PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

G.R. No. 185734               July 3, 2013

ALFREDO C. LIM, JR., PETITIONER, 

vs.
SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO AND CARMEN T. LAZARO, RESPONDENTS.

WRIT OF ATTACHMENT IS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY THE EXECUTION OF A COMPROMISE

AGREEMENT

RULING

By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary
remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief
sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or
incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by
a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate
effects of a final judgment in the case.26 In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire
jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where
personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.27

In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates
that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same
manner provided by law.28

Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had
already been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations
thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the total compromise
amount of ₱2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of
Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have continued to subsist.

In Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. CA,29 the Court pronounced that a writ of attachment is
not extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement between the parties.

The case at bench admits of peculiar character in the sense that it involves a compromise
agreement. Nonetheless, x x x. The parties to the compromise agreement should not be deprived of
the protection provided by an attachment lien especially in an instance where one reneges on his
obligations under the agreement, as in the case at bench, where Antonio Garcia failed to hold up his
own end of the deal, so to speak.

If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a debtor can easily
escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be faced with an anomalous situation where a debtor,
in order to buy time to dispose of his properties, would enter into a compromise agreement he has
no intention of honoring in the first place. The purpose of the provisional remedy of attachment
would thus be lost. It would become, in analogy, a declawed and toothless tiger. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment subject of this case should be restored
and its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his preferential lien over the
properties covered by the same as it were before the cancellation of the said writ. Lest it be
misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an attachment even before judgment, is in the nature
of a vested interest which affords specific security for the satisfaction of the debt put in suit.30 Verily,
the lifting of the attachment lien would be tantamount to an abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps.
Lazaro’s properties which the Court, absent any justifiable ground therefor, cannot allow.

G.R. No. 190028               February 26, 2014

LETICIA P. LIGON, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56 AT MAKATI CITY AND ITS PRESIDING JUDGE,
JUDGE REYNALDO M. LAIGO, SHERIFF IV LUCITO V. ALEJO, ATTY. SILVERIO GARING, MR.
LEONARDO J. TING, AND MR. BENITO G. TECHICO, Respondents.

ATTACHMENT IS PROCEEDING IN REM; PRIOR REGISTRATION OF AN ATTACHMENT LIEN

CREATES A PREFERENCE SUCH THAT WHEN AN ATTACHMENT HAS BEEN DULY LEVIED
UPON A PROPERTY, A PURCHASER THEREOF SUBSEQUENT TO THE ATTACHMENT TAKES
THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO SAID ATTACHMENT

RULING

Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken
into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.  Case 38

law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular
property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific
lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of
the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an
indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt. The lien continues until the
debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied,
or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.  Thus, a prior 39

registration  of an attachment lien creates a preference,  such that when an attachment has been
40 41

duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property
subject to the said attachment.  As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of
42

constructive notice to all persons. 43

Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did
not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially
disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property patently anathema to
the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-established in law and jurisprudence.  In this 44

case, Ligon, in order to secure the satisfaction of a favorable judgment in the Quezon City Case,
applied for and was eventually able to secure a writ of preliminary attachment over the subject
45

property on November 25, 2002, which was later annotated on the dorsal portion  of TCT No. 9273
46

in the name of Polished Arrow on December 3, 2002. Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation
of TCT No. 9273 due to the Makati City RTC’s December 9, 2004 Decision rescinding the transfer of
the subject property from Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in
fraud of creditors, Ligon’s attachment lien over the subject property continued to subsist since the
attachment she had earlier secured binds the property itself, and, hence, continues until the
judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to Ligon as adjudged in the Quezon City Case is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. The grave abuse of discretion
of the Makati City RTC lies with its directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting (i.e.,
TCT No. 19756),  free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of action clearly negates the
47

efficacy of Ligon’s attachment lien and, also, defies the legal characterization of attachment
proceedings. It bears noting that Ligon’s claim, secured by the aforesaid attachment, is against Sps.
Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property had been effectively restored in view of the
RTC’s rescission of the property’s previous sale to Polished Arrow. Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment
48

lien against Sps. Baladjay as well as their successors-in-interest should have been preserved, and
the annotation thereof carried over to any subsequent certificate of title,  the most recent of which as
49

it appears on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico, without prejudice to the latter’s right
to protect his own ownership interest over the subject property.

G.R. No. 166759               November 25, 2009

SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF MARIO TORRES and SOLAR RESOURCES,
INC.,Petitioners, 
vs.
NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA SATSATIN, NIKKI NORMEL SATSATIN and NIKKI
NORLIN SATSATIN, Respondents.

2 WAYS OF DISCHARGING ATTACHMENT: 1)FILING OF COUNTERBOND UNDER SEC 12,

RULE 57 2) QUASH THE ATTACHMENT ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS IRREGULARLY OR
IMPROVIDENTLY ISSUED;

PRIOR OR CONTEMPORANEOUS SERVICE OF SUMMONS AT THE TIME OF THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT IS NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT;

SUBSEQUENT SERVICE OF SUMMONS DOES NOT CONFER A RETROACTIVE ACQUISITION

OF JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENT’S PERSON BECAUSE THE LAW DOES NOT
ALLOW FOR RETROACTIVITY OF A BELATED SERVICE

EVERY BOND SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEARANCE FROM THE SC SHOWING THAT

THE COMPANY CONCERNED IS QUALIFIED TO TRANSACT BUSINESS WHICH IS VALID FOR
30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS ISSUANCE

RULING

Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the
company concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the
date of its issuance.38 However, it is apparent that the Certification39 issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by
Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and
Pasig. Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted
by the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company from
the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-
mentioned cities. Thus, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment founded on the said bond.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction

between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to
the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment
upon his person.

This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should
be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time
after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically,
Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment."40 This phrase refers to the date of the filing of the
complaint, which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the action." The reference plainly
is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.41

In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court clarified the actual time when
jurisdiction should be had:

It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of defendant x x x issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ
of attachment x x x these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless
jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of
summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court’s authority. Hence,
when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is
essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant’s affidavit and attachment
bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also
the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, 43 this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second,
the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no
power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court
will not bind the defendant.44

Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or
contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of summons, together with a
copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicant’s affidavit and bond, and the
order must be served upon him.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the trial court validly issued the writ of attachment on
November 15, 2002, which was implemented on November 19, 2002, it is to be noted that the
summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served only on November 21, 2002.

At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do so
since the motion for its issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the action or at any time
before entry of judgment." However, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served upon
them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the
writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court to
have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if
the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore,
cannot bind and affect the respondents.

Moreover, although there is truth in the petitioners’ contention that an attachment may not be
dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the
same time the applicant’s cause of action in the main case, since an anomalous situation would
result if the issues of the main case would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion.
However, the same is not applicable in the case bar. It is clear from the respondents’ pleadings that
the grounds on which they base the lifting of the writ of attachment are the irregularities in its
issuance and in the service of the writ; not petitioners’ cause of action.
1avvphi1

Further, petitioners’ contention that respondents are barred by estoppel, laches, and prescription
from questioning the orders of the RTC issuing the writ of attachment and that the issue has become
moot and academic by the renewal of the attachment bond covering after its expiration, is devoid of
merit. As correctly held by the CA:

There are two ways of discharging the attachment. First, to file a counter-bond in accordance with
Section 12 of Rule 57. Second[,] [t]o quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or
improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same rule. Whether the attachment was
discharged by either of the two ways indicated in the law, the attachment debtor cannot be deemed
to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one
way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a
speedier way of discharging the attachment writ instead of the other way.45

Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the trial
court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them, such
belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the
enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents
without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be
served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal
service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her
person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.46

G.R. No. 125027            August 12, 2002

ANITA MANGILA, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA, respondents.

The Ruling of the Court

Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three
stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment
issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two
stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind
the defendant.23
In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and
implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served only on
January 26, 1989 or almost three months after the implementation of the writ of attachment.

The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on September 27 since a motion for
its issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the action." However, on the day the writ was
implemented, the trial court should have, previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the
writ, acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as was shown in the records of the case, the
summons was actually served on petitioner several months after the writ had been implemented.

Private respondent, nevertheless, claims that the prior or contemporaneous service of summons
contemplated in Section 5 of Rule 57 provides for exceptions. Among such exceptions are "where
the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts or
where the defendant is a resident temporarily absent therefrom x x x." Private respondent asserts
that when she commenced this action, she tried to serve summons on petitioner but the latter could
not be located at her customary address in Kamuning, Quezon City or at her new address in
Guagua, Pampanga.24 Furthermore, respondent claims that petitioner was not even in Pampanga;
rather, she was in Guam purportedly on a business trip.

Private respondent never showed that she effected substituted service on petitioner after her
personal service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private respondent could not ascertain the
whereabouts of petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she had some other recourse under the Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be effected on a
party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever the defendant’s
"whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation x x x." Thus, if
petitioner’s whereabouts could not be ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons at her
given address, then respondent could have immediately asked the court for service of summons by
publication on petitioner.25

Moreover, as private respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of the service of
summons, this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of the country. This is the exact
situation contemplated in Section 16,26 Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for service
of summons by publication.

In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to
have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a
coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ
of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant
whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the
circumstances of the case.27 The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a
belated service.

G.R. No. 139941       January 19, 2001

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner, 

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
WHEN THE PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT IS ISSUED UPON A GROUND WHICH IS AT THE
SAME TIME THE APPLICANT’S CAUSE OF ACTION, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ALLOWED TO
FILE A MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE ATTACHMENT – THE HEARING ON SUCH MOTION FOR
DISSOLUTION OF THE WRIT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A TRIAL OF THE MERITS OF THE
ACTION

RULING

The Rules of Court specifically provide for the remedies of a defendant whose property or asset has
been attached. As has been consistently ruled by this Court, the determination of the existence of
grounds to discharge a writ of attachment rests in the sound discretion of the lower courts.29

The question in this case is: What can the herein petitioner do to quash the attachment of the L/C?
There are two courses of action available to the petitioner:

First. To file a counterbond in accordance with Rule 57, Section 12, which provides:

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. – At anytime after an order of
attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing
on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the
order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order discharging the
attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge
of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond executed to the attaching creditor is
filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is
made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to
secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon the
filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his
lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the
property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the
deposit or giving the counter-bond, or the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-
bond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for any
reason be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an
additional counter-bond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment. 1âwphi1.nêt

or

Second. To quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued, as
provided for in Section 13 of the same Rule:

SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. - The party whose property has
been attached may also, at any time either before or after the release of the attached property, or
before any attachment shall have been actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching
creditor, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is
pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or
irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the party whose property has
been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-affidavits
or other evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was made. After hearing, the judge
shall order the discharge of the attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued
and the defect is not cured forthwith.

It would appear that petitioner chose the latter because the grounds he raised assail the propriety of
the issuance of the writ of attachment. By his own admission, however, he repeatedly acknowledged
that his justifications to warrant the lifting of the attachment are facts or events that came to light or
took place after the writ of attachment had already been implemented.

Petitioner may argue, albeit belatedly, that he also raised the issue that there was no evidence of
fraud on record other than the affidavit of PCGG Chairman Gunigundo. This issue of fraud, however,
touches on the very merits of the main case which accuses petitioner of committing fraudulent acts
in his dealings with the government. Moreover, this alleged fraud was one of the grounds for the
application of the writ, and the Sandiganbayan granted said application after it found a prima
facie case of fraud committed by petitioner.

In fine, fraud was not only one of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminary attachment, it was
at the same time the government's cause of action in the main case.

We have uniformly held that:

x x x when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicant's cause of action; e.g., "an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an
attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other
person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty," or "an action against a party who has
been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is
brought," the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of
Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and
affidavits on which the writ was based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been
improperly or irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution
of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the
action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular
trial.34 (Underscoring ours)

Thus, this Court has time and again ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary
attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment, otherwise
an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.35

Moreover, we have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the
same time the applicant's cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by
a counterbond, in accordance with Section 12 of the same rule. 38 This recourse, however, was not
availed of by petitioner, as noted by the Solicitor General in his comment.39

To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbond
immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance.40 These
grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power
of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified
therein.41 Petitioner's motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the
issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a counterbond.

G.R. No. 203530, April 13, 2015

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, TOMAS CLEMENTE, JR., AND OSCAR

RAMIREZ, Petitioners, v.ERLINDA KRISHNAN, Respondent.
RULE 57 SECTION 5 REQUIRES THE DEPOSIT OF MONEY AS THE WORD “AMOUNT”
COMMONLY REFERS TO OR IS REGULARLY ASSOCIATED WITH A SUM OF MONEY

Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may be issued
either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or
by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so
much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from
execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless such party makes
deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order,
which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property to
be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."

Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and
with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of
the property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from
execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a
deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the
applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to
the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs."

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only
remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-
bond. Thus, the Court holds that petitioner's argument that it has the option to deposit real property
instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the
implementation thereof is unmeritorious.

In fact, in Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante,6 we held that one of the ways to
secure the discharge of an attachment is for the party whose property has been attached or a
person appearing on his behalf, to post a counterbond or make the requisite cash deposit in an
amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment.7

Apropos, the trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined
or construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for
the reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is required to make a
deposit in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value
of the property to be attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is
unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded
that Section 5 requires the deposit of money as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly
associated with a sum of money.

In Alcazar v. Arante,8 we held that in construing words and phrases used in a statute, the general
rule is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain,
ordinary and common usage meaning. The words should be read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and approved
usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been
employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.9 Thus, petitioners
should not give a special or technical interpretation to a word which is otherwise construed in its
ordinary sense by the law and broaden the signification of the term "deposit" to include that of real
properties.
 G.R. No. 203240, March 18, 2015

NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DENNIS AND CHERYLIN* GARCIA,

DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE “ECOLAMP MULTI
RESOURCES,”, Respondents.

ATTACHMENT CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE ACTION INDEPENDENT OF THE

PRINCIPAL ACTION BECAUSE ATTACHMENT IS ONLY AN INCIDENT OF SUCH ACTION; IF
THE PRINCIPAL ACTION IS APPEALED, THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT ISSUED IN
CONNECTION THERETO IS ALSO APPEALED

Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

With the RTC’s loss of jurisdiction over the Main Case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over
all matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety of conducting a trial by commissioners in
order to determine the excessiveness of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary
matter to the Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.

Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral,40 the Court, in view of the nature of a preliminary
attachment, definitively ruled that the attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action
independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action, viz.:

Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken
into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.

It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim
instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding,
the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can
no longer be justified.

The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been
issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the
jurisdiction of the court a quo.  The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action
independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such
action.41 (Emphases supplied)

G.R. No. 212025, July 01, 2015

EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL, INC., Petitioner, v. 

VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION, AND FAR EASTERN SURETY &
INSURANCE CO., INC., Respondents.
A COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ENTERTATIN ANY PROCEEDING SEEKING TO HOLD A
SURETY LIABLE UPON ITS BOND, WHERE THE SURETY HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN NOTICE OF
THE PROCEEDINGS FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE PRINCIPAL AND THE JUDGMENT
HOLDING THE LATTER LIABLE HAS ALREADY BECOME FINAL

DUE NOTICE TO THE ADVERSE PARTY AND ITS SURETY SETTING FORTH THE FACTS
SUPPORTING THE APPLICANT’S RIGHT TO DAMAGES AND THE AMOUNT THEREOF UNDER
THE BOND IS INDISPENSABLE

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE, WHATSOEVER, CAN THE GARNISEHD FUNDS OR ATTACHED

PROPERTIES, UNDER THE CUSTODY OF THE SHERIFF OR THE CLERK OF COURT, BE
RELEASED TO THE ATTACHING PARTY BEFORE THE PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT

IN ATTACHMENT, THE DAMAGES ARE UNLIQUIDATED, HENCE THE NECESSITY OF NOTICE

AND HEARING

The history of Section 20, Rule 57 was discussed in Malayan Insurance, Inc. v. Salas42 In that case,
the Court explained that Section 20, Rule 57 was a revised version of Section 20, Rule 59 of the
1940 Rules of Court, which, in turn, was a consolidation of Sections 170, 177, 223, 272, and 439 of
the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the damages recoverable in case of wrongful issuance of the
writs of preliminary injunction, attachment, mandamus and replevin and the appointment of a
receiver.

Thus, the current provision of Section 20, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure covers
application for damages against improper attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and
replevin.43Consequently, jurisprudence concerning application for damages against preliminary
injunction, receivership and replevin bonds can be equally applied in the present case.

In a catena of cases,44 the Court has cited the requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 in order to claim
damages against the bond, as follows:

1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was
issued;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and

3. After hearing with notice to the surety.

The first and second requisites, as stated above, relate to the application for damages against the
bond. An application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued, either
(a) before the trial or (b) before the appeal is perfected or (c) before the judgment becomes
executory.45 The usual procedure is to file an application for damages with due notice to the other
party and his sureties. The other method would be to incorporate the application in the answer with
compulsory counterclaim.46redarclaw

The purpose of requiring the application for damages to be filed in the same proceeding is to avoid
the multiplicity of suit and forum shopping. It is also required to file the application against the bond
before the finality of the decision to prevent the alteration of the immutable judgment.47redarclaw

In the present petition, the Court holds that petitioner sufficiently incorporated an application for
damages against the wrongful attachment in its answer with compulsory counterclaim filed before
the RTC. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of the improper writ of attachment caused it actual
damages in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00. It added that the Equitable PCI Bank Check No.
160149 it issued to the RTC Clerk of Court, to lift the improper writ of attachment, should be returned
to it.50 Evidently, these allegations constitute petitioner's application for damages arising from the
wrongful attachment, and the said application was timely filed as it was filed before the finality of
judgment.

The next requisite that must be satisfied by petitioner to hold Visayan Surety liable would be that the
judgment against the wrongful attachment was promulgated after the hearing with notice to the
surety. Certainly, the surety must be given prior notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to
the application for damages before the finality of the judgment. The Court rules that petitioner did not
satisfy this crucial element.

Section 20, Rule 57 specifically requires that the application for damages against the wrongful
attachment, whether filed before the trial court or appellate court, must be with due notice to the
attaching party and his surety or sureties. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing
and shall be included in the judgment on the main case.

Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the applicant's right
to damages and the amount thereof under the bond is indispensable. The surety should be given an
opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the damages resulting from the
wrongful issuance of the writ. In the absence of due notice to the surety, therefore, no judgment for
damages may be entered and executed against it.51redarclaw

Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 because Visayan
Surety was not given due notice on the application for damages before the finality of judgment. The
subsequent motion for execution, which sought to implicate Visayan Surety, cannot alter the
immutable judgment anymore.

FESICO's bond is not covered by Section 20, Rule 57

Strictly speaking, the surety bond of FESICO is not covered by any of the provisions in Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court because, in the first place, Win Multi-Rich should not have filed its motion to
release the cash deposit of petitioner and the RTC should not have granted the same. The release
of the cash deposit to the attaching party is anathema to the basic tenets of a preliminary
attachment.

The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant's
property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property
applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means
of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or
concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.61 The garnished funds or attached
properties could only be released to the attaching party after a judgment in his favor is
obtained. Under no circumstance, whatsoever, can the garnished funds or attached
properties, under the custody of the sheriff or the clerk of court, be released to the attaching
party before the promulgation of judgment.

Cash deposits and counterbonds posted by the defendant to lift the writ of attachment is a security
for the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may obtain; they are, thus, mere
replacements of the property previously attached.62 Accordingly, the P8,634,448.20 cash deposit of
petitioner, as replacement of the properties to be attached, should never have been released to Win
Multi-Rich.

Nevertheless, the Court must determine the nature of the surety bond of FESICO. The cash deposit
or the counter-bond was supposed to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party
may recover in the action.63 In this case, however, Win Multi-Rich was able to withdraw the cash
deposit and, in exchange, it posted a surety bond of FESICO in favor of petitioner to answer for the
damages that the latter may sustain. Corollarily, the surety bond of FESICO substituted the cash
deposit of petitioner as a security for the judgment. Thus, to claim damages from the surety bond of
FESICO, Section 17, Rule 57 could be applied. It reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 17. Recovery upon the counter-bond.

When the judgment has become executory, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given
pursuant to the provisions of this Rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged
on such counter-bond and bound to pay the judgment obligee upon demand the amount due under
the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and
summary hearing in the same action.
From a reading of the above-quoted provision, it is evident that a surety on a counter-bond given to
secure the payment of a judgment becomes liable for the payment of the amount due upon: (1)
demand made upon the surety; and (2) notice and summary hearing on the same
action.64 Noticeably, unlike Section 20, Rule 57, which requires notice and hearing before the finality
of the judgment in an application for damages, Section 17, Rule 57 allows a party to claim damages
on the surety bond after the judgment has become executory.65redarclaw

The question remains, in contrast to Section 20, why does Section 17 sanction the notice and
hearing to the surety after the finality of judgment? The answer lies in the kind of damages sought to
be enforced against the bond.

Under Section 20, Rule 57, in relation to Section 4 therein,66 the surety bond shall answer for all the
costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason
of the attachment. In other words, the damages sought to be enforced against the surety bond
are unliquidated. Necessarily, a notice and hearing before the finality of judgment must be
undertaken to properly determine the amount of damages that was suffered by the defendant due to
the improper attachment. These damages to be imposed against the attaching party and his sureties
are different from the principal case, and must be included in the judgment.

On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, in relation to Section 12 therein, the cash deposit or
the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in
the action. Stated differently, the damages sought to be charged against the surety bond
are liquidated. The final judgment had already determined the amount to be awarded to the winning
litigant on the main action. Thus, there is nothing left to do but to execute the judgment against the
losing party, or in case of insufficiency, against its sureties.

G.R. No. 181721

WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION, represented by its Vice-President, ROSARIO E.

RANOA,Petitioners, 
vs.
ALFRED RAYMOND WOLFE, Respondent.

RULES ON THE APPLICATION OF A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT MUST BE STRICTLY

CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT NO MOTION TO DISSOLVE MAY BE FILED WHEN THE
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT IS ISSUED UPON A GROUND WHICH IS AT THE SAME TIME
THE APPLICANT’S CAUSE OF ACTION: ALLEGING THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO
PARTICULARLY ALLEGE ANY CIRCUMSTANCE AMOUNTING TO FRAUD

A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court
where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the
same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that
might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.  However, it
10

should be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy because it exposes the debtor to
humiliation and annoyance.  It must be granted only on concrete and specific grounds and not
11

merely on general averments quoting the words of the rules.  Since attachment is harsh,
12

extraordinary, and summary in nature,  the rules on the application of a writ of attachment must be
13

strictly construed in favor of the defendant. Such bond executed to the adverse party in the amount
fixed by the court is subject to the conditions that the applicant will pay: (1) all costs which may be
adjudged to the adverse party; and (2) all damages which such party may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.  As to the
15

requisite affidavit of merit, Section 3,  Rule 57of the Rules of Court states that an order of
16

attachment shall be granted only when it appears in the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other
person who personally knows the facts:

1. that a sufficient cause of action exists;

2. that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1  hereof;

17

3. that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action;
and

4. that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which
he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal
counterclaims.

The mere filing of an affidavit reciting the facts required by Section 3, Rule 57, however, is
not enough to compel the judge to grant the writ of preliminary attachment. Whether or not
the affidavit sufficiently established facts therein stated is a question to be determined by the
court in the exercise of its discretion. "The sufficiency or insufficiency of an affidavit depends
18

upon the amount of credit given it by the judge, and its acceptance or rejection, upon his
sound discretion."  
19

After a careful perusal of the foregoing allegations, the Court agrees with the CA that Watercraft
failed to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by Section 5,  Rule
24

8 of the Rules of Court, and that Wolfe's mere failure to pay the boat storage fees does not
necessarily amount to fraud, absent any showing that such failure was due to insidious machinations
and intent on his part to defraud Watercraft of the amount due it.

In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,  the Court explained that to constitute a
25

ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that the
debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. A debt is
fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it, the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention
not to pay. "The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason
which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given." 26
Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a condition of the mind beyond the reach of the senses,
usually kept secret, very unlikely to be confessed, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded
expressions, conduct and circumstances.  Thus, the applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment
27

must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent
cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his
obligation.  The particulars of such circumstances necessarily include the time, persons, places and
28

specific acts of fraud committed.  An affidavit which does not contain concrete and specific grounds
29

is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such writ. In fact, mere general averments render the writ
defective and the court that ordered its issuance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.
30

In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific allegations of
other factual circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a
preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Neither can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars
of why he was guilty of fraud in the performance of such obligation. To be specific, Watercraft's
following allegation is unsupported by any particular averment of circumstances that will show why
or how such inference or conclusion was arrived at, to wit: "16. For failing to pay for the use [of]
facilities and services - in the form of boat storage facilities – duly enjoyed by him and for failing and
refusing to fulfill his promise to pay for the said boat storage fees, the Defendant is clearly guilty of
fraud x x x."  It is not an allegation of essential facts constituting Watercraft's causes of action, but a
31

mere conclusion of law.

when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's
cause of action; e.g., "an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or
converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor,
broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a
fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty," OR "an action against a party who has been guilty
of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought," the
defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by
offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on
which the writ was based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or
irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ
would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action
would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial. 35

Be that as it may, the foregoing rule is not applicable in this case because when Wolfe filed a motion
to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment, he did not offer to show the falsity of the factual
averments in Watercraft's application and affidavit on which the writ was based. Instead, he sought
the discharge of the writ on the ground that Watercraft failed to particularly allege any circumstance
amounting to fraud. No trial on the merits of the action at a mere hearing of such motion will be had
since only the sufficiency of the factual averments in the application and affidavit of merit will be
examined in order to find out whether or not Wolfe was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.

G.R. No. 193821, November 23, 2015

PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING CENTER, Petitioner, v. RCJ LINES AND ROLANDO ABADILLA,

JR., Respondent.

SECTION 12: COUNTER-BOND; HEARING TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENCY OF COUNTER-BOND

SECTION 13: IRREGULARITY; HEARING TO DETERMINE IF ATTACHMENT BOND IS
SUFFICIENT

The enforcement of the writ notwithstanding, the party whose property is attached is afforded relief
to have the attachment lifted.

There are various modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.: (1) by depositing cash or
posting a counter-bond under Section 12;52 (2) by proving that the attachment bond was improperly
or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is insufficient under Section 13;53 (3) by showing
that the attachment is excessive under Section 13; and (4) by claiming that the property is exempt
from execution under Section 2.54

The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the attachment applies when there has already been a
seizure of property by the sheriff and all that is entailed is the presentation of a motion to the proper
court, seeking approval of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the value of the property
seized and the lifting of the attachment on the basis thereof. The counter-bond stands in place of
the property so released.57

To be clear, the discharge of the attachment by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond under
Section 12 should not be confused with the discharge sanctioned under Section 13. Section 13
speaks of discharge on the ground that the writ was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or
that the attachment bond is insufficient, or that the attachment is excessive.

To reiterate, the discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon posting of a counter-bond or
depositing cash, and after hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or counter-bond.
On the other hand, the discharge under Section 13 takes effect only upon showing that the plaintiffs
attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is insufficient. The discharge
of the attachment under Section 13 must be made only after hearing.58

These differences notwithstanding, the discharge of the preliminary attachment either through
Section 12 or Section 13 has no effect on and does not discharge the attachment bond. The
dissolution of the preliminary attachment does not result in the dissolution of the attachment
bond. Justice Narvasa, writing his separate opinion in one case,
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon security given [Section 12], or a showing of
its irregular or improper issuance [Section 13], does not of course operate to discharge the
sureties on plaintiffs own attachment bond. The reason is simple. That bond is executed to the
adverse party,. . . conditioned that the ... (applicant) will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to
the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court
shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto." Hence, until that determination is
made, as to the applicant's entitlement to the attachment, his bond must stand and cannot be
withdrawn.59 [emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted]cralawlawlibrary

As discussed above, it is patent that under the Rules, the attachment bond answers for all damages
incurred by the party against whom the attachment was issued.60

Thus, Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the costs adjudged to and the damages sustained by
RCJ Lines because of the attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57 positively lays down the rule that the
attachment bond will pay "all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and
all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally
adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250      February 28, 2001
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-332-MTJ]

RIMEO S. GUSTILO, complainant, 
vs.
HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR., Presiding Judge, 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-
Manapla, Negros Occidental, respondent.

SUMMARY HEARING MAY NOT BE DISPENSED WITH

The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the
application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other words,
a summary hearing may not be dispensed with.9 In the instant case, respondent admits that he
issued the injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after receiving the applicant's evidence ex
parte. His failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO is grave
abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.

Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1)
there must be aright in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which
injunction to be directed is a violation of such right.11 The onus probandi is on movant to show that
there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.
Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.12 In this case,
complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had taken
his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We
do not see how the complainant's exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate
the right of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order "to
maintain the status quo." We see no reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident
purpose of the second TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of the Liga
ng mga Barangay. 

G.R. No. 168637

LAGROSAS

V BRISTOL-MYERS

INJUNCTION BOND IS INTENDED TO PROTECT THE RESPONDENT AGAINST LOSS OR

DAMAGE BY REASON OF THE INJUNCTION ONLY; IT IS NOT A SECURITY FOR THE
JUDGMENT AWARD BY THE LABOR ARBITER
 In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment pending final resolution of this
case or unless the [w]rit is sooner lifted by the Court.[32]

By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by granting
Bristol-Myers petition and reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of the NLRC which
dismissed the complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and
injunction cash bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied.

Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards granted
by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of execution and notices
of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not
sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to
protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas
claim, it is not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.[33]

Considering the foregoing, we hold that the appellate court erred in disallowing the discharge
and release of the injunction cash bond.

G.R. No. 172138               September 8, 2010

NELSON JENOSA and his son NIÑO CARLO JENOSA, SOCORRO CANTO and her son
PATRICK CANTO, CYNTHIA APALISOK and her daughter CYNDY APALISOK, EDUARDO
VARGAS and his son CLINT EDUARD VARGAS, and NELIA DURO and her son NONELL
GREGORY DURO, Petitioners, 
vs.
REV. FR. JOSE RENE C. DELARIARTE, O.S.A., in his capacity as the incumbent Principal of
the High School Department of the University of San Agustin, and the UNIVERSITY OF SAN
AGUSTIN, herein represented by its incumbent President REV. FR. MANUEL G. VERGARA,
O.S.A., Respondents.

HE WHO MUST APPLY FOR INJUNCTION MUST COME WITH EQUITY OR WITH CLEAN
HANDS

Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with
clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do
equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently
stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have
equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy
in issue.31

Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason, come to court
with unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been inequitable, unfair
and dishonest as to the controversy in issue.1avvphi1
Since petitioners have come to court with inequitable and unfair conduct, we deny them relief. We
uphold the validity of the 28 November 2002 agreement and rule that the Principal had the authority
to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students based on the 28 November 2002 agreement.

G.R. No. 179665               April 3, 2013

SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioners, 

vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.

REQUISITES: (1) CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT OR RIGHT IN ESSE, (2) ACTS SOUGHT TO BE
ENJOINED ARE VIOLATIVE OF SUCH RIGHT

This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in
Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank24:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order,
requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative
remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final
judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed
emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a
litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.

At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that there is no power
the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance
of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford
an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is
very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor;
where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance,
the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and
arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of
actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction
are present in the case before it.25 In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to
preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions,
namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are
violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injury.26

As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee
CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged "usurious,
exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest."30 First, assuming that the interest rate agreed upon by
the parties is usurious, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lender’s
right to recover the principal loan, nor affect the other terms thereof.31 Thus, in a usurious loan with
mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the
creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due.32

Second, even the Order dated December 14, 2000 of the trial court, which granted the application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, recognizes that the parties still have to be heard
on the alleged lack of "fairness of the increase in interests and penalties" during the trial on the
merits.33 Thus, the basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial or
disputable as there is still a need to determine whether or not, upon consideration of the various
circumstances surrounding the agreement of the parties, the interest rates and penalty charges are
unconscionable. Therefore, such claimed right cannot be considered clear, actual and subsisting. In
the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.34

As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The accessory
follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation mortgagor and surety is
tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default.

Thus, MFII’s interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is necessarily prejudiced by
SBI’s wrongful conduct and breach of contract.

G.R. No. 172909               March 5, 2014

SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA, Petitioners, 

vs.
GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON
GOLOSENO, Respondents.

