Republic of the Philippines
8 Thus, the Autonomous Region of
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893 and 183951 - THE PROVINCE OF NORTH
COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or
VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PINOL, for and in his own behalf vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL
ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA,
ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN, and/or GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and
duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the
so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
Promulgated:
October 14, 2008
x--------------------------------------------x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, C.J.:
It is the duty of the government to seek a just, comprehensive and enduring
peace with any rebel group but the search for peace must always be in accord
with the Constitution. Any search for peace that undercuts the Constitution must
be struck down. Peace in breach of the Constitution is worse than worthless.
I. Historical Roots
A historical perspective of our Muslim problem is helpful.
From time immemorial, an enduring peace with our Muslim brothers and sisters
in Mindanao has eluded our grasp. Our Muslim problem exploded in March of
1968 when Muslim trainees were massacred by army officers at Corregidor.
About 180 Muslim trainees had been recruited in the previous year as a part of a
covert force named Jabidah,1 allegedly formed to wrest away Sabah from
Malaysia. The trainees were massacred when they reportedly protested their
unbearable training and demanded the return to their home. 2 The Jabidah
Massacre fomented the formation of Muslim groups clamoring for a separate
Islamic state. One of these groups was the Muslim Independence Movement
(MIM), founded by the then Governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam. 3
Another was the Nurul Islam, led by Hashim Salamat.
On September 21, 1972 Martial Law was declared by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Among the reasons cited to justify martial law were the armed conflict
between Muslims and Christians and the Muslim secessionist movement in the
Southern Philippines.4 The imposition of martial law drove some of the Muslim
secessionist movements to the underground. One of them was the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) headed by Nur Misuari. In 1974, the MNLF
shot to prominence, when the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) officially
gave it recognition. During the 5 th ICFM, they strongly urged "the Philippines
Government to find a political and peaceful solution through negotiation with
Muslim leaders, particularly with representatives of the MNLF in order to arrive
at a just solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims within the framework of
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines"; and recognized
"the problem as an internal problem with the Philippine Government to ensure
the safety of the Filipino Muslims and the preservation of their liberties in
accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."5
In December 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF under the
auspices of the OIC started their peace negotiation in Tripoli, Libya. It bore its
first fruit when on January 20, 1977, the parties signed the Tripoli Agreement in
Zamboanga City in the presence of the OIC Representative.
President Marcos immediately implemented the Tripoli Agreement. He issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1628, "Declaring Autonomy in Southern
Philippines." A plebiscite was conducted in the provinces covered under the
Tripoli Agreement to determine the will of the people thereat. Further, the
legislature enacted Batasang Pambansa Blg. 20, "Providing for the Organization
of Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Legislative Assembly) in Each of Regions
IX and XII." President Marcos then ordered the creation of Autonomous Region
IX and XII.
In the meanwhile, the MNLF continued enhancing its international status. It was
accorded the status of an observer in Tripoli, Libya during the 8 th ICFM. In the
15th ICFM at Sana'a, Yemen, in 1984, the MNLF's status was further elevated
from a mere 'legitimate representative' to 'sole legitimate representative' of the
Bangsamoro people.6
In April 1977, the peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and MNLF Talks collapsed. Schism split the MNLF
leadership. The irreconcilable differences between Nur Misuari and Hashim
Salamat led to the formation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
headed by Hashim Salamat. Thus, the Maguindanao-led MILF, parted ways
with the Tausug-led MNLF.
In 1986, the People Power Revolution catapulted Corazon C. Aquino to the
Presidency. Forthwith, she ordered the peace talks with the MNLF to resume.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people. It provided for the creation of
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao through an act of Congress. But
again the talks with the MNLF floundered in May 1987. 7 Be that as it may, it was
during President Aquino's governance that a culture of peace negotiations with
the rebellious MNLF and MILF was cultivated.
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created through Republic Act No. 6734. The law
took effect on August 1, 1989.
Then came the presidency of President Fidel V. Ramos. He issued on
September 15, 1993, Executive Order No., 125 (E.O. 125) which provided for a
comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process with the Muslim rebels.
E.O. 125 created the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
give momentum to the peace talks with the MNLF.
In 1996, as the GRP-MNLF peace negotiations were successfully winding down,
the government prepared to deal with the MILF problem. Formal peace talks
started on January of 1997, towards the end of the Ramos administration. The
Buldon Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 1997 9 but time ran out for the
negotiations to be completed.
President Joseph Estrada continued the peace talks with the MILF. The talks,
however, were limited to cessation of hostilities and did not gain any headway.
President Estrada gave both sides until December 1999 to finish the peace
process.10 They did not meet the deadline. The year 2000 saw the escalation of
acts of violence and the threats to the lives and security of civilians in Southern
Mindanao. President Estrada then declared an "all-out war" against the MILF. 11
He bowed out of office with the "war" unfinished.
Thereafter, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed office. Peace
negotiations with the MILF were immediately set for resumption. Executive
Order No. 3, was issued "Defining Policy and Administrative Structure: For
Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts." On March 24, 2001, a General
Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF
was signed. Republic Act No. 9054 12 was also enacted on March 31, 2001 and
took effect on August 14, 2001 to strengthen and expand the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. Through the Organic Act of 2001, six municipalities
in Lanao del Norte voted for inclusion in the ARMM.
On June 22, 2001, the ancestral domain aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement was signed in Libya. Several rounds of exploratory talks with the
MILF followed. Unfortunately, on April 2, 2003, Davao was twice bombed. Again,
the peace talks were cancelled and fighting with the MILF resumed. On July 19,
2003 the GRP and the MILF agreed on "mutual cessation of hostilities" and the
parties returned to the bargaining table. The parties discussed the problem of
ancestral domain, divided into four strands: concept, territory, resources, and
governance.
On February 7, 2006, the 10th round of Exploratory Talks between the GRP and
the MILF ended. The parties issued a joint statement of the consensus points of
the Ancestral Domain aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June
22, 2001. The Joint Statement provides that:
"Among the consensus points reached were:
· Joint determination of the scope of the Bangsamoro
homeland based on the technical maps and data submitted
by both sides;
· Measures to address the legitimate grievances of the
Bangsamoro people arising from the unjust dispossession
and/or marginalization;
· Bangsamoro people's right to utilize and develop their
ancestral domain and ancestral lands;
· Economic cooperation arrangements for the benefit of the
entire Bangsamoro people."
On July 27, 2008, a Joint Statement on the Memorandum of Agreement on
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was signed by Chairperson Rodolfo C. Garcia on
behalf of the GRP Peace Panel, and Mohagher Iqbal on behalf of the MILF
Panel. In the Joint Statement, it was declared that the final draft of the MOA-AD
has already been initialed. It was announced that "both sides reached a
consensus to initial the final draft pending its official signing by the Chairmen of
the two peace panels in early August 2008, in Putrajaya, Malaysia."13
The Joint Statement triggered the filing of the petitions at bar. These Petitions,
sought among others, to restrain the signing of the MOA-AD. On August 4,
2008, a day before the intended signing of the initialed MOA-AD, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order stopping the signing of the MOA-AD.
Several petitions-in-intervention were also filed praying for the same relief. On
August 8, 2008 and September 1, 2008, the respondents through the Solicitor
General, submitted official copies of the initialed MOA-AD to the Court and
furnished the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention with copies of the same.
All the petitions were heard by the Court in three separate days of oral
arguments. In the course of the arguments, the Solicitor General informed the
Court that the MOA-AD will not be signed "in its present form or any other
form."14 Thereafter, the government Peace Panel was dismantled by the
President.
II. Petitions should be Decided on the Merits
The first threshold issue is whether this Court should exercise its power of
judicial review and decide the petitions at bar on the merits.
I respectfully submit that the Court should not avoid its constitutional duty to
decide the petitions at bar on their merit in view of their transcendental
importance. The subject of review in the petitions at bar is the conduct of the
peace process with the MILF which culminated in the MOA-AD. The
constitutionality of the conduct of the entire peace process and not just the
MOA-AD should go under the scalpel of judicial scrutiny. The review should not
be limited to the initialed MOA-AD for it is merely the product of a constitutionally
flawed process of negotiations with the MILF.
Let us revisit the steps that led to the contested and controversial MOA-AD.
Peace negotiations with the MILF commenced with the execution of ceasefire
agreements. The watershed event, however, occurred in 2001, with the
issuance of Executive Order No. 315 entitled "Defining Policy and Administrative
Structure for Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts." Government Peace
Negotiating Panels were immediately constituted to negotiate peace with rebel
groups, which included the MILF. Significantly, Executive Order No. 3
provides that in the pursuit of social, economic and political reforms,
administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments
may be required.16 Section 4 of Executive Order No. 3 states, viz:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the
comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the
"Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and
not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously
in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may
not be limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and
projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal
armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require
administrative action, new legislation or even
constitutional amendments.
xxxx
c. PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE
DIFFERENT REBEL GROUPS. This component involves
the conduct of face-to-face negotiations to reach peaceful
settlement with the different rebel groups. It also involves
the effective implementation of peace agreements.
(Emphasis supplied)
Executive Order No. 3, was later amended by E.O. No. 555, 17 and was followed
by the Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001. The Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001
became the basis for several rounds of exploratory talks between the GRP
Peace Panel and the MILF. These exploratory talks resulted in the signing of the
Joint Statements of the GRP and MILF peace panels to affirm commitments that
implement the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, including the ancestral domain aspect.
The issuance of the Joint Statements culminated in the initialing of the
MOA-AD.18
It is crystal clear that the initialing of the MOA-AD is but the evidence of the
government peace negotiating panel's assent to the terms contained therein. If
the MOA-AD is constitutionally infirm, it is because the conduct of the
peace process itself is flawed. It is the constitutional duty of the Court is to
determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the government peace negotiating panel
in the conduct of the peace negotiations with the MILF. The Court should
not restrict its review on the validity of the MOA-AD which is but the end
product of the flawed conduct of the peace negotiation with the MILF.
Requirements of Ripeness and
Mootness are not bars to review
In contending that this Court should refrain from resolving the merits of the
petitions at bar, two principal defenses were deployed by the Solicitor General:
the issues raised for resolution are not ripe for adjudication and regardless of
their ripeness, are moot.
With due respect, the defenses cannot be sustained. To contend that an issue is
not ripe for adjudication is to invoke prematurity; 19 that the issue has not reached
a state where judicial intervention is necessary, hence, there is in reality no
actual controversy. On the other hand, to urge that an issue has become moot
concedes that judicial intervention was once proper but subsequent
developments make further judicial action unnecessary. Together, mootness
and ripeness act as a two-pronged pincer, squeezing the resolution of
controversies within a narrow timeframe. 20
First, the issues at bar are ripe for resolution. In Ohio Forestry Ass'n Inc. v.
Sierra Club,21 the following factors were identified as indicative of the ripeness
of a controversy:
1. Whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs;
2. Whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with
further administrative action;
3. Whether the Court would benefit from further factual development
of the issues presented;
Underlying the use of the foregoing factors is first, the setting of a threshold for
review and second, judicial application of the threshold to the facts extant in a
controversy. I respectfully submit that where a controversy concerns
fundamental constitutional questions, the threshold must be adjusted to
allow judicial scrutiny, in order that the issues may be resolved at the
earliest stage before anything irreversible is undertaken under cover of an
unconstitutional act. Schwartz cites one vital consideration in determining
ripeness, viz:
In dealing with ripeness, one must distinguish between statutes and
other acts that are self-executing and those that are not. If a
statute is self executing, it is ripe for challenge as soon as it is
enacted. For such a statute to be subject to judicial review, it is not
necessary that it be applied by an administrator, a prosecutor, or
some other enforcement officer in a concrete case.22
Although Schwartz employs the term "statute," he qualifies that the principle
enunciated applies to other governmental acts as well.23
Prescinding from these parameters, it is evident that the Court is confronted
with a MOA-AD that is heavily laden with self-executing components. Far
from the representation of the Solicitor General, the MOA-AD is not a mere
collection of consensus points,24 still bereft of any legal consequence. The
commitments made by the government panel under the MOA-AD can be divided
into (1) those which are self-executory or are immediately effective by the
terms of the MOA-AD alone, (2) those with a period or which are to be effective
within a stipulated time, and (3) those that are conditional or whose effectivity
depends on the outcome of a plebiscite.
Let us cast an eye on the self executory provisions of the MOA-AD which will
demolish the argument of the respondents that the issues in the petitions at bar
are not ripe for adjudication.
The MOA-AD provides that "the Parties affirm that the core of the BJE shall
constitute the present geographic area of the ARMM, including the municipalities
of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal in the province of
Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001
plebiscite."
The MOA-AD then proceeds to enumerate the powers that the BJE possesses
within its area. The BJE is granted powers of governance which it can exercise
without need of amendments to be made to the Constitution or existing law or
without imposing any condition whatsoever.
The MOA-AD also gives the BJE the unconditional right to participate in
international meetings and events, e.g., ASEAN meetings and other specialized
agencies of the United Nations.25 It grants BJE the right to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations that are engaged in the negotiation
of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection, equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues, in addition to those of fishing rights. 26 Again,
these rights are given to the BJE without imposing prior conditions such as
amendments to the Constitution, existing law or the enactment of new
legislation.
Next, let us go to provisions of the MOA-AD with a period which will further
demonstrate the lack of merit of respondents' posture that the petitions at bar
are not ripe for adjudication. The MOA-AD provides that "without derogating
from the requirements of prior agreements 27, the Government stipulates to
conduct and deliver, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, a plebiscite covering the
areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A x x x the
Parties shall endeavor to complete negotiations and resolve all outstanding
issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from signing
of the MOA-AD."28 Once more, it is evident that no conditions were imposed with
respect to the conduct of a plebiscite within twelve months following the signing
of the MOA-AD. The provision starkly states that within twelve months, the
government will conduct and deliver a plebiscite covering areas under Category
A of the MOA-AD.
We now come to respondents' argument on mootness. In determining whether
a case has been rendered moot, courts look at the development of events to
ascertain whether the petitioner making the constitutional challenge is
confronted with a continuing harm or a substantial potential of harm.
Mootness is sometimes viewed as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:
The requisite personal interest must exist at the commencement of the litigation
and must continue throughout its existence." 29 Stated otherwise, an actual
controversy must be extant at all stages of judicial review, not merely at the time
the complaint is filed.30
Respondents insist that the petitions at bar are moot for three reasons: (1) the
petitioners North Cotabato and Zamboanga have already been furnished copies
of the MOA-AD; (2) the Executive Secretary has issued a Memorandum that the
government will not sign the MOA-AD and, (3) the GRP Peace Panel has been
dissolved by the President.
These grounds are barren grounds. For one, the press statements of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., are
clear that the MOA-AD will still be used as a major reference in future
negotiations.31 For another, the MILF considers the MOA-AD a "done deal," 32
hence, ready for implementation. On the other hand, the peace panel may have
been temporarily dismantled but the structures set up by the Executive and their
guidelines which gave rise to the present controversy remain intact. With all
these realities, the petitions at bar fall within that exceptional class of
cases which ought to be decided despite their mootness because the
complained unconstitutional acts are "capable of repetition yet evading
review."33
This well-accepted exception to the non-reviewability of moot cases was
first enunciated in the case of Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC.34 The
United States Supreme Court held that a case is not moot where interests of a
public character are asserted under conditions that may be immediately
repeated, merely because the particular order involved has expired.
In the petitions at bar, one need not butt heads with the Solicitor General to
demonstrate the numerous constitutional infirmities of the MOA-AD. There is no
need to iterate and reiterate them. Suffice to stress that it is because of these
evident breaches, that the MOA-AD requires the present Constitution to undergo
radical revisions. Yet, the unblushing threat is made that the MOA-AD which
shattered to smithereens all respect to the Constitution will continue to be a
reference point in future peace negotiations with the MILF. In fine, the MOA-AD
is a constitutional nightmare that will come and torment us again in the near
future. It must be slain now. It is not moot.
Let us adhere to the orthodox thought that once a controversy as to the
application of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is hide-bound to decide. 35 Supervening events,
whether contrived or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a
decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution has already been
committed or the threat of being committed again is not a hypothetical fear. 36 It is
the function of judicial review to uphold the Constitution at all cost or we forfeit
the faith of the people.
III. The Deviation from the MNLF
Model of Pursuing Peace with
Rebels is Inexplicable
The MNLF model in dealing with rebels which culminated in the Peace
Agreement of 1996, was free from any infirmity because it respected the metes
and bounds of the Constitution. While the MNLF model is ostensibly based on
the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, its implementation was in perfect accord with
Philippine laws. The implementation of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 came in
two phases: the first, under the legislative power of then President Marcos and
the second, under the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution and its
implementing legislation, Republic Act No. 6734. 37
Under President Marcos, autonomy in the affected provinces was recognized
through Presidential Proclamation No.1628. It declared autonomy in 13
provinces and constituted a provisional government for the affected areas. The
proclamation was followed by a plebiscite and the final framework for the
autonomous region was embodied in Presidential Decree No.1618.
The establishment of the autonomous region under P.D. 1628 was
constitutionalized by the commissioners in the 1987 Constitution as shown
by the following exchange of views:
MR. ALONTO: Madam President, I have stated from the start of our
consideration of this Article on Local Governments that the
autonomous region exists now in this country. There is a de facto
existence of an autonomous government in what we call now Regions
IX and XII. Region IX is composed of the provinces of Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga
del Norte, including all the component cities in the provinces. Region
XII is composed of the Provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato. This autonomous
region has its central governmental headquarters in Zamboanga City
for Region IX and in Cotabato City for Region XII. In fact, it is stated
by Commissioner Ople that it has an executive commission and a
legislative assembly.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President.
MR. ALONTO: These two regions have been organized by virtue of
P.D. No. 1618 of President Marcos, as amended by P.D. No. 1843.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President.
MR. ALONTO: If the Gentleman will bear with me, I will explain to him.
That is why there is a de facto autonomous government existing in
Mindanao
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: May we please allow Commissioner Alonto to
finish his remarks before any interruption?
MR. DE CASTRO: Yes Madam President.
MR. ALONTO: Madam President, this autonomous region is
recognized by the present regime for the very reason that the present
regime is now in the process of a negotiation with the Moro National
Liberation Front. In a way, what we are doing is to give constitutional
basis for the President of this country today to proceed with the
negotiation with the Moro National Liberation Front.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Uka is recognized.
MR. UKA: Madam President, not only that. President Corazon C.
Aquino has appointed Mr. Albert Tugum as the Chairman of Region IX
and Mr. Datu Zakaria Candau as chairman of Region XII. They are
doing their work well right now. So there are two recognized
autonomous regions. They have also a complete regional assembly
as the legislative body. So, it is only a matter of putting this in the
Constitution.
THE PRESIDENT: So, what is before the body is the proposed
amendment on Line 11 of Section 1.
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President, if there is now an autonomous
region in Mindanao and if, according to the Honorable Ople, this has
the recognition of the central government, what then is the use of
creating autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and going through
the process of a plebiscite and enacting an organic act?
My amendment is simply to clarify the term "Muslim Mindanao." I
really did not expect that this will go this far --- that it is being placed in
the Constitution, that it is a fait accompli and that all we have to do
here is say "amen" to the whole thing and it we do not say "amen,"
they will still continue to be autonomous regions. I insist on my
amendment, Madam President.
MR. OPLE: May I provide more information to Commissioner de
Castro on this matter.
First of all, we have to correct the misimpression that the autonomous
regions, such as they now exist in Mindanao, do not enjoy the
recognition of the central government. Secondly, may I point out that
the autonomy existing now in Regions IX and XII is a very imperfect
kind of autonomy. We are not satisfied with the legal sufficiency of
these regions as autonomous regions and that is the reason the
initiative has been taken in order to guarantee by the Constitution the
right to autonomy of the people embraced in these regions and not
merely on the sufferance of any existing or future administration. It is a
right, moreover, for which they have waged heroic struggles, not only
in this generation but in previous eras and, therefore, what we seek is
constitutional permanence for this right.
May I also point out, Madam President, that the Tripoli Agreement
was negotiated under the aegis of foreign powers. No matter how
friendly and sympathetic they are to our country, this is under the
aegis of the 42-nation Islamic Conference. Should our brothers look
across the seas to a conclave of foreign governments so that their
rights may be recognized in the Constitution? Do they have to depend
upon foreign sympathy so that their right can be recognized in final,
constitutional and durable form.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Ople, the consensus here is to
grant autonomy to the Muslim areas of Mindanao?
MR. OPLE: Yes.(Emphasis supplied)38
Clearly, the mandate for the creation of the ARMM is derived principally
from the 1987 Constitution. Thereafter, ARRM was given life by Republic Act
No. 6734,39 the Organic Act of the ARMM. Our executive officials were guided by
and did not stray away from these legal mandates at the negotiation and
execution of the Peace Agreement with the MNLF in 1996. Without ifs and buts,
its Whereas Clauses affirmed our sovereignty and territorial integrity and
completely respected our Constitution.40
In stark contrast, the peace process with the MILF draws its mandate
principally from Executive Order No. 3. This executive order provided the
basis for the execution of the Tripoli Agreement of 2001 and thereafter, the
MOA-AD. During the whole process, the government peace negotiators
conducted themselves free from the strictures of the Constitution. They
played fast and loose with the do's and dont's of the Constitution. They acted as
if the grant of executive power to the President allows them as agents to make
agreements with the MILF in violation of the Constitution. They acted as if these
violations can anyway be cured by committing that the sovereign people will
change the Constitution to conform with the MOA-AD. They forgot that the
Constitution grants power but also sets some impotence on power.
IV. The Exercise of Executive Power is
Subject to the Constitution
Clearly, the respondents grossly misunderstood and patently misapplied the
executive powers of the President.
The MILF problem is a problem of rebellion penalized under the Revised Penal
Code.41 The MILF is but a rebel group. It has not acquired any belligerency
status. The rebellion of the MILF is recognized expressly by E.O. No. 3 42 as well
as by E.O. No. 555.43 The President's powers in dealing with rebellion are
spelled out in Article VII, section 18 of the Constitution, viz:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
 Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able
to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
These are the well crafted commander-in-chief powers of the President. They
enumerate with exactitude the powers which the President should use in dealing
with rebellion. They are graduated in degrees. The strongest of these powers is
the power to declare martial law and worthy to note, its exercise is subject to
restraints. But more important, all these commander-in-chief powers can only be
used to quell the rebellion. They cannot be utilized to dismember the State or to
create a state within our State and hand it over to the MILF rebels.
In dealing with the MILF rebellion, the President may, however, opt not to
use force but negotiate peace with the MILF. Undoubtedly, the President as
Chief Executive can negotiate peace with rebels, like the MILF. Article VII,
section 1 of the Constitution vests in the President the entire panoply of
executive power, to reach peace with rebels. But undoubtedly too, the
exercise of executive power to secure peace with rebels is limited by the
Constitution.
All these are due to the preeminent principle that our government is
fundamentally one of limited and enumerated powers. As well stated in Angara
v. Electoral Commission,44 viz:
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves
off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
In fine, there is no power in the Constitution that can run riot. There is no power
in the Constitution that is unbounded. There is no power in the Constitution that
can be exercised if it will destroy the Constitution. For all powers in the
Constitution are designed to preserve the Constitution.
In other words, the President as Chief Executive can negotiate peace with the
MILF but it is peace that will insure that our laws are faithfully executed. The
President can seek peace with the MILF but without crossing the parameters of
powers marked in the Constitution to separate the other branches of
government to preserve our democracy. For even in times of war, our system of
checks and balances cannot be infringed. 45 More so in times where the only
danger that faces the State is the lesser danger of rebellion.
Needless to stress, the power of the President to negotiate peace with the MILF
is not plenary. While a considerable degree of flexibility and breadth is accorded
to the peace negotiating panel, the latitude has its limits - the Constitution. The
Constitution was ordained by the sovereign people and its postulates may not
be employed as bargaining chips without their prior consent.
V. The Constitution as Compact of the People
The question may be asked: In the process of negotiating peace with the MILF,
why cannot the Executive commit to do acts which are prohibited by the
Constitution and seek their ratification later by its amendment or revision?
Many philosophical perspectives have been advanced in reply to this question.
Yet, no theory has been as influential, nor has been as authoritative, as the
social contract theory,46 articulated by John Locke, viz:
For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,
made a community, they have thereby made that community one
body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and
determination of the majority: for that which acts any community,
being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary
to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body
should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the
consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or
continue one body, one community, which the consent of every
individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is
bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore
we see, that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws, where
no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of
the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines,
as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.47
The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rosseau stressed the non-derogability
of this social contract, viz:
But the body politic or sovereign, deriving its existence only from the
sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to others, in
anything that derogates from the original act, such as alienation of
some portion of itself, or submission to another sovereign. To violate
the act by which it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is
nothing produces nothing.48
Dean Vicente Sinco of the U.P. College of Law articulated these precepts in his
seminal work, Philippine Political Law, viz:
As adopted in our system of jurisprudence a constitution is a written
instrument which serves as the fundamental law of the state. In
theory, it is the creation of the will of the people, who are deemed the
source of all political powers. It provides for the organization of the
essential departments of government, determines and limits their
powers, and prescribes guarantees to the basic rights of the
individual.49
xxxx
Some authorities have also considered the constitution as a compact,
an "agreement of the people, in their individual capacities, reduced to
writing, establishing and fixing certain principles for the government of
themselves." This notion expresses the old theory of the social
contract obligatory on all parties and revocable by no one individual
or group less than the majority of the people; otherwise it will not
have the attribute of law.50 (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, there is no power nor is there any right to violate the Constitution
on the part of any official of government. No one can claim he has a blank
check to violate the Constitution in advance and the privilege to cure the
violation later through amendment of its provisions. Respondents' thesis
of violate now, validate later makes a burlesque of the Constitution.
I vote to grant the petitions.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 160261             November 10, 2003 x---------------------------------------------------------x
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C.
petitioner-in-intervention, LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003 G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES,
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioners-in-intervention, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003 LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
petitioners-in-intervention, GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
vs. GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY
x---------------------------------------------------------x SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003 QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
petitioner-in-intervention, GALLOR, petitioners,
vs. WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF petitioner-in-intervention,
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS vs.
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON.
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN AL., respondents.
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO x---------------------------------------------------------x
NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS vs.
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, x---------------------------------------------------------x
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS vs.
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, x---------------------------------------------------------x
CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, vs.
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents, ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D.
CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P.
NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME
COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR.,
petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN
OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA,
MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY
FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS
[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND
CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE
NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
petitioner, BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope
and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches.
This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the
judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a
few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
petitioners, controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court
unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in
petitioner, adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is
ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part
of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
petitioner, At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable
co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the
good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination
among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and
enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi
est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
petitioner, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
 (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be
on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall
not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according
to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on
November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1
approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II RULE V
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Impeachment. – Impeachment Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
shall be initiated only by a verified Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a
complaint for impeachment filed verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified
by any Member of the House of complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House
Representatives or by any citizen through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable
upon a resolution of endorsement officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are
by any Member thereof or by a deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds
verified complaint or resolution of that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such
impeachment filed by at least one- official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on
third (1/3) of all the Members of the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of
the House. the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the
time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution
of impeachment with the Secretary General.
 
