In Theory

Mediators and Mediation Strategies

in International Relations
Jacob Bercovitch

Conflict is an inescapable aspect of all interactions. This is true of interpersonal

interactions, as it is of intergroup or international interactions. Given the poten-
tiality of omnipresem com'~ct, a limited range of widely accepted conflict-
handling procedures in the international environment, and the unwelcome real-
ity of destructive conflict, it is hardly surprising that so many individuals, bod-
ies or oganizations that have significant influence and standing in. the global
community may be keen to do something to facilitate peaceful interactions.
What they can best do is offer their mediation services.1 Mediation is, after
all, a low-cost and flexible approach, a n approach that may be adopted legiti-
mately and creatively by private citizens, international organizations, and any
other actor whose behavior affects the dynamic, multi-level process that con-
stimtes international relations (as opposed to internationalpolitics). 2 The suc-
cessful application of mediation requires experience, professionalism, and
judgment of the Sort all international actors possess. Although it is a serious
and time-consttming undertaking, mediation rarely does more harm than good,
and more often than not it helps the cause of constructive conflict manage-
ment, as well as, let us not forget, the interests of the mediator.
In an environment lacking a centralized authorit3~, the range of poss~le
mediators is immense. In a way, any actor in the global environment may become
a formal or informal mediator. To make some sense of the bewildering range
of possible mediators and their behavior, I suggest that they are all encompassed
within any one of the following three categories of actors in international rela-
tions: individuals, states, and institutions and organizations.3 Following is a
description of the characteristics of each category of mediators.
I n d i v i d u a l s . The traditional image of International mediation, one nur-
tured by the media and popular accounts, is that of a single, usually- high-ranking,

J a c o b B e r c o v i t c h is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in Christ-

church, New Zealand, He and Jeffrey Z. Rubin ate the editors of a forthcoming new book called
Mediation in International Relations (London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press).

0748-4526/92/0400-009956.50/0 © 1992 PlenumPublishingCorporation Negotiation Journal April 1992 99

 individual, shuttling from one place to another trying to search for understand-
ing, restore communication between hostile parties, or help settle their con-
flict. This image is only partly accurate. The individual mediator w h o engages
in such behavior is normally an official representing his or her government
in a series of formal interactions with high-level officials from the disputing
countries. The interactions may be of an individual kind (as most political inter-
actions ultimately are), but we must not lose sight o f the fact that most o f these
individuals represent larger constituencies, n o r should we attempt to explain
complex political p h e n o m e n a in terms of the one easily visible component,
namely, the individual. For example, w h e n President Carter brought Prime
Minister Begin and President Sadat to Camp David, much face-to-face interac-
tion occurred, but no one could possibly describe the whole experience as
individual mediation. The three leaders were there as representatives of their
respective countries, with a highly developed sense of the consequences and
constraints o f representation.
By individual mediation I mean a process that is carried o n by individuals
w h o do not ft~lll an official, representative traction. Individual mediators may
differ with respect to the nature and level o f their capabilities and resources;
their ability to perform the tasks required; as well as their knowledge, skills,
experience, and other attributes. They may also hold different beliefs, values,
and attitudes. These qualities affect both the objectives they may seek and their
range of strategies in mediation. The strategies and mediation o f individuals
are more directly related to their capabilities and subjective experiences than
to the external and contextual stimuli that may impinge on them. Individual
mediation can, therefore, exhibit greater flexibility and experimentation than
mediation by political incumbents.
Individual mediation may be carried o n informally or formally. Informal
mediation refers to the efforts o f practitioners w h o have a long-standing
experience of, and a deep commitment to, international conflict resolution (e.g.,
the Quakers), or knowledgeable scholars whose background, attitudes, and
behavior may enable disputants to engage in productive conflict management
(e.g., the efforts of scholars such as Burton, Doob, and Kelman). 4 Such
individuals approach an international dispute as private citizens only, not as
official representatives, and their efforts are designed to utilize their compe-
tence, credibility, and experience to create contexts and occasions in which
communication may be facilitated and in which a better understanding o f a
conflict may be gained.
Formal mediation, o n the other hand, takes place w h e n a political incum-
bent, a government representative, or a high-level decision maker acts in an
individual capacity to mediate a dispute between the official representatives
of other groups or states. It invariably occurs within a formal structure (e.g.,
conference, political forum, or other official arena) and is less flexible than infor-
mal mediation. Formal mediation combines role and individual variables and
is thus less susceptible to the impact of personality characteristics. Its loss o f
flexibility, however, is more than matched by its immediacy o f access to high-
level and influential decision makers. Formal mediation usually takes place in
the diplomatic arena, within a structure that emphasizes f o r m , established proce-
dures, and roles. Its r a ~ e o f strategies may be m u c h more limited than that
o f informal mediation, but it does more directly affect political outcomes.