The petitioners failed to show clear

and unmistakable rights to be protected
by the writ; the present action has been
rendered moot and academic by the
dismissal of the main action

As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the
latter’s reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. Because they were never owners of the
property, the petitioners failed to establish entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. "[T]o be
entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be
shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing
right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant’s right or title
is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive
relief is not proper."
23

Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the question of
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of
the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically
died with it. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and
subject to the determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main
case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. 25

G.R. No. 193809, March 23, 2015

NOVECIO v LIM

DENIAL OF A PETITION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MUST STATE THE FACTUAL BASIS

We note at the outset that the petition merely assails the interlocutory orders of the CA. Thus, the
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate as the assailed resolutions are not appealable and
there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.21

Our decision in this case is without prejudice to the Petition for Review pending in the CA. Our
judgment is limited to the resolutions of the CA denying the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.

Subject to this clarification, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners.

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias.22

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted when
the following have been established:

i. That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consist in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

ii. That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

iii. That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought
and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. As this Court has previously ruled,
"while the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear."23

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such
evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a
preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the
principal action which has yet to be decided.24

In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and
complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in his complaint.25

In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First,
the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their
ejectment from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their
source of livelihood would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision
is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to render the MTC judgment
dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual.
Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary injunction based
on the pleadings of the parties and their respective evidence must state in its order the findings and
conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief.26

The MTC found that the petitioners have been in actual and physical possession of the land for more
than two (2) years prior to the institution of the complaints for forcible entry.27 The MTC also found
that the respondents were not even sure how the petitioners entered the land. In their complaints,
they alleged that petitioners entered the land by means of "force, intimidation, threat, stealth and
strategy," a shotgun allegation which shows that respondents' lack knowledge of how the petitioners
entered the disputed property.

We quote the MTC decision with approval, viz:

xxx Force, intimidation[,] and threat usually connote actual knowledge of dispossession. One cannot
force, intimidate or threaten another who is not around. In stealth and strategy[,] the actual entry is
usually done without the knowledge of the plaintiff. If they are not sure how [the] defendants entered
the land[,] the likelihood is that they also do not know when [the] defendants] entered the land. The
court is apt to believe that [the] defendants have been in possession of the land for more than 2
years. And under Rule 70[,] the action of forcible entry must be filed within one year from
dispossession. The filing of these cases was beyond the one-year period.28

The RTC, on the other hand, relied on a mere request for authority to conduct a land survey,
allegedly showing that respondent Manuel V. Nieto was the occupant and tiller of the land.

However, this document does not prove prior possession of the subject land. It only points to the fact
that there was an application for a land title in the name of one of the respondents, which application
was not even shown to have been granted. This document merely authorized the survey of the land;
the declaration regarding possession was just incidental to the application for land survey.

Between the clear findings of the MTC, which conducted the trial of the forcible entry cases, and the
RTC acting as an appellate court, which relied on documentary evidence but without sufficiently
explaining how such evidence would prove prior possession, we are inclined to give weight to the
MTC's ruling.

G.R. No. 205875               June 30, 2015

LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., now known as WI-TRIBE TELECOMS,

INC., Petitioner, 
vs.
ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC., Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208916

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioner, 
vs.
ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC., Respondent.

GRANT OR DENIAL OF WRIT LIES ON THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT

REQUISITES: (1) RIGHT IN ESSE; (2) MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INVASION OF SUCH
RIGHT; (3) URGENT NEED FOR THE WRIT TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE INJURY TO THE
APPLICANT; (4) NO OTHER ORDINARY, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY EXISTS

A preliminary injunction is defined as "[a]n order granted at any stage of an action prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular
act or acts."  It may be a prohibitory injunction, which requires a party to refrain from doing a
17

particular act, or a mandatory injunction, which commands a party to perform a positive act to correct
a wrong in the past.  It is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and
18

protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. 19

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

The following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue: (1) The
applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is, a right in esse; (2) There
is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and ( 4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
20

The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court
for its conclusive determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction
shall not be disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. 21

In deciding whether to grant an injunction, a court must consider established principles of equity and
all the circumstances of the test for issuing an injunction is whether the facts show a necessity for
the intervention of equity in order to protect rights cognizable in equity. Here, there are factual and
legal justification for issuance of the writ of injunction. To reiterate to the point of being pedantic,
petitioner's right to its frequencies is covered by a provisional authority. Petitioner as the rightful
grantee thereof has the right, in the meantime, to enjoin its implementation.

Under existing laws and regulations, it is clear that a frequency assignment is not automatically
included in the PA granted by the NTC to an applicant for a CPC. Thus, the Order dated October 8,
2003 expressly provided that the PA granted to Atlocom, valid for 18 months, is subject to several
conditions, foremost of which is the assignment of frequency by the Frequency Management
Division (FMD).

From the evidence on record, no clear, actual and existing right to the subject frequencies or to the
extension of PA had been shown by Atlocom. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the RTC in denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the implementation of MC 06-08-2005 insofar as the use of the re-allocated frequencies claimed by
Atlocom. The CA thus seriously erred in reversing the RTC and holding that Atlocom was entitled to
injunctive relief due to alleged violation of its right by the NTC.

A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm of equity
or a transcendent remedy, it must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial
rights. In the absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter
within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been
rendered in grave abuse of discretion. 31

Pursuant to Section 6,  Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction may
32

be dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or
restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable
damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition
that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the
injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur: first, the court, in the exercise of its
discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the defendant,
while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the
defendant files a counterbond. 33

GR. No. 197472

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Commander Raymond Alpuerto of the Naval

Base Camillo Osias, Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, Petitioner, 
vs.
REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent.

"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a

particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, [as in this case,] or to refrain from
doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction."  "It may be the main action
20

or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action." 21

"The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction."  A preliminary injunction does not determine the merits of a case or decide controverted
22

facts.  Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury
23

and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are settled.  "It is usually granted when
24

it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is
committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable
injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of
the case."  A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
25

judgment or final order.  For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least tentatively, that
26

he has a right which is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction.  Simply stated, the
27

applicant needs only to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint.  On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final
28

injunction.  A final injunction is one which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined from the
29

commission or continuance of an act, or in case of mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the
preliminary mandatory injuction.  It is issued when the court, after trial on the merits, is convinced
30

that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined.  Otherwise
31

stated, it is only after the court has come up with a definite pronouncement respecting an applicant’s
right and of the act violative of such right, based on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a
final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and permanant injunction, the right and the act
violative thereof must be established by the applicant with absolute certainty. 32

What was before the trial court at the time of the issuance of its July 3, 2007 Decision is whether a
final injunction should issue. While the RTC seemed to realize this as it in fact made the injunction
permanent, the Court, however, finds the same to be wanting in basis.

Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction between a preliminary injunction and a
final injunction. Despite this, the RTC apparently confused itself. For one, what it cited in its Decision
were jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ
and not as a final injunction. At that point, the duty of the RTC was to determine, based on the
evidence presented during trial, if Rev. Cortez has conclusively established his claimed right (as
opposed to preliminary injunction where an applicant only needs to at least tentatively show that he
has a right) over the subject area. This is considering that the existence of such right plays an
important part in determining whether the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction should be
confirmed.

Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based on the right of possession (jus
possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of the subject area since 1962.
He avers that as this right is protected by law, he cannot be peremptorily dispossessed therefrom, or
if already dispossessed, is entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the mandatory injunctive
writ was correctly issued in his favor.

Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner  is one of the two concepts of
36

possession provided under Article 525  of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse
37

possession,  this kind of possesion is one which can ripen into ownership by prescription.  As
38 39

correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal
presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.  In the 40

same manner, the law endows every possessor with the right to be respected in his possession. 41

It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession.  The following cannot be appropriated and hence,
42

cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common things (res communes) such as

sunlight and air, and things specifically prohibited by law.43

Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.

As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the
military reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable
or disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and
reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is
primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive
prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without first determining the nature
and character of the land, all other requirements such as length and nature of possession
and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession
does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.

RECEIVERSHIP
G.R. No. 135706             October 1, 2004

SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS, petitioners, 

vs.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondent.

A BANK IS BOUND BY THE ACTS, OR FAILURE TO ACT OF ITS RECEIVER; HOWEVER, A

BANK MAY GO AFTER THE RECEIVER WHO IS LIABLE TO IT FOR ANY CULPABLE OR
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO COLLECT THE ASSETS OF SUCH BANK AND TO SAFEGUARD ITS
ASSETS

BEING PLACED IN A RECEIVERSHIP IS NOT A FORTUITOUS EVENT

One characteristic of a fortuitous event, in a legal sense and consequently in relations to contract, is
that its occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for a party to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner.22

Respondent’s claims that because of a fortuitous event, it was not able to exercise its right to
foreclose the mortgage on petitioners’ property; and that since it was banned from pursuing its
business and was placed under receivership from April 25, 1985 until August 1992, it could not
foreclose the mortgage on petitioners’ property within such period since foreclosure is embraced in
the phrase "doing business," are without merit.

When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under receivership, the Central Bank, through the
Monetary Board, determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or reorganization of the
financially distressed bank. A receiver, who concurrently represents the bank, then takes control and
possession of its assets for the benefit of the bank’s creditors. A liquidator meanwhile assumes the
role of the receiver upon the determination by the Monetary Board that the bank can no longer
resume business. His task is to dispose of all the assets of the bank and effect partial payments of
the bank’s obligations in accordance with legal priority. In both receivership and liquidation
proceedings, the bank retains its juridical personality notwithstanding the closure of its business and
may even be sued as its corporate existence is assumed by the receiver or liquidator. The receiver
or liquidator meanwhile acts not only for the benefit of the bank, but for its creditors as well.27

In Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals,28 we further stated that:

When a bank is prohibited from continuing to do business by the Central Bank and a receiver
is appointed for such bank, that bank would not be able to do new business, i.e., to
grant new loans or to accept new deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact
obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the
bank. The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation of the bank under
 receivership, and take steps to prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, the
receiver of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due to the bank, and in
connection therewith, to foreclose mortgages securing such debts.29 (Emphasis
supplied.)

It is true that we also held in said case that the period during which the bank was placed under
receivership was deemed fuerza mayor which validly interrupted the prescriptive period.30 This is
being invoked by the respondent and was used as basis by the trial court in its decision. Contrary to
the position of the respondent and court a quo however, such ruling does not find application in the
case at bar.

A close scrutiny of the Provident case, shows that the Court arrived at said conclusion, which is an
exception to the general rule, due to the peculiar circumstances of Provident Savings Bank at the
time. In said case, we stated that:

Having arrived at the conclusion that a foreclosure is part of a bank’s business activity which
could not have been pursued by the receiver then because of the circumstances
discussed in the Central Bank case, we are thus convinced that the prescriptive period
was legally interrupted by fuerza mayor in 1972 on account of the prohibition imposed by the
Monetary Board against petitioner from transacting business, until the directive of the Board
was nullified in 1981.31 (Emphasis supplied.)

Further examination of the Central Bank case reveals that the circumstances of Provident Savings
Bank at the time were peculiar because after the Monetary Board issued MB Resolution No. 1766 on
September 15, 1972, prohibiting it from doing business in the Philippines, the bank’s majority
stockholders immediately went to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which prompted the trial court
to issue its judgment dated February 20, 1974, declaring null and void the resolution and ordering
the Central Bank to desist from liquidating Provident. The decision was appealed to and affirmed by
this Court in 1981. Thus, the Superintendent of Banks, which was instructed to take charge of the
assets of the bank in the name of the Monetary Board, had no power to act as a receiver of the bank
and carry out the obligations specified in Sec. 29 of the Central Bank Act.32

Unlike Provident Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein respondent to
deter its receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under the law. Thus, the ruling laid
down in the Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar.

Settled is the principle that a bank is bound by the acts, or failure to act of its receiver.34 As we held
in Philippine Veterans Bank vs. NLRC,35 a labor case which also involved respondent bank,

… all the acts of the receiver and liquidator pertain to petitioner, both having assumed
petitioner’s corporate existence. Petitioner cannot disclaim liability by arguing that the non-
payment of MOLINA’s just wages was committed by the liquidators during the liquidation
period.36

However, the bank may go after the receiver who is liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to
collect the assets of such bank and to safeguard its assets.37

G.R. No. 203585               July 29, 2013

MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE, Petitioners, 

vs.
DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDE-LABRADOR,
and JOSEPHINE E. CABOVERDE, Respondents.

FILING OF APPLICANT’S BOND IS MANDATORY; REQUIRING A RECEIVER’S BOND RESTS

UPON THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT

The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and
only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is
imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be
averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not
be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts
demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as
much consideration from the court as those of the complainant.15

Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury resulting from
such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left
undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights
deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.19

Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is
to take real estate out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of
the parties, the appointment should be made only in extreme cases.20

After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of this case, We
find that the grant of Dominalda’s Application for Receivership has no leg to stand on for reasons
discussed below.

First, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid
justification for the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely
on this ground is not only unwarranted but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial
need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or
reasons for granting receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is
justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing.
To be clear, even in cases falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing
that there is imminent danger that the properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost,
wasted or injured.

Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or
materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means
to preserve, administer or dispose of them.

Based on the allegations in her application, it appears that Dominalda sought receivership mainly
because she considers this the best remedy to ensure that she would receive her share in the
income of the disputed properties. Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that she needed this
income for her medical expenses and daily sustenance. But it can be gleaned from her application
that, aside from her bare assertion that petitioner Mila solely appropriated the fruits and rentals
earned from the disputed properties in connivance with some of her siblings, Dominalda has not
presented or alleged anything else to prove that the disputed properties were in danger of being
wasted or materially injured and that the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and
feasible means to preserve their integrity.
Further, there is nothing in the RTC’s February 8 and July 19, 2010 Resolutions that says why the
disputed properties might be in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured while in the hands
of the defendants a quo. Neither did the RTC explain the reasons which compelled it to have them
placed under receivership. The RTC simply declared that placing the disputed properties under
receivership was urgent and merely anchored its approval on the fact that Dominalda was an elderly
in need of funds for her medication and sustenance. The RTC plainly concluded that since the
purpose of the receivership is to procure money from the proceeds of these properties to spend for
medicines and other needs of the Dominalda, who is old and sickly, this circumstance falls within the
purview of Sec. 1(d), that is, "Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver
is the most convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property
in litigation."

Verily, the RTC’s purported determination that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient
and feasible means of preserving, administering or disposing of the properties is nothing but a
hollow conclusion drawn from inexistent factual considerations.

Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S-760 are the registered owners of the
disputed properties that were in their possession. In cases such as this, it is settled jurisprudence
that the appointment should be made only in extreme cases and on a clear showing of necessity in
order to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or damage.22

This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession
of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer
property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute
and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident
usurpation.23

Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights
of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the determination of their
respective claims to the title of such property24 unless such property is in danger of being materially
injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it or its portions are being
occupied by third persons claiming adverse title.25

It must be underscored that in this case, Dominalda’s claim to the disputed properties and her share
in the properties’ income and produce is at best speculative precisely because the ownership of the
disputed properties is yet to be determined in Civil Case No. S-760. Also, except for Dominalda’s
claim that she has an interest in the disputed properties, Dominalda has no relation to their produce
or income. 1âwphi1

By placing the disputed properties and their income under receivership, it is as if the applicant has
obtained indirectly what she could not obtain directly, which is to deprive the other parties of the
possession of the property until the controversy between them in the main case is finally
settled.26 This Court cannot countenance this arrangement.

To reiterate, the RTC’s approval of the application for receivership and the deprivation of petitioners
of possession over the disputed properties would be justified only if compelling reasons exist.
Unfortunately, no such reasons were alleged, much less proved in this case.

In any event, Dominalda’s rights may be amply protected during the pendency of Civil Case No. S-
760 by causing her adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title covering the disputed
properties.27
Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall
require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented.
The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as
in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is
required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the
discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any
time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.

G.R. No. 168332               June 19, 2009

ANA MARIA A. KORUGA, Petitioner, 

vs.
TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR., ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, CESAR S. PAGUIO, FRANCISCO A.
RIVERA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 169053               June 19, 2009

TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR., ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, CESAR S. PAGUIO, and FRANCISCO A.

RIVERA,Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 138, Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
and ANA MARIA A. KORUGA, Respondents.

THE MONETARY BOARD EXERCISES EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER PROCEEDINGS OF

RECEIVERSHIP INVOLVING BANKS; A REGULAR COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE THE PROPRIETY OF APPOINTING A RECEIVER IN A CASE INVOLVING A BANK

AN ORDER FROM THE MONETARY BOARD PLACING A BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP MAY
NOT BE QUESTIONED EXCEPT BY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE
STOCKHOLDERS REPRESENTING MAJORITY OF THE CAPITAL STOCK WITHIN 10 DAYS
FROM RECEIPT BY THE BOARD OF SUCH ORDER

Section 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. - Whenever, upon report of the head of
the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:

(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business:
Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands
induced by financial panic in the banking community;

(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its
liabilities; or

(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or
creditors; or

(d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final,
involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the
institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior
 hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.

xxxx

The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be
final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for
certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse
of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed
by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from
receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or
conservatorship.

The designation of a conservator under Section 29 of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under
this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. Furthermore, the designation of a
conservator is not a precondition to the designation of a receiver.33

On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over proceedings for receivership of banks.

Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision that says the "appointment of a receiver under this section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board." The term "exclusively" connotes that only the
Monetary Board can resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and,
upon an affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is further affirmed by the
fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action "summarily and without need for prior
hearing."

And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides that "actions of the Monetary Board taken under this
section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set
aside by the court except on a petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction."
1avvphi1

From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide
a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership.

G.R. No. 174356               January 20, 2010

EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES, Petitioners, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS, Respondents.

Two. In any event, we hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the property in dispute in
this case. For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed,
or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of
imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the
remedy is not receivership.6

Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce.
She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not
entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially injured,
necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be
granted only in extreme situations,7 Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not.
Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted
her.8

REPLEVIN
G.R. No. 111080             April 5, 2000

JOSE S. OROSA and MARTHA P. OROSA, petitioners, 

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FCP CREDIT CORPORATION, respondents.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner, 

vs.
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 151079             January 28, 2008

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner, 

vs.
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 151372             January 28, 2008

REGINA M. ASTORGA, petitioner, 
vs.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and ANN MARGARET V. SANTIAGO, respondents.

A REPLEVIN CASE MAY BE HEARD BY THE REGULAR COURTS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A

LABOR CASE BEING HEARD BEFORE THE NLRC INVOLVING A CAR WHICH IS PART OF AN
EMPLOYEE’S BENEFIT PACKAGE

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may
recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully
detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover
property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property.30 The term may refer
either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally
associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained
during the pendency of the action.31

That the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC of Makati City was one for
replevin hardly admits of doubt.
Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted
well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of
the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil,
dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer
relations.33 As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante,34 this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit,
explained:

Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff.
The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained
by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or
possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has
wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the
pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor
Arbiters.

The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The
respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other.

A.M. No. P-07-2384             June 18, 2008

KENNETH HAO, complainant, 
vs.
ABE C. ANDRES, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, respondent.

THE SHERIFF SHOULD NOT DELIVER THE SEIZED ARTICLES TO THE APPLICANT BEFORE
THE EXPIRATION OF THE 5-DAY PERIOD TO GIVE THE ADVERSE PARTY SUFFICIENT TIME
TO OBJECT THE REPLEVIN

Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are well-defined steps provided in the
Rules of Court regarding the proper implementation of a writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure.
The Rules, likewise, is explicit on the duty of the sheriff in its implementation. To recapitulate what
should be common knowledge to sheriffs, the pertinent provisions of Rule 60, of the Rules of Court
are quoted hereunder:

SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff.–Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof
on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must
forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his
agent, and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a
building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered, he must
cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the property into his
possession. After the sheriff has taken possession of the property as herein provided,
he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party
entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and
keeping the same. (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.–If within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or
of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its
approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the
 return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not
forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any
reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse
party. (Emphasis supplied.)

First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately
to the plaintiff.22 In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days
in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the
surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond.
This, he failed to do.

Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor vehicles on October 17,
2005, four on October 18, 2005, and another three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as
evidenced by the depository receipts, on October 18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six of the
seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19, 2005. Consequently, there is
no question that Silver was already in possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after
seizure, or no more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres committed a clear
violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with regard to the proper disposal of the
property.

It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as stated
in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately
delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five
days.23 Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to Silver
for whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.

G.R. No. 153788               November 27, 2009

ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and
KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents.

ANY ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS MAY BRING AN ACTION FOR THE RECOVERY OF CO-
OWNED PROPERTIES

DEMAND IS NOT REQUIRED FOR FILING OF A REPLEVIN ACTION

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any
kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely
the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for
a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.25 [Emphasis supplied.]

Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover
possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is
consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either spouse
may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the
property in question without the other spouse’s consent.

Demand not required prior

to filing of replevin action

In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed, Navarro
apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:

Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the
facts:

(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;

(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;

(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise
placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody;
and

(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the
property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party
if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover
from the applicant in the action.

We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the
possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not
a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as
he has already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him,
demanding that he either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles. Navarro’s
position that a demand is necessary and has not been made is therefore totally unmeritorious.

G.R. No. 182963               June 3, 2013

SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER, Petitioners, 

vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Respondent.
Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido15 that prior demand is not a condition precedent
to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court
that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a
writ of replevin could be filed.

The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by
payment. A promissory note in the hands of the creditor is a proof of indebtedness rather than proof
of payment. In an action for replevin by a mortgagee, it is prima facie evidence that the promissory
note has not been paid. Likewise, an uncanceled mortgage in the possession of the mortgagee
gives rise to the presumption that the mortgage debt is unpaid.23

SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999

MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN
CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D.
ANDRES, respondents.

SUPPORT CANNOT BE RENOUNCED, NOR CAN IT BE TRANSMITTED TO A THIRD PERSON

IT CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF A COMPROMISE

The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301
of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:

Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted
to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the
obligor. . . .

Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.

The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of

the right to support is stated, thus:

The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his
existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean
sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce;
hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.

xxx xxx xxx

To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person

to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a
public burden. This is contrary to public policy. 4

In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that
she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his
paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation
between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such
manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any
and all future complaint for support.

The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would
be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum
that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent's mother for the
dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the
prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the
claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that
must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be
left to the will or agreement of the parties.

The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because
the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver
and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot
be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person neither can it be
compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the
right to support cannot be waived or transferred to third parties and future support
cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135,
cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable
that the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the
previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing
that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits,
as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for
support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of
plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that
her cause for action is accrues.. . .

Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's
pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still
prosper.

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
MANUEL MANAHAN, alias "Maning," defendant-appellant.

On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a
quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also
be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and
"in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the
child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the
accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, 16 the rule is that if
the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should
there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the
judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused
to support the child as it is in accordance with law.

G.R. No. 163209               October 30, 2009

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, Petitioners, 

vs.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM,
CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III, Respondents.

GRANDPARENTS MAY BE COMPELLED TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THEIR GRANDCHILD IF THE

PARENTS OF THE CHILD ARE INCAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE CHILD

We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners’ liability
to the amount of monthly support needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III only.

Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren

By statutory9 and jurisprudential mandate,10 the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their

descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the
narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions11 found
in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability
is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination12 or
suspension13 during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support,
Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children,14 petitioners submit that the
obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the
scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant
provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on
Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority
encompasses the obligation to provide legal support,15 they differ in other concerns including
the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees.16 Thus,
although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child,17the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally
lasts during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative
parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension,
the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents
but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising
the ancillary issue of an ascendant’s obligation to give support in light of the father’s sufficient
means:

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this
view.

xxxx
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there
any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide
for her grandson's legal support. x x x18 (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents, ₱6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic
needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of
their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal19 lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to
petitioners’ theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation
of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree
removed are more than able to fill the void. 1avvphi1

However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category.
Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward,
arising from their marital bond.20 Unfortunately, Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support
the trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand
the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.21

Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under

The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 165166               August 15, 2012

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, 
vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

AMOUNT OF SUPPORT IS VARIABLE; DEPENDENT ON THE NEEDS OF THE RECIPIENT AND

ON THE MEANS OF THE PERSON OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT

We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but
also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or
inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child."
31

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for
45 

sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no
46 

final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
47 

proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support. 48
G.R. Nos. 175279-80               June 5, 2013

SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, 
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.

The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:

Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of
work. (Emphasis supplied.)

As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
to the needs of the recipient.18 Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.

Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment
of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu
proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.19 Because of
its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.20

Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule on
Provisional Orders24

Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the
following rules:

(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the
spouses may be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership.

(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of time
as the court may deem just and reasonable based on their standard of living during the
marriage.

(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse seeking
support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse
not to seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education and
training to enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that
spouse’s future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative
 financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the labor
market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to
the marriage, including services rendered in home-making, child care, education, and career
building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the physical and
emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support,
taking into account that spouse’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets,
and standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.

(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of
the spouse.

Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the properties
of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.

Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount
necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.

In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following
factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child;
(2) the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the
standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the
parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.

The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.

On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as
relevant the following rulings by US courts.

The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the
mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments
become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments
voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However,
special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his
indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra.
The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such credits may be
allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited
against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite
granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of
drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two
expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of
petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods
(clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support
pendente lite.

In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that aside from
paying the expenses of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars
and credit cards of which the expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs
of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of more than One Hundred Thousand
(₱100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the private respondent that she
needs the total amount of ₱113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other
miscellaneous expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2)
children, and to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him through the credit
cards he provided them in the amount of ₱100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly
support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount
of ₱115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs.
This monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of ₱115,000.00 excludes the
amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive (₱135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance
expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable
upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support of ₱115,000.00 is without
prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private respondent as the
circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the
proceedings for the main action for support.

…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.36

G.R. No. 201043               June 16, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines

Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner, 
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.

IF THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES FROM RA 9262, RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE NOT
EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION

Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s directive for the automatic deduction of 50%
from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military
personnel.

The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638,  which states: Section 31.
15

The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned,
ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property
accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be
withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)

A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x

xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the
members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his
exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with
his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the
GSIS.

In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,  we held that a court order directing the Philippine
16

National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half
of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter’s conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it
violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.

The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39
enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:

SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

xxxx

(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension
or gratuity from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will.  Statutes must be so
17

construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of

jurisprudence.  However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the
18

later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.
19

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying
down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to
the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."

Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products:

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be
sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers
to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.
23

We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.

It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation.  In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act  allow
1âwphi1
24

garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal
obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity
problems" and provide that "moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to
child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government
agencies attaching funds in their possession." 25

Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of
violence committed against women – economic abuse.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;

2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. Destroying household property;

4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money
or properties.28

The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are
victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal
safety and security.

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."29

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, 

v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent.
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioner’s counsel informing this Court that
petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.

The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is not
barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner, 
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT SHALL BE DETERMINED BASED ON THE NATIONAL LAW

OF THE GIVER BECAUSE SUPPORT PERTAINS TO FAMILY RIGHTS AND DUTIES

FURTHER, FOREIGN LAW MUST BE PROPERLY PLEADED AND PROVED, OTHERWISE

DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION WILL TAKE PLACE

FURTHER, THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE FOREIGNER CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED IF IT RUNS

COUNTER TO A PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC ORDER OR GOOD CUSTOMS OF THE FORUM

NOT PROVIDING SUPPORT UNDER RA 9262 5(E)(2) IS A CONTINUING OFFENSE

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195  of the New Civil
34

Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15  of the New
35

Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by
their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject
to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.  In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
40

national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support.  While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
41

is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,  has already enunciated that:
42

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine
of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.  Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
44

has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid
down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable
in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,  to wit:
49

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son, to wit:

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,  which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
53

instant case has clearly not prescribed.

INTERPLEADER
G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.

A STAKEHOLDER NEED NOT AWAIT THE FILING OF CLAIMS AGAINST HIM, OTHERWISE HE
MAY BE BARRED BY LACHES OR DELAY

IT IS GENERAL RULE THAT A STAKEHOLDER, TO BE ENTITLED TO AN INTERPLEADER,

MUST HAVE NOT BEEN INDEPENDENTLY LIABLE TO ANY PARTY. OTHERWISE, IT IS
TANTAMOUNT TO A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE JUDGMENT

The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure,   is a remedy whereby
2

a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be
required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or the one
thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double
vexation in respect of one liability.   The procedure under the Rules of Court   is the same as that
3 4

under the Code of Civil Procedure,   except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is
5

available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter
an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or
relates to the performance of an obligation.

There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and
timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining.

A stakeholder   should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court.   He need
6 7

not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader.   He
8

should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without
waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants.   Otherwise, he may be barred by
9

laches   or undue delay.   But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental
10 11

circumstances, the remedy is not barred.  12

Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view of all the circumstances, such that it
may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of the conflicting
claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the
present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by
Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred
to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final
judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been executed. It is not therefore
too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has
been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants,   especially where he had
13

notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered.

It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for
an order of intrepleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites,
that he has not become independently liable to any of the claimants. 25 Tex. Jur. p.
52, Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p. 218, Section 8.
 It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after
judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being
especially true when the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior
to the rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to implead the adverse
claimants in the suit in which the judgment was rendered. United Procedures Pipe
Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v. McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74
S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 A.L.R.,
note 5, p. 275. 16

Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to
proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in
an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final
judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan in the same
litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper because it was
filed much too late.

To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful establishment of his
rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to diminish
the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that
the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done because having
elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, the
Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.

Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader
suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect
be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made
independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would
in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had
already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and,
therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase
instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possiblity
that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him;
and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of
interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable
delay.

G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION, petitioner, 

vs.
FIRST SPECIAL CASES DIVISION INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NORTH
PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, respondents.

IN INTERPLEADER, THE COURT MAY DEMAND THE DEPOSIT OF THE PROPERTY UNTIL
FINAL JUDGMENT HAS BEEN RENDERED

In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted among others
in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent;
that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to
said amounts. Such admissions in the complaint were reaffirmed in open court before the Court of
Appeals as stated in the latter court's resolution dated September 5, 1985 in A.C. G.R. No. 04869
which states:

Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections to the
deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing a
complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature
of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program
(Rollo, p. 252).

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the
disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the
property or funds in controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the
plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the
suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto." (Rollo, p. 24).

The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and mandatory
injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on
interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal
Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it
clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the
requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court. (Rollo,
p.-25)

Petitioner would now compound the issue by its obvious turn-about, presently claiming in its
memorandum that there is a novation of contract so that the amounts due under the Land
Development Agreement were allegedly extinguished, and the requirement to make a deposit of said
amounts in a depositary bank should be held in abeyance until after the conflicting claims of
ownership now on trial before Branch CXXII RTC-Caloocan City, has finally been resolved.

All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been established, riot only in the
lower courts and in the Court of Appeals but also in the Supreme Court where such deposit was
required in "the resolution of July 8, 1987 to avoid wastage of funds.

G.R. No. 136409               March 14, 2008

SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA, Petitioners, 

vs.
DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC., Respondent.

What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners’ non-payment of rentals
because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not
justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They
should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of
payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.

Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to
accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum
due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases:

xxxx

(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;

x x x x.

Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial authority,
before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the
consignation in other cases.57

In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals.
The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous
to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him.58 Petitioners claim that they made a written
tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient
to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would not
constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that tender of
payment must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be
produced.59

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves.

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect).60 The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him
against double vexation in respect of one liability.61

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making
payments.

G.R. Nos. 154470-71               September 24, 2012

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, 
vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 154589-90

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, 

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.
INTERPLEADER MAY BE RAISED IN AN ANSWER-IN-INTERPLEADER

DOCKET FEES ARE JURISDICTIONAL; WHERE AN INITIATORY PLEADING IS FILED WITHOUT

THE PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES, PAYMENT MAY BE ALLOWED THEREAFTER BUT NEVER
BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD

Interpleader

1. as a special civil action

What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an
original complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is
considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its
claim recorded in the BSP’s books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a
potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an
alternative position, made only in the BSP’s Answer. 135

The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions
in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil
actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as
136 

part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation
to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a
137 

claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his
138  139 

answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s "counter-
complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.

Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through
140  141 

the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion, seeking relief which essentially
142 

consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that "payment is made
to the rightful or legitimate owner" of the subject CB bills.
143 

The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as a
stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it,
thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.

Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the
uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing
ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third
(fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim
is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting
claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-
complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.

1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
 therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. [underscoring
ours]

This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:

SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. – The docket and other
lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and litigation
expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court
shall order otherwise.

only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated the interpleader suit,
and who, under the Rules, actually "claims no interest whatever in the subject matter." By
constituting a lien on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in effect only aims to actually
compensate the complainant-in-interpleader, who happens to be the stakeholder unfortunate
enough to get caught in a legal crossfire between two or more conflicting claimants, for the faultless
trouble it found itself into. Since the defendants-in-interpleader are actually the ones who make a
claim - only that it was extraordinarily done through the procedural device of interpleader - then to
them devolves the duty to pay the docket fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. 151

The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee cannot be overemphasized:

The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray
court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to the
judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on
the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant. 152

DECLARATORY RELIEF
G.R. No. 150806             January 28, 2008

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, 

vs.
BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his
rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that
such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the
circumstances. 15

Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful
and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons
whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.16
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners
insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.

We do not agree.

After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent
complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals
stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the
pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a
breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial
court the petition for declaratory relief.

Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission,
ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the
subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum.

We are not convinced.

It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation 17 we held that the petition for
declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful
detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory
relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be
preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had
not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition.
In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.

We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol18 where the declaratory
relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer
suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the
declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from
applying Teodoro to the instant case.

Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory
relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case
before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as
it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual
stipulations subject of this controversy.

Now, on the substantive law issues.

Petitioners repeatedly made a demand on respondent for the payment of VAT and for rental
adjustment allegedly brought about by extraordinary inflation or devaluation. Both the trial court and
the appellate court found no merit in petitioners' claim. We see no reason to depart from such
findings.

In short, petitioners are estopped from shifting to respondent the burden of paying the VAT.

Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise, unavailing. This provision
clearly states that respondent can only be held liable for new taxes imposed after the effectivity of
the contract of lease, that is, after May 1997, and only if they pertain to the lot and the building where
the leased premises are located. Considering that RA 7716 took effect in 1994, the VAT cannot be
considered as a "new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the sixth stipulation.

Neither can petitioners legitimately demand rental adjustment because of extraordinary inflation or
devaluation.

Petitioners contend that Article 1250 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case because the
contract stipulation speaks of extraordinary inflation or devaluation while the Code speaks of
extraordinary inflation or deflation. They insist that the doctrine pronounced in Del Rosario v. The
Shell Company, Phils. Limited20 should apply.

Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties, and
such determination must take into account the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
This intention, once ascertained, is deemed an integral part of the contract.21

While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of "extraordinary inflation or devaluation" as
compared to Article 1250's "extraordinary inflation or deflation," we find that when the parties used
the term "devaluation," they really did not intend to depart from Article 1250 of the Civil Code.
Condition No. 7 of the contract should, thus, be read in harmony with the Civil Code provision.

That this is the intention of the parties is evident from petitioners' letter22 dated January 26, 1998,
where, in demanding rental adjustment ostensibly based on condition No. 7, petitioners made
explicit reference to Article 1250 of the Civil Code, even quoting the law verbatim. Thus, the
application of Del Rosario is not warranted. Rather, jurisprudential rules on the application of Article
1250 should be considered.

Article 1250 of the Civil Code states:

In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene,

the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis
of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.

Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or both, without a corresponding
increase in business transaction. There is inflation when there is an increase in the volume of money
and credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general
price level.23 In a number of cases, this Court had provided a discourse on what constitutes
extraordinary inflation, thus:

[E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power
of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of
said currency, and such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or
was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of
the obligation.24

The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of extraordinary
inflation or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would
like to stress that the erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades,
starting in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial
notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that span of time, such
downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated
by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or declaration by
competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during a given period, the effects of
extraordinary inflation are not to be applied. 25

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts
its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the
case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12

G.R. No. 181303               September 17, 2009

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO,
LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their
Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners, 
vs.
BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND
MARIA LIGUTAN,Respondents.

RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

MTC HAS ALSO JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS FOR SIMILAR RELIEFS (REFORMATION OF
INSTRUMENT, QUIETING OF TITLE AND CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP)

THE ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT BEFORE THERE IS BREACH OR VIOLATION

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract
or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights
or duties thereunder.21

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly
made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances
in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under
this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action
for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an
action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to
consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.22

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that
an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" – that an action for
quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive
and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.23

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses
the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed ₱20,000.00, thus:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No.
02-48386 is only ₱410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title to and possession of the
said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance
therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only
before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for
declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state
where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.25

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.26

In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed
only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of ownership over the subject property before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners’ title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of
their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of
possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s
recovery of possession over the real property as owner.27 1avvphi1

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction
of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the
consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an
action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If
the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or
motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

G.R. No. 202242               July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
THE SC MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF GIVING DUE
CONSIDERATION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AT HAND

Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to first ascertain the
nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations therein and the character of the relief sought, the Court views the petition as essentially
an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 25

The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII
as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the
adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very
declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the
fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among
those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.26

At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to the
sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After all, the
petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2)
representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.

G.R. No. 181359               August 5, 2013

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners, 

vs.
JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI,
JR., Respondent.

The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.

On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be
instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule
63 of the Rules of Court,29 an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be
brought in the appropriate RTC.

It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998
letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud from
being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a
declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of
sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991, or
ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the
subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia was no
longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.

The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between
him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public document
under the Civil Code,33 is only for convenience, and not for validity or enforceability.34 And because it
remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to
petitioners, for his ownership thereof had ceased.

Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no
longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was
unrecorded.35 Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and void.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do
not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.36

G.R. No. 204603               September 24, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONALDEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE CHIEFOF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Petitioners, 
vs.
HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, MORO CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE, FR. JOE DIZON,
RODINIE SORIANO, STEPHANIE ABIERA, MARIA LOURDES ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE ALFEREZ,
CZARINA MAYALTEZ, SHERYL BALOT, RENIZZA BATACAN, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, LEANA
CARAMOAN, ALDWIN CAMANCE, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, RODRIGO
FAJARDO III, ANNAMARIE GO, ANNA ARMINDA JIMENEZ, MARY ANN LEE,LUISA
MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, NORMAN ROLAND OCANA III,
WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, CHERRY LOU REYES, MELISSA ANN SICAT,
CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA TORNO, and HON. JUDGE ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN, as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 92, Respondents.

A DECLARATORY RELIEF DEMANDS THAT THERE BE PARTICULAR, REAL OR IMMINENT

THREAT TO THE PETITIONER

Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:

first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no breach
of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.34

Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first,35 second,36 and
third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however,
remain wanting.

As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one exists in this case.

Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.38 Corollary thereto,
by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a
dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity,
passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts
indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by
tranquilizing declaration.39

A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as
a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual
milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as
citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the
enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which
were addressed to the general public.40 They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended
towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372
against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held
in Southern Hemisphere:

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction
to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
1âwphi1

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions
out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since
the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on
real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.41 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases
on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one),
the RTC should have dismissed private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all the same.

As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-
discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely
theorized.  It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
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had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.47 This private respondents failed to
demonstrate in the case at bar.

Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the
availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in
the first place.

G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY HON.
ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, Petitioners, 
v. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON. FELICITAS O. LARON-CACANINDIN, IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 17, RONNIE C.
SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA CUESTA, ROGEL C. GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D.CRUZ,
LILIBETH S. SANDAG, RAYMOND P. VENTURA, MA. LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ,
MA. LOURDES V. MANGAOANG, FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO, MARIETTA D.
ZAMORANOS, CARMELITA M. TALUSAN,1] AREFILES H. CARREON,2] AND ROMALINO G.
VALDEZ, Respondents.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry out
their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence.8 The doctrine entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies.9 Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative remedies are
available, is a ground for dismissal of the action.

The doctrine, however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively
so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (7) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where
the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto
proceedings.10cralawrednad

In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and unconstitutional.
Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. This case clearly
falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be resorted to by
respondents.

REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS OF COMELEC AND COA

G.R. No. 206987               September 10, 2013

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

We dismiss the petition.

The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice
and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.5
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.6

ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it promulgated the assailed
Resolution without giving ANAD the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing, thus violating its right
to due process. It is to be noted, however, that ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing on
23 August 2013, during which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANAD’s president, authenticated documents
and answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD’s qualifications.7

ANAD, nonetheless, insists that the COMELEC should have called for another summary hearing
after this Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the
parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Comelec . This is a superfluity.

ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the summary hearing of 23
August 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence to establish
said qualifications. In re-evaluating ANAD’s qualifications in accordance with the parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC , the COMELEC need not have called another summary
hearing. The Comelec could, as in fact it did,8 readily resort to documents and other pieces of
evidence previously submitted by petitioners in re-appraising ANAD’s qualifications. After all, it can
be presumed that the qualifications, or lack thereof, which were established during the summary
hearing of 23 August2012 continued until election day and even there after.

As to ANAD’s averment that the COMELEC erred in finding that it violated election laws and
regulations, we hold that the COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on
matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.9

As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three nominees instead of
five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941( An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor).10 Such factual
finding of the COMELEC was based on the Certificate of Nomination presented and marked by
petitioner during the 22 and 23 August 2012summary hearings.11

Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard against
arbitrariness. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to substitute
1âwphi1

and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the list to
the COMELEC.

CERTIORARI
G.R. No. 192685               July 31, 2013

OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Registrar, Register of
Deeds, Pasig City, FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA O.
CHENG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199115

OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner, 
vs.
POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Respondent.

Despite the Ombudsman’s categorical dismissal of his complaint, Ampil is adamant on the existence
of probable cause to bring respondents to trial for falsification of the CCTs, and for violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. In fact, he argues that Espenesin has been held
administratively liable by the Ombudsman for altering the CCTs. At the time of the filing of G.R. No.
192685, the Ombudsman had not yet reversed its previous resolution finding Espenesin liable for
simple misconduct. He insists that the admission by respondents Espenesin and Serrano that they
altered the CCTs should foreclose all questions on all respondents’ (Espenesin’s, Serrano’s,
Yuchengco’s and Cheng’s) liability for falsification and their commission of corrupt practices, under
the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019, respectively. In all, Ampil maintains that the
Ombudsman’s absolution of respondents is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of discretion in
the Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition of Ampil’s complaint.

The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate the
Office of the Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’
and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the
execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.19

Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to
determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof.20 On this score, we have consistently
hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally
mandated powers.21 The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal
case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and
so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.22

However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining
probable cause:

(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;

(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;

(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

 (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.23 (Emphasis supplied).

The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.

G.R. No. 200804               January 22, 2014

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, 

vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.

DECISIONS ON SMALL CLAIMS CASES MAY BE QUESTIONED VIA RULE 65, BECAUSE
APPEAL IS NOT AVAILABLE

RECOURSE TO 65 MUST OBSERVE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:

SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based
on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered
by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the
parties.

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy
of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution.  Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
25

proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy,  does not preclude the aggrieved party from
26

filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been
enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,  wherein it was held
27

that:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is
always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law."

Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the
RTC).  To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
1âwphi1

jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a
31

party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the
issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the
Court.  This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
32 33
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts,  certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding
34

Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before
the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in
dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case
No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.

G.R. No. 190566               December 11, 2013

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner, 

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its
incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.

EMPLOYEES GOVERNED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND PENALIZED WITH SUSPENSION
OF NOT MORE THAN 30 DAYS HAVE NO RECOURSE TO APPEAL; 65 IS PROPER

ONLY ERRORS OF JURISDICTION OR PRESENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION MAY

BE QUESTIONED BY A 65

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of
the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice,
for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions:

(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is
irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified
political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot. 29
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by
Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.

In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law.  For
1âwphi1

what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not
more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a
clear policy reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They
are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To
allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our
administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these
administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on
government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to
eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity
from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions
exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a decision
acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.

Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law
are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco,  we held:
32

Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and
unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the
same. The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate
jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be
questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared
by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a
contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of
the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.It bears stressing that the
judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari
ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
PAGCOR, not an appeal.

Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are
entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case
fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive. 33

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal
of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any
legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an
error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts
exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent
court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the
evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred
or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.  Considering the circumstances
34

and since this Court is not a trier of facts,   remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution
35

is in order.

G.R. No. 208290               December 11, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE CAESAR A. CASANOVA,
HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-GRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL
SECOND DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO
MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.

65 MAY BE AVAILED OF WITHIN A NON-EXTENDIBLE PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE

RECEIPT OF THE DECISION OR ORDER

At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for the
filing thereof under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was
received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the
RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M.
Campos Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of
judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According to Atty.
Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the May 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA.
Thus, it was prayed that the petition be given due course despite its late filing.

This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be
instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.  While there are recognized
13

exceptions  to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
14

liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.
15

In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to
warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on
August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse
this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also sanction a
seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the
reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.

G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her
capacity as Secretary of the Board, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL, respondents.

On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said
writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of
suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his
course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers
only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own making,
which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the
overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition
of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning.

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a
showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required.   It is of no avail
38

against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment.  39

Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally
forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was
peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the
decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing and that is, to violate the suspension order by
enrolling for the first semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that the University
officials helplessly watching him complete his academic requirements for taking the Bar.   In the
40

event that he be allowed to continue with his studies he would, in effect render moot and academic
the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally imposed upon him by the BOR's final decision of
March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other aspirants for STFAP scholarships from misleading the
University authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in instant case, withholding vital
information and stating downright falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity? Not only
would this undermine the authority of the U.P. to discipline its students who violated the rules and
regulations of the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very concept and lofty intent to give
financial assistance to poor but deserving students through the STFAP which, incidentally, has not
ceased refining and modifying it's operations.

G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988

ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad S.

Viado, petitioners, 
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and the NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in her own behalf and in behalf of the
other members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association," petitioners-intervenors.

A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY BE TREATED AS ONE FOR PROHIBITION

The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari   may
9

properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be
directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with
the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while
Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be
shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.

The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a
determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the
parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function,   or an exercise of
10

jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause.   He 11

adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent
transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the
lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ...
(the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the
adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by
the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the
Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said
property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.

These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in
the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never
vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law   — the judicial acts done by him were in the
12

circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his
office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he
had assumed as head of the martial law regime.

In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the
averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter.   Considered in this wise, it will
13

also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not
granted to him by the Constitution or the laws — and had furthermore performed the act in violation
of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be
proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the
appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the
basic averments of the parties' pleadings.  14

G.R. No. 203124               June 22, 2015

PROVINCE OF LEYTE, herein represented by MR. RODOLFO BADIABLE, in his capacity as

the ICO-Provincial Treasurer, Province of Leyte, Petitioner, 
vs.
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

SINCE CERTIORARI IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION, COURT MUST ACQUIRE JURISDICTION

OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENT; JURISDICTION OVER
THE PETITIONER IS ACQUIRED UPON THE FILING OF THE PETITION WHILE JURISDICTION
OVER THE RESPONDENT IS ACQUIRED BY THE SERVICE OF THE ORDER OR THROUGH HIS
VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION

At the outset, it must be stressed that the instant case was elevated to the CA via a petition for
certiorari which is, by nature, an original and independent action, and therefore, not considered as
part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.  Being an
21

original action, there is a need for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the
case before it can resolve the same on the merits. Naturally, the CA acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner – which is the Province of Leyte in this case – upon the filing of the certiorari
petition. On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court (Rules), which covers cases
originally filed before the CA, provides how the CA is able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. – The court shall acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial
action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.

Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA , the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent upon: ( a ) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA’s initial action on
the petition to the respondent; or ( b ) the voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA’s
jurisdiction. In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution  dated November 4,
22

2009 indicating its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing
EDC to file a comment to the petition, among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive
by filing its comment  dated December 14, 2009 to such petition. Hence, the CA had already
23

acquired jurisdiction over both parties to the instant case.

G.R. No. 207145               July 28, 2015

GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON, DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V. APOLINARES,

MA. LUISA S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M. INTIA, RUBEN C. CALIWATAN,
ADOLFO Q. ROSALES, MA. LUISA NAVARRO, and the PHILIPPINE PUBLIC HEALTH
ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners, 
vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM); ENRIQUE T. ONA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Health (DOH); and FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), Respondents.

RULE 65 CANNOT BE USED TO QUESTION A LEGISLATIVE OR QUASI-LEGISLATIVE ACT OF

AN OFFICER SUCH AS ISSUANCE OF JOINT CIRCULAR ON LONGEVITY PAY AND HAZARD
PAY

At the outset, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners is not the appropriate
remedy to assail the validity of respondents' circulars. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court provide:

RULE 65
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxxx
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require. 10

Thus, on the one hand, certiorari as a special civil action is available only if: (1) it is directed against
a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. 11

On the other hand, prohibition is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal,
corporation, board or person acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Based on the foregoing, this Court has
12

consistently reiterated that petitions for certiorari and prohibition may be invoked only against
tribunals, corporations, boards, officers, or persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, and not against their exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative functions. 13

Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertaking to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties.  Quasi judicial functions apply to the actions and discretion of public administrative officers
14

or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action, in their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.  Ministerial functions are those
15

which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner
and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. 16

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights under which adverse claims are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with authority to
determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.  In this case,
17

respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their issuance of the
assailed joint circulars. In issuing and implementing the subject circulars, respondents were not
called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a
judicial nature. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH of the
questioned joint circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative
functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by them in their exercise of
delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government. 18

Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie against herein respondents' issuances. It
is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances illegal because
petitions for certiorari seek solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, and not to correct just any error
committed by a court, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such
court, board, or officer thereby acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 19

It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition since generally, the purpose of the same is to
keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice
in orderly channels. It affords relief against usurpation of jurisdiction by an inferior court, or when, in
the exercise of jurisdiction, the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. 20

SO ORDERED.

PROHIBITION
G.R. No. 191424               August 7, 2013

ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF

EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK, PETITIONER, 
vs.
THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

PROHIBITION IS USED TO PREVENT THE DOING OF AN ACT WHICH IS ABOUT TO BE DONE.

IT DOES NOT APPLY IN CASES WHERE THE ACTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy

To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March
4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the
MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set
aside except on a petition for certiorari.

Prohibition is already unavailing

Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the
circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior
court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction
with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers
legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising
jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it
has cognizance.26 In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as the law and justice require.
 x x x x.

Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct
the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.27 As a
rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be
done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.28

Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts
of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been
issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were
already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the
rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.29

The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA

Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4
of Rule 65 reads:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals. [Emphases supplied]

That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of
Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.30

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction,
however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file
a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason
which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal
to this Court only on pure questions of law.31 In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues
as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.

Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the
extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the
obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.32 The judicial policy must be
observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.

G.R. No. 186613               August 27, 2013

ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF

NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, PETITIONERS, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AS
REPRESENTED BY PROVINCIAL STATE AUDITOR OF LAGUNA MAXIMO L.
ANDAL, RESPONDENT.

Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to
when there is "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law."27

In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies
considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to
assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.

This Court finds the said contention plain self-deception.

As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative
process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even
granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or
resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales
to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature
since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM.
Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: "[a]n aggrieved
party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report,
memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to
the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit." From the final order or decision of the
Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper.28 It is the decision or resolution
of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.29

Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed
to exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the
auditing process has just begun but the petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a
Petition for Prohibition. In Fua, Jr. v. COA,30citing Sison v. Tablang,31 this Court declared that the
general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself
of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies
are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court
without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation. Also, in The Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit v. Court of Appeals and
Government Service Insurance System,32 this Court has extensively pronounced that:

If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be
sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition
of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case. x x x.

MANDAMUS
G.R. Nos. 174813-15               March 17, 2009

NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING

JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR
VILLARUEL, Petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon
City, Branch 86, Respondent.

ONCE THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, ANY DISPOSITION

THEREOF RESTS IN THE SOUND DISRECTION OF THE COURT; IT CANNOT BE COMPELLED
BY MANDAMUS

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of
the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the
arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of
the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to
due process of law.15

G.R. No. 161735               September 25, 2007

EX-C1C JIMMY B. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C SALVADOR A. METEORO, Petitioners, 

vs.
ROBERTO T. LASTIMOSO, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE,Respondent.

THE POWER TO APPOINT IS DISCRETIONARY; CANNOT BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS

We have repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions that the remedy of mandamus is employed only
to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to require anyone to fulfill a
discretionary one. The issuance of the writ is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.20 

In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has
a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an
imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a
right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt
exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to
implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded,
mandamus will not issue.22

Viewed in light of the said guideposts, the PNP Chief’s issuance of the orders for the absorption of
herein petitioners in the police force is not compellable by a writ of mandamus precisely because the
same does not involve a performance of a ministerial duty. Let it be noted that petitioners were
discharged from the PC service, subsequently cleared of the charges against them, applied for
reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon until the integration of the PC into the PNP
in 1990 when R.A. No. 697523 was enacted. Thus, we no longer speak of the reinstatement of the
petitioners to the service because the Philippine Constabulary no longer exists, but of their
employment in the PNP which is, as we held in Gloria v. De Guzman,24 technically an issuance of a
new appointment. The power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law.25 Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application
for a writ of mandamus.26

Furthermore, the petitioners do not have a clear legal right over the issuance of the absorption
orders. They cannot claim the right to be issued an appointment based on the NAPOLCOM
issuances, specifically Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105. Suffice it to state that R.A. No. 6975
clearly provides that the power to appoint PNP personnel with the rank of "Police Officer I" to "Senior
Police Officer IV" to which petitioners may be appointed27 is vested in the PNP regional director or in
the Chief of the PNP as the case may be, and not in the NAPOLCOM,

G.R. No. 156052             March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

THE CITY MAYOR MAY BE COMPELLED TO ENFORCE THE ORDINANCE AS IT IS HIS DUTY
TO ENFORCE THE LAW UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an
extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty
that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the
act required to be done.17

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ
of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the
office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18

To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance,
petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has
its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other
petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding
concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any
specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to
institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor,
to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city."20 One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

G.R. No. 193462               February 4, 2014

DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner, 

vs.
MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.

Evidently, and just like the peculiarity that attends the DOLE "verification fees," there is no consular
office for the collection of the "consular fees." Thus, the authority for the MECO to collect the
"reasonable fees," vested unto it by the executive order.

The "consular fees," although held and expended by the MECO by virtue of EO No. 15, s. 2001, are,
without question, derived from the exercise by the MECO of consular functions—functions it
performs by and only through special authority from the government. There was never any doubt
that the visas, passports and other documents that the MECO issues pursuant to its authorized
functions still emanate from the Philippine government itself.

Such fees, therefore, are received by the MECO to be used strictly for the purpose set out under EO
No. 15, s. 2001. They must be reasonable as the authorization requires. It is the government that
has ultimate control over the disposition of the "consular fees," which control the government did
exercise when it provided in Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001 that such funds may be kept by the
MECO "to defray the cost of its operations."

The Accounts of the MECO Pertaining to the Verification Fees and Consular Fees May Be Audited
by the COA.

The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially
entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan
without jeopardizing the country’s faithful commitment to the One China policy of the PROC.
However, despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form
of the "verification fees" it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the "consular fees" it collects under
Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO
pertaining to its collection of such "verification fees" and "consular fees" should be audited by the
COA.

G.R. No. 211362               February 24, 2015

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy, represented
by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners, 
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),Respondents.

x-----------------------x

FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her
own behalf,Petitioner-Intervenor.

MANDAMUS MAY NOT BE USED AGAINST THE EXERCISE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Propriety of a petition for mandamus

We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also
be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.

For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or
corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically
enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide
how or when to perform the duty.61

Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the commencement exercises, the same was rendered
moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014 without
including Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.

With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and entitlements
as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and commission as a new
Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of
academic freedom, which We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that
these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore,
beyond the province of the Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant
awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the
President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of Garcia:

There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of
the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses
is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the
prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue,
petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative
duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.67

The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain
to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law,
a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or
review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his
duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by
law.68

We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Once admitted, a
student's enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to
complete it.111 An institution of learning has an obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued with public interest because of
the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over a educational institutions.113

The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. "[It] has consequences
appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind -it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights
and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them
to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the
academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations."114

Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning,115has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this
Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire,117 which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a university: To determine for
itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught,
and (4) who may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution has the power to adopt and
enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very
object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the college.119 It can
decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or
interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some
restraint.120 Indeed, "academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a
privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a
long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every 'person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith."'121

The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and
that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to
student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is
like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power
assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this regard, the Court has always recognized
the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel,
on students who violate disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it
shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and
regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an
educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for
the protection of the students, faculty, and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The
Constitution no less imposes such duty.

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be
admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also
has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser
sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.126

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act
done by the student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals,127 We upheld the university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a
student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:

Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution
likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of
students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a
university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This
freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court of
Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy
that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to
join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations
conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to
graduate.

G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,

COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, 

v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.

INCLUSION IN THE LIST OF CANDIDATES, RESTS IN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE JBC
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first determine whether
or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the
petitioner was proper.

One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two
special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,10 this Court explained that:

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.11 (Citation
omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants,
the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines
and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the
exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC
has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of
oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the
laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with.
Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules,
nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may
order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.12

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the
JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being
attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire
about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.

Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The
petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not included
in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of
candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.

It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right
to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required.13The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to
perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the
performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.

The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a
course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in
his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the
list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications
for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in
the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on
the discretion of the JBC, thus:

The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment
to the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or her name be included in the
list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a
recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to the search,
screening, and selection process, and to use its discretion in deciding whether or not one should be
included in the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal right to be included in the list of
candidates simply because he or she possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications, then
the application process would then be reduced to a mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the
search, screening, and selection process would not only be unnecessary, but also improper.
However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's inclusion in the list of candidates is
subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees for a particular judicial
post. Such candidate's inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege
the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.

Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from a
first-level court to a second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a
promotion to second-level courts.15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by
mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.

QUO WARRANTO
G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999

PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, 
vs.
RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court  granting his petition
1

for quo warrantowhich ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service, and the payment of his back salaries and benefits.

Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the positions of Port
Security Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs from August
1972 to September 1975, Acting Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977 and
Customs Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988.  On March 1, 1988, he was
2

appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In
1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's
position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of
said office.

On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection
District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting
Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he
continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III.

In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario,
informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas'
appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:

Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel
V. Ramos and as a consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without
prejudice to [his] claim for all government benefits due [him].

Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS,
Bureau of Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."

Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and
without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.

On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the
Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258.   The case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a
3

decision was rendered granting the petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated
from office without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was
deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was
void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and
at the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full
back salaries and other benefits appurtenant thereto.

Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was
pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of
Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this
promotion, Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and
academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order
of dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996. 4

On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July
24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by
respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to
the quo warranto petition. 5

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals

questioning the order of the trial court.   On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
6

petition.   Hence, this recourse.

7

Petitioner claims that:

The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer
be issued, considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now
occupies the subject position. 8

The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to
show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which,
according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a
grant or authority from the state.  In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
9

determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the
privilege.   The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the
10

fiscal   against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a
11

ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without
being legally incorporated.   The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name who
12

claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.  13

Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.   If the court
14

finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the
office.   If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping,
15

intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:

Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found. — When the defendant is found guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted
and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may
be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the
parties to the action as justice requires.

If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or
unlawfully holding the same, the court may order:

(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;

(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;

(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right,
privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. 
16
The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion
of the court and on the relief sought.   In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for the following relief:
17

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether

excluded from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service of the Bureau of Customs, and petitioner be seated to the position as the one
legally appointed and entitled thereto.

Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for. 
18

In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that:

WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

granting this petition for quo warranto by:

1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of

Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the
Bureau of Customs; and

2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of

Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the
Bureau of Customs with full back wages and other monetary benefits
appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until
reinstated.  19

The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that respondent Allas be
ousted from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his stead. Although petitioner
did not specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages
and other monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested position "from the time they were
withheld until reinstated."

The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its
execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment
because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and he
was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same.
Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent
Olores, his successor-in-interest.  20

Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office.
This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.   A judgment in quo warranto does not
21

bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the
same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an
officer as such, but always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and
legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays
claim.   In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against
22

respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of
petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores.
The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.
Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
years on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for the
payment of his back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality
of the trial court's decision. 
23

Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was
merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his
constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the
said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition
for quo warranto. 24

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 41801 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168696             February 28, 2006

MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON PETER P. CALLEJA,

MA. JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and PERFECTO NIXON C.
TABORA, Petitioners, 
vs.
JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P.
MALLARI, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued on July 13, 2005.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines
Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages
and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents alleged that
from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who
are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of
armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents.

On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in
Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein
respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the action for quo warrantoshould be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides.
However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject
case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo
warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents
below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative
defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto.
Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses.
All the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda.

On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as
follows:

It is undisputed that the plaintiffs’ cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc.
which originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory
and adjudicated functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19,
2000, otherwise known as the Securities and Regulation Code, the Commission’s jurisdiction over all
cases enumerated in Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred ["]to the Court of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the "Supreme Court in
the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over these cases." Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the
exercise of said mandated authority, promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
which took effect 15 December 2000 designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try
and decide Securities and Exchange Commission Cases arising within their respective territorial
jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Region and within the respective provincesin the First
to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch
23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was designated as "special court" (Section 1, A.M.
No. 00-11-03-SC).

Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect
on March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that "all SEC cases originally
assigned or transmitted to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the
Regional Trial Court specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC.

On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on April 1, 2001.

From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to try
and decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2 of RA
8799, it is evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction "to try and decide
these cases to the "special courts" created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .

Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On
the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from
the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide
intra-corporate dispute.

In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to

Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies
(A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8)
and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this
case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate
controversies under R.A. 8799.
The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction set
on July 18, 2005 is hereby cancelled.

For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the
court of competent jurisdiction to rule upon.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately
elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The petition raises the following issues:

WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO

JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE
SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO CURE THE DEFECTS ON
VENUE AND JURISDICTION

II

WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED JANUARY 23, 2001
WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON MARCH 1, 2001 MAY BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE
WHICH WAS FILED ON MAY 16, 2005. 3

In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due course and
dismissed on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate in this case because the
Order dated July 13, 2005 is merely an interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 is the wrong remedy under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides that "all decisions and final
orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court;" and (3) the petition was intended merely to delay the proceedings in the trial court because
when the case was transferred to Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court, said court granted
petitioners’ motion to hold the proceedings in view of the present petition pending before this Court.

Subsequently, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging that on
January 12, 2006, respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men, assaulted the
premises of St. John Hospital in Naga City, taking away the daily hospital collections estimated at
₱400,000.00.

The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of July 13,
2005. It is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals
from judgments or final orders.4 The Order dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein
petitioners’ prayer in their Answer for the dismissal of respondents’ case against them. As a
consequence of the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of the case
to another branch of the Regional Trial Court that had been designated as a special court to hear
cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the order was merely interlocutory as it does not
dispose of the case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits. Such being the
case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a petition under Rule 45. As we held
in Tolentino v. Natanauan, 5 to wit:

In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the
well-settled rule that:

. . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor
can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the
ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be
followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment.6

It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for
more violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,7 the Court
proceeded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the petitioner
therein, stating thus:

While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an
interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an apparent error
committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to
ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari. Not much, after all, can be gained if the
Court were to refrain from now making a pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by
the parties.8

In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of the
parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond petitioners’ technical lapse of filing a
petition for review on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper
court. Thus, the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.

It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make
out a case for an intra-corporate controversy.9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court,
adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that Section 1,
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons
who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and
associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo
warrantoagainst corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No.
902-A as amended)."11

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:

5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been
transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an
office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines against

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

xxxx

As explained in the Unilongo12 case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains
the phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old
Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations
which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It
is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A.
No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warrantofiled by
respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners
to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.