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided
impeachment proceedings shall be in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such,
initiated against the same official can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the
more than once within the period original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
of one (1) year.
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House 12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines
Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he
has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment
complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to
the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted
and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and
prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus
directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,
Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment
complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with
the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance,
pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of
a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President
Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding
with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang,
as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it
involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on
the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,
and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have
a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers'
money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief
Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing,
trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer
and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not
state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a
member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in
their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution,
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule
V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently
enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al.,
in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed
in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of
respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation
of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance
with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate
and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint
due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time
they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal
power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse
the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his
locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on
the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have
exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition
"To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters
of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that
(1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent
Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the
first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court, 18 prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition
bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260
(calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the
JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a
direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint
be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House
of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum, 19 and as reflected above, to
date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003,
Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected
their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to
participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution
of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require
respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00
a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo,
enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from
committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through
Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives,
which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in
his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and
Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings
and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant
to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved
to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require
respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003;
and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned,
the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding
that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented
before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment
court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it
had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to
the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,
questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003
on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a
"constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to
Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261.
On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were
admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal,
and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an
Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
 d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-
a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising
from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted
and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of
whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution
of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions
of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government. 24 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the
proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set
at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27
that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to
wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those
only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument. 28 (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the
1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to
invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law
professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the
executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination
in the workings of the various departments of the government. x
x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise
of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
"x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention
– of the judiciary in that balancing operation." 34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into
its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of
this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following
excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of
habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that
the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court
must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for
its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness,
its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking
through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice
Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great document. 43 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass
of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood
by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character.
Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power
to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial
review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings
are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et.
al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities,
principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they
contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different
fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on
the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment
to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check
and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate
the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52
"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have
been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their
paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father
Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary
in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several limitations
to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5),
Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same
official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment
of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language
of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity
of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond
the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60
this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the
petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc
v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties
as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial
review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does
not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 66 it ruled that confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that
insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial
review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and
will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing
since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and
transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the
need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when
the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same
remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the
rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure 73 while the latter
has constitutional underpinnings. 74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding
standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
party-in-interest.
 The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest
has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that
standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings,
is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff
is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating
to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether
he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners
before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers;
members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of
the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators
when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this
Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's
suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of
the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. 82 Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially
when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their
vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with
standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 86 It, therefore, behooves this
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of
all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in
the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised
in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit
ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and
taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397,
is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying
these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are
indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean
that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case,
they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save
for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and
no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed,
this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,
et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right
as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of
the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court
found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the
Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which
will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of
Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to
fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to
Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied
for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to
wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the
act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public
money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest
as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of
what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality
of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated
and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been
complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions
are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines
that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time,
it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be
exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law
who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to
encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to
the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI
of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as
previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality,
whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power
to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. 99
(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any
rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of
cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of
judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature
of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary 102
which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in
force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it
being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application
on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the
usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive
the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or
commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after
all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without
exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ
of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the government
set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it."
The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this
situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who
are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the
Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of
Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21.
The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the
administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on
September 21. So that when martial law was announced on
September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact,
the media could not publish any story not only because our main
writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the
object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention
had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not
finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of
the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial
law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens
of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they
finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had
been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1,
1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite
which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law
decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of
certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to
allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a
word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of
its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of
the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until
the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision
not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated
as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into
existence. The questions to be propounded were released with
proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold
a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be
regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was
filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the
referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before
the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
 proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast
in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note
that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but
none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective
places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a
big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a
political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is
not the only major case in which the plea of "political question"
was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because
the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed
by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case,
a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her
duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her
duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her
husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly
derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the
Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers
of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each
one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power"
but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but
also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems
to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But
there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the
government had authority or had abused its authority to the
extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not
a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided
by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with
the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
"judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. 104
(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect
of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College
of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over
questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present
Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus, 105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice Teodoro
Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given
to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court
ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these
two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
 impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice
into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement
of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly,
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public
trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way
to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes
than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving
at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114 Clearly, the issue calls
upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the
scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible.
Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117
where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for
being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly
be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related
cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among
other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional
for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a
violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and
(d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of
the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional
law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in
general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said
petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not
be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Commttee, 122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus,
as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill
of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and
the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the
new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and
filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article
XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives
signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the
same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of
the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro
and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at
least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee
on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
 Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that
for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or
more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra,
does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as
the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that
only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have
raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the
instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the
original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they
are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as
they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground
that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of
judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is
a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the
impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125
But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the
House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before
this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More
than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions. 127 In the august words of amicus curiae
Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not
be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of
duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no
other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had
been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the
matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and,
as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all, "by [his] appointment to
the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that
[he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to
be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in
[his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already
been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case,
the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing
and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose
disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court
held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution
of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in
the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's
competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal
be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power
to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest
as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.
Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the
Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting
in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the
Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in
the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function
as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members
alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself
of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if
that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the
jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the
deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very
heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to
abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the
original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
"seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a
party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry
as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its
decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently
dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent
state ground.
 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint
of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild
v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the
federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided
(citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander
v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be
encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required
by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress
the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk
serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded
the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano
echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial
authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by
the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is
not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive
act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed
upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not
only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself
constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary 139 where this Court was split and "in
the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which
paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and
not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law
of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within
which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by
the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even
the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues
that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not
violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the
term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the
House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file"
because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only
be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment
by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been
initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet
to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice
of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae
affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5,
2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial
action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it
twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to
begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or
facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of
Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions
on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment
is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into
the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would
need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee
a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the
information of the Committee, the resolution covers several
steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation,
action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report,
voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and
judgment by the Senate.
 xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that
we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by
the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If
we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging
these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have
been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of
the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings
on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just
want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of
the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect
the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States
regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of
this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we
delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution
WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as
the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned,
really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing
of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I
will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not
vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate
the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is
Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both
adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the
complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the
word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in
the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of
reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by
a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that
sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment.
No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in
the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A
proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word
initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It
has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint
either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject
the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or
upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House
of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee
or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated
when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the
trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather,
the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but
rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line was deleted and is not
found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning,
they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse
it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs
of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term
"to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice
or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not
use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of
Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances
of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are
so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions.
There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the
1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of
Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make
and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for
other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either
House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what
constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice)
Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in
United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a
rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v.
Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held
that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all
matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same
case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the
Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity
of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction
over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as
a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the
US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of
this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of
its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of
the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining
the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb.
14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining
the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may
of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages
or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only
one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length
of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by
the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond
the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
(2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be
defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1,
Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in
the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the
US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it
as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
 jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President
and the legislators being elected by the people. 156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government.
xxx
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by
not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration
to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls
us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last
bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this
new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching
the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions.
Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution
are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as
basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the
U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives
shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no
clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to
the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating
how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict
or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy
over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven
to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both
sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they
respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar
slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society -
from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith –
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of
the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability
upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment
had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued
to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the
House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject
respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak
at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made
through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability,"
and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may
have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already
explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for
its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over
an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation
of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of
a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of
action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is
patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on
the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year
time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the
raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive
and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of
the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this
Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members'
interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights
regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has
dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations
could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and
the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions
just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution?
Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from
taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the
law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience
to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law
and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The
law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test
once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search
for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But
though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in
our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve
differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate
concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of
J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex "H."
2
Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose
C. De Venecia, Jr. (Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 325-363) the pertinent
House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no copy of the same was
submitted before this Court.
3
Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF
was established "to help ensure and guarantee the independence of
the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy and
required by the impartial administration of justice" by creating a
special fund to augment the allowances of the members and
personnel of the Judiciary and to finance the acquisition, maintenance
and repair of office equipment and facilities."
4
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex "E."
5
The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban,
Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato
C. Corona, and was later amended to include Justices Jose C. Vitug,
and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
6
Supra note 4 at 123-124.
7
Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex "A."
8 15
http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php?
bill_no=RPT9999
9
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8.
10
Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11.
11
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex "B."
12
Supra note 2.
13
A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners
reveals the following signatories to the second impeachment
complaint and the accompanying Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert
Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix Fuentebella,
NPC, Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio
Ledesma, IV, NPC, Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone
District of Pasig City 5. Kim Bernardo-Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6.
Marcelino Libanan, NPC, Lone District of Eastern Samar, (Chairman,
House Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos,
Independent, 1st District, North Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas,
NPC, 1st District, Davao del Sur 9. Sherwin Gatchalian, NPC, 1st
District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone
District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz Alayon, 6th District, Cebu 12.
Ernesto Nieva, Lakas, 1st District, Manila 13. Edgar R. Erice, Lakas,
2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay III, Independent, 2nd
District, Quezon City 15. Samuel Dangwa, Reporma, Lone District of
Benguet 16. Alfredo Marañon, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, Negros
Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Reporma, 1st District,
Zamboanga del Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd District,
Makati City 19. Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20.
Georgilu Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa, 4th District, Quezon 21.
Jose Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Occidental 22.
Manuel C. Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La Union 23. Uliran Joaquin,
NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24. Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of
Tawi-Tawi 25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District, Bulacan
26. Claude P. Bautista, NPC, 2nd District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De
Guzman, Lakas, Lone District of Marikina City 28. Zeneida Cruz-
Ducut, NPC, 2nd District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio,
Independent-LDP, 2nd District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III,
NPC-Lakas, 3rd District, Isabela 31. Agusto Boboy Syjuco, Lakas, 2nd
District, Iloilo 32. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP, Lone District of
Muntinlupa City 33. Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st District,
Agusan del Norte 34. Eric Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35.
Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st District, Negros Oriental 36. Jose Solis,
Independent, 2nd District, Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo, Party
List-Partido ng Manggagawa 38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd
District, Negros Oriental 39. Amado T. Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd District,
Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC, 2nd District, Negros Oriental 41.
Arthur Y. Pingoy, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, South Cotobato 42. Francis
Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District, Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella
III, NPC, 6th District, Pangasinan 44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone
District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M. Romualdo, NPC, Lone District
of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo Bondoc, NPC, 4th District, Pampanga 47.
Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan 48. Perpetuo
Ylagan, Lakas, Lone District of Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st
District, Rizal 50. Joseph Ace H. Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu 51.
Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52. Carlos Q. Cojuangco, NPC,
4th District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th
District, Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District,
Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde, Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L.
Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga City 57. Alipio Cirilo V.
Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao del Norte 58. Didagen P.
Dilangalen, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of Maguindanao 59.
Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd District, Palawan 60. Joseph Santiago,
NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene Antonino-Custodio,
NPC, 1st District of South Cotobato & General Santos City 62. Aleta
C. Suarez, LP, 3rd District, Quezon 63. Rodolfo G. Plaza, NPC, Lone
District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party List-Sanlakas 65.
Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd District, North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C.
Remulla, LDP, 2nd District, Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico, LDP, 5th
District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC, Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Zubiri,
Lakas, 3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon Jr,. NPC,
2nd District, Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District of
Nueva Ecija 72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th District, Pangasinan 73.
Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone District of Baguio City 74. Ronaldo B.
Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan 75. Angelo O.
Montilla, NPC, Lone District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L.
Barinaga, NPC, 2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R.
Falcon, NPC, 2nd District, Surigao del Sur 78. Ruy Elias Lopez, NPC,
3rd District, Davao City.
14
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two
separate impeachment complaints before the House of
Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez
argued that as a taxpayer and a citizen, he had the legal personality to
file a petition demanding that the PCGG make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of
recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner Chavez further
argued that the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. The
Supreme Court, citing Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985),
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) and
Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264 (1989) ruled that petitioner had
standing. The Court, however, went on to elaborate that in any event,
the question on the standing of petitioner Chavez was rendered moot
by the intervention of the Jopsons who are among the legitimate
claimants to the Marcos wealth.
16
384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation, wherein the petition sought to compel the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on its then on-
going negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to
reclaim portions of Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner
Chavez had the standing to bring a taxpayer's suit because the
petition sought to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
17
224 SCRA 792 (1993).
18
Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar
relief. Other than the petitions, this Court also received Motions for
Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and
 51
Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal
Senate President Franklin Drilon. Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996,
19
Supra note 2 at 10. p. 119.
20 52
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners 227 SCRA 100 (1993).
53
Justice Regalado E. Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Id. at 112.
54
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former Minister of Justice and Solicitor US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall
General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and Raul C. have the sole Power of Impeachment.
55
Pangalangan, and Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,. 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of
21
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292. Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
22
Id. at 292. impeachment.
23 56
63 Phil 139 (1936). Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto, The Supreme Court and
24
Id. at 157-159. Constitutional Democracy, 1984, pp. 112-113.
25 57
Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Tañada v. Cuenco, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
58
103 Phil 1051 (1957); Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 141 SCRA 263 (1986).
59
SCRA 659, 665 (1987). Supra note 25.
26 60
Const., art. VIII, sec. 1. 298 SCRA 756 (1998).
27 61
5 US 137 (1803). 272 SCRA 18 (1997).
28 62
Id. at 180. 201 SCRA 792 (1991).
29 63
In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute 187 SCRA 377 (1990).
64
allowing for imprisonment for non-payment of a debt was invalid. In 180 SCRA 496 (1989).
65
Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907), this Court invalidated a statute Supra note 25.
66
imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground that a government Supra note 23.
67
grant stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the grantee Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330-
would be in lieu of other taxes was a contractual obligation which 331.
68
could not be impaired by subsequent legislation. In Concepcion v. Id. at 158-159.
69
Paredes, 42 Phil 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225
Code, as amended, which provided that judges of the first instance SCRA 568 (1993); House International Building Tenants Association,
with the same salaries would, by lot, exchange judicial districts every Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703 (1987); Baker v.
five years, was declared invalid for being a usurpation of the power of Carr, supra note 57.
70
appointment vested in the Governor General. In McDaniel v. Apacible, Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995).
71
42 Phil 749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so far as it declares open to lease Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA
lands containing petroleum which have been validly located and held, 330 (1997).
72
was declared invalid for being a depravation of property without due Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas,
process of law. In U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act No. 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).
73
2868, in so far as it authorized the Governor-General to fix the price of Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the
rice by proclamation and to make the sale of rice in violation of such a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid delegation of legislative or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
power. authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
30
Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time defended in the name of the real party in interest.
74
62-53 (2003). JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152
31
Supra note 23. (2000).
32 75
Id. at 156-157. 246 SCRA 540 (1995).
33 76
Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Id. at 562-564.
77
Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v.
AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992). Zamora, 342 SCRA 449, 562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra
34
Ibid. note 57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 (2000); TELEBAP
35
I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986). v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
36 78
31 SCRA 413 (1970) Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.
37 79
Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan,
Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 Inc., et.al. v. Morato, supra note 70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA
SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 392 (1980); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Philconsa v.
(1990). Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
38
194 SCRA 317 (1991). 110 Phil 331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77;
39
Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581. Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965); Philconsa v.
40
152 SCRA 284 (1987). Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters
41
Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), Association v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
80
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc v. Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176
and I Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines 21 SCRA 240, 251-252 (1989); Vide Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79;
( Fourth Ed. ). Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; TELEBAP v. COMELEC, supra
42
82 Phil 771 (1949). note 77; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya v. PCGG,
43
Id. at 775. supra note 69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v.
44
Supra note 38. COMELEC, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79;
45
Id. at 330-331. Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Gimenez,
46
Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. supra note 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano,
365, 3 Atl. 220 and Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, supra note 79; Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.
81
SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808. Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC,
47
Supra note 2. supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v.
48
Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).
82
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Morato, supra note 70 at 140-141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992);
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v.
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971).
83
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two- Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v.
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Mathay, supra note 79.
49 84
Supra note 21. Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89
50
506 U.S. 224 (1993). Phil 439, 461 (1951) citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng
mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz, 4245.
85 112
Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing Id. at 217.
113
Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 286.
114
supra note 79. Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286.
86 115
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000). 76 Phil 516 (1946).
87 116
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Id. at 522.
117
Philippines, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, citing Industrial Supra note 37.
118
Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles County Id. at 58 citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Winans, 109 P 640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62. Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
88 119
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559, Vide concurring opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada
570-571 (1974), citing Moore's Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages v.Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 550 (2001); Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA
3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules Service, pages 454-455; Johnson, et al., 208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
120
vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711, 715; Borlasa v. Polistico, As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of
47 Phil. 345, 348 (1925). the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice pursuant
89
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the to said Resolution was submitted to the Court by any of the parties.
121
Philippines, supra note 87, dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio; Bulig- Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38.
122
bulig Kita Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514- Supra note 107.
123
515 (1989); Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doña Paz, Id. at 777 (citations omitted).
124
159 SCRA 623, 627 (1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.
125
Vol. 3B, 23-257, 23-258; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 Supra note 2 at 342.
126
(1996), citing Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Mathay v. Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).
127
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran, Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas
supra note 17. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v.
90
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297, 315-316 (1948); Planas v. COMELEC,
91
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union 49 SCRA 105 (1973), concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.
128
v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38; Philconsa v. Giménez, supra Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 705
note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra (1993).
129
note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); vide Tatad v. Ibid.
130
Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).
131
Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v. Garcia, Jr., Supra note 127.
132
239 SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.
133
v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Osmeña v. Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,
COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 supra note 127; Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., supra note 127.
134
(1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Supra note 119 at 210-211.
135
Singson, supra note 64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79. Supra note 119.
92 136
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996); Joya v.
(1999) citing Gibson vs. Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador PCGG, supra note 69 at 575; Macasiano v. National Housing
v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989). Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v. Northwestern
93
Supra note 79. Airlines, 210 SCRA 256, 261-262 (1992), National Economic
94
Id. at 403. Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, 665 (1989).
95 137
Supra note 81. Supra note 2 at 353.
96 138
Id. at 681. Supra note 33 at 32.
97 139
SECTION 3. x x x Supra note 102.
140
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by Supra note 33.
141
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any 249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).
142
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member Id. at 251.
143
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission at 342-416.
144
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Id. at 416.
145
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Commissioner Maambong's Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.
146
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 375-376, 416
147
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
148
session days from such referral, together with the Justice Hugo Guiterrez's Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.
149
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
150
calendared for consideration by the House within ten 40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).
151
session days from receipt thereof. 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).
152
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the 277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).
153
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable 144 U.S. 1 (1862).
154
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Supra note 152 at 304-306.
155
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of Id. at 311.
156
each Member shall be recorded. Id. at 313.
98 157
Supra note 25. Supra note 152 at 314-315.
99 158
Id. at 1067. Supra note 50.
100
Vide Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v.
Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952); De la Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA
525 (1977).
101
Vide Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3
SCRA 1 (1961); Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
(1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 82.
102
50 SCRA 30 (1973).
103
Record of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at
434-436.
104
Id. at 439-443.
105
177 SCRA 668 (1989).
106
Id. at 695.
107
203 SCRA 767 (1991).
108
Id. at 776 citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990).
109
Supra note 64.
110
Id. at 501.
111
Supra note 57.
EN BANC DECISION
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016 LEONEN, J.:
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from
exclude all foundlings from public service. Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.23chanrobleslaw
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a
diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable
inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least
one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to
establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these inferences are
made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive
prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there
is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single
foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and
substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born. The
nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the scheme of political
powers, as devised by the Constitution, are likewise different from the other
ways to raise questions of citizenship.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David
(David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed November 17, 2015
Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought
to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for
allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not
being qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987
Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution 5 denied David's Motion
for Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose
biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on
September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs.
Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. 9 She was given the
name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.10 Local Civil Registrar issued a
Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH
CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY
EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE
CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET,
JARO . . .11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the
Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald
Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe
(more popularly known as Susan Roces).12 The Decision also ordered the
change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III
Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of
Finality.14chanrobleslaw
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the evasion.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling
certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.15
This hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling certificate:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time." 51chanrobleslaw
as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M.
Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No.
138.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila
when she turned 18 years old.17 The Commission on Elections issued her a
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila on December 13, 1986.18chanrobleslaw
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine
passport.19 Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to
13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014. 20 Having become Senator, have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the original)
she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December 19,
2013.21chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines,
Manila, but eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares,
both an American and Filipino national since birth.24 The marriage took place in
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.25cralawred On July 29, 1991,
Senator Poe returned to the United States with her husband.26 For some time,
she lived with her husband and children in the United States. 27chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian),
Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).28 Brian was born in the
United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika
on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the
Philippines.29chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18,
2001.30 She was subsequently given a United States passport. 31chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the 2004 National Elections. 32 To support her
father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the
Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she returned to the United
States on July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.35chanrobleslaw
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually
"slipped into a coma."36 Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on December
13, 2004.37 On December 14, 2004, her father died.38 She stayed in the country
until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to the settling
of his estate.39chanrobleslaw
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked
for work again in the United States. 40chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41 After consulting her children,
they all agreed to return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan
Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia, United
States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the following semester. 43
She came back on May 24, 2005.44 Her children also arrived in the first half of
2005.45 However, her husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending
projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home there."46chanrobleslaw
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47chanrobleslaw
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines:48
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-
acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. 50 She also
"filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July
18, 2006 through an Order signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro
for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:52
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition
indicate that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being
born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen;
thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder of an American
passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of allegiance to
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the
Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225." 54 Until
now, the Order "has not been set aside by the Department of Justice or any
other agency of Government."55chanrobleslaw
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in P R
the name of Senator Poe and her children.56 It stated that Senator Poe is a O c t o b e r
3 5  
"citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re- 5 , 2 0 0 8
9
acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, Series of
2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06- M a y P R
9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2 1 , 1 0  
2006."57chanrobleslaw 2 0 0 9 5

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City P R
A u g u s t
on August 31, 2006.58chanrobleslaw 7 3  
3 , 2 0 0 9
3
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006
and 2009 using her United States Passport No. 170377935. 59 She used her P R 1
N o v e m b e r 6
passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 0 3  
1 5 , 2 0 0 9 1
2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20
October 2010."60 The following are the flight records given by the Bureau of On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator
Immigration:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
F l i g Board (MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of
D e p a r Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
h t  
t u r e s American Citizenship, 63 stating:
N o .

N o v e m b e S Q I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently

r 1 , 0 7   residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after
2 0 0 6 1 having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and
state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my
J u l y P R United States nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and
2 0 , 7 3   privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make
2 0 0 7 0 this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any
duress or undue influence.64 (Emphasis in the original)
P R The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, 2010. 65
O c t o b e r
3 0   On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and
3 1 , 2 0 0 7
0 assumed office on October 26, 2010.66 Her oath of office
P R stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
O c t o b e r PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN
3 5  
2 , 2 0 0 8
8
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang
A p r i l P R Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim
2 0 , 1 0   na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng
2 0 0 9 4 aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng
mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng
J u l y P R Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas;
3 1 , 7 3   na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga
2 0 0 9 0 kautusang lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may
kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang
O c t o b e r P R pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
1 9 , 1 0  
2 0 0 9 2 Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
P R NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010,
N o v e m b e r
1 0   Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the original)
1 5 , 2 0 0 9
3 Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States68 in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July
P R
D e c e m b e r 12, 2011.69 On this occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire Information for
1 1  
2 7 , 2 0 0 9 Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.70 On December 9, 2011, Vice
2
Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator
M a r c h P R Poe.71 The certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service,
2 7 , 1 0   Department of State, on February 3, 2012. 72chanrobleslaw
2 0 1 0 2
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections.73 On September
F l i g 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the
A r r i Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.74 She won and was declared as
h t  
v a l s Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75chanrobleslaw
N o .

N o v e m b e S Q David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the
r 4 , 0 7   Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He
2 0 0 6 6 contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship
and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
J u l y P R Constitution."77chanrobleslaw
2 3 , 7 3  
2 0 0 7 1 Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 requiring
David "to correct the formal defects of his petition." 78 David filed his amended
N o v e m b e P R Petition on August 17, 2015. 79chanrobleslaw
r 5 , 3 3  
2 0 0 7 7 On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral
M a y P R Tribunal, through its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate
8 , 1 0   Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended
2 0 0 8 3 Petition.80chanrobleslaw

Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the
Record of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and related documents from
the Bureau of Immigration on August 25, 2015. 81 The documents requested
included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate. 82 On
August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04
granting the Motion.83 The same Resolution directed the Secretary of the
Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials of the Bureau of
Immigration and the National Statistics Office.84 The subpoenas ordered the
officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the
Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents. 85
The subpoenas were complied with by both the Bureau of Immigration and the
National Statistics Office on September 1, 2015. 86chanrobleslaw
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1)
Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds
for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of
Court.87chanrobleslaw
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-
05 requiring the parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or before
September 9, 2015.88 The Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference on
89
September 11, 2015. During the Preliminary Conference, the parties "agreed
to drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription."90chanrobleslaw
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21,
2015.91 The parties were then "required to submit their respective [memoranda],
without prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within
thirty (30) days from the said date."92chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David
Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24
November 2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE
the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01 December
2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit memorandum as
amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for
Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez,
Petitoner, versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares,
Respondent."
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received
by David.106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari
before this Court.107chanrobleslaw
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and
Senator Poe to comment on the Petition "within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from notice."108 The Resolution also set oral arguments on
January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on December 30, 2015.110 Senator
Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016.111chanrobleslaw
This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on
Elections case on the issue of private respondent's citizenship.

On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal
of DNA test results.93 The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 15-08. 94 On November 5, 2015, in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding that
Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of DNA Testing, 95 which private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as
stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took provided results that would Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
shed light to the real identity of her biological parents."96 The Manifestation also I
stated that Senator Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue and Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a
submit any development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He
submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship as a foundling for seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral
resolution upon the legal arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private respondent's
Tribunal."97 On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate citizenship.
Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and considered the case submitted
for resolution."98chanrobleslaw Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration of
two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—a
Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, petition for certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the
qualified to hold office as Senator. 99 The Decision Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary I. A
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives
and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act Constitution:112
to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship. ARTICLE VI
.... The Legislative Department
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino ....
citizen, Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
"final act" to reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship. may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
.... the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until today. Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is Elections113) the power to rule on contests114 relating to the election, returns, and
DISMISSED. qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the House of
Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and distinct
No pronouncement as to costs. constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted) any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no
101
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration. The Senate other function.
Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving
Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion for The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal
Reconsideration.102chanrobleslaw system an "independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the
legislature and specially created for that singular purpose." 115 The 1935
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, independent from the
December 1, 2015.103 David's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests relating to members of
Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015: 104 the National Assembly.116 This was a departure from the system introduced by
prior organic acts enforced under American colonial rule—namely: the Philippine the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action. 122 The viability
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve of such a petition is premised on an allegation of "grave abuse of
such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution was amended discretion."123chanrobleslaw
to make room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment was
made for there to be separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such
Congress.117 The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack
they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution. of jurisdiction:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
shall be the "sole" judge. discretion is not enough: it must be grave. 124chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118 Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which
conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which
1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.125chanrobleslaw
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant
of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as
and complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, also considered grave abuse of discretion.126 The arbitrariness consists in the
clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral disregard of the current state of our law.
Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.119chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and from settled principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a
qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, badge of hostile intent against a party.
thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election
challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach
Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice-President, in the case to an issue is premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated. a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b) where a
tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with
VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be standards that can be used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's action on the
read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to
power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not the point of being grossly unreasonable"; 129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.130chanrobleslaw
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." I. C
Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without
Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120 or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House or excess of jurisdiction.
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
House of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship
status of children whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one's father
cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a
has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.
interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not have asked the
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's errand to
as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose because private
clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that on burdening private respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of
the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in the few short months, the one thing that she has never been in a position to
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the
as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it implications of all other facts known about her finding. Therefore, it arrived at
in Co vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof required in
area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof
it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but "substantial
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
calls for remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."131chanrobleslaw
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the
determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from
judgment. reducing them to inferior, second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
I. B did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the well-being
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of the
invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari laws and equal access to opportunities for public service.
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation II
of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition for Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o
certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines." It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone,
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown, instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence of one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
the Constitution's determination of who are natural-born citizens of the construction, the two can be made to stand together.
Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private
respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never leave reverted to In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
natural-born status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with favor of construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- which may make the words idle and nugatory. 139 (Citations omitted)
acquisition Act of 2003. Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has
previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of on the basic principle that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system." 140 Jurisprudence is not an
specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or independent source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part
mothers are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is
private respondent's foundling status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the
parentage was upon her. With private respondent having supposedly failed to text brings to effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of
discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not a considering prior interpretation as immutable.
natural-born Filipino.
III Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the re-
foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, adoption—often with accompanying re-calibration—of previously existing rules.
by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of
parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may addressing the inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules.
be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown.132 Resolving
this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation. One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current
iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes such
purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations of the same as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in enumerations, shifting
text is the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words— terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the
text—and how they are situated within the whole document—context—govern. imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and change
Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, galvanizes meaning.
contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless,
even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are
construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the citizens of the Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, not
clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution. only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws142 and in similar
III. A mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily resonate today.
begin with the text itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is the
principal source from which this Court determines constitutional Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal
intent.133chanrobleslaw interpretation must grapple with the truth that meaning is not always singular
and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,144 this
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.134 The Constitution is truly a interpretation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively)
exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of
preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People's COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction between
consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes; and, on
Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We word "subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that variance in the parties' positions, considering that they are both banking on what
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective they claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where extant ambiguity.
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can
people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism
construction is reduced to a minimum.135 (Emphasis supplied) purports to bolster.
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the
whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is
greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates each of its erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary
components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is belief wrongly assumes that language is static.
called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The
Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather
—ut magis valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision must be understood and than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the
effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
foundational principles to its finest fixings.137chanrobleslaw convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be
effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes
provision at the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
v. Executive Secretary:138 primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here,
we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole,
i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair
elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should have a
present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read,
depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
III. B
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be
resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.146 It is only
then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading
of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate
the meaning yielded by such reading.
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that
the business of understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The
basic democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily means that
all organs of government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and
are guided by it. When competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable
controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with
finality at which interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its
democratic moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a
framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle
underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory
opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are
narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.147chanrobleslaw
When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is,
judicial decisions on similar, but not the very same, matters or concerns), 148 as
well as thematically similar statutes and international norms that form part of our
legal system. This includes discerning the purpose and aims of the text in light of
the specific facts under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when
external aids may be consulted—that the supposedly underlying notions of the
framers, as articulated through records of deliberations and other similar
accounts, can be illuminating.
III. C
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning
from the supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original understanding
of the individuals who adopted the basic document is the weakest approach.
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover,
they allow for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the framers is not
necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the records of
deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have not actively
engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a proposition
for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with
those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that the beliefs that
motivated them were based on entirely erroneous premises. Fathoming original
understanding can also misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of
actions made within specific historical episodes through detached, and not
necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always
uniform with the original understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil
Liberties Union:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings
of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framer's understanding thereof. 149 (Emphasis supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen
without the need for an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her
status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is
not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications
of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision,
which principally governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV,
Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This definition must be harmonized with
Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These
provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case.
The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and
uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private
respondent's Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born
unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily
engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its
provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being
of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to
opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its
reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this
is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related
legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international
instruments.
V
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement
from birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to
consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the
requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office
as Senator of the Republic.
V. A
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the
Philippines:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.150
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born
citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term
"natural-born citizens." This is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are
citizens. As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates
those who may count themselves as natural-born.
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated
when supplemented with an understanding of how our concepts of citizenship
and natural-born citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the term "natural-
born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign concept.
V. B
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to have
rights."151 It is one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a political
community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that
is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the
right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of
grievance.152chanrobleslaw
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is
part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is
owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is
particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the
moment of the citizen's birth.
Tecson v. Commission on Elections 154 reckoned with the historical development
of our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial rule.155 Under the
Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were identified not as
citizens but as "Spanish subjects."156 Church records show that native
inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The alternative identification of native
inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial master's regard
for native inhabitants as inferior.157 Natives were, thus, reduced to subservience
in their own land.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory,
not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification, however,
did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that
the archipelago was to be governed by special laws.158 It was only on December
18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that
there existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens, 159
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 (a) Persons born in Spanish territory, citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine
of Spain, Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he
or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers, Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country."168chanrobleslaw
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. 160 There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference to parentage
ceded by Spain to the United States of America under the Treaty of Paris, which vis-a-vis the determination of citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the 1935
was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not Constitution provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
automatically convert the native inhabitants to American citizens.161 Instead, it SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
left the determination of the native inhabitants' status to the Congress of the
United States:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in adoption of this Constitution.
such territory or may remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain in the territory (2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which Philippine Islands.
declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
nationality of the territory in which they may reside. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
Thus - the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Constitution's provision stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice-
Congress.162chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
had ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued passports describing them to SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-
be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified
States."163chanrobleslaw voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding the election.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in the While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define
Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902: 164 the term.
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil law
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the who marry alien husbands—was discriminatory towards women.170 The 1973
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, Constitution rectified this problematic situation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and this Constitution.
ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11,
1899. However, it did not account for the status of children born in the Islands to (3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the common Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in
the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.165chanrobleslaw (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include a proviso for the enactment by the the law, to have renounced her citizenship.171chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary "natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such citizenship.172chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution
States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the on citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
United States if residing therein.166chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of Constitution."173chanrobleslaw
1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended: 167 Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads: Section 1. The following
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the this Constitution;
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.174
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such natural-born citizens, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the (Emphasis supplied)
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept that actual naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and more
was transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility effective way to terminate this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack
requirements for President and Vice-President of the Philippines. of proof.

In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to
"natural-born citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with
requirement for the presidency.175 It is not defined in that Constitution or in naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The statutory
American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a requirement for the mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The
presidency are not even found in the records of constitutional deliberations.176 investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose
However, it has been suggested that, as the United States was under British capacity to act is restricted.184 It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult
colonial rule before its independence, the requirement of being natural-born was filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a
introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in the administration of Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or she must himself
national government:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born
response to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the restrictive
other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary process of naturalization.
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong
check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born
Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the status is clear. It should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-
American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born born status is to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating to
Citizen. citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled diminution
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had of the status of citizens.
served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was V. E
suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.
constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the Convention was
concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a
monarch.177chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.
V. C That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
naturalized.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of does not even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is
the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be
Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who ethnically foreign.
is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal178
articulates this definition by dichotomy:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which
Filipino.179chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept V. F
of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized
citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they proceedings attests to how at least one—if not both—of her biological parents
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law were Filipino citizens.
in order to become Filipino citizens." 180chanrobleslaw
Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible.
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned
required to file a verified petition. 181 He or she must establish. among others, that almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a handful of those who, in
he or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, and has the capacity to 1968, were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the
adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the identification of individuals
Philippines for a significant period of time.182 Further, the applicant must show against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer
that he or she will not be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' economic cost, prohibitive.
core beliefs.183chanrobleslaw
V. D However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. to establish her parentage.
Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born citizens." This constitutional
definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence.
citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185
Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into the interpreted text,
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any
thus establishing its contemporaneous intent. inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or
facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a particular
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable
bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section consequence.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1's mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section's People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial
unequivocal definition. evidence:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact
Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether private respondent is a natural- that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.188
born citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her (Citation omitted)
citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into whether she Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates
underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino. when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal
proceedings:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
She did not. Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) There is more than one circumstances;
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and a mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious error.
cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not
beyond reasonable doubt. Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible condition. To require
evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless proof from private respondent borders on the absurd when there is no dispute
sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. 189 There is no that the crux of the controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply
rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal not known.
proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof "Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
in civil and/or administrative proceedings. necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations;198 that is, the
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue"199 Burden of proof never shifts
(which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift
highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The other
reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, party then bears the "burden of going forward"201 with the evidence considering
so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in that which has ostensibly been established against him or her.
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence. 190chanrobleslaw In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party
who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies
Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all— such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is
Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population. 192 Private substantial evidence.202 This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the
respondent is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the
bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." 193 She stands at 5 feet and respondent.
2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her facie case in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of
biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more private respondent's biological parents are not known, it does not automatically
or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is
along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting
Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of the burden of evidence to private respondent.
ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,195 the other uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously established as
Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more probable that private substantive evidence of private respondent's
respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted parentage:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the following table is support of his statistical inference:196 (1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE (2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;
PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014 (3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;
FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN IN FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN (4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as
YEAR
THE PHILIPPINES THE PHILIPPINES a foundling;
1965 1,479 795,415 (5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
1966 1,437 823,342 (6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of
1967 1,440 840,302 typical Filipinos.
1968 1,595 898,570 Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive
1969 1,728 946,753 bias. As against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable
1970 1,521 966,762 inference from these facts is that at least one of private respondent's parents is
1971 1,401 963,749 a Filipino.
1972 1,784 968,385 VII
1973 1,212 1,045,290 Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent
1974 1,496 1,081,873 with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born
1975 1,493 1,223,837 citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a
2010 1,244 1,782,877 presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either
2011 1,140 1,746,685 a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is
2012 1,454 1,790,367 substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
2013 1,315 1,751,523 countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's
2014 1,351 1,748,782 biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
VII. A
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible] 197chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner
0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship
that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen. may be indulged in resolving this case. 203 He insists that it is private
respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her Filipino parentage.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents
after half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates
reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's parentage. that actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based
VI on presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence.
Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is sustained
by a general assumption on foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the
and validated by a contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and allegations that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
considering that we have just discussed the evidence pertaining to the known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court
circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is opportune to consider proceeded from the presumptions that: first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather,
petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore the burden of proving— Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, while the country was still under
through proof of her bloodline—her natural-born status. Spanish colonial rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as
indicated in his dearth certificate, must have also been his place of residence
before death, which subjected him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping
investiture of Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. 205 This
Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son
and Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr.
would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born while the 1935
Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers,
was in effect:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or
not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been
a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.206chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and Go v. Ramos208 (which
merely cites Paa)—to the effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in
citizenship cases.
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove
to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.209 (Emphasis
supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more
recent ruling in Tecson.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the
claimant" was preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the duty of "the
respondent." The syntax of this Court's pronouncement—using the definitive
article "the"—reveals that its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his
circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic language.
Instead of the definite article "the," it could have used the indefinite article "a" in
that same sentence: "no presumption can be indulged in favor of a claimant of
Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used other words that
would show absolute or sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can
be indulged in favor of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of all claimants of Philippine citizenship."
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its
statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear
evidence was adduced showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as established benefits and incentives. 227chanrobleslaw
an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an
alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably establish foreign citizenship Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to
and shut the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case
presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or of both of
her parents' foreign citizenship.
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear
that the same pronouncement was generally
applicable:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged hi favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. 210 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In
any case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn
Tecson, which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual ARTICLE II
and even procedural backdrops are different from those of this case. Go
involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and undesirable alien, not an
election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing
the Chinese citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced.
VII. B
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least
either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless
there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a Bill of Rights
whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose."211chanrobleslaw
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV,
Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in
isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the
well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access
to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They must also
be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born
status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments,
executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require
the state to enhance children's well-being and to project them from conditions
prejudicial to or that may undermine their development. Fulfilling this mandate
includes preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially, dismantling
mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the veneer of the legal
apparatus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
....
ARTICLE XV
The Family
....
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to
natural-born citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) President;212
(2) Vice-President;213
(3) Senator;214
(4) Member of the House of Representatives; 215
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court;216
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission; 217
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections;218
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 219
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; 221 and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. 222
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens include,
among others, city fiscals,223 assistant city fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and
Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other public offices. 225 Certain
professions are also limited to natural-born citizens,226 as are other legally
permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never
be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state
scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These
consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through
the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is
merely to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are
not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to
suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to
opportunities for public service:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
....
ARTICLE III
 Consistent with this statute is our ratification 230 of the United Nations Convention
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due on the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states-parties' protection
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the of: first, children's rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth;
laws. second, against statelessness; and third, against discrimination on account of
.... their birth status.231 Pertinent portions of the Convention
ARTICLE XIII read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Social Justice and Human Rights Preamble

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of The State Parties to the present Convention,
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
common good. (Emphasis supplied) inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like freedom, justice and peace in the world,
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of
'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter,
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and
oppression of inequality.'"228chanrobleslaw worth of the human person, and have determined to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction 229
differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human
entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment of their birth. Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and
Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them— agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
an inability arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those other status,
who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is
dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations
were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation. has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
....
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to
effect the Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and Have agreed as follows:
development of children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes Article 2
based on circumstances of birth. 1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in
the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the
human persons whose dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized nation, child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race,
respect. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
ARTICLE II national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability,
.... birth or other status.
State Policies 2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to
.... ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status,
guarantees full respect for human rights. (Emphasis supplied) activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's
VII. C parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of Article 3
constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of Congress, interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive 2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such
organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-
the Philippines. being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her
parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all
Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the constitutional appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put Article 7
this mandate into effect. 1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
Act of 2006, provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary know and be cared for by his or her parents.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
observed at all times: rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary. . . . this field, in particular where the child would otherwise
be stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
that will ensure the observance of international standards of child Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty
protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire
before any authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a a nationality. It similarly defends them against
manner which allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself discrimination:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
freely. The participation of children in the program and policy formulation and Article 24. . . .
implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the
concerned government agency. (Emphasis supplied) 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the child" language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of
the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most his family, society and the State.
encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary    a) Child study;

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.     b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

....     c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of

parents;
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall     d) Medical evaluation/history;
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,     e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and cralawlawlibrary
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)     f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written form In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." 233 passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by
Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties require foreigners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
concurrence by the Senate before they became SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified
binding:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary true copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case the applicant is for
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall be
transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by required:
Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the
Duque III, et al.:234 Death Certificate of the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of Commitment executed after the birth of the child.
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate. 238 (Emphasis supplied)
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do
deemed to have the force of domestic law. any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at recognized her natural-born status. This status was never questioned
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was a
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the
to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. 235 proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent's
(Emphasis supplied) natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is public acts.
necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government—including the judiciary—is
duty-bound to abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from
servanda. the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an
order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the
of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson—an office that requires
nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, natural-born citizenship. 239chanrobleslaw
and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and VIII
undermine their development. As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-
born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the constitutional citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her
dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the requisites
discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the intent to treat of Republic Act No. 9225.
foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth. VIII. A
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent
of 1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section
Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a
as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and assistance through foster foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when
care or adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took
abandoned."236chanrobleslaw her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her
No. 8552:237 Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted. 241chanrobleslaw
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63242 and Republic
child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such Act No. 8171243 specifically "to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared become naturalized citizens of other countries." 244chanrobleslaw
abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its
Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
Govern Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." 245 This
As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes foundlings among "Filipino Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep.
children" who may be adopted:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
subject of inter-country adoption, hi order that such child may be considered for foreign country."247chanrobleslaw
placement, the following documents must be submitted: to the Board:
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and
immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this,
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after
Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that
is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and
the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are
subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for
specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand,
those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant
rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in
conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a policy of immutability, this
reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening
period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though
it was never lost at all.
VIII. B
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights,
"subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities."248 However, other
conditions must be met for the exercise of other
faculties:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its
duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office
in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those
who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to
run for elective public office must comply with all of the following requirements:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
This effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born
Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject There may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the
solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are
satisfied.250chanrobleslaw
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 251
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of
suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.252chanrobleslaw
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." 253 This,
along with satisfying the other qualification requirements under relevant laws,
makes one eligible for elective public office.
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,254 this required
sworn renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the
Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks
to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law."255 It is also in view of this
that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office
elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces of other countries from
being appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.
VIII. C
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7,
2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. 256
Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa
Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed
with the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly,
on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship. 258 This
was complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States 259 before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers
on July 12, 2011,260 which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's
issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011261 and the
approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State,
on February 3, 2012.262chanrobleslaw
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born
citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility
to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. D
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with
Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-
born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act
No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and
immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as
illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born
Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or
her natural-born status.
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix "re"
signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante
that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things
were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the investiture of an entirely
new status, it should not have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act
No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship
commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements.
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that
repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's
original nationality:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.263 (Emphasis
supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force,
its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of permanence and
immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship." 264 In Bengson's words, the once
naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back to his or her natural-born status.
interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born
status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a
 22
Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or Id. at 9 and 682.
23
she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the Id. at 9.
24
intervening fact may have consequences de facto. Id. at 682-683.
25
cralawred Id. at 228.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the 27 Id. at 9.
28
Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but Id. at 683.
30
these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for Id. at 9.
32
effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is Id. at 683.
markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular, extended process 33 Id. at 9.
35
with which the former natural-born citizen must comply. Id. at 683.
36
IX Id. at 10.
265 40
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless is not only Id. at 684.
to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice 41 Id. at 228.
42
to injustice. Id. at 684.
44
Id. at 685.
47
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice Id. at 228.
48
are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the Id. at 10.
49
inability or outright irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are Id. at 685.
compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing 50 Id. at 228.
51
destitution that can never be truly remedied by any economic relief. Id. 686.
52
Id. at 228.
53
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate Id. at 686.
56
an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune Id. at 686-687.
57
because of their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert Id. at 687.
59
and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat. Id. at 256.
62
Id. at 10.
63
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against Id. at 687.
64
other reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command us to Id. at 687-688.
65
consider legal text, but always with justice in mind. Id. at 688.
66
Id. at 229.
67
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we Id. at 689, Poe Comment.
68
must always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less Id. at 229.
78
fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people. Id. at 230.
88
Id. at 231.
99
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional Id. at 257.
100
competence when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen Id. at 253-257.
101
qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, Id. at 84-100.
102
there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision and Resolution. Id. at 80, SET Resolution No. 15-12.
103
Id. at 81.
104
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Id. at 80-83.
105
Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or Id. at 82.
106
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in Id. at 7.
107
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Id. at 7-8.
108
Resolution. Id. at 647, SET Comment.
110
Id. at 669.
111
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino Id. at 677-828.
112
citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic. A counterpart electoral tribunal for the positions of President and Vice-
President was also created by the seventh paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the 1987 Constitution.