100 Jacob Bercovitch International Relations

 States. Individual mediation, although significant, is not all that c o m m o n
in international relations. Most mediation activity is carried o n by states (or
to be more accurate, their representatives) and international or regional organi-
zations.
As a political actor, the state is one o f the most successful and enduring
forms o f social and political organization. As an organization, the state offers
a measure of political and economic security and in return expects the unquali-
fied allegiance of the people. Today, some 180 sovereign and legally equal states
- - but with different capabilities, regime-structures and interests - - interact in
the international arena. They pursue resources, markets, and influence. Often,
they get into conflicts with other states that are pursuing similar objectives.5
W h e n this happens, representatives of states get together in any of the myriad
of international forums to articulate their concerns and search for a settlement
m through mediation or other means.
Notwithstanding the increase in, and importance accorded to, v~trious trans-
national entities (e.g., multinational corporations, international organizations),
states are still widely regarded as the most significant actors in international
politics. The m o d e r n diplomatic system evolved around the state, and m a n y
o f the rudimentary norms and traditions o f behavior that are current in inter-
national relations pertain to states only. The vibrant patterns o f interplay and
shifting relationships that make up the international arena are dominated by
h o w states perceive events, evaluate them, and respond to them. One o f the
events to which states may have to respond is whether or not to accept or offer
mediation.
When a state is invited to mediate a dispute, or initiates such mediation
itself, it normally engages the services of one o f its top decision makers. Figtmes
such as Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Carter, Secretary o f State Baker, or Lord
Carrington fulfill a mediatory role, in the full glare o f the international media,
as salient representatives o f their countries. The activities o f these individuals
depend o n (a) the position they hold in their o w n country; (b) the leeway given
to them in determining policies; and (c) the different resottrces, capabilities,
and political orientations o f their countries.
Looking at differences between states, it is possible to draw distinctions
between aligned states and nonaligned states, democratic states and non-
democratic states, or economically developed and underdeveloped states. In
addition, it is also possible to focus on the p o w e r distinction between small
states and great powers and evaluate its significance for mediation. By using
the terms small states and large states, I do not mean to refer to the size o f
the state, per se, but to its "weight" in the international system. 6 Large states
are those states whose "weight" and resources significantly surpass those of
other states, and small states are those whose "weight" and resources are sig-
nificandy below those of other actors in the international system.
Representatives o f all states interact formally in the various international
policy-making bodies. But trying to penetrate b e y o n d the myth o f formal
representation and legal equality, it is legitimate to w o n d e r to what extent d o
tremendous differences in the level o f resources impinge o n the m a n n e r and
m e t h o d o f mediation, or indeed the choice o f disputes? Are such differences
significant, or ate they cancelled out by the formal context? I believe these differ-
ences are crucial to mediation success and should be examined in greater detail.

