has increased exponentially, and our ability to inadvertently mess the world
up has similarly increased. Take your pick of anthropogenic apocalypse scenarios. You don't like enslavement to
intelligent toasters? Fine. There's always nuclear annihilation, still a distinct possibility . Or deadly
epidemics spread by bio-engineered germs (or naturally occurring germs whose transmission is aided by air travel and so on), or a
meltdown of the global financial system that will make 2008 look like a boom year, or climate change that submerges coastal cities,
or cyberattacks that cause catastrophic infrastructure failure. (Richard Posner, who will certainly be the only law professor to survive
the apocalypse, offers lurid details of these scenarios and many more in his 2005 book, Catastrophe). Ah, you're still scoffing. "Ha,"
you say, "People have been predicting catastrophes for decades -- remember Silent Spring? Acid Rain? Overpopulation? SARS?
Swine flu? Betcha all those doomsday prophets feel silly now!" I bet they do feel silly. I feel silly whenever I contemplate buying more
Black swans may
than a few extra flashlight batteries. But once again, feeling silly doesn't mean you're wrong to worry.
yet appear, and low-probability/high-consequence events may yet happen . But don't
take my word for it. Consider this recent report from Chatham House, which is not known for apocalyptic
hysteria: "Current contingency planning often assumes the return of the status quo ante after a
crisis. But this approach may be inadequate in a world of complex economic and social risks ,
especially when combined with slow-motion crises like climate change and water scarcity. Slow-
motion crises such as these build over many years, but are likely to result in a higher frequency and
greater severity of shocks....We have always had risks to face. Two things seem to have changed today: the
frequency of catastrophes seems to be increasing; and our population remains relatively
unaccustomed to the magnitude and probability of the risks we are currently facing ." Adjusting for
the dryness of British think-tank reports, this is a hysterical cry for help. Even if we think catastrophic events
are extremely unlikely to occur, it makes sense to start thinking about how to
mitigate risks . In the words of philosopher Huw Price, co-founder of the new Centre for the Study
of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge, shouldn't we all be trying to "shift some
probability from the bad side to the good"?

Nuclear war causes mass extinction

Starr 14 (Steven, published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms
Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and Director of
the Clinical Laboratory Science program at University of Missouri and member of Physicians for
Social Responsibility, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner,”
5/30/14, Centre for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-
nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611)
*Environmental Destruction- disrupts climate, destroys the ozone layer, destroys agriculture
create mass famine, produces nuclear firestorms which block sunlight creating over a decade of
ice age
*Electromagnetic Pulse- the pulse from nukes would destroy nuclear power plants, melting all
nuclear reactors, and boils off spent fuel
*1% stockpile- High risk of all of our impacts – the studies predict catastrophic impacts with 1%
of US stockpile
Prefer the Starr evidence- cites peer reviewed studies that were found to be without error

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning

in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologist s (at Rutgers,
UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies
that evaluated
the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought
with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded
that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of
global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies
predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would
result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii] These peer-reviewed
studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error –
also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would
destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to
the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war
between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter.
Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the
International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains
that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and
form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly
encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain
for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B
reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that
would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall
below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer.
No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic
pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic
devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost
instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the
reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe
uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were
introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of
“limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic .[ix] In 2002 the Bush
administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive
nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule
changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the
US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be
under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear
weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles
armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii] Both
the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to
transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top
political leaders and policymakers of both the
US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-
destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the
New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, during
their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were familiar with the
recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the operational and
deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with
their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.”
 1nc – advantage

No impact to Biodiversity --

1. It really doesn’t matter.

Sagoff ’97 - Sr researcher, U Maryland - ’97 (Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in
School of Public Affairs @ U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM
DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE
THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March,
L/N)

