De Bogacki vs.

Inserto
Facts:
Private respondent is the registered owner of four lots with a total area of 3,005 sq.
meters over which her mother, the herein petitioner, has a usufructuary right over
a proindiviso one-sixth portion of the said lots. For taking possession of all the lots and
collecting all the rentals therefrom, petitioner was sued in an action for partition and
recovery of rentals and after trial, judgment was rendered ordering her "to get only one-
sixth (1/6) of the rentals and to turn over to her daughter five-sixth (5/6) of all that she had
previously collected from the lots not beyond ten years before" the date of the decision, the
rentals appraised at P50.00 a month. The judgment having become final and executory, it
was enforced against the petitioner's usufructuary right which was levied and sold at public
auction to private respondent since no tangible assets or properties were available to satisfy
the money judgment. Petitioner moved to set aside the execution sale on the ground that
her usufructuary right is exempt from execution. The petitioner claimed that her usufruct
cannot be alienated for family reasons pursuant to Article 321 of the Civil Code. The trial
court denied the motion and directed the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of private
respondent. Hence, the instant recourse for the annulment of the order directing the
issuance of a writ of possession, the levy on execution and the sale at public auction of
petitioner's usufructuary rights and to restrain private respondent from dispossessing her of
said usufruct.
Issue:
Whether or not the usufructuary right of the petitioner cannot be alienated and is exempted
from execution.
Ruling:
NO. Article 321 of the Civil Code, however, cannot be invoked by the petitioner because the
usufructuary rights mentioned in this Article are those enjoyed by parents over the property
of their unemancipated children under their custody, and not those enjoyed by the petitioner
which are those of a widow, constituted on the property of her late husband as her share in
the estate of the latter. The usufructuary rights, same like any other hereditary property and
alienable interest in real property, can be sold upon execution to satisfy a judgment and
upon petitioner's failure to make any redemption within one year after the sale of her
usufructuary rights, the writ of possession was properly issued to complement the writ of
execution.

Notes:
The usufruct herein granted cannot be alienated or transferred to third persons because it
arises from parental authority and is necessary to enable the parents to carry out their
obligations to the incompetents under their authority. But, upon emancipation of the child or
loss of parental authority, as in the case of the private respondent who has already attained
the age of majority, is married, and living independently of the petitioner, the usufruct is
extinguished.
Valisno v. Adriano
G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 398
Grino – Aquino, J.

FACTS: Plaintiff – appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land in
Nueva Ecija which he bought from his sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. Said land is planted
with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco and other vegetables and adjoins the land of Felipe
Adriano, on the bank of the Pampanga River. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the
land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long,
traversing Adriano’s land. Later, Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno
was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57 – hectare land. Thus,
Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of Public Works and
Communications (Bureau – PWC). Bureau – PWC ruled in favour of Valisno. Instead of restoring
the irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. In the
meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense due to his urgent need to
irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno then filed a complaint for damages. However, the
Secretary of Bureau – PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisno’s complaint. It held that
Eladio Adriano’s water rights which had been granted in1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in
1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water rights since then for
a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence, the water
rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves.
Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her father’s estate did
not acquire any water rights with the land purchased. The trial court held that Valisno had no
right to pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed
out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming a right
to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Bureau-PWC and his
decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty days.
The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary
collaterally. Furthermore, there was nothing in Valisno’s evidence to show that the resolution
was not valid. It dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. Valisno’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to the Court of the Appeals who certified the case
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code
should apply to this case.
HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence of the irrigation canal on
Adriano’s land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to
and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a title for the vendee
of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an
apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of
both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement
may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in
case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more persons (Civil Code).

This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided:
Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single point is
divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or more owners,
the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an
easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to any
compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance.

The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights
and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to
Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above-
described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge
500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe
with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such other
improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to Valisno, the water
right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the
property would be unproductive.

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The
fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does
detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the
necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been established, he is entitled to
enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as
Adriano’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the
Pampanga River.

Ronquillo, et. al. v. Roco, et. al.

G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 84
Montemayor, J.

FACTS: Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a
road which traversed the land of the defendants, Rocos, in going to Igualdad Street and the
market place of Naga City for more than 20 years and that the Rocos have long recognized and
respected the private legal easement of a right of way of said plaintiffs.

On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a number of men maliciously obstructed plaintiff’s
right of way by constructing a chapel in the middle of the said road and then later, by means of
force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with
barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way thereby preventing the plaintiff from
using it.

The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the land thru
prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land as passage
way. However, plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed by the CFI.

ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription.

HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired thru
prescription because though it may be apparent, it is nevertheless discontinuous or
intermittent, and therefore, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, can be acquired only by a
virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right of way cannot be acquired by prescription because
prescription requires that the possession be continuous and uninterrupted.