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, and Caguioa, JJ., concur. CONST., art. VII, sec. 4 provides:
Carpio, J., no part. SECTION 4 . . . .
Leonardo-De Castro, J., no part. ....
Brion, J., no part. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
Del Castillo, J., not natural born until proven otherwise. relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
Mendoza, J., with some reservation. President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Reyes, J., dissenting.
113
Perlas-Bernabe, J., please see dissenting opinion. Trial courts and the Commission on Elections still exercise jurisdiction over
Jardeleza, J., in result. contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of local elective
Endnotes: offices.
1
Rollo, pp. 3-76. The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 2(2) provides:
2
Id. at 73
3
Id. at 227-258. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall
4
CONST., art. VI, sec. 3 provides: exercise the following powers and functions:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
5
Rollo, pp. 80-83. officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective
6
Id. at 8. barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
7
Id. See also rollo, p. 227, SET Decision.
9
Id. at 227. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
10
Id. at 681, Poe Comment. involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
11
Id. at 8. not appealable.
12
Id. at 681.
17 114
Id. at 9. The term "contest" refers to post-election disputes. In Tecson v. Commission
20
Id. at 228. on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], this Court referring to
21
Id. at 682. the counterpart electoral tribunal for the President and Vice President — the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal - explained: "Ordinary usage would characterize a October 14, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
"contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of file=/jurisprudence/2015/october2015/212096.pdf> 7 [Per J. Brion, Second
eitheir an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct Division].
127
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e. to dislodge the whining Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777-778, 782 (2010) [Per J.
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Brion, En Banc].
128
Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" promulgated by the Id. at 787.
129
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise. . . . Id. at 778. In Mitra, this Court faulted the Commission on Elections for relying
on very select facts that appeared to have been appreciated precisely in such a
"The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests manner as to make it appear that the candidate whose residence was in
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice- question was not qualified. Viewing these facts in isolation indicated a practically
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice- deliberate, ill-intentioned intent at sustaining a previously-conceived myopic
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action conclusion:
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a "In considering the residency issue, the [Commission on Elections] practically
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post- focused solely on its consideration of Mitra's residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have the basis of mere photographs of the premises. In the [Commission on
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election Elections'] view (expressly voiced out by the Division and fully concurred in by
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitra's
residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra's
"It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [sitting as the personality and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home
Presidential Electoral Tribunal], defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 to make it one's residence. This was the main reason that the [Commission on
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the Elections] relied upon for its conclusion.
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held." "Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a
dwelling as showm by and examined only through photographs, is far from
115
Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 250 Phil. 390, 399 reasonable; the [Commission on Elections] thereby determined the fitness of a
(1988). [Per J. Cortes, En Banc]. dwelling as a person's residence based solely on very personal and subjective
116
CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 4 provides: assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used.
SECTION 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence - i.e., the dwelling where a person
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six permanently intends to return to and to remain - his or her capacity or inclination
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial."
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having
130
the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the In Varias v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 292, 314-315 (2010) [Per J.
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole Brion, En Banc], this Court, citing Pecson v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil.
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the 1214, 1226 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc] stated: "[A] court abuses its discretion
Members of the National Assembly. when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors
relevant to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings,
117
CONST. (1935 amended), art. VI, sec. 11 provides: considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to
SECTION 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the factual or legal conclusions."
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral 131 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5.
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of 132 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1(2):
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines[.]
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
133
largest numbers of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil.
shall be its Chairman. 308, 338 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
118 134
250 Phil. 390 (1988) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc]. See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709
119
Id. at 399-400. Phil. 478, 501-523 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
120 135
347 Phil. 797 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]. Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 885 (2003) [Per J.
121
Id. at 804-805. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
122
See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinions in Rappler v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702, Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division]. This
April 5, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html? was also cited in Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
file=/jurisprudence/2016/april2016/222702.pdf> 2-3 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] and <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
in Villanueva v. Judicial Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015 file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/212426.pdf> [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
136
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html? Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 886 (2003) [Per J.
file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/211833_leonen.pdf> 4-5 [Per J. Reyes, En Carpio Morales, En Banc].
137
Banc]. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos (Resolution), 486 Phil. 754,
123
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1 provides: 773 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc] states that "[t]he Constitution should
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer be read in broad, life-giving strokes."
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or 138 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of 139 Id. at 162, as cited in Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy Phil. 326, 341 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
140
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified CIVIL CODE, art. 8.
141
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956) [Per J. J. B. L. Reyes,
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, En Banc].
142
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may The adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine
require. Organic Act of 1902, crystallized the concept of "Philippine citizens." See
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 467-468 (2004) per J. Vitug,
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order En Banc].
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and 143 For example, the Civil Code of Spain became effective in the jurisdiction on
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in December 18, 1889, making the first categorical listing on who were Spanish
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. citizens. See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 465 (2004)
124
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
144
Banc]. G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015
125
Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
Commission (First Division) and Arnulfo R. Flores, 670 Phil. 136, 151 (2011) file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2015/208062.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
145
[Per J. Brion, Second Division]. Id. at 26.
126 146
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096, Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 692 Phil. 407, 421 (2012) [Per
J. Reyes, En Banc]: "Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or Islands.
more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must
admit of two or more possible meanings." (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
147
See, for example, In the Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
Development Fund, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015 age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/january2015/15143.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
citing J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1, 278-279 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
148
Cf. what was previously discussed regarding previous judicial decisions on the provided by law.
175
very same text. See Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The
149
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 887 [Per J. Carpio Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1968).
176
Morales, En Banc], citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. Id. at 3-4.
147, 169-170 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
150 177
The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the Id. at 5.
178
provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that 409 Phil. 633 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
179
the present Constitution provides clarity for "natural born" status. For Id. at 651.
180
comparison, the 1935 provisions state: Id. at 656.
181
See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines. SECTION 5. Petition for Citizenship. — (1) Any person desiring to acquire
Philippine, citizenship under this Act shall file with the Special Committee on
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5) copies legibly
this Constitution. typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's
passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the forth the following:
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands. Com. Act No. 473, sec.7 provides:
SECTION 7. Petition for Citizenship. — Any person desiring to acquire
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. and date of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the
name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; the
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of
debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a
SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the
provided by law. same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of
this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act;
151
C.J. Warren, Dissenting Opinion in Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing
152
Go v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. 202809, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 138, of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The
149 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing BERNAS, THE 1987 petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are
COMMENTARY (2009 ed.). citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of
153
Id. the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good
154
468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J.Vitug, En Banc]. repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in then opinion all
155
Id. at 464-470. the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in
156
Id. at 464. any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set
157
Id. forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
158
Id. at 465. may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and
159
Id. the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
160
Id. at 465-466, citing The Civil Code of Spain, art. 17.
161
Id. at 466-467, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND 182See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 3 provides:
NATURALIZATION 22-23 (1965). SECTION 3. Qualifications. — Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
162
Id. at 466, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the
NATURALIZATION 22-23 (1965). following qualifications:
163
Id. at 467.
164
Id. at 467-468. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines
165
Id. and residing therein since birth;
166
Id. at 468.
167
Id. (b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of
168
Id. at 469. filing of his/her petition;
169
Id.
170
Id. (c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying
171
CONST. (1973), art. III, secs. 1 and 2. principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himselfherself in a
172
CONST. (1973), art. III, sec. 4. proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in
173
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 470 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as
En Banc]. with the community in which he/she is living;
174
The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the
provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that (d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education
the present Constitution provides clarity for "natural born" status. For in any public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the
comparison, the 1935 provisions state: Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines. government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school
curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must
this Constitution. have enrolled them in similar schools;

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the (e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and
if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders
but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so
by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the
dialects of the Philippines; and cralawlawlibrary
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino
people.
Comm. Act No. 473, sec. 2 provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. Qualifications. — Subject to section
four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a
citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst. He must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not
less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the
principal Philippine languages;
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education
of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for life, except in cases specified by law.
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
183
Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 4 provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 4. Disqualifications. — The following are 186 Id. at 189-190, citing Lack County v. Neilon, 44 Or. 14, 21, 74, p. 212; State
not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Those opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their
ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn 192See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2016/221697_leonen.pdf> 83 [Per J. Perez, En
such war; and cralawlawlibrary
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Com. Act No. 473 (1939), sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Who are Disqualified. — The following can not be naturalized as
Philippine citizens:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Persons opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of their
ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
184
The Civil Code states:
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do
not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity
to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes,
the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account
of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
185
571 Phil. 170 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
v. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 494, 21 S.W. 193; and Reynolds Trial Ev., Sec. 4, p. 8.
187
374 Phil. 810 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
188
Id. at 822.
189
See Lua v. O'Brien, et al., 55 Phil. 53 (1930) [Per J. Street, En Banc]; Vda. De
Laig, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 172 Phil. 283 (1978) [Per J. Makasiar, First
Division]; Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division]; and Heirs of Celestial v. Heirs of Celestial, 455 Phil. 704 (2003) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
190
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel,
En Banc]. Also, Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodie's, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
191
Rollo, p. 8.
Elections, G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
Banc].
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2016/221697.pdf>
196
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2016/221697_leonen.pdf> 83 [Per J. Perez, En
Banc].
197
Id. at 84.
198
Uytengsu III v. Baduel, 514 Phil. 1 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. D. Commission on Audit
199
Jison v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First
Division]. SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman
200
Id. and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
201
Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]. and, at the time of men-appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified
202
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5. public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or
203
Rollo, pp. 56-58. members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
204
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 473-474 (2004) [Per J. at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
Vitug, En Banc]. in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all
205
Id. at 473-474 and 488. Members of the Commission beloiig to the same profession.
206
Id. at 487-488.
207 220
128 Phil. 815 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc]. CONST., art. XI, sec.8 provides:
208
614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. ARTICLE XI. Accountability of Public Officers
209
128 Phil. 815, 825 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc]. ....
210
Go v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of
211
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991) [Per the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of
C.J. Fernan, En Banc]. recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and
212
CONST., art. VII, sec. 2 provides: must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
ARTICLE VII. Executive Department preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a
.... judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
221
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born CONST., art. XII, sec. 20 provides:
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty ARTICLE XII. National Economy and Patrimony
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at ...
least ten years immediately preceding such election. SECTION 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary
authority, the members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino
213
CONST., art. VII, sec. 3. citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall
214
CONST., art. VI, sec. 3 provides: come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall
.. . provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for institutions performing similar functions.
222
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. CONST., art. XIII, sec. 17(2) provides:
ARTICLE XIII. Social Justice and Human Rights
215
CONST., art. VI, sec. 6 provides: ....
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department Human Rights
....
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives SECTION 17. . . .
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except (2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who
the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of
immediately preceding the day of the election. the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
223
Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963), sec. 1. Section thirty-eight of Republic Act
216
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7(1) provides: Numbered Four hundred nine, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eighteen
ARTICLE VIII. Judicial Department hundred sixty and Republic Act Numbered Three thousand ten, is further
.... amended to read as follows:
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Sec. 38. The City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscals. — There shall be in the
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must Office of the City Fiscal one chief to be known as the City Fiscal with the rank,
have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the salary and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, an assistant chief
practice of law in the Philippines. to be known as the first assistant city fiscal, three second assistant city fiscals
217
CONST., art. LX-B, sec. 1(1) provides: who shall be the chiefs of divisions, and fifty-seven assistant fiscals, who shall
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions discharge their duties under the general supervision of the Secretary of Justice.
.... To be eligible for appointment as City Fiscal one must be a natural born citizen
B. The Civil Service Commission of the Philippines and must have practiced law in the Philippines for a period of
not less than ten years or held during a like period of an office in the Philippine
SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be requisite. To be eligible for appointment as assistant fiscal one must be a natural
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at born citizen of the Philippines and must have practiced law for at least five years
least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and prior to his appointment or held during a like period an office in the Philippine
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
immediately preceding their appointment. requisite. (Emphasis supplied)
218 224
CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 1(1) provides: Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963).
225
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions Examples of these are: the Land Transportation Office Commissioner, the
.... Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director, the Executive Director of Bicol River
C. The Commission on Elections Basin, the Board Member of the Energy Regulatory Commission, and the
National Youth Commissioner, among others.
226
SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Examples of these are pharmacists and officers of the Philippine Coast
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Guard, among others.
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, 227 Among these incentives are state scholarships in science and certain
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective investment rights.
228
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, Sameer v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 22, 57 [Per
including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been J. Leonen, En Banc].
229
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939) [Per J. Moran, First Division].
230
Ratified on August 21, 1990.
219 231
CONST., art. IX-D, sec. 1(1) provides: See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions (visited March 7, 2016).
232
.... Ratified on October 23, 1986.
233 250
See Bayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 657-660 (2000) [Per J. Buena, En Banc], Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5 provides:
citing the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties. Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
234
561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc]. acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
235
Id. at 397-398. rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
236
Rep. Act No. 8552 (1998), sec. 2(b) provides: laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
251
Section 2 (b). In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, CONST., art. V, sec. 1 provides:
his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 1. Suffrage maybe exercised by all citizens
tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year,
and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months
Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
252
Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and assistance Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5(1) provides:
through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
abandoned. acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
237
See also Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), An Act Requiring the Certification of the rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to Declare a "Child laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
Legally Available for Adoption" as a Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings,
Amending for this Purpose Certain Provision of Rep. Act No. 8552, otherwise chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Those intending to exercise their right of
known as the Inter-country Adoption Act of 1995, Pres. Decree No. 603, suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and for Other Purposes. Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
253
Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), sec. 2 provides: Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5(2) provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
Act, the following terms shall mean: full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
charged to implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority conditions:
to issue the certification declaring a child legally available for adoption. (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
.... for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
three (3) continuous months, which includes a foundling. authorized to administer an oath;
238
DFA Order No. 11-97, Implementing Rules and Regulations for Rep. Act No. 254 692 Phil. 407 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
255
8239 (1997), Philippine Passport Act. Id. at 428.
239 256
Pres. Decree No. 1986, sec. 2 provides: Rollo, p. 10.
257
Section 2. Composition; qualifications; benefits. - The BOARD shall be Id. at 687.
258
composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall Id.
259
all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice- Id. at 229.
260
Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one Id.
(1) year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause; Provided, That 261 Id.
262
they shall be eligible for re-appointment after the expiration of their term. If the Id.
Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman or any member of the BOARD fails to complete 263Bengson v. Bouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 409 Phil. 633, 649
his term, any person appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
264
unexpired portion of the term of the BOARD member whom he succeeds. Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2.
265
Rollo, p. 35.
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen DISSENTING OPINION
of the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community; Provided, That in the selection of the PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
members of the BOARD due consideration shall be given to such qualifications I dissent.
as would produce a multi-sectoral combination of expertise in the various areas I respectfully submit that the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) committed grave
of motion picture and television; Provided, further, That at least five (5) members abuse of discretion in ruling that private respondent Mary Grace Poe-
of the BOARD shall be members of the Philippine Bar. Provided, finally That at Llamanzares (respondent) was a natural-born citizen and, thus, qualified to hold
least fifteen (15) members of the BOARD may come from the movie and office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. 1chanrobleslaw
television industry to be nominated by legitimate associations representing the
various sectors of said industry. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as committed with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise
The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the other members of the BOARD shall of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be entitled to transportation, representation and other allowances which shall in be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
no case exceed FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) per month. virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
240
CONST, art. IV, sec. 3. of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
241
Rollo, pp. 685-686. reason of passion and hostility.2 In this relation, "grave abuse of discretion
242
An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship may be Lost or arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the
Reacquired. law or existing jurisprudence."3chanrobleslaw
243
An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women who have Lost their
Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and Natural-born Filipinos. The advent of the 1935 Constitution established the principle of jus sanguinis as
244
See Calilung v. Commission on Elections, 551 Phil. 110, 117-18 (2007) [Per basis for acquiring Philippine citizenship. 4 Following this principle, citizenship is
J. Quisumbing, En Banc] in which this Court stated that this was the clear intent conferred by virtue of blood relationship to a Filipino parent.5chanrobleslaw
of the legislature when it enacted Republic Act No. 9225.
245
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2. It was admitted that respondent was a foundling with unknown facts of birth and
246
551 Phil. 110 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc]. parentage. On its face, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution - the
247
Id. at 118. applicable law to respondent's case - did not include foundlings in the
248
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5. enumeration of those who are considered Filipino citizens. It reads:
249
Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 3, par. 2: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - . . . (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
taking the aforesaid oath. Philippine Islands.
 (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. auspices of the 1935 Constitution, respondent could not be considered a
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon natural-born Filipino citizen. As worded, the provisions of Section 1, Article IV of
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. the 1935 Constitution are clear, direct, and unambiguous. This Court should
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. therefore apply the statutory construction principles of expressio unius est
This case was originally a quo warranto proceeding before the SET.6 The initial exclusio alterius and verba legis non est recedendum. Consequently, it would be
burden, thus, fell upon petitioner Rizalito Y. David to show that respondent unnecessary to resort to the constitutional deliberations or to examine the
lacked the qualifications of a Senator. However, upon respondent's voluntary underlying intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. In Civil Liberties Union
admission that she was a foundling, the burden of evidence was shifted to her. v. The Executive Secretary,11 this Court remarked
In his Dissenting Opinion before the SET, Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
pertinently explains: Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
[I]n quo warranto, the petitioner who challenges the respondent's qualification to the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
office carries the burden of proving, by preponderance of evidence, the facts they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
constituting the disqualification. Upon such proof, the burden shifts to the less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
respondent who must now present opposing evidence constituting his or her instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it [is] safer to construe the
defense or establishing his or her affirmative defense. constitution from what appears upon its face."12
In fact, it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in
xxxx its final form, never carried over any proposed provision on foundlings
being considered or presumed to be Filipino citizens. Its final exclusion is
In the present case, the petitioner has alleged that the respondent is a foundling. therefore indicative of the framers' prevailing intent. 13 The ponencia's theorized
He posits that, as a foundling has no known parents from whom to trace the "harmonization"14 of the constitutional provisions on citizenship with the
origins of her citizenship, the respondent is not a Filipino citizen and is, provisions on the promotion of children's well-being, 15 equal protection,16 public
therefore, not eligible for the position of senator. service,17 and even human dignity and human rights18 appears to be a tailor-
fitted advocacy for allowing foundlings to run for key national posts that, quite
Significantly, the respondent admitted her status as a foundling, thus, lifting the frankly, stretches the import of these distinct provisions to the separate and
petitioner's burden of proving his claim that she is a foundling. With the unique matter of citizenship. There seems to be an evident logical problem with
admission, the fact necessary to establish the petitioner's claim is considered the argument that since the Constitution protects its children, and respects
established.7 human rights and equality to run for office, then ergo, foundlings should be
In this case, respondent failed to present competent and sufficient evidence to presumed to be natural-born. It appears that this approach aims to collate all
prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent which is necessary to determine possibly related constitutional text, albeit far-flung, just to divine a presumption
natural-born citizenship pursuant to the jus sanguinis principle. This when unfortunately, there is none.
notwithstanding, the ponencia concludes that the following circumstances are
substantial evidence justifying the inference that respondent's biological parents Moreover, as Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) aptly
are Filipino:8chanrobleslaw pointed out in his Dissenting Opinion before the SET, it would be insensible to
suppose that the framers of the 1935 Constitution intended that foundlings be
(a) Circumstances of abandonment: Respondent was found as a newborn considered as natural-born citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968. In 1968, [N]one of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born
Iloilo, as did most if not all other Philippine provinces, had a predominantly in relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution,
Filipino population. In 1968, there was also no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo. only those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born
citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still
(b) Physical features: She is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born
a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She stands at citizens. If, as respondent would like us to believe, the framers intended that
only 5 feet and 2 inches tall. foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this would create an
absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage would be placed in a
(c) Statistical inference: in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. better position than child whose mother is actually known to be a Filipino citizen.
Commission on Elections,9 former Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay underscored The framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have intended to create such
how it was statistically more probable that respondent was born a Filipino absurdity.19
citizen, submitting that out of 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, While the predicament of foundlings of having their parents unknown would
over 1,595 or 0.18% were foreigners. This translates to, roughly, a 99.8% seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task of proving their Filipino
probability that respondent was born a Filipino citizen. parentage, the current state of the law which requires evidence of blood relation
to a Filipino parent to establish natural-born citizenship under the jus sanguinis
However, the foregoing "circumstantial evidence" do not adequately prove the principle must be respected at all costs. This is not to say that the position of
determination sought to be established: that is, whether or not respondent can foundlings in relation to their endeavors for high public offices has been
trace her parentage to a Filipino citizen. These circumstances can be easily overlooked in this discourse. Rather, the correction of this seeming "misfortune"
debunked by contrary but likewise rationally-sounding suppositions. Case law - as the ponencia would suppose20 - lies in legislative revision, not judicial
holds that "[m]atters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be supplication. For surely, it is not for this Court to step in and supply additional
strictly complied with."10 The proof to hurdle a substantial challenge against a meaning when clarity is evoked in the citizenship provisions of the Constitution.
candidate's qualifications must therefore be solid. This Court cannot make a
definitive pronouncement on a candidate's citizenship when there is a looming For another, I would also like to express my reservations on the ponencia's
possibility that he/she is not Filipino. The circumstances surrounding reliance on Tecson v. Commission on Elections21 (Tecson) wherein this Court
respondent's abandonment (both as to the milieu of time and place), as well as resolved that respondent's adoptive father, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, more
her physical characteristics, hardly assuage this possibility. By parity of popularly known as Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ), was qualified to run for the
reasoning, they do not prove that she was born to a Filipino: her abandonment presidential post during the 2004 National Elections which, according to the
in the Philippines is just a restatement of her foundling status, while her physical ponencia,22 was based on the basis of "presumptions" that proved his status as
features only tend to prove that her parents likely had Filipino features and yet it a natural-born citizen. In that case, the identity of FPJ's parents, Allan F. Poe
remains uncertain if their citizenship was Filipino. More so, the statistics cited - and Bessie Kelley, was never questioned. More importantly, there was direct
assuming the same to be true - do not account for all births but only of those documentary evidence to trace Allan F. Poe's parentage to Lorenzo Pou, whose
recorded. To my mind, it is uncertain how "encompassing" was the Philippine's death certificate identified him to be a Filipino. Thus, by that direct proof alone,
civil registration system at that time - in 1968 - to be able to conclude that those there was a substantial trace of Allan F. Poe's parentage to a Filipino (Lorenzo
statistics logically reflect a credible and representative sample size. And even Pou), which in turn, allowed the substantial tracing of FPJ's parentage to a
assuming it to be so, 1,595 were reflected as foreigners, rendering it factually Filipino (Allan F. Poe). As such, FPJ was declared qualified to run for the
possible that respondent belonged to this class. Ultimately, the opposition presidential post in 2004. The Court further explained that while the birth
against respondent's natural-born citizenship claim is simple but striking: the fact certificate of FPJ's grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was not presented, it could be
that her parents are unknown directly puts into question her Filipino citizenship assumed that the latter was born in 1870 while the Philippines was still a colony
because she has no prima facie link to a Filipino parent from which she could of Spain. This inference was drawn from the fact that Lorezo Pou died at the age
have traced her Filipino citizenship. of 84 years old in 1954. Thus, absent any evidence to the contrary, and against
petitioner therein's bare allegation, Lorenzo Pou was deemed to be a resident of
Absent satisfactory proof establishing any blood relation to a Filipino parent, and the Philippines and hence, a Filipino citizen by operation of the Philippine
without any mention in the 1935 Constitution that foundlings are considered or Organic Act of 1902,23 on the premise that the place of residence of a person at
even presumed to be Filipino citizens at birth, it is my view that, under the the time of his death was also his residence before his death. In any event, the
certified true copy of the original death certificate of Lorenzo Pou reflecting that Section 3. The State shall defend:
he was a Filipino citizen was enough basis to trace FPJ's Filipino natural-born xxxx
citizenship. As the Court aptly cited, according to Section 44, Rule 130 of the (3) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
Rules of Court, "entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." x x x x
16
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution reads:
In contrast, by her admission as a foundling whose parents are unknown, and Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
without presenting any other evidence to show any substantial tracing of Filipino process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
17
parentage similar to FPJ, the legal and factual nuances of respondent's case Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution state:
should be treated differently. Accordingly, Tecson provides no authoritative Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
jurisprudential anchorage to this case. service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
18
Section 1, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Finally, it bears stressing that they jus sanguinis principle of citizenship Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
established in the 1935 Constitution was subsequently carried over and adopted measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.24 Thus, notwithstanding the existence of any reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
treaty or generally accepted principle of international law which purportedly inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
evince that foundlings are accorded natural-born citizenship in the State in which
they are found, the same, nonetheless, could not be given effect as it would xxxx
contravene the Constitution. To recall, should international law be adopted in Section 11, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states:
this jurisdiction, it would only form part of the sphere of domestic law. 25cralawred Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
Being relegated to the same level as domestic laws, they could not modify or full respect for human rights.
19
alter, much less prevail, over the express mandate of the Constitution. In this See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio in David v. Poe-Llamanzares, SET
relation, I deem it fitting to echo the point made by Associate Justice Teresita J. Case No. 001-15, November 17, 2015, pp. 28-29.
20
Leonardo-De Castro, likewise in her Separate Opinion before the SET: See ponencia, pp. 18-19.
21
Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the international conventions 468 Phil. 421 (2004).
22
cited but will entail an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or See ponencia, pp. 42-43.
23
legislative enactment, so that the nature of citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant See Section 4 of the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, entitled "AN ACT
thereto, is citizenship by naturalization. There must be a law by which citizenship TEMPORARILY TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFFAIRS
can be acquired. By no means can this citizenship be considered that of a OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND FOR OTHER
natural-born character under the principle of jus sanguinis in the Philippine PURPOSES."
24
Constitution.26 See Valles v. Commission on Elections, supra note 4, at 336-337.
25
For all these reasons, I unfortunately depart from the ruling of the majority and cralawred Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Phils, v. Duque III,
perforce submit that the SET committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring 561 Phil. 386, 397-398 (2007).
26
respondent a natural-born citizen. The majority ruling runs afoul of and even See Separate Opinion of Justice De Castro in David v. Poe-Llamanzares, SET
distorts the plain language of the Constitution which firmly and consistently Case No. 001-15, November 17, 2015, p. 18.
27
follows the jus sanguinis principle. In the final analysis, since respondent has not See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio in David v. Poe-Llamanzares, SET
presented any competent and sufficient evidence to prove her blood relation to a Case. No. 001-15, p. 35, citing Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 553 Phil. 331,
Filipino parent in these proceedings, she should not be deemed to be a natural- 343-344 (2007).
born citizen of the Philippines, which, thus, renders the instant petition
meritorious. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that respondent is not
precluded from later on proving her natural-born citizenship through such
necessary evidence in the appropriate proceeding therefor, considering that a
decision determining natural-born citizenship never becomes final.27 I reach
these conclusions solely under the peculiar auspices of this case and through
nothing but my honest and conscientious assessment of the facts parallel to the
applicable legal principles. As a magistrate of this High Court, I am impelled to
do no less than fulfill my duty to faithfully interpret the laws and the Constitution,
bereft of any politics or controversy, or of any regard to the tides of popularity or
gleam of any personality.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.

Endnotes:
1
See Section 3, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
2
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015,
citing Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474, 481-482 (2011).
3
See id., citing Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706
Phil. 534, 558 (2013).
4
Valles v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 327, 336 (2000).
5
Id.
6
Docketed as SET Case No. 001-15.
7
See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brion in David v. Poe-Llamanzares, SET
Case No. 001-15, November 17, 2015, pp. 12-13.
8
See ponencia, pp. 39-40.
9
See G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-221700, March 8, 2016.
10
See Arnado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015.
11
272 Phil. 147 (1991).
12
Id. at 169-170.
13
See Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 157
(1991).
14
Ponencia, pp. 45-50.
15
Section 13, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 3, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution also provides:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 162230               August 13, 2014
ISABELITA C. VINUY A, VICTORIA C. DELA PENA, HERMINIHILDA
MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMA WANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA
L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M.
NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M.
SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A.
SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PENA, EUGENIA M.
LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P.
MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B.
MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M.
HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PENA, MARIA DELA PAZ B.
CULALA,ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M.
GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN,
JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q.
GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PENA, RUFINA Q.
CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M.
DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA 0. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ,
CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ,
ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL,
MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C.
MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA
S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M.
CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L.
TURLA, et al. in their capacityand as members of the "Malaya Lolas
Organizations," Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA
DOMINGOALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR
GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration1 and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration,2 praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010,
and grant their petition for certiorari.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our constitutional and
jurisprudential histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy
prerogatives ofthe Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by
international human rights and international conventions of which the Philippines
is a party; that the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative
whether to bring petitioners’ claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy
powers of the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the
constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights;
that the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote
international humanitarian law as incorporated intothe laws of the land through
the Incorporation Clause; that the Court must re-visit its decisions in Yamashita
v. Styer3 and Kuroda v. Jalandoni4 which have been noted for their prescient
articulation of the import of laws of humanity; that in said decision, the Court
ruled that the State was bound to observe the laws of war and humanity; that in
Yamashita, the Court expressly recognized rape as an international crime under
international humanitarian law, and in Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if
the Philippines had not acceded or signed the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare, the Rules and Regulations formed part of
the law of the nation by virtue of the Incorporation Clause; that such commitment
to the laws ofwar and humanity has been enshrined in Section 2, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, which provides "that the Philippines…adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations."
The petitioners added that the statusand applicability of the generally accepted
principles of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain
without the Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the general
international law forms part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly
adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr.5 and U.S. v. Guinto6
the Court has said that international law is deemed part of the Philippine law as
a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu,7 the Court has declared
that a treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the
land through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the Incorporation Clause,
the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnesobligations arising from the
jus cogensnorms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the
principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against
petitioners are proscribed under international human rights law as there were
undeniable violations of jus cogensnorms; that the need to punish crimes
against the laws of humanity has long become jus cogensnorms, and that
international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that the Court’s
invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is misplaced; and that the
Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give justice
to the victims ofthe comfort women system in the Philippines.8
Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with
the broader responsibility of states to protect the human rights of their citizens,
especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnesobligations and
pertain to jus cogensnorms; that the claims raised by petitioners are not simple
private claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic protection; that the crimes
committed against petitioners are shocking to the conscience of humanity; and
that the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against petitionersare not
subject to the statute of limitations under international law.9
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and
declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual
violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against
humanity and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the
Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the
waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned;
(3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort
women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondents.
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and
the Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an
official apology,legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan.10
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was
highly improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at least
three sources without proper attribution – an article published in 2009 in the Yale
Law Journal of International Law; a book published by the Cambridge University
Press in 2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western ReserveJournal
of International Law – and make it appear that such commentaries supported its
arguments for dismissing the petition, when in truth the plagiarized sources even
made a strong case in favour of petitioners’ claims.11
In their Comment,12 respondents disagree withpetitioners, maintaining that
aside from the statements on plagiarism, the arguments raised by petitioners
merely rehashed those made in their June 7, 2005 Memorandum; that they
already refuted such arguments in their Memorandumof June 6, 2005 that the
Court resolved through itsApril 28, 2010 decision, specifically as follows:
1. The contentions pertaining tothe alleged plagiarism were then
already lodged withthe Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of
the Court; hence, the matter of alleged plagiarism should not be
discussed or resolved herein.13
2. A writ of certioraridid not lie in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in view
of the failureof petitioners to show any arbitrary or despotic act on the
part of respondents,the relief of the writ of certiorariwas not
warranted.14
3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace
with Japan, being valid, bound the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda.The
validity of the Treaty of Peace was the result of the ratification by two
mutually consenting parties. Consequently, the obligations embodied
in the Treaty of Peace must be carried out in accordance with the
common and real intention of the parties at the time the treaty was
concluded.15
4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have direct international
remedies against any State that violated their human rights except
where such remedies are provided by an international agreement.
Herein, neither of the Treaty of Peace and the Reparations
Agreement,the relevant agreements affecting herein petitioners,
provided for the reparation of petitioners’ claims. Respondents aver
that the formal apology by the Government of Japan and the
reparation the Government of Japan has provided through the Asian
Women’s Fund (AWF) are sufficient to recompense petitioners on
their claims, specifically:
a. About 700 million yen would be paid from the national treasury over
the next 10 years as welfare and medical services;
b. Instead of paying the money directly to the former comfort women,
the services would be provided through organizations delegated by
governmental bodies in the recipient countries (i.e., the Philippines,
the Republic of Korea,and Taiwan); and
c. Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services (like
home helpers), housing, environmental development, medical
expenses, and medical goods.16
Ruling
The Court DENIESthe Motion for Reconsiderationand Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for being devoid of merit.
1. Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing ofthe special civil action for
certiorariwas timely, i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 4. When and where position filed. – The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) daysfrom notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.
As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner
receives the assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not. To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date
of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition;otherwise,
the petition for certiorarimust be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot
be understated, for such dates determine the timeliness of the filing of the
petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge
Development Corporation:17
There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was
received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suffice in
a matter involving strict observance with the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals:18
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is
required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for
certiorariwas filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was notin any position
to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for
reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated.
It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than
fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the
ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of
cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard
of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy ofliberal
construction.19
The petition for certioraricontains the following averments, viz:
82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the "comfort women
system," approached the Executive Department through the
Department of Justice in order to request for assistance to file a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines;
83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and
refused to file a claim against the said Japanese officials and military
officers;
84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turnapproached the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Department of Justice and Office of the of the Solicitor
General to file their claim against the responsible Japanese officials
and military officers, but their efforts were similarly and carelessly
disregarded;20
The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners
approached the Department ofJustice for assistance, but does not specifically
state when they received the denial of their request for assistance by the
Executive Department of the Government. This alone warranted the outright
dismissal of the petition.
Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request
for assistance in 1998, their filing of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still
way beyond the 60-day period. Only the most compelling reasons could justify
the Court’s acts of disregarding and lifting the strictures of the rule on the period.
As we pointed out inMTM Garment Mfg. Inc. v. Court of Appeals:21
All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or
disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own
rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely: to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.
Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are
contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants.
As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of
certiorariis neither a natural right noran essential element of due process; a writ
of certiorariis a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, and
never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a
writ of certiorarimust apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance
with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule
and the requirements under current jurisprudence. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-
judicial on the part of respondents.
Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorarithat the assailed
act was either judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Courtrequires such showing, to wit:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping
as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. However, petitioners
did notmake such a showing.
3. Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.
The Court cannot grant petitioners’ prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to
the main case, and is subject to the latter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action
itself.22 It is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of
during the pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a mere
incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.23 Following the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is no more legal basis to issue the
writ of injunction sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of the principal action.24
In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular
act.1âwphi1 Hence, it is an extreme remedy,25 to be granted only if the
following requisites are attendant, namely:
(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in
esse;
(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and
(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to
the applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.26
In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58,
Lucena City,27 we expounded as follows:
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and
positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary,
peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided by law,
specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme caution
must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should be granted only
when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction
rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable
injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity
of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the
relief of injunction should be refused.28
Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and
judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or
question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by
writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a
certain manner.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(no part)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

