GR No.

218871 - January 11, 2017

Jebsens Maritime Inc, Sea Chefs Ltd. and Enrique M. Aboitiz
versus
Florvin G. Rapiz

FACTS:

Jebsens, on behalf of its foreign principal, Sea Chefs, engaged the services of
respondent to work on board the M/V Mercury as a buffet cook for a period of nine (9)
months. On March 30, 2011, respondent boarded the said vessel. Sometime in September
2011, respondent experienced excruciating pain and swelling on his right wrist/forearm
while lifting a heavy load of meat. A consultation with the ship doctor revealed that
respondent was suffering from severe "Tendovaginitis DeQuevain" which caused his medical
repatriation since it was not possible for him to work without using his right forearm. 

On October 14, 2011, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines and underwent

consultation, medication, and therapy with the company-designated physician, who then
classified his condition as a "Grade 11" disability pursuant to the disability grading
provided for in the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Association-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Dissatisfied, respondent consulted an independent
physician, who classified his condition as a Grade 10 disability. Thereafter, respondent
requested petitioners to pay him total and permanent disability benefits, which the latter
did not heed, thus, constraining the former to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
NCMB.1âwphi1 As the parties failed to amicably settle the case, the parties submitted the
same to the Voluntary Arbitrator for adjudication. Subsequently, the VA found that
respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and to attorney's fees as he
was forced to litigate to protect his rights and interest. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

2. If there is discrepancy between the diagnosis of the company-designated physician

and the independent physician, whose diagnosis should prevail?

RULING:

1. The Court laid down the following guidelines that shall govern seafarers' claims for
permanent and total disability benefits:

A. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the

seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;

B. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of
120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total;

C. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of
120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical
treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment
shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the
company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

D. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the
extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and
total, regardless of any justification.
 Here, records reveal that on October 14, 2011, respondent was medically repatriated
for what was initially diagnosed by the ship doctor as "Tendovaginitis DeQuevain."  As early
as January 24, 2012, or just 102 days from repatriation, the company-designated physician
had already given his final assessment on respondent when he diagnosed the latter and
gave a final disability rating of "Grade 11" pursuant to the disability grading provided in the
2010 POEA-SEC. In view of the final disability rating made by the company-designated
physician classifying respondent's disability as merely permanent and partial- which was
not refuted by the independent physician except that respondent's condition was classified
as a Grade 10 disability - it is plain error to award permanent and total disability benefits to
respondent.

2 As already adverted to, there is a slight discrepancy with the classifications of the
aforesaid physicians, as the former rated respondent's disability as Grade 11, while the
latter's rating was Grade 10. In this regard, the Court rules that the findings of the company-
designated physician should prevail, considering that he examined, diagnosed, and treated
respondent from his repatriation on October 14, 2011 until he was assessed with a Grade 11
disability rating on January 24, 2012; whereas the independent physician only examined
him sparingly on March 13, 2012. In INC Navigation Co. Philippines, Inc. v. Rosales, the Court
held that under these circumstances, the assessment of the company designated physician is
more credible for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and diagnosis,
compared with the assessment of a private physician done in one day on the basis of an
examination or existing medical records. 
 GR No. 207156 - January 16, 2017
Turks Shawarma Company/Gem Zeñarosa
versus
Feliciano Z. Pajaron and Larry A. Carbonilla

FACTS:

Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) and Larry A. Carbonilla (Carbonilla)

in May 2007 as service crew and in April 2007 as head crew, respectively. On April 15, 2010,
Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal
dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium,
service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. Both Complaints were
consolidated.

In a Decision dated December 10, 2010, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the
respondents and held them constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. The Labor
Arbiter found it suspicious for petitioners to file criminal cases against Pajaron and
Carbonilla only after the complaints for illegal dismissal had been filed.

Due to alleged non-availability of counsel, Zeñarosa himself filed a Notice of Appeal

with Memorandum and Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC. Along with this, Zeñarosa
posted a partial cash bond in the amount of ₱15,000.00, maintaining that he cannot afford to
post the full amount of the award since he is a mere backyard micro-entrepreneur. He
begged the NLRC to reduce the bond.

The NLRC denied the motion and ruled that financial difficulties may not be invoked
as a valid ground to reduce bond and it was not even substantiated by proof. Moreover, the
partial bond in the amount of ₱15,000.00 is not reasonable in relation to the award which
totaled to ₱197,936.27. Petitioners' appeal was thus dismissed by the NLRC for non-
perfection.

On April 7, 2011, petitioners, through a new counsel, filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, imploring for a more liberal application of the Rules and prayed that their
appeal be given due course. Along with this motion for reconsideration, petitioners
tendered the sum of ₱207,435.53 representing the deficiency of the appeal bond.

The NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, reiterating that the grounds for
the reduction of the appeal bond are not meritorious and that the partial bond posted is not
reasonable. The NLRC further held that the posting of the remaining balance on April 7,
2011 or three months and eight days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on
December 30, 2010 cannot be allowed, otherwise, it will be tantamount to extending the
period to appeal which is limited only to 10 days from receipt of the assailed Decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner’s appeal should be allowed.

2. What are the requisites for the relaxation of the rules regarding the posting of
superseadeas bond?

RULING:

1. The Court has time and again held that the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks
to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the
right to appeal is lost.

It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there is
legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the
Court should give utmost regard to this intention. The posting of cash or surety bond is
therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with this requirement renders the
decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case, the
monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal and is
further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of
their obligations to the employees.

2. The Court, in special and justified circumstances, has relaxed the requirement of
posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal on technical considerations to
give way to equity and justice. Thus, under Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Revised
Rules of Procedure, the reduction of the appeal bond is allowed, subject to the following
conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2)
a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant.
Compliance with these two conditions will stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal.
 GR No. 205727 - January 18, 2017
Rutcher T. Dagasdas
versus
Grand Placement and General Services Corporation

FACTS:

Grand Placement and General Services Corp. (GPGS) is a licensed recruitment or

placement agency in the Philippines while Saudi Aramco (Aramco) is its counterpart in
Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Industrial & Management Technology Methods Co. Ltd.
(ITM) is the principal of GPGS, a company existing in Saudi Arabia.

In November 2007, GPGS employed Dagasdas as Network Technician. He was to be

deployed in Saudi Arabia under a one-year contract with a monthly salary of Saudi Riyal
(SR) 5,112.00. Before leaving the Philippines, Dagasdas underwent skill training and pre-
departure orientation as Network Technician. Nonetheless, his Job Offer indicated that he
was accepted by Aramco and ITM for the position of "Supt."

Dagasdas contended that although his position under his contract was as a Network
Technician, he actually applied for and was engaged as a Civil Engineer. Purportedly the
position of Network Technician was only for the purpose of securing a visa for Saudi
Arabia because ITM could not support visa application for Civil Engineers.

On February 8, 2008, Dagasdas arrived in Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, he signed with

ITM a new employment contract which stipulated that the latter contracted him as
Superintendent or in any capacity within the scope of his abilities with salary of SR5,112.00
and allowance of SR2,045.00 per month. Under this contract, Dagasdas shall be placed
under a three-month probationary period; and, this new contract shall cancel all contracts
prior to its date from any source.

On February 11, 2008, Dagasdas reported at ITM's worksite.  He was allegedly given
tasks suited for a Mechanical Engineer, which were foreign to the job he applied for and to
his work experience. Seeing that he would not be able to perform well in his work,
Dagasdas raised his concern to his Supervisor in the Mechanical Engineering Department.
Consequently, he was transferred to the Civil Engineering Department and was temporarily
given a position as Civil Construction Engineer, and was issued an identification card good
for one month. On March 9, 2008, he was directed to exit the worksite.

In April 2008, Dagasdas returned to Al-Khobar and stayed at the ITM Office. Later,
ITM gave him a termination notice indicating that his last day of work was on April 30,
2008, and he was dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his contract, which provided that
ITM reserved the right to terminate any employee within the three-month probationary
period without need of any notice to the employee.

Before his repatriation, Dagasdas signed a Statement of Quitclaim with Final

Settlement stating that ITM paid him all the salaries and benefits for his services from
February 11, 2008 to April 30, 2008, and ITM was relieved from all financial obligations due
to Dagasdas.

On June 24, 2008, Dagasdas returned to the Philippines. Thereafter, he filed an illegal

dismissal case against GPGS, ITM, and Aramco.
ISSUES:

1. What laws govern the contracts of OFWs?

2. Whether or not Dagasdas new employment contract was validly executed which
would warrant his termination under its stipulations.

RULING:

1. Security of tenure remains even if employees, particularly the overseas Filipino

workers (OFW), work in a different jurisdiction. Since the employment contracts of OFWs
are perfected in the Philippines, and following the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of
the place where the contract is made), these contracts are governed by our laws, prin1arily
the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations. At the same
time, our laws generally apply even to employment contracts of OFWs as our Constitution
explicitly provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or
overseas. Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad, he or she is entitled to security of
tenure, among other constitutional rights.