Tañedo v. Bernad
G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 86
Padilla, J.

FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On the said
two lots, a septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots.
Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Tañedo and the other Lot 7501-B was also
mortgaged to Tañedo as a security for the payment of loan with an agreement that Cardenas
would only sell Lot 7501-B to him. However, said Lot 7501-B was sold to herein respondent
Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the said sale, Tañedo offered to redeem the
property from Sim but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the
building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked
Tañedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. Tañedo was then
constrained to file an action for legal redemption and damages invoking Article 1622 of the Civil
Code. On the other hand, respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot
7501-B and that Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil
Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Tañedo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot
7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners
who do not have the same interest.

HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no statement abolishing or
extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to
Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by
the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the
septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim
the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever,
the use of the servitude.

Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333
Sarmiento, J.

FACTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu
City, on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other
hand, are the owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began the construction of
its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from their respective properties and
the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In
1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of
its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which the private
respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it
undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its
property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents
from traversing any part of it. Therefore, an action for injunction with damages was filed
against the petitioner by the private respondents before the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu.

The CFI rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents had
acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its
continued use and enjoyment by the private respondents and also by the community at large.
On appeal, Appellate Court held as without basis the trial court's finding that the private
respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of
prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of right of way is a
discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by
virtue of a title and not by prescription. That notwithstanding, the appellate court went on to
rule that ". . . in the interest of justice and in the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction,
there is no reason for Us in not treating the easement here sought by appellees Katipunan
Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as one that is not dependent upon the claims of the
parties but a compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of the dominant estate
from the owner of the servient estate."

ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be granted to private respondent over the land of
Costabella.

HELD: No. It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is
discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the
appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making
the correct pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the
trial court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement had
been validly constituted over the petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to
commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement
which the private respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand from the
petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate.

Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of the dominant estate may validly
claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to
wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was
not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. In the case at bar, there is absent any showing that the
private respondents had established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law.

Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 74
Fernan, C.J.

FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by the servient estate owned by
respondents and an estate owned by Magsino, all of which are located in Talisay, Batangas. The
servient estate is bound on the north by the national highway. To provide access to the
highway, a one meter road path was paved through in which half of its width was taken from
the estate of Magsino and the other half from the estate of the respondent. Petitioner started a
nursery plant type of business in which pushcarts were used to haul the plants from his estate
to and from his nursery and the highway, using the one meter road path. As his business grew,
he bought a jeepney to enable him to transport more plants and soil catering to the now bigger
demand. The problem however was that the jeepney cannot pass through the road path since
its width would not be accommodated by a one meter width. Petitioner made a request upon
the respondent to sell to him 1 ½ meters of their property so that the pathway may be widened
to enable his jeepney to pass through. The respondents refused. Petitioner went to court
praying that he would be granted the additional land to the right of way already constituted but
the trial court rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner because there was no such
necessity as it was shown that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80 meters away
from the property of the petitioner which he may use as an alternative route. The CA affirmed
said decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his prayer to buy the additional land
to increase the existing one meter road path.

HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river bed, upon thorough investigation, it was
found to be an inadequate right of way because a concrete bridge traverses it thereby the jeep
would have to jump over said bridge which has a height of 5 meters in order to reach the
highway. It was also found that during the rainy season, the same was impassable as it became
flooded. This right of way could not provide adequate access to the highway thereby when an
estate has no access to a public road, it may demand for a right of way. Furthermore, under
Article 651 of the Civil Code, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately
determine the width of the right of way. In this case, since the business of the petitioner grew
larger and pushcarts became tedious to transport his nursery plants, it became necessary for
him to do so with a jeepney. And in order to efficiently make such transportation of his plants,
the right of way had to be widened to accommodate the width of the jeepney of the petitioner.
The petitioner thus shall be granted the additional land to the existing right of way .
Case v. Heirs of Tuason
G.R. No. L-5044, December 1, 1909, 14 Phil. 521
Torres, J.

FACTS: The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibañez alleged that the
parties whom he represents are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the
petitioner Edwin Case on the southwest. The latter, extended his southwest boundary line to a
portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and Santibañez. They alleged that the true dividing
line between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is a belonging to the
respondents, and that about two years ago, when Case made alterations in the buildings
erected on his land, he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the wall is the property of the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez.

HELD: The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez for the
reason, among others, that in the public document by which one of their original ancestors
acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now possessed by them, it appears that
property was then already inclosed by a stone wall.
The wall supports only the property of the respondents and not that of the petitioner, can not
be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length would belong to the adjoining building
owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to sustain such claim, and besides, the building
erected thereon disproves the pretension of the petitioner.
Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a
title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls adjoining
buildings up to the common point of elevation.
The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in the said article
of the code, and is that of juris tantum unless the contrary appear from the title of ownership of
the adjoining properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the
property owners, or where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a
presumption against the party wall.
It can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that it was not
exclusively owned by the respondents, inasmuch as the latter have proven by means of a good
title that has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their ancestors and
principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which the building
was erected; it must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property the wall by
which the land was inclosed was necessarily included.