No part
ESTELA M. PERLAS-
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F.
BERNABE
LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 419-429.
2 Id. at 435-529.
3 75 Phil. 563 (1945).
4 83 Phil. 171 (1949).
5 G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994, 238SCRA 524.
6 G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644.
7 No. L-49112, February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195.
8 Supra note 1.
9 Id. at 426-427.
10 Id. at 427-428.
11 Id. at 436.
12 Id. at 665-709.
13 Id. at 684-685.
14 Id. at 686-690.
15 Id. at 690-702.
16 Id. at 703-706.
17 G.R. No. 146068, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 399, 403-404.
18 G.R. No. 141947, July 5, 2001, 360 SCRA 521, 527-528.
19 Id. at 527-528.
20 Rollo, p. 18.
21 G.R. No. 152336, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 55, 66.
22 Buyco v. Baraquia, G.R. No. 177486, December 21, 2009, 608
SCRA 699, 703-704.
23 Id. at 704.
24 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Antonio-
Valenzuela, G.R. No. 184778, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 698, 715,
citing Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134617, February 13, 2006,
482 SCRA 326, 331.
25 I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Seventh Revised Edition,
p. 638.
26 Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authority v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 156303, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 85,99-100.
27 G.R. No. 141849, February 13, 2007, 515 SCRA 577.
28 At 589.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 173034             October 9, 2007
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER
SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON,
ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J.
LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Court and all parties involved are in agreement that the best nourishment
for an infant is mother's milk. There is nothing greater than for a mother to
nurture her beloved child straight from her bosom. The ideal is, of course, for
each and every Filipino child to enjoy the unequaled benefits of breastmilk. But
how should this end be attained?
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise
Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing
Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the
RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond the law it is supposed to implement.
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of
herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since
respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said
executive agency.1
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino
on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president
under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk
Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 2 of the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted
several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health
claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take
effect on July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are
manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The main issue raised in the petition is whether respondents officers of the DOH
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of
the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.3
On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO enjoining
respondents from implementing the questioned RIRR.
After the Comment and Reply had been filed, the Court set the case for oral
arguments on June 19, 2007. The Court issued an Advisory (Guidance for Oral
Arguments) dated June 5, 2007, to wit:
The Court hereby sets the following issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest;
2. Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
2.1 Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code);
2.2 Whether pertinent international agreements 1 entered into by the
Philippines are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by
the DOH through the RIRR; If in the affirmative, whether the RIRR is
in accord with the international agreements;
2.3 Whether Sections 4, 5(w), 22, 32, 47, and 52 of the RIRR violate
the due process clause and are in restraint of trade; and
2.4 Whether Section 13 of the RIRR on Total Effect provides sufficient
standards.
_____________
1 (1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) the
WHO and Unicef "2002 Global Strategy on Infant and Young Child
Feeding;" and (3) various World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions.
The parties filed their respective memoranda.
The petition is partly imbued with merit.
On the issue of petitioner's standing
With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute this case as the
real party-in-interest, the Court adopts the view enunciated in Executive
Secretary v. Court of Appeals, 4 to wit:
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of
injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an
association with that of its members. An association has standing to
file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its
members are affected by the action. An organization has
standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
xxxx
x x x We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent
was organized x x x to act as the representative of any individual,
company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower
recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities
necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The
respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of
its members, because it and its members are in every practical
sense identical. x x x The respondent [association] is but the
medium through which its individual members seek to make
more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of
their grievances. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
which was reasserted in Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco,6
where the Court ruled that an association has the legal personality to represent
its members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests. 7
Herein petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation contains a similar provision
just like in Executive Secretary, that the association is formed "to represent
directly or through approved representatives the pharmaceutical and health care
industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical
professions and the general public." 8 Thus, as an organization, petitioner
definitely has an interest in fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing
members who are part of the pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner
is duly authorized9 to take the appropriate course of action to bring to the
attention of government agencies and the courts any grievance suffered by its
members which are directly affected by the RIRR. Petitioner, which is mandated
by its Amended Articles of Incorporation to represent the entire industry, would
be remiss in its duties if it fails to act on governmental action that would affect
any of its industry members, no matter how few or numerous they are. Hence,
petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be
considered as a real party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by
any judgment in the present action.
On the constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR
First, the Court will determine if pertinent international instruments adverted to
by respondents are part of the law of the land.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk
Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense
of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various
international instruments 10 regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is
respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed part of the
law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by
respondents, namely: (1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties
to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of
breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that
women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy
and lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the
use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes.
The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding
breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.11 The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.12
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it
to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. 13
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required
under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been
transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code.
Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to
emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS
absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general
public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and
approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
On the other hand, Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with
all nations. (Emphasis supplied)
embodies the incorporation method.14
In Mijares v. Ranada,15 the Court held thus:
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted
as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.16 (Emphasis supplied)
"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or
customary international law which are binding on all states, 17 i.e., renunciation of
war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, 18 a
person's right to life, liberty and due process, 19 and pacta sunt servanda,20
among others. The concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also
been depicted in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as
a primary source of international law because they have the "character of jus
rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge
Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966
I.C.J. 296). O'Connell holds that certain priniciples are part of international law
because they are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the
jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are established by a process of
reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If there should be
doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether
the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution. x x x 21
(Emphasis supplied)
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows:
Custom or customary international law means "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the
two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how
states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is,
why they behave the way they do.
xxxx
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual
behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration,
consistency, and generality of the practice of states.
The required duration can be either short or long. x x x
xxxx
Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important
is the consistency and the generality of the practice. x x x
xxxx
Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes
necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states
behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to
behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio
juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is
what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not
law.22 (Underscoring and Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic
system.23
WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation. Have they
attained the status of customary law and should they then be deemed
incorporated as part of the law of the land?
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized
agencies allied with the United Nations (UN) by virtue of Article 57, 24 in relation
to Article 6325 of the UN Charter. Under the 1946 WHO Constitution, it is the
WHA which determines the policies of the WHO, 26 and has the power to adopt
regulations concerning "advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical
and similar products moving in international commerce," 27 and to "make
recommendations to members with respect to any matter within the competence
of the Organization."28 The legal effect of its regulations, as opposed to
recommendations, is quite different.
Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted by the WHA
bind member states thus:
Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt
conventions or agreements with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization. A two-thirds vote of the Health
Assembly shall be required for the adoption of such conventions or
agreements, which shall come into force for each Member when
accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen
months after the adoption by the Health Assembly of a convention or
agreement, take action relative to the acceptance of such
convention or agreement. Each Member shall notify the Director-
General of the action taken, and if it does not accept such convention
or agreement within the time limit, it will furnish a statement of the
reasons for non-acceptance. In case of acceptance, each Member
agrees to make an annual report to the Director-General in
accordance with Chapter XIV.
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt
regulations concerning: (a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and
other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of
disease; (b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death
and public health practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic
procedures for international use; (d) standards with respect to the
safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar
products moving in international commerce; (e) advertising and
labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in
international commerce.
Article 22. Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into
force for all Members after due notice has been given of their adoption
by the Health Assembly except for such Members as may notify the
Director-General of rejection or reservations within the period stated in
the notice. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not
come into force for members, in the same way that conventions or
agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force.
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization. (Emphasis supplied)
The absence of a provision in Article 23 of any mechanism by which the
recommendation would come into force for member states is conspicuous.
The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA
recommendations are generally not binding, but they "carry moral and political
weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective
membership of the highest international body in the field of health." 29 Even the
ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere recommendation, as WHA Resolution No.
34.22 states:
"The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly x x x adopts, in the sense
of Article 23 of the Constitution, the International Code of Marketing
of Breastmilk Substitutes annexed to the present resolution."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Introduction to the ICMBS also reads as follows:
In January 1981, the Executive Board of the World Health
Organization at its sixty-seventh session, considered the fourth draft
of the code, endorsed it, and unanimously recommended to the Thirty-
fourth World Health Assembly the text of a resolution by which it
would adopt the code in the form of a recommendation rather
than a regulation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The legal value of WHA Resolutions as recommendations is summarized in
Article 62 of the WHO Constitution, to wit:
Art. 62. Each member shall report annually on the action taken with
respect to recommendations made to it by the Organization, and with
respect to conventions, agreements and regulations.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA
Resolutions urging member states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been done
with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions
into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, 30
specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months,
continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been
adopted as a domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. 31
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in
Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. 32 It
is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that
influence state behavior.33 Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN
General Assembly fall under this category. 34 The most notable is the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases,
specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,35
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,36 Mijares v. Rañada37 and Shangri-la International
Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc..38
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency
attached to the UN with the mandate to promote and protect intellectual property
worldwide, has resorted to soft law as a rapid means of norm creation, in order
"to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of its
constituents."39 Other international organizations which have resorted to soft law
include the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (in the form of the Codex Alimentarius).40
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international
law binding on WHO member states, it provides an excellent
example of the power of "soft law" in international relations.
International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of
international law-"hard law"-from non-binding norms, principles,
and practices that influence state behavior-"soft law." WHO has
during its existence generated many soft law norms, creating a
"soft law regime" in international governance for public health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps
in laying the political groundwork for improved international
cooperation on infectious diseases. These resolutions clearly define
WHO member states' normative duty to cooperate fully with other
countries and with WHO in connection with infectious disease
surveillance and response to outbreaks.
This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of
the SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful politically for two
reasons. First, the SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that
participating in, and enhancing, international cooperation on infectious
disease controls is in a country's self-interest x x x if this warning is
heeded, the "soft law" in the SARS and IHR Resolution could inform
the development of general and consistent state practice on infectious
disease surveillance and outbreak response, perhaps crystallizing
eventually into customary international law on infectious disease
prevention and control.41
In the Philippines, the executive department implemented certain measures
recommended by WHO to address the outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by
issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003 and E.O. No. 280 on
February 2, 2004, delegating to various departments broad powers to close
down schools/establishments, conduct health surveillance and monitoring, and
ban importation of poultry and agricultural products.
It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency, the
duty of a state to implement the IHR Resolution was still considered not binding
or enforceable, although said resolutions had great political influence.
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary
law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because
they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris).
Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have
respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA
Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA
Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law
of the land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions
cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by
the legislature.
Second, the Court will determine whether the DOH may implement the
provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under
the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law.
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987
provides that the DOH shall define the national health policy and implement a
national health plan within the framework of the government's general policies
and plans, and issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation
of established health policies.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other
forms of promotion of breastmilk substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions
has been adopted as part of the national health policy.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is
embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the
Administrative Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal
breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive
breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years
and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six
months; (3) micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the
exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally difficult
circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized
as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it
declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion
of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.
The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot
automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk
substitutes.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on
the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically
creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows that
a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the
Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the
legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA
Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
Third, the Court will now determine whether the provisions of the RIRR are in
accordance with those of the Milk Code.
In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner
alleges the following:
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but
the RIRR extended its coverage to "young children" or those from
ages two years old and beyond:
MILK CODE RIR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate Se
nutrition for infants is provided, there is a need to protect and are
promote breastfeeding and to inform the public about the ad
proper use of breastmilk substitutes and supplements and pro
related products through adequate, consistent and objective en
information and appropriate regulation of the marketing and su
distribution of the said substitutes, supplements and related ind
products; inf
SECTION 4(e). "Infant" means a person falling within the age dis
bracket of 0-12 months. Se
mo
(36
2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and
possible substitute for breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR
provides "exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months" and
declares that "there is no substitute nor replacement for breastmilk":
MILK CODE RIR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate Se
nutrition for infants is provided, there is a need to protect and un
promote breastfeeding and to inform the public about the reg
proper use of breastmilk substitutes and supplements and a.
related products through adequate, consistent and objective mo
information and appropriate regulation of the marketing and b.
distribution of the said substitutes, supplements and related
products;
3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable
requirements for advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an
absolute ban on such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for
infants from 0-24 months old or beyond, and forbids the use of health
and nutritional claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which provides for a
"total effect" in the promotion of products within the scope of the Code,
is vague:
MILK CODE RIR
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. – Se
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, un
whether written, audio or visual, for products within the scope reg
of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed, exhibited x x
and broadcast unless such materials are duly authorized and f. A
approved by an inter-agency committee created herein bre
pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code. pro
Se
sp
bre
up
 (e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the Th
scope of this Code may assist in the research, scholarships rev
and continuing education, of health professionals, in i. M
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the pa
Ministry of Health. ad
SE
of
or
ed
Co
or
an
ma
SE
is t
pro
you
con
bre
fro
7. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely
prohibits it.
MILK CODE RIR
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. – Se
(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent donations from Do
manufacturers and distributors of products within the scope of the
this Code upon request by or with the approval of the Ministry sha
of Health. Se
Co
an
Co
ag
be
sha
oth
8. The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the
4. The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code.
Milk Code: MILK CODE RIR
MILK CODE
  Se
SECTION 10. Containers/Label. – ad
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the jur
necessary information about the appropriate use of the Co
products, and in such a way as not to discourage a)
breastfeeding. b)
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily Th
readable and understandable message in Pilipino or English Pe
printed on it, or on a label, which message can not readily inc
become separated from it, and which shall include the c)
following points: Th
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent; (P1
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding; the
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the off
advice of a health worker as to the need for its use and the Pro
proper methods of use; and d)
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning Hu
against the health hazards of inappropriate preparation. (P5
an
5. The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula of
to health professionals; the RIRR totally prohibits such activity: Lic
MILK CODE e)
SECTION 7. Health Care System. – Fin
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the off
purpose of promoting infant formula or other products within Lic
the scope of this Code. This Code does not, however, inc
preclude the dissemination of information to health De
professionals as provided in Section 8(b). De
SECTION 8. Health Workers. - f)
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to (P2
health professionals regarding products within the scope of vio
this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters IAC
and such information shall not imply or create a belief that the
bottle-feeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It Fo
shall also include the information specified in Section 5(b). "re
6. The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to ow
extend assistance in research and continuing education of health are
professionals; RIRR absolutely forbids the same. an
MILK CODE 9. The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary.
SECTION 8. Health Workers – The Court shall resolve the merits of the allegations of petitioner seriatim.
1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's coverage is limited only
to children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code states:
SECTION 3. Scope of the Code – The Code applies to the marketing,
and practices related thereto, of the following products: breastmilk
substitutes, including infant formula; other milk products, foods and
beverages, including bottle-fed complementary foods, when marketed
or otherwise represented to be suitable, with or without modification,
for use as a partial or total replacement of breastmilk; feeding bottles
and teats. It also applies to their quality and availability, and to
information concerning their use.
Clearly, the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child
but on the kind of product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant
formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as separate
and distinct product categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as "a breastmilk substitute x
x x to satisfy the normal nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to
six months of age, and adapted to their physiological characteristics"; while
under Section 4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to "any food, whether
manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or
infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the nutritional
requirements of the infant." An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within
the age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants or
children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the
Milk Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section
4(a) as "any food being marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total
replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose." This
section conspicuously lacks reference to any particular age-group of
children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be considered
exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk
substitutes may also be intended for young children more than 12 months of
age. Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends
to protect and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old.
Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk
Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to
said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.
There is, therefore, nothing objectionable with Sections 2 42 and 5(ff)43 of the
RIRR.
2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code,
does not recognize that breastmilk substitutes may be a proper and possible
substitute for breastmilk.
The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions thereof, must be
considered and construed together. As held in De Luna v. Pascual,44 "[t]he
particular words, clauses and phrases in the Rule should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole."
Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically indicated and only when
necessary, the use of breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete
and updated information." Section 8 of the RIRR also states that information and
educational materials should include information on the proper use of infant
formula when the use thereof is needed.
Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain
cases, the use of breastmilk substitutes may be proper.
3. The Court shall ascertain the merits of allegations 345 and 446 together as they
are interlinked with each other.
To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising
regulations under the RIRR are valid, it is important to deal first with the nature,
purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the DOH, as defined in general
under the 1987 Administrative Code, 47 and as delegated in particular under the
Milk Code.
Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other
administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer
span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss it. .48
However, health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently
non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively
new area for regulation by the DOH.49
As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands, 50
health information was already within the ambit of the regulatory powers of the
predecessor of DOH.51 Section 938 thereof charged it with the duty to protect the
health of the people, and vested it with such powers as "(g) the dissemination of
hygienic information among the people and especially the inculcation of
knowledge as to the proper care of infants and the methods of preventing
and combating dangerous communicable diseases."
Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to
carry out the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, which is "to protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them."52 To that end, it was granted
under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to "(6) propagate health
information and educate the population on important health, medical and
environmental matters which have health implications." 53
When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children,
however, the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health
(hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate,
consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk
substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control such
information. These are expressly provided for in Sections 12 and 5(a), to wit:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring –
xxxx
(b) The Ministry of Health shall be principally responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this Code. For
this purpose, the Ministry of Health shall have the following powers
and functions:
(1) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are
necessary or proper for the implementation of this Code and
the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives.
xxxx
(4) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be
necessary for or incidental to the attainment of the purposes
and objectives of this Code.
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent
information is provided on infant feeding, for use by families and those
involved in the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility shall cover
the planning, provision, design and dissemination of information, and
the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any
information on breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and
related products, in the following manner:
SECTION 5. x x x
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or
visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and intended to reach
pregnant women and mothers of infants, shall include clear
information on all the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority
of breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and
maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding
of introducing partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the
decision not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use of
infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or home-prepared.
When such materials contain information about the use of infant
formula, they shall include the social and financial implications
of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding
methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or
improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes.
Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may
idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes.
SECTION 8. Health Workers –
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health
professionals regarding products within the scope of this Code shall
be restricted to scientific and factual matters, and such
information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the
information specified in Section 5(b).
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the
necessary information about the appropriate use of the products, and
in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
xxxx
(d) The term "humanized," "maternalized" or similar terms shall not be
used. (Emphasis supplied)
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to
whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the
Milk Code54 to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women,
mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care
system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create
a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to
control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not
absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely
prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
The following are the provisions of the Milk Code that unequivocally indicate that
the control over information given to the DOH is not absolute and that absolute
prohibition is not contemplated by the Code:
a) Section 2 which requires adequate information and appropriate
marketing and distribution of breastmilk substitutes, to wit:
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code – The aim of the Code is to
contribute to the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for
 infants by the protection and promotion of breastfeeding
and by ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes
and breastmilk supplements when these are necessary, on
the basis of adequate information and through appropriate
marketing and distribution.
b) Section 3 which specifically states that the Code applies to the
marketing of and practices related to breastmilk substitutes, including
infant formula, and to information concerning their use;
c) Section 5(a) which provides that the government shall ensure that
objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding;
d) Section 5(b) which provides that written, audio or visual
informational and educational materials shall not use any picture or
text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes and should
include information on the health hazards of unnecessary or improper
use of said product;
e) Section 6(a) in relation to Section 12(a) which creates and
empowers the IAC to review and examine advertising, promotion, and
other marketing materials;
f) Section 8(b) which states that milk companies may provide
information to health professionals but such information should be
restricted to factual and scientific matters and shall not imply or create
a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding;
and
g) Section 10 which provides that containers or labels should not
contain information that would discourage breastfeeding and idealize
the use of infant formula.
It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the
RIRR regarding labeling and advertising.
Sections 1355 on "total effect" and 26 56 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some
labeling requirements, specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no
substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement that powdered infant
formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and
used appropriately. Section 1657 of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition
claims for products within the scope of the Milk Code, such as claims of
increased emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child.
These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section
8 of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 8. Health workers -
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health
professionals regarding products within the scope of this Code shall
be restricted to scientific and factual matters, and such information
shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or
superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information
specified in Section 5.58 (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 10(d)59 which bars the use on containers and labels of the terms
"humanized," "maternalized," or similar terms.
These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply
or create a belief that there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which
is humanized or maternalized, as such information would be inconsistent with
the superiority of breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given
to health workers regarding breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and labels
thereof. However, such restrictive application of Section 8(b) will result in the
absurd situation in which milk companies and distributors are forbidden to claim
to health workers that their products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk,
and yet be allowed to display on the containers and labels of their products the
exact opposite message. That askewed interpretation of the Milk Code is
precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to avoid by mandating that all
information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be consistent,
at the same time giving the government control over planning, provision, design,
and dissemination of information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state
that the product offered is not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means
of enforcing Section 8(b) of the Milk Code and deterring circumvention of the
protection and promotion of breastfeeding as embodied in Section 2 60 of the Milk
Code.
Section 26(f)61 of the RIRR is an equally reasonable labeling requirement. It
implements Section 5(b) of the Milk Code which reads:
SECTION 5. x x x
xxxx
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or
visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and intended to reach
pregnant women and mothers of infants, shall include clear
information on all the following points: x x x (5) where needed, the
proper use of infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or
home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the
use of infant formula, they shall include the social and financial
implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or
feeding methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other
breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or
text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes. (Emphasis
supplied)
The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the
buyers thereof. The buyers of breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and
Section 26 of the RIRR merely adds a fair warning about the likelihood of
pathogenic microorganisms being present in infant formula and other related
products when these are prepared and used inappropriately.
Petitioner’s counsel has admitted during the hearing on June 19, 2007 that
formula milk is prone to contaminations and there is as yet no technology that
allows production of powdered infant formula that eliminates all forms of
contamination.62
Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of the RIRR for the label to
contain the message regarding health hazards including the possibility of
contamination with pathogenic microorganisms is in accordance with Section
5(b) of the Milk Code.
The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis
breastmilk substitutes and supplements and related products cannot be
questioned. It is its intervention into the area of advertising, promotion, and
marketing that is being assailed by petitioner.
In furtherance of Section 6(a) of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. –
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether
written, audio or visual, for products within the scope of this Code
shall be printed, published, distributed, exhibited and broadcast unless
such materials are duly authorized and approved by an inter-agency
committee created herein pursuant to the applicable standards
provided for in this Code.
the Milk Code invested regulatory authority over advertising, promotional and
marketing materials to an IAC, thus:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring -
(a) For purposes of Section 6(a) of this Code, an inter-agency
committee composed of the following members is hereby created:
Minister of Health
Minister of Trade and Industry
Minister of Justice
Minister of Social Services and Development
The members may designate their duly authorized representative to
every meeting of the Committee.
The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) To review and examine all advertising. promotion or
other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual,
on products within the scope of this Code;
(2) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions
from and prohibit the printing, publication, distribution,
exhibition and broadcast of, all advertising promotion or
other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual,
on products within the scope of this Code;
(3) To prescribe the internal and operational procedure for
the exercise of its powers and functions as well as the
performance of its duties and responsibilities; and
(4) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are
necessary or proper for the implementation of Section
6(a) of this Code. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:
SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions, sponsorships,
or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes
intended for infants and young children up to twenty-four (24) months,
shall be allowed, because they tend to convey or give subliminal
messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and
breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or
replacements, as well as related products covered within the scope of
this Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and
activities for breastmilk substitutes in line with the RIRR’s declaration of principle
under Section 4(f), to wit:
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles –
xxxx
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula,
breastmilk substitutes and other related products are prohibited.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the
regulatory authority given to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on
advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk
Code in Section 6 thereof for prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing
and promotional materials prior to dissemination.
Even respondents, through the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and
repeatedly insisted, during the oral arguments on June 19, 2007, that the
prohibition under Section 11 is not actually operational, viz:
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
xxxx
x x x Now, the crux of the matter that is being questioned by Petitioner
is whether or not there is an absolute prohibition on advertising
making AO 2006-12 unconstitutional. We maintained that what AO
2006-12 provides is not an absolute prohibition because Section 11
while it states and it is entitled prohibition it states that no advertising,
promotion, sponsorship or marketing materials and activities for breast
milk substitutes intended for infants and young children up to 24
months shall be allowed because this is the standard they tend to
convey or give subliminal messages or impression undermine that
breastmilk or breastfeeding x x x.
We have to read Section 11 together with the other Sections because
the other Section, Section 12, provides for the inter agency committee
that is empowered to process and evaluate all the advertising and
promotion materials.
xxxx
What AO 2006-12, what it does, it does not prohibit the sale and
manufacture, it simply regulates the advertisement and the
promotions of breastfeeding milk substitutes.
xxxx
Now, the prohibition on advertising, Your Honor, must be taken
together with the provision on the Inter-Agency Committee that
processes and evaluates because there may be some information
dissemination that are straight forward information dissemination.
What the AO 2006 is trying to prevent is any material that will
undermine the practice of breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
Madam Solicitor General, under the Milk Code, which body has
authority or power to promulgate Rules and Regulations regarding the
Advertising, Promotion and Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Your Honor, please, it is provided that the Inter-Agency Committee,
Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
x x x Don't you think that the Department of Health overstepped its
rule making authority when it totally banned advertising and promotion
under Section 11 prescribed the total effect rule as well as the content
of materials under Section 13 and 15 of the rules and regulations?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Your Honor, please, first we would like to stress that there is no total
absolute ban. Second, the Inter-Agency Committee is under the
Department of Health, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
x x x Did I hear you correctly, Madam Solicitor, that there is no
absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk substitutes in the Revised
Rules?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Yes, your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
But, would you nevertheless agree that there is an absolute ban on
advertising of breastmilk substitutes intended for children two (2)
years old and younger?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
It's not an absolute ban, Your Honor, because we have the Inter-
Agency Committee that can evaluate some advertising and
promotional materials, subject to the standards that we have stated
earlier, which are- they should not undermine breastfeeding, Your
Honor.
xxxx
x x x Section 11, while it is titled Prohibition, it must be taken in
relation with the other Sections, particularly 12 and 13 and 15, Your
Honor, because it is recognized that the Inter-Agency Committee has
that power to evaluate promotional materials, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
So in short, will you please clarify there's no absolute ban on
advertisement regarding milk substitute regarding infants two (2)
years below?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
We can proudly say that the general rule is that there is a prohibition,
however, we take exceptions and standards have been set. One of
which is that, the Inter-Agency Committee can allow if the advertising
and promotions will not undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding, Your
Honor.63
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code.
However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the approval or rejection of advertising, promotional, or other
marketing materials under Section 12(a) of the Milk Code, said provision must
be related to Section 6 thereof which in turn provides that the rules and
regulations must be "pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this
Code." Said standards are set forth in Sections 5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code,
which, at the risk of being repetitious, and for easy reference, are quoted
hereunder:
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
xxxx
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or