Negotiation Journal April 1992 101

We cannot assume that mediation by small states resembles, in every aspect,
the mediation efforts o f a large state.
Institutions a n d Organizations. The complexity o f the international
environment is such that states and nations can no longer facilitate the pursuit
o f human interests, nor satisfy their demands for an ever-increasing range o f
services. Consequently, we have witnessed a p h e n o m e n a l growth in the num-
ber o f international, transnational, and other nonstate actors, all of w h o m affect
issues of war and peace, knowledge and responsibility, and environment and
survival. These functional systems of activities or organizations have become,
in some cases, more important providers of services than states. They have also
become, in the m o d e r n international system, active participants in the search
for institutions and proposals conducive to peace. We would expect such organi-
zations to play their full part in the mediation of international disputes.
Three kinds o f organizations - - regional, international, and transnational
- - are important to our understanding o f international politics. Regional and
international organizations represent local or global collect_ions o f states sig-
nifying their intention to fulfill the obligations o f membership as set forth in
their formal treaty. Transnationat organizations represent individuals across
countries w h o have similar feelings, cognitions, knowledge, skills, or interests
w h o meet together o n a regular basis to promote the special interests o f their
members. Whereas regional and international organizations are "governmen-
tal" in origin, imbued with political purposes, and largely staffed by official
representatives, transnational organizations are "nongovernmental" in origin,
and insofar that they are not really "public" organizations, they can afford to
be more creative and less inhibited in the policy positions they advocate than
international organizations.
Regional, international and transnational organizations e m b o d y many o f
the elements c o m m o n l y associated with impartiality. They are also usually-
entrusted with the task of mediating disputes between members. Such bodies
may appear, o n the face of it, to be ideal mediators. In reality, alas, their role
and performance are circumscribed by the lack of an adequate resource base.
Mediation requires resources which regional, international, or transnational
organizations do not always possess.

Strategies and Behavior in International Mediation

With so many political actors capable o f initiating and conducting international
mediation, h o w can we even begin to make sense of the wide range o f media-
tion behavior and the many strategies that may be adopted? Is not the variabil-
ity o f actors - - from individuals to large states n and behavior too great to
permit any useful analysis? It may seem so intuitively, but it is not so in reality.
Proliferation of actors need not obscure the essence of international mediation.
We can have c o m m o n standards, build o n our existing knowledge, and develop
a model that accounts for the ways different mediators operate and explains
the reasons for such differences.
All international mediators operate within a system o f exchange and
influence. The parameters o f that system can be identified as the communica-
tion, experience, and expectations set by the disputing parties and by the
resources and interests o f the mediators. The interplay among these parameters
determines the nature and effectiveness o f mediation. Whatever else they do,

102 Jacob Bercovitch International Relations

mediators - - be the3~ individuals, states, or institutions - - h o p e to influence,
change, or m o d i f y o n e or m o r e o f these parameters. This is at the " h e a r t " o f
international mediation. This is the aspect of mediation w e must discern ff w e
are to improve the p e r f o r m a n c e and effectiveness of mediation.
Normally, we suggest a n u m b e r o f roles to describe what mediators do
and h o w they go about achieving their objective. Mediators' roles m a y be charac-
terized in a n u m b e r of ways, Jeffrey Rubin (1981: 3-43), for instance, offers a
comprehensive set of dichotomous roles and distinguishes b e t w e e n formal vs.
informal roles, individual vs. representative roles, invited vs. noninvited role,
advisory vs. directive roles, content vs. process roles, p e r m a n e n t vs. temporary
roles, and conflict resolution vs. conflict prevention roles. Stulberg (1981: 85-117),
writing in a more traditional vein, lists the following potential roles for a medi-
ator: a catalyst; an educator; a translator; a resource-expander; a bearer o f bad
news; an agent o f reality; and a scapegoat. Susskind and Crttickshank (1987),
w h o s e conception of mediation is that o f "assisted negotiation," introduce a
dynamic element into the discussion by identifying a n u m b e r o f other roles
(e.g., representation, inventing options, monitoring) and relating these to the
various stages of negotiation. Each role has its place in the lifecycle of a conflict.
Discussing mediator behavior in terms of preordained roles does not really
take us very far in our quest for a better understanding of h o w different inter-
national mediators behave and w h i c h factors shape theft behavior. Mediators'
roles, w h e n placed o n a spectrum ranging f r o m passive (e.g., facilitation) to
active (e.g., p r o m o t i o n of settlement ideas) involvement, can be seen only in
static and typological terms. In reality, mediators a d o p t one or m o r e roles and,
if necessary, change these in the course o f mediation. Gulliver (1979: 2 2 0 ) p u t s
it very well w h e n he states that "it is necessary to avoid an assumption of the
role o f the mediator, w h e t h e r in description or prescription. Dogmatic asser-
tions o f that kind, unfortunately not u n c o m m o n , are misleading and stultify
careful analysis."
The enactment o f a particular role or a set o f roles, and the a d o p t i o n o f
a passive or active srance~ does not so m u c h d e p e n d o n the mediator's deter-
m i n e d adherence to a prescribed notion o f "a r o l e " but o n the context of the
dispute and the interests and resources o f the mediator. This is as true o f inter-
personal mediation as it is of international mediation.
Role classification provides one dimension along which mediation behavior
can be categorized. The notion of mediation strategies offers another dimen-
sion. A mediation strategy is defined by Kolb (1983: 249) as "an overall plan,
approach or m e t h o d a mediator has for resolving a d i s p u t e . . . i t is the way the
mediator intends to manage the case, the parties, and the issue." H o w can we
identify the m o s t important strategies, and h o w do mediators choose a partic-
ular strategy?
A great deal has b e e n written about the strategies and tactics o f media-
tion. Mediation strategies have traditionally b e e n viewed as either content or
process strategies (see Bartunek, Benton, and Keys, 1975: 532-557). Content
strategies are designed to change the substantive content of the dispute (through
the use o f such. tactics as offering suggestions, encouraging concessionmaldng,
hlaposing deadlines, etc.), and process strategies are designed to affect the per-
ceptual dimension o f the dispute (by educating the parties, offering facilities
for Better communication, etc.). The distinction b e t w e e n content a n d process