Choco v. Santamaria
G.R. No. 6076, December 29, 1911, 21 Phil. 132
Mapa, J.

FACTS: The defendant in the building of his house, has made several openings and windows in
the walls of the house on both sides overlooking then property of the plaintiff; that at the time
the defendant was building his house, and the windows and the openings were being made, the
plaintiffs protested, and later on and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the
defendant, and the defendant received the written protest and referred it to his counsel, who,
from the evidence, appears to have suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter, but
the adjustment was not made, and this action was brought. The Trial Court rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs, Severina and Flora Choco, and against the defendant, Isidro
Santamaria, forever prohibiting the opening of the window stated, which must be closed, and
forever prohibiting the opening of the windows and openings marked, which must be closed or
made to conform to the requirements of law with regard to dimensions and an iron grate
embedded in the wall, with the costs of the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred by not ordering in his judgment the final and
perpetual closing of the large window opened in the balcony of the back part of the appellee's
house and that, though the appellant's lot can be seen through the window, it is not contiguous
to the latter's property.

HELD: To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the boundary line between the said
lot and that the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that belongs
to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's witness who
took the said photographs, in so far as he said that "a part of the window in question is in front
of the plaintiffs' property, since between it and the plaintiffs' property there does not intervene
the distance required by law — that of two meters in the first case, and 60 centimeters in the
second, therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil
Code which reads as follows: “Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings
projecting over the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made if there is not a distance of, at least,
2 meters between the wall in which they are built and said estate. Neither can side nor oblique
views be opened over said property, unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters.” Because of
the lack of the distance required by law, the window in question must be closed, and
consequently the judgment appealed from should be modified in this sense, as regards this
window.

Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 90596, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 748
Sarmiento, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Solid Manila Corporation is the owner of the land in Ermita, Manila. The same
lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent Bio Hong
Trading Co., Inc. The private respondent’s title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of
sale, the parties thereto reserved as easement of way. As a consequence, there is an
annotation which was entered wherein a construction of private alley has been undertaken.
However, the petitioner averred that they and their neighbors have been using the private alley
and maintained and contributed to its upkeep until sometime in 1983. Due to this, the private
respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered used. The petitioner
commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent to have the gates removed and
to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo issued ex parte an order directing the
private respondent to open the gates. However, the Court of Appeals ordered the restoration
of the annotation. They ruled that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it
does not impair the private respondent’s title, and that since the private respondent had
acquired title to the property, “merger” brought about an extinguishment of the easement. The
petitioner then averred that the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent
and the previous owner of the property “excluded” the alley in question, and that in any event,
the intent of the parties was to retain the “alley” as an easement, notwithstanding the sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: No. The Court held that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in
favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger
then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here,
however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in
favor of a particular tenement but rather, for the benefit of the general public as stated in
Article 614 of the Civil Code. In personal servitude, there is therefore no “owner of a dominant
tenement” to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in
this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-
dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no
use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public, if that is possible, no genuine
merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.

Floro v. Llenado
G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713
Romeo, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park Subdivision who has its own egress
and ingress to and from the Mac Arthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level
crossing. On the other hand, Respondent Orlando Llenado, is the registered owner of Llenado
Homes Subdivision, adjacent to Floro Park Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado, the
land was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered housing
subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide
Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands
belonging to Marcial Ipapo. the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or passage to
the Mac Arthur Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of
Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision which was duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission. Meanwhile, the Llenados sought, and were granted permission by the Floros to
use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as passageway to and from MacArthur
Highway. However no contract of easement of right of way was ever perfected by both parties.
Later, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby
preventing its use by the Llenados. Llenado instituted a complaint before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan against Floro for easement of right of way. The RTC granted the prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered Floro to open the road and pay
damages. Thereafter, the trial court rendered another judgment dismissing the case and lifting
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued and ordered the plaintiff to pay
defendant damages and costs. On appeal by Llenado on the CA, the judgment of the RTC was
reversed ordering Floro to open roads 4 and 5 and remove all the objects that prevent passage
on road 5 and to pay the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of indemnity for the
easement of right of way.
ISSUE: Whether or not Llenado is entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way.
HELD: No. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the
Civil Code, the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established.
These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and
has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) after payment of proper
indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).