visual, dealing with the feeding of infants and intended to reach
pregnant women and mothers of infants, shall include clear
information on all the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority
of breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and
maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding
of introducing partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the
decision not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use of
infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or home-prepared.
When such materials contain information about the use of infant
formula, they shall include the social and financial implications of its
use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods of feeding methods;
and, in particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use
of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall
not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes.
xxxx
SECTION 8. Health Workers. –
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health
professionals regarding products within the scope of this Code shall
be restricted to scientific and factual matters and such information
shall not imply or create a belief that bottle feeding is equivalent or
superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information
specified in Section 5(b).
xxxx
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the
necessary information about the appropriate use of the products, and
in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily
readable and understandable message in Pilipino or English printed
on it, or on a label, which message can not readily become separated
from it, and which shall include the following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the
advice of a health worker as to the need for its use and the
proper methods of use; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning
against the health hazards of inappropriate preparation.
Section 12(b) of the Milk Code designates the DOH as the principal
implementing agency for the enforcement of the provisions of the Code. In
relation to such responsibility of the DOH, Section 5(a) of the Milk Code states
that:
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent
information is provided on infant feeding, for use by families and those
involved in the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility shall cover
the planning, provision, design and dissemination of information, and
the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into
operational terms the standards set forth in Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the
Milk Code, by which the IAC shall screen advertising, promotional, or other
marketing materials.
It is pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly provided for Section
13 in the RIRR which reads as follows:
SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the scope
of this Code must be objective and should not equate or make the
product appear to be as good or equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding
in the advertising concept. It must not in any case undermine
breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total effect" should not directly or
indirectly suggest that buying their product would produce better
 individuals, or resulting in greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or
in any manner bring better health to the baby or other such
exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on
advertising, promotion, and marketing. Through that single provision, the DOH
exercises control over the information content of advertising, promotional and
marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplements
and other related products. It also sets a viable standard against which the IAC
may screen such materials before they are made public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,64 the Court held:
x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience
and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."65
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with
public interest and welfare.
4. With regard to activities for dissemination of information to health
professionals, the Court also finds that there is no inconsistency between the
provisions of the Milk Code and the RIRR. Section 7(b) 66 of the Milk Code, in
relation to Section 8(b)67 of the same Code, allows dissemination of information
to health professionals but such information is restricted to scientific and
factual matters.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the
giving of information to health professionals on scientific and factual
matters. What it prohibits is the involvement of the manufacturer and distributor
of the products covered by the Code in activities for the promotion, education
and production of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials
regarding breastfeeding that are intended for women and children. Said
provision cannot be construed to encompass even the dissemination of
information to health professionals, as restricted by the Milk Code.
5. Next, petitioner alleges that Section 8(e) 68 of the Milk Code permits milk
manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and in the
continuing education of health professionals, while Sections 22 and 32 of the
RIRR absolutely forbid the same. Petitioner also assails Section 4(i) 69 of the
RIRR prohibiting milk manufacturers' and distributors' participation in any
policymaking body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding.
Section 4(i) of the RIRR provides that milk companies and their representatives
should not form part of any policymaking body or entity in relation to the
advancement of breastfeeding. The Court finds nothing in said provisions which
contravenes the Milk Code. Note that under Section 12(b) of the Milk Code, it is
the DOH which shall be principally responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of said Code. It is entirely up to the DOH to decide
which entities to call upon or allow to be part of policymaking bodies on
breastfeeding. Therefore, the RIRR's prohibition on milk companies’ participation
in any policymaking body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding is in
accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner is also mistaken in arguing that Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk
companies from giving reasearch assistance and continuing education to health
professionals. Section 2270 of the RIRR does not pertain to research
assistance to or the continuing education of health professionals; rather, it
deals with breastfeeding promotion and education for women and children.
Nothing in Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving
assistance for research or continuing education to health professionals; hence,
petitioner's argument against this particular provision must be struck down.
It is Sections 971 and 1072 of the RIRR which govern research assistance. Said
sections of the RIRR provide that research assistance for health workers and
researchers may be allowed upon approval of an ethics committee, and
with certain disclosure requirements imposed on the milk company and on
the recipient of the research award.
The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to determine how such research
or educational assistance may be given by milk companies or under what
conditions health workers may accept the assistance. Thus, Sections 9 and 10
of the RIRR imposing limitations on the kind of research done or extent of
assistance given by milk companies are completely in accord with the Milk
Code.
Petitioner complains that Section 3273 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from
giving assistance, support, logistics or training to health workers. This provision
is within the prerogative given to the DOH under Section 8(e) 74 of the Milk Code,
which provides that manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes may
assist in researches, scholarships and the continuing education, of health
professionals in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Ministry of Health, now DOH.
6. As to the RIRR's prohibition on donations, said provisions are also consistent
with the Milk Code. Section 6(f) of the Milk Code provides that donations may be
made by manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes upon the
request or with the approval of the DOH. The law does not proscribe the
refusal of donations. The Milk Code leaves it purely to the discretion of the DOH
whether to request or accept such donations. The DOH then appropriately
exercised its discretion through Section 5175 of the RIRR which sets forth its
policy not to request or approve donations from manufacturers and distributors
of breastmilk substitutes.
It was within the discretion of the DOH when it provided in Section 52 of the
RIRR that any donation from milk companies not covered by the Code should be
coursed through the IAC which shall determine whether such donation should
be accepted or refused. As reasoned out by respondents, the DOH is not
mandated by the Milk Code to accept donations. For that matter, no person or
entity can be forced to accept a donation. There is, therefore, no real
inconsistency between the RIRR and the law because the Milk Code does not
prohibit the DOH from refusing donations.
7. With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative sanctions
that are not found in the Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's objection
thereto.
Respondent's reliance on Civil Aeronautics Board v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. 76 is
misplaced. The glaring difference in said case and the present case before the
Court is that, in the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA) was expressly granted by the law (R.A. No. 776) the power to impose
fines and civil penalties, while the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was granted by
the same law the power to review on appeal the order or decision of the CAA
and to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise
such fine and civil penalties. Thus, the Court upheld the CAB's Resolution
imposing administrative fines.
In a more recent case, Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines,
Inc.,77 the Court upheld the Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-
10 implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 33. The circular provided for fines
for the commission of prohibited acts. The Court found that nothing in the
circular contravened the law because the DOE was expressly authorized by B.P.
Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 7638 to impose fines or penalties.
In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code
grants the DOH the authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus, without
any express grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOH cannot provide
for those fines in the RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded its authority
by providing for such fines or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said
provision is, therefore, null and void.
The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its rules and regulations.
Section 12(b) (3) of the Milk Code authorizes the DOH to "cause the prosecution
of the violators of this Code and other pertinent laws on products covered by this
Code." Section 13 of the Milk Code provides for the penalties to be imposed on
violators of the provision of the Milk Code or the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to it, to wit:
SECTION 13. Sanctions –
(a) Any person who violates the provisions of this Code or the rules
and regulations issued pursuant to this Code shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a penalty of two (2) months to one (1) year
imprisonment or a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) nor more than Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) or
both. Should the offense be committed by a juridical person, the
chairman of the Board of Directors, the president, general manager, or
the partners and/or the persons directly responsible therefor, shall be
penalized.
(b) Any license, permit or authority issued by any government agency
to any health worker, distributor, manufacturer, or marketing firm or
personnel for the practice of their profession or occupation, or for the
pursuit of their business, may, upon recommendation of the Ministry of
Health, be suspended or revoked in the event of repeated violations of
this Code, or of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
8. Petitioner’s claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are
contrary to the RIRR is frivolous.
Section 57 reads:
SECTION 57. Repealing Clause - All orders, issuances, and rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with these revised rules and
implementing regulations are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders,
issuances and rules and regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within
the DOH's rule-making power.
An administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-
making power or the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
Constitution, and subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.78 Such express grant of rule-making power necessarily includes the
power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same. 79 This is to allow
administrative agencies flexibility in formulating and adjusting the details and
manner by which they are to implement the provisions of a law, 80 in order to
make it more responsive to the times. Hence, it is a standard provision in
administrative rules that prior issuances of administrative agencies that are
inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are
DOH to promulgate and in contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore, null they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
and void. The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the Milk WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46
Code. of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL
Lastly, petitioner makes a "catch-all" allegation that: and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are
x x x [T]he questioned RIRR sought to be implemented by the PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.
Respondents is unnecessary and oppressive, and is offensive to The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar
the due process clause of the Constitution, insofar as the same as the rest of the provisions of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is
is in restraint of trade and because a provision therein is inadequate concerned.
to provide the public with a comprehensible basis to determine SO ORDERED.
whether or not they have committed a violation.81 (Emphasis supplied) Puno, (Chief Justice), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Petitioner refers to Sections 4(f), 82 4(i),83 5(w),84 11,85 22,86 32,87 46,88 and 5289 as Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia,
the provisions that suppress the trade of milk and, thus, violate the due process Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
clause of the Constitution.
The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to Footnotes
1
some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over Section 11, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
business interests.90 In Pest Management Association of the Philippines v. Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Neither
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority,91 it was held thus: misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal
x x x Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, despite the fact that of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative
"our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. x
nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene x x (Emphasis supplied)
2
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." There can Article 11. Implementation and monitoring
be no question that the unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides 11.1 Governments should take action to give effect to the
would be hazardous to our environment. Thus, in the aforecited case, principles and aim of this Code, as appropriate to their
the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for removal of social and legislative framework, including the adoption of
‘protective regulations’." x x x It must be clearly explained and national legislation, regulations or other suitable measures.
proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective For this purpose, governments should seek, when
regulation would result in the restraint of trade. [Emphasis and necessary, the cooperation of WHO, UNICEF and other
underscoring supplied] agencies of the United Nations system. National policies
In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers’ and measures, including laws and regulations, which are
participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for adopted to give effect to the principles and aim of this Code
women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics should be publicly stated, and should apply on the same
or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would basis to all those involved in the manufacture and marketing
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not of products within the scope of this Code.
established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of xxxx
3
breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned Petition, rollo, p. 12.
4
provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of G.R. No. 131719, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 81.
5
trade. Id. at 96-97.
6
Petitioner also failed to convince the Court that Section 5(w) of the RIRR is G.R. No. 135092, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 382.
7
unreasonable and oppressive. Said section provides for the definition of the term Id. at 396.
8
"milk company," to wit: Annex "G", Petitioner's Memorandum dated July 19, 2007.
9
SECTION 5 x x x. (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the owner, Annexes "H", "I", and "J" of Petitioner's Memorandum executed by
manufacturer, distributor of infant formula, follow-up milk, milk formula, Wyeth Philippines, Inc., Bristol Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc., and Abbott
milk supplement, breastmilk substitute or replacement, or by any other Laboratories, Inc., respectively.
10
description of such nature, including their representatives who a) The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); b) the
promote or otherwise advance their commercial interests in marketing International Code of Marketing Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS); c) the
those products; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
On the other hand, Section 4 of the Milk Code provides: (CSCR); d) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
(d) "Distributor" means a person, corporation or any other entity in the Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); e) the Global Strategy for
public or private sector engaged in the business (whether directly or Infant and Young Child Nutrition (Global Strategy); and f) various
indirectly) of marketing at the wholesale or retail level a product within resolutions adopted by the World Health Assembly.
11
the scope of this Code. A "primary distributor" is a manufacturer's Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., Constitutional Structure and Powers of
sales agent, representative, national distributor or broker. Government (Notes and Cases) Part I ( 2005).
12
xxxx Id.
13
(j) "Manufacturer" means a corporation or other entity in the public or Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., An Introduction to Public International Law,
private sector engaged in the business or function (whether directly or 2002 Ed., p. 57.
14
indirectly or through an agent or and entity controlled by or under According to Fr. Bernas, the Austrian Constitution (Art. 9) and the
contract with it) of manufacturing a products within the scope of this Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Art. 25) also use the
Code. incorporation method.
15
Notably, the definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term "milk G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 397.
16
company" the entities defined separately under the Milk Code as "distributor" Id. at 421.
17
and "manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in Section 5(w) the products Merlin M. Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law,
manufactured or distributed by an entity that would qualify it as a "milk 2005 Ed., p. 526.
18
company," whereas in the Milk Code, what is used is the phrase "products within Id. at 525.
19
the scope of this Code." Those are the only differences between the definitions Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia ,
given in the Milk Code and the definition as re-stated in the RIRR. G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007.
20
Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 592 (1997).
21
manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR providing Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter, Hans Smit,
for just one term to encompass both entities. The definition of "milk company" in International Law, Cases and Materials, 2nd Ed., p. 96.
22
the RIRR and the definitions of "distributor" and "manufacturer" provided for Supra note 13, at 10-13.
23
under the Milk Code are practically the same. Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 445 Phil. 250, 269 (2003).
24
The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the Article 57. The various specialized agencies, established by
RIRR would bring about any change in the treatment or regulation of intergovernmental agreement and having wide international
"distributors" and "manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic,
Milk Code. social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the
consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting provisions of Article 63.
reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and,
Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations
are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.
25
Article 63. The Economic and Social Council may enter into
agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining
the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into
relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be
subject to approval by the General Assembly.
It may coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through
consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through
recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the
United Nations.
26
Article 18. The functions of the Health Assembly shall be: (a) to
determine the policies of the Organization x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
27
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt
regulations concerning: x x x (e) advertising and labeling of biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international
commerce. (Emphasis supplied)
28
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization. (Emphasis supplied)
29
See David Fidler, Developments Involving SARS, International Law,
and Infectious Disease Control at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the World
Health Assembly, June 2003, ASIL.
30
In Resolution No. 34.22 (May 21, 1981), the WHA, acting under
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution, adopted the ICBMS.
(a) In Resolution No. 35.26 (May 1982), the WHA urged
member states to implement the ICBMS as a "minimum
requirement".
(b) In Resolution No. 39.28 (May 16, 1986), the WHA
requested the WHO Director General to direct the attention
of member states to the fact that any food or drink given
before complementary feeding is nutritionally required may
interfere with the initiation or maintenance of breastfeeding
and therefore should neither be promoted nor encouraged
for us by infants during this period.
(c) In Resolution No. 43.3 (May 14, 1990), the WHA urged
member states to protect and promote breastfeeding as an
essential component of nutrition policies so as to enable
infants to be exclusively breastfed during the first four to six
months of life.
(d) In Resolution No. 45.34 (May 14, 1992), the WHA
urged member states to implement the targets of the
Innocenti Declaration specifically, to give effect to the
ICMBS.
(e) In Resolution No. 46.7 (May 10, 1993), the WHA urged
member states to strive to eliminate under-nutrition,
malnutrition and nutritional deficiency among children.
(f) In Resolution No. 47.5 (May 9, 1994), the WHA urged
member states to ensure that there are no donations of
supplies of breastmilk substitutes and other products
covered by the ICMBS in any part of the health care system.
(g) In Resolution No. 49.15 (May 25, 1996), the WHA
urged member states to ensure that complementary foods
are not marketed for or used in ways that undermine
exclusive and sustained breastfeeding.
(h) In Resolution No. 54.2 (May 2002), the WHA, noting
that "despite the fact that the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes and relevant
subsequent World Health Assembly resolutions state that
there should be no advertising or other forms of promotion
of products within its scope, new modern communication
methods including electronic means, are currently
increasingly being used to promote such products; and
conscious of the need for the Codex Alimentarius
Commission to take the International Code and subsequent
relevant Health Assembly resolutions into consideration in
dealing with health claims in the development of food
standards and guidelines x x x," urged member states to
develop new approaches to protect, promote and support
exclusive breastfeeding for six months as a global public
health recommendation.
(i) In Resolution No. 55.25 (May 15, 2002), the WHA
requested the Codex Alimentarius Commission to ensure
that labelling of processed foods for infants and young
children be consistent with the WHO policy under the
ICBMS.
(j) In Resolution No. 58.32 (May 25, 2005), the WHA urged
member states to continue to protect and promote exclusive
breastfeeding for six months.
(k) In Resolution No. 59.21 (May 27, 2006), the WHA
reiterated its support for the Gobal strategy for Infant and
Young Child Feeding.
31
David Fidler, supra note 29.
32
Article 38. 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law; c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d)
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
33
Supra note 29.
34
Louis Henkin, et al., International Law, Cases and Materials, 2nd Ed.,
supra note 21, at 114-136.
35
Supra note 19.
36
90 Phil. 70 (1951).
37
Supra note 15.
38
G.R. No. 159938, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 405.
39
Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the World
Intellectual Property Organization, www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite;
September 13, 2007, 12:33, citing the 1999 WIPO Resolution
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, 2000
WIPO Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses, and 2001
WIPO Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of
Marks and other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on the Internet.
40
Id.
41
Supra note 29.
42
Section 2. Purpose – These Revised Rules and Regulations are
hereby promulgated to ensure the provision of safe and adequate
nutrition for infants and young children by the promotion, protection
and support of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes, breastmilk supplements and related products
when these are medically indicated and only when necessary, on the
basis of adequate information and through appropriate marketing and
distribution. (Underscoring supplied)
43
Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a person from the age of more
than twelve (12) months up to the age of three (3) years (36 months).
(Underscoring supplied)
44
G.R. No. 144218, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 42, 55.
45
See pp. 19-21.
46
See p. 21.
47
Executive Order No. 292, made effective on November 23, 1989 by
Proclamation No. 495.
48
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US 11 (1905); Beltran v. Secretary
of Health G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 168, 196;
St. Lukes’s Medical Center Employees Association- AFW v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162053, March 7, 2007;
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA
730, 741; Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112, 123-124; Rivera v. Campbell,
34 Phil. 348, 353-354 (1916); Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil.
595, 597 (1927).
49
As early as People v. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440, 445 (1924), we already
noted that "advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of
police power of the state today things which were not thought of
as being with in such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public
opinion, with [an increasing] desire on the part of the masses and of
the government to look after and care for the interests of the
individuals of the state, have brought within the police power of the
state many questions for regulation which formerly were not so
considered."
50
Act No. 2711, approved on March 10, 1917.
51
Known then as Public Health Service
52
Section 1, Chapter I, Title IX, Executive Order No. 292.
53
Id. at Section 3.
54
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers –
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials,
whether written, audio or visual, for products within the
scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed,
exhibited and broadcast unless such materials are duly
authorized and approved by an inter-agency committee
created herein pursuant to the applicable standards
provided for in this Code.
 (b) Manufacturers and distributors shall not be permitted to
give, directly or indirectly, samples and supplies of products
within the scope of this Code or gifts of any sort to any
member of the general public, including members of their
families, to hospitals and other health institutions, as well as
to personnel within the health care system, save as
otherwise provided in this Code.
(c) There shall be no point-of-sale advertising, giving of
samples or any other promotion devices to induce sales
directly to the consumers at the retail level, such as special
displays, discount coupons, premiums, special sales, bonus
and tie-in sales for the products within the scope of this
Code. This provision shall not restrict the establishment of
pricing policies and practices intended to provide products
at lower prices on a long-term basis.
(d) Manufactures and distributors shall not distribute to
pregnant women or mothers of infants any gifts or articles or
utensils which may promote the use of breastmilk
substitutes or bottlefeeding, nor shall any other groups,
institutions or individuals distribute such gifts, utensils or
products to the general public and mothers.
(e) Marketing personnel shall be prohibited from advertising
or promoting in any other manner the products covered by
this Code, either directly or indirectly, to pregnant women or
with mother of infants, except as otherwise provided by this
Code.
(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent donations from
manufacturers and distributors or products within the scope
of this Code upon request by or with the approval of the
Ministry of Health.
SECTION 7. Health Care System –
(a) The Ministry of Health shall take appropriate measures
to encourage and promote breastfeeding. It shall provide
objective and consistent information, training and advice to
health workers on infant nutrition, and on their obligations
under this Code.
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the
purpose of promoting infant formula or other products within
the scope of this Code. This Code does not, however,
preclude the dissemination of information to health
professionals as provided in Section 8(b).
(c) Facilities of the health care system shall not be used for
the display of products within the scope of this Code, or for
placards or posters concerning such products.
(d) The use by the health care system of "professional
service" representatives, "mothercraft nurses" or similar
personnel, provided or paid for by manufacturers or
distributors, shall not be permitted.
(e) In health education classes for mothers and the general
public, health workers and community workers shall
emphasize the hazards and risks of the improper use of
breastmilk substitutes particularly infant formula. Feeding
with infant formula shall be demonstrated only to mothers
who may not be able to breastfeed for medical or other
legitimate reasons.
SECTION 8. Health Workers –
(a) Health workers shall encourage and promote
breastfeeding and shall make themselves familiar with
objectives and consistent information on maternal and infant
nutrition, and with their responsibilities under this Code.
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors
to health professionals regarding products within the scope
of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual
matters and such information shall not imply or create a
belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified
in Section 5(b).
(c) No financial or material inducements to promote
products within the scope of this Code shall be offered by
manufacturers or distributors to health workers or members
of their families, nor shall these be accepted by the health
workers or members of their families, except as otherwise
provided in Section 8(e).
(d) Samples of infant formula or other products within the
scope of this Code, or of equipment or utensils for their
preparation or use, shall not be provided to health workers
except when necessary for the purpose of professional
evaluation or research in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health. No health
workers shall give samples of infant formula to pregnant
women and mothers of infants or members of their families.
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the
scope of this Code may assist in the research, scholarships
and continuing education, of health professionals, in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Ministry of Health.
SECTION 9. Persons employed by Manufacturers and Distributors –
Personnel employed in marketing products within the scope of this
Code shall not, as part of their job responsibilities, perform
educational functions in relation to pregnant women or mothers of
infants.
55
See p. 20.
56
See p. 21.
57
SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for products within the
scope of the Code are absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any
phrase or words that connotes to increase emotional, intellectual
abilities of the infant and young child and other like phrases shall not
be allowed.
58
See p. 30.
59
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
xxxx
(d) The term "humanized", "maternalized" or similar terms
shall not be used.
60
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code – The aim of the Code is to contribute
to the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for infants by the
protection and promotion of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper
use of breastmilk substitutes and breastmilk supplements when these
are necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through
appropriate marketing and distribution.
61
SECTION 26. Content – Each container/label shall contain such
message, in both Filipino and English languages, and which message
cannot be readily separated therefrom, relative the following points:
xxxx
(f) The health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of
infant formula and other related products including
information that powdered infant formula may contain
pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and
used appropriately.
62
TSN of the hearing of June 19, 2007, pp. 114-120.
63
TSN of June 19, 2007 hearing, pp. 193-194, 198, 231, 237-240,
295-300.
64
G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 295.
65
Id. at 314.
66
SECTION 7. Health Care System –
xxxx
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the
purpose of promoting infant formula or other products within
the scope of this Code. This Code does not, however,
preclude the dissemination of information to health
professionals as provided in Section 8(b).
67
SECTION 8. Health Workers. -
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors
to health professionals regarding products within the scope
of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual
matters and such information shall not imply or create a
belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified
in Section 5(b).
68
SECTION 8. Health Workers -
xxxx
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the
scope of this Code may assist in the research, scholarships
and continuing education, of health professionals, in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Ministry of Health.
69
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles – The following are the
underlying principles from which the revised rules and regulations are
premised upon:
xxxx
(i) Milk companies, and their representatives, should not
form part of any policymaking body or entity in relation to
the advancement of breastfeeding.
70
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or representatives of
products covered by the Code shall be allowed to conduct or be
involved in any activity on breastfeeding promotion, education and
production of Information, Education and Communication (IEC)
materials on breastfeeding, holding of or participating as speakers in
classes or seminars for women and children activities and to avoid the of the product, revocation of the CPR, suspension of the
use of these venues to market their brands or company names. License to Operate (LTO) for one year;
71
SECTION 9. Research, Ethics Committee, Purpose - The DOH shall (e) 5th and succeeding repeated violations – Administrative
ensure that research conducted for public policy purposes, relating to Fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the recall of the
infant and young child feeding should, at all times, be free form any offending product, cancellation of the CPR, revocation of
commercial influence/bias; accordingly, the health worker or the License to Operate (LTO) of the company concerned,
researcher involved in such must disclose any actual or potential including the blacklisting of the company to be furnished the
conflict of interest with the company/person funding the research. In Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the
any event, such research and its findings shall be subjected to Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);
independent peer review. x x x. (f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five Hundred
72
SECTION 10. Public Disclosure – For transparency purposes, a (P2,500.00) Pesos per day shall be made for every day the
disclosure and/or disclaimer of the sponsoring company should be violation continues after having received the order from the
done by the company itself, health worker, researcher involved IAC or other such appropriate body, notifying and penalizing
through verbal declaration during the public presentation of the the company for the infraction.
research and in print upon publication. For purposes of determining whether or not there is
73
SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health Workers – It is the "repeated" violation, each product violation belonging or
primary responsibility of the health workers to promote, protect and owned by a company, including those of their subsidiaries,
support breastfeeding and appropriate infant and young child feeding. are deemed to be violations of the concerned milk company
Part of this responsibility is to continuously update their knowledge and shall not be based on the specific violating product
and skills on breastfeeding. No assistance, support, logistics or alone.
89
training from milk companies shall be permitted. SECTION 52. Other Donations By Milk Companies Not Covered by
74
Supra note 68. this Code - Donations of products, equipments, and the like, not
75
SECTION 51. Donations Within the Scope of This Code - Donations otherwise falling within the scope of this Code or these Rules, given
of products, materials, defined and covered under the Milk Code and by milk companies and their agents, representatives, whether in kind
these implementing rules and regulations, shall be strictly prohibited. or in cash, may only be coursed through the Inter Agency Committee
76
159-A Phil. 142 (1975). (IAC), which shall determine whether such donation be accepted or
77
G.R. No. 159149, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 638. otherwise.
78 90
Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation v. Land Transportation
Commission, 456 Phil. 145, 155-156 (2003). Franchising and Regulatory Board, 459 Phil. 395, 399 (2003).
79 91
Yazaki Torres Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. G.R. No. 156041, February 21, 2007.
130584, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 86, 97.
80
Supra note 78, at 156.
81
Petitioner's Memorandum.
82
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles – The following are the
underlying principles from which the revised rules and regulations are
premised upon:
xxxx
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant
formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related products
are prohibited.
83
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles – x x x
(i) Milk companies, and their representatives, should not
form part of any policymaking body or entity in relation to
the advancement of breastfeeding.
84
SECTION 5. x x x x (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the owner,
manufacturer, distributor, of infant formula, follow-up milk, milk
formula, milk supplement, breastmilk substitute or replacement, or by
any other description of such nature, including their representatives
who promote or otherwise advance their commercial interests in
marketing those products; x x x.
85
SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions,
sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk
substitutes intended for infants and young children up to twenty-four
(24) months, shall be allowed, because they tend to convey or give
subliminal messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and
breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or
replacements, as well as related products covered within the scope of
this Code.
86
Supra note 70.
87
Supra note 73.
88
SECTION 46. Administrative Sanctions. – The following
administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon any person, juridical
or natural, found to have violated the provisions of the Code and its
implementing Rules and Regulations:
(a) 1st violation – Warning;
(b) 2nd violation – Administrative fine of a minimum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the violation,
including the recall of the offending product;
(c) 3rd violation – Administrative Fine of a minimum of Sixty
Thousand (P60,000.00) to One Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P150,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent
of the violation, and in addition thereto, the recall of the
offending product, and suspension of the Certificate of
Product Registration (CPR);
(d) 4th violation –Administrative Fine of a minimum of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) to Five Hundred
(P500,000.00) Thousand Pesos, depending on the gravity
and extent of the violation; and in addition thereto, the recall
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA
OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents
CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA,
all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO
and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her
parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE
ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA
ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO,
CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed
SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA
SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN,
all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA,
MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP
JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT,
BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR.
and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced
and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin
concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause
of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by
the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it
is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied,
rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are
also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and
forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a)
water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the
water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility
and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of
corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the
entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation
and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known
as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as
well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some
sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained
no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8%
of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors
have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas
covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of
this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious
injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As
a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders
to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
 great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique
natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust
for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with
the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto
attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the
existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel
the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country
that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's
is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that
is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151,
6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel
the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches
of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
(2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not
only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners
filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause
of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise
rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may
still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague
and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of
action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging
should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25)
years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are
so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by
the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said
order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint,
the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are
seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of
action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before
it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter
of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this
Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches
of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal
wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for
in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for
the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one
of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to
provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to
healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not
impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance.
12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would
be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987
E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of
the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the population
to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social
and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure,
for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and
the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to
the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2
of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment
and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge
of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the
State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b)
to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it
speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by
virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should
be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to
the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21
this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care
and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the
law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on
the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved
is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed
in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess
of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-
impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo
declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by
such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary
did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity
to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into
every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires,
the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are
the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall
be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that
a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the
same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting
their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government,
is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in
Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free
of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if
the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed
in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
 