Negotiation Journal April 1992 103

strategies corresponds roughly to Kochan and Jick's (1978: 209-238) distinc-
tion between contingent and noncontingent strategies.
Other ways of categorizing mediator strategies include Kolb's (1983a) deal-
making strategies (affecting the substance of a dispute) and orchestration strate-
gies (managing the interaction) and Stein's (1985: 331-347) incremental (seg-
menting a dispute into smaller issues) vs. comprehensive strategies (dealing with
all aspects of a dispute). Carnevale (1986: 41-56; 1986a: 251-269) suggests that
mediators may choose from among four fundamental strategies: integration
(searching for c o m m o n ground), pressing (reducing range of available alterna-
tives), compensation (enhancing attractiveness of some alternatives), and inac-
tion (which, in effect, means no mediation). Kressel (1972), in one of the most
widely used typologies, presents three general mediation strategies: reflexive
(discovering issues, facilitating better interactions), nondirective (producing a
favorable climate for mediation), and directive (promoting specific outcomes).
Touval and Zartman's (1985: 7-20; Zartman and Touval, 1985: 27-46) three-
fold classification of mediation strategies offers, I believe, the best taxonomy
for the student of international mediation. The principal strategies they iden-
tifT are: communication-facilitation; formulation; and maniptflation. The use
of these strategies, in the process of transforming a dyad into a triad, is designed
to change, affect, or modify aspects of the dispute or the nature of interaction
between the parties. Different international mediators rely on different strate-
gies in different disputes. Mediators tend to adapt their strategy to the nature
of the dispute and to their own resources.
The specific behavioral tactics these strategies may lead to are as follows:
Communication-Facilitation
• make contact with parties
• gain the trust and confidence of the parties
• arrange for interactions between the parties
• identify issues and interests
• clarify situation
• avoid taking sides
• develop a rapport with parties
• supply missing information
• develop a framework for understanding
• encourage meaningful communication
• offer positive evaluations
• allow the interests of all parties to be discussed
Formulation
• choose meetings site
• control pace and formafity of meetings
• control physical environment
• establish protocol
• suggest procedures
• highlight c o m m o n interests
• reduce tensions
• control timing
• deal with simple issues first
• structure agenda
• keep parties at the table