The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of
way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. On the past subdivision plans by Emmanuel
Homes which is bought by Llenado, there is an indication of an access road through IPAPO’s
property although it was not properly paved, a dirt road will suffice. Seeing this, Llenado has
failed to comply with the first requirement. If the servitude requested by Llenado is allowed,
other subdivision developers/owners would be encouraged to hastily prepare a subdivision
plan with fictitious provisions for access roads merely for registration purposes. Furthermore, if
such practice were tolerated, the very purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 957 was
enacted, that is, to protect subdivision buyers from unscrupulous subdivision
owners/developers who renege on their duties to develop their subdivisions in accordance with
the duly approved subdivision plans, would be defeated.

In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a
fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of a
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same should not be
imposed.

The complaint for easement of right of way filed by Llenado in the lower court did not contain a
prayer for the fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the easement of
right of way is constituted. Thus, the existence of the second requisite has likewise not been
established. Private respondent Llenado admitted that the Ipapo riceland was no longer being
cultivated. Indications are that it has already been abandoned as a ricefield. There was no
reason for private respondent's failure to develop the right of way except the inconvenience
and expenses it would cost him. Hence, the third requisite has not been met. Failing to establish
the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, private
respondent Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of
the Floro Park Subdivision must fail.

Quimen v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996, 257 SCRA 163
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and
sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide
the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero,
Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia
and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter
divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is
behind the property of Sotero, father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda
purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was
then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the
property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia
prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on
her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as
her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda
finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In
fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. Later, Yolanda
purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the
property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the lot of
Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made
of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide
and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate
for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store
itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of
the store to reach the road. Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a
right of way through Anastacia's property. The report was that the proposed right of way was at
the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of
Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left
for about five (5) meters to avoid the store. However, the trial court dismissed her complaint.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on
petitioner’s property and that the way proposed by Yoland would cause the least damage and
detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to
the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing
thereon.

HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a)
the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was
not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may
ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures
obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of
obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the
easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate,
the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However,
as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way
which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to
a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado
tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

De Jesus, et. al. v. Homart Corporation, et. al.

G.R. No. 44191 – R, August 28, 1974, 19 CA Rep. 831
FACTS: Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners of the building located in Tondo, Manila.
They brought an action for damages against Homart Corporation and Howmill Manufacturing
Corporation, owners of the land adjoining the plaintiff on the same street where a sixty storey
concrete building was constructed. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to observe the
necessary care and precautions to protect the construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support, thereby causing it to sink in some parts; its walls,
ceilings, and floorings to crack in some places; and by the careless manner of handling the
cement used the roofing’s of the building of the plaintiff were damaged with the accumulated
debris piled thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not proper precautions had been taken by the defendants in constructing
the building in question so as to prevent causing damage to the building of the plaintiff.

HELD: No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides “No property shall make such excavations
upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building sufficient lateral or subjacent
support”. A reading of Article 684 shows that the duty of an adjacent owner not to deprive
any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It
does not depend on the degree of care and precaution made by the proprietor in making the
excavation or building on his land. Plaintiffs’ house which adjoins the seven storey concrete
building constructed by the defendants had sunk by about eight inches. The sinking of the left
side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of subjacent support and to the
weight of the seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendant, as the excavation
made necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of the plaintiff’s land. Defendants having failed to
provide the plaintiff’s land and house with sufficient lateral and subjacent support are liable for
damages.

La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 95252, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 498
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: The Tuasons owned a vast tract of land in Quezon City and Marikina, and when they
sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings, it was expressly provided
in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line between the property sold and the
adjoining property of the Tuasons shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which
shall be taken from the property sold to the Philippine Building Corporation and the other half
from the portion adjoining belonging to the Tuasons. Philippine Building Corporation then sold
and assigned with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to ATENEO which
assumed the mortgage and the obligation in the seven and one-half roadway.

On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to
Philippine Building Corporation into a residential village known as LA VISTA Subdivision. Thus
the boundary between LA VISTA and the portion sold to ATENEO was the 15-meter wide
roadway known as the Mangyan Road. The Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-
meter wide boundary, while ATENEO deferred improvement on its share and erected instead
an adobe wall on the entire length of the boundary.

ATENEO subsequently sold to Solid Homes Inc. the land which the latter developed into a
subdivision now known as LOYOLA Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. now claims to have an
easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which they could have access to
Katipunan Avenue.

LA VISTA however instructed its security guards to prohibit agents and assignees of Solid
Homes, Inc., from traversing Mangyan Road, and even constructed concrete posts that
prevented the residents of LOYOLA from passing through.

Solid Homes, Inc., filed a case before the Regional Trial Court and prayed that LA VISTA been
joined from preventing and obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA residents through
Mangyan Road. The lower court recognized the easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road
in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and ordered LA VISTA to pay damages. On appeal by LA VISTA, the
decision of the lower court was affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.

HELD: Yes. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the
Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. A voluntary easement is quite evidently
manifested in the stipulation in the Deed of Sale with mortgage executed by them. When the
easement was established by their contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions for its
observance by all whom in the future might succeed them in dominion. It is thus very
apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and
servient estates.