2. In this case, prior to his deployment and while still in the Philippines, Dagasdas was
made to sign a POEA-approved contract with GPGS, on behalf of ITM; and, upon arrival in
Saudi Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment contract. Nonetheless, this new
contract, which was used as basis for dismissing Dagasdas, is void.

First, Dagasdas' new contract is in clear

violation of his right to security of tenure.

There is no clear justification for the dismissal of Dagasdas other than the exercise of
ITM's right to terminate him within the probationary period. While our Civil Code
recognizes that parties may stipulate in their contracts such terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, these terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or policy. The above-cited clause is contrary to law because as
discussed, our Constitution guarantees that employees, local or overseas, are entitled to
security of tenure. To allow employers to reserve a right to terminate employees without
cause is violative of this guarantee of security of tenure.

Moreover, even assuming that Dagasdas was still a probationary employee when he
was terminated, his dismissal must still be with a valid cause. As regards a probationary
employee, his or her dismissal may be allowed only if there is just cause or such reason to
conclude that the employee fails to qualify as regular employee pursuant to reasonable
standards made known to the employee at the time of engagement. Here, ITM failed to
prove that it informed Dagasdas of any predetermined standards from which his work will
be gauged. In the contract he signed while still in the Philippines, Dagsadas was employed
as Network Technician; on the other hand, his new contract indicated that he was employed
as Superintendent. However, no job description - or such duties and responsibilities
attached to either position - was adduced in evidence. It thus means that the job for which
Dagasdas was hired was not definite from the beginning.

Indeed, Dagasdas was not sufficiently informed of the work standards for which his
performance will be measured. Even his position based on the job title given him was not
fully explained by his employer. Simply put, ITM failed to show that it set and
communicated work standards for Dagasdas to follow, and on which his efficiency (or the
lack thereof) may be determined.
Second, the new contract was not shown to
have been processed through the POEA.

Under our Labor Code, employers hiring OFWs may only do so through entities
authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. Unless the
employment contract of an OFW is processed through the POEA, the same does not bind
the concerned OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA, certainly the State
has no means of determining the suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers. 

This new contract also breached Dagasdas' original contract as it was entered into
even before the expiration of the original contract approved by the POEA. Therefore, it
cannot supersede the original contract; its terms and conditions, including reserving in
favor of the employer the right to terminate an employee without notice during the
probationary period, are void.

Third, under this new contract, Dagasdas was

not afforded procedural due process when he
was dismissed from work.

As cited above, a valid dismissal requires substantive and procedural due process.
As regards the latter, the employer must give the concerned employee at least two notices
before his or her termnation. Specifically, the employer must inform the employee of the
cause or causes for his or her termination, and thereafter, the employer's decision to dismiss
him. Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must be accorded the opportunity to
be heard.

Here, no prior notice of purported infraction, and such opportunity to explain on any
accusation against him was given to Dagasdas. He was simply given a notice of
termination. In fact, it appears that ITM intended not to comply with the twin notice
requirement. As above-quoted, under the new contract, ITM reserved in its favor the right
to terminate the contract without serving any notice to Dagasdas in specified cases, which
included such situation where the employer decides to dismiss the employee within the
probationary period. Without doubt, ITM violated the due process requirement in
dismissing an employee.

Lastly, while it is shown that Dagasdas

executed a waiver in favor of his employer, the
same does not preclude him from filing this
suit.

Generally, the employee's waiver or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee from
demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from filing an illegal dismissal case.
This is because waiver or quitclaim is looked upon with disfavor, and is frowned upon for
being contrary to public policy. Unless it can be established that the person executing the
waiver voluntarily did so, with full understanding of its contents, and with reasonable and
credible consideration, the same is not a valid and binding undertaking. Moreover, the
burden to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the employer.
In this case, however, neither did GPGS nor its principal, ITM, successfully discharged its
burden. GPGS and/or ITM failed to show that Dagasdas indeed voluntarily waived his
claims against the employer.

Indeed, even if Dagasdas signed a quitclaim, it does not necessarily follow that he
freely and voluntarily agreed to waive all his claims against his employer. Besides, there
was no reasonable consideration stipulated in said quitclaim considering that it only
determined the actual payment due to Dagasdas from February 11, 2008 to April 30, 2008.
Verily, this quitclaim, under the semblance of a final settlement, cannot absolve GPGS nor
ITM from liability arising from the employment contract of Dagasdas.

GR No. 197492 - January 18, 2017

Chateau Royale Sports and Country Club, Inc.
versus
Rachelle G. Balba and Marinel N. Constante

FACTS:

Petitioner hired the respondents as Account Executives on probationary

status. Subsequently, the respondents were promoted to Account Managers effective July 1,
2005. As part of their duties as Account Managers, they were instructed by the Director of
Sales and Marketing to forward all proposals, event orders and contracts for an orderly and
systematic bookings in the operation of the petitioner's business. However, they failed to
comply with the directive. Accordingly, a notice to explain was served on them, to which
they promptly responded. 