The Interim Rules provide thus:

Section 1. (a) Cases covered. – These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in
civil cases involving the following:

xxxx

(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations,

between and among stockholders, members, or associates, and between, any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders,
members, or associates, respectively;

(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or

managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;

xxxx

SEC. 5. Venue. – All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation,
partnership, or association concerned. xxx (Emphasis ours)

Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
(effective December 15, 2000) designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and
decide cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the Fifth Judicial
Region, this Court designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit:

Camarines Sur (Naga City) Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.
Albay (Legaspi City) Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta
 Sorsogon (Sorsogon) Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor

Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective July 1, 2003, which provides
that:

1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a)

Resolutions of this Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9
July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M.
No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are
hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try and
decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their
jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission;

xxxx

4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within
their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region
and within the respective provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial
Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official
station of the designated Special Commercial Court; (Emphasis ours)

The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present
action for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be
commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the
corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines
Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial
Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction
over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein Respondents.

Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’
petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving
an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a
Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously
cognizable by the SEC.

Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer
of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take
on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and
Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners’ Association,13 the Court held that the
trial court, having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same
so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed
with jurisdiction.

Note, further, that respondents’ petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No. 03-03-
03-SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein that such petitions
shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court. Since the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for
Camarines Sur is the Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents should have filed their petition
with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC having been in effect for four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-
SC having been in effect for almost two years by the time respondents filed their petition, there is no
cogent reason why respondents were not aware of the appropriate court where their petition should
be filed.

The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial court to
order the transfer of respondents’ petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is specious
because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly stated that cases
formerly cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official
station of the designated Special Commercial Court,had been in effect for almost two years.
Thus, the filing of the petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, which had
no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and
VOID. The petition for quo warranto in Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case No.
RTC 2005-0001), entitled "Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al." is
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 179431-32               June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC),Petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 180443

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C.
GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus
is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations
(IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby
implements.

Common Antecedents

The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered
under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14,
2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to
participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five
nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number
of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of
nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis
K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The
nominees’ certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC.
The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine
Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5

Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the
nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-
Gonzales, and (3) Borje.

Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the
CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna
were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in
May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.

On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting
as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second
nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed
were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have
garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC
was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of

the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to
act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9

On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the matter
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.

In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim
the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as
having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC,
Gabriela Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.,
Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party,
Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees
of the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their
respective cases.

The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18,
2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna,
CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional
seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations
and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.

With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the
House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that
Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office.
Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because
COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.

On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise:

WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal
of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and
fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as
second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new
order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:

1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva

2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales

3. Armi Jane R. Borje

SO ORDERED.

The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of
CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was
charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate
activities, which included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the
May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as
the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative
and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done
without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or at least
understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the
selection of the nominees.

As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of

CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office

as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15

Precís of the Consolidated Cases

In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.

In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12,
2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth
 nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on
the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges
that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18the law that the
COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in
law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office;
that Lokin’s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by
Lokin.

For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and
a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the
second nominee of CIBAC.

Issues

The issues are the following:

(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;

(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act; and

(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the
amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the
close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.

Ruling

The petitions are granted.

A
The Court has jurisdiction over the case

The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been
done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the
HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the
question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in
the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.

We do not agree.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between
the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities,
to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is
entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of
the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office,
but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly
speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be
seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of
CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking
to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning
party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in
which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of
the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the
case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the
Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the
review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-
Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for
certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30
days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for
certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

B 
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping

Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having
filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because
he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular
remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c)
where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the
writ from another court.19

What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue.20

The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum
shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing
their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of
justice.21
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise identical
causes of action, subject matter, and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.24

Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second
nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s
entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision
in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation
of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the
COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and
that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation
of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes.

On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007
resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third
nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis
for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.

Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action
for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same
parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were
different.

C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with
the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate
its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot
be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character
may be delegated.25

Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative
boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the
Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given
cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to
execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by
statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves
to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits,
although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of
discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment
of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to
make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the
operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather
administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however,
subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative
agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic
that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:28

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.

The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also
charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other
laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite.

The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804
underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.

Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of
whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin
against Section 13 succeeds.

As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the
resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It
is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for administrative IRRs
are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency
issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and
enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the
Legislature.33

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition

shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names,
not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person
who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names
or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to
the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the
right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the
COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination;
or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language
is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey.
Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other
meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment,
the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not
depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation
or construction, but only for application.35Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement
a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and
unambiguous.36

The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to
alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:

MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see
any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the
nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at
any time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?

MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from
Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee
will gladly consider the same.

MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the
COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.

MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has
been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his
political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list
and the political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his
political party affiliation.

MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the
exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has
to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the
prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.37

The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall
be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the
nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders Section 8 a negative law,
and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words
can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and
that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the
law itself, like in this case.

Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but
merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees’
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.

The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers.
The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of
the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains
the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the
nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be
published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list
organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the
right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the
list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people,
enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list
organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of
the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for
transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of
such circumvention.

D 
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the
COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.

The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under
any of the three exceptions.

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather
than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the
enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication,
and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in
determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason
and justice.39
1avvphi1

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the
general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall
apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any
doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal
construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the
operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

E
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded 
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he
dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue
as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of
the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.

No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being
when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."

Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three
statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.

We agree with Lokin.

The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,40 has neither the
authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby.
The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should
remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.41

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative
authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs,
because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42

The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941,43because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s
phraseology.

The explanation does not persuade.

To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew
or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.

However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,
because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground
granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted
to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant
of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to
withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives
has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling
under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC,
and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.

We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and
guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only
be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the
transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of
making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.

The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but
must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs
are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be
issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45

F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the IRR,
the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to
the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or
part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s
withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees
were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others
could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the
COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of
CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck
down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the
invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.

We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes
a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the
nomination to the Commission on Elections.

Accordingly, we annul and set aside:

(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens’
Battle Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N.
Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering
their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje
as third nominee; and

(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a

Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-
List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.

We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195229               October 9, 2012

EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to review and nullify the
1 

Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order dated 12 January 2011 of the Commission on
2  3 

Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo D. Lonzanida, docketed as SPA

No. 09-158 (DC). The petition asserts that the COMELEC issued the Resolution and Order with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate
of candidacy on 1 December 2009. On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a
4 

petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due
course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected,
and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior
to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was
eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section
5 

43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and
6 

serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s
7 

certificate of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read:

Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
more than nine consecutive years. Instead he raised arguments to forestall or dismiss the petition on
the grounds other than the main issue itself. We find such arguments as wanting. Respondent
Lonzanida, for holding the office of mayor for more than three consecutive terms, went against the
three-term limit rule; therefore, he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010 elections. It is time
to infuse new blood in the political arena of San Antonio.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of
Candidacy of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position of mayor in the municipality of San
Antonio, Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of
Official Candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED. 8

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the
May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of
votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C.
Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010. On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department
9 

of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor,
he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification.
DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 2010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by
10 

reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification, the Office of the
Mayor was deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an
acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for
reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to
take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010,
then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent
Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases
pending before the [COMELEC]." 11

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from
12 

running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on
two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment
of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each
count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of
conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v.
People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Pertinent portions
13 

of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for having been convicted by a final
judgment of a crime punishable by more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to
run for the same position in the May 2010 Elections.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 14

On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention. She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because
15

Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February
2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his
name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the
May 2010 elections.
In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who
received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor
could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent
vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by
Section 44 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor.
16 

The COMELEC’s Rulings

The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating:

Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed by
Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this Commission to suspend its Rules or
any portion thereof in the interest of justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:

1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;

2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo;

3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL

ARATEA, proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their respective Comments on
the Petition-in- Intervention within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof;

4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at 10:00 a.m.
COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila.

WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and compliance.

SO ORDERED. 17

In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer considered Lonzanida’s
qualification as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold and discharge the
functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this
juncture is how to fill the vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s disqualification." The Resolution further
18 

stated:

We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a second placer in the elections. The
teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al.,
while they remain sound jurisprudence find no application in the case at bar. What sets this case
apart from the cited jurisprudence is that the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification and ineligibility
to hold public office is established both in fact and in law on election day itself. Hence, Lonzanida’s
name, as already ordered by the Commission on February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off
from the list of official candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby:

1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA;

2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo;

3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to
PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales;

4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the
Office of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her
proclamation; and

5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election Director of Region III
to cause the implementation of this Resolution and disseminate it to the Department of Interior and
Local Government.

SO ORDERED. 19

Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011.

The Issues

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under
Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is
determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales.

The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011
Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be
declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government Code’s rule on succession.

The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a
false representation in the certificate of candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms elected and
served is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78; second, they ignore that a false representation as to eligibility to run for public office due
to the fact that the candidate suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a material fact that is a
ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; and third, they resort to a
strained statutory construction to conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a
ground for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even when it is clear and plain
that violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to
elective office.

The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a candidate’s eligibility to
the office he seeks election must be strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e., age,
citizenship, or residency, among others, which the law requires him to state in his COC, and which
he must swear under oath to possess. The dissenting opinions choose to view a false certification of
a candidate’s eligibility on the three-term limit rule not as a ground for false material representation
under Section 78 but as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is
clearly contrary to well-established jurisprudence.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at
all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the qualifications
of elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40 of the Local
Government Code provide in pertinent part:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.

xxxx

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

xxxx

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are
specifically enumerated:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is

declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts
and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned
20 

in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of
other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify
including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under
Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, this Court ruled:
21 

[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x

Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of
the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition
under Section 68.

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or
cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities,
highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items of
information in the certificate of candidacy: name; nickname or stage name; gender; age; place of
22 

birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil status; residence/address; profession or
occupation; post office address for election purposes; locality of which the candidate is a registered
voter; and period of residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies
four statements: a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a
statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; a
statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and a statement of the
candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The certificate of
23 

candidacy should also be under oath, and filed within the period prescribed by law.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him
perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This
perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code
are as follows:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión
mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years,
except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which
case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties
of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following
effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of
the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of

this article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties
of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall
produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term
of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence,
according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it
that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
24 

penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under

Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal
penalty of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office,
and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he
is eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna), the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import
25 

of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction
of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised
Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he
had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office
and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict
of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised
Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according
to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind
of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary
special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are
necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether
the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives

the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.”

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend
on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The
last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the
time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he
became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time
the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was
promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed
his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .  26

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not
eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under
oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the27 

false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from
perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from
perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible
to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained
in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running
for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office
he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC,
following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the
Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with
the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
28

Latasa, Rivera and Ong:

The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility

Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks
election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing x x x is eligible for said office.” The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice, is found both
29 

in the Constitution and the law. After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an
30  31 

elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular
election because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not
32 

"eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for
33 

elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the
public office.

In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the
34 

Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was
converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy
for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed before the COMELEC
a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section
78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to
run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make any false representation. In his
certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated
"*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city
mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa’s certificate of candidacy for violation of the
three-term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En
Banc’s denial of Latasa’s motion for reconsideration.

We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission on

Elections (Rivera). We held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having been
35 

elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001,
2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a candidate for the same position for
the 2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’ violation of the three-term
limit rule constituted false material representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel
Morales’ certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis
Ong’s certificate of candidacy in Ong v. Alegre, where the "petition to disqualify, deny due course
36 

and cancel" Ong’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was predicated on the violation of the
three-term limit rule.
Loong, Fermin and Munder:

When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition

is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification

It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for
eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may
represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine locality when he is actually a permanent
37 

resident of another country. In cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his
38 

choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple
remedies. Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
39 

candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after
the election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification
using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78.

The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed
in Loong v. Commission on Elections with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. Respondent
40 

Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for
the office of Regional Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false
representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the
prescribed 25 day period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that
Ututalum’s petition was one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for
disqualification under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78
should be strictly applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law:

It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a
certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-
day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such
misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the
misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of
the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under
Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is
made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the
candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could
avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto
against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which,
according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.

At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the
government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates
for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent
Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap", but it is not for it to
prescribe what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether
the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to
decide and remedy. 41

In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the issue of a candidate’s possession of the required one-
42 

year residency requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Section 68 instead of a
petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the
question of the one-year residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the
petitioner before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7800 and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC
43 

rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for
disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said
grounds." A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground specified in Section 12 or
44 

68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition
questioning a candidate’s possession of the required one-year residency requirement, as
distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed
under Section 78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.

In Munder v. Commission on Elections, petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of candidacy for
45 

Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition
for Munder’s disqualification on 13 April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he
was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter in
2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s registration. Moreover,
Munder’s certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct
and did not affix his thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and
declared that his grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for denial or
cancellation of Munder’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarip’s petition was filed out of
time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December
2009, within which to file his petition.

The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second
Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the
question of whether Munder was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated
the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition,
lack of registration as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is inappropriate for a
petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our ruling in Fermin, we had already
rejected the claim that lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for
disqualification under Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a
ground for a petition under Section 68 is the candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant status in
a foreign country.

The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under
Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from
running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local
Government Code]." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the
law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification under said Section. The
grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under Section 68 are specifically enumerated in said
Section. However, contrary to the specific enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing
jurisprudence, the dissenting opinions add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term
limit rule and falsification under the Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in the
enumeration in Section 68.

The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s possession of a disqualifying condition (violation of the
three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as
to the proper grounds for disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited acts under the
Omnibus Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign
country. Any other false representation regarding a material fact should be filed under Section 78,
specifically under the candidate’s certification of his eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-
term limit as a condition for eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoring
the verba legis doctrine and well-established jurisprudence on this very issue.
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus
qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not
specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position,
such fact is material in determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus qualification for the office.
Election to and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a
candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida
misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he
was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he
was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his
qualification or eligibility for the office.

Legal Duty of COMELEC

to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a
legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for
public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is
part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the
Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC
is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election." The disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal
46 

Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and

administration of "all the laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes. We quote from the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval:
47 

As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already
ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the
list of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the
Commission En Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution
disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The
disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was
emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he
violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he
is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s
disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never
a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be
considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified
candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. (Boldfacing and underscoring in
48 

the original; italicization supplied)

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run
for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
1âwphi1

because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning,
his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in
the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order
dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The
COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to
proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren
Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194994               April 16, 2013

EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, 
vs.
EMERSON S. CARLOS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 filed by Emmanuel A.
de Castro (petitioner) seeking to oust respondent Emerson S. Carlos (respondent) from the position
of assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA).

On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as AGM0.1 His
appointment was concurred in by the members of the Metro Manila Council in MMDA Resolution No.
09-10, Series of 2009.2 He took his oath on 17 August 2009 before then Chairperson Bayani F.
Fernando.3

Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President (OP)
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of
2010.

OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 states:

2. All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive Service
(CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office and continue to perform
their duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have
been accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated,
whichever comes first, unless they are reappointed in the meantime.4
On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued Office Order No.
106,5 designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner
was then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager. The
service vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to
other employees.

Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the

Office of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24,6 which in turn cited OP Memorandum
Circular No. 2 as basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he
was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.

Petitioner sought a clarification7 from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper
classification of the position of AGMO. In her reply,8 Executive Director Maria Anthonette Allones
(Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated that the position of AGMO had not yet been classified
and could not be considered as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). She further stated
that a perusal of the appointment papers of petitioner showed that he was not holding a coterminous
position. In sum, she said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2.

Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services
and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank.

Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll,9 petitioner sent a letter
on 5 December 2010 to Edenison Faisan, assistant general manager (AGM) for Finance and
Administration; and Lydia Domingo, Director III, Administrative Services. For his failure to obtain an
action or a response from MMDA, he then made a formal demand for his reinstatement as AGMO
through a letter addressed to the Office of the President on 17 December 2010.10

However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed
respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA.11 On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.

Hence, the instant Petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent, filed its Comment on 19 August
2011.12However, upon motion of petitioner, it was disqualified from representing respondent. Thus, a
private law firm13entered an appearance as counsel for respondent and adopted the Comment filed
by the OSG.14

Petitioner filed his Reply on 17 November 2011.

ISSUES

Petitioner raises the following issues15 for the consideration of this Court:

(1) Whether respondent Emerson S. Carlos was validly appointed by President Aquino to the
position of AGMO of the MMDA;

(2) Whether petitioner Emmanuel A. de Castro is entitled to the position of AGMO; and

(3) Whether or not respondent should pay petitioner the salaries and financial benefits he received
during his illegal tenure as AGMO of the MMDA.
THE COURT’S RULING

Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the security
of tenure of employees in the civil service. He further argues that his appointment as AGMO is not
covered by OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, since it is not a CES position as determined by the
CESB.

On the other hand, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES; thus, in order to
have security of tenure, petitioner, must be a Career Executive Service official (CESO). Respondent
maintains that the function of an AGM is executive and managerial in nature. Thus, considering that
petitioner is a non-CESO occupying a CES position, he is covered by OP Memorandum Circular
Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent likewise raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to
the Supreme Court by petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Hierarchy of Courts

As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted by the
urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable need for stability in the civil service and
the protection of the rights of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the President of
the Philippines is the appointing authority, petitioner doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court
justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against a presidential
appointment.

Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of
Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.16 The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.

Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition."17 A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright
dismissal of a petition.18

A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important
reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition.19 The rationale behind this policy
arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the
Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket.20

In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply
and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright
dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of
the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse
to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower
courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition
must be dismissed.

Nature of the AGMO Position

Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be
dismissed for lack of merit.

"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a
franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-
founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited."21 Where the action is filed by a
private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.22

The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which applies
to all non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being
a non-CESO, avers that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of
the MMDA is a non-CES position.

In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the contentious position
of AGMO of the MMDA.

Career vs. non-career

Section 4 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7924,23 otherwise known as the MMDA Charter, specifically
created the position of AGMO. It reads as follows:

Sec. 4 Metro Manila Council. x x x.

xxxx

The Council shall be headed by a Chairman, who shall be appointed by the President and who shall
continue to hold office at the discretion of the appointing authority. He shall be vested with the rank,
rights, privileges, disqualifications, and prohibitions of a Cabinet member.

The Chairman shall be assisted by a General Manager, an Assistant General Manager for Finance
and Administration, an Assistant General Manager for Planning and an Assistant General Manager
for Operations, all of whom shall be appointed by the President with the consent and concurrence of
the majority of the Council, subject to civil service laws and regulations. They shall enjoy security of
tenure and may be removed for cause in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

Executive Order No. (E.O.) 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
provides for two classifications of positions in the civil service: career and non-career.24

Career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure,25 as contradistinguished from

non-career service whose tenure is coterminous with that of the appointing authority; or subject to
the latter’s pleasure; or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project
for which purpose the appointment was made.26

Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds that an AGMO holds a career
position, considering that the MMDA Charter specifically provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure
– the core characteristic of a career service, as distinguished from a non-career service position.  

CES vs. non-CES

Career service includes the following:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination
is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the
faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in
scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate
merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or

proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.27 (Emphasis supplied)

In Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals and PCSO,28 the Court clarified the positions
covered by the CES:

Thus, from the long line of cases cited above, in order for a position to be covered by the CES, two
elements must concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under Book V,
Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e.,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service, or (2) a position of equal rank as those
enumerated, and identified by the Career Executive Service Board to be such position of equal rank.
Second, the holder of the position must be a presidential appointee. Failing in any of these
requirements, a position cannot be considered as one covered by the third-level or CES. (Emphasis
supplied)

In sum, there are two elements required for a position to be considered as CES:

1) The position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3)
of the Administrative Code of 1987 OR a position of equal rank as those enumerated and identified
by the CESB to be such position of equal rank; AND

2) The holder of the position is a presidential appointee. Records show that in reply29 to Chairperson
Tolentino’s query on whether the positions of general manager and AGM of the MMDA are covered
by the CES,30 the CESB – thru Executive Director Allones – categorically stated that these positions
are not among those covered by the CES.

Upon petitioner’s separate inquiry on the matter,31 the CESB similarly responded that the AGMO’s
position could not be considered as belonging to the CES.32 Additionally, Executive Director Allones
said that petitioner was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, to wit:
A cursory perusal of your appointment papers would show that it does not bear any indication that
you are holding a coterminous appointment. Neither your position as AGMO can be considered as
created in excess of the authorized staffing pattern since RA 7924, the law that created the MMDA
clearly provided for such position. As further stated above, your position will not fall under paragraph
No. 2 of OP MC 1 because it is not yet considered as belonging to the CES. Hence, we posit that
you are not covered by OP MC 1 and 2.33

However, contrary to Executive Director Allones’ statement, the CESB, through Resolution No. 799
already declared certain positions meeting the criteria set therein as embraced within the CES.

It is worthy of note that CESB Resolution No. 799 was issued on 19 May 2009, even prior to
petitioner’s appointment on 29 July 2009. Moreover, as early as 31 May 1994, the above
classification was already embodied in CSC Resolution No. 34-2925, circularized in CSC
Memorandum Circular 21, Series of 1994.

Resolution No. 799 classified the following positions as falling within the coverage of the CES:

a. The Career Executive Service includes the positions of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, regional Director (department-wide and bureau-wide),
Assistant Regional Director (department-wide and bureau-wide), and Chief of Department Service;

b. Unless provided otherwise, all other managerial or executive positions in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters are embraced within
the CES provided that they meet the following criteria:

i.) The position is a career position;

ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,

iii.) The duties and responsibilities of the position require performance of executive and managerial
functions.

Without a doubt, the AGMO position is not one of those enumerated in the above-cited paragraph(a)
but it clearly falls under paragraph(b) considering that it belongs to a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter. The nature of AGMO is clear from the provisions of
the MMDA Charter.

First, we have already determined that an AGMO is a career position that enjoys security of tenure
by virtue of the MMDA Charter.

Second, it is undisputed that the position of AGMO is above the division chief level, which is
equivalent to the rank of assistant secretary with Salary Grade 29.34

Third, a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals that the duties and responsibilities of the
position require the performance of executive and managerial functions.

Section 12.4, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7924 provides the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of an AGMO, as follows:

12.4 Assistant General Manager for Operations

The Assistant General Manager for Operations shall perform the following functions:

a. Establish a mechanism for coordinating and operationalizing the delivery of metro-wide basic
services;

b. Maintain a monitoring system for the effective evaluation of the implementation of approved
policies, plans and programs for the development of Metropolitan Manila;

c. Mobilize the participation of local government units, executive departments or agencies of the
national government, and the private sector in the delivery of metro-wide services; and

d. Operate a central radio communication system.

He shall perform such other duties as are incidental or related to the above functions or as may be
assigned from time to time.

An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over people,
resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating,
controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of
managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional
guidance, leadership, and supervision.

For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.

In relation thereto, positions in the career service, for which appointments require examinations, are
grouped into three major levels:35

Sec. 8. Classes of positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positions in the career service
appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:

(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service positions which involve
non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring
less than four years of collegiate studies;

(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at
least four years of college work up to Division Chief levels; and

(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. (Emphasis supplied)

Entrance to different levels requires corresponding civil service eligibilities.36 Those at the third level
(CES positions) require career service executive eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent
appointment.37

Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within
the CES. In this case, petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his
appointment to the position of AGMO was merely temporary.

Amores v. Civil Service Commission38 is instructive as to the nature of temporary appointments in the
CES. The Court held therein that an appointee cannot hold a position in a permanent capacity
without the required CES eligibility:
We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent
appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to
which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. An
appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which
he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the
appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service
eligibility.

xxxx

With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the requisite civil service
eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board and the
subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. Once a person acquires
eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has
previously been appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position
provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Verily, it is clear that
the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career
executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot
be said that his appointment to the position was permanent.

Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions
in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest
of public service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best
merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES
eligibility. This rule, according to De Leon v. Court of Appeals, Dimayuga v. Benedicto, Caringal v.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso v. Macaraig, is invariable even though the
given appointment may have been designated as permanent by the appointing authority.

xxxx

Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment,
takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board x x x.

Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of AGMO in a
permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment
was temporary and "co-terminus with the appointing authority."39 In Carillo v. CA,40 this Court ruled
that "one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be
terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination
is for cause." Therefore, we find no violation of security of tenure when petitioner was replaced by
respondent upon the latter’s appointment to the position of AGMO by President Aquino.

Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is yet to be classified by the
CESB, petitioner’s appointment is still deemed coterminous pursuant to CESB Resolution No. 945
issued on 14 June 2011, which reads:

WHEREAS, on November 23, 2010, the Supreme Court in the case of PCSO v. CSC, G.R. NO.
185766 and G.R. No. 185767 limited the coverage of positions belonging to the CES to positions
requiring Presidential appointments.

WHEREAS, in the same vein, CES positions have now become synonymous to third level positions
by virtue of the said ruling.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Board RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED,
to issue the following guidelines to clarify the policy on the coverage of CES and its classification:

1. For career service positions requiring Presidential appointments expressly enumerated under
Section 7(3), Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 namely:

Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, and Chief of Department Service, no classification of position is
necessary to place them under the coverage of the CES, except if they belong to Project Offices, in
which case a position classification is required, in consultation with the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM).

2. For positions requiring Presidential appointments other than those enumerated above, a
classification of positions is necessary which shall be conducted by the Board, upon request of the
head of office of the government department/agency concerned, to place them under the coverage
of the CES provided they comply with the following criteria:

i.) The position is a career position;

ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,

iii.)The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and
managerial functions.

All appointments to positions which have not been previously classified as part of the CES would be
deemed co-terminus with the appointing authority. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term ended on
30 June 2010, petitioner’s term of office was also deemed terminated upon the assumption of
President Aquino.

Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible.
In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office
allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or
eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.41

All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy
of courts and petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure to sufficiently show
that he has undisturbed rights to the position of AGMO of the MMDA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211140

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner, 

vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN  B. 1

BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.

 DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party is the son of a
sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought to be done as dictated by law
and justice solely for that reason.

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte,
Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap ), Secretary General, House of Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes
(Reyes), Representative, Lone District of the Province of Marinduque .

Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections
in accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
[this] Honorable Court;"  thus, he seeks the following reliefs:
2

a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.
be issued ordering said respondent to administer the proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord
Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque;
-and allow petitioner to assume the position of representative for Marinduque and exercise
the powers and prerogatives of said position of Marinduque representative;

b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN] BARUA-YAP

be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of Regina 0. Reyes in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord
Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein petitioner, in her stead; and

c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN, PREVENT and

PROHIBIT respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from usurping the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque and from further
exercising the prerogatives of said position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and
DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position. 3

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:

On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
petition  to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate for
4

the position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan
alleged that Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that she is a
resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (iii) that she
is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (iv) that her date of birth is July
3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to
be elected to."  The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC), entitled "Joseph Socorro B.
5

Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's COC
was accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED. 6

Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.

But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national elections were
held on May 13, 2013.

The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit. The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Commission (First Division) is hereby AFFIRMED. 7

A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque,
through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013.

Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May 16, 2013.

On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013
elections for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord
Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against Reyes in the
HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes."

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality  in SPA No. 13-053 (DC),
8

which provides:

NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have lapsed since the date of
the promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme Court restraining its execution, the
Resolution of the Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby
declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. 9

On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.

On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR. No.
207264, entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro
Tan," assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion
for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division cancelling her .
Certificate of Candidacy (for material misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013
Certificate of Finality.

In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC
docketed as SPC No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old
Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone District of Marinduque and
Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of
Reyes as null and void.

On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC No. 13-010.

On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing Reyes's
petition, viz.:

IN VIEW OF THE· FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld.10

Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over
her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of Representatives. This Court explained
that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.
11

On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc) in SPA No.
13-053 (DC), wherein he prayed that:

[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate EXECUTION of this
Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the
PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local
Elections. 12

At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started discharging the
functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.

On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the
COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and
void and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes. The dispositive part reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is
declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q.
VELASCO is hereby proclaimed the winning candidate for the position of representative in the
House of Representatives for the province of Marinduque.  (Emphasis supplied.)
13

Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.

On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i) granting
Tan's motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii) directing the reconstitution of a
new PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly
elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion. Accordingly,
a new composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque is hereby constituted to be
composed of the following:

1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz - Chairman

2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman

3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas - Member

4. Three (3) Support Staffs

For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the convening of
the New Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at
the COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN
JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District
of Marinduque in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.

Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial Board of
Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco in the 2013 National and Local Elections.

Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy of the
Certificate of Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the
House of Representatives. 14

On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein petitioner Velasco
as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque with
48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts. 15

On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint
session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of
Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in
open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition "without waiver of
her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be articulated in the HRET which is now
the proper forum."16

On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration  (of this Court's June 25, 2013 Resolution
17

in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, viz.:

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed.
Entry of Judgment is ordered. 18

On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.

On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for reconsideration and was
denied by this Court.
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes
essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.

On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among others,
that he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to implement and enforce
the May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010 and
the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as
Representative of Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certified true copy of the writ of execution
be personally served and delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano Belmonte for
the latter's implementation and enforcement of the aforementioned May 14, 2013 Resolution and
July 9, 2013 Resolution and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation issued by the Special
Board of Canvassers of the Honorable Commission. 19

the COMELEC issued an Order  dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all copies of its
20

Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the Certificate of Finality dated June 5,
2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be
forwarded and furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.

On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. reiterating the above-
mentioned request but to no avail.

On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his earlier
requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and register
his name in her place as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and
requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the
duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous
written demands for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position.

Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction anchored on the following issues:

A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED
by a Writ of Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of petitioner as duly elected
Marinduque Representative and allow him to assume said position and exercise the
prerogatives of said office.

B. Whether or not respondent SG Barna-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and

ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of
Members of the House and include the name of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives.
 C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of
PERMANENT. INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit respondent
Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and performing the functions as Marinduque
Representative, and to order her to VACATE the said office. 21

As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-defined and clear legal right
and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus."  He insists that the final and executory
22

decisions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), and this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as
the nullification of respondent Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly
elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to
claim the congressional seat.

Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. "to
administer the oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the
congressional seat for Marinduque representative;"  and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to
23

register [his] name xx x as the duly elected member of the House and delete the name of
respondent Reyes from the Roll ofM embers."   Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De
24

Venecia,  citing a statement of this Court to the effect that the Speaker of the House of
25

Representatives has the ministerial duty to recognize the petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly
elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally
excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque. 26

With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and unlawful holding of
such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in that she
has already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position
of Marinduque Representative since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around
several hundreds of thousands of pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to "restrain, prevent
and prohibit [her] from usurping the position."27

In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not
mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the
installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of
office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a
title to public office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases. 28

As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo
Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the
Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction
and absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. "  She argues that numerous
29

jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an abundance
of case law that categorically states that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her
proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction
over quo warranto cases  filed against Reyes by several individuals.
30
Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to annul [her]
proclamation. " But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of argument that
31

the proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be declared the winner x x
x" as he was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is
estopped from asserting the jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco)
filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap, opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:

I.

UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

TO RESOLVE ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT REYES, INCLUDING THE
VALIDITY OF HER PROCLAMATION AND HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE
HRET.

Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest filed against
respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final and executory,
respondent Reyes may not be restrained from exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque
Representative, and respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to
remove respondent Reyes :S name from the Roll of Members of the House.

II.

CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT PETITIONER, BEING
MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY
ASSUME THE POST OF MARINDUQUE REPRESENTATIVE.

Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by
mandamus to, respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner and register the latter's name in
the Roll of Members of the House.

III.

PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. 32

The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for this Court
to revisit its twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 both in GR. No. 207264,
given that (i) this Court was "divided" when it issued the same; and (ii) there were strong dissents to
the majority opinion. It argues that this Court has in the past revisited decisions already final and
executory; there is no hindrance for this Court to do the same in G.R. No. 207264.

Moreover, the OSG contends that:

Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013 Resolution, upholding
the cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no compelling reason for the House to
withdraw its recognition of respondent Reyes as Marinduque Representative, in the absence· of any
specific order or directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the Honorable Court's
disposition in Reyes v. COMELEC that required any action from the House. Again, it bears
emphasis that neither petitioner nor respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap were
parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.

Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against respondent
Reyes:

(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L.
Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;

(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;

(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes; and

(iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes. 33

And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:

If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office of the winner, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then there would obviously be a clash of
jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011 HRET Rules provide that the
appropriate cases should be filed before it within 15 days from the date of proclamation of the
winner. If, as the June 25, 2013 Resolution provides, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only after
assumption of office, at noon of June 30 following the election, then quo warranto petitions and
election protests filed on or after said date would be dismissed outright by the HRET under its own
rules for having been filed out of time, where the winners have already been proclaimed within the
period after the May elections and up to June 14. 34

In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14, 2015
dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037,  the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against
35

Reyes, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of
Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 36

In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. No. 207264 is the
COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution." 37

To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal of a Petition-
In-Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin petitions for quo warranto, for "lack
of merit." Further, the HRET directed "the hearing and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for
Quo Warranto against x x x Respondent [Reyes] to proceed. "  Sioco, however, moved for the
38

reconsideration of the said September 11, 2014 HR.ET Resolution based on the argument that the
latter was contrary to law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that-

The Tribunals Jurisdiction

It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo
warranto, considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve the
same vis-a-vis the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray that "after due
proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to sit as Member of the House of Representatives, representing the
Province of Marinduque." In addition, the petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to follow
the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264.

On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the outright dismissal
of the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part,
respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception
of evidence by the contending parties.

The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or authority of the Tribunal is
echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives."

xxxx

In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), had already
resolved that the COMELEC First Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she
lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her
proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En
Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.

With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of
her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over the
present petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation,
(2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office, so the Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution
of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207264, thus:

x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

xxxx

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a
member of the House of Representatives x x x.

xxxx

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the
Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins.xx x

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office x x x.

Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first essential
element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House of Representatives over
which the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously absent in the present cases
as Regina Reyes' proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the
Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the
present petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives," as declared by the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It further
stresses:

"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013. Without
the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of
office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office."

The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme Court is "supreme in its task
of adjudication; x x x. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power
ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all other
courts, must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of the Supreme Court. 39

Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1 77 (Usurpation of
Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015, has been filed in
court,  entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. "
40 41

The Issue

The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus to
compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts sought by
Velasco in this petition.

The Ruling

The petition has merit.

At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this petition to re-
litigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are reminded to respect the Entry of
Judgment that has been issued therein on October 22, 2013.
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this special
civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of
the respondents.

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise
of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if
he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must
prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the
undisturbed possession of the office.  In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final
42

and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of
the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the
final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the
proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the
present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.

To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try
disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo
warranto.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified
petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is
a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and
that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. 43

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. 44

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have no discretion
whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll
of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in
existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and
executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of
Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning
candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.

The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and beyond
dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque.

Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation.
Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions regarding her
election, the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives especially so that she has already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to
discharge her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque. But the confluence of the three acts in this case - her proclamation,
oath and assumption of office - has not altered the legal situation between Velasco and Reyes.

The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is
when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque - for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a
candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision
of the COMELEC was promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was affirmed by
this Court's final and executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.

This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC, the
PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling
Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be
made that as early as May 16, 2013, a couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had
already received the said decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the much
argued proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.

That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the present
petition for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts that should be taken into
consideration:

First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the
COMELEC En Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the effectivity of
which was not enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of the prescribed remedy which
is to seek a restraining order within a period of five (5) days as required by Section 13(b),
Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order was forthcoming, the PBOC should
have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.

Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent Reyes's COC in
its Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these Resolutions are already
final and executory.

Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 cancelled
respondent Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly elected
Member of the House of Representatives in representation of the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque. The said proclamation has not been challenged or questioned
by Reyes in any proceeding.

Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. in
open session, Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation.

Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in deciding this
case will paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu between her and Velasco.

Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve as a

Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque,
and therefore, she HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as a party-respondent
at a quo warranto proceeding before the HRET.
And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution acknowledging and
ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes. Its
finding was based on the existence of a final and executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264
that Reyes is not a bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid
proclamation. To reiterate this Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v.
Commission on Elections - 45

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013.
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent
oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.

xxxx

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the proclamation
of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013.
After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's
qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x."

As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to argue on the
basis of her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the
undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013
was WITHOUT ANY BASIS." (Emphasis supplied.)

Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to any party, specially
to Velasco, who should be the sitting Member of the House of Representatives if it were not for the
disregard by the leadership of the latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the
COMELEC, and the Supreme Court

Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes before the HRET
had actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010.
Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the HRET' s December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained
Velasco's well-defined, clear and certain right to the subject office.

The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel

respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the
final and executory Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering
the oath of office to Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In other words, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for
acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in
the Roll of Members, are ministerial in character vis-a-vis the factual and legal milieu of this case. As
we have previously stated, the administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are
no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the
House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this
Court and the COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative district and the
Secretary-General to enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,  the Court decreed:
46

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition
for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board,
officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act
or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no
longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond
dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in
the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its
Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en
banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been
finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The
rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land There is no alternative to
the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General
shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory.
(Citations omitted.)

Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane Resolution dated May 14, 2013 in SPA No.
13-053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC); (iii) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-
010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC);
and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco is the rightful
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a writ
of Mandamus.
As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barna-Yap are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the enforcement of the
Decision rendered therein nor argue that the doctrine of res judieata by conclusiveness of judgment
applies to him and the public respondents, this Court maintains that such contention is incorrect.
Velasco, along with public respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap, are all
legally bound by this Court's judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC
correctly cancelled Reyes' s COC for Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District
of the Province of Marinduque on the ground that the latter was ineligible for the subject position due
to her failure to prove her Filipino citizenship and the requisite one-year residency in the Province of
Marinduque. A contrary view would have our dockets unnecessarily clogged with petitions to be filed
in every direction by any and all registered voters not a party to a case to question the final decision
of this Court. Such restricted interpretation of res judieata is intolerable for it will defeat this Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 207264. To be sure, Velasco who was duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper
party to invoke the Court's final judgment that Reyes was ineligible for the subject position. 47

It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated and take judicial
notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected to the subject position had already
been long affirmed by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such established ruling will be contrary to
the Rule of Law and should not be countenanced.

In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010,
there is no longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,  "[t]he rule of law demands
48

that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law
except the reign of chaos and confusion."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. Feliciano R.

Belmonte, Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath of office of petitioner
Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque. And public respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of
Representatives, shall register the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This Decision shall
be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

EXPROPRIATION
G.R. No. 142304            June 20, 2001

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, 

vs.
OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE, BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND ADELAIDA, ALL
SURNAMED SERRANO, respondents.

Mendoza, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated November 16, 1999, and resolution,
dated February 23, 2000, of the Court of Appeals reversing the order, dated December 15, 1998, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila and perpetually enjoining it from proceeding with the
petitioner's complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-72282.

The facts are as follows:

On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted the Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila 's First District in Tondo, covered by TCT Nos. 70869,
105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and
distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila.

One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square
meters. It is covered by TCT No. 138272 which was derived from TCT No. 70869 issued in the name
of Feliza De Guia.1 After her death, the estate of Feliza De Guia was settled among her heirs by
virtue of a compromise agreement, which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Manila in its decision, dated May 8, 1986.2 In 1989, Alberto De Guia, one of the heirs of Feliza De
Guia, died, as a result of which his estate, consisting of his share in the properties left by his mother,
was partitioned among his heirs. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of
Alberto De Guia.3 On April 15, 1994, Edgardo De Guia was issued TCT No. 215593, covering Lot 1-
C.4On July 29, 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT No.
217018 was issued.5

The property was subsequently sold on January 24,1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT No.
226048 was issued.6

On September 26, 1997, petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72282, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the
supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202 and
138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora,
Adelaida, all surnamed are Serrano.7 On November 12, 1997, respondents filed a consolidated
answer, in which they alleged that their mother, the late Demetria De Guia, had acquired Lot l-C
from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more
than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot l-C would result in their disclosure, it being the only
residential land left to them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt from
expropriation because dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only
about 50 square meters of land. Respondents, therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered
declaring Lot l-C exempt from expropriation and ordering the cancellation of the notice annotated on
the back of TCT No. 226048,8 regarding the pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282. for eminent
domain filed by petitioner.9

Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998, directing petitioner
to deposit the amount of Pl,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties.10 After
petitioner had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated December 15, 1998,
directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner.ll

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the expropriation of
Lot l-C would render respondents, who are actual occupants thereof, landless; that Lot l-C is exempt
from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not
exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriations; that
respondents would only receive around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot l-C which
consists of only 343.10 square meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant to deprive an owner of
the entire residential land but only that in excess of 300 square meters.12
On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that Lot l-C is not exempt
from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered
a small property within the framework of R.A. No. 7279. However, it held that in accordance with the
ruling in Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 the other modes of acquisition of lands
enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to
expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had done so, the Court of Appeals gave judgment
for respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE and accordingly GRANTED. The Order, dated December 15, 1998, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration issued by the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 94-72282 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let a
writ of injunction issue perpetually enjoining the same respondent court from proceeding with
the complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-72282,14

In its resolution, dated February 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise denied two motions for
reconsideration filed by petitioner.l5 Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in --

1) Giving due course to the petition of the Serranos under Rule 65 notwithstanding its own
declaration of the impropriety of the resort to the writ and filing thereof with the wrong
appellate court;

2) Concluding that the Order of October 9, 1998 which authorizes the immediate entry of the
City as the expropriating agency into the property sough to be expropriated upon the deposit
of the provisionally fixed fair market value thereof as tantamount to condemnation of the
property without prior showing of compliance with the acquisition of other lands enumerated
in Sec. 9 of R.A. 7279 ergo a violation of due process of the Serranos by the doctrinaire
application of FILSTREAM ruling and corrollarily,

3) In prohibiting permanently, by writ of injunction, the trial court from proceeding with a
complaint for expropriation of the City in Civil Case No. 94-72282.16

We will deal with these contentions in the order they are presented.

First. Petitioner contends that the respondents' remedy against the order of the trial court granting a
writ of possession was not to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but a petition for review under
Rule 45 which should have been filed in the Supreme Court.17

This contention has no merit. A petition for review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal. Accordingly, it
could not have been resorted to by the respondents inasmuch as the order of the trial court granting
a writ of possession was merely interlocutory from which no appeal could be taken. Rule 45, §1 of
the 1997 Rules for Civil Procedure applies only to final judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial Court. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is the
suitable remedy in view of Rule 65, §1 which provides:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainly and praying that judgment be rendered
 annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as laws and justice may require.

Respondents' petition before the Court of Appeals alleged that the trial court had acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the order, dated December 15, 1998, resolving that Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation and
ordering the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of petitioner.18

Second. Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for deciding issues not raised in the trial court,
specifically the question of whether or not there was compliance with §§9 and 10 of RA. No. 7279. It
argues that the sole defense set up by respondents in their petition before the Court of Appeals was
that their property was exempted from expropriation because it comes within the purview of a "small
property" as defined by R.A. No. 7279 . Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should not have applied
the doctrine laid down by this Court in the Filstream19 case as such issue was not raised by
respondents in their petition before the Court of Appeals.

This contention likewise has no merit. In their petition before the Court of Appeals, respondents
raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the subject Lot 1-C with an area of 343.10 square meters covered by
T.C.T. No. 226048 in the name of petitioners' mother, the late Demetria [De Guia] Serrano,
may be lawfully expropriated "for the public purpose of providing landless occupants thereof
homelots of their own under the "land-for-the landless program of respondent City of Manila."

2. Whether or not the expropriation of the said Lot l-C by respondent City of Manila violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution, since petitioners, with the exemption of
petitioner Oscar G. Serranno, who are likewise landless are actual occupants hereof.

3. Whether or not Lot 1-C is or may be exempted from expropriation pursuant to R.A. 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.20

It is clear that respondents raised in issue the propriety of the expropriation of their property in
connection with RA. No. 7279. Although what was discussed at length in their petition before the
Court of Appeals was whether or not the said property could be considered a small property within
the purview of the exemption under the said law, the other provisions of the said law concerning
expropriation proceedings need also be looked into to address the first issue raised by the
respondents and to determine whether or not expropriation of Lot 1-C was proper under the
circumstances. The Court of Appeals properly considered relevant provisions of R A. No.7279 to
determine the issues raised by respondents. Whether or not it correctly applied the doctrine laid
down in Filstream in resolving the issues raised by respondents, however, is a different matter
altogether, and this brings us to the next point.

Third. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously presumed that Lot 1-C has been
ordered condemned in its favor when the fact is that the order of the trial court, dated December 15,
1998, merely authorized the issuance of a writ of possession and petitioner's entry into the property
pursuant to Rule 67, §2. At that stage, it was premature to determine whether the requirements of
RA. No. 7279, §§9 - 10 have been complied with since no evidentiary hearing had yet been
conducted by the trial court.21

This contention is well taken. Rule 67, §2 provides:

 Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the
defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depository an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof
the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the
Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.

If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to
be deposited shall be fixed by the court.

After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith
place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof
to the court with service of copies to the parties.

Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint
for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance
with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.22 In this case,
these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue
the writ of possession.

The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements laid down
in §§9 - 10 of RA. No. 7279 and reiterated in Filstream ruling. This is error. The ruling in
the Filstream was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the
trial court in that case. Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the
trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to
determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA. No.
7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted
expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in § 10 of the law.

RA. No 7279 in pertinent parts provide:

SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land… Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired
in the following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or

agencies, including government owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d) Those within the declares Areas or Priority Development, Zone Improvement Program
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Programs sites which have not yet been
acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement and Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet
been acquired, and;

(f) Privately-owned lands.

 Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageously to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government
units shall give budgetary priority on-site development of government lands.

SEC. 10. Modes of Lands Acquisition. -- The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this
Act shall include, amount others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however; That expropriation shall be
resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided,
further; That were expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property
owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided finally, That abandoned
property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding
analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.

For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be
acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily
through negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual
occupants of the lands shall be given the right of first refusal.

Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence,
although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the
requirements.23 The determination of this question must await that hearing on the complaint for
expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be
expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consist of two stages: first, condemnation of the property
after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of the private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.24

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 16,1999, and resolution, dated February 23, 2000, of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and the order of the trial court, dated December 15,1998, is
REINSTATED. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to further proceedings. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 106804. August 12, 2004]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO
POBRE, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review [1] of the 30 March 1992 Decision[2] and 14 August 1992
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Tabaco, Albay in Civil Case No. T-552.

The Antecedents
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public corporation created to generate
geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide. [4]NPC
is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain.
 Private respondent Antonino Pobre (Pobre) is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land
(Property) located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The Property is covered by TCT
No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 11-9709.
In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he named as Tiwi
Hot Springs Resort Subdivision. On 12 January 1966, the then Court of First Instance of Albay
approved the subdivision plan of the Property. The Register of Deeds thus cancelled TCT No. 4067
and issued independent titles for the approved lots. In 1969, Pobre started advertising and selling
the lots.
On 4 August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and
steam were present beneath the Property. The Commission on Volcanology found the thermal
mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use.
NPC then became involved with Pobres Property in three instances.
First was on 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the
approved subdivision plan.
Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre
to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property.[5] On 23 October 1979, the trial court
ordered the expropriation of the lots upon NPCs payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount
of P207,790. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. While this first
expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC
with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property.
NPC did not act on Pobres complaints and NPC continued with its dumping.
Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to
acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the subject of this petition. NPC
needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 739[6] and Republic Act No. 5092.[7] NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the
Philippine National Bank. The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered
by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot upon
the trial courts issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
On 10 December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation.
Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots
affected by NPCs actions and for the payment of damages.
On 2 January 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground
that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project
within the Property due to Pobres opposition.
On 8 January 1985, the trial court granted NPCs motion to dismiss but the trial court allowed
Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The trial court admitted Pobres exhibits on the
damages because NPC failed to object.
On 30 August 1985, the trial court ordered the case submitted for decision since NPC failed to
appear to present its evidence. The trial court denied NPCs motion to reconsider the submission of
the case for decision.
NPC filed a petition for certiorari[8] with the then Intermediate Appellate Court, questioning the 30
August 1985 Order of the trial court. On 12 February 1987, the Intermediate Appellate Court
dismissed NPCs petition but directed the lower court to rule on NPCs objections to Pobres
documentary exhibits.
On 27 March 1987, the trial court admitted all of Pobres exhibits and upheld its Order dated 30
August 1985. The trial court considered the case submitted for decision.
 On 29 April 1987, the trial court issued its Decision in favor of Pobre. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, ordering the plaintiff to pay unto the defendant:

(1) The sum of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY (P3,448,450.00) PESOS which is the fair market value of the
subdivision of defendant with an area of sixty eight thousand nine hundred sixty nine
(68,969) square meters, plus legal rate of interest per annum from September 6, 1979
until the whole amount is paid, and upon payment thereof by the plaintiff the
defendant is hereby ordered to execute the necessary Deed of Conveyance or
Absolute Sale of the property in favor of the plaintiff;
(2) The sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS for and as
attorneys fees.

Costs against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.[9]

On 13 July 1987, NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision. On 30 October 1987,
the trial court issued its Order denying NPCs motion for reconsideration.
NPC appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 30 March 1992, the Court of Appeals upheld the
decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorneys fees. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by reason of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the award of attorneys fees is deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[10]

The Court of Appeals denied NPCs motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 14 August
1992.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its 69-page decision, the trial court recounted in great detail the scale and scope of the
damage NPC inflicted on the Property that Pobre had developed into a resort-subdivision. Pobres
Property suffered permanent injury because of the noise, water, air and land pollution generated by
NPCs geothermal plants. The construction and operation of the geothermal plants drastically
changed the topography of the Property making it no longer viable as a resort-subdivision. The
chemicals emitted by the geothermal plants damaged the natural resources in the Property and
endangered the lives of the residents.
NPC did not only take the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property, but also the remaining
area of the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC had rendered Pobres entire Property useless as a
resort-subdivision. The Property has become useful only to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobres
entire Property and pay for it.
 The trial court found the following badges of NPCs bad faith: (1) NPC allowed five years to pass
before it moved for the dismissal of the second expropriation case; (2) NPC did not act on Pobres
plea for NPC to eliminate or at least reduce the damage to the Property; and (3) NPC singled out
Pobres Property for piecemeal expropriation when NPC could have expropriated other properties
which were not affected in their entirety by NPCs operation.
The trial court found the just compensation to be P50 per square meter or a total of P3,448,450
for Pobres 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC failed to contest this valuation. Since NPC was in
bad faith and it employed dilatory tactics to prolong this case, the trial court imposed legal interest on
the P3,448,450 from 6 September 1979 until full payment. The trial court awarded Pobre attorneys
fees of P150,000.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the appellate court
deleted the award of attorneys fees because Pobre did not properly plead for it.

The Issues

NPC claims that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors that warrant reversal of the
appellate courts decision:
1. In not annulling the appealed Decision for having been rendered by the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction;
2. In holding that NPC had taken the entire Property of Pobre;
3. Assuming arguendo that there was taking of the entire Property, in not excluding from
the Property the 8,311.60 square-meter portion NPC had previously expropriated and
paid for;
4. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court at P3,448,450.00
with interest from September 6, 1979 until fully paid, is just and fair;
5. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at P25.00 per square meter
only as what NPC and Pobre had previously mutually agreed upon; and
6. In not totally setting aside the appealed Decision of the trial court.[11]

Procedural Issues

NPC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, insists that at the time that it moved for
the dismissal of its complaint, Pobre had yet to serve an answer or a motion for summary judgment
on NPC. Thus, NPC as plaintiff had the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint.
NPC relies on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules then in effect. NPC argues
that the dismissal of the complaint should have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case
including Pobres counterclaim.
NPCs belated attack on Pobres claim for damages must fail. The trial courts reservation of
Pobres right to recover damages in the same case is already beyond review. The 8 January 1985
Order of the trial court attained finality when NPC failed to move for its reconsideration within the 15-
day reglementary period. NPC opposed the order only on 27 May 1985 or more than four months
from the issuance of the order.
We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for not considering NPCs objections against the
subsistence of Pobres claim for damages. NPC neither included this issue in its assignment of errors
nor discussed it in its appellants brief. NPC also failed to question the trial courts 8 January 1985
Order in the petition for certiorari[12] it had earlier filed with the Court of Appeals. It is only before this
Court that NPC now vigorously assails the preservation of Pobres claim for damages. Clearly, NPCs
opposition to the existence of Pobres claim for damages is a mere afterthought. Rules of fair play,
justice and due process dictate that parties cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.[13]
We must correct NPCs claim that it filed the notice of dismissal just shortly after it had filed the
complaint for expropriation. While NPC had intimated several times to the trial court its desire to
dismiss the expropriation case it filed on 5 September 1979,[14] it was only on 2 January 1985 that
NPC filed its notice of dismissal.[15] It took NPC more than five years to actually file the notice of
dismissal. Five years is definitely not a short period of time. NPC obviously dilly-dallied in filing its
notice of dismissal while NPC meanwhile burdened Pobres property rights.
Even a timely opposition against Pobres claim for damages would not yield a favorable ruling
for NPC. It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case but
Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to
dismissal of civil actions in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases.
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take private property for
public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. [16]The power
of eminent domain may be validly delegated to the local governments, other public entities and
public utilities[17] such as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent
domain.[18] Eminent Domain was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. In the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, the prescribed method of expropriation is
still found in Rule 67, but its title is now Expropriation.
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided the exception to the general rule that the
dismissal of the complaint is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[19] For as long as all of
the elements of Section 1, Rule 17 were present the dismissal of the complaint rested exclusively on
the plaintiffs will.[20] The defending party and even the courts were powerless to prevent the
dismissal.[21] The courts could only accept and record the dismissal.[22]
A plain reading of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule
was not intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of
Court, provided that:

SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for
summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except
that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not
be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.

While Section 1, Rule 17 spoke of the service of answer or summary judgment, the Rules then
did not require the filing of an answer or summary judgment in eminent domain cases. [23]In lieu of an
answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant to file a single motion to dismiss where he
should present all of his objections and defenses to the taking of his property for the purpose
specified in the complaint.[24] In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion
to dismiss took the place of the answer.
 The records show that Pobre had already filed and served on NPC his motion to
dismiss/answer[25] even before NPC filed its own motion to dismiss. NPC filed its notice of dismissal
of the complaint on 2 January 1985. However, as early as 10 December 1984, Pobre had already
filed with the trial court and served on NPC his motion to dismiss/answer. A certain Divina Cerela
received Pobres pleading on behalf of NPC.[26] Unfortunately for NPC, even Section 1, Rule 17 of the
1964 Rules of Court could not save its cause.
NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses
his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant
had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could
file his notice of dismissal of the complaint.[27] Pobres motion to dismiss/answer, filed and served way
ahead of NPCs motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same
applies.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss the
complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the
taking. The plaintiffs right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to
court approval and to certain conditions. [28] The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964
Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil
actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.[29]
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his
right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. [30] The court must then see
to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process
of law.[31]
If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial
scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may
have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case
cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use,
[32]
 then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action.[33] However, when the defendant
claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should
not foreclose the defendants right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a
separate action.[34]
Thus, NPCs theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobres
claim for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided
for the dismissal of the defendants claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the expropriation case.
Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may
be made either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of
the expropriation case.[35] The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions, such
as the reservation of the defendants right to recover damages either in the same or in another
action.[36] The trial court in this case reserved Pobres right to prove his claim in the same case, a
reservation that has become final due to NPCs own fault.

Factual Findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts Bind the Court

The trial and appellate courts held that even before the first expropriation case, Pobre had
already established his Property as a resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to the
Property that NPC had made the Property uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision. NPCs facilities such
as steam wells, nag wells, power plants, power lines, and canals had hemmed in Pobres Property.
NPCs operations of its geothermal project also posed a risk to lives and properties.
 We uphold the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. Questions of facts are beyond
the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a petition for review may only raise questions of law.
[37]
 Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
generally binding on this Court.[38] We thus find no reason to set aside the two courts factual findings.
NPC points out that it did not take Pobres 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC argues that
assuming that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 square-meter portion that it had successfully
expropriated and fully paid for should have been excluded from the 68,969 square-meter Property
that Pobre claims NPC had damaged.
We are not persuaded.
In its 30 October 1987 Order denying NPCs motion for reconsideration, the trial court pointed
out that the Property originally had a total area of 141,300 square meters. [39] Pobre converted the
Property into a resort-subdivision and sold lots to the public. What remained of the lots are the
68,969 square meters of land.[40] Pobre no longer claimed damages for the other lots that he had
before the expropriation.
Pobre identified in court the lots forming the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC had the
opportunity to object to the identification of the lots. [41] NPC, however, failed to do so. Thus, we do
not disturb the trial and appellate courts finding on the total land area NPC had damaged.

NPC must Pay Just Compensation for the Entire Property

Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land
to the landowner.[42] However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner
because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the
aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.[43]
In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and
practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a
resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has
completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter
Property.
In United States v. Causby,[44] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is
rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is
deemed complete. Such taking is thus compensable.
In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without
expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may
demand payment of just compensation.[45] This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.[46]
In the recent case of National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo,[47] the Court
compelled the National Housing Authority (NHA) to pay just compensation to the landowners even
after the NHA had already abandoned the expropriation case. The Court pointed out that a
government agency could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a persons property, and then
just decide not to proceed with the expropriation. Such a complete turn-around is arbitrary and
capricious and was condemned by the Court in the strongest possible terms. NHA was held liable to
the landowners for the prejudice that they had suffered.
In this case, NPC appropriated Pobres Property without resort to expropriation proceedings.
NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute
expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the second
expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just compensation
and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre.
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for
expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no
longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived
when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements.[48] NPCs taking of Pobres
property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation
is a transgression of procedural due process.
From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for Pobres entire
68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation
of the Property. Even as the second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the
damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to Pobres
repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property.
NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that it
had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. [49] NPC abandoned the
second expropriation case five years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its
value. NPC has demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobres property rights.
Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine
the just compensation for Pobres 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared any further
delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation from NPC.
Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss. [50] The trial and appellate courts
endeavored to meet this standard. The P50 per square meter valuation of the 68,969 square-meter
Property is reasonable considering that the Property was already an established resort-subdivision.
NPC has itself to blame for not contesting the valuation before the trial court. Based on the P50 per
square meter valuation, the total amount of just compensation that NPC must pay Pobre
is P3,448,450.
The landowner is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from the time of the taking up
to the time of full payment by the government. [51] In accord with jurisprudence, we fix the legal
interest at six per cent (6%) per annum.[52] The legal interest should accrue from 6 September 1979,
the date when the trial court issued the writ of possession to NPC, up to the time that NPC fully pays
Pobre.[53]
NPCs abuse of its eminent domain authority is appalling. However, we cannot award moral
damages because Pobre did not assert his right to it.[54] We also cannot award attorneys fees in
Pobres favor since he did not appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of
attorneys fees.[55]
Nonetheless, we find it proper to award P50,000 in temperate damages to Pobre. The court
may award temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, if the court finds that a party has suffered some pecuniary loss but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty from the nature of the case.[56] As the trial and appellate
courts noted, Pobres resort-subdivision was no longer just a dream because Pobre had already
established the resort-subdivision and the prospect for it was initially encouraging. That is, until NPC
permanently damaged Pobres Property. NPC did not just destroy the property. NPC dashed Pobres
hope of seeing his Property achieve its full potential as a resort-subdivision.
The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority. Such entities
cannot trifle with a citizens property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary power
they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements. Thus, we hold
NPC liable for exemplary damages of P100,000. Exemplary damages or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.[57]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. The appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 March 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
National Power Corporation is ordered to pay Antonino Pobre P3,448,450 as just compensation for
the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter. National Power Corporation is directed
to pay legal interest at 6% per annum on the amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 until fully
paid. Upon National Power Corporations payment of the full amount, Antonino Pobre is ordered to
execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in National Power Corporations favor. National
Power Corporation is further ordered to pay temperate and exemplary damages of P50,000
and P100,000, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160656              June 15, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Public Works and Highways), petitioner, 

vs.
ISMAEL ANDAYA, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated October 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 65066 affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan
City, Branch 33 in Civil Case No. 4378, for enforcement of easement of right-of-way (or eminent
domain).

Respondent Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Bading, Butuan City.
His ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. RT-10225 and RT-10646. These
properties are subject to a 60-meter wide perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation ditches,
aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or public enterprise, at no cost to the
government, except only the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated with Andaya to enforce the 60-meter
easement of right-of-way. The easement was for concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage
1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project. The parties, however, failed to reach an agreement.

On December 13, 1995, the Republic instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan
City to enforce the easement of right-of-way or eminent domain. The trial court issued a writ of
possession on April 26, 1996.3 It also constituted a Board of Commissioners (Board) to determine
the just compensation. Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of Expropriation upon payment of
just compensation.4 Later, the Board reported that there was a discrepancy in the description of the
property sought to be expropriated. The Republic thus amended its complaint, reducing the 60-meter
easement to 10 meters, or an equivalent of 701 square meters.

On December 10, 1998, the Board reported that the project would affect a total of 10,380 square
meters of Andaya’s properties, 4,443 square meters of which will be for the 60-meter easement. The
Board also reported that the easement would diminish the value of the remaining 5,937 square
meters. As a result, it recommended the payment of consequential damages amounting to
₱2,820,430 for the remaining area.5

Andaya objected to the report because although the Republic reduced the easement to 10 meters or
an equivalent of 701 square meters, the Board still granted it 4,443 square meters. He contended
that the consequential damages should be based on the remaining area of 9,679 square meters.
Thus, the just compensation should be ₱11,373,405. The Republic did not file any comment,
opposition, nor objection.

After considering the Board’s report, the trial court decreed on April 29, 1999, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court decides as follows:

a) That the plaintiff is legally entitled to its inherent right of expropriation to, viz.: 1) the lot now known
as lot 3291-B-1-A, portion of lot 3291-B-1, (LRC) Psd-255693, covered by TCT No. RT-10225, with
an area of 288 sq. m.; and 2) the lot now known as lot 3293-F-5-B-1, portion of lot 3293-F-5-B (LRC)
Psd-230236, covered by TCT No. RT-10646, with an area of 413 sq. m., both of the Butuan City
Registry of Deeds, it being shown that it is for public use and purpose --- free of charge by reason of
the statutory lien of easement of right-of-way imposed on defendant’s titles;

b) That however, the plaintiff is obligated to pay defendant the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY (P2,820,430.00) PESOS as fair and
reasonable severance damages;

c) To pay members of the Board of Commissioners, thus: for the chairman --- TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) PESOS and the two (2) members at FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS
each;

d) To pay defendant’s counsel FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as Attorney’s fees; and
finally,

e) That the Registry of Deeds of Butuan City is also directed to effect the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Titles for the aforementioned two (2) lots in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
following the technical description as appearing in pages 6, 7, and 8 of the Commissioner’s Report.

NO COSTS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.6

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Republic contested the awards of severance
damages and attorney’s fees while Andaya demanded just compensation for his entire property
minus the easement. Andaya alleged that the easement would prevent ingress and egress to his
property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River. As a result,
his entire property would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. He thus demanded ₱11,373,405
as just compensation based on the total compensable area of 9,679 square meters.

The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision by imposing a 6% interest on the
consequential damages from the date of the writ of possession or the actual taking, and by deleting
the attorney’s fees.
Hence, the instant petition. Simply put, the sole issue for resolution may be stated thus: Is the
Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property,
the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable?

It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the Republic. Andaya’s
transfer certificates of title7 contained the reservation that the lands covered thereby are subject to
the provisions of the Land Registration Act8 and the Public Land Act.9 Section 11210 of the Public
Land Act provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60
meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the
government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements
existing thereon that may be affected. In view of this, the Court of Appeals declared that all the
Republic needs to do is to enforce such right without having to initiate expropriation proceedings and
without having to pay any just compensation.11 Hence, the Republic may appropriate the 701 square
meters necessary for the construction of the floodwalls without paying for it.

We are, however, unable to sustain the Republic’s argument that it is not liable to pay consequential
damages if in enforcing the legal easement on Andaya’s property, the remaining area would be
rendered unusable and uninhabitable. "Taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his
property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment
of the value of his property.12 Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining
area of Andaya’s property. True, no burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and
possession of the property. But, as correctly observed by the Board and affirmed by the courts a
quo, the nature and the effect of the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the
remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn it into a catch basin for
the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River.