With this, the free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement
between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New
Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same.
LA VISTA contends that there are other routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road, however, this
should not be taken into consideration since the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway
can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case
at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity
does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the
necessity.

Alcantara v. Reta, Jr.

G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 364
Pardo, J.

FACTS: Alcantara and the other petitioners claim that they were tenants or lessees of the land
owned by Reta. The land has been converted into a commercial center and Reta is threatening
to eject them. They claim that since they are legitimate tenants or lessees of such land, they
have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of
Presidential Decree No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act. They also claimed that the amicable
settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab
initio for being violative of PD No. 1517. On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is
question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not proclaimed as an Urban Land
Reform Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara, among others, then filed complaint for the exercise of the right
of first refusal under PD No. 1517 in the Regional Trial Court. However, such complaint was
dismissed and such dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was
filed.

ISSUE: Whether the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the right of first refusal.

HELD: No. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In
fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that said land
be declared as an ULRZ. Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not
be necessary if the property was an ULRZ. PD No. 1517 pertains to areas proclaimed as ULRZ.
Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved is
not an ULRZ.

To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must
be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home
on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Those who
do not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore,
not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land
decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time.

Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and Roble. Alcantara, on the other
hand, failed to present evidence of a lease agreement other than his testimony in court. Reta
allowed Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba. This
arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Roble was also allowed to
construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be
in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable
settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was one
of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by PD No. 1517.

With regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with them.
This notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate tenants who can exercise the right of first
refusal under PD No. 1517. From the moment Reta demanded that the petitioners vacate the
premises, the verbal lease agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid
monthly, ceased to exist as there was termination of the lease.

In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under PD
No. 1517.

There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the
petitioners had the right of first refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of that
right, that is, the sale or intended sale of the land has not happened. PD No. 1517 applies
where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.

Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114170, January 15, 1999, 301 SCRA 52
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. (MFI) and petitioner Prosperity Credit
Resources, Inc. (PCRI) executed a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) wherein PCRI acceded
to MFI’s request to redeem three of the seven lots foreclosed and won by the former in the
ensuing public auction. The MOA was conditioned upon the agreement that the petitioner shall
be given a right of way on the existing private road which forms part of the area to be
redeemed by private respondents. Later, PCRI filed an injunctive suit against MFI alleging, inter
alia, that the latter, in violation of the terms of the MOU, refused to allow PCRI to make
excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of water. The trial court granted
the petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On appeal, the CA
set aside the assailed order of the trial court; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. PCRI
contends that it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as
may be gleaned from the following provision in the MOU: The above cited lot, being an existing
private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of
PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors=in-interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering private respondent to allow petitioner to undertake
excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing water pipes.

Held: Yes. There is no question as to the meaning of the terms “ingress” and “egress”. They give
petitioner the right to use the private road as means of entry into and exit from its property on
the northwestern side o f the compound. The question concerns the meaning of the phrase “for
whatever kind of passage”. The trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the
right to make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network of pipes.
The word “passage” does not, however; “clearly and unmistakably” convey a meaning that
includes a right to install water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as
defined in Webster’s Dictionary, is that act or action of passing: movement or transference
from one place or point to another.” this legal meaning is not different. It means, according to
Black’s Law Dictionary, the act of passing; transit; transition.

Villanueva v. Velasco
G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 99
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it
from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. When petitioner bought the
parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the
two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas,
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was
also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8,
1991 for easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the
contract of easement. On August 13, 1991, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
issued, ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house
encroaching on the easement. On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco issued an Alias Writ of
Demolition. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of
Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he
was not a party to the civil case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner.

HELD: Yes. Unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a servitude like a right of way
can exist even if they are not expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens
title because servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively
belong. Moreover, Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to
exist unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is
removed before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Article 649 in accordance
with Article 617 of the Civil Code.

National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114348, September 20, 2000, 340 SCRA 661
Pardo, J.
FACTS: A free patent over 3 hectares of land in Cagayan was issued and registered in the name
of private respondent Dick Manglapus’ predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manglapus. The land
was granted to the latter subject to the provisions of sections 113, 121, 122 and 124 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provide that except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units, or institutions, the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be
subject to encumbrance for a period of 5 years from the date of this patent and shall not be
liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of that period.
Subsequently, private respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by
absolute sale and was later registered 11 years later from the issuance of patent. Meanwhile,
petitioner National Irrigation Administration entered into a contract with Villamar Development
Construction. Under the contract, petitioner NIA was to construct canals in Cagayan. NIA then
entered a portion of petitioner’s land and made diggings and fillings thereon. Private
respondent then filed a complaint for damages alleging that petitioner’s diggings and fillings
destroyed the agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable compensation was paid for its
taking.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the
taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way.