On October 4, 2005, the management served notices of administrative hearing on the

respondents. Thereupon, they sent a letter of said date asking for a postponement of the
hearing. Their request was, however, denied by the letter dated October 7, 2005, and at the
same time informed them that the petitioner's Corporate Infractions Committee had found
them to have committed acts of insubordination, and that they were being suspended for
seven days from October 10 to 17, 2005, inclusive.  However, the suspension order was
lifted even before its implementation.

On October 10, 2005, the respondents filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
non-payment of allowances and commissions.  On December 1, 2005, the respondents
amended their complaint to include constructive dismissal as one of their causes of action
based on their information from the Chief Financial Officer of the petitioner on the latter's
plan to transfer them to the Manila Office.  The proposed transfer was prompted by the
shortage of personnel at the Manila Office as a result of the resignation of three account
managers and the director of sales and marketing. Despite attempts to convince them to
accept the transfer to Manila, they declined because their families were living in Nasugbu,
Batangas.

The respondents received the notice of transfer dated December 13, 2005 on

December 28, 2005 directing them to report to work at the Manila Office effective January 9,
2006. They responded by letter addressed to Mr. Rowell David, the Human Resource
Consultant of the petitioner, explaining their reasons for declining the order of transfer.
Consequently, another request for incident report was served on them regarding their
failure to comply with the directive to report at the Manila office. Following respondents'
respective responses, the petitioner sent a notice imposing on them the sanction of written
reprimand for their failure to abide by the order of transfer. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents were constructively dismissed.

RULING:

We have to weigh and consider, on the one hand, that management has a wide
discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the transfer and re-assignment
of employees according to the exigencies of the business;  and, on the other, that the transfer
constitutes constructive dismissal when it is unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the
employee, or involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other
privileges, or when the acts of discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the part of the
employer become unbearable for the employee, forcing him to forego her employment.

The resignations of the account managers and the director of sales and marketing in
the Manila office brought about the immediate need for their replacements with personnel
having commensurate experiences and skills. With the positions held by the resigned sales
personnel being undoubtedly crucial to the operations and business of the petitioner, the
resignations gave rise to an urgent and genuine business necessity that fully warranted the
transfer from the Nasugbu, Batangas office to the main office in Manila of the respondents,
undoubtedly the best suited to perform the tasks assigned to the resigned employees
because of their being themselves account managers who had recently attended seminars
and trainings as such. The transfer could not be validly assailed as a form of constructive
dismissal, for management had the prerogative to determine the place where the employee
is best qualified to serve the interests of the business given the qualifications, training and
performance of the affected employee.

Secondly, although the respondents' transfer to Manila might be potentially

inconvenient for them because it would entail additional expenses on their part aside from
their being forced to be away from their families, it was neither unreasonable nor
oppressive. The petitioner rightly points out that the transfer would be without demotion in
rank, or without diminution of benefits and salaries. Instead, the transfer would open the
way for their eventual career growth, with the corresponding increases in pay. It is noted
that their prompt and repeated opposition to the transfer effectively stalled the possibility of
any agreement between the parties regarding benefits or salary adjustments.

Thirdly, the respondents did not show by substantial evidence that the petitioner
was acting in bad faith or had ill-motive in ordering their transfer.1avvphi1 In contrast, the
urgency and genuine business necessity justifying the transfer negated bad faith on the part
of the petitioner.

Lastly, the respondents, by having voluntarily affixed their signatures on their

respective letters of appointment, acceded to the terms and conditions of employment
incorporated therein. One of the terms and conditions thus incorporated was the
prerogative of management to transfer and re-assign its employees from one job to another
"as it may deem necessary or advisable.
 GR No. 199977 - January 25, 2017
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., Crown Shipmanagement Inc.,
and Victorio Q. Esta
versus
Wilfredo T. De Leon

FACTS:

Respondent Wilfredo T. de Leon worked for petitioner Scanmar Maritime Services,

Inc. (Scanmar) as a seafarer aboard the vessels of its principal, Crown Shipmanagement, Inc.
He was repatriated on September 13, 2005 after completing his nine-month POEA
Contract. Based on the records, he had not contracted any ailment during his 22 years in the
service.

Prior to his next deployment, De Leon reported to Scanmar's office on November 17,
2005 for a pre-employment medical examination. Noticing that respondent dragged his
right leg, the company physician referred him to a neurologist for consultation,
management, and clearance. In the meantime, the status of respondent in his Medical
Examination Certificate was marked "pending." However, Scanmar no longer heard from
De Leon.