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of
massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the
contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need
more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated
systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that " the
argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one."
n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not
affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than
10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 " The
human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided
only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346 [*906] The monumental Global Biodiversity
Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each
species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the
community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is
"unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period
over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that
species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible
overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349 Other biologists
believe, however, that species are so
fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and
processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer
of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every
threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in
the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people
forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point.
"Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment,
the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of
species are, in a sense, carried along." n352 [*907] To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species,
consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the
creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What
crucial
ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species
threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans
depend? If so, which ones are they? Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically,
continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example,
between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant
reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result
of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is
commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of
One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures
the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.
available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the
"library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well
permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In
the United States as in many other parts of the
world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a
result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in
the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct . Indeed, introductions
may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time
largely as a result of human action. n354 [*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in
California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of
mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how
many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life
forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that
there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no
instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native
somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such
as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [*909] with human migration.
Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast
majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of
many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from
native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by,
species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to
come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we
are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem
because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America
today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain
biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance.
n360 Yet as Simon Le vin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be
irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [*910] He added: "For net primary
productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a
certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference ." n362 What about the use of
plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000
types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are
extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the
world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced.
Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even
though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer
demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants
and animals to add to the world's diet.

2. Resilient.
Kennedy 2 — Victor Kennedy, PhD Environmental Science and Dir. Cooperative Oxford Lab (“Coastal and Marine Ecosystems
and Global Climate Change,” Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Available Online:
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/marine_ecosystems.pdf, Accessed: 09/02/2013)
There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems
are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991)
hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors,
allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them
ecologically adaptable . Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their
range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

No impact to overfishing – its exaggerated hype

Baker ‘12 – publisher and editor in chief for the sunbreak (Michael Van, “Is the Overfishing
Crisis Oversold?”, The SunBreak, 6/22/12, http://thesunbreak.com/2012/06/22/is-the-
overfishing-crisis-oversold/)//js