104 Jacob Bercovitch International Relations

® help parties save face
* keep process focused o n issues
Manipulation
* change parties' expectations
* take responsibility for concessions
* make substantive suggestions and proposals
® make parties aware of costs o f nonagreement
® supply and filter information
® suggest concessions parties can make
® help negotiators to undo a commitment
® reward party concessions
® help devise a framework for acceptable outcome
* change expectations
* press the parties to show flexibility
® promise resources or threaten withdrawal
® offer to verify compliance with agreement
H o w do international mediators decide which specific tactics to utilize?
H o w do they determine which strategy to articulate? To answer such questions
one must recognize the fact that mediators cannot choose any strategy they
wish, irrespective o f circumstances. International mediators function within a
system that is composed, as Wall (1981: 157-180) so convincingly demonstrates,
o f the disputing parties, their relationship, the mediator, a number o f concerned
audiences or constituencies, and other factors such as societal norms, political
institutions, and economic pressures. The relationships within that system are
relationships of exchange and influence: Each actor has interests and expecta-
tions, each acxor possesses resources, and each expects to receive some rewards
the mediator as well as the disputing parties. We can, if we so desire, focus
o n one aspect of the relationship (say the behavior o f a mediator) and prescribe
a wide variety o f innovative methods o f mediation and advise their applicabil-
ity to all kinds o f international disputes. Unless we take into account the con-
text of the dispute and the resources o f a mediator, such prescn'ptions will
amount to little more than wishful thinking.
For international mediation to be effective, it must reflect as well as affect
the wider conflict system. This is one reason w h y different mediators use differ-
ent approaches and emphasize different aspects. It is as simplistic as it is errone-
ous to regard mediation outcomes as being totally related to mediation processes
only. Processes and procedures, strategies and tactics are deduced from the broad
context in which a mediator operates. Mediation must not be analyzed or under-
stood in terms o f a simple cause-and-effect model in which a particular stt'ategy
invariably produces a desired outcome.
Mediation, in general, and international mediation, in particular, are not
merely driven by some exogenous input that can be applied uniformly and
indiscriminately to all disputes. Nor is mediation merely a set of rules, the rigid
pursuit o f which can affect or influence the parties. The relationship between
a mediator and the ,disputing parties is reciprocal. Exchange and influence in
mediation are thus bidirectional, not unidirectional.
The strategies and behavior o f international mediators are so very differ-
ent not merely because o f actor differences, but because o f differences in the
nature and context o f a dispute and the characteristics o f the parties involved.

Negotiation Journal April 1992 105

 FIGURE 1
A F r a m e w o r k f o r the Analysis
o f Mediation Strategy and B e h a v i o r

Current Conditions Consequent

Antecedent Conditions (Mediation strategy & Conditions
(Prior to mediation) behavior) (Post-mediation)

Mediation
Identity & outcomes:
Nature of rank of (1) subjective
dispute mediator
(2) objective