For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be
neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.13 One of the basic principles
enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due
process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be
just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Noteworthy, Section 9, Article
III of our Constitution mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.14

Finally, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court that just compensation
should be paid only for 5,937 square meters of the total area of 10,380 square meters. Admittedly,
the Republic needs only a 10-meter easement or an equivalent of 701 square meters. Yet, it is also
settled that it is legally entitled to a 60-meter wide easement or an equivalent of 4,443 square
meters. Clearly, although the Republic will use only 701 square meters, it should not be liable for the
3,742 square meters, which constitute the difference between this area of 701 square meters and
the 4,443 square meters to which it is fully entitled to use as easement, free of charge except for
damages to affected existing improvements, if any, under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.

In effect, without such damages alleged and proved, the Republic is liable for just compensation of
only the remaining areas consisting of 5,937 square meters, with interest thereon at the legal rate of
6% per annum from the date of the writ of possession or the actual taking until full payment is made.
For the purpose of determining the final just compensation, the case is remanded to the trial court.
Said court is ordered to make the determination of just compensation payable to respondent Andaya
with deliberate dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
65066, modifying the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 33 in Civil Case
No. 4378, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as herein set forth.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 33 for the
determination of the final just compensation of the compensable area consisting of 5,937 square
meters, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the writ of
possession or actual taking until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169914             April 18, 2008

ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION, petitioner, 

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondents.

x ----------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 174166             April 18, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

AND COMMUNICATIONS and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SALACNIB BATERINA, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Court is still continuously besieged by Petitions arising from the awarding of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) Project to the Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), despite the promulgation by this Court of Decisions
and Resolutions in two cases, Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc.1 and Republic v. Gingoyon,2 which already resolved the more basic and immediate issues
arising from the said award. The sheer magnitude of the project, the substantial cost of its building,
the expected high profits from its operations, and its remarkable impact on the Philippine economy,
consequently raised significant interest in the project from various quarters.

Once more, two new Petitions concerning the NAIA IPT III Project are before this Court. It is only
appropriate, however, that the Court first recounts its factual and legal findings
in Agan and Gingoyon to ascertain that its ruling in the Petitions at bar shall be consistent and in
accordance therewith.

Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547, and
155661)

Already established and incontrovertible are the following facts in Agan:

In August 1989, the [Department of Trade and Communications (DOTC)] engaged the
services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can cope with the
traffic development up to the year 2010. The study consisted of two parts: first, traffic
forecasts, capacity of existing facilities, NAIA future requirements, proposed master plans
and development plans; and second, presentation of the preliminary design of the passenger
terminal building. The ADP submitted a Draft Final Report to the DOTC in December 1989.

Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun,
Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President Fidel
V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new
international airport terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they formed
the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993.

On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the
DOTC/[Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)] for the development of NAIA
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer
arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).

On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT
III project.

On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the proposal of AEDC to
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). A revised proposal, however,
was forwarded by the DOTC to NEDA on December 13, 1995. On January 5, 1996, the
NEDA Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA ICC) - Technical Board favorably endorsed
the project to the ICC - Cabinet Committee which approved the same, subject to certain
conditions, on January 19, 1996. On February 13, 1996, the NEDA passed Board Resolution
No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III project.

On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of
an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's unsolicited proposal, in
accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended. The alternative bidders were required to
submit three (3) sealed envelopes on or before 5:00 p.m. of September 20, 1996. The first
envelope should contain the Prequalification Documents, the second envelope the Technical
Proposal, and the third envelope the Financial Proposal of the proponent.

On June 20, 1996, PBAC Bulletin No. 1 was issued, postponing the availment of the Bid
Documents and the submission of the comparative bid proposals. Interested firms were
permitted to obtain the Request for Proposal Documents beginning June 28, 1996, upon
submission of a written application and payment of a non-refundable fee of P50,000.00
(US$2,000).

The Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among others that the proponent must
have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for the detailed engineering,
design, construction, operation, and maintenance phases of the project. The proponent
would be evaluated based on its ability to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project,
and its capacity to secure external financing for the project.
On July 23, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 2 inviting all bidders to a pre-bid
conference on July 29, 1996.

On August 16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 amending the Bid Documents.
The following amendments were made on the Bid Documents:

a. Aside from the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment, the proponent shall include in
its financial proposal an additional percentage of gross revenue share of the
Government, as follows:

i. First 5 years 5.0%

ii. Next 10 years 7.5%
iii. Next 10 years 10.0%

b. The amount of the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment shall be subject of the price
challenge. Proponent may offer an Annual Guaranteed Payment which need not be
of equal amount, but payment of which shall start upon site possession.

c. The project proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the financing
requirement for the detailed engineering, design, construction, and/or operation and
maintenance phases of the project as the case may be. For purposes of pre-
qualification, this capability shall be measured in terms of:

i. Proof of the availability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to

provide the minimum amount of equity for the project; and

ii. a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project
proponent and/or the members of the consortium are banking with them, that
the project proponent and/or the members are of good financial standing, and
have adequate resources.

d. The basis for the prequalification shall be the proponent's compliance with the
minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the Bid Documents and
the [Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)] of the BOT Law. The minimum
amount of equity shall be 30% of the Project Cost.

e. Amendments to the draft Concession Agreement shall be issued from time to time.
Said amendments shall only cover items that would not materially affect the
preparation of the proponent's proposal.

On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held where certain clarifications
were made. Upon the request of prospective bidder People's Air Cargo & Warehousing Co.,
Inc (Paircargo), the PBAC warranted that based on Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law, only the proposed Annual Guaranteed Payment
submitted by the challengers would be revealed to AEDC, and that the challengers' technical
and financial proposals would remain confidential. The PBAC also clarified that the list of
revenue sources contained in Annex 4.2a of the Bid Documents was merely indicative and
that other revenue sources may be included by the proponent, subject to approval by
DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only those fees and charges denominated
as Public Utility Fees would be subject to regulation, and those charges which would be
actually deemed Public Utility Fees could still be revised, depending on the outcome of
PBAC's query on the matter with the Department of Justice.

In September 1996, the PBAC issued Bid Bulletin No. 5, entitled "Answers to the Queries of
PAIRCARGO as Per Letter Dated September 3 and 10, 1996." Paircargo's queries and the
PBAC's responses were as follows:

1. It is difficult for Paircargo and Associates to meet the required minimum equity
requirement as prescribed in Section 8.3.4 of the Bid Documents considering that
the capitalization of each member company is so structured to meet the
requirements and needs of their current respective business undertaking/activities. In
order to comply with this equity requirement, Paircargo is requesting PBAC to just
allow each member of (sic) corporation of the Joint Venture to just execute an
agreement that embodies a commitment to infuse the required capital in case the
project is awarded to the Joint Venture instead of increasing each corporation's
current authorized capital stock just for prequalification purposes.

In prequalification, the agency is interested in one's financial capability at the time of

prequalification, not future or potential capability.

A commitment to put up equity once awarded the project is not enough to establish
that "present" financial capability. However, total financial capability of all member
companies of the Consortium, to be established by submitting the respective
companies' audited financial statements, shall be acceptable.

2. At present, Paircargo is negotiating with banks and other institutions for the
extension of a Performance Security to the joint venture in the event that the
Concessions Agreement (sic) is awarded to them. However, Paircargo is being
required to submit a copy of the draft concession as one of the documentary
requirements. Therefore, Paircargo is requesting that they'd (sic) be furnished copy
of the approved negotiated agreement between the PBAC and the AEDC at the
soonest possible time.

A copy of the draft Concession Agreement is included in the Bid Documents. Any
material changes would be made known to prospective challengers through bid
bulletins. However, a final version will be issued before the award of contract.

The PBAC also stated that it would require AEDC to sign Supplement C of the Bid
Documents (Acceptance of Criteria and Waiver of Rights to Enjoin Project) and to submit the
same with the required Bid Security.

On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People's Air Cargo and Warehousing
Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp.
(Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to
the PBAC. On September 23, 1996, the PBAC opened the first envelope containing the
prequalification documents of the Paircargo Consortium. On the following day, September
24, 1996, the PBAC prequalified the Paircargo Consortium.

On September 26, 1996, AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its reservations as regards
the Paircargo Consortium, which include:
 a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAIRCARGO;

b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAGS;

c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the General Banking Act) on the
amount that Security Bank could legally invest in the project;

d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the PAIRCARGO Joint Venture, for

prequalification purposes; and

e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in view of the Philippine

requirement in the operation of a public utility.

The PBAC gave its reply on October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had considered the
issues raised by the latter, and that based on the documents submitted by Paircargo and the
established prequalification criteria, the PBAC had found that the challenger, Paircargo, had
prequalified to undertake the project. The Secretary of the DOTC approved the finding of the
PBAC.

The PBAC then proceeded with the opening of the second envelope of the Paircargo
Consortium which contained its Technical Proposal.

On October 3, 1996, AEDC reiterated its objections, particularly with respect to Paircargo's
financial capability, in view of the restrictions imposed by Section 21-B of the General
Banking Act and Sections 1380 and 1381 of the Manual Regulations for Banks and Other
Financial Intermediaries. On October 7, 1996, AEDC again manifested its objections and
requested that it be furnished with excerpts of the PBAC meeting and the accompanying
technical evaluation report where each of the issues they raised were addressed.

On October 16, 1996, the PBAC opened the third envelope submitted by AEDC and the
Paircargo Consortium containing their respective financial proposals. Both proponents
offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 million at no cost to the
government and to pay the government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five years of
operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share
in gross revenues for the last ten years of operation, in accordance with the Bid Documents.
However, in addition to the foregoing, AEDC offered to pay the government a total of P135
million as guaranteed payment for 27 years while Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the
government a total of P17.75 billion for the same period.

Thus, the PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted
by the Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days or until November 28, 1996
within which to match the said bid, otherwise, the project would be awarded to Paircargo.

As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period, then DOTC Secretary
Amado Lagdameo, on December 11, 1996, issued a notice to Paircargo Consortium
regarding AEDC's failure to match the proposal.

On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International

Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated
its objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.

On April 11, 1997, the DOTC submitted the concession agreement for the second-pass
approval of the NEDA-ICC.

On April 16, 1997, AEDC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against the Secretary of
the DOTC, the Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D.
Alvarez, in his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee.

xxxx

On July 9, 1997, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO.

On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and
PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the "Concession Agreement for the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Passenger Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). x x x.

On November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA). x x x.

Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to the ARCA. The
First Supplement was signed on August 27, 1999; the Second Supplement on September 4,
2000; and the Third Supplement on June 22, 2001 (collectively, Supplements).

xxxx

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA
Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and
ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and
other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. x x x.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming
that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the questioned
agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said
agreements.

On October 15, 2002, the service providers, joining the cause of the petitioning workers, filed
a motion for intervention and a petition-in-intervention.

On October 24, 2002, Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino
Jaraula filed a similar petition with this Court.

On November 6, 2002, several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the
legality of the various agreements.

On December 11, 2002, another group of Congressmen, Hon. Jacinto V. Paras, Rafael P.
Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie B. Villarama, Prospero C. Nograles, Prospero A. Pichay,
 Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing O. Macaranbon, moved to intervene in the case as
Respondents-Intervenors. They filed their Comment-In-Intervention defending the validity of
the assailed agreements and praying for the dismissal of the petitions.

During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, on
November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacañang
Palace, stated that she will not "honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch's
legal offices have concluded (as) null and void."3

The Court first dispensed with the procedural issues raised in Agan, ruling that (a) the MIAA service
providers and its employees, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 155001 and 155661, had the requisite standing
since they had a direct and substantial interest to protect by reason of the implementation of the
PIATCO Contracts which would affect their source of livelihood;4 and (b) the members of the House
of Representatives, petitioners in G.R. No. 155547, were granted standing in view of the serious
legal questions involved and their impact on public interest.5

As to the merits of the Petitions in Agan, the Court concluded that:

In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the
Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the
contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.
Further, considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial
amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession
Agreement into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997
Concession Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. The
provisions under Sections 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997 Concession
Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a
direct government guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being
accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void.6

Hence, the fallo of the Court's Decision in Agan reads:

WHEREFORE, the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession
Agreement and the Supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void.7

In a Resolution8 dated 21 January 2004, the Court denied with finality the Motions for
Reconsideration of its 5 May 2003 Decision in Agan filed by therein respondents PIATCO and
Congressmen Paras, et al., and respondents-intervenors.9 Significantly, the Court declared in the
same Resolution that:

This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA
IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their
construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just
and in accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at
the expense of PIATCO and its investors.10 (Emphasis ours.)

It is these afore-quoted pronouncements that gave rise to the Petition in Gingoyon.

Republic v. Gingoyon (G.R. No. 166429)

According to the statement of facts in Gingoyon:

After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the
possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport
terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds
of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings were
commenced before the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration
and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the
Government has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies.

Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the
Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special
Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon the
filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate
possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had
deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value for taxation purposes.

The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge
Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed,
the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government,
authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case
of City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of
possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance,
and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly
noting that "[t]he case record shows that [the Government has] deposited the assessed
value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of the Philippines, an authorized depositary,
as shown by the certification attached to their complaint." Also on the same day, the RTC
issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take
possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued.

However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21

December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now
assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of
possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known
as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National
Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.

There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act
No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate
payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit
with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike
Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the
market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
 Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the
Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it
directed the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately
release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC
characterized as that which the Government "specifically made available for the purpose of
this expropriation;" and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation
due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to
submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover
the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed "to maintain,
preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in
preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation
proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was
prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part
of [NAIA 3] to other parties."

The very next day after the issuance of the assailed 4 January 2005 Order, the Government
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for hearing on 10 January 2005.
On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second now assailed before this
Court, which appointed three (3) Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just
compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for
Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.

The RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition on 10

January 2005. On the same day, it denied these motions in an Omnibus Order dated 10
January 2005. This is the third Order now assailed before this Court. Nonetheless, while
the Omnibus Order affirmed the earlier dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted
from affirmance "the superfluous part of the Order prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding
concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties."

Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed on 13
January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders dated 4 January
2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from
taking further action on the expropriation case. A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in
a Resolution dated 14 January 2005.11

The Court resolved the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines and Manila International Airport
Authority in Gingoyon in this wise:

In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows:

(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before
the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just
compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation
case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.

(2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate
payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO
and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just
compensation.
 (3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the
Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3
Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.

(4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the implementation of
the NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation
of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of
Possession, subject to the conditions above-stated. As prescribed by the Court, such
authority encompasses "the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex,
maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and
equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and
transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport."

5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation within sixty
(60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged to comply with the
standards set under Rep. Act No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules. Considering that the
NAIA 3 consists of structures and improvements, the valuation thereof shall be determined
using the replacements cost method, as prescribed under Section 10 of the Implementing
Rules.

(6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing the
commissioners for the purpose of determining just compensation. The provisions on
commissioners under Rule 67 shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act
No. 8974, its Implementing Rules, or the rulings of the Court in Agan.

(7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to
PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision.

(8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.

All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to warrant the
nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of these orders should be
modified to conform with law and the pronouncements made by the Court herein.12

The decretal portion of the Court's Decision in Gingoyon thus reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders dated 4
January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2004 is HELD IN

ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of Three Billion Two
Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the
proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities;

2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized [to] start the
implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pasenger Terminal III project by
performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the said International Airport
Passenger Terminal project;
 3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision, to
determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government.

The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the qualification that
the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to file, if they so choose,
objections to the appointment of the commissioners decreed therein.

The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby LIFTED.

No pronouncement as to costs.13

Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision were filed by therein petitioners
Republic and MIAA, as well as the three other parties who sought to intervene, namely, Asakihosan
Corporation, Takenaka Corporation, and Congressman Baterina.

In a Resolution dated 1 February 2006, this Court denied with finality the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of therein petitioners and remained faithful to its assailed Decision based on the
following ratiocination:

Admittedly, the 2004 Resolution in Agan could be construed as mandating the full payment
of the final amount of just compensation before the Government may be permitted to take
over the NAIA 3. However, the Decision ultimately rejected such a construction,
acknowledging the public good that would result from the immediate operation of the NAIA 3.
Instead, the Decision adopted an interpretation which is in consonance with Rep. Act No.
8974 and with equitable standards as well, that allowed the Government to take possession
of the NAIA 3 after payment of the proffered value of the facilities to PIATCO. Such a reading
is substantially compliant with the pronouncement in the 2004 Agan Resolution, and is in
accord with law and equity. In contrast, the Government's position, hewing to the strict
application of Rule 67, would permit the Government to acquire possession over the NAIA 3
and implement its operation without having to pay PIATCO a single centavo, a situation that
is obviously unfair. Whatever animosity the Government may have towards PIATCO does
not acquit it from settling its obligations to the latter, particularly those which had already
been previously affirmed by this Court.14

The Court, in the same Resolution, denied all the three motions for intervention of Asakihosan
Corporation, Takenaka Corporation, and Congressman Baterina, and ruled as follows:

We now turn to the three (3) motions for intervention all of which were filed after the
promulgation of the Court's Decision. All three (3) motions must be denied. Under Section 2,
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the court. Since this case originated from an original action
filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention in this case if
ever was before and not after resolution of this case. To allow intervention at this juncture
would be highly irregular. It is extremely improbable that the movants were unaware of the
pendency of the present case before the Court, and indeed none of them allege such lack of
knowledge.

Takenaka and Asahikosan rely on Mago v. Court of Appeals wherein the Court took the
extraordinary step of allowing the motion for intervention even after the challenged order of
the trial court had already become final. Yet it was apparent in Mago that the movants
therein were not impleaded despite being indispensable parties, and had not even known of
the existence of the case before the trial court, and the effect of the final order was to deprive
 the movants of their land. In this case, neither Takenaka nor Asahikosan stand to be
dispossessed by reason of the Court's Decision. There is no palpable due process violation
that would militate the suspension of the procedural rule.

Moreover, the requisite legal interest required of a party-in-intervention has not been
established so as to warrant the extra-ordinary step of allowing intervention at this late stage.
As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan have not been judicially proved or
conclusively established as fact by any trier of facts in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could
not be considered as indispensable parties to the petition for certiorari. In the case of
Representative Baterina, he invokes his prerogative as legislator to curtail the disbursement
without appropriation of public funds to compensate PIATCO, as well as that as a taxpayer,
as the basis of his legal standing to intervene. However, it should be noted that the amount
which the Court directed to be paid by the Government to PIATCO was derived from the
money deposited by the Manila International Airport Authority, an agency which enjoys
corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality separate and distinct from those of
the National Government and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved by
Congress.

It is also observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be duly litigated in
proceedings which are extant before lower courts. There is no compelling reason to
disregard the established rules and permit the interventions belatedly filed after the
promulgation of the Court's Decision.15

Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications

and Manila International Airport Authority (G.R. No. 169914)

Banking on this Court's declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO is
null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC) filed before this Court the present
Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order), praying of
this Court that:

(1) After due hearing, judgment be rendered commanding the Respondents, their officers,
agents, successors, representatives or persons or entities acting on their behalf, to formally
award the NAIA-APT [sic]III PROJECT to Petitioner AEDC and to execute and formalize with
Petitioner AEDC the approved Draft Concession Agreement embodying the agreed terms
and conditions for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project and directing Respondents to
cease and desist from awarding the NAIA-IPT Project to third parties or negotiating into any
concession contract with third parties.

(2) Pending resolution on the merits, a Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining
Respondents, their officers, agents, successors or representatives or persons or entities
acting on their behalf from negotiating, re-bidding, awarding or otherwise entering into any
concession contract with PIATCO and other third parties for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III
Project.

Other relief and remedies, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise prayed for.16

AEDC bases its Petition on the following grounds:

I. PETITIONER AEDC, BEING THE RECOGNIZED AND UNCHALLENGED ORIGINAL

PROPONENT, HAS THE EXCLUSIVE, CLEAR AND VESTED STATUTORY RIGHT TO
THE AWARD OF THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT;
 II. RESPONDENTS HAVE A STATUTORY DUTY TO PROTECT PETITIONER AEDC AS
THE UNCHALLENGED ORIGINAL PROPONENT AS A RESULT OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S NULLIFICATION OF THE AWARD OF THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT TO PIATCO[;
and]

III. RESPONDENTS HAVE NO LEGAL BASIS OR AUTHORITY TO TAKE OVER THE

NAIA-IPT III PROJECT, TO THE EXCLUSION OF PETITIONER AEDC, OR TO AWARD
THE PROJECT TO THIRD PARTIES.17

At the crux of the Petition of AEDC is its claim that, being the recognized and unchallenged original
proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it has the exclusive, clear, and vested statutory right to the
award thereof. However, the Petition of AEDC should be dismissed for lack of merit, being as it is,
substantially and procedurally flawed.

SUBSTANTIVE INFIRMITY

A petition for mandamus is governed by Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which
reads –

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or some other time to
be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the respondent.

It is well-established in our jurisprudence that only specific legal rights are enforceable
by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ will
not issue in cases where the right is doubtful. Just as fundamental is the principle governing the
issuance of mandamus that the duties to be performed must be such as are clearly and peremptorily
enjoined by law or by reason of official station.18

A rule long familiar is that mandamus never issues in doubtful cases. It requires a showing of a

complete and clear legal right in the petitioner to the performance of ministerial acts. In varying
language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only
if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Otherwise, the mandamus petition must be
dismissed.19

The right that AEDC is seeking to enforce is supposedly enjoined by Section 4-A of Republic Act No.
6957,20 as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, on unsolicited proposals, which provides –

SEC. 4-A. Unsolicited proposals. – Unsolicited proposals for projects may be accepted by

any government agency or local government unit on a negotiated basis: Provided, That, all
the following conditions are met: (1) such projects involve a new concept or technology
and/or are not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct government guarantee, subsidy
or equity is required, and (3) the government agency or local government unit has invited by
publication, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation,
comparative or competitive proposals and no other proposal is received for a period of sixty
 (60) working days: Provided, further, That in the event another proponent submits a lower
price proposal, the original proponent shall have the right to match the price within thirty (30)
working days.

In furtherance of the afore-quoted provision, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, devoted the entire Rule 10 to
Unsolicited Proposals, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below –

Sec. 10.1. Requisites for Unsolicited Proposals. – Any Agency/LGU may accept unsolicited
proposals on a negotiated basis provided that all the following conditions are met:

a. the project involves a new concept or technology and/or is not part of the list of priority
projects;

b. no direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required; and

c. the Agency/LGU concerned has invited by publication, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in
a newspaper of general circulation, comparative or competitive proposals and no other
proposal is received for a period of sixty (60) working days. In the event that another project
proponent submits a price proposal lower than that submitted by the original proponent, the
latter shall have the right to match said price proposal within thirty (30) working days. Should
the original proponent fail to match the lower price proposal submitted within the specified
period, the contract shall be awarded to the tenderer of the lowest price. On the other hand,
if the original project proponent matches the submitted lowest price within the specified
period, he shall be immediately be awarded the project.

xxxx

Sec. 10.6. Evaluation of Unsolicited Proposals. – The Agency/LGU is tasked with the initial
evaluation of the proposal. The Agency/LGU shall: 1) appraise the merits of the project; 2)
evaluate the qualification of the proponent; and 3) assess the appropriateness of the
contractual arrangement and reasonableness of the risk allocation. The Agency/LGU is
given sixty (60) days to evaluate the proposal from the date of submission of the complete
proposal. Within this 60-day period, the Agency/LGU, shall advise the proponent in writing
whether it accepts or rejects the proposal. Acceptance means commitment of the
Agency/LGU to pursue the project and recognition of the proponent as the "original
proponent." At this point, the Agency/LGU will no longer entertain other similar
proposals until the solicitation of comparative proposals. The implementation of the
project, however, is still contingent primarily on the approval of the appropriate approving
authorities consistent with Section 2.7 of these IRR, the agreement between the original
proponent and the Agency/LGU of the contract terms, and the approval of the contract by the
[Investment Coordination Committee (ICC)] or Local Sanggunian.

xxxx

Sec. 10.9. Negotiation With the Original Proponent. – Immediately after ICC/Local
Sanggunian's clearance of the project, the Agency/LGU shall proceed with the in-
depth negotiation of the project scope, implementation arrangements and concession
agreement, all of which will be used in the Terms of Reference for the solicitation of
comparative proposals. The Agency/LGU and the proponent are given ninety (90) days
upon receipt of ICC's approval of the project to conclude negotiations. The Agency/LGU and
the original proponent shall negotiate in good faith. However, should there be
 unresolvable differences during the negotiations, the Agency/LGU shall have the
option to reject the proposal and bid out the project. On the other hand, if the
negotiation is successfully concluded, the original proponent shall then be required to
reformat and resubmit its proposal in accordance with the requirements of the Terms
of Reference to facilitate comparison with the comparative proposals. The
Agency/LGU shall validate the reformatted proposal if it meets the requirements of the
TOR prior to the issuance of the invitation for comparative proposals.

xxxx

Sec. 10.11. Invitation for Comparative Proposals. The Agency/LGU shall publish the
invitation for comparative or competitive proposals only after ICC/Local Sanggunian issues a
no objection clearance of the draft contract. The invitation for comparative or competitive
proposals should be published at least once every week for three (3) weeks in at least one
(1) newspaper of general circulation. It shall indicate the time, which should not be earlier
than the last date of publication, and place where tender/bidding documents could be
obtained. It shall likewise explicitly specify a time of sixty (60) working days reckoned from
the date of issuance of the tender/bidding documents upon which proposals shall be
received. Beyond said deadline, no proposals shall be accepted. A pre-bid conference shall
be conducted ten (10) working days after the issuance of the tender/bidding documents.

Sec. 10.12. Posting of Bid Bond by Original Proponent. – The original proponent shall be
required at the date of the first date of the publication of the invitation for comparative
proposals to submit a bid bond equal to the amount and in the form required of the
challengers.

Sec. 10.13. Simultaneous Qualification of the Original Proponent. – The Agency/LGU shall
qualify the original proponent based on the provisions of Rule 5 hereof, within thirty (30) days
from start of negotiation. For consistency, the evaluation criteria used for qualifying the
original proponent should be the same criteria used for qualifying the original proponent
should be the criteria used in the Terms of Reference for the challengers.

xxxx

Sec. 10.16. Disclosure of the Price Proposal. – The disclosure of the price proposal of the
original proponent in the Tender Documents will be left to the discretion of the Agency/LGU.
However, if it was not disclosed in the Tender Documents, the original proponent's price
proposal should be revealed upon the opening of the financial proposals of the
challengers. The right of the original proponent to match the best proposal within thirty
(30) working days starts upon official notification by the Agency/LGU of the most
advantageous financial proposal. (Emphasis ours.)

In her sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1586 (the precursor of Republic Act No. 7718), then
Senator (now President of the Republic of the Philippines) Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo explained the
reason behind the proposed amendment that would later become Section 4-A of Republic Act No.
6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718:

The object of the amendment is to protect proponents which have already incurred costs in
the conceptual design and in the preparation of the proposal, and which may have adopted
an imaginative method of construction or innovative concept for the proposal. The
amendment also aims to harness the ingenuity of the private sector to come up with
solutions to the country's infrastructure problems.21
It is irrefragable that Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718,
and Section 10 of its IRR, accord certain rights or privileges to the original proponent of an
unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project. They are meant to encourage private sector
initiative in conceptualizing infrastructure projects that would benefit the public. Nevertheless, none
of these rights or privileges would justify the automatic award of the NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC
after its previous award to PIATCO was declared null and void by this Court in Agan.

The rights or privileges of an original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure

project are never meant to be absolute. Otherwise, the original proponent can hold the Government
hostage and secure the award of the infrastructure project based solely on the fact that it was the
first to submit a proposal. The absurdity of such a situation becomes even more apparent when
considering that the proposal is unsolicited by the Government. The rights or privileges of an original
proponent depends on compliance with the procedure and conditions explicitly provided by the
statutes and their IRR.

An unsolicited proposal is subject to evaluation, after which, the government agency or local
government unit (LGU) concerned may accept or reject the proposal outright.

Under Section 10.6 of the IRR, the "acceptance" of the unsolicited proposal by the agency/LGU is
limited to the "commitment of the [a]gency/LGU to pursue the project and recognition of the
proponent as the 'original proponent.'" Upon acceptance then of the unsolicited proposal, the original
proponent is recognized as such but no award is yet made to it. The commitment of the
agency/LGU upon acceptance of the unsolicited proposal is to the pursuit of the project,
regardless of to whom it shall subsequently award the same. The acceptance of the unsolicited
proposal only precludes the agency/LGU from entertaining other similar proposals until the
solicitation of comparative proposals.

Consistent in both the statutes and the IRR is the requirement that invitations be published for
comparative or competitive proposals. Therefore, it is mandatory that a public bidding be held before
the awarding of the project. The negotiations between the agency/LGU and the original proponent,
as provided in Section 10.9 of the IRR, is for the sole purpose of coming up with draft agreements,
which shall be used in the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the solicitation of comparative proposals.
Even at this point, there is no definite commitment made to the original proponent as to the awarding
of the project. In fact, the same IRR provision even gives the concerned agency/LGU, in case of
unresolvable differences during the negotiations, the option to reject the original proponent's
proposal and just bid out the project.

Generally, in the course of processing an unsolicited proposal, the original proponent is treated in
much the same way as all other prospective bidders for the proposed infrastructure project. It is
required to reformat and resubmit its proposal in accordance with the requirements of the TOR.22 It
must submit a bid bond equal to the amount and in the form required of the challengers.23 Its
qualification shall be evaluated by the concerned agency/LGU, using evaluation criteria in
accordance with Rule 524 of the IRR, and which shall be the same criteria to be used in the TOR for
the challengers.25 These requirements ensure that the public bidding under Rule 10 of IRR on
Unsolicited Proposals still remain in accord with the three principles in public bidding, which are: the
offer to the public, an opportunity for competition, and a basis for exact comparison of bids.26

The special rights or privileges of an original proponent thus come into play only when there are
other proposals submitted during the public bidding of the infrastructure project. As can be gleaned
from the plain language of the statutes and the IRR, the original proponent has: (1) the right to match
the lowest or most advantageous proposal within 30 working days from notice thereof, and (2) in the
event that the original proponent is able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal
submitted, then it has the right to be awarded the project. The second right or privilege is contingent
upon the actual exercise by the original proponent of the first right or privilege. Before the project
could be awarded to the original proponent, he must have been able to match the lowest or most
advantageous proposal within the prescribed period. Hence, when the original proponent is able to
timely match the lowest or most advantageous proposal, with all things being equal, it shall enjoy
preference in the awarding of the infrastructure project.

This is the extent of the protection that Legislature intended to afford the original proponent, as
supported by the exchange between Senators Neptali Gonzales and Sergio Osmeña during the
Second Reading of Senate Bill No. 1586:

Senator Gonzales:

xxxx

The concept being that in case of an unsolicited proposal and nonetheless public bidding
has been held, then [the original proponent] shall, in effect, be granted what is the
equivalent of the right of first refusal by offering a bid which shall equal or better the
bid of the winning bidder within a period of, let us say, 30 days from the date of bidding.

Senator Osmeña:

xxxx

To capture the tenor of the proposal of the distinguished Gentleman, a subsequent

paragraph has to be added which says, "IF THERE IS A COMPETITIVE PROPOSAL, THE
ORIGINAL PROPONENT SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO EQUAL THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROPOSAL."

In other words, if there is nobody who will submit a competitive proposal, then nothing is lost.
Everybody knows it, and it is open and transparent. But if somebody comes in with another
proposal – and because it was the idea of the original proponent – that proponent now has
the right to equal the terms of the original proposal.

SENATOR GONZALES:

That is the idea, Mr. President. Because it seems to me that it is utterly unfair for one who
has conceived an idea or a concept, spent and invested in feasibility studies, in the drawing
of plans and specifications, and the project is submitted to a public bidding, then somebody
will win on the basis of plans and specifications and concepts conceived by the original
proponent. He should at least be given the right to submit an equalizing bid. x x
x.27 (Emphasis ours.)

As already found by this Court in the narration of facts in Agan, AEDC failed to match the more
advantageous proposal submitted by PIATCO by the time the 30-day working period expired on 28
November 1996;28 and, without exercising its right to match the most advantageous proposal, it
cannot now lay claim to the award of the project.

The bidding process as to the NAIA IPT III Project was already over after the award thereof to
PIATCO, even if eventually, the said award was nullified and voided. The nullification of the award to
PIATCO did not revive the proposal nor re-open the bidding. AEDC cannot insist that this Court turn
back the hands of time and award the NAIA IPT III Project to it, as if the bid of PIATCO never existed
and the award of the project to PIATCO did not take place. Such is a simplistic approach to a very
complex problem that is the NAIA IPT III Project.