HELD: No. We find that NIA is under no obligation. We sustain the appeal. We agree with NIA
that the Transfer Certificate of Title and the Original Certificate of Title covering the subject
parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government a right of way over the land
covered therein.

Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition that the land is
subject to “to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by
law, especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended.” This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant,
was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition. Section 112,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent, “shall further be subject to
a right of way not exceeding twenty meters in width for public highways, railrods, irrigation,
ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works as the Government or
any public or quasi-public service or enterprises, including mining or forest concessionaires may
reasonably require for carrying on their business, with damages for the improvements only.

Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that “Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.” In the
present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the
government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free
patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which
case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an
easement of a right of way.

Case Digest: Alolina vs. Flores G.R. No. 198774 I April 04, 2016

FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially
constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the
structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are
terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the
ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.

In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their
house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear
perimeter wall of Alolino's house. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away
from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents'
construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and
prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.

Respondents on their part argued that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their
house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that
plaintiff only has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to the very boundary of
his lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their
house facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it
has no window.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view; and (2) whether or not
Alolino has acquired an easement of right of way.

DECISION:
Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the
respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal easements
of right of way. None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with respect to the
barrio road where the respondents' house stands on.

On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription
counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the
adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate.
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the
respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement
of light and view through prescription.

MARGARITA F. CASTRO vs. NAPOLEON A. MONSOD

G.R. No. 183719               February 2, 2011
FACTS
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes,
Pamplona, Las Piñas City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36071.
Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner,
located on Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase 2, Las Piñas City. There is a concrete fence,
more or less two (2) meters high, dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.
Respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the
property of petitioner covered by TCT No. T-36071. The adverse claim was filed without any
claim of ownership over the property. Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal
easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the
property from collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated plateau of fifteen (15)
feet, more or less, above the level of petitioner’s property.
ISSUE
Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support that exists on the subject adjacent
properties may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate.
RULING
No, because an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer
necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A
judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same,
including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to
court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be
recognized and respected.

Reyes vs. Valentin

Facts:
On March 28, 2006, petitioner Reyes, through Dolores Cinco, filed a Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for easement of right of way against respondents,
Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos.
Petitioner alleged that respondents' 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property,
and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. A 113-square-meter
portion of respondents' property was also the "point least prejudicial to the
[respondents]." The easement sought was the vacant portion near the boundary of
respondents' other lot. Despite demands and willingness to pay the amount, respondents
refused to accede to petitioner's claims. |
The trial court found that petitioner's proposed right of way was not the least onerous to the
servient estate of respondents.  It noted that the proposed right of way would pass through
improvements, such as respondents' garage, garden, and grotto.  The trial court also noted the
existence of an irrigation canal that limited access to the public road. However, the trial court
pointed out that "[o]ther than the existing irrigation canal, no permanent
improvements/structures can be seen standing on the subject rice land." Moreover, the nearby
landowner was able to construct a bridge to connect a property to the public road.  Hence,
"[t]he way through the irrigation canal would . . . appear to be the shortest and easiest way to
reach the barangay road."| The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner's appeal and
affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court's Decision.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over respondents' property
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner failed to satisfy the Civil Code requirements for the grant of easement rights.
Based on these provisions, the following requisites need to be established before a person
becomes entitled to demand the compulsory easement of right of way: 
1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is
without adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
There is an adequate exit to a public highway. Access to the public highway can be satisfied
without imposing an easement on respondents' property. Based on the Ocular Inspection
Report, petitioner's property had another outlet to the highway. In between her property and
the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be traversed by constructing a
bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties. There is, therefore, no
need to utilize respondents' property to serve petitioner's needs. Another adequate exit exists.
Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads.
Petitioner also failed to satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient
estate."
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an
easement of right of way, the requirement of "least prejudic[e] to the servient estate"
trumps "distance [between] the dominant estate [and the] public highway." "Distance" is
considered only insofar as it is consistent to the requirement of "least prejudice."
This court had already affirmed the preferred status of the requirement of "least
prejudice" over distance of the dominant estate to the public highway. Thus, in Quimen, this
court granted the longer right of way over therein respondent's property because the
shorter route required that a structure of strong materials needed to be demolished. 
Petitioner would have permanent structures — such as the garage, garden, and
grotto already installed on respondent's property — destroyed to accommodate her
preferred location for the right of way.
The cost of having to destroy these structures, coupled with the fact that there is an
available outlet that can be utilized for the right of way, negates a claim that respondents'
property is the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Notes: An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted
to another person, the rights of the property's owner are limited.  An owner may not exercise
some of his or her property rights for the benefit of the person who was granted the easement
of right of way. Hence, the burden of proof to show the existence of the above conditions is
imposed on the person who seeks the easement of right of way. 