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr.,
J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by
this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision
are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all
the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought
to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as
a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from
the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned
and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any
and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the
part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left
for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with
very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles;
of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets
and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
— all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth
"Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners
nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of
the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of
private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a
legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is
in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution
are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should
have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of
a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional
or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to
this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of
law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected
to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced
and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
 respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area
of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments —
the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents
should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon
proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that
they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all
the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance
for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
 
 
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr.,
J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by
this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision
are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all
the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought
to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as
a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from
the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned
and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any
and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the
part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left
for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with
very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles;
of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets
and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
— all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth
"Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners
nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of
the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of
private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a
legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is
in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution
are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should
have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of
a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional
or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to
this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of
law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected
to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced
and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area
of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments —
the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents
should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon
proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that
they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all
the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance
for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 164; 186.
2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.
3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.
4 Rollo, 67.
5 Id., 74.
6 Rollo, 70-73.
7 Annex "B" of Petitions; Id., 43-44.
8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.
9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged,
1986, 1508.
10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.
11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.
12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.
13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the
National Economy and Patrimony.
14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
15 E.O. No. 292.
16 Section 1.
17 Section 2.
18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947];
Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88
Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251
[1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata
vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs.
Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.
20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529
[1968]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayn, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal,
supra.
21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].
22 1991 ed., 226-227.
23 180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs.
Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191
SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991];
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA
767 [1991].
24 Rollo, 44.
25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].
26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].
27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.
28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.
29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.
30 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].
31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler Corp. supra.; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA
172[1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59
SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority,
156 SCRA 623 [1987].
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48             December 18, 2008
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, 1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by
DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA
CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON
SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has
of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally
trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and
other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage.
And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale
few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.2 But amidst
hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice
of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of
their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and
preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas
polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official
complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national
priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier
attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is
a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past,
once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for
different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse
mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that
could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the
complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the
complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of
omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and
present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL
defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water
quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms
of contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued
neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a
violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced
ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to
clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action
for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed
by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the
Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for
petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around
the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from
50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other
forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding
200 MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce
pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project.
For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its
evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-
generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean)
project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies,
jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and
restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-
diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-
agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed,
within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their
respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and
concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the
bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain
adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its
jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings,
provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper
disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay,
to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic
and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of
ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from
docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate
and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and
liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system
such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its
waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely
for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other
nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These
nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up
in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the
government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing
debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-
biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of
septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage
coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people
through education the importance of preserving and protecting the
environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to
protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually
consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other
executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for
review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the
said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS,
LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from
raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes,
petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial
act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and
affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision
did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45
petition on the following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT
HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E.,
IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT
SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS
SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL
COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I to their judgment or conscience. 13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE
CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT
COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS
NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152
under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific
pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to
clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral
arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the
premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial
duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." 10 Mandamus is
available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but
not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy
evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned.
They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions,
including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility
studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear
and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate
of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents,
petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to
choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill
they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners
are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and
liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend
to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as
defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the
other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the
law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice
Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as
a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local
oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But
to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an
adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as
well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c)
of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and
delineates the scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for
proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the
establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs
intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the
establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum
operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of
a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, 12
enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the
effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open
dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use
of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set
forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot
be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes
the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according
person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any
suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid
waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and
pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are
enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating
directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of
the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the
primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation,
more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water
pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all
aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity,
causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes]
measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such
pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality
Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-
year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope
covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this
Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the
following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four
(24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the
Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or
as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework
within twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action
Plan within 12 months following the completion of the framework for
each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be
reviewed by the water quality management area governing board
every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in
the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit
a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the
DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that
the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various government
agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December
2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and
time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy,
for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of
its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track
what are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234, 18 is vested with jurisdiction,
supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the
territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of
the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as
may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the
cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local
water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the
operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water
standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and
furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of
sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as
attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation
facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment,
and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country. 19 In relation to
the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation
facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution
in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of
1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce
all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of
agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government
units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a
monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic
resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a
sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with
coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality
standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be
responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development,
management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national
government, is tasked under EO 292 23 to provide integrated planning, design,
and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource
development systems in accordance with national development objectives and
approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to
perform metro-wide services relating to "flood control and sewerage
management which include the formulation and implementation of policies,
standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and
sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the
DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible
for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain
as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the
MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the
removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other
pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast
Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979, 24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of
1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with
the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission
upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and
enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators
who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship,
vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made
structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the
territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be
thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge,
or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets
and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into
such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any
navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable
water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed
or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP
Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the Philippine
territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the
PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to
perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the
capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine
pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the
enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime
Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and
regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish,
develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in
support of trade and national development." 26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513
states that the PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as
may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes
and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau
of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police
authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of
persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of
watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as
amended by MARPOL 73/78, 28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure
the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the
reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is
tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and
dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters,
it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain
adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as
other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would
necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction. 29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are
frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as
roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps
and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable
materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as
enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279),
eviction or demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH,
LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With
respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga,
Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the
Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the
demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in
coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water
Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of
waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for
domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in
coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall
formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of
sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment
system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix
sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the
Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH
is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of
wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the
requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection
treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental
sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment
Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education
in its school curricula at all levels. 32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in
collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine
Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign
to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the
environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on
the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental
concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste
management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2,
Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound
utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the
country’s development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue
a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,
preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters.
It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to
streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement
of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote
environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of
control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic
national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues
related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water
sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life;
and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the
noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves
clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of
each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their
tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution
incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water
has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its
best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water
to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the
polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at
his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-
up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be
charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such
pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o,
amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD
1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of
Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or
pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing
standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any
pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water
bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use:
Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are
necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same,
the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies
concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup
operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed
by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper
administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost
incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to
such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more
apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case,
merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup
operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution
incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions
would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which
defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the
pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill
condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous
substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions and
groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct
the government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and
cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water
concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to
"water pollution incidents," which are situations that presuppose the occurrence
of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment,
removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the
aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of
water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific
incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous
substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec.
62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and
cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture,
respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec.
20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed
covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of
businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly
accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far
from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of
Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents
contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled
with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to
the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert,
that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD
1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup operations"
embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As
pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not
appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state
that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a degree
where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress,
commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such
measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards."
In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on
the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched,
indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution
is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such
instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work
for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform
cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution
incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and
cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary
Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the
agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at
them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD
1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends
on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said
with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as
it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a
comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is
better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting
them to specific pollution incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the
implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that
the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-
nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty
who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water
pollution incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila
Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways
that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically
adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which
may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near
the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up
in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and
involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as
beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies
concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend
the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say
that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far
between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or
clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the
Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA
9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a
general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial
stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay
after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is
imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland
bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay.
Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no
time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal
minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus
behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and
the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin
them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay
and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial
discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," 36 the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring
that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce
directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial
and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other
unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-
Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting
waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the
accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the
Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river
systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of
the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously
addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these
important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as
much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is
Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code, 39 which prohibits the building of structures
within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and
lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3)
meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to
the easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be
allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial
establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major
rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as
unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying
industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary
waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial
discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River,
other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying
establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-
agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development
Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results
of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the
garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some
highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the
Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming
quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic
liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison
the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life,
and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large
amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas,
which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to
sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an
understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous
contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into
ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and
Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than
ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some
LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid
Waste.––No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any
practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs
which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed
after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled
dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this
Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five
(5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single
sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA
9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003,
like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other
public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the
like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply
discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the
Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which
enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of
infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea
waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which
proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic
environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters,
discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous
or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made
structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to
emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and
agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and
obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set
timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as
defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a
historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to
restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea
life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they
may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and
cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks
and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to
take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners
must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work
before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate
that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their
mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two
untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before
they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary
duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and
improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it
is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. 41 Even assuming the absence of
a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay,
they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation
to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and
clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust
reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with
MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in
the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
 rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with
waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like
Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the
them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of
recreation. RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws
In particular: on pollution.
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency (9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic
the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal
designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is sanitation clearance.
ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, 48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA
departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the 9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules. management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,
and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, 42 the DILG, in exercising their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the
guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the entire Philippine archipelago.
Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila
river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain economic growth
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan- marine waters.
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA,
discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality
determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the
tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying No costs.
establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a SO ORDERED.
reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under Associate Justice
pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, 43 the MWSS is directed to provide, WE CONCUR:
install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment
facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed atREYNATO
the earliest possible S.
time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, 44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
LEONARDO
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNA
sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, Associate Justice
and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible ANTONIO
time. T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUST
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, 45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to Associate Justice
improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist
the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, RENATOPampanga, and C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO
Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic Associate Justice
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O.
Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, Associate Justice
shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and
regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 46 and the International Convention for Associate Justice
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt
such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid RUBENand liquid wastes T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels Associate Justice
docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects
ARTURO D.
for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination
with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall
dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments CERTIFICATION
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal REYNATO S. PUNO
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the Chief Justice
country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in
coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and Footnotes
other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all 1
Now the Department of Education (DepEd).
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 2
Gore, An Inconvenient Truth 161.
and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) 3
Rollo, p. 74.
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, 4
Id. at 53.
and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater 5
Id. at 109-123. Penned by Executive Judge Lucenito N. Tagle (now
into the Manila Bay. retired Court of Appeals Justice).
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary
landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of
6
Id. at 47-58. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos
and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Jose
C. Reyes, Jr.
7 25
Id. at 52.
8
Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13,
1997, 268 SCRA 301, 306.
9
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed., 2004).
10
Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 490 (1912).
11
G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 657, as subsequently
reiterated on February 13, 2008.
12
RA 9003 was approved on January 26, 2001.
13
2 Feria Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated.
14
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed., 2004).
15
"Providing for the Reorganization of the [DENR], Renaming it as the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and for Other
Purposes."
16
Per DENR Secretary Jose Atienza, the DENR is preparing an EO
for the purpose. TSN of oral arguments, p. 118.
17
Per information from the Water Quality Management Section,
Environmental Management Bureau, DENR, as validated by the
DENR Secretary during the oral arguments. TSN, pp. 119-120.
18
"An Act Creating the [MWSS] and Dissolving the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority [NAWASA]; and for Other
Purposes."
19
Sec. 22. Linkage Mechanism.––The [DENR] and its concerned
attached agencies x x x shall coordinate and enter into agreement
with other government agencies, industrial sector and other
concerned sectors in the furtherance of the objectives of this Act. The
following agencies shall perform tile functions specified hereunder:
xxxx
b) DPWH through its attached agencies, such as the
MWSS, LWUA, and including other urban water utilities for
the provision or sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment and disposal of
sewage within their area of jurisdiction.
20
Book IV, Title IV, Sec. 2.
21
Sec. 14. Monitoring Control and Surveillance of the Philippine
Waters.––A monitoring, control and surveillance system shall be
established by the [DA] in coordination with LGUs and other agencies
concerned to ensure that the fisheries and aquatic resources in the
Philippine waters are judiciously and wisely utilized and managed on a
sustainable basis x x x.
22
Sec. 22. Linkage Mechanism.––x x x x
a) Philippine Coast Guard in coordination with DA and
DENR shall enforce for the enforcement of water quality
standards in marine waters x x x specifically from offshore
sources;
xxxx
c) DA, shall coordinate with the DENR, in the formulation of
guidelines x x x for the prevention, control and abatement of
pollution from agricultural and aquaculture activities x x x
Provided, further, That the x x x BFAR of the DA shall be
primarily responsible for the prevention and control of water
pollution for the development, management and
conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
23
Book IV, Title V, Sec. 2. Mandate.––The [DPWH] shall be the
State’s engineering arm and is tasked to carry out the policy
enumerated above [i.e., the planning, design, construction, and
maintenance of infrastructure facilities, especially x x x flood control
and water resources development systems].
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions.––The Department, in order
to carry out its mandate, shall:
xxxx
(2) Develop and implement effective codes, standards, and
reasonable guidelines to ensure the safety of all public and
private structures in the country and assure efficiency and
proper quality in the construction of public works;
(3) Ascertain that all public works plans and project
implementation designs are consistent with current
standards and guidelines;
xxxx
(8) Provide an integrated planning for x x x flood control and
water resource and water resource development systems x
x x.
24
Sec. 6. Enforcement and Implementation.–The [PCG] shall have the
primary responsibility of enforcing the laws, rules and regulations
governing marine pollution. However, it shall be the joint responsibility
of the [PCG] and the National Pollution Control Commission to
coordinate and cooperate with each other in the enforcement of the
provisions of this decree and its implementing rules and regulations,
and may call upon any other government office, instrumentality or
agency to extend every assistance in this respect.
Sec. 124. Persons and Deputies Authorized to Enforce this Code x
x x.–The law enforcements of the [DA], the Philippine Navy, [PCG,
PNP], PNP-Maritime Command x x x are hereby authorized to enforce
this Code and other fishery laws x x x.
26
<http://www.ppa.com.ph> (visited November 20, 2008).
27
EO 513, "Reorganizing the Philippine Ports Authority," Sec. 2
provides further:
Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as
follows:
Sec. 6-c. Police Authority.–x x x Such police authority shall
include the following:
xxxx
c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in
coordination with local police authorities;
xxxx
e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the
Authority pursuant to law.
28
"International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from
Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto."
29
Sec. 10. Role of LGUs in Solid Waste Management.––Pursuant to
the relevant provisions of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this Act within
their respective jurisdictions.
30
Sec. 72. Scope of Supervision of the Department.––The approval of
the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is required in the
following matters:
xxxx
(g) Method of disposal of sludge from septic tanks or other
treatment plants.
31
Sec. 5.1.1.a. It shall be unlawful for any person, entity or firm to
discharge untreated effluent of septic tanks and/or sewage treatment
plants to bodies of water without obtaining approval from the
Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representatives.
32
Sec. 53. Environmental Education.––The [DepEd] shall integrate
subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all
levels. It shall also endeavor to conduct special community education
emphasizing the relationship of man and nature as well as
environmental sanitation and practices.
33
Sec. 56. Environmental Education in the Formal and Nonformal
Sectors.––The national government, through the [DepEd] and in
coordination with concerned government agencies, NGOs and private
institutions, shall strengthen the integration of environmental concerns
in school curricula at all levels, with particular emphasis on the theory
and practice of waste management principles like waste minimization,
specifically resource conservation and recovery, segregation at
source, reduction, recycling, re-use, and composing, in order to
promote environmental awareness and action among the citizenry.
34
Title XVII, Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy.––The national budget shall
be formulated and implemented as an instrument of national
development, reflective of national objectives and plans; supportive of
and consistent with the socio-economic development plans and
oriented towards the achievement of explicit objectives and expected
results, to ensure that the utilization of funds and operations of
government entities are conducted effectively; formulated within the
context of a regionalized governmental structure and within the totality
of revenues and other receipts, expenditures and borrowings of all
levels of government and of government-owned or controlled
corporations; and prepared within the context of the national long-term
plans and budget programs of the Government.
35
Rollo, p. 76.
36
Vineet Narain v. Union of India, 1 SCC 226 (1998).
37
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 4 SC 463 (1987).
38
TSN, p. 121.
39
Repealed Art. 638 of the Civil Code. See E.L. Pineda, Property 399
(1999).
40
Asian Development Bank, The Garbage Book 44-45 (November
2006).
41
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 805.
42
Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.––(a)
Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall
exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure
that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
43
Sec. 8. Domestic Sewage Collection, Treatment and Disposal.––
Within five (5) years following the effectivity of this Act, the Agency
vested to provide water supply and sewerage facilities and/or
concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities
(HUCs) as defined in [RA] 7160, in coordination with LGUs, shall be
required to connect the existing sewage line found in all subdivisions,
condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports and recreational
facilities, hospitals, market places, public buildings, industrial complex
and other similar establishments including households to available
sewerage system. Provided, That the said connection shall be subject
to sewerage services charge/fees in accordance with existing laws,
rules or regulations unless the sources had already utilized their own
sewerage system: Provided, further, That all sources of sewage and
septage shall comply with the requirements herein.
44
Supra note 19.
45
Sec. 65. Functions of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources.––As a line bureau, the BFAR shall have the following
functions:
xxxx
q. assist the LGUs in developing their technical capability in
the development, management, regulation, conservation,
and protection of fishery resources;
xxxx
s. perform such other related function which shall promote
the development, conservation, management, protection
and utilization of fisheries and aquatic resources.
46
Supra notes 26 & 27.
47
Among the prohibited and penalized acts under Sec. 48 of RA 9003
are: (1) littering and dumping of waste matters in public places; (2)
open burning of solid wastes; (3) squatting in open dumps and
landfills; (4) transporting and dumping in bulk of collected domestic,
industrial, commercial and institutional wastes in areas other than
centers and facilities prescribed under the Act; (5) construction or
operation of waste management facilities without an Environmental
Compliance Certificate; and (6) construction or operation of landfills or
any waste disposal facility on any aquifer, groundwater reservoir or
watershed area.
48
Supra note 32.
49
Supra note 33.
 REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Republic of the Philippines
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health;
SUPREME COURT
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON.
Baguio City
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
EN BANC
Government, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014
x---------------------------------x
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in
G.R. No. 205003
behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
vs.
Petitioners,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
x---------------------------------x
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
G.R. No. 205043
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
Government, Respondents.
vs.
x---------------------------------x
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO,
G.R. No. 204934
DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA.
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI],
ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses
x---------------------------------x
Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
G.R. No. 205138
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. &
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented
Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf,
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco &
Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio
Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor
Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E.
children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco,
Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito
Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan
M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
vs.
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
& Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C.
Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and
Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J.
on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development,
Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine
HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and
V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food
Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura
and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine
on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on
Commission on Women, Respondents.
behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
x---------------------------------x
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws,
G.R. No. 205478
Petitioners,
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T.
vs.
DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T.
known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON
ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development,
For Life, Petitioners,
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
vs.
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B.
Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-
ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON.
Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE
Respondents.
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
x---------------------------------x
President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 205491
represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F.
MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity,
Donato Marcos, Respondents.
Petitioners,
x---------------------------------x
vs.
G.R. No. 204957
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines,
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
Respondent.
AVILA, Petitioners,
x---------------------------------x
vs.
G.R. No. 205720
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B.
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE
Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I.
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON
x---------------------------------x
CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
G.R. No. 204988
vs.
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
member of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R.
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON.
G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
vs.
Government, Respondents.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY.
CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI
CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B.
LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and
LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS
ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-
SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,
Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty
of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as
a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger,
illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared
towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every
member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people
and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the
main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies
that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to
fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions
within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch,
oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its
watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate.
Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly
embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the
Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of
population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic
society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to
sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings
organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has
caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold
support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions
and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys.
James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal
capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their
minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family
Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life
Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life
Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several
others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a
citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer
and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine
Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several
others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco
and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities
as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F.
Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar
(Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life
Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are
members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation,
Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera,
and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B.
Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for
Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as
citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and
Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in
his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B
UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against
their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are
public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital
staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious
beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present
danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under
the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by
PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would
mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is
claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define
the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to
due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own
affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to
explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer
their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the
service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family
protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon
their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their
beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between
the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also
claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived
of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of
legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is
non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government
Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
{ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive
health measures at the local government level and the ARMM,
infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the
Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective
comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law.
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the
petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56
former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie
Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty.
Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the
petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1]
there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe
for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH
Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the
Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of
the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties
and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the
cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their
clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale,
dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as
June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late
the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices."
Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of
a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions
relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical
product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on
Population, which recognized that the population problem should be considered
as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate
population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved
on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on
Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. "
The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad
educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples
desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further
reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos
issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which,
among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made
"available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all
Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69
Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the
method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the
commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710
or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to
provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on
galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million
Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the
year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus,
felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and
to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health
be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for
health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family
planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain
acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make
effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population
control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the
right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation
prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives
per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729,
the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable
and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials
in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of
the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money.
The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning
methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning
methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the
Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing
rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts
that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and
respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product
of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate
amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to
review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the
Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It
further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the
petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper
considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its
face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions
of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its
exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government,
which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of
separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of
the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or
political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch
done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows
it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH
Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to
protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of
review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of
legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point.
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but,
rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said
review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no
more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in
Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94
and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather
than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
"judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the
chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of
the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any
actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97
They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and
ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its
provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has
been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial
review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other;
that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement
of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was
argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there
was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners'
and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the
law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete
acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle
the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is
not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts
are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has
withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged
that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment
of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their
respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the
petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and
applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite
locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one
can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his
own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court.
This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in
cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected
by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed,
thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in
Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of
this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the
public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the
guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression
and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother
and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when
rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so,
when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions
for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. 120 Suffice
it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population
control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible
parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees
it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-
preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to
information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared
towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce
the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-
natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination
of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services,
methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the
RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are
related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained,
"the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care
including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the
Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In
Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis
Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted
a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the
human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination
of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and
the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable
human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health
of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed
legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford
protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient"
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill
the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the
petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes
natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used
as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency
that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies
to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it
shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend
that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes
that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices
products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that
contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law
was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with
the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is
asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination
and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined
as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of
one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently,
he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides
that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to
life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law,
is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law,
custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in
the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729,
entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion
of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote
population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-
term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's
rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus,
aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine
national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone
principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As
will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection
expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at
this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation,
however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This
is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For
said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription
prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because,
amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific
fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that
life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On
the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of
Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed
that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of
law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming
pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human
life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US
Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in
the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or
cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is
fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning
of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first
question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within.
Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell
division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no
question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes."
At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As
this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of
the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is
found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is
human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that
if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must
be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not
"from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life
begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described
by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the
moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under
the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of
writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to
the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define
when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined
by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no
doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point.
Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the
egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine
whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not
because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of
the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is
for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is
proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called
abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state
whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and
based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered
abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the
Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also
apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit
Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend
to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive
device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts
to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life,
to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the
lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I
would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term
"protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised
some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation
of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a
categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain
contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that
the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be
preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some
contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say
"from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is
even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded
that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but
I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby
s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the
beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters
an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a
zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used
by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human
person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the
sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human
development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence
of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid
nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a
new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is
the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position.
They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical
landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct
human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes
present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a
"Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and
therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that
PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this
stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from
the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no
matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and
human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after
that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where
only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or
political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically
well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent
with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical
parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism
and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by
Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization
and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the
WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or
scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of
the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has
been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control
in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but
also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of
any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine
wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and
abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the
record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the
unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever
passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme
Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination,
at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates
that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by
Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of
the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel
to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of
the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms
shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods,
facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-
being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to
decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number,
spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual
health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health
rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any
law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient
as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not
only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce
abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH
Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to
that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind),
the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that
protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the
moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from
the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the
fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the
Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And
as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law
that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd.
The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all
be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every
instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-
abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section
9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the
FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the
proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any
means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be
used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR
gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms
shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven
modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum
or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses
of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and
recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well
taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the
qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the
RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as
an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the
prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval
of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe
mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that
these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the
definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared
policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be
included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do
not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the
secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line
with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in
the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and
the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and
supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who
never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of
contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined
oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an
indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of
the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to
ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not
self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and
policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities
refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard,
the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to
health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide
for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for
their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into
the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI,
do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays
that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a
prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave
intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away
with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public
that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly
explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same
cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/
or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921
or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not
repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with
the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in
full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to
sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any
contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by
a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion
which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of
the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or
agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary
purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this
Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an
imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921
provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No
medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall
be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to
the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital
pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and
other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will
lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is
completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original.
Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the
RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH
shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning
supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate
local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and
distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on,
among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to
space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and
monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that
the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible
means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden
are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices,
for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from
or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being
the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are
safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as
expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-
abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be
construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and
approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and
non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply
from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination
by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress
that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not
covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their
religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives,
whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners
who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives
but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely
opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life,
and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies
the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives,
arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious
beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address
religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes
upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able
to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring
the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do
without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is
recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities
referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the
law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in
Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that
the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still
considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They
add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they
tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives
with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono
reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of
those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to
refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings.
While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor
injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to
justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or
threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions
according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of
responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify
the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-
be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and
to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of
penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its
provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide
that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It
neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the
RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective
and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in
line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of
the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or
practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They
assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is
an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free
will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should
be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to
religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of
the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the
Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this
on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one
hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen
who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health
care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without
unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as
the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the
respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for
would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to
any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars
are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free
to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide
on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural
family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic
hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is
made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice,
has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in
a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant
towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they
conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in
crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution
reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their
spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by
tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it
instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State
would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle
of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of
the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely
believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred
over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term
"church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or
any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample
barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the
Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article
VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two
guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support
or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the
free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It
has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.
Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or
all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose
and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6
Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and
449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of
individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for
religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual
religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that
the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however
strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the
State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is
"subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the
Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated
"that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is
the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the
same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral
law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by
the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling
state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is
the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it
should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits.
Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible
Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not
employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility
of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society
and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test
as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious
exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of
the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state
interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag
then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona
test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and
present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or
"grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious
speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the
other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom
will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however,
which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case
that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously,
the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society,
Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave
and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible
or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has
different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and
short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right
that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable
and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for
an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty.
The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid
of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of
interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore
not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over
the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to
batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty,
reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the
purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection
to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which
involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling
state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.
[Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine
whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem
reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood
only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court
stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and
religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be
compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions
against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are
the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to
all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods
which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such
as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to
promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to
have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health,
particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in
accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions.
[Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning
methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural
beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human
rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and
people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious
sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to
the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared
responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government
can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot
refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health
manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment
Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23
and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with
the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than
strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to
religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an
intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the
other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an
act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner
Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is,
however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers
complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly.
One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act
by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the
right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience.
This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in
communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being
silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in
his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH
Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of
choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any
degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of
one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of
individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing
of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the
principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session,
found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde
Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors
under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to
delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this
would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was
the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their
conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions
should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and
Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative
of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health
procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be
respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the
Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty
of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour
to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or
mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when
what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-
protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on
a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a
constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal
health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief
of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not
be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to
other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all,
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that
guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in
the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in
the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills,
whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by
oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such
concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly
and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is
stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection
clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict
between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page
52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of
religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not
thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH
Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial,
city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged
with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who
can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be
considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against
the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must
prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents,
in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more
compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of
services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the
law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in
vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling
state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right
not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral
arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts
of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the
compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious
objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling
State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This
is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by
the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the
free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the
government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means
the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this
freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of
an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a
couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children
refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides
to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and
occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of
the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which
could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also,
the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that
the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be
momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the
very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the
State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform
an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last
vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to
ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they
stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The
Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. -
The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and
gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a
woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality
and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health
services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the
rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of
women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
 (1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to
address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods
of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality
education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-
related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children,
women and children victims and survivors shall be provided
with comprehensive health services that include
psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions
and assistance towards healing, recovery, and
empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual
dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing
years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental
health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through
programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide
women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate
information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth and the development of moral character
and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere
of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human
dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning
methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the
compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however,
failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable
sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported
that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such
revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social
healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure
that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth
in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to
render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right
to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a
medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to
unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral
arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral
clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the
RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein
intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to
bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child
and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is
medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to
the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the
mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the
child because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the
religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever
burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more
than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable
exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated.
All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the
type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be
natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any
information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled
to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters
of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates
the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy.
It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than
promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is
the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to
the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population
growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the
parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is
already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on
any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the
following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of
disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
[Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation
and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and
decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution
espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family."
One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both
spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By
giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and
barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger
the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This
would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as
an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter
which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would
reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to
undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as
one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown
any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall
have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations,
including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed,
responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be
allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family
by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to
undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of
marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of
spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to
privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the
US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O.
Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons.
Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples.
Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the
minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,
whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she
is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because
there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care,
advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say
that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote
unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of
parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the
recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in
the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse
under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on
one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second
paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own
body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of
the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones'
health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be
allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental
control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to
accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In
such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical
care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be
struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only
in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save
for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this
right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen
the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof,
mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle
of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively
force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they
believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing
various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in
the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to
an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging
of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the
RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of
instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue,
the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places
more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by
recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in
upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in
the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of
the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-
appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional
changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible
teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and
that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself
provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity
and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that
the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive
health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very
well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By
imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention
that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without
merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus
violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section
23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service
provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts
hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section
23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and
providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect
information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only
be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health
care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution,
which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance
and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability
or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2)
public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a
midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care
services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs
under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders
primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to
function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the
law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of
confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject
to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt
from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures.
The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes
health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide
incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or
intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full
range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a
copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with
the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)
(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is
acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not
barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and
services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to
provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive
use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the
poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law
dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259
and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law
renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to
expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst
itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's
duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under
the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of
the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members
of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include
or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members
of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-
application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations
excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive
health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that
they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the
use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with
the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a
deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to
state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend
public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates
the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that
Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government
health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because
it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section
17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner
and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with
conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the
practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public
health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude
connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish
to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider
the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long
as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have
the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render
such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health
services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711
reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office
to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of
Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and
shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the
rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of
health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the
implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation
of health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity,
purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to
serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products
prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers,
exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer
users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that
reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to
the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or
any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified
complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA
Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist
order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60)
days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of
any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all
concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA
are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the
country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary
powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and
"methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the
permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under
Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the
LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and
facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall
likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x
x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public
works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive
orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are
not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing
agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases
supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is
that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it
has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to
the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health
professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local
autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it
comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law
which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory
for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an
undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed
by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments
can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its
autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the
organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption
of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy
statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by
the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the
notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its
inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all
matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it
to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or
invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is
not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity
to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school
are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the
past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written
law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that
the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it
conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be
used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights
inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking
away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available
to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it
seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors
of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve.
After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious
group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society.
Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As
such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony
may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape
the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial
issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's
wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long
run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program
generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of
their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These
young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped
them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now
trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore,
even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our
Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young
able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down
by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to
support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go
down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State
should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court
is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its
duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the
same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set
of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of
the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it
the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt
judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function
of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and
mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and
enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws,
but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The
Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-
coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court
declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to
the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
 under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is See Separate dissent
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family Associate Justice
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s; CERTIFICATION
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
regardless of his or her religious beliefs. Chief Justice
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life- Footnotes
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo 1 Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse; Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003; 405 SCRA 497,
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR 504.
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to 2 See <http://wn.com/pro-rh_ bill_vs_anti-rh_ bi ll>, last visited on
elective surgical procedures. November 5, 20 13; See also <http://www.abs-
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, cbnnews.com/nation/04/ 19/ I O/h ontiveros-tatad-debate-rh-bill>, last
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any vi sited on November 5, 201 3.
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient 3 See <http ://news info .inqu irer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under 20110321-326743/Stickers-spread-anti-RH-bill-message>, last visited
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within on November 5, 2 01 3; See also <http
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of ://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/ 218169/news/nation/carlos-
his or her religious beliefs; celdran-distributes-pro-rh-stickers-in-quiapo>, last visited on
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, November 5, 201 3.
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public 4 See <http ://newsinfo. inquirer.net/241 737/massive-church-rally-set-
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall against-rh-bill>, last visited November 5, 201 3; See also
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health <http://www.splendorofthechurch.eom.ph/201 3/04/29/fi lipino-
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; catholics-flex-muscles-in-poll-clout/>, last visited November 5, 2013.
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR 5 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 2048 19; rollo (G.R.
far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth No. 204819), pp. 3-32.
accreditation; and 6 With Prayer for the Urgent Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No.
the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, 204934; rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 3-76.
as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening 7 Also proceeding in her personal capacity a citizen and as a member
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the of the Bar.
Constitution. 8 Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C . Gorrez,
by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista &
R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional. Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho,
SO ORDERED. Femand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette
Associate Justice C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel Fernando C .
WE CONCUR: Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C.
Tingnan ang aking opinyong Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor &
Chief Justice Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor
See Concurring Opinion PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, & Raphae l C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho
ANTONIO T. CARPIO JR. for themselves a nd on behalf of their minor chi ldren Margarita
Associate Justice Associate Justice Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho,
Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Franc ine Y. Racho for themse lves and
on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho,
With Separate concurring
See: Separate Concurring Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, C hessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses
opinion
Opinion David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION the ir minor child Gabrie l Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of
CASTRO
Associate Justice her minor children Elijah General Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Associate Justice
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R.
Laws
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN 9 With Prayer for Injunction; docketed a s G.R. No. 204957.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 10 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/
Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 204988; rollo
(G.R. No. 204988), pp. 5-3 5.
See Concurring and dissenting See Concurring Opinion 11 Through and together with its president Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD 12 Through and together with its representative/ member of the school
Associate Justice Associate Justice board Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D.
13 Rosemarie R. Alenton, Imelda G. Ibarra, Cpa, Lovenia P. Naces,
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Phd. , Anthony G. Nagac, Earl Anthony C. Gambe And, Marlon I. Yap.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 14 Docketed as G.R. No. 205003; Petition is entitled "Petition (To
Declare As Unconstitutional Republic Act No. 10354)." The petition
fails to provide any description as to nature of the suit under the Rules
See Concurring and Dissenting of Court; rollo (G.R. No. 205003), pp. 3-40.
See concurring and dissenting Opinion 15 With prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order;
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS- docketed as G.R. No. 205043 ; rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 3-16.
Associate Justice BERNABE 16 Through its vice president and co-founder, Eduardo B.Olaguer.
Associate Justice 17 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/
Writ of Prel iminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 205 138; rollo
(G.R. No. 205138), pp. 3-50.
18 Through and together with its president Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo.
19 Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes,
Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio 0. Plana, Bienvenido C.
Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno And Baldomero Falcone.
20 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/
Writ of Pre lim inary Injunction; The petition fails to provide any
description as to nature of the suit under the Rules of Court; docketed
as G.R. No. 205478; rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 3-26.
21 Jacqueline H. King, M.D., Cynthia T. Domingo, M.D., Josephine
Millado-Lumitao, M.D., Anthony Perez, Michael Anthony G. Mapa,
Carlos Antonio Palad, Wilfredo Jose, Claire Navarro, Anna Cosio,
Gabrie l Dy Liacco
22 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/
Writ of Prelim inary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 20549 1; rollo
(G.R. No. 20549 1), pp. 3-13.
23 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/
Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 205720; rollo
(G.R. No. 205720), pp. 3-90.
24 Through and together with its executive director, Loma Melegrito.
25 Joselyn B. Basilio, Robert z. Cortes, Ariel A. Crisostomo, Jeremy I.
Gatdula, Cri stina A. Montes, Raul Antonio A. N idoy, Winston Conrad
B. Padojinog, Rufino L. Policarpio III.
26 Docketed as G.R. No. 206355, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 3-32.
27 Through and together with its co-petitioners, Attys. Ramon
Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Cataluna
Causing .
28 With prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R.
No. 207 111 ; rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 3-51.
29 Mary M. lmbong, Anthony Victorio B. Lumicao, Joseph Martin Q.
Verdejo, Antonio Emma R. Roxas and Lota Lat-Guerrero.
30 With prayer for a Writ of Pre liminary Injunction; docketed as G.R.
No. 207 172; rollo (G.R. No. 207 172), pp. 3-56.
31 Spouses Juan Carlos Artadi Sarmiento and Francesca Isabelle
Besinga-Sarmiento, and Spouses Luis Francis A. Rodrigo, Jr. and
Deborah Marie Veronica N. Rodrigo.
32 Docketed as G.R. No. 2 07563; rollo (G.R. No. 2 07563), pp. 3-1 5.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 138-1 55.
34 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 124 8-1 260.
35 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 20481 9), pp. 8-1 O;
Petit ion, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rol!
o (G.R. No. 20493 4), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro
City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition,
Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rol!o (G.R. No.
205138), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. N o.
205478), pp. 10-1 3; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v.
Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No . 20635 5), pp . 11-15 ; Petition,
Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 17- 18; Petition, Buhay
Party-list (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 1255- 1256.
36 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 26-28; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De
Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G. R. No. 204988), pp. 15-1 6; Petition,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. N o. 205478), pp. 13- 14; Petition, Pro-
Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),
pp. 30-35.
37 Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition, Philippine Alliance of
XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 39-44;
Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rol/o (G. R. No. 205491), pp.
8-9; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 205720), pp . 59-67; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation,
Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2 06355), pp. 25-26.
38 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 I 9), pp. 20-22;
Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 204934), pp. 34-38; Petition, Task Force for the Family and
Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27;
Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 6-7; Petition,
Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205720), pp. 56-75; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v.
Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 16-22; Petition,
Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 111), pp.28-33 ; Petition, Couples
for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No. 207 172), pp. 12-
16.
39 Section 5.23 Skilled Health Professional as a Conscientious
Objector. ln order to be considered a conscientious objector, a skilled
health professional shall comply with the following requirements:
a) Submission to the DOH of an affidavit stating the modem
family planning methods that he or she refuses to provide
and his or her reasons for objection;
b) Posting of a notice at the entrance of the clinic or place of
practice, in a prominent location and using a clear/legible
font, enumerating the reproductive health services he or she
refuses to provide; and c) Other requirements as
determined by the DOH. xxx.
Provided, That skilled health professionals who are pub lic
officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or
Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses,
public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are
specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. xx x
(Emphases Ours)
40 Joint Memorandum, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp.
26 17-26 19.
41 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa,
ro/lo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 40; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 205478), pp.6-7; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, In c. v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), p. 81.
42 Petition, Pro-l ife Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R.
No. 205720), pp. 63-64; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc.
v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 20-23.
43 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo,
(G.R. No . 204988), pp. 16-48 ; Petition , Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 2 05478), pp. 7-9.
44 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,
(G.R. No. 204988), pp. 16-48; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 205478), pp. 7-9.
45 Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 30-3 1; Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 1247- 1250; Petition, Millennium Saint
Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2063 55),
pp. 25; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 207 172 ), pp. 43-45.
46 Joint Memorandum, Im bong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19),
pp. 2626-2637; Petition, Alcantara, pp. 9-1 3; rollo, (G.R. No. 204934),
pp. 146- 150; Petition, Pro-l ife Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 78-81.
47 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, ro//o (G.R.
No. 207172), pp. 32-34.
48 Petition, l mbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 2623-
2626; Petition, Alcantara, pp.5-9; rollo, (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 142-
148; Petition, Serve life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,
(G.R. No. 204988), pp. 20-21; Petition, Bugarin v. Office of the
President, rollo (G. R. No. 205003), pp. 14- 16; Petit ion, Millennium
Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No.
206355), p. 16; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, In c. v.
Ochoa, ro//o (G. R. No. 207 172), pp. 16-20.
49 Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 2 0481 9), pp. 14- 19;
Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 204934), pp. 42-44; Petition, Task Force for the Family and
Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 21-25;
Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President,
rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 23-25; Petition, Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 23 -28.
50 Jo int Memorandum, Jmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No . 204819),
pp. 257 1-2574; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp.
11-1 2; Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No.
205491), pp. 7-8; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v.
Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 207172), pp. 28-32.
51 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 28-33; Petition, Philippine Alliance of
XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205138), pp. 37-38.
52 Section 26. ( I) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof; Task
Force for the Family and l ife Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
204957), pp. 6-1 O; Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205478), pp.
9-10.
53 Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 205720), pp. 14-30.
54 Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp.
894-900; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 207172), pp. 45-48; Petition, Tillah v. Executive Secretary,
rollo (G.R. No. 207563) pp. 6-12.
55 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 362-480.
56 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 195-353.
57 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 487-528.
58 Rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 871-1007.
59 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp.1 306-1334; rollo, (G.R. No. 204934),
pp. 98-132.
60 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 736-780.
61 In her Motion for Leave to Intervene, Senator Pilar Ju liana S.
Cayetano manifested that she was adopting as her own the
arguments raised by respondents Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie
Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez in their Petition for
Intervention; See rollo (G..R. No. 20481 9), pp. 173 1-1 783. After
being directed by the Court to file their respective memoranda,
intervenors Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr.
Alberto G. Romualdez manjfested on November 18, 201 3, that they
were adopting the arguments raised by Congressman Lagman in his
Joint Memorandum; See rollo (G..R. No. 20481 9), pp. 3061-3070. On
November 26, 201 3, Senator Pilar Juliana S. Cayetano file d her
separate Memorandum ; see, rollo (G. .R. No. 204819), pp. 3032-
3059.
62 Resolution dated March 15, 201 3.
63 Resolution, dated July 16, 201 3.
64 In its Resolution, dated August 27, 201 3, the Court required the
parties to also include the following in their respective memoranda:
1. What is the relation of the first portion of Section 7 on
Access to Family Planning to the theory that R.A. No. I 0354
is an anti-poor program that seeks to reduce the population
of the poor?
2. How is the second paragraph of the same section related
to the proposition that R.A. No. 10354 encourages sex
among minors?
3. In relation to Section 23 on Prohibited Acts, where in the
law can you find the definition of the term ' health care
service provider' ? Is the definition of a ' public health care
service provider ' found in Section 4, paragraph (n) of the
law sufficient for the Court to understand the meaning of a
'private health care service provider' or should the Court
refer to the Implementing Rules and Regulations which refer
to 'health care providers'?
4. With respect to ' health care providers' under the
Implementing Rules and Regulations, does it make a
difference that they are called ' health care providers' and
not ' health care service providers'? Does the fact that there
is a missing word indicate that there is a difference or that
the tautology being proposed actually refers to different
objects? If in the affirmative, is there enough basis to say
that the law is a criminal statute that has sufficient
definitions for purposes of punitive action?
5. In relation to Section 23(a)(l), how will the State be able
to locate the programs and services on which the health
care service provider has the duty to give information? If the
terminology of ' health care service provider ' includes '
private health care service provider', which includes private
hospitals and private doctors, is the State duty-bound to
consequently provide these providers with information on
the programs and services that these providers should give
information on?
6. As regards programs, is there a duty on the part of the
State to provide a way by which private health care service
providers can have access to information on reproductive
health care programs as defined in Section 4, paragraph
(r)? What is the implication of the fact that the law requires
even private parties with the duty to provide information on
government programs on the criminal liability of private
health care service providers?
7. As regards services, what is the distinction between
'information' and 'services' considering that 'services' in
different portions of the statute include providing of
information?
8. What are the specific elements of every sub-group of
crime in Section 23 and what are the legal bases for the
determination of each element?
9. Are there existing provisions in other statutes relevant to
the legal definitions found in R.A. No. 10354?
10. Why is there an exemption for the religious or
conscientious objector in paragraph (3) of Section 23 and
not in paragraphs ( 1) and (2)? What is the distinction
between paragraph (3) and paragraphs ( 1) and (2)?
11 . Section 23(a)(3) penalizes refusal to extend quality
health care services and information 'on account of the
person's marital status, gender, age, religious convictions,
personal circumstances, or nature of work.' What if the
refusal is not on account of one's marital status, gender,
age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or
nature of work, or what if the refuser simply does not state
the reason for the refusal? Will there still be a criminal
liability under Section 23(a)(3)?
12. Still on Section (23 )(a)(3) on referring a person to
another facility or provider, is this the same or analogous to
referral of a person to seek second opinion? What is the
medical standard for the provision of a second opinion? In
referring to another professional or service provider for a
second opinion, is it the patient who is not comfortable with
the opinion given by the first doctor that triggers the duty or
option to refer? How is it different with the situation in
Section 23(a)(3) when it is the doctor who is not comfortable
about giving an opinion? Is the difference legally material?
13. How does Section 23, paragraph (c) relate to Article 134
the Labor Code which requires employers to provide family
planning services?
14. Section 24 provides that in case the offender is a
juridical person, the penalties in the statute shall be
imposed on the president or any responsible officer. For
each offense in Section 23, how will the corporate officer be
made responsible if there is no actual participation by the
hospital board directors or officers of such action? Does
Section 24 in relation to Section 23 require corporate
action? What is the situation being contemplated in the
second paragraph of Section 24 before there can be
accountability for criminal violations?
15. Section 7 provides that access of minors to information
and family planning services must be with the written
consent of parents or guardians. Is the re a penalty in the
law for those who will make these information and services
(e.g. , contraceptives) available to minors without the
parent's consent? How does this relate to Section 14 which
requires the Department of Education to formulate a
curriculum which 'shall be used by public schools' and ' may
be adopted by private schools'? Is there a penalty for
teaching sex education without the parents' or guardians'
written consent? Correlatively, is there a penalty for private
schools which do not teach sex education as formulated by
the DepEd considering the use of the word ' may'?
65 Section I , R.A. No. 4729
66 Entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting
Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines."
67 See http://www.pop.org/content/coercive-population-ploys-in-ph
ilippines-1428, last visited October 17, 2013.
68 Entitled "Revising the Population Act of Nineteen Hundred And
Seventy-One."
69 <http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-
%20Promoting%20Reproductive%20Health.pdf->, last visited October
17, 2013.
70 Held in Cairo, Egypt from September 5- 13, 1994.
71 Section 17, R.A. 97 10.
72 See <www. nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d)pop.asp>; last accessed
February 2 0, 2014.
73 Alliance /or the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI) v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 204934), p. 1408.
74 Id.
75 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 376.
76 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 377.
77 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 378.
78 G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 20 10, 632 SCRA 146, 166.
79 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 385,
387-388.
80 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp .3 81-
384.
81 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 ( 1936).
82 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. I.
83 Constitution, Art. Vll , Sec. I.
84 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
85 Supra note 81.
86 See Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc., et al. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 799 (1989).
87 Francisco, Jr. v. Th e House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 ,
November I 0, 2003, citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139, 158 (1936).
88 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 77-78 (2009).
89 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G. R. No. 19627 I, October 18,
20 I I, 659 SCRA 270, 326-327.
90 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G. R. No. I 92935 &
G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 7 8, I 77.
91 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 (I997).
92 453 Phil. 586 (2003).
93 G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA137.
94 G.R No. 187 167, July 16, 2011 , 655 SCRA 476.
95 Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 83 0, 882-883
(2003), citing Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some
Recurring Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial Review And Decision
Making, 37 A MJJUR 17, 24 (1 992).
96 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G. R. No . 192935,
December 7, 20 10, 637 SCRA 78, 148 ; Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 20 10, 632 SCRA 146, 166-1 67; Senate of the
Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. I, 27 (2006); Francisco v. House of
Representatives, 460 Phil. 83 0, 892 (2003).
97 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 2 04819), pp. 375-
376.
98 Comment-In-Intervention, Hontiveros, et al., rollo, (G.R. No.
204934), pp. 106- 109; Comment-In-Intervention, Cabral et al., rollo,
(G.R. No. 204819), pp. 500-501.
99 Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, 556 Phil.
83, 9 1-92 (2007).
100 Jriformation Technology Foundation of the Philipp ines v.
Commission on Elections , 499 Phil. 281, 304-305 (2005).
101 Lawyers Against Monopoly And Poverty (LAMP) v. Th e Secretary
of Budget and Management, G. R. No. 164987, April 24, 201 2, 670
SCRA 373 , 383.
102 The Province Of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, 589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008).
103 Id. at 483 .
104 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 ( 1997).
105 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 381.
106 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 ( 1987).
107 The First Amendment of the US Constitution reads: Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
108 Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phi l. 357 (2008);
Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265 (2004 ); Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 421 Phi I. 290 (200 I).
109 Resolution, Romualdez v. Commission on Elect ions, 594 Phil.
305, 3 16 (2008).
110 Constitution, Article VIII , Section 1.
111 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 375-
376.
112 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), p. 384.
113 Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Th e Executive Secretary, 558
Phil. 338, 350 (2007).
114 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633
(2000), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 ( 1962).
115 Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio; Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 406 (2008).
116 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board and
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 591 Phil. 393, 404 (2008);
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321 (1997);
De Guia v. COMELEC, G .R . No. 104 71 2, May 6, I 992, 208 SCRA
420, 422.
117 503 Phil. 42, 53 (2005).
118 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).
119 464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).
120 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 388-
389.
121 The Province Of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, supra note 102; Ortega v. Quezon City
Government, 506 Phil. 373, 380 (2005); and Gonzales v. Comelec,
137 Phil. 471 (1969).
122 Section 26. (I) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
123 Petition, Task Force for the Family and life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 6-10; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 205478), pp. 9-10.
124 Joint Memorandum, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819) pp. 212-
214.
125 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819, pp.389-
393.
126 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. N o. 204934), p. 1396.
127 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. No. 204934), p. 1396.
128 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. No. 204934), p. 1396.
129 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Edition, pp. 15 7-1 58; citing
82 CJS 365.
130 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rol/o (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 8-10;
Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 204934), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro
City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition,
Olaguer v. Ona, ro/lo (G. R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No .
2051 38), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2
05478), pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office
of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 206355), pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Partylist
(BU HAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1255 -1256.
131 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa,
rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De
Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition,
Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205138), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No .
205478), pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v.
Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 11-1 5; Petition,
Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay
Partylist (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 1255-1256.
132 Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, inc. v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 205720), pp. 14-30.
133 Memorandum, Alcantara, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2133; Reply,
Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 339-340.
134 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 393-
396; Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp.
230-233; Comment-In-Intervention, C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19),
pp. 1091-11 92; Hontiveros, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 111-1 16;
Memorandum, Cayetano,, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 3038-3041.
135 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 396-
410.
136 Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp.
225-342.
137 Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
138 See Republic Act No. 4729, dated June 18, 1966.
139 See http://www.pop.org/content/coerci ve-population-ploys- in-
philippines- 1428 , last visited October 17, 2013.
140 <http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-
%20Promoting%20Reproductive%20 Health.pdt>, last visited October
17, 2013.
141 <http://www.pop.org/content/ coercive-population-p loys-in-ph ii
ippines-1428>
During the deliberation, it was agreed that the individual members of
the Court ca n express their own views on this matter.
142 Petition, Alliance/or the Family Foundation, Inc. (AL FI) v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp . 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De
Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 2 04988), pp. 13- 15; Petition,
Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205 138), pp. 8-36 ; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205478), pp. 10-13 ; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v.
Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 11-15; Petition,
Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 111), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay
Party/isl (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1255-1256.
143 Comment-ln-lntervention, Lag man, rollo, (G. R. No. 204819), pp.
225-342.
144 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 201 2, 676 SCRA 579.
145 Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 469.
146 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 262.
147 G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 618 Phil. 634 (2009).
148 Gonzales v. Carhart (Nos. 05-380 and 05-1382), No. 05- 380, 413
F. 3d 791 ; 05- 1382, 435 F. 3d 1163,
149 http: //www.law.comell.edu/supct/html/05-380.ZO.html, last visited
February 15, 2014.
150 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September
16, 1986, p. 668.
151 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September
12, 1986, p. 596.
152 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September
12, 1986, p. 669.
153 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September
19, 1986, p. 800.
154 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September
17, 1986, p. 711 .
155 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September
17, 1986, p. 711.
156 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4 , September
17, 1986, p. 745 .
157 TSN, July 9, 2013 , pp. 23-24.
158 Id.
159 4th Edition, p. 375
160 Id, p. 609
161 Sumpaico, Gutierrez, Luna, Pareja, Ramos and Baja-Panlilio, 2"d
Edition, (2002), pp. 76-77.
162 Moore, Persaud, Torchia, The Developing Human: Clinically
Oriented Embryo logy, International Edition, 9th Edition (2013), pp. 1-
5, 13.
163 O'Rahilly, Ronan and Muller, Fabiola, Huma n Embryo logy &
Teratology. 2nd edition. New York: Wiley-Liss, 1996, pp. 8, 29, cited
at: http://www.princeton.edu/-prolife/articles/embryoguotes2.html, last
visited February 15, 2014.
164 From https://www.philippinemedicalassociation
.org/downloads/circular-forms/ Position-Paper-on-the-Republic-Health-
Bill-%28Responsible-Parenthood-Bill%29.pdf. last visited March 26,
2014.
165 Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rol/o, (G.R. No. 204819), pp.
225-342.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See <http://americanpregnancy.org/duringpregnancy/
fetaldevelopment I .htm>, last visited April 7, 2014.
169 Joint Memorandum of the House of Representatives and
Respondent- Intervenor Rep. Edee I C. Lagman), Section 40, Rollo,
G.R. No. 2048 19, p. 2343.
170 Concurring Opinion (Justice Carpio), p. 3.
171 See TSN, July 9, 2013, p. 100.
172 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), pp. 17-19; Separate
Opinion (Justice Brion), p. 25.
173 Section 3.01 For purposes ofthese Rules, the terms shall be defin
ed as fo llows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily
induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertil ized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Admini stration (F DA) .
xxxx
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and
scientifically proven modern fam ily planning method,
device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that
prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a
fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being
implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) .
174 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), pp. 17-19; Separate
Opinion (Justice Brion), p. 25 .
175 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), p. 19 .
176 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI} v. Ochoa,
rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 26-28; Petition, Serve l ife Cagayan De
Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rolfo, (G. R. No . 204988), pp. 15-16; Petition,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 13- 14; Petition, Pro-
life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rolfo (G.R. No. 205 720),
pp. 30-35.
177 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, rollo, (G.R.
No . 204934), pp. 1419-1445.
178 Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the
reproductive system and to its functions and processes.
This implies that people are able to have a responsible,
safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that they have the
capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when ,
and how often to do so. This further implies that women and
men attain equal relationships in matters related to sexual
relations and reproduction.
179 Section 4. Definition of Terms . - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(w) Sexual health refers to a state of physical, mental and
social well-being in relation to sexuality. It requires a
positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual
relationships, as well as the possibility of having pleasurable
and safe sexual experiences, free from coercion,
discrimination and violence.
180 Me morandum, Alcantara, rollo, (G.R. No. 204934)p. 2136;
Memorandum , PAX, rollo (G.R. No. 205 138), pp. 2154-2155.
181 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 415-
416.
182 Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 ,
6 52 SCRA 690, 738-739.
183 335 Phil. 82 ( 1997).
184 Memorandum , Alliance for the Family Foundation, In c. (ALFI) v.
Ochoa, rol/o (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1408.
185 Id.
186 Memorandum, Lagman, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 2359-2361.
187 Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-De Castro) p. 54.
188 Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa,
rollo (G. R. No. 205138), pp. 40-41.
189 Petition, Task Force/or the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition, Philippine
Alliance of XSem inarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),
pp. 39-44; Petition, Tatadv. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No.
205491), pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp . 59-67; Petition, Millennium Saint
Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2063 55),
pp. 25-26.
190 Joint Memorandum, lmbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p.
2615.
191 Joint Memorandum, Imbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp .
2616-2621.
192 Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (GR. No. 205478), pp. 6-7.
193 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 207172), pp. 20-23.
194 Petition, Coup les for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 207 I 72), pp. 20-23.
195 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI) v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 35-37.; Petition, Millennium Saint
Foundation, In c. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),
pp. 17- 18.
196 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 3050;
Comment-in-Lntervention, Cabral, rollo (G.R. No. 2 04819), p. 5 11.
197 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 2677.
198 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), p. 3050.
199 Joint Memorandum Lagman, rol!o (G.R. No. 2048 19), p. 2361.
200 Memorandum . C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2189;
Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 3050-305 1.
201 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204 819), p. 3050 .
202 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2677.
203 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p . 2679.
204 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2679.
205 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2000 ed ., p. 179, citing Justice
Laurel in Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421.
206 Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. I 007
207 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed. , p. 330
208 Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. I 066
209 59 SC RA 54 (1974).
210 Escritor v. Estrada, A.M. No. P-02-1651 , June 22, 2006, 525 Phil.
110, 140- 141 (2006).
211 106 Phil. 2 (1959).
212 Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 9- 10 ( 1959).
213 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 25 6 (
1993 ), March 1, 1993.
214 525 Phil. 110 (2006).
215 Id. at 137.
216 Id. at 148.
217 Id . at 149.
218 Id. at 175.
219 Id. at 168- 169.
220 Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 4 11 , 560 (2003).
221 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, pp. 178-1 79.
222 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed. , p. 330.
223 Separate Opinion, Cruz, Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of
Schools, 219 SCRA 25 6 ( 1993 ), March 1, 1993.
224 Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 220, at 537.
225 20 130 CSIH 36.
226 http://www. skepticink.com/tippling/201 3/05/0 5/conscientious-
objection-to-abortion -cathoIic-midwives-win-appeal/; last visited
February 22, 2014
227 http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/20 13/05/03/conscientious-
objection-to-abortion-catholic-midwives-win-appeal; last visited
February 22 , 2014
228 453 Phil. 440 (2003).
229 Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed. , p. 565; See
Dissenting Opinion Makasiar, Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee G. R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975.
230 TSN , August 13, 201 3, pp. 52-54.
231 TSN, August27, 201 3, pp. 71-72
232 Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines v. Office of the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President of the Philippines,
supra note 228 at 450.
233 http://fatherbemasblogs. blogspot.com/2011 _02_0 !_archive.html
; last vi sited February 15, 2014.
234 Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 210.
235 TSN , Aug ust 27 , 201 3, p. 130.
236 http ://www. lifenews.com/2011 /09/01 /philippines-sees-matemal-
mortalitv-decline-without-abortion; last visited March 9, 2014
[Researchers from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation of
the University of Washington in Seattle examined maternal mortality
rates in 181 countries and found the rate (the number of women's
deaths per 100,000) dropped by 81 percent in the Philippines between
.1980 and 2008. The decrease comes as the largely Catholic nation
has resister efforts to legalize abortions, even though the United
Nations and pro-abortion groups claim women will supposedly die in
illegal abortions and increase the maternal mortality rate if abortion is
prohibited.
The 2010 study, published in Lancet, shows the Philippines
outpaced first-world nations like Germany, Russia and Israel
- where abortions are legal - in cutting maternal mortality
rates.
Meanwhile, the National Statistical Coordination Board in
the Philippines, according to Spero Forum, has shown the
same results. From 1990-2010, the daily maternal mortality
rate dropped 21 percent, its figures indicated. The World
Health Organization also found that the Filipino maternal
mortality rate dropped 48 percent from 1990 to 2008.
237 TSN, July 23, 2013 , p. 23.
238 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. {ALFI) v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1407.
239 SEC. 15. Certificate of Compliance. - No marriage license shall be
issued by the Local Civil Registrar unless the applicants present a
Certificate of Compliance issued for free by the local Family Planning
Office certifying that they had duly received adequate instructions and
information on responsible parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding
and infant nutrition.
240 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 207 172), p. 29.
241 80 CONST. Art XV, §2 .
242 Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-De Castro), p. 42-43.
243 130 Phil. 415 (1968).
244 Id . at 436.
245 81 Griswold v. Connecticut,3 81U.S. 479, June7, 1965.
246 Id.
247 Section 12, Article II , 1987 Constitution.
248 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., p . 85.
249 (ii) Parental consent or that of the person exercising parental
authority in the case of abused minors, where the parent or the person
exercising parental authority is the respondent, accused or convicted
perpetrator as certified by the proper prosecutorial office of the court.
In the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-
kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures and in no
case shall consent be required in emergency or serious cases as
defined in Republic Act No. 8344.
250 Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 15- 16.
251 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v.
Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 1453- 1496.
252 Records, 1986 Constitutional Convention, Volume IV, pp. 401-
402 .
253 Article II , Section 13, 1987 Constitution.
254 Petition, Task Force for the Family and life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo (G. R. No. 204957), pp. 24-25.
255 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010; People v.
Nazario, No. L-44 143, August 3 1, 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195.
256 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, G.R. No.
1835 17, June 22, 2010, 621 SC RA 461, 469.
257 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p.
1145 .
258 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p.
1252.
259 SEC. 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. - Th is Act
declares the following as guiding principles:
xxxx
(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal,
accessible, affordable, non-abortifacient, effective and
quality reproductive health care services and supplies is
essential in the promotion of people's right to health,
especially those of women, the poor, and the marginalized,
and shall be incorporated as a component of basic health
care;
(e) The State shall promote and provide information and
access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modem methods which have
been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards such as those registered and
approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide fun ding support to promote modern
natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors
and the irreligious convictions;
(f) The State shall promote programs that: (I) enable
individuals and couples to have the number of children they
desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of
women, and the resources available and affordable to them
and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and
their religious convictions: Provided, That no one shall be
deprived, for economic reasons, of the rights to have
children; (2) achieve equitable allocation and utilization of
resources; (3) ensure effective partnership among national
government, local government units (LGUs) and the private
sector in the design, implementation, coordination,
integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered
programs to enhance the quality of life and environmental
protection; (4) conduct studies to analyze demographic
trends including demographic dividends from sound
population policies towards sustainable human development
in keeping with the principles of gender equality, protection
of mothers and children, born and unborn and the
promotion and protection of women's reproductive rights
and health ; and (5) conduct scientific studies to determine
the safety and efficacy of alternative medicines and
methods for reproductive health care development;
xxxx
(g) The provision of reproductive health care, information
and supplies giving priority to poor beneficiaries as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
identifying marginalization must be the primary responsibility
of the national government consistent with its obligation to
respect, protect and promote the right to health and the right
to life;
xxxx
(i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations
(NGOs), women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and
communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health
and population and development policies, plans, and
programs will address the priority needs of women, the
poor, and the marginalized;
xxxx
(l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and
the mitigation, promotion and/or stabilization of the
population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health ;
xxxx
(n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the
entire population, espec ially the poor, and allocations
thereof must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the
life of the unborn is protected;
(o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the
harmonization and integration of policies, plans, programs
 and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of the
people, more particularly the poor, the needy and the
marginalized;
260 SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(r) Reproductive health care program refers to the
systematic and integrated provision of reproductive health
care to all citizens prioritizing women, the poor,
marginalized and those invulnerable or crisis situations.
xxxx
(aa) Sustainable human development refers to bringing
people, particularly the poor and vulnerable, to the center of
development process, the central purpose of which is the
creation of an enabling environment in which all can enjoy
long, healthy and productive lives, done in the manner that
promotes their rights and protects the life opportunities of
future generation s and the natural ecosystem on which all
life depends.
261 Biraogo v. Th e Philippine Truth Commission, supra note 90.
262 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.
R. No. 204988), pp. 16-48; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R.
No. 205478), pp. 7-9.
263 Except the practice of law which is under the supervision of the
Supreme Court.
264 United States v. Jesus, 3 1 Phil. 218, 230 (1915).
265 Petition , Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. N o. 205478), p. 8.
266 With reference to Section 2 , 3(E), 4(L), 9 and I 9(C) of the RH La
w; Petition, ALFI, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 28-33; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205138), pp. 37-38.
267 358 Phil. 410 (1998) .
268 Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17,
201 2, 676 SCRA 551, 559.
269 Id . at 559-560.
270 Id. at 561.
271 See Section 6, R.A. No. 10354.
272 See Section 5, R.A . No. 10354.
273 See Section 16, R.A . No. 1354.
274 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18,
2011, 659 SCRA 270, 306.
275 Id. at 305.
276 Petition, Pro-life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (GR.
N o. 205 720), pp. 14-30.
277 Gettel , Political Science, Revised Edition, p. 180.
278 454 Phil. 504 (2003).
279 Separate Opinion, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 454 Phi l. 504 (2003).
280 https://www.cia.gov/ library/ publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html ; last visited March 21, 2014
281 St. Josephs College v. St. Josephs College Workers' Association
(Samahan), 489 Phil. 559, 572-573 (2005) ; and Cebu Institute of
Technology v. Opie, G.R. No. L-58870, 18 December 1987, 156
SCRA 629.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to
reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No.
90-183.
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September 19, 1991
denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in
Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of
petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the
name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to
private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private
respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
I [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the
three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of
petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at
the price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made
on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the
sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then
occupying the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the
same month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent
and informed the sellers of the said assignment; (5) thereafter, private
respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking
and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private
respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either
that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be
returned to the latter; (6) private respondent counterproposed that if it would
undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be
reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos
returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving
it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash;
(8) private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later
discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to
private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate
Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that
the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred
and registered in the name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and
the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private
respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to
Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private
respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and
has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view
of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.
Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale
between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other;
(2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the
agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from
suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion
was filed by private respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others,
petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign
immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August
30, 1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of
Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional
Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign
immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish
certain facts upon which the said defense is based. Private respondent opposed
this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on
the motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing
petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes
the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its
official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome
of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts
by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as
they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit"
(Rollo, p. 87).
Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. In compliance with the resolution of this Court, both parties and the
Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed
of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule
is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate
courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with
the hearing before the trial court. But the general rule admits of exceptions, and
one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no
alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo,
206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114
the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or
legal interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in
behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign
Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is
entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion,"
where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American
court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is
entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune
from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
"suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar
procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect
instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965];
Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations,
50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing
the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
(1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that
effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of
the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
"suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the
"suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of
Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of
petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in
support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the
local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v.
Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80
Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and
companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office,
the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the
nature of the acts and transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over
petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand,
private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore
absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own
free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land
located in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its
status as a sovereign state is in order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the
monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of International
Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the
Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in International
Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37
[1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy
recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See
over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive
foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter
into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In
International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the
purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of
guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international
relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether
the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers
even suggested that the treaty created two international persons — the Holy
See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the
attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in
which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948];
Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the
Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical
purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City
has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of
the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity
with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the
world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a
sense an "international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of
International Law 160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has
significant implication — that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects
essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with
international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law,
46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into
transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can
conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international
person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a
foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio,
has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957
(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted
the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this
affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part
of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the
society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-
Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or
judicial determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The
United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which
defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct
or a particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that
the "commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to
Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial
activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of
conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems
involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own.
Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory
have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a
private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into
purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of
governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist
states which took control of nationalized business activities and international
trading.
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with
private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of
apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312
[1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United
States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the
change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162
SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a
foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in
the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a
store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City,
to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of
America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation
of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v.
Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other
facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and
not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the
cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be
considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to
come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a
business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then
it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
There is no question that the United States of America, like
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary
or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver
may be implied.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized
as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired
said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in
a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic
mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered
into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from
the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of
the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more
reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in
this case is the Holy See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still
occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has
been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court
without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of
private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case
was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the
Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec.
3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and
officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited
diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local
jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic
mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of
the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to
sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon
the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA
130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's
foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]).
As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health
Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court
to conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In
view of said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and
unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R.
No. 109645, July 25, 1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own
government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign
Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade
the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims.
Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its
espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected
Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]).
Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases
to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the
International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting
to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on
his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights — its
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302
[1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil
Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206510               September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.;
MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan,
FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE,
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna
Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA
R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list,
PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D.,
Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR,
Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY
JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ,
Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK
A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian,
PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL
ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO
OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON.
VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON.
RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and
Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy
Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL
RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard,
COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard
Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed
Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US
Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director,
Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7
of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian
over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern
Philippines) language which means "long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha
is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and
the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of
the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of
Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of
Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11,
1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of
Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the
global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was
recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent
examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare
protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally threatened
and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding
universal value as an important and significant natural habitat for in situ
conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant on-going
ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty
and aesthetic importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise
known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure
the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological,
sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into
perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-
take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human
activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering,
destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise
created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall
be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of
the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the
ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief
stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting
the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift,
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US
Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over
the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del
Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for
damage to the reef caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led
salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the
coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in
representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H.
Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his
capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G.
Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-
Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A
Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr.,
Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary
Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-
Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP),
Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore
Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General
Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine
respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of
the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras,
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu,
and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US
respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-
payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement
officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and
disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to
nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the
petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully
pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this
petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of
Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease
and desist all operations over the Guardian grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as
well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under
'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear guidelines, duties, and
liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require
Respondents to assume responsibility for prior and future
environmental damage in general, and environmental damage under
the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism,
diving, recreation, and limited commercial activities by fisherfolk and
indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from the
damaged site and an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO
until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include,
without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the
dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with
the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on
[environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under
Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence
administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against erring officers
 and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such
proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S. personnel under the
circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in
the settlement of all meritorious claims for damages caused to the
Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those
applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if
such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of
witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including
seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related to
the grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to
notify each other of the disposition of all cases, wherever heard,
related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported
restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or plans, including
cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef
absent a just settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU
consultations in accordance with the Local Government Code and
R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a
deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined under Section 17 of RA
10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas
affected by the grounding of the Guardian in light of Respondents'
experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar
grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and
in the name of transparency and accountability such environmental
damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages
of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific
and technical support to the TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National
Defense, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense
Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of
erga omnes rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and for
damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for
purposes of protecting the damaged areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal
Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces Agreement
unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the
preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law
of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all
other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures
and such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises.7
(Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the petition,
petitioners also filed a motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte
against the US respondents.9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and
ocular inspection and production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the
grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have
become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were
already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the
petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the
extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the
Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to
file the present petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a
case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act
being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."11
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter
of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public
right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in
the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such
right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa,
this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for
the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of
their own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. 15
(Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to
minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows
the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in
the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature."16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental
question of whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did
not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign
immunity or non-suability of the State,17 is expressly provided in Article XVI of
the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of
state immunity from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in
Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land
under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence
of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society,
the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations
with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the
justification given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement
of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the
local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem,
non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of
Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that
if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded
as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v.
Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss
the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.19
(Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh
Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the
immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-
standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of
democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or
his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If
the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his
official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded
for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the
maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms,
is that if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the
privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases
therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force,
and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in
court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the said
employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the suit was against the US Government which had not given its
consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the
complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were acting in the
exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation
against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows
that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be
directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in
the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved
into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts
(Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis).
Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts
Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic affairs.24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State
immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity
as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was
clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity
of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or
suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the
personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or
under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of
immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may
be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US
respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP
reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while
historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases
where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the
UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified
in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents
Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal
Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules
arid customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its
resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch
of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the
uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened
for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by
the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the
submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance
State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas
(mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the
oldest customary principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the
coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the
sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4)
exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States
more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is
located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State
exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international
law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as
to its bed and subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to
enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request
for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to
leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to
the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or
with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.)
A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting
damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may
apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this
case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of
UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not
ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and
drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing
it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions
contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S.
membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the
succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions
satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part XI
implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton
transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate
requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President
Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of
stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the
President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during
the 108th and 110th Congresses, its progress continues to be hamstrung by
significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S. participation in
international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman
Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full Senate consideration
among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action has been
taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President
Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will "recognize the rights of the other ,
states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so
long as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states", and President Clinton's
reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS]
provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other
countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses of the
oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other
states in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is
more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal
waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US'
refusal to join the UN CLOS was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS'
regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep
seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do
with its [the US'] acceptance of customary international rules on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps
publicly endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following
statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it
establishes stable maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial
seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes
passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations
from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of
warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests
by enhancing the ability of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the
resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the
Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime
Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized the rights of
coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS
does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US
to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been
actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources,
would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship
while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a
Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply
with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to
protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional
basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating
and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation
of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is
beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from
the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the
flag States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout
the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for
non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA.
Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US
have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common
law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for
negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops
and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests"
between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines
to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the
United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.36 The invocation of US federal tort laws and
even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which governs
disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in
pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7
of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance
of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or
administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-
application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who
may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also
find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which
have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A.
No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal
action charging the same violation of an environmental law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the
privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from
committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of
environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency,
private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the
environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency,
private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision
and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or
private person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of
the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation,
rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has
become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or
restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse
from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect
and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine habitat adversely affected by
the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the
coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine
governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy
has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in
assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by
the Rules. As can be gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and
settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute
resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court
shall inquire from the parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court
shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients,
to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not
available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher
for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice of referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration
of the 30-day period. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the CASTRO
Associate Justice
continuance of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court Associate Justice
may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for
the following purposes:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
Associate Justice Associate Justice
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties
and their counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
conferences. Associate Justice Associate Justice
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a
settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree approving the
agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and (On official leave)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*
Associate Justice
ecology. Associate Justice
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree See Separate Concurring
to compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings ESTELA M. PERLAS-
Opinion
before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.) BERNABE
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided- Associate Justice
Associate Justice
missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the
Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After spending (No Part)
$6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA**
paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over coral reef damage Associate Justice
caused by the grounding.38 CERTIFICATION
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it is hereby certified
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Chief Justice
Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The
US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation options, in Footnotes
coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine * On official leave.
government entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts ** No part.
from Philippine universities."39 1 T ubbataha Reefs Natural Park - <http://tubbatahareef org>.
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the 2 Id.
violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in 3 "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE TUBBATAHA REEFS NATURAL
a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz: PARK IN THE PROVINCE OF PALAWAN AS A PROTECTED AREA
RULES UNDER THE NIPAS ACT (R.A. 7586) AND THE STRATEGIC
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN (SEP) FOR PALAWAN ACT (R.A. 7611),
plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or PROVIDING FOR ITS MANAGEMENT AND FOR OTHER
rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit PURPOSES."
and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a 4 Rollo, pp. 194-199.
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which 5 < http://manila.usembassy.gov/pressphotoreleases2013/navy-
shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that commander-expresses-regret-concerning-uss-guardian-
purpose subject to the control of the court.1âwphi1 grounding.html>.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the 6 "Joint Statement Between The Philippines And The United States
matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic On The USS Guardian Grounding On Tubbatata Reef," February 5,
channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another 2013. Accessed. at US Embassy website
State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that -<http://manila.usembassy.gov/jointstatementguardiantubbataha.html
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the >.
Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the 7 Rollo, pp. 89-92.