In his separate opinion in Agan, former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted that "[T]here was
effectively no public bidding to speak of, the entire bidding process having been flawed and
tainted from the very outset, therefore, the award of the concession to Paircargo's successor
Piatco was void, and the Concession Agreement executed with the latter was likewise void ab
initio. x x x.29" (Emphasis ours.) In consideration of such a declaration that the entire bidding process
was flawed and tainted from the very beginning, then, it would be senseless to re-open the same to
determine to whom the project should have been properly awarded to. The process and all
proposals and bids submitted in participation thereof, and not just PIATCO's, were placed in doubt,
and it would be foolhardy for the Government to rely on them again. At the very least, it may be
declared that there was a failure of public bidding.30

In addition, PIATCO is already close to finishing the building of the structures comprising NAIA IPT
III,31 a fact that this Court cannot simply ignore. The NAIA IPT III Project was proposed, subjected to
bidding, and awarded as a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project. A BOT project is defined as –

A contractual arrangement whereby the project proponent undertakes the construction,

including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and the operation and
maintenance thereof. The project proponent operates the facility over a fixed term during
which it is allowed to charge facility users appropriate tolls, fees, rentals, and charges not
exceeding those proposed in its bid or as negotiated and incorporated in the contract to
enable the project proponent to recover its investment, and operating and maintenance
expenses in the project. The project proponent transfers the facility to the government
agency or local government unit concerned at the end of the fixed term that shall not exceed
fifty (50) years. This shall include a supply-and-operate situation which is a contractual
arrangement whereby the supplier of equipment and machinery for a given infrastructure
facility, if the interest of the Government so requires, operates the facility providing in the
process technology transfer and training to Filipino nationals.32 (Emphasis ours.)

The original proposal of AEDC is for a BOT project, in which it undertook to build, operate,
and transfer to the Government the NAIA IPT III facilities. This is clearly no longer applicable or
practicable under the existing circumstances. It is undeniable that the physical structures comprising
the NAIA IPT III Project are already substantially built, and there is almost nothing left for AEDC to
construct. Hence, the project could no longer be awarded to AEDC based on the theory of legal
impossibility of performance.

Neither can this Court revert to the original proposal of AEDC and award to it only the unexecuted
components of the NAIA IPT III Project. Whoever shall assume the obligation to operate and
maintain NAIA IPT III and to subsequently transfer the same to the Government (in case the
operation is not assumed by the Government itself) shall have to do so on terms and conditions that
would necessarily be different from the original proposal of AEDC. It will no longer include any
undertaking to build or construct the structures. An amendment of the proposal of AEDC to address
the present circumstances is out of the question since such an amendment would be substantive
and tantamount to an entirely new proposal, which must again be subjected to competitive bidding.

AEDC's offer to reimburse the Government the amount it shall pay to PIATCO for the NAIA IPT III
Project facilities, as shall be determined in the ongoing expropriation proceedings before the RTC of
Pasay City, cannot restore AEDC to its status and rights as the project proponent. It must be
stressed that the law requires the project proponent to undertake the construction of the
project, including financing; financing, thus, is but a component of the construction of the structures
and not the entirety thereof.

Moreover, this "reimbursement arrangement" may even result in the unjust enrichment of AEDC. In
its original proposal, AEDC offered to construct the NAIA IPT III facilities for $350 million or P9 billion
at that time. In exchange, AEDC would share a certain percentage of the gross revenues with, and
pay a guaranteed annual income to the Government upon operation of the NAIA IPT III.
In Gingoyon, the proferred value of the NAIA IPT III facilities was already determined to be P3 billion.
It seems improbable at this point that the balance of the value of said facilities for which the
Government is still obligated to pay PIATCO shall reach or exceed P6 billion. There is thus the
possibility that the Government shall be required to pay PIATCO an amount less than P9 billion. If
AEDC is to reimburse the Government only for the said amount, then it shall acquire the NAIA IPT III
facilities for a price less than its original proposal of P9 billion. Yet, per the other terms of its original
proposal, it may still recoup a capital investment of P9 billion plus a reasonable rate of return of
investment. A change in the agreed value of the NAIA IPT III facilities already built cannot be done
without a corresponding amendment in the other terms of the original proposal as regards profit
sharing and length of operation; otherwise, AEDC will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the
Government.

Again, as aptly stated by former Chief Justice Panganiban, in his separate opinion in Agan:

If the PIATCO contracts are junked altogether as I think they should be, should not AEDC
automatically be considered the winning bidder and therefore allowed to operate the facility?
My answer is a stone-cold 'No.' AEDC never won the bidding, never signed any contract, and
never built any facility. Why should it be allowed to automatically step in and benefit from the
greed of another?33

The claim of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project, after the award thereof to PIATCO was
set aside for being null and void, grounded solely on its being the original proponent of the project, is
specious and an apparent stretch in the interpretation of Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718, and Rule 10 of the IRR.

In all, just as AEDC has no legal right to the NAIA IPT III Project, corollarily, it has no legal right over
the NAIA IPT III facility. AEDC does not own the NAIA IPT III facility, which this Court already
recognized in Gingoyon as owned by PIATCO; nor does AEDC own the land on which NAIA IPT III
stands, which is undisputedly owned by the Republic through the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA). AEDC did not fund any portion of the construction of NAIA IPT III, which was
entirely funded by PIATCO. AEDC also does not have any kind of lien over NAIA IPT III or any kind
of legal entitlement to occupy the facility or the land on which it stands. Therefore, nothing that the
Government has done or will do in relation to the project could possibly prejudice or injure AEDC.
AEDC then does not possess any legal personality to interfere with or restrain the activities of the
Government as regards NAIA IPT III. Neither does it have the legal personality to demand that the
Government deliver or sell to it the NAIA IPT III facility despite the express willingness of AEDC to
reimburse the Government the proferred amount it had paid PIATCO and complete NAIA IPT III
facility at its own cost.

AEDC invokes the Memorandum of Agreement, purportedly executed between the DOTC and
AEDC on 26 February 1996, following the approval of the NAIA IPT III Project by the National
Economic Development Authority Board in a Resolution dated 13 February 1996, which provided for
the following commitments by the parties:
 a. commitment of Respondent DOTC to target mid 1996 as the time frame for the formal
award of the project and commencement of site preparation and construction activities with
the view of a partial opening of the Terminal by the first quarter of 1998;

b. commitment of Respondent DOTC to pursue the project envisioned in the unsolicited

proposal and commence and conclude as soon as possible negotiations with Petitioner
AEDC on the BOT contract;

c. commitment of Respondent DOTC to make appropriate arrangements through which the

formal award of the project can be affected[;]

d. commitment of Petitioner AEDC to a fast track approach to project implementation and to

commence negotiations with its financial partners, investors and creditors;

e. commitment of Respondent DOTC and Petitioner AEDC to fast track evaluation of

competitive proposals, screening and eliminating nuisance comparative bids;34

It is important to note, however, that the document attached as Annex "E" to the Petition of AEDC is
a "certified photocopy of records on file." This Court cannot give much weight to said document
considering that its existence and due execution have not been established. It is not notarized, so it
does not enjoy the presumption of regularity of a public document. It is not even witnessed by
anyone. It is not certified true by its supposed signatories, Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. for DOTC
and Chairman Henry Sy, Sr. for AEDC, or by any government agency having its custody. It is
certified as a photocopy of records on file by an Atty. Cecilia L. Pesayco, the Corporate Secretary, of
an unidentified corporation.

Even assuming for the sake of argument, that the said Memorandum of Agreement, is in existence
and duly executed, it does little to support the claim of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III
Project. The commitments undertaken by the DOTC and AEDC in the Memorandum of Agreement
may be simply summarized as a commitment to comply with the procedure and requirements
provided in Rules 10 and 11 of the IRR. It bears no commitment on the part of the DOTC to award
the NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC. On the contrary, the document includes express stipulations that
negate any such government obligation. Thus, in the first clause,35 the DOTC affirmed its
commitment to pursue, implement and complete the NAIA IPT III Project on or before 1998,
noticeably without mentioning that such commitment was to pursue the project specifically with
AEDC. Likewise, in the second clause,36 it was emphasized that the DOTC shall pursue the project
under Rules 10 and 11 of the IRR of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718.
And most significantly, the tenth clause of the same document provided:

10. Nothing in this Memorandum of Understanding shall be understood, interpreted or

construed as permitting, allowing or authorizing the circumvention of, or non-compliance
with, or as waiving, the provisions of, and requirements and procedures under, existing laws,
rules and regulations.37

AEDC further decries that:

24. In carrying out its commitments under the DOTC-AEDC MOU, Petitioner AEDC
undertook the following activities, incurring in the process tremendous costs and expenses.

a. pre-qualified 46 design and contractor firms to assist in the NAIA-IPT III Project;
 b. appointed a consortium of six (6) local banks as its financial advisor in June 1996;

c. hired the services of GAIA South, Inc. to prepare the Project Description Report and to
obtain the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) for the NAIA-IPT III Project;

d. coordinated with the Airline Operators Association, Bases Conversion Development

Authority, Philippine Air Force, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Immigration, relative to their
particular requirements regarding the NAIA-IPT III [P]roject; and

e. negotiated and entered into firm commitments with Ital Thai, Marubeni Corporation and
Mitsui Corporation as equity partners.38

While the Court may concede that AEDC, as the original proponent, already expended resources in
its preparation and negotiation of its unsolicited proposal, the mere fact thereof does not entitle it to
the instant award of the NAIA IPT III Project. AEDC was aware that the said project would have to
undergo public bidding, and there existed the possibility that another proponent may submit a more
advantageous bid which it cannot match; in which case, the project shall be awarded to the other
proponent and AEDC would then have no means to recover the costs and expenses it already
incurred on its unsolicited proposal. It was a given business risk that AEDC knowingly undertook.

Additionally, the very defect upon which this Court nullified the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to
PIATCO similarly taints the unsolicited proposal of AEDC. This Court found Paircargo Consortium
financially disqualified after striking down as incorrect the PBAC's assessment of the consortium's
financial capability. According to the Court's ratio in Agan:

As the minimum project cost was estimated to be US$350,000,000.00 or

roughly P9,183,650,000.00, the Paircargo Consortium had to show to the satisfaction of the
PBAC that it had the ability to provide the minimum equity for the project in the amount of at
least P2,755,095,000.00.

xxxx

Thus, the maximum amount that Security Bank could validly invest in the Paircargo
Consortium is only P528,525,656.55, representing 15% of its entire net worth. The total net
worth therefore of the Paircargo Consortium, after considering the maximum amounts that
may be validly invested by each of its members is P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the
project cost, an amount substantially less than the prescribed minimum equity investment
required for the project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost.

The purpose of pre-qualification in any public bidding is to determine, at the earliest

opportunity, the ability of the bidder to undertake the project. Thus, with respect to the
bidder's financial capacity at the pre-qualification stage, the law requires the government
agency to examine and determine the ability of the bidder to fund the entire cost of the
project by considering the maximum amounts that each bidder may invest in the
project at the time of pre-qualification.

xxxx

Thus, if the maximum amount of equity that a bidder may invest in the project at the time
the bids are submitted falls short of the minimum amounts required to be put up by the
bidder, said bidder should be properly disqualified. Considering that at the pre-qualification
 stage, the maximum amounts which the Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project fell
short of the minimum amounts prescribed by the PBAC, we hold that Paircargo Consortium
was not a qualified bidder. Thus the award of the contract by the PBAC to the Paircargo
Consortium, a disqualified bidder, is null and void.39

Pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, AEDC, like the Paircargo Consortium, would not be financially
qualified to undertake the NAIA IPT III Project. Based on AEDC's own submissions to the
Government, it had then a paid-in capital of only P150,000,000.00,40 which was less than
the P558,384,871.55 that Paircargo Consortium was capable of investing in the NAIA IPT III Project,
and even far less that what this Court prescribed as the minimum equity investment required for the
project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost. AEDC had not sufficiently
demonstrated that it would have been financially qualified to undertake the project at the time of
submission of the bids.

Instead, AEDC took pains to present to this Court that allowing it to take over and operate NAIA IPT
III at present would be beneficial to the Government. This Court must point out, however, that AEDC
is precisely making a new proposal befitting the current status of the NAIA IPT III Project, contrary to
its own argument that it is merely invoking its original BOT proposal. And it is not for this Court to
evaluate AEDC's new proposal and assess whether it would truly be most beneficial for the
Government, for the same is an executive function rather than judicial, for which the statutes and
regulations have sufficiently provided standards and procedures for evaluation.

It can even be said that if the award of the NAIA IPT III Project was merely a matter of choosing
between PIATCO and AEDC (which it is not), there could be no doubt that PIATCO is more qualified
to operate the structure that PIATCO itself built and PIATCO's offer of P17.75 Billion in annual
guaranteed payments to the Government is far better that AEDC's offer of P135 Million.

Hence, AEDC is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, there being no specific, certain, and clear legal
right to be enforced, nor duty to be performed that is clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by
reason of official station.

PROCEDURAL LAPSES

In addition to the substantive weaknesses of the Petition of AEDC, the said Petition also suffers from
procedural defects.

AEDC revived its hope to acquire the NAIA IPT III Project when this Court promulgated its Decision
in Agan on 5 May 2003. The said Decision became final and executory on 17 February 2004 upon
the denial by this Court of the Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration submitted
by PIATCO. It is this Decision that declared the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO as null
and void; without the same, then the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO would still subsist
and other persons would remain precluded from acquiring rights thereto, including AEDC. Irrefutably,
the present claim of AEDC is rooted in the Decision of this Court in Agan. However, AEDC filed the
Petition at bar only 20 months after the promulgation of the Decision in Agan on 5 May 2003.

It must be emphasized that under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitions for prohibition and mandamus, such as in the instant case, can only be resorted to when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the party in the ordinary course of law.

In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,41 this Court elucidates that –

 Although Rule 65 does not specify any period for the filing of a petition for certiorari
and mandamus, it must, nevertheless, be filed within a reasonable time. In certiorari cases,
the definitive rule now is that such reasonable time is within three months from the
commission of the complained act. The same rule should apply to mandamus cases.

The unreasonable delay in the filing of the petitioner's mandamus suit unerringly negates any
claim that the application for the said extraordinary remedy was the most expeditious and
speedy available to the petitioner. (Emphasis ours.)

As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for certiorari may be filed within 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.42 Reasonable time for filing a petition
for mandamus should likewise be for the same period. The filing by the AEDC of its petition
for mandamus 20 months after its supposed right to the project arose is evidently beyond
reasonable time and negates any claim that the said petition for the extraordinary writ was the most
expeditious and speedy remedy available to AEDC.

AEDC contends that the "reasonable time" within which it should have filed its petition should be
reckoned only from 21 September 2005, the date when AEDC received the letter from the Office of
the Solicitor General refusing to recognize the rights of AEDC to provide the available funds for the
completion of the NAIA IPT III Project and to reimburse the costs of the structures already built by
PIATCO. It has been unmistakable that even long before said letter – especially when the
Government instituted with the RTC of Pasay City expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III on
21 December 2004 – that the Government would not recognize any right that AEDC purportedly had
over the NAIA IPT III Project and that the Government is intent on taking over and operating the
NAIA IPT III itself.

Another strong argument against the AEDC's Petition is that it is already barred by res judicata.

In Agan,43 it was noted that on 16 April 1997, the AEDC instituted before the RTC of Pasig City Civil
Case No. 66213, a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and
Injunction, against the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members.

In Civil Case No. 66213, AEDC prayed for:

i) the nullification of the proceedings before the DOTC-PBAC, including its decision to qualify
Paircargo Consortium and to deny Petitioner AEDC's access to Paircargo Consortium's
technical and financial bid documents;

ii) the protection of Petitioner AEDC's right to match considering the void challenge bid of the
Paircargo Consortium and the denial by DOTC-PBAC of access to information vital to the
effective exercise of its right to match;

iii) the declaration of the absence of any other qualified proponent submitting a competitive
bid in an unsolicited proposal.44

Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 66213, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the NAIA
IPT III Project to PIATCO on 9 July 1997. The DOTC and PIATCO also executed on 12 July 1997
the 1997 Concession Agreement. AEDC then alleges that:

k) On September 3, 1998, then Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada convened a meeting with the
members of the Board of Petitioner AEDC to convey his "desire" for the dismissal of the
 mandamus case filed by Petition AEDC and in fact urged AEDC to immediately withdraw
said case.

l) The President's direct intervention in the disposition of this mandamus case was a clear
imposition that Petitioner AEDC had not choice but to accept. To do otherwise was to take a
confrontational stance against the most powerful man in the country then under the risk of
catching his ire, which could have led to untold consequences upon the business interests of
the stakeholders in AEDC. Thus, Petitioner AEDC was constrained to agree to the signing of
a Joint Motion to Dismiss and to the filing of the same in court.

m) Unbeknownst to AEDC at that time was that simultaneous with the signing of the July 12,
1997 Concession Agreement, the DOTC and PIATCO executed a secret side agreement
grossly prejudicial and detrimental to the interest of Government. It stipulated that in the
event that the Civil Case filed by AEDC on April 16, 1997 is not resolved in a manner
favorable to the Government, PIATCO shall be entitled to full reimbursement for all costs and
expenses it incurred in order to obtain the NAIA IPT III BOT project in an amount not less
than One Hundred Eighty Million Pesos (Php 180,000,000.00). This was apparently the
reason why the President was determined to have AEDC's case dismissed immediately.

n) On February 9, 1999, after the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement

(hereinafter referred to as "ARCA") was signed without Petitioner AEDC's knowledge,
Petitioner AEDC signed a Joint Motion to Dismiss upon the representation of the DOTC that
it would provide AEDC with a copy of the 1997 Concession Agreement. x x x.45

On 30 April 1999, the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order dismissing with prejudice Civil Case No.
66213 upon the execution by the parties of a Joint Motion to Dismiss. According to the Joint Motion
to Dismiss –

The parties, assisted by their respective counsel, respectfully state:

1. Philippine International Air Terminals Company, Inc. ("PIATCO") and the respondents
have submitted to petitioner, through the Office of the Executive Secretary, Malacañang, a
copy of the Concession Agreement which they executed for the construction and operation
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III Project ("NAIA
IPT III Project), which petitioner requested.

2. Consequently, the parties have decided to amicably settle the instant case and jointly

move for the dismissal thereof without any of the parties admitting liability or conceding to
the position taken by the other in the instant case.

3. Petitioner, on the other hand, and the respondents, on the other hand, hereby release
and forever discharge each other from any and all liabilities, direct or indirect, whether
criminal or civil, which arose in connection with the instant case.

4. The parties agree to bear the costs, attorney's fees and other expenses they respectively
incurred in connection with the instant case. (Emphasis ours.)

AEDC, however, invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President Joseph E.
Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the DOTC, and paragraph 2 in the afore-quoted Joint
Motion to Dismiss to justify the non-application of the doctrine of res judicata to its present Petition.
The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are as follows: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial
of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action.46 All of the elements are present herein so as to bar the present
Petition.

First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was issued on 30 April
1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise agreement, once approved by the court is
immediately executory and not appealable.47

Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213 pursuant to the Joint
Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgment on the merits.

The Joint Motion to Dismiss stated that the parties were willing to settle the case amicably and,
consequently, moved for the dismissal thereof. It also contained a provision in which the parties –
the AEDC, on one hand, and the DOTC Secretary and PBAC, on the other – released and forever
discharged each other from any and all liabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising in connection with
the case. It is undisputable that the parties entered into a compromise agreement, defined as "a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to
one already commenced.48" Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are
to constitute the contract. Once an agreement is stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more
than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment.49 Article 2037 of
the Civil Code explicitly provides that a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority
of res judicata.

Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was accordingly a judicial
settlement of the controversy, and the Order, dated 30 April 1999, of the RTC of Pasig City was no
less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled only upon the ground of extrinsic fraud.50 Thus,
the RTC of Pasig City, in the same Order, correctly granted the dismissal of Civil Case No.
66213 with prejudice.

A scrutiny of the Joint Motion to Dismiss submitted to the RTC of Pasig City would reveal that the
parties agreed to discharge one another from any and all liabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising
from the case, after AEDC was furnished with a copy of the 1997 Concession Agreement between
the DOTC and PIATCO. This complete waiver was the reciprocal concession of the parties that puts
to an end the present litigation, without any residual right in the parties to litigate the same in the
future. Logically also, there was no more need for the parties to admit to any liability considering that
they already agreed to absolutely discharge each other therefrom, without necessarily conceding to
the other's position. For AEDC, it was a declaration that even if it was not conceding to the
Government's position, it was nonetheless waiving any legal entitlement it might have to sue the
Government on account of the NAIA IPT III Project. Conversely, for the Government, it was an
avowal that even if it was not accepting AEDC's stance, it was all the same relinquishing its right to
file any suit against AEDC in connection with the same project. That none of the parties admitted
liability or conceded its position is without bearing on the validity or binding effect of the compromise
agreement, considering that these were not essential to the said compromise.

Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the subject matter and
parties in Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving the
issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction.51 To recall, the Petition of AEDC before the RTC of Pasig City was for the declaration of
nullity of proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The RTC of Pasig City likewise had jurisdiction
over the parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper service of summons on the
DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members.

Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and the Petition now
pending before this Court, an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

There is an identity of parties. In both petitions, the AEDC is the petitioner. The respondents in Civil
Case No. 66213 are the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members. The respondents
in the instant Petition are the DOTC, the DOTC Secretary, and the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA). While it may be conceded that MIAA was not a respondent and did not participate
in Civil Case No. 66213, it may be considered a successor-in-interest of the PBAC. When Civil Case
No. 66213 was initiated, PBAC was then in charge of the NAIA IPT III Project, and had the authority
to evaluate the bids and award the project to the one offering the lowest or most advantageous bid.
Since the bidding is already over, and the structures comprising NAIA IPT III are now built, then
MIAA has taken charge thereof. Furthermore, it is clear that it has been the intention of the AEDC to
name as respondents in their two Petitions the government agency/ies and official/s who, at the
moment each Petition was filed, had authority over the NAIA IPT III Project.

There is an identity of subject matter because the two Petitions involve none other than the award
and implementation of the NAIA IPT III Project.

There is an identity of cause of action because, in both Petitions, AEDC is asserting the violation of
its right to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project as the original proponent in the absence of any other
qualified bidders. As early as in Civil Case No. 66213, AEDC already sought a declaration by the
court of the absence of any other qualified proponent submitting a competitive bid for the NAIA IPT
III Project, which, ultimately, would result in the award of the said project to it.

AEDC attempts to evade the effects of its compromise agreement by alleging that it was compelled
to enter into such an agreement when former President Joseph E. Estrada asserted his influence
and intervened in Civil Case No. 66213. This allegation deserves scant consideration. Without any
proof that such events did take place, such statements remain mere allegations that cannot be given
weight. One who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a contract must establish the
same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance thereof.52 And, even
assuming arguendo, that the consent of AEDC to the compromise agreement was indeed vitiated,
then President Estrada was removed from office in January 2001. AEDC filed the present Petition
only on 20 October 2005. The four-year prescriptive period, within which an action to annul a
voidable contract may be brought, had already expired.53

The AEDC further claims that the DOTC committed fraud when, without AEDC's knowledge, the
DOTC entered into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) with PIATCO. The
fraud on the part of the DOTC purportedly also vitiated AEDC's consent to the compromise
agreement. It is true that a judicial compromise may be set aside if fraud vitiated the consent of a
party thereof; and that the extrinsic fraud, which nullifies a compromise, likewise invalidates the
decision approving it.54 However, once again, AEDC's allegations of fraud are unsubstantiated.
There is no proof that the DOTC and PIATCO willfully and deliberately suppressed and kept the
information on the execution of the ARCA from AEDC. The burden of proving that there indeed was
fraud lies with the party making such allegation. Each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations. The burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given
on either side. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed.55
Moreover, a judicial compromise may be rescinded or set aside on the ground of fraud in
accordance with Rule 38 of the Rules on Civil Procedure on petition for relief from judgment. Section
3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for relief must be filed:

SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition provided for in either of
the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not
more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding
was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

According to this Court's ruling in Argana v. Republic,56 as applied to a judgment based on

compromise, both the 60-day and six-month reglementary periods within which to file a petition for
relief should be reckoned from the date when the decision approving the compromise agreement
was rendered because such judgment is considered immediately executory and entered on the date
that it was approved by the court. In the present case, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City granting
the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties in Civil Case No. 66213 was issued on 30 April 1999,
yet AEDC only spoke of the alleged fraud which vitiated its consent thereto in its Petition before this
Court filed on 20 October 2005, more than six years later.

It is obvious that the assertion by AEDC of its vitiated consent to the Joint Motion to Dismiss Civil
Case No. 66213 is nothing more than an after-thought and a desperate attempt to escape the legal
implications thereof, including the barring of its present Petition on the ground of res judicata.

It is also irrelevant to the legal position of AEDC that the Government asserted in Agan that the
award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO was void. That the Government eventually took such a
position, which this Court subsequently upheld, does not affect AEDC's commitments and
obligations under its judicially-approved compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 66213, which
AEDC signed willingly, knowingly, and ably assisted by legal counsel.

In addition, it cannot be said that there has been a fundamental change in the Government's position
since Civil Case No. 66213, contrary to the allegation of AEDC. The Government then espoused that
AEDC is not entitled to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project. The Government still maintains the
exact same position presently. That the Government eventually reversed its position on the validity
of its award of the project to PIATCO is not inconsistent with its position that neither should AEDC be
awarded the project.

For the foregoing substantive and procedural reasons, the instant Petition of AEDC should be
dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Baterina (G.R. No. 174166)

As mentioned in Gingoyon, expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III was instituted by the
Government with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Case No. 04-0876CFM. Congressman
Baterina, together with other members of the House of Representatives, sought intervention in Case
No. 04-0876CFM by filing a Petition for Prohibition in Intervention (with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction). Baterina, et al. believe that the Government
need not file expropriation proceedings to gain possession of NAIA IPT III and that PIATCO is not
entitled to payment of just compensation, arguing thus –
 A) Respondent PIATCO does not own Terminal III because BOT Contracts do not vest
ownership in PIATCO. As such, neither PIATCO nor FRAPORT are entitled to
compensation.

B) Articles 448, ET SEQ., of the New Civil Code, as regards builders in good faith/bad faith,
do not apply to PIATCO's Construction of Terminal III.

C) Article 1412(2) of the New Civil Code allows the Government to demand the return of
what it has given without any obligation to comply with its promise.

D) The payment of compensation to PIATCO is unconstitutional, violative of the Build-

Operate-Transfer Law, and violates the Civil Code and other laws. 57

On 27 October 2005, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order admitting the Petition in Intervention of
Baterina, et al., as well as the Complaint in Intervention of Manuel L. Fortes, Jr. and the Answer in
Intervention of Gina B. Alnas, et al. The Republic sought reconsideration of the 27 October 2005
Order of the RTC of Pasay City, which, in an Omnibus Order dated 13 December 2005, was denied
by the RTC of Pasay City as regards the intervention of Baterina, et al. and Fortes, but granted as to
the intervention of Alnas, et al. On 22 March 2006, Baterina, et al. filed with the RTC of Pasay City a
Motion to Declare in Default and/or Motion for Summary Judgment considering that the Republic and
PIATCO failed to file an answer or any responsive pleading to their Petition for Prohibition in
Intervention.

In the meantime, on 19 December 2005, the Court's Decision in Gingoyon was promulgated.

Baterina also filed a Motion for Intervention in said case and sought reconsideration of the Decision
therein. However, his Motion for Intervention was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 1
February 2006.

On 27 March 2006, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order and Writ of Execution, the dispositive
portion of which reads –

WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution be issued in this case directing the Sheriff of this court
to immediately implement the Order dated January 4, 2005 and January 10, 2005, as
affirmed by the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 166429 in the above-entitled case
dated December 19, 2005, in the following manner:

1. Ordering the General Manager, the Senior Assistant General Manager and the Vice
President of Finance of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) to immediately
withdraw the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 from the above-mentioned Certificates of US
Dollar Time Deposits with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch;

2. Ordering the Branch Manager, Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch to
immediately release the sum of P3,002,125,000.00 to PIATCO;

Return of Service of the Writs shall be made by the Sheriff of this court immediately
thereafter;58

The RTC of Pasay City, in an Order, dated 15 June 2006, denied the Motions for Reconsideration of
its Order and Writ of Execution filed by the Government and Fortes. Baterina, meanwhile, went
before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction), docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 95539, assailing the issuance, in grave abuse of discretion, by the RTC of Pasay City of its
Orders dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006 and Writ of Execution dated 27 March 2006.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. No. 95539 with the Court of Appeals, the RTC of Pasay City issued
an Order, dated 7 August 2006, denying the Urgent Manifestation and Motion filed by the Republic in
which it relayed willingness to comply with the Order and Writ of Execution dated 27 March 2006,
provided that the trial court shall issue an Order expressly authorizing the Republic to award
concessions and lease portions of the NAIA IPT III to potential users. The following day, on 8 August
2006, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order denying the intervention of Baterina, et al. and Fortes
in Case No. 04-0876CFM. In a third Order, dated 9 August 2006, the RTC of Pasay City directed
PIATCO to receive the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 from the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Baclaran Branch.

By 24 August 2006, the Republic was all set to comply with the 9 August 2006 Order of the RTC of
Pasay City. Hence, the representatives of the Republic and PIATCO met before the RTC of Pasay
City for the supposed payment by the former to the latter of the proferred amount. However, on the
same day, the Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. No. 95539, issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining, among other things, the RTC of Pasay City from implementing the questioned
Orders, dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006, or "from otherwise causing payment and from
further proceeding with the determination of just compensation in the expropriation case involved
herein, until such time that petitioner's motion to declare in default and motion for partial summary
judgment shall have been resolved by the trial court; or it is clarified that PIATCO categorically
disputes the proferred value for NAIA Terminal 3." The TRO was to be effective for 30 days. Two
days later, on 26 August 2006, the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Motion to Lift
Temporary Restraining Order, which the appellate court scheduled for hearing on 5 September
2006.

While the Urgent Motion to lift the TRO was still pending with the Court of Appeals, the Republic
already filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Urgent Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, attributing to the Court of
Appeals grave abuse of discretion in granting the TRO and seeking a writ of prohibition against the
Court of Appeals to enjoin it from giving due course to Baterina's Petition in CA-G.R. No. 95539. The
Republic thus raises before this Court the following arguments:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO AN EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER.

A. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S DECISION IN GINGOYON CONSTITUTES THE

"LAW OF THE CASE".

B. THE TRO IS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THIS COURT'S DECISION

WICH HAD ATTAINED FINALITY.

II

THE REPUBLIC IS SUFFERING IRREPARABLE DAMAGE.

III
 THE COURT OF APPEALS MUST BE PROHIBITED FROM GIVING DUE COURSE TO A
PETITION THAT IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.

A. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING.

1. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS RULED THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING.

2. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LOST HIS STANDING AS AN

INTERVENOR.

B. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS ENTITLED

TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.

C. THE BOND POSTED IS INSUFFICIENT.

IV

GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PETITION IS SUFFICIENT IN

FORM AND SUBSTANCE, THE SAME HAS BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

A. THE MOTION TO DECLARE IN DEFAULT AND/OR MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED.

B. PIATCO HAS CATEGORICALLY DISPUTED THE PROFFERED VALUE FOR

NAIA TERMINAL III.59

The Republic prays of this Court that:

(a) Pending the determination of the merits of this petition, a temporary restraining order
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be ISSUED restraining the Court of Appeals from
implementing the writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 95539 and proceeding in
said case such as hearing it on September 5, 2006. After both parties have been heard, the
preliminary injunction be MADE PERMANENT;

(b) The Resolution date 24 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals be SET ASIDE; and

(c) CA-G.R. SP No. 95539 be ORDERED DISMISSED.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.60

On 4 September 2006, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Urgent Motion to
Lift Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals stating, among other things, that it had
decided to withdraw the said Motion as it had opted to avail of other options and remedies. Despite
the Motion to Withdraw filed by the Government, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, dated 8
September 2006, lifting the TRO it issued, on the basis of the following –

In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Gingoyon case upholding the
right of PIATCO to be paid the proferred value in the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 prior to
the implementation of the writ of possession issued by the trial court on December 21, 2004
over the NAIA Passenger Terminal III, and directing the determination of just compensation,
 there is no practical and logical reason to maintain the effects of the Temporary Restraining
Order contained in our Resolution dated August 24, 2006. Thus, We cannot continue
restraining what has been mandated in a final and executory decision of the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, Our Resolution dated 24 August 2006 be SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
Motion to Withdraw the Motion to Lift the Temporary Restraining Order is rendered moot and
academic.61

There being no more legal impediment, the Republic tendered on 11 September 2006 Land Bank
check in the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 representing the proferred value of NAIA IPT III, which
was received by a duly authorized representative of PIATCO.