Has “the increasingly energetic and sophisticated fishing industry has left the world’s oceans a
shambles?” asks the New York Times at the outset of its review of Overfishing: What Everyone Needs to Know. As it turns out, that’s
not a particularly great way of framing the question , because you can get pages and pages of learned and contradictory
debate on how the “world’s” fisheries are doing.¶ The pragmatic question is, Can we avoid shambling oceans? And
this book argues: Yes, we can.¶ Now, if you’re not up to even a slim book on overfishing, its author, Dr. Ray Hilborn, got to make some
of its points in an April op-ed in the Times, “Let Us Eat Fish“–originally less imperatively titled “The Unheralded Revival of America’s Fish Stock.” ¶
That unused title is important, because when Hilborn says in his article that “The overall record of American fisheries management since the mid-1990s
is one of improvement, not of decline,” that’s not to give the world’s fisheries a coattail A+ in management. ¶ But
it is to suggest that the
U.S. may have found a way to break out of the vicious circle that leads invariably to collapse. (Nor
is it just the U.S.; in his book, Hilborn references other fisheries that have found “good enough” management methods, while acknowledging there are
plenty of spectacular failures out there.)¶ You could say that Hilborn is “talking back” to the rhetoric of
apocalypse used by environmental groups pushing for closing areas to fishing entirely . Their message
is that everything we have tried has failed, so it’s time for desperate measures. To quote Oceana: “85 percent of the world’s
fisheries are now either overexploited, fully exploited, significantly depleted or recovering from
overexploitation. No matter which category is considered, there is no good news.”¶ But it’s equally important to stress
that there is such a thing as sustainable fishing because an absence of better options hasn’t ,
historically, led to people adopting strict conservation so much as it has resulted in a general shrug as the last whatever is
used up.¶ For Overfishing, Hilborn, who also writes papers with titles like “Bayesian hierarchical meta-analysis of density-dependent body growth in
haddock,” has taken up a more general-interest tone (that may be the gift of his co-writer Ulrike Hilborn). It’s informational, structured for easy
reference, with questions as subheads, beginning with the big one: What is overfishing? ¶ Much
depends upon context. Hilborn’s
concern is not to maintain a “natural” state–whatever that is–but is with “harvesting” and
“yields.” So yield overfishing is when you take more fish than you should if you want to get the
best harvest. It doesn’t mean extinction, though it can, if pursued–but the weakened population simply doesn’t produce as many
fish as it would otherwise.¶ Then there’s economic overfishing, when you overshoot the economic return, and may begin a race to the bottom, with each
participant earning less the more fish they take. Hilborn singles out Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway for their stewardship of the economic
commons, as well as for avoiding yield overfishing.¶ Often, these two modes of overfishing join forces to almost eradicate a fish population. And it’s not
a new concept: Hilborn locates an 1877 reference to “overfishing” in Nature. But this would also be a good moment to point out that fish populations
can fluctuate dramatically, and that is also natural. If you compare year-over-year fish populations, you may see a lot of volatility, but that doesn’t
always have to do with the number of fish taken. What is important is to keep the percentage of fish taken in line
with the actual number of fish out there, which is easier said than done.¶ One important factor in developing a
fishing management strategy, Hilborn notes, is to realize that fish reproduce on different timelines (whales, being
mammals, are particularly vulnerable to overhunting). You can more or less draw up formulas for taking sustainable percentages, based on
reproduction rates and growth rates. The
optimal time to take a fish is after it has reproduced and has reached
its mature size. If you know that, and the number of fish, it’s just math .¶ Unfortunately, there’s an ocean in the
way that makes it a challenge to count fish precisely. And that ocean contains different ecosystems in which fish react differently to different pressures.
Hilborn discusses the collapse of the Newfoundland cod fishery, but also contrasts that with American and European cod fisheries that stabilized at a
lower abundance, and the Barents Sea and Icelandic cod stocks, that never collapsed. ¶ A theme that emerges is successful
fishery management will depend upon what’s known in software circles as localization . You can’t roll
out a one-size-fits-all program due to differences in fish and fisherpeople habitats. What works in the U.S. because of
legislation and infrastructure may not work elsewhere. (Conversely, the perverse economic incentives that exist in the
U.S.–creating a “race for fish,” where each boat tries to hoover up the maximum–may not exist elsewhere.) ¶ Chilean caletas, for instance, use a more
“local-motion” ethos to manage fishery catches–each has been granted the responsibility to exclude others from fishing their patch. With a local group
of stakeholders managing their waters, things have improved without central governmental enforcement. (Though, again, natural variability in fish
abundance makes it difficult–fishing boats will almost always go in search of “missing” fish.) ¶ Hilborn tackles recreational fishing (Is it next to
godliness?), trawling (Is it pure evil?), and marine protected areas (How protective are they?). If this is your first real dive into the topic, you’ll become
intimately acquainted with complex the issues are.¶ In concluding, Hilborn is careful to steer away from Pollyanna prediction; while he’s impressed
with the rebound he’s seen in fisheries with good management, the world is still weighted toward overfishing. If not critically in all cases, certainly in
terms of getting the best yield from the fish populations in whatever abundance there are: “at present about two-thirds of stocks are below the
abundance level that would produce maximum sustainable yield.” ¶ Followers of Eurozone troubles will not be surprised to hear that, with European
fisheries, part of the problem is the many disparate stakeholders whose interests need to be harmonized. ¶ As mentioned, the subject of
overfishing is a subject that engenders lively debate, and Hilborn, while well-know n and -respected, is
not the last word, especially when it comes to how the world’s fisheries are actually being
managed. But if you’ve been staring at your guide to fish that are okay to eat and wondering whether it’s not easier to give up fish entirely, this
book has insights that you do need to know.
The likelihood of unilateral geoengineering is low
Horton 11 – Consultant at DNV KEMA Energy & Sustainability [Joshua B. Horton, “Geoengineering and the Myth of
Unilateralism: Pressures and Prospects for International Cooperation,” Stanford Journal of Law, Science & Policy, May 2011.

First, the relative simplicity and affordability of SAI technology would make it widely ¶ available to members of the international
community.15 Other states or international bodies¶ might inject stratospheric aerosols just as easily as Country B does. The
likelihood of¶ uncoordinated interventions is low, but the possibility is real, and the
effects could be damaging.¶ Indeed, the potential for such deleterious effects helps
explain the low probability of multiple,¶ uncoordinated injections in the first place. The
prospect of such inexpensive, mutually¶ destructive interference would act as a
disincentive to any state contemplating unilateral¶ deployment. Pg. 60