Calimoso vs. Roullo

FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for easement of right of way in which damage would be done to
the estate of the petitioners claiming that the route was the shortest and most convenient
access to the nearest public road.

Petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement stating that it would cause
substantial damage and there are alternatives.

The RTC granted respondent’s complaint. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the requirements of a valid right of way demand is present.

RULING: NO.

“To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites should be met:

1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
4. The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.”

“The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the dominant estate, and
the property subject to the easement is called the servient estate. Here, the respondent’s lot is
the dominant estate and the petitioners’ lot is the servient estate.”

“Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where the distance to
the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If these
two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have
held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance
criterion.”

“In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners’ lot would cause the
destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners’ property. Although this right-of-
way has the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the
destruction pointed out, and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any
damage, albeit longer, is available.”

“We have held that ‘mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law
as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement’; that ‘a longer way may be adopted to avoid
injury to the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be
avoided by a round-about way.’”

Andres vs. Sta. Lucia

Republic vs. Santos III
REPUBLIC VS SANTOS (G.R. NO. 160453 NOVEMBER 12, 2012)
Republic of the Philippines vs Santos
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
Facts: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the
property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and
was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan
amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because
of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.
Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.
Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the
banks of rivers.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the
water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was
the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the
current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence,
respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined
the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical
language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership.
Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public
dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that
provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not
need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that
instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian
owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest
has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through
accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents
predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to
acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more
than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by
prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already
declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still
belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is
indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public
land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that
are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging
to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the
adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying
their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by
acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable
and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through
prescription.
HI-LON MANUFACTURING v. COA, GR No. 210669, 2017-08-01
Facts:
the government,... through the
DPWH), converted to a road right-of-way (RROW)... parcel of land (subject property)... for
the Manila South Expressway Extension Project. The subject property was registered in the
name of Commercial and Industrial Real Estate Corporation (CIREC) under Transfer
Certificate of Title
(PPIC) acquired the subject property, which led to the cancellation... n of TCT... and the
issuance of TCT... under its name.
PPIC then mortgaged the subject property with the
(DBP), a government financing institution,... , which later acquired the property in a
foreclosure proceeding... was issued in favor of DBP.
portion of the property as RROW, the government neither annotated its claim or lien on the
titles of CIREC, PPIC and DBP nor initiated expropriation proceedings, much less paid just
compensation to the registered owners.
Administrative Order No. 14... entitled "Approving the Identification of and Transfer to the
National Government of Certain Assets and Liabilities of the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Bank," the DBP submitted all its acquired assets,
including the subject property, to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for disposal, pursuant
to Proclamation No. 50
APT disposed of a portion of the subject property in a public bidding
The Abstract of Bids... indicated that Fibertex... submitted a P154,000,000.00 bid for the
asset formerly belonging to PPIC located in Calamba, Laguna, i.e., "Land (5.9 hectares)
TCT 4099, buildings & improvements, whole mill,"
APT certified that Fibertex was the highest bidder of PPIC and Texfiber assets for
P370,000,000.00, and recommended to the Committee on Privatization to award said
assets to Fibertex... ibertex allegedly requested APT to exclude separate deeds of sale for
the parcel of land and for improvements... nder the subject property covered... in the name
of DBP.
Upon complete submission of the required documents and proof of tax payments... the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, cancelled DBP's TCT... in the name of TGPI,
covering the entire... including the
RROW.
TGPI had paid real property taxes for the entire... property,... TGPI executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of HI-LON over the entire... subject property
HI-LON, requested assistance from the Urban Road Project Office (URPO) DPWH for
payment of just compensation... a Deed of Sale was executed between HI-LON and the
Republic of the Philippines,... The auditor pointed out that the just compensation should be
based on the value of said property at the time of its actual taking in 1978.
Project Director (URPO-PMO) for the lifting
HI-LON filed a petition for review before the COA.