i
Outcome
Mediation
Nature of strategy &
issues behavior

Process

Nature of
parties

Nature of
relationship

t
Context
1

~)6 jacob Bercovitch International 2~elatiom

To be effective, mediation strategy and behavior must match and reflect these
factors. The process (of mediation) and context (of a dispute) are closely inter-
related. The context factors influencing the choice and diversity o f mediators'
strategy and behavior can be placed in a general framework that organizes the
dimensions and processes of mediation into temporal sequences that depict
the interplay among prior conditions that are antecedent to mediation, the actual
process o f mediation, and subsequent outcomes.7
The structure and diversity of mediation in international relations may be
explained, in part, by the influence of different contexts. However, it is also
affected by the resources mediators can bring to bear o n the situation. An inter-
national mediator, whether an individual, a state, or an organization, is, after
all, an element that purports to influence, change, or affect a conflict system
that comprises an agent of influence (i.e., a mediator), the intended targets of
influence (i.e., the disputing parties), and the means of influence (i.e., media-
tor's resources), s To exert any influence at all, to change or affect aspects o f
an international dispute requires the possession or control of some valued
resources. What are these resources and to what extent do they determine medi-
ation behavior?
The control and possession of resources is a major determinant o f a medi-
ator's power to achieve a favourable outcome or other desired objectives.
Without resources, one cannot achieve any objective. In the context of a volun-
tary relationship such as mediation, these resources may take the form of oppor-
tunities, acts, and objects that can be used to effect a change in the behavior
or perceptions o f the disputing parties. Such resources may include money,
status, expertise, access, and prestige. The specific resources utilized in a par-
ticular instance depend u p o n the nature o f the mediator and the social context
o f mediation. Whichever form these resources take, and however they are
exploited, their use will affect mediation strategy and behavior as well as the
course and likely outcomes of mediation.
Mediators' resources constitute the basis required for exercising "leverage,"
or any other type of influence. Using the conceptualization of social influence
proposed originally by French and Raven (1959: 150-167), and modified by
Raven (1990: 493-520) more than 30 years later, six types of resources, or "bases
of p o w e r " may be identified. These are: reward, coercion, referent, legitimacy,
expertise, and information. Reward resources are based o n the mediator's abil-
ity to offer the parties tangible benefits and promises o f approval. Coercive
resources depend on various kinds of mediator's threats (e.g., the threat to with-
draw mediation or make public the recalcitrance of one or both parties). Referent
resources stem from a sense of mutual identity between a mediator and the
disputing parties and the desire to see things similarly. Legitimacy resources
are related the parties' internalized values that a mediator has a right and an
obligation (by virtue of occupying an office or a position) to change or influence
a dispute. Resources o f expertise depend on the disputants' belief that a medi-
ator does have superior knowledge and ability (because o f experience, train-
ing, or reputation) and really knows what is best. And informational resources
are based o n the mediator's ability to uncover and transmit valued information
that may lead to a change in some aspects o f the dispute.
This six-fold conception of resources provides the link among the media-
tor, the disputing parties, and the process o f mediation. If mediators wish to

Negotiation Journal April 1992 107

influence a dispute, they have to rely o n their resources to induce a change
in motivation, perception or behavior. One of m y central assumptions here is
that the choice o f resources, and thereby strategies, in mediation is not ran-
dom. Different mediators possess different resources and make use of t h e m in
different disputes. The possession and control of resources is in m a n y ways
the ticket to a specific f o r m of international mediation.
The motivation to change or influence and the expectation of goal-
achievement are the very reasons w h y so m a n y international actors are keen
to mediate. These actors rely o n different resources. Individual mediators, pos-
sessing only referent, legitimacy, and informational resources, show a strong
tendency to use communication-facilitative strategies. Institutions and organi-
zations are endowed with resources of legitimacy and expertise, and their medi-
ation strategies are mostly of the communicational and procedural kind. And
states, with so m a n y resources at their disposal, can use commtmicational,
procedural, and manipulative strategies. If mediation is about changing or
influencing a dispute or the disputants - - which, of course, it is - - then the
possession and use of different resources can be postulated to account for differ-
ences in mediation behavior.
We are often told that, to be successful, a mediator must take into account
the parties' needs, interests, and capabilities. To gain a better understanding of
mediation, we must k n o w something about the context of interactions, and
the needs, interests, and capabilities of the mediator. Shifting the focus from
the disputants to the mediator may seem a pretty obvious point, but it is,
nonetheless, one we have neglected for far too long.

Evaluating International Mediation

All international mediators, using their skills and resources, try to change or
influence the nature o f the parties' interactions, aspects of its context, and
the likely range o f outcomes. But h o w can the activities a n d contributions
o f so m a n y different mediators be assessed? H o w can the i m p a c t o f a partic-
ular mediation be evaluated? If mediation is ultimately about changing, affect-
ing, or influencing the nature of a dispute or the w a y the parties interact,
can such change even be discerned? Furthermore, if change has b e e n effected,
a n d a satisfactory o u t c o m e o f sorts has b e e n achieved, can this be attributed
to the w i s d o m and e x p e r i e n c e o f a mediator? And conversely, if the disput-
ing parties s h o w no change whatsoever, should this b e described as media-
tion failure? Evaluating the consequences of mediation and attributing success
or failure to one element, out of several interdependent elements, in a volun-
tary system o f interactions, poses serious c o n c e p t u a l and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l
problems.
As international mediation is not uniform, it seems futile to draw up one
set o f criteria to cover the varied objectives of all mediators. Individual media-
tots, for instance, may emphasize commtmicational-facilitative strategies, be more
concerned with the quality of interaction, and seek to be instrumental in creating
a better environment for negotiations. Mediating states, on the other hand, m a y
well seek to effect a change in the behavior of the parties and contribute toward
an appropriate settlement of the dispute. Such different objectives cannot be
easily a c c o m m o d a t e d within a single perspective. To answer the question
w h e t h e r or not mediation works, we need to k n o w something about the goals