On 27 December 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA G.R. No. 95539 dismissing
Baterina's Petition.

The latest developments before the Court of Appeals and the RTC of Pasay City render the present
Petition of the Republic moot.

Nonetheless, Baterina, as the private respondent in the instant Petition, presented his own prayer
that a judgment be rendered as follows:

A. For this Honorable Court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion to relax procedural rules
consistent with Metropolitan Traffic Command v. Gonong and deem that justice would be
better served if all legal issuesinvolved in the expropriation case and in Baterina are
resolved in this case once and for all, to DECLAREthat:

i. TERMINAL 3, as a matter of law, is public property and thus not a proper object of
eminent domain proceedings; and

ii. PIATCO, as a matter of law, is merely the builder of TERMINAL 3 and, as such, it
may file a claim for recovery on quantum meruit with the Commission on Audi[t] for
determination of the amount thereof, if any.

B. To DIRECT the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 to dismiss the
expropriation case;

C. To DISMISS the instant Petition and DENY The Republic's application for TRO and/or writ
of preliminary injunction for lack of merit;

D. To DECLARE that the P3 Billion (representing the proferred value of TERMINAL 3) paid

to PIATCO on 11 September 2006 as funds held in trust by PIATCO for the benefit of the
Republic and subject to the outcome of the proceedings for the determination of recovery
on quantum meruit due to PIATCO, if any.

E. To DIRECT the Solicitor General to disclose the evidence it has gathered on corruption,

bribery, fraud, bad faith, etc., to this Honorable Court and the Commission on Audit, and
to DECLARE such evidence to be admissible in any proceeding for the determination of any
compensation due to PIATCO, if any.

[F]. In the alternative, to:

 i. SET ASIDE the trial court's Order dated 08 August 2006 denying Private
Respondent's motion for intervention in the expropriation case, and

ii. Should this Honorable Court lend credence to the argument of the Solicitor
General in its Commentdated 20 April 2006 that "there are issues as to material fact
that require presentation of evidence", to REMAND the resolution of the legal issues
raised by Private Respondent to the trial court consistent with this Honorable Court's
holding in the Gingoyon Resolution that "the interests of the movants-in-
intervention [meaning Takenaka, Asahikosan, and herein Private Respondent]
may be duly litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower
courts."62

In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that NAIA IPT III is
already public property. Hence, PIATCO is not entitled to just compensation for NAIA IPT III. He is
asking the Court to make a definitive ruling on this matter considering that it was not settled in
either Agan or Gingoyon.

We disagree. Contrary to Baterina's stance, PIATCO's entitlement to just and equitable

consideration for its construction of NAIA IPT III and the propriety of the Republic's resort to
expropriation proceedings were already recognized and upheld by this Court in Agan and Gingoyon.

The Court's Decisions in both Agan and Gingoyon had attained finality, the former on 17 February

2004 and the latter on 17 March 2006.

This Court already made an unequivocal pronouncement in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004
in Agan that for the Government of the Republic to take over the NAIA IPT III facility, it has to
compensate PIATCO as a builder of the structures; and that "[t]he compensation must be just and in
accordance with law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
PIATCO and its investors."63 As between the Republic and PIATCO, the judgment on the need to
compensate PIATCO before the Government may take over NAIA IPT III is already conclusive and
beyond question.

Hence, in Gingoyon, this Court declared that:

This pronouncement contains the fundamental premises which permeate this decision of the
Court. Indeed, Agan, final and executory as it is, stands as governing law in this case, and
any disposition of the present petition must conform to the conditions laid down by the Court
in its 2004 Resolution.

xxxx

The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two
aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation
determined in accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred
from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid. The parties cannot be
allowed to evade the directives laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action,
such as the complaint for eminent domain.

It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed mandatory
guidelines which the Government must observe before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities.
Thus, the actions of respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties
 must, to merit affirmation, pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord
with the 2004 Resolution.64

The Court then, in Gingoyon, directly addressed the issue on the appropriateness of the Republic's
resort to expropriation proceedings:

The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the
law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just
compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is
a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex
constructed on land which the State already owns. There is an inherent illogic in the resort to
eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State
already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an
action for ejectment.

However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is
understandable in this case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just
compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3, effectively precluded it
from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the unilateral exercise of its
rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the
2004 Resolution, the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was
preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of
the structures.

xxxx

The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3
structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real property. The public
purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1
of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be
expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although
occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be
made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex
"stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another
agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]."

Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government
may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004
Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest
means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate
possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure
through which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as
to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case.

Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are impelled to
apply or construe these rules in accordance with the Court's prescriptions in the 2004
Resolution to achieve the end effect that the Government may validly take over the NAIA 3
facilities. Insofar as this case is concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a
legal precedent, but as the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not
enforced, in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings
of this Court will be severely diminished.65 (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, also in Gingoyon, categorically recognized PIATCO's ownership over the structures it had
built in NAIA IPT III, to wit:

There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it
had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it
mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the
Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain
proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCO's ownership. Indeed, if
no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize
control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.

xxxx

Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real property
owned by PIATCO. x x x (Emphasis ours.)66

It was further settled in Gingoyon that the expropriation proceedings shall be held in accordance
with Republic Act No. 8974,67 thus:

Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the
2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of
the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the
extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at
least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may
issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum
requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the
proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the
owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is
precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the
prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.

And finally, as to the determination of the amount due PIATCO, this Court ruled in Gingoyon that:

Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay" the owner of the
property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of
the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of
the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7. As stated above, the
BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment
should be limited to "the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7," with Section 7 referring to the "implementing rules and regulations for the
equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land." Under the present
implementing rules in place, the valuation of the improvements/structures are to be based
using "the replacement cost method." However, the replacement cost is only one of the
factors to be considered in determining the just compensation.

In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that the
payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well. Thus, in
ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure
that such amount conforms not only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles
of equity as well.
 Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of the
improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination. Yet
Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately
take possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the
valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a
government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no
existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." The "proffered value" may strike as a highly subjective
standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does
provide relevant standards by which "proffered value" should be based, as well as the
certainty of judicial determination of the propriety of the proffered value.

In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have deposited the
amount of P3 Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the assessed value of the
property. The making of the deposit, including the determination of the amount of the
deposit, was undertaken under the erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No.
8974, is the applicable law. Still, as regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to
recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No.
8974. After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value, the Government is not
strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its proffered value may
later be subjected to judicial review using the standards enumerated under Section 5 of Rep.
Act No. 8974.68

Gingoyon constitutes as the law of the case for the expropriation proceedings, docketed as Case
No. 04-0876CFM, before the RTC of Pasay City. Law of the case has been defined in the following
manner –

By "law of the case" is meant that "whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be
the law of the case" so long as the "facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court" (21 C.J.S. 330). And once the decision becomes
final, it is binding on all inferior courts and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or
modify (Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G.R. L-15548, October 30, 1962).69

A ruling rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and, even if erroneous, it may
no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago.70

The extensive excerpts from Gingoyon demonstrate and emphasize that the Court had already
adjudged the issues raised by Baterina, which he either conveniently overlooked or stubbornly
refused to accept.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the
subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily involved in an issue,
and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific
finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred
to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the
former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular
matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties
and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the
judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which
are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the court leading up to
the final conclusion and upon which such conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as the
ultimate question which is finally solved.71

Since the issues Baterina wishes to raise as an intervenor in Case No. 04-0876CFM were already
settled with finality in both Agan and Gingoyon, then there is no point in still allowing his intervention.
His Petition-in-Intervention would only be a relitigation of matters that had been previously
adjudicated by no less than the Highest Court of the land. And, in no manner can the RTC of Pasay
City in Case No. 04-0876CFM grant the reliefs he prayed for without departing from or running afoul
of the final and executory Decisions of this Court in Agan and Gingoyon.

While it is true that when this Court, in a Resolution dated 1 February 2006, dismissed the Motions
for Intervention in Gingoyon, including that of Baterina, it also observed that the interests of the
movants-in-intervention may be duly litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower
courts. This does not mean, however, that the said movants-in-interest were assured of being
allowed as intervenors or that the reliefs they sought as such shall be granted by the trial courts. The
fate of their intervention still rests on their interest or legal standing in the case and the merits of their
arguments.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing:

a. The Petition in G.R. No. 169914 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; and

b. The Petition in G.R. No. 174166 is hereby likewise DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189239               November 24, 2010

SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO AND ERWIN COLLANTES, SPS.
RICARDO AND FELITA ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND ROGER LAS PIÑAS, LINDA LAYDA,
RESTITUTO MARIANO, SPS. ARNOLD AND MIRIAM MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND
WENCESLAO A. RAPACON, SPS. ROMEO AND EMILYN HULLEZA, LUZ MIPANTAO, SPS.
HELEN AND ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE TUAZON, SPS. ZALDO AND MIA SALES, SPS.
JOSEFINA AND JOEL YBERA, SPS. LINDA AND JESSIE CABATUAN, SPS. WILMA AND
MARIO ANDRADA, SPS. RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA LELIS, FREDY AND SUSANA
PILONEO, Petitioners, 
vs.
FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG REALTY
CORPORATION,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation (respondents),
co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Parañaque City and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 21712 and 21713, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named
petitioners before the Parañaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots since 1980
but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them.

Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event,
they contend that the question of ownership must first be settled before the issue of possession may
be resolved.

During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Parañaque filed expropriation
proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque with the intention of
establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including
petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the
City.

Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer
case against petitioners, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
Leticia and Ervin Abad et. als. ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them
to VACATE and SURRENDERpossession of the premises (Lots covered by TCT NOS. (71065)
21712 and (71066) 21713 otherwise known as Purok I Silverio Compound, Barangay San Isidro,
Parañaque City to plaintiff and to PAY the said plaintiff as follows:

1. The reasonable compensation in the amount of ₱20,000.00 a month commencing

November 20, 2002 and every month thereafter until the defendants shall have finally
vacated the premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff;

2. ₱20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees, and finally

3. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.1 (emphasis in the original)

The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, they still maintain
ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a
Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4, 2008,2 reversed the MeTC
decision and dismissed respondents’ complaint in this wise:

x x x The court a quo ruled that the case filed by plaintiffs (respondents herein) is unlawful detainer
as shown by the allegations of the Complaint. The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate. It is not
the allegations of the Complaint that finally determine whether a case is unlawful detainer,
rather it is the evidence in the case.

Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of "tolerance". Tolerance of the occupation of the
property must be present right from the start of the defendants’ possession. The phrase "from the
start of defendants’ possession" is significant. When there is no "tolerance" right from the start
of the possession sought to be recovered, the case of unlawful detainer will not
prosper.3 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the
continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been
rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the
MeTC has no jurisdiction to "disregard the . . . final judgment and writ of possession" due to non-
payment of just compensation:

The Writ of Possession shows that possession over the properties subject of this case had already
been given to the City of Parañaque since January 19, 2006 after they were expropriated. It is
serious error for the court a quo to rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang Realty
Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation could still be given
possession of the properties which were already expropriated in favor of the City of
Parañaque.

There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo that the case for expropriation in
the Regional Trial Court would not bar, suspend or abate the ejectment proceedings. The court a
quo had failed to consider the fact that the case for expropriation was already decided by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 196 way back in the year 2006 or 2 years before the court a quo
rendered its judgment in the unlawful detainer case in the year 2008. In fact, there was already a
Writ of Possession way back in the year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation case by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 196. The court a quo has no valid reason to disregard the said final
judgment and the writ of possession already issued by the Regional Trial Court in favor of
the City of Parañaque and against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty
Development Corporation and make another judgment concerning possession of the subject
properties contrary to the final judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196. 4 (emphasis in
the original)

Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they maintained that
respondents’ "act of allowing several years to pass without requiring [them] to vacate nor filing an
ejectment case against them amounts to acquiescence or tolerance of their possession."5

By Decision of May 27, 2009,6 the appellate court, noting that petitioners did not present evidence to
rebut respondents’ allegation of possession by tolerance, and considering petitioners’ admission that
they commenced occupation of the property without the permission of the previous owner ─ Pilipinas
Development Corporation ─ as indicium of tolerance by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, ruled
in favor of respondents. Held the appellate court:

Where the defendant’s entry upon the land was with plaintiff’s tolerance from the date and fact of
entry, unlawful detainer proceedings may be instituted within one year from the demand on him to
vacate upon demand. The status of such defendant is analogous to that of a tenant or lessee, the
term of whose lease, has expired but whose occupancy is continued by the tolerance of the lessor.
The same rule applies where the defendant purchased the house of the former lessee, who was
already in arrears in the payment of rentals, and thereafter occupied the premises without a new
lease contract with the landowner.7

Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the appellate
court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon,8 held the same does not signify the completion of the
expropriation proceedings. Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court a quo is REVOKED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated
March 3, 2008 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION [by] deleting the award for attorney’s
fees.
SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated August 26, 2009, hence, the
filing of the present petition for review.

The petition fails.

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for public
use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public
use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions on social justice.9

As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their
resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 53810 enlightens, however:

Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings,
lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the
tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by
the expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which
latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.

To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current
rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has
been instituted. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the
suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation proceedings,
respondents can no longer assert a better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance
authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots,
hence, they are entitled to continue staying there.

Petitioners’ position does not lie.

The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of the Local
Government Code (LGC):

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value of the property.

Lintag v. National Power Corporation 11 clearly outlines the stages of expropriation, viz:
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of
"the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x . lavvphi1

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed.
The process is not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the
writ of possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the
transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did
not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in
expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents
prior to the City’s possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.

Respecting petitioners’ claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance
authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so.13 Petitioners cannot thus
claim any right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance.

Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that
they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and
complied with before they can be considered to be beneficiaries.

In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their possession is by mere
tolerance. This too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan v. Pascual:14

In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the premises nor filing an
action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendant’s possession and use of the premises. It
has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The
status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired
but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983. They stepped into the
shoes of the seller with respect to its relationship with petitioners. Even if early on respondents made
no demand or filed no action against petitioners to eject them from the lots, they thereby merely
maintained the status quo – allowed petitioners’ possession by tolerance.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.

G.R. No. 193936               December 11, 2013

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, 

vs.
YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
1

annul and set aside the Decision  dated September 23, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
2

G.R. CV No. 86508, which affirmed with modification the Decision  dated May 12, 2005 of the
3

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40, in Civil Case No. R-4600.

The Facts

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government owned and controlled corporation
created for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power throughout the
Philippines. NPC is thus authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to carry out the said
purpose. 4

Respondent YCLA Sugar Development Corporation (YCLA) is the registered owner of three parcels
of land situated in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
5209, T-21280 and T-78583.

In order to complete its 69 KV Calapan-Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would traverse several private properties,
including the said parcels of land owned by YCLA.

Accordingly, on December 2, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint  for expropriation with the RTC against
5

YCLA and several other individuals. The NPC sought the expropriation of a portion of the parcels of
land owned by the said defendants for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that
would be affected by the construction of transmission lines. The portion of YCLA’s properties that
would be affected by the construction of NPC’s transmission lines has an aggregate area of 5,846
square meters.

YCLA filed its Answer  dated July 9, 1998, alleging that the Complaint should be dismissed outright
6

due to NPC’s failure to allege the public use for the intended expropriation of its properties.

On April 30, 1999, the parties moved, inter alia, for the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to
be appointed by the RTC to determine the reasonable amount of just compensation to be paid by
the NPC. Thus, on even date, the RTC issued an order terminating the pre-trial conference and
directing the constitution of a Board of Commissioners, which would submit a report and
recommendation as to the reasonable amount of just compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated.

Meanwhile, on June 4, 1999, the RTC, acting on NPC’s urgent ex- parte motion, issued a writ of
possession placing NPC in possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.
On May 2, 2001, the Board of Commissioners submitted its Report,  which fixed the amount of just
7

compensation of the subject properties at ₱500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected to the amount
recommended by the Board of Commissioners, claiming that the amount of just compensation
should be fixed at ₱900.00 per sq m considering the improvements in their properties.

On October 19, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing YCLA to submit its written manifestation,
together with supporting documents, on its position on the proper valuation of the subject properties.
NPC was likewise given 15 days to comment thereon. Trial on the determination of the reasonable
amount of just compensation ensued thereafter.

Consequently, YCLA filed a motion asking the RTC to direct the Board of Commissioners to conduct
an ocular inspection over the subject properties and, thereafter, amend/revise the Board of
Commissioner’s Report dated May 2, 2001. YCLA’s motion was granted by the RTC on July 25,
2003.

Meanwhile, on November 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a Partial Decision as regards the amount of
just compensation that would be paid by the NPC to the other defendants.

On September 15, 2003, the Board of Commissioners submitted its second Report,  which fixed the
8

just compensation of the subject properties at ₱1,000.00 per sq m. The Board of Commissioners’
Report dated September 15, 2003, in part, reads:

The undersigned secured from the office of the Provincial Assessor the actual appraised value per
square meter x x x of the Agricultural Land subject matter of the case which is [₱11.50] per square
meter[.] [H]owever, the prevailing market value is Five Hundred Pesos ([P]500.00) to One Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos ([P]1,500.00) per square meters x x x, per actual sale and opinion value of
reliable persons x x x.

In view thereof, the undersigned is submitting this report to the Honorable Court that the amount of
One Thousand Pesos ([P]1,000.00) per square meter should be the basis in the computation of the
price per square meter of the land subject matter of the instant case, justified by its location on [a]
strategic place and the consequential damages to the whole properties of the defendants because
the plaintiff occupied the front portion along the highway. 9

On May 12, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision,  which adopted the report and recommendation of
10

the Board of Commissioners, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered directing the plaintiff National Power Corporation to
pay herein defendant YCLA the total amount of [P]5,786,000.00 representing the value of the
expropriated lands owned by the said defendant and its 26 molave trees which were cut down to
make way for the plaintiff[’s] project, with legal interest from the time the plaintiff had actually took
possession of the subject properties on 19 April 1999 until full payment has been made.

SO ORDERED. 11

The RTC pointed out that the Board of Commissioner’s Report dated May 2, 2001, which
recommended that the amount of just compensation be fixed at ₱500.00 per sq m, was arrived at
without conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties. That, upon YCLA’s request, the
Board of Commissioners subsequently conducted an ocular inspection of the subject properties,
which prompted them to revise their earlier recommendation.
Unperturbed, NPC appealed the RTC Decision dated May 12, 2005 to the CA, alleging that the RTC
erred in relying on the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners as regards the amount of
just compensation. NPC claimed that the amount of ₱1,000.00 per sq m recommended by the Board
of Commissioners as the reasonable amount of just compensation, which was adopted by the RTC,
is too excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural
lands at the time it instituted the action for expropriation.

On September 23, 2010, the CA rendered the Decision  which affirmed with modification the RTC
12

Decision dated May 12, 2005, thus:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION only in so far as the

value of just compensation for the property involved is concerned. Resultantly, the herein
appellant is ordered to pay YCLA Sugar Development Corporation the award of [P]900.00 per
square meter, as and by way of just compensation for the expropriated property. Costs against the
herein appellant.

SO ORDERED. 13

The CA held that the RTC’s determination of the amount of just compensation was reasonable
notwithstanding that it was merely based on the Report submitted by the Board of Commissioners.
The RTC pointed out that there was no showing that the said Report was tainted with irregularity,
fraud or bias. Nevertheless, the CA modified the award rendered by the RTC, by fixing the amount of
just compensation to ₱900.00 per sq m instead of ₱1,000.00 per sq m, since YCLA only sought an
award of ₱900.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties in the proceedings before
the RTC.

The Issue

Essentially, the issue presented to the Court for resolution is whether the RTC and the CA had
sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties.

The NPC posits that the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, 2003 lacks factual
basis; that both the RTC and the CA erred in giving credence to the Report dated September 15,
2003 as to the recommended amount of just compensation for the subject properties. NPC
maintains that the amount of ₱900.00 per sq m that was fixed by the CA as just compensation is
excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural lands at
the time it filed the complaint for expropriation. Thus, NPC prayed that the Court fix the amount of
just compensation for the subject properties at ₱500.00 per sq m pursuant to the Board of
Commissioners’ Report dated May 2, 2001.

On the other hand, YCLA contends that the RTC and the CA aptly relied on the Board of
Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, 2003, pointing out that the Board of Commissioners
was in the best position to determine the amount of just compensation considering that its members
undertook intensive ocular inspection of the subject properties.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to
convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a
sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the
property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. 14

It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking,
which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
15

In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily
on the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, 2003, which, in turn, was arrived at
after conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties on August 27, 2003. However, the
Board of Commissioners’ recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was based on the
prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of the lower
courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to
determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was
filed by NPC on December 2, 1997.

Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commissioners, in its Report dated September 15, 2003,
merely alleged that its members arrived at the amount of ₱1,000.00 per sq m as just compensation
for the subject properties based on actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on
the opinion of "reliable persons" that were interviewed. However, the Report dated September 15,
2003 is not supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn declarations of the "reliable
persons" that were supposedly interviewed.

The Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several
factors must be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like
properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these
factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary
evidence.  The amount of just compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data
16

as bases for fixing the value of the condemned property. A commissioners’ report of land prices
which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded
by the court. 17

Under the Rules of Court, any evidence – whether oral or documentary – is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who
is not on the witness stand. 18

A commissioners’ report of land prices is considered as evidence in the determination of the amount
of just compensation due the land owner in expropriation cases. The recommended amount of just
compensation contained in the commissioners’ report of land prices, in turn, is based on various
factors such as the fair market value of the property, the value of like properties. Thus, it becomes
imperative that the commissioners’ report of land prices be supported by pertinent documents, which
impelled the commissioners to arrive at the recommended amount for the condemned properties, to
aid the court in its determination of the amount of just compensation. Otherwise, the commissioner’s
report becomes hearsay and should thus not be considered by the court.
The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the report
submitted by the Board of Commissioners, which is merely advisory and recommendatory in
character.  It may also recommit the report or set aside the same and appoint new
1âwphi1

commissioners.  In this case, the lower courts gave full faith and credence to the Board of
19

Commissioners' Report dated September 15, 2003 notwithstanding that it was not supported by any
documentary evidence.

Considering that the legal basis for the determination of just compensation for the subject properties
is insufficient, the respective Decisions of the RTC and the CA should be set aside.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot fix the amount of just compensation for the subject properties at
₱500.00 per sq m pursuant to the Board of Commissioners' Report dated May 2, 2001. The said
Report suffers from the same infirmity as the Report dated September 15, 2003 - it is unsupported
by any documentary evidence and its recommendation as regards the amount of just compensation
are based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2001.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Decision dated September 23, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
86508 and the Decision dated May 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro, Branch 40, in Civil Case No. R-4600 are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the
trial court for the proper determination of just compensation, in conformity with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,

GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR
B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G.
ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J.
PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES,
BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,

HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC.,
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, 
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and
Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO
TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, 

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life
on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules
flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their
struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they
continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die
as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held
Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the
precious earth to stay alive.

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this
precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it
has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us
for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people,"   especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new
1

Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits."   Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and
2

implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
soil." 
3

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted
one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but
undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
 just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already
been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated
principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was
promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition
of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This
was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited
debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4

The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions,
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They
will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case
will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.

G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No.
228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228.
The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure
to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI,
Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may
be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the
recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay   andManotok v. National Food Authority.   Moreover, the just
5 6

compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form
of bonds or other things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also
violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners
of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due
process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers
are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the
earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel,   Gonzales v. Estrella,   and Association of Rice and Corn
7 8

Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council.   The determination of just
9

compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention
whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no
valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for
retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf
of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just
compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by
the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while
what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.

In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228
and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless,
this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the
same infirmities as the earlier measures.

A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a
1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the
payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the
basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A.
No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400
planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to
enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim
legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still
have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process,
and equal protection.

They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform
Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the
receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten
wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources
as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall
be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount
appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated
expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it
is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the
Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government,
which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4
hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that
may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in
cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be
prescribed or approved by the PARC.

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a
careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that
can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been
lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems
exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.

A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the
country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the
Court.

NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that,
in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section
2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty
billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is
not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National
Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the
violation of the fundamental right to own property.

The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of
the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax
purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to
immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality
in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as
explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's
contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's
opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that
they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the
possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of
private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of
public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in
existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as
Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum
appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later
when necessary.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing
the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends
that the measure is unconstitutional because:

(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;

(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;

(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not
originate from the House of Representatives.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private
respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land
Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition
was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had
not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion
moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the
1987 Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The
legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency
measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law
and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of
the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the
provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:

Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972
shall be considered as advance payment for the land.

is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of
even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven
hectares or more is undemocratic.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for
reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the
issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article
XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened.

On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on
October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was
tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization
payments.

In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved
on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the
promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
respondent's acts.

G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the
same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are
actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be

ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of
the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance
with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes
from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do
not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit,
the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with
an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December
29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners),
and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to
Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention
under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.

The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the
issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of
discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this
function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in
force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court
in Tanada v. Tuvera.  As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere
10

letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments
of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the
legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the
reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not
lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts
a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments,
in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed,
is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done
or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure
that the Constitution would not be breached.

In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme
Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc.  And11

as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are
first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised
by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of
the case itself. 
12

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold
that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or
is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained
of.   And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
13

discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases,   ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
14

constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking
only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the
objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases.  15

The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid
when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the
Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its
purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its
decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.

For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make
the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these
departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —

... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution.  16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically
resolve. And so we shall.

II

We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.

The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law
has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on
that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
quoted above.

The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of
the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not
"midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on
July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her
legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by
subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by
her when and as long as she possessed it.

Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially
affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A.
No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.   Indeed, some portions of the said
17

measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and
21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law.  18

That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the
requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No.
131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is
not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.   The creation of the fund is only incidental to
19

the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section
25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could
not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now
has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the
proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the
Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the
Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the
law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:

Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which
 shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1)
that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of
this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one
subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill
does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.  20

The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever
name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such
are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI
474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The
important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with
the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera.   Hence, unless published in
21

the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and
effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was
published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)

Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus
cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of
the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification.
Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus
can issue to require action only but not specific action.

Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and

unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed
by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to
compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If
the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For
example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable
length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties
concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law
clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision,
and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause.  22

And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be
permitted if the issue raised is a question of law.  23
III

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case
of City of Baguio v. NAWASA,  for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal
24

waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held
that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome
and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for
a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,   Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police
25

power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went
"too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human
habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier
granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee
assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained
without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there
was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police
power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an
abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But
restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of
a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The
state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the
owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further
changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and
the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the
power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of
taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been
accepted.   As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois
26

College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which
sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:

Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent
domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent
domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that
would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the
other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a
point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to
bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm
bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure
need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of
government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has
 contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend
expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,
which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the
police power's standard of "public purpose."  27

The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the
District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the
attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should
be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the
exercise of eminent domain is clear.

For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.  28

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,   decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
29

Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of
the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the
Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to
be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal
would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area
could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court
nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it
said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he
called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:

In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized
to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the
Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-
story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on
neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its
losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence
more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several
measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are
prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many
bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally
agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not
discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection
with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of
expropriation.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that
they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the
sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their
own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.   To be valid, it must conform to
31

the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all the members of the class.   The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by
32

the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both
as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.   The petitioners have not shown that they
33

belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing
land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter.
In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion
is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if
there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the
public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State
and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.   As the subject and
34

purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first
requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed
to achieve the constitutional goal.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is
also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere
expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest
moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will
excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a
right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of
the nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which
reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

IV

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell
under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties.   It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or
35

cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State
over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the
case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed
no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that
has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise
of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should
first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately
disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not
correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution
calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private
agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive
departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the
absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they
decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case
of Tañada v. Cuenco:  36

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of
judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."   Even so, this should not be construed as a license
37

for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the
redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first
provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The
Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that the
political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.

In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,  it was held:

38

Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St.
Mary's river between the American bank and the international line, as well as all of
the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was
"necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected
therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted
by the United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the
judgment of Congress ... .

As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why
private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum
retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an
elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are
landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the
fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator.   It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's
39

gain but the owner's loss.   The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
40

"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 
41

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of
private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all
its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi,   there is compensable taking when the following
42

conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more
than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the
measures before us.

Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking
possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of
the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising
the amount."   Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
43
 Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is
entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is
made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the
offer of the government to buy his land-

... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested
parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15)
days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the
matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty
(30) days after it is submitted for decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice
and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay   resolved
44

a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just
compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by
the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring
these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees

constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have
the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of
the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary
consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule
67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the
taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of
the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or
charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that
of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination
of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

xxx

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of
whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just
compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to
 determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this
effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro
and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a
fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the
proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless
allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly,
the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive
upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in
the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.

This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR
and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and
other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the
just compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the

excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five
percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.
 (b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up
to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below —

Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid
in government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred

shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines
set by the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury

bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the
bonds shall mature every year from the date of
issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That
should the landowner choose to forego the cash
portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid
correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds

may be used by the landowner, his successors-in-
interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face
value, for any of the following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the

government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province
or region where the lands for which the bonds were
paid are situated;

(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-

owned or controlled corporations or shares of stock
owned by the government in private corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the

provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial

institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be
invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a
small and medium- scale industry, in the same
 province or region as the land for which the bonds are
paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to

government: Provided, That the use of these bonds
for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial
instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall
determine the percentages mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of

the original bondholder in government universities,
colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the

original bondholder in government hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to

time allow.

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional
insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor
in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they
cite jurisprudence holding that:

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of
said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to
suffer by reason of the expropriation .   (Emphasis supplied.)
45

In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration,   this Court held:

46

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the
property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of
that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation
to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that
sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight
of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in
money and not otherwise. Thus —

The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor

cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel
or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the
 property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and
the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a
standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that
standard as money in cash.   (Emphasis supplied.)
47

Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be
regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation.  48

"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in

money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is
not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future
obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage.  (Emphasis supplied.)
49

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the
past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power
of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of
expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of
the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished
farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country
but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision
and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in
this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling
life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms,
calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of
their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering
the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds
of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact
not even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when
they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the
lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly
the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire
amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that what they
had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law
in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in
principle.

The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement
among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied
to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to
"fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they
should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and
reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive
compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no
special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission.  50

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we
are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of
the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the
limitations of the expropriator.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the
Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our
decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities
and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely
anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are
aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing
the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and
dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is
not what we shall decree today.

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully
in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting
the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in
money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who
can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government
financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and
other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not
a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly
hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their
forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of
the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the
Holy Grail.

The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem
to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section
14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure
but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the
valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the
contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the
factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of
eminent domain.

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle
is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:

Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor
until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates
back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report
under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.  51

... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry,
title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made.   (Emphasis
52

supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis,   the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property
53

does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the
decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure,   it was
54

held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the
investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use."
In Rexford v. Knight,   the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes
55

was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the
authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property
is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public
use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has
been made to him."

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,   that: 56

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in
this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can
be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ...
. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972
and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized
farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until
he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood,
however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

 All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972
of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis
supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-
fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it
was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to
the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after
full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with
the landowner.   No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
57

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title
before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as
recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should
counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands
have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs
who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by
the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to
judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level,
especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other
agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.

Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are
entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole
more liberal than those granted by the decree.

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of
bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be
scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be
continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better
protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform,
we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties.
This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice
Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture
forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should
strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron
shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the
day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and
from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At
last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give
him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep
despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he
banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music
and the dream."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No.
27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.