the COA denied for lack of merit HI-LON's petition for review... that HI-LON or its
predecessor-in-interest TGPI does not own the RROW in question, as it has been the
property of the Republic of the Philippines since its acquisition by the DBP up to the
present, the COA concluded that the proper valuation of the claim for just compensation is
irrelevant as HI-LON is not entitled thereto in the first place.
this Petition for Certiorari, HI-LON argues that... he OSG agrees with the COA that HI-LON
is not entitled to payment of just compensation because the 29,690 sq. m. portion used as
RROW is already owned by the Republic since 1987 when DBP transferred the entire
89,070 sq. m. subject property to APT, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14.
Issues:
issue of whether or not HI-LON is entitled to just compensation
Ruling:
Concededly, the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property is not just an ordinary asset,
but is being used as a RROW for the Manila South Expressway Extension Project, a road
devoted for a public use since it was taken in 1978. Under the Philippine Highway Act of
1953, "right-of-way" is defined as the land secured and reserved to the public for highway
purposes, whereas "highway" includes rights-of-way, bridges, ferries, drainage structures,
signs, guard rails, and protective structures in connection with highways.[17] Article 420 of
the New Civil Code considers as property of public dominion those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the state, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character.Being of similar character as roads for public
use, a road right-of-way (RROW) can be considered as a property of public dominion, which
is outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a
contract,[18] except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other
incidental matters. However, this RROW must be differentiated from the concept of
easement of right of way under Article 649[19] of the same Code, which merely gives the
holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the property but grants no title thereto,[20]
inasmuch as the owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the
exercise of the easement.[21]
Spouses Garcia vs. Santos
Facts:
The instant case stems from a Complaint for "[easements of light, air and view,
lateral support, and intermediate distances and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction and/or issuance of temporary restraining order]" (Complaint) filed on February
18, 2009 by the Sps. Garcia against the respondents Spouses Loreta and Winston Santos
(the Sps. Santos) and respondent Conchita Tan (Tan) before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 31 (RTC). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-30023.
As alleged in the Complaint, the Sps. Garcia are the registered owners of Lot 2, Blk.
1, San Jose Street, Southville Subdivision, Molo, Iloilo City (subject property), covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-130666. 
The subject property, which has been occupied by the Sps. Garcia for about eleven
(11) years, has a one-storey residential house erected thereon and was purchased by them
from the Sps. Santos in October 1998. At the time of the purchase of the subject property
from the Sps. Santos, the one-storey house was already constructed. Also, at the time of the
acquisition of the subject property, the adjoining lot, Lot 1, which is owned by the Sps.
Santos, was an idle land without any improvements. Lot 1 is covered by TCT No. T-
114137, registered under the name of the Sps. Santos. Lot 1 remained empty until the Sps.
Santos started the construction of a two-storey residential house therein on January 24,
2009. Upon inquiry from the construction workers, Tedy was erroneously informed that Tan
was the new owner of Lot 1.
As further alleged in the Complaint, the building constructed on Lot 1 is taller than
the Sps. Garcia's one-storey residential house. As such, the Sps. Santos' building allegedly
obstructed the Sps. Garcia's right to light, air, and view. The Sps. Garcia bemoaned how,
prior to the construction on Lot 1, they received enough bright and natural light from their
windows. The construction allegedly rendered the Sps. Garcia's house dark such that they
are unable to do their normal undertakings in the bedroom, living room and other areas of
the house without switching on their lights. The Sps. Garcia likewise alleged that the said
structure constructed on Lot 1 is at a distance of less than three meters away from the
boundary line, in alleged violation of their easement. Furthermore, the Sps. Santos allegedly
made excavations on Lot 1 without providing sufficient lateral support to the concrete
perimeter fence of the Sps. Garcia. CAIHTE
Hence, in their Complaint, aside from asking for damages, the Sps. Garcia prayed
that: the RTC declare them as having acquired the easement of light, air, and view against
Lot 1; the respondents be prohibited from constructing any structure on Lot 1 taller than
the Sps. Garcia's one-storey residential house; the respondents be prohibited from building
any structure on Lot 1 at a distance of less than three meters from the boundary line; and
the respondents be prohibited from making excavations on Lot 1 that deprive sufficient
lateral support to the fence located on the subject property.
Issue: Whether the Sps. Garcia have acquired an easement of light and view with respect to
Lot 1 owned by the Sps. Santos.
Ruling: YES. Subsequently, one estate or a portion of the estate is alienated in favor of
another person, wherein, in that estate or portion of the estate, an apparent visible sign of an
easement exists. According to Article 624, there arises a title to an easement of light and
view, even in the absence of any formal act undertaken by the owner of the dominant
estate, if this apparent visible sign, such as the existence of a door and windows, continues
to remain and subsist, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, (1)
the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or (2) the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.||| (Spouses Garcia v.
Santos, G.R. No. 228334, [June 17, 2019])
Considering the foregoing discussion, the RTC and CA, Special 18th Division committed an
error in holding that the Sps. Garcia failed to acquire an easement of light and view in the
instant case. By virtue of Article 624 of the Civil Code and applicable jurisprudence, the Court
holds that the Sps. Garcia have acquired an easement of light and view by title despite the
lack of any formal notice or prohibition made upon the owner of the servient estate.
Notes: The existence of an easement of light and view under Article 624 is established as long
as (1) there exists an apparent sign of servitude between two estates; (2) the sign of the
easement must be established by the owner of both tenements; (3) either or both of the
estates are alienated by the owner; and (4) at the time of the alienation nothing is stated in
the document of alienation contrary to the easement nor is the sign of the easement
removed before the execution of the document.