lOB Jacob Bercovitch International Relations

of mediation. This is w h y I suggest the n e e d for two broad evaluative criteria,
subjective and objective, to assess the contribution and consequences of inter-
national mediation.
Subjective criteria - - and I use the term subjective because these criteria
can not usually be assessed empirically - - refer to the parties', or the media-
tor's, perception that the goals of mediation were achieved or that a desired
change took place. The goals o f mediation or the desired change pertain to
either the process of interaction or its outcome. Using this perspective, w e can
evaluate mediation as being successful w h e n the parties express satisfaction with
the process or o u t c o m e o f mediation, w h i c h they have perceived to be fair,
efficient, or effective.
Parties' satisfaction with mediation is generally high (see Latour and others,
1976: 319-356), but its precise meaning, let alone its measurement, is unclear.
Parties in dispute may express satisfaction with mediation because (a) the process
of mediation allows them a final say over the outcome or because (b) of the
intrinsic nature of mediation services rendered. Here, again, we cannot disen-
tangle one set o f perceptions from another. Nor can we l~md any evidence to
suggest that the overall level of satisfaction with international mediation is strongly
associated with particular kinds of mediators or certain strategies of mediation.
Fairness, or parties' conceptions o f entitlements and distribution of
resources~ defines another criterion in the evaluation of mediation outcomes.
Fairness can be thought of in terms of the parties' expressions of c o n c e r n with
the process of mediation or its outcome.9 As a process, international media-
tion is likely to be seen as fair w h e n it is " o p e n to continuous modification
by the disputants", (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987: 21) and w h e n the media-
tor treats both parties equally. A mediated o u t c o m e is seen as fair w h e n the
parties' expectations are met, or w h e n the allocation of scarce resources is con-
sistent with the principles of equality, equity, or need.
The third subjective criterion for assessing mediation outcomes is efficiency
the time mediation takes and the costs to those involved. International medi-
ation that emphasizes timeliness, minimizes costs, and produces outcomes that
ma~dmize the benefits each party experiences m a y very well be evaluated as
successfftl mediation. There is no doubt that some international mediators con-
sider efficiency of procedures to be their p a r a m o u n t objective.
The final subjective criterion is effectiveness - - a key attribute o f a g o o d
outcome. This refers to the implementability and p e r m a n e n c e of a setdement.
An effectively mediated o u t c o m e is a stable and realistic o u t c o m e and one that
offers opportunities to avoid similar disputes in the future. Clearly, effective-
ness is a significant criterion in determining the success or failure o f media-
tion, but like the other criteria, it can be discerned only in hindsight - - and
even then, only in a totally subjective manner. Evaluating international media-
tion in terms o f its quality or expectations takes us s o m e way, albeit along a
fairly problematic road, toward analyzing the success or failure of various medi-
ation efforts.
Objective criteria offer a totally different perspective for evaluating media-
tion outcomes. Objective criteria rely o n substantive indicators that m a y be
assessed empirically by an observer or any o f the participants in mediation.
Usually, such criteria involve notions o f change and judgments about the extent
o f change as evidence of the success or failure of mediation.