Two years later, in December 2007, it received a letter from De Leon asking for
disability benefits amounting to USD60,000. It did not reply to the letter, prompting him to
file a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter (LA) for disability benefits and attorney's fees.

Before the LA, respondent alleged that on his last duty as a Third Mate on
board M/V Thuleland, he began feeling that something was wrong with his body, and that
he experienced lower abdominal pain and saw blood in his stool. He also claimed that after
he disembarked, he underwent a series of medical check-ups with his private doctors,
which revealed that he was suffering from L5-S1 radiculopathy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is entitled to disability benefits.

RULING:

To be entitled to disability benefits, this Court refers to the provisions of the POEA
Contract, as it sets forth the minimum rights of a seafarer and the concomitant obligations
of an employer. Under Section 20 (B) thereof, these are the requirements for compensability:
(1) the seafarer must have submitted to a mandatory post-employment medical examination
within three working days upon return; (2) the injury must have existed during the term of
the seafarer's employment contract; and (3) the injury must be work-related.

De Leon reneged on his obligation to

submit to a post-employment medical
examination within three days from
disembarkation.

It is not disputed that De Leon failed to submit to a post-employment medical

examination by a company-designated physician within three working days from
disembarkation. The three-day rule must be observed by all those claiming disability
benefits, including seafarers who disembarked upon the completion of contract. 

The rationale for the rule is that reporting the illness or injury within three days from
repatriation fairly makes it easier for a physician to determine the cause of the illness or
injury. Ascertaining the real cause of the illness or injury beyond the period may prove
difficult. To ignore the rule might set a precedent with negative repercussions, like opening
floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits, or causing
unfairness to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's
illness because of the passage of time. The employer would then have no protection against
unrelated disability claims.

De Leon did not prove that he had

suffered his injury during the term of
his contract.

Claimants for disability benefits must first discharge the burden of proving, with
substantial evidence, that their ailment was acquired during the term of their contract. They
must show that they experienced health problems while at sea, the circumstances under
which they developed the illness, as well as the symptoms associated with it.

In his Position Paper before the LA, De Leon allegedly felt something wrong with his
body, experienced lower abdominal pain, and saw blood in his stool. To support his claim,
he attached several laboratory reports, as well as the medical certifications, indicating that
he had been injured and was unfit for sea service. These pieces of documentary evidence,
however, bear dates well past the disembarkation of respondent. Hence, none of the
attachments he has adduced prove the symptoms of the radiculopathy he allegedly
experienced during the term of his contract.

In contrast, petitioners submitted a Checklist/Interview Sheet for Disembarked Crew

indicating that De Leon had no medical check-up in foreign ports; did not report any illness
or injury to the master of the vessel or the ship doctor; and did not request a post-medical
examination after disembarkation. Also, based on the records, there is no documentation
that De Leon had bouts of sickness, injury, or illness associated with radiculopathy in his 22
years at sea. Hence, based on the evidence, it cannot be reasonably concluded that
respondent contracted radiculopathy during the term of his contract.

De Leon failed to show a reasonable causal

connection between his ailment and the
work for which he had been contracted.

The second hurdle for seafarers claiming disability benefits is to prove the positive
proposition that there is a reasonable causal connection between their ailment and the work
for which they have been contracted. Logically, the labor courts must determine their actual
work, the nature of their ailment, and other factors that may lead to the conclusion that they
contracted a work-related injury. 

Respondent merely alleged that in his last stint as a Third Mate, he was a
watchstander. His job entailed that he was responsible to the captain for keeping the ship,
its crew, and its cargo safe for eight hours a day. Still, he did not particularize the laborious
conditions of his work that would cause his injury.

The CA mentioned that De Leon was consistently engaged in stressful physical labor
throughout his 22 years of employment. But it did not define these purported stressful
physical activities, nor did it point to any piece of evidence detailing his work.

Not only did claimant fail to portray his actual work; he also failed to describe the
nature, extent, and treatment of his radiculopathy. Drs. Reyes, Luna, Geslani, and Guevara,
who issued medical opinions on his condition, stated that their patient was unfit for sea
service without discussing what caused his injury. Dr. Geslani had an impression that
respondent had a mild central canal stenosis, which should have been further explained to
depict the gravity and permanence of respondent's injury. Dr. Luna prescribed medicines
and physical therapy for two weeks, but no subsequent reports as regards this treatment
plan followed her initial certification. In effect, De Leon failed to show before the labor
tribunals his functions as a seafarer, as well as the nature of his ailment.