Negotiation Journal April 1992 109

 Objective criteria permit us to examine the behavior of the parties u p o n
the termination of mediation and to determine the extem o f change t h a t had
taken place. Thus, we can assess a particular mediation effort as having failed
if the parties continue to interact in the same dysfunctional manner. We can
see mediation as partly successful if its efforts contribute to a cessation of vio-
lent behavior and the opening o f dialogue between the parties. And w h e n the
parties embrace a formal outcome that settles many o f the issues in dispute
and produces new and more productive interactions, we can evaluate media-
tion as having been successful.
Evaluating international mediation in terms of observed change in the par-
ties' behavior is a relatively straightforward task. Using an objective criterion
to define the success or failure of mediation facilitates comparative evaluations
and permits systematic empirical research. On the surface, it does not suffer
from the arbitrariness and methodological problems that beset subjective criteria.
We would, however, be unwise to rely solely on objective criteria. Differ-
ent mediators, and indeed different conflict parties, have different goals in mind
w h e n they enter conflict management. Changing behavior could well be only
one among a set o f goals. Some international mediators may focus on the con-
tent of interactions; others may focus o n its climat~ setting, and decision-making
norms. These cannot always be easily evaluated. Each mediation should,
perhaps, be evaluated in terms of the criteria that are significant to its o w n
efforts. The questions of whether mediations work and h o w best to evaluate
them can be answered only by collecting information and making judgments
in specific cases. There are just too many problems with these questions, and
it seems that on this issue, our theoretical ambitions must be tempered by the
constraints of a complex reality.

Conclusion
Mediation has been, and remains, one o f the most significant methods o f con-
flict management. Mediators have played an important role in the attempts to
settle interpersonal or other conflicts from earliest times. Nowhere was this
role more visible than in the international arena, where mediation became quite
indistinguishable from the evolving pattern of diplomacy and the codification
o f international norms. Increased utilization has resulted in a greater need to
understand the p h e n o m e n o n of international mediation. It was with this in
mind that this article addressed one or two broad questions concerning medi-
ators' identity and their choice o f strategy.
International mediators operate in a complex arena of interdependent rela-
tions. They enter that arena in order to influence, change, or modify some of
its aspects. This is w h y mediation takes place. The best way to understand the
objectives and performance o f mediation is to analyze the c o m m o n dimen-
sions o f any interaction - - namely, actors, interests, resources, and behavior.
Many actors may initiate mediation. These actors have different interests, they
possess different resources, and their behavior is affected by their interests and
resources. The structure o f international mediation, and its diversity, is largely
explained by reference to these f o u r dimensions.
Improvements in international mediation will not necessarily come about
by fbcusing o n one dimension oniy and devising new inputs to inject at all
societal levels. More likely, they will come about by recognizing, as Thucydides

1tO Jacob Bercovitch International Relations

did more than two thousand years ago, that political p h e n o m e n a are due to
the interplay of person and circumstance, Likewise, mediators must be evalu-
ated in their contexts - - the actor and the structure. We need to keep both
sides of tl~s equation in mind if we are to understand the structure and diver-
sity o f mediation in international relations.

NOTES

This article is a revised version of Chapter One of the author's forthcoming book edited with
Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Mediation in International Relations (London: Macmillan and New York:
St• Martin's Press, 1992). Special thanks are due to Bill Breslin for his helpful comments and
suggestions.

1. On the range of providers of mediation services, see Kriesberg, 1991: 19-27.

2. The term relations is much broader than the term politics, which may be taken to apply
to official policy-making bodies only. We are interested here in the full range of interactions, not
merely official interactions. For a discussion of relations vs. politics, see Saunders, 1991: 41-69.
3. I am using the categories suggested, in a different context, by Waltz, 1959.
4. The efforts of these individuals have been the subject of a voluminous literature. Much
of it is summarized in Bercovitch, I984; Azar, 1990; Hill, 1982: 109-138; Kelman, 1972: 168-204;
and de Reuck, 1983: 27-36.
5. On the relation between states and conflict, see Rasler and Thompson, 1989.
6. Five factors can be identified as affecting the "weight" of a state: (a) population and terri-
tory; (b) military strength; (c) economic development; (d) level of industrialization; and (e) GNP
per capita.
7. This framework owes much to Drnckman's (1977) detailed analysis of negotiation. Also
see Bercovitch, 1984a: t25-144.
8. For a comprehensive review of this conception, see Tedeschi, Bonoma, and Scblenker,
1972: 346-418.
9. The discussion of procedural and outcome fairness owes much to Thibaut and Walker,
1975; and to Sheppard, 1984: 141-190.

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