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this 8 Id. at 156-191. In a letter dated 27 May 2013, the DFA's Office of
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40 Legal Affairs informed this Court that it has received from the
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the Embassy of the United States the Notice sent by this Court, with a
petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions request to return the same. It said that the US Embassy "asserts that
thereof. it is not an agent for the service of process upon the individuals
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 named in court documents, and that the transmission of the Court
the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been documents should have been done through diplomatic channels." (Id.
recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly at 255.)
authorized representative of the United States government. The VF A being a 9 Id. at 215-247.
valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international 10 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011, 641
law to abide by its terms and provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules SCRA 244, 254, citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755
is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. (2006).
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of 11 Id., citing Jumamil v. Cafe, 507 Phil. 455, 465 (2005), citing
Kalikasan is hereby DENIED. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 6I8, 632-633
No pronouncement as to costs. (2000).
SO ORDERED. 12 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of2010, G.R. Nos. 192935
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. & 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 151, citing Social
Associate Justice Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al., 591 Phil. 393,
WE CONCUR: 404 (2008); Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil.
See Concurring Opinion 321 (1997) and De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, May 6,
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 1992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.
Chief Justice 13 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
14 Id. at 804-805.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, 15 Id. at 802-803.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
JR. 16 See ANNOTATION TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
Associate Justice
Associate Justice ENVIRONMENTAL CASES ..
17 Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23,
2011, 644 SCRA 36, 41.
18 261 Phil. 777 (1990).
19 Id. at 790-792.
20 445 Phil. 250 (2003).
21 Id. at 269-270. Citations omitted.
22 Id. at 268, citing J.L. Brierly, "The Law of Nations," Oxford
University Press, 6th Edition, 1963, p. 244.
23 Supra note 18, at 788-789 & 797.
24 United States of America v. Ruiz, 221 Phil. 179, 182-183 & 184
(1985).
25 G.R. No. 90314, November 27, 1990, 191 SCRA 713.
26 Id. at 727-728.
27 24 F Supp. 2d 155, 159 (D.P.R. 1997).
28 Merlin M. Magallona, A Primer on the Law of the Sea, 1997, p. 1.
29 Bertrand Theodor L. Santos, "Untangling a Tangled Net of
Confusion: Reconciling the Philippine Fishery Poaching Law and the
UNCLOS' World Bulletin, Vol. 18: 83-116 (July-December 2002), p.
96.
30 Anne Bardin, "Coastal State's Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels"
14 Pace Int'!. Rev. 27, 28 (2002).
31 Id. at 29.
32 Art. 2, UNCLOS.
33 Art. 29 of UNCLOS defines warship as "a ship belonging to the
armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing
such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government of the State and whose name
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned
by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline."
34 Commander Robert C. "Rock" De Tolve, JAGC, USN, "At What
Cost? Americas UNCLOS Allergy in the Time of 'Lav.fare'", 61 Naval
L. Rev. 1, 3 (2012).
35 <http://www.jag.navy.mil/organizationlcode10lawofthesea.htm>.
36 See BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec.
Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 652 (2000).
37 Rule 10, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CASES.
38 USS Port Royal (CG73)" - <http://navysite.de/cg/cg73.html>; "USS
Port Royal Returns to Homeport", Navy Military Home Page, Story
Number NNS0902 l l-02 Release Date: 2/11/2009 6:00 AM
-<http://www.navymillsubmit/display.asp?story_id=42502>; "Navy,
state reach settlement on USS Port Royal damage'', posted Feb. 05,
2011 8:26 AM - <http:/!www.hawaiinewsnow.com!
story/13974224/navystate-reach-settlement-on-uss-port-royal-reef-
damage>.
39 <http://manila.usembassy.gov/usgtargetedassistancetubbataha.
html>.
40 Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, 619 SCRA
533, 559, citing Detjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
(1918).
41 Supra note 36.
42 Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo, et al., 598 Phil. 262. 280 & 285.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28196      November 9, 1967
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224      November 9, 1967
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No.
4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite
for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines,
approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots,
pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing
in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic
Act No. 4913; and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House
of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article
VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of
their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)
member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from
each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on
the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution,
be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President,
on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions
No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections
which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on
October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents.
Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine Constitution
Association — hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA — were allowed to
argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta,
likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred until after a
substantially identical case brought by said organization before the Commission
on Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision
would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court — had been submitted thereto
for final determination, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in both
cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the
petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review by certiorari of the resolution of the
Commission on Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases
were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the
answer of respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply
memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a
taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit,
for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although
respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth of
this allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or information to
form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear to be a
perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General
expressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued
raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit
and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law
in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts
from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his
answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is
"merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and filed an
opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear before
this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no
jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the
legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that the petition,
if granted, would, in effect, render in operational the legislative department; and
c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not
have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected
thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court — speaking through
one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected
professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito,5 this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political
one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes
cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which
was being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths
vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 6 Avelino vs.
Cuenco,7 Tañada vs. Cuenco, 8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the
first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as
claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the
number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest
number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the
first party, as members, for the second party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal;
and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to
apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible
according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the
theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto
is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. 10 It is part
of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours11 — to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution
merely because the same explicitly grants such power. 12 Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements
of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing
the same function,13 for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution —
they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution
itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the
Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise,
they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet
that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly
confers upon the Supreme Court, 14 the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character of treaty-making
power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a
constituent assembly — violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view
may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter
should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are
unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of
all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or
 call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people
for their ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed,
either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In
either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such
amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been
approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged
that said resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as
well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best,
de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose — amendments
or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both — that is to say, propose
amendment and call a convention — at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be
submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in
which officers of the national and local governments — such as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 — will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for
amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under
such conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to give the people a
reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said
amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which
provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among
the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of
their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one
Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within
three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise.
Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that
fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous
and compact territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no
apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress
of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that
Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de
facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed
Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act
No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within
three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a
bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040, 17 purporting to make said
apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the
ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according
to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines. 18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of
Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period stated in the
Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and that, in
consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de facto
officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional
provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under
legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the
conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal
or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has
not made a valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law. The effect
of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that
fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to
make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or
becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall
continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the
expiration of said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in
1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made necessarily
before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, or in 1938. 19 The assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for
there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would
be made. Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be
certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible
enumeration, would expire after the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly
those on the legislative department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a
bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said amendment,
incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution regarding the
apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have known that the
three-year period therefor would expire after the elections scheduled to be held
and actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the
original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly
indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of the
failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the
elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last
enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows
that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963,
or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore,
that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on
December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de
jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said
period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members,
or at least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their
respective offices, and were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a
reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision
creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are not
aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither
do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically
expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse
of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law
on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a
mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture
of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to
the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence
of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after
the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably
held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating
Congress — with a House of Representatives composed of members elected by
qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said
elections — remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the House
of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of
their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the period
aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the
President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the
enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main
function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory
duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or
ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article
IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is
not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are
merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and
Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the
existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of
persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be,
likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished from the officer
in question — is concerned. 21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and
employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from them
satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold, before dealing with
them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if
they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices,
positions or employments. 22 One can imagine this great inconvenience,
hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. 23
It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither
may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a
de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry
into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the
competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the
acts therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are not
third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs.
Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge
Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that,
meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held that the
objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto
Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko
was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one of the
parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as yet,
finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights had
vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet,
Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is
concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested and Republic
Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in connection
therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration
is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either
propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose,
but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that
the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or."
Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances —
and none has brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the
amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or
vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the
constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for
ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention
in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In
other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H.
Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and
3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be
proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again,
although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were
taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words,
they were not passed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof
anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the
contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different
sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has
any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt
said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to
propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said
convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be
submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this
argument must be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action
taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to
permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the
constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without
forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be done is a
political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a
General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-
fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to
is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous
amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification
in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under
the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed
amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval
independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact
that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed amendments is
likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the
choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial
and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are
addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election
of public officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either
alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the
abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more
patent when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the
choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the
word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to
women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of
the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election. Some
members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite,"
without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that
constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not
transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be
focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon
may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the
merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by
extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations
that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which
should be promoted. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. The question
whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to
the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer
and those who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find
themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the
Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be
deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter
of sheer speculation.
The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to
declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional — as ably set forth in the opinion
penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate
the Spirit of the Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16,
1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically
eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question. Then again,
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and in
every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall
remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling
place, to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal
native languages, for free distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the
ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably
inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals for
amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said
measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform
the people of the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the
subject submitted to them for ratification, from the original Constitution down to
the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of
Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be
published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three
consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a
printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended
thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and
provincial government office building and in each polling place not
later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-
five, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the
termination of the election. At least ten copies of the Constitution with
the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be
kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified
electors during election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the
principal local dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the
Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 34, reading:
 Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official
Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at
least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be
posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office
building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day
of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the plebiscite. At least ten
copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in English and in Spanish,
shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the
qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies
in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940
amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days
prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government
office building and in every polling place not later than May eighteen,
nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after
the election. At least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in
each polling place to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the
principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of
the Interior, shall also be kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the
effect that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days
prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government
office building and in every polling place not later than February
eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted
therein until after the election. At least, ten copies of the said
amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available
for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When
practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in
each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in
connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted
therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political
parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution — except,
perhaps, the woman's suffrage — and, consequently, debated thereon at some
length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said political
parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being
contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the
current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place
— on a rather limited scale — on the latest proposals for amendment, have
been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some
militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon. A
legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain
sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time
of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing
agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or
approval of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency
or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for
ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends — in the view of those
who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute
the minority — upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such
as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said
proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum
number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under
R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to run for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge
the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We —
who constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such
requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the
proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by R. B.
H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however,
that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful
reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof.
Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten
themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments
posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and the text of
contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or
envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional
Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell
such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3
permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run
for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed
brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom
of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not the authority of
Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down
acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth in the
fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers,
pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere. The
determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be
submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative
sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has
exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it
could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter
thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond
improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6)
Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic
Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in
these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein
prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the
question of jurisdiction.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would make some
additional observations in connection with my concurrence. Sections 2 and 4 of
Republic Act No. 4913 provide:
Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election.
A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every
municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling
place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-
seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least
five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling place
to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections,
shall be kept in each polling place. The Commission on Elections shall
make available copies of each amendments in English, Spanish and,
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distribution.
xxx      xxx      xxx
Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the approval
of said amendments shall be printed in English and Pilipino and shall
be in the size and form prescribed by the Commission on Elections:
Provided, however, That at the back of said ballot there shall be
printed in full Resolutions of both Houses of Congress Numbered One
and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and
sixty-seven, proposing the amendments: Provided, further, That the
questionnaire appearing on the face of the ballot shall be as follows:
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five of Article
VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section sixteen of
Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall
write the word "yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect in
the blank space after each question; to vote for the rejection thereof,
he shall write the word "No" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local
dialect.
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without reference to
extraneous factors and circumstances, the manner prescribed in the aforesaid
provisions is sufficient for the purpose of having the proposed amendments
submitted to the people for their ratification, as enjoined in Section 1, Article XV
of the Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else should have been required by
the Act to make it adhere more closely to the constitutional requirement.
Certainly it would have been out of place to provide, for instance, that
government officials and employees should go out and explain the amendments
to the people, or that they should be the subject of any particular means or form
of public discussion.
The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act No. 4913 seems to
me predicated on the fact that there are so many other issues at stake in the
coming general election that the attention of the electorate, cannot be entirely
focused on the proposed amendments, such that there is a failure to properly
submit them for ratification within the intendment of the Constitution. If that is so,
then the defect is not intrinsic in the law but in its implementation. The same
manner of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for ratification
may, in a different setting, be sufficient for the purpose. Yet I cannot conceive
that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law may be made to depend
willy-nilly on factors not inherent in its provisions. For a law to be struck down as
unconstitutional it must be so by reason of some irreconcilable conflict between
it and the Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid, according
to circumstances not found in its provisions, such as the zeal with which they are
carried out. To such a thesis I cannot agree. The criterion would be too broad
and relative, and dependent upon individual opinions that at best are subjective.
What one may regard as sufficient compliance with the requirement of
submission to the people, within the context of the same law, may not be so to
another. The question is susceptible of as many views as there are viewers; and
I do not think this Court would be justified in saying that its own view on the
matter is the correct one, to the exclusion of the opinions of others.
On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification must necessarily be
in a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such
procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," and I do not subscribe to the restrictive interpretation that the
petitioners would place on this provision, namely, that it means only a special
election.
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law, that no one can
exercise any authority over the rights and interests of others except pursuant to
and in the manner authorized by law.1 Based upon this principle, petitioners
Ramon A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
come to this Court in separate petitions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in
representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission on Elections,
Director of Printing and Auditor General from implementing and/or complying
with Republic Act 4913, assailing said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation,
assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of Resolutions
of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 of March 16, 1967.
Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to the Filipino
people for approval the amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines
proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of Both Houses
Numbered 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the
date and manner of the election at which the aforesaid proposed amendments
shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.
Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two amendments to the
Constitution: the first, to amend Sec. 5, Art. VI, by increasing the maximum
membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160
of said 180 seats and eliminating the provision that Congress shall by law make
an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration; the
second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by allowing Senators and Representatives to
be delegates to a constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they are considered
together herein.
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as follows: (1)
Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, in submitting the
proposed amendments to the Constitution, to the people for approval, at the
general election of 1967 instead of at a special election solely for that purpose;
(2) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, since it was
not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint session required when Congress proposes
amendments to the Constitution, said Republic Act being a step in or part of the
process of proposing amendments to the Constitution; and (3) Republic Act
4913 violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Art.
III), in not requiring that the substance of the proposed amendments be stated
on the face of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed
amendments, such as by stating the provisions before and after said
amendments, instead of printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed
amendments.
Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the procedure for amending
the Constitution is concerned, the issue is cognizable by this Court under its
powers to review an Act of Congress to determine its conformity to the
fundamental law. For though the Constitution leaves Congress free to propose
whatever Constitutional amendment it deems fit, so that the substance or
content of said proposed amendment is a matter of policy and wisdom and thus
a political question, the Constitution nevertheless imposes requisites as to the
manner or procedure of proposing such amendments, e.g., the three-fourths
vote requirement. Said procedure or manner, therefore, from being left to the
discretion of Congress, as a matter of policy and wisdom, is fixed by the
Constitution. And to that extent, all questions bearing on whether Congress in
proposing amendments followed the procedure required by the Constitution, is
perforce justiciable, it not being a matter of policy or wisdom.
Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1, Art. XV clearly does
not bear him on the point. It nowhere requires that the ratification be thru an
election solely for that purpose. It only requires that it be at "an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification." To join it with
an election for candidates to public office, that is, to make it concurrent with such
election, does not render it any less an election at which the proposed
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. To prohibition
being found in the plain terms of the Constitution, none should be inferred. Had
the framers of requiring Constitution thought of requiring a special election for
the purpose only of the proposed amendments, they could have said so, by
qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely" or
"exclusively". They did not.
It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is wise, or that it would
not have been better to provide for a separate election exclusively for the
ratification of the proposed amendments. The point however is that such
separate and exclusive election, even if it may be better or wiser, which again, is
not for this Court to decide, is not included in the procedure required by the
Constitution to amend the same. The function of the Judiciary is "not to pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation". 2 It is limited to
determining whether the action taken by the Legislative Department has violated
the Constitution or not. On this score, I am of the opinion that it has not.
Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is deficient for not
having been passed by Congress in joint session by 3/4 vote.
Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election to which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution? If by the
term "propose amendment" is meant to determine WHAT said amendment shall
be, then Republic Act 4913 does not; Resolutions of Both Houses 1 and 3
already did that. If, on the other hand, it means, or also means, to provide for
how, when, and by what means the amendments shall be submitted to the
people for approval, then it does.
A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense. is the one
intended. Said Section has two sentences: in the first, it requires the 3/4 voting
in joint session, for Congress to "propose amendments". And then in the second
sentence, it provides that "such amendments . . . shall be submitted to the
people for their ratification". This clearly indicates that by the term "propose
amendments" in the first sentence is meant to frame the substance or the
content or the WHAT-element of the amendments; for it is this and this alone
that is submitted to the people for their ratification. The details of when the
election shall be held for approval or rejection of the proposed amendments, or
the manner of holding it, are not submitted for ratification to form part of the
Constitution. Stated differently, the plain language of Section 1, Art. XV, shows
that the act of proposing amendments is distinct from — albeit related to — that
of submitting the amendments to the people for their ratification; and that the 3/4
voting requirement applies only to the first step, not to the second one.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be done thru an
ordinary statute passed by Congress. The Constitution does not expressly state
by whom the submission shall be undertaken; the rule is that a power not lodged
elsewhere under the Constitution is deemed to reside with the legislative body,
under the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore validly enacted
Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner of submitting the
proposed amendments to the people for their ratification. Since it does not
"propose amendments" in the sense referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution, but merely provides for how and when the amendments, already
proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same does not need the 3/4 vote in
joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution. Furthermore,
Republic Act 4913 is an appropriation measure. Sec. 6 thereof appropriates
P1,000,000 for carrying out its provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution
states that "All appropriation . . . bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives". Republic Act 4913, therefore, could not have been validly
adopted in a joint session, reinforcing the view that Sec. 1, Art. XV does not
apply to such a measure providing for the holding of the election to ratify the
proposed amendments, which must perforce appropriate funds for its purpose.
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913 offends against
substantive due process. An examination of the provisions of the law shows no
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The publication in the
Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting of notices in
public buildings not later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until after the
elections, the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling
places, aside from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient
opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process
refers only to providing fair opportunity; it does not guarantee that the
opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and
the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity to be
informed is given, and it is, the due process clause is not infringed.
Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand, and the
printing of the full proposed amendments at the back of the ballot instead of the
substance thereof at the face of the ballot, do not deprive the voter of fair
opportunity to be informed. The present wording of the Constitution is not being
veiled or suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to know them and
they are available should he want to check on what he is conclusively presumed
to know. Should the voters choose to remain ignorant of the present
Constitution, the fault does not lie with Congress. For opportunity to familiarize
oneself with the Constitution as it stands has been available thru all these years.
Perhaps it would have been more convenient for the voters if the present
wording of the provisions were also to be printed on the ballot. The same
however is a matter of policy. As long as the method adopted provides
sufficiently reasonable chance to intelligently vote on the amendments, and I
think it does in this case, it is not constitutionally defective.
Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or wisdom of the
proposed amendments. These are for the people in their sovereign capacity to
decide, not for this Court.
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress cannot both call a
convention and propose amendments; second, that the present Congress is a
de facto one, since no apportionment law was adopted within three years from
the last census of 1960, so that the Representatives elected in 1961 are de
facto officers only. Not being de jure, they cannot propose amendments, it is
argued.
As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress "may propose
amendments or call a convention for that purpose". The term "or", however, is
frequently used as having the same meaning as "and" particularly in permissive,
affirmative sentences so that the interpretation of the word "or" as "and" in the
Constitution in such use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v.
Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it should be pointed out that
the resolutions proposing amendments (R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from
that calling for a convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better
or wise to amend the Constitution before a convention called for is elected, it
should not be fettered from doing so. For our purposes in this case, suffice it to
note that the Constitution does not prohibit it from doing so.
As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art. VI of the
Constitution provides in part that "The Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise". It however further states in the next sentence: "Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have
the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly,
who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly
districts." The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a valid redistricting law
since the time the above provision was adopted, does not render the present
districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself provides for its
continuance in such case, rendering legal and de jure the status quo.
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act
4913, and fully concur with the opinion of the Chief Justice.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The opinion prepared
by the Chief Justice discusses the matter with a fullness that erases doubts and
misgivings and clarifies the applicable principles. A few words may however be
added.
We start from the premise that only where it can be shown that the question is to
be solved by public opinion or where the matter has been left by the Constitution
to the sole discretion of any of the political branches, as was so clearly stated by
the then Justice Concepcion in Tañada v. Cuenco,1 may this Court avoid
passing on the issue before it. Whatever may be said about the present
question, it is hard to speak with certitude considering Article XV, that Congress
may be entrusted with the full and uncontrolled discretion on the procedure
leading to proposals for an amendment of the Constitution.
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this Court through
Justice Tuason followed Coleman v. Miller, 3 in its holding that certain aspects of
the amending process may be considered political. His opinion quoted with
approval the view of Justice Black, to which three other members of the United
States Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself is political in its entirety,
"from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is
not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." In a sense
that would solve the matter neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at times
arduous and in every case soul-searching process of determining whether the
procedure for amendments required by the Constitution has been followed.
At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress, which cannot be
judicially inquired into at any rate, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a
failure to observe the requirements of Article XV would occur. In the event that
judicial intervention is sought, to rely automatically on the theory of political
question to avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy might under certain
circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as nothing less than judicial
abdication or surrender.
What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an esteemed jurist, the late
Justice Tuason, would no longer be controlling. There is comfort in the thought
that the view that then prevailed was itself a product of the times. It could very
well be that considering the circumstances existing in 1947 as well as the
particular amendment sought to be incorporated in the Constitution, the parity
rights ordinance, the better part of wisdom in view of the grave economic
situation then confronting the country would be to avoid the existence of any
obstacle to its being submitted for ratification. Moreover, the Republic being less
than a year old, American Supreme Court opinions on constitutional questions
were-invariably accorded uncritical acceptance. Thus the approach followed by
Justice Tuason is not difficult to understand. It may be said that there is less
propensity now, which is all to the good, for this Court to accord that much
deference to constitutional views coming from the quarter.
Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to do injustice to his
memory. For as he stated in another major opinion in Araneta v. Dinglasan,4 in
ascertaining the meaning to be given the Emergency Powers Act, 5 one should
not ignore what would ensue if a particular mode of construction were followed.
As he so emphatically stated, "We test a rule by its results."
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed amendment on the
economic survival of the country, an erroneous appraisal it turned out later,
constituted an effective argument for its submission. Why not then consider the
question political and let the people decide? That assumption could have been
indulged in. It could very well be the inarticulate major premise. For many it did
bear the stamp of judicial statesmanship.
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear why as of this
date and in the foreseeable future judicial inquiry to assure the utmost
compliance with the constitutional requirement would be a more appropriate
response.
SANCHEZ, J., in separate opinion:
Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep appreciation to Mr. Justice
Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro for their invaluable
contribution to the substance and form of the opinion which follows.
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the constitutionality of
Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967. This Act seeks to implement
Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives
on March 16, 1967 with the end in view of amending vital portions of the
Constitution.
Since the problem here presented has its roots in the resolutions aforesaid of
both houses of Congress, it may just as well be that we recite in brief the salient
features thereof. Resolution No. 1 increases the membership of the House of
Representatives from 120 to 180 members, and immediately apportions 160
seats. A companion resolution is Resolution No. 3 which permits Senators and
Congressmen — without forfeiting their seats in Congress — to be members of
the Constitutional Convention1 to be convened, as provided in another resolution
— Resolution No. 2. Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the
Constitution (Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the people for their
ratification next November 14, 1967. Resolution No. 2 just adverted to calls for a
constitutional convention also to propose amendments to the Constitution. The
delegates thereto are to be elected on the second Tuesday of November 1970;
the convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the amendments proposed by the
convention to be submitted to the people thereafter for their ratification.
Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing the number of
members of the House of representatives under Resolution No. 1, and that in
Resolution No. 3 which gives Senators and Congressmen the right to sit as
members of the constitutional convention to be convened on June 1, 1971.
Because, these are the two amendments to be submitted to the people in the
general elections soon to be held on November 14, 1967, upon the provisions of
Section 1, Republic Act 4913, which reads:
The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by
the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of both Houses
Numbered One and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen
hundred and sixty- seven, shall be submitted to the people for
approval at the general election which shall be held on November
fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust upon us — the
manner in which the amendments proposed by Congress just adverted to be
brought to the people's attention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that proposed
amendments to the Constitution may become effective, Section 1, Article XV
thereof commands that such amendments must be "approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which amendments are submitted to the people
for their ratification."2 The accent is on two words complementing each other,
namely, "submitted" and "ratification."
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the problem facing us.
And this, because the amendments submitted are transcendental and
encompassing. The ceiling of the number of Congressmen is sought to be
elevated from 120 to 180 members; and Senators and Congressmen may run in
constitutional conventions without forfeiting their seats. These certainly affect the
people as a whole. The increase in the number of Congressmen has its
proportional increase in the people's tax burdens. They may not look at this with
favor, what with the constitutional provision (Section 5, Article VI) that Congress
"shall by law make an apportionment", without the necessity of disturbing the
present constitutionally provided number of Congressmen. People in Quezon
City, for instance, may balk at the specific apportionment of the 160 seats set
forth in Resolution No. 1, and ask for a Congressman of their own, on the theory
of equal representation. And then, people may question the propriety of
permitting the increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in the forthcoming
constitutional convention and future conventions for fear that they may dominate
its proceedings. They may entertain the belief that, if at all, increase in the
number of Congressmen should be a proper topic for deliberation in a
constitutional convention which, anyway, will soon take place. They probably
would ask: Why the hurry? These ponderables require the people's close
scrutiny.
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy behind the
constitutional directive that constitutional amendments be submitted to the
people for their ratification.
A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike a statute which
may suffer amendments three or more times in the same year, it is intended to
stand the test of time. It is an expression of the people's sovereign will.
And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of submission for
ratification of amendments is that reasoning on the basis of the spirit of the
Constitution is just as important as reasoning by a strict adherence to the
phraseology thereof. We underscore this, because it is within the realm of
possibility that a Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths of the
Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the all important;
Bill of Rights in its entirety. We believe it to be beyond debate that in some such
situations the amendments ought to call for a constitutional convention rather
than a legislative proposal. And yet, nothing there is in the books or in the
Constitution itself. which would require such amendments to be adopted by a
constitutional convention. And then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we
are sure, forbids that proposals therefor be initiated by Congress and thereafter
presented to the people for their ratification.
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words "submitted to the
people for their ratification", if construed in the light of the nature of the
Constitution — a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people,
an — expression of their sovereign will — is that it can only be amended by the
people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the
Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for
their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They
are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
original provisions compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to
reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the
incubus of extraneous or possibly in insidious influences. We believe, the word
"submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities,
should strain every effort to inform very citizen of the provisions to be amended,
and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By
this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or
1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the
meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the
Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment
for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of
ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission
and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent, consent or
rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendment no
matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For, the people decree their
own fate.
Aptly had it been said:
. . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in this
respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge
Cooley, who has said "A good Constitution should beyond the reach
of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed
for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people;
not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved the excitement
or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the
government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. . . . Changes in
government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign
says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not
necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse." Am.
Law Rev. 1889, p. 3113
3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this proposition: If the people
are not sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner can
it be said that in accordance with the constitutional mandate, "the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification?" Our answer is "No".
We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967 — the statute that
submits to the people the constitutional amendments proposed by Congress in
Resolutions 1 and 3. Section 2 of the Act provides the manner of propagation of
the nature of the amendments throughout the country. There are five parts in
said Section 2, viz:
(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election.
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
every municipality, city and provincial office building and in every
polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and
sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election.
(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each
polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified
electors during election day.
(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may
be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each
polling place.
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the
principal native languages, for free distribution.
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for dissemination of
information regarding the amendments effectively brings the matter to the
people. A dissection of the mechanics yields disturbing thoughts. First, the
Official Gazette is not widely read. It does not reach the barrios. And even if it
reaches the barrios, is it available to all? And if it is, would all under stand
English? Second, it should be conceded that many citizens, especially those in
the outlying barrios, do not go to municipal, city and/or provincial office buildings,
except on special occasions like paying taxes or responding to court
summonses. And if they do, will they notice the printed amendments posted on
the bulletin board? And if they do notice, such copy again is in English (sample
submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General) for, anyway, the statute does
not require that it be in any other language or dialect. Third, it would not help any
if at least five copies are kept in the polling place for examination by qualified
electors during election day. As petitioner puts it, voting time is not study time.
And then, who can enter the polling place, except those who are about to vote?
Fourth, copies in the principal native languages shall be kept in each polling
place. But this is not, as Section 2 itself implies, in the nature of a command
because such copies shall be kept therein only "when practicable" and "as may
be determined by the Commission on Elections." Even if it be said that these are
available before election, a citizen may not intrude into the school building where
the polling places are usually located without disturbing the school classes being
held there. Fifth, it is true that the Comelec is directed to make available copies
of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever practicable, in the
principal native languages, for free distribution. However, Comelec is not
required to actively distribute them to the people. This is significant as to people
in the provinces, especially those in the far-flung barrios who are completely
unmindful of the discussions that go on now and then in the cities and centers of
population on the merits and demerits of the amendments. Rather, Comelec, in
this case, is but a passive agency which may hold copies available, but which
copies may not be distributed at all. Finally, it is of common knowledge that
Comelec has more than its hands full in these pre-election days. They cannot
possibly make extensive distribution.
Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even the official sample
ballot submitted to this Court would show that only the amendments are printed
at the back. And this, in pursuance to Republic Act 4913 itself.
Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper notice of the
proposed amendments thru dissemination by publication in extenso. People do
not have at hand the necessary data on which to base their stand on the merits
and demerits of said amendments.
We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the proposed
constitutional amendments within the meaning and intendment of Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution.
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the present election
campaign the focus is on the election of candidates. The constitutional
amendments are crowded out. Candidates on the homestretch, and their
leaders as well as the voters, gear their undivided efforts to the election of
officials; the constitutional amendments cut no ice with them. The truth is that
even in the ballot itself, the space accorded to the casting of "yes" or "no" vote
would give one the impression that the constitutional amendments are but a
bootstrap to the electoral ballot. Worse still, the fortunes of many elective
officials, on the national and local levels, are inextricably intertwined with the
results of the votes on the plebiscite. In a clash between votes for a candidate
and conscience on the merits and demerits of the constitutional amendments, 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.] 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213;
we are quite certain that it is the latter that will be dented. Sheenan's Case, 122 Mass., 445; 23 Am. Rep., 323.
22
5. That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to Torres vs. Ribo, 81 Phil. 50.
23
equally ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement, is Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, supra.
24
reflected in the sequence of uniform past practices. The Constitution had been People vs. Rogelio Gabitanan, 43 O.G. 3211.
25
amended thrice — in 1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case, the amendments were 53 Phil. 866.
26
embodied in resolutions adopted by the Legislature, which thereafter fixed the 50 Am. Jur., Sec. 282, pp. 267-268, citing Heckathorn v.
dates at which the proposed amendments were to be ratified or rejected. These Heckathorn, 284 Mich. 677, 280 NW 79, citing RCL; Robson v.
plebiscites have been referred to either as an "election" or "general election". At Cantwell, 143 SC 104, 141 SE 180, citing RCL; Geiger v. Kobilka, 26
no time, however, was the vote for the amendments of the Constitution held Wash 171, 66 P 423, Am. St. Rep. 733 and many others.
simultaneously with the election officials, national or local. Even with regard to BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
1
the 1947 parity amendment; the record shows that the sole issue was the 1947 United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273.
2
parity amendment; and the special elections simultaneously held in only three Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 1958, Justice Laurel,
provinces, Iloilo, Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were merely incidental thereto. ponente.
In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that guard against FERNANDO, J., concurring:
1
indiscriminate changes in the Constitution that is theirs. Is it too much to ask that 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
2
reasonable guarantee be made that in the matter of the alterations of the law of 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
3
the land, their true voice be heard? The answer perhaps is best expressed in the 307 US 433 (1939).
4
following thoughts: "It must be remembered that the Constitution is the people's 84 Phil. 368 (1940).
5
enactment. No proposed change can become effective unless they will it so Commonwealth Act No. 671 (1941).
through the compelling force of need of it and desire for it."4 6
Araneta v. Dinglasan, supra, at p. 376.
For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be stricken down SANCHEZ, J., separate opinion:
1
as in violation of the Constitution. The text of the law reads: "He (Senator or Member of the House of
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur. Representatives) may, however, be a Member of Constitutional
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result. Convention."
2
Emphasis supplied.
3
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: Ellingham vs. Dye, 99 N.E. pp. 4, 15; Emphasis supplied.
4
I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez. To Elingham vs. Dye, supra, at p. 17; emphasis supplied.
approve a mere proposal to amend the Constitution requires (Art. XV) a three-
fourths (3/4) vote of all the members of each legislative chamber, the highest
majority ever demanded by the fundamental charter, one higher even than that
required in order to declare war (Sec. 24, Article VI), with all its dire
consequences. If such an overwhelming majority, that was evidently exacted in
order to impress upon all and sundry the seriousness of every constitutional
amendment, is asked for a proposal to amend the Constitution, I find it
impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such
amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon to be diverted
by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials.
The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof,
and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have only
meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted
upon at an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the
subject. That this was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated
in the case of all other constitutional amendments in the past, that were
submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively devoted to the issue
whether the legislature's amendatory proposals should be ratified or not.
Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Urging the latter to refrain from implementing Republic Act. No. 4913
and from submitting to a plebiscite in the general elections to be held
on November 14, 1967, the Constitutional amendments proposed in
the aforementioned R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3.
2
Dated October 30, 1967.
3
78 Phil. 1.
4
63 Phil. 139, 157.
5
Supra.
6
81 Phil. 818.
7
L-2851, March 4 and 14, 1949.
8
L-10520, February 28, 1957.
9
L-18684, September 14, 1961.
10
Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines.
11
Section 1, Art. II, Constitution of the Philippines.
12
Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines.
13
Of amending the Constitution.
14
And, inferentially, to lower courts.
15
Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution.
16
Supra.
17
Approved, June 17, 1961.
18
Macias vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
19
Under the original Constitution providing for a unicameral legislative
body, whose members were chosen for a term of three (3) years
(Section 1, Art. VI, of the Original Constitution).
20
Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution.
21
Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez and De los Angeles, 37 Phil. p. 192;
Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil., 126; Codilla vs. Martinez, L-
14569, November 23, 1960. See, also, State vs. Carrol, 38 Conn.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA
ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the
People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),
respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN),
petitioners-intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2
of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country,
except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution.
The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent1 and
the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by
Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed,
we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over
the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the
attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of
the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended
to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and
other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the
assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers
can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated
for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that
to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise
necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures
shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation,
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,7 Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article
X9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions
concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF
ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the
people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of
registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND
96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11
(a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the
attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal,
proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense"
not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12
December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following
appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor
Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives
of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors
to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil
action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in
fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and
Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative,
which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November
1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes,
and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in
Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator
Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his
privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
"There is not a single word in that law which can be
considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional
initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the
law after publication in print media. This indicates that the
Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not
after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January
1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution
and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is
ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no
power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of
the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for
people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the
petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the
people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national
treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million,
not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be
incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental
importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this
petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and
legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on
the petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b)
issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the
Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their
Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES
TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS
THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL
EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL
FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES
AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC.
THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF
THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE
PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS
ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY
LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE
CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY
JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT
IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE
CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989
IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER
OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION
OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT
NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED
ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735
WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE
RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND
RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE
BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING
TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE
SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS
ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E,
PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF
OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE
CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT.
"AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE
OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD
BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL.
CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a
Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a
"knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . .
which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an
"Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start
the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to
gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive
allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law,
R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle
for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not
requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that
the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra
vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to
alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does
not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers
petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can
give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous
with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative
will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the
sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January
1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy
explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power;
and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of
initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines
the same as the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions
initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not
necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in
scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for
initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a
material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with
initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a
mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued
under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus
Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact
upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs.
COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary
restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift
Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra,
as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was
for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January
1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention
not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January
1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and
the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.
(MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their
Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in
Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere
amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because,
in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve
a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited
tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although
the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect
other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections
and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which,
 by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and
the limits provided for all other national and local elective
officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to
open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands
of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common
good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and
nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of
initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation.
Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be
availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the
performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium
for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be
called the enabling law that implements the people's
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state
(a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the
appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed,
(c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the
same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures
of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f)
the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity
of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the
verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the
petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC,
(I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of
funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being
no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or
remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the
COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for
a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal
basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a
sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements
the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored
the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to
promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the
respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin
Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory
pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in
an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is
signed by the required number of registered voters. He also submits that the
proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and
resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of
signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited
to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and
supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a
Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for
the required implementing law on the initiative to amend the
Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in
that it does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the
Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a
constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for
Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion
for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in
Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator
Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible
period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in
Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a
nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to
comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the
said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the
following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and
arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative
on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the
Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
(In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum
on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on
the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and
local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or
an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has
jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations;
and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days and requested
intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No.
21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts
the allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the
COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a
sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the
Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the
deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic
notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and
Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated
Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI,
and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda.
24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special
civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the
fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN
THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious
attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take
cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so,
it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding
any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section
2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to
an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior
tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not
legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case
the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive
and adverse environmental consequences on the body
politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent
climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for
judicial statesmanship.
 30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional
law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the
Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount
majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to
dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon
evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors
at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days
their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6
December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering
Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition
for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the
case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss
and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant
petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by
the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also
asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss
the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In
light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil
action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum,
this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed
aside this technicality because the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS,
UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate.
Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action,
in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional
action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on
Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and
Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee
Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as
provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the
Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative
which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam
President. May we respectfully call
attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is
now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section
2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just
two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of
initiative upon petition of at least 10
percent, there are no details in the
provision on how to carry this out. Do
we understand, therefore, that we are
leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam
President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also
understand, therefore, that for as long
as the legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law on this,
this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also
taken up during the committee hearing,
especially with respect to the budget
appropriations which would have to be
legislated so that the plebiscite could be
called. We deemed it best that this
matter be left to the legislature. The
Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the
power of initiative can be called until
after five years from the date of the
ratification of this Constitution.
Therefore, the first amendment that
could be proposed through the exercise
of this initiative power would be after
five years. It is reasonably expected
that within that five-year period, the
National Assembly can come up with
the appropriate rules governing the
exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to
the legislature — the details on how
this is to be carried out — is it possible
that, in effect, what will be presented to
the people for ratification is the work of
the legislature rather than of the
people? Does this provision exclude
that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude
that possibility because even the
legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe
 individually or collectively, if it fails to
muster the three-fourths vote in order to
constitute itself as a constituent
assembly and submit that proposal to
the people for ratification through the
process of an initiative.
x x x           x x x          x x x
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the
sponsor that the intention in the
proposal is to vest constituent power in
the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely
correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the
underlying precept of the proposal in
terms of institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the
Constitution or in the amendment
thereof, but I would have a lot of
difficulties in terms of accepting the
draft of Section 2, as written. Would the
sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent
power has primacy over all other legal
mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is
right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor
agree with me that in the hierarchy of
legal values, the Constitution is source
of all legal mandates and that therefore
we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the
amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is
nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to
underscore the primacy of constituent
power we have a separate article in the
constitution that would specifically
cover the process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor
inclined, as the provisions are drafted
now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the
mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of
implementing this could very well be
placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate into this provision the
mechanics that would adequately cover
all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is
limited to proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was
suggested on the theory that this matter
of initiative, which came about because
of the extraordinary developments this
year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1.
The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution,
so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. 34
x x x           x x x          x x x
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am
seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead
of setting it up as another separate
section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable
except that, as we clarified a while ago,
this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not
expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the
Constitution. That was the sense that
was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the
Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas the
process of initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those
were the terms envisioned in the
Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam
President. I propose to substitute the
entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have
modified the proposed amendment
after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor
himself and the honorable
Commissioners Guingona, Monsod,
Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo.
The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2
will now read as follows: "SECTION 2.
— AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS,
OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF
THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER
THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL
BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President,
considering that the proposed
amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed
Committee Report No. 7, we accept the
proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to
Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the
exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner
Davide's amendment, is it possible for
the legislature to set forth certain
procedures to carry out the
initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
x x x           x x x          x x x
 MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's
amendment does not prevent the
legislature from asking another body to
set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is
correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided
the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures,
including the determination of the
proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not
destroy the substantive right to initiate.
In other words, none of the procedures
to be proposed by the legislative body
must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the
Constitution can the procedures which I
have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly
confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the
Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam
President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question:
Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the
word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because
"amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate
to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing
amendments through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the
initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be
made that under this proposal, what is
involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution
would ordinarily require a proposal by
the National Assembly by a vote of
three-fourths; and to call a This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a
constitutional convention would require
a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a
constitutional convention, a majority of
the National Assembly is required, the
import being that the process of
amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably
initiating an ordinary legislation or
putting an end to a law proposed by the
National Assembly by way of a
referendum. I cannot agree to reducing
the requirement approved by the
Committee on the Legislative because
it would require another voting by the
Committee, and the voting as precisely
based on a requirement of 10 percent.
Perhaps, I might present such a
proposal, by way of an amendment,
when the Commission shall take up the
Article on the Legislative or on the
National Assembly on plenary sessions.
39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments,
and the final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor
and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam
President. Section 2, as amended,
reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO
THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE
BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS,
OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF
THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER
THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL
BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was
approved on second reading on 9 July 1986. 41 Thereafter, upon his
motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to
introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second
and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be
amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and
deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph
reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present
second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the
Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-
executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right?
Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents
and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise
of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the
essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional
Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then
reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right.
The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out."
46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation
of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives
on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47
which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988,
48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and
initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill
No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or
resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which
was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House
of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to
"provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the
Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said
section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
 propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section
is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.
The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the
system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was
lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement
of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases
"propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative
on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems
of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does
not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section
5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions
of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than
one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis
supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved
or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion
that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for
the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could
have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative
on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National
Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum)
leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what
is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is
actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer
understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
x x x           x x x          x x x
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing
to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a
subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate.
Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are
placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by
majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation of the Commission.
(Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with
the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and
other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the
COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition
for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national
and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on
Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein
applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null
and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local
legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in
providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed,
rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the
following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the
contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number
of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered
voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the
invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the
local government unit concerned as to whether the required number of
signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition
to the registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period
specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A.
No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word
"Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on
the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the
constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the
petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the
paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a
reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed
in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized
exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard
— the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE
ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does
not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power
under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws
and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC
under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and
the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the
power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments,
or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12%
of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition
does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself
admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his
petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without
the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its
filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe
the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and
Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of
by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the
petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason
it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order
of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing
Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying
it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the
proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an
amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary,
if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and
blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of
the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard
for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN
petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made
permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against
private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
 
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret,
however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the
Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
I
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people
to initiate amendments to the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover
the meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the search of the intent of our
lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature is
the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation.1 Stated otherwise, intent is
the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought
to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was a
consolidation of House Bill No. 215053 and Senate Bill No. 17.4 Senate Bill No.
17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject
any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body." Beyond
doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5
expressly included people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Congressman
(now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder
on the constitutional basis of the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential
system which was introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw
the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973
Constitution the principle remained applicable, the 1981
amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of
legislative powers between the Legislature and the
Executive departments. Transcending changes in the
exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the
Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a republican
state where sovereignty resides in the people and all
sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still
preserved in Congress; however, to institutionalize direct
action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution,
the Constitution recognizes the power of the people,
through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress does not have plenary powers since reserve
powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the
same Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest
possible time, a bill on referendum and initiative, and to
share its legislative powers with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other
hand, vests in the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon
petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of
registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's
response to the duty imposed on Congress to implement
the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system
of initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited
Section 99 of the Local Government Code which vests in
the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative
processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports
of the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of
the power of initiative and referendum. He added that the
holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are likewise
provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that
pertinent quotation on the subject which he will later submit
to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of his
sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar
to those contained in the instant Bill among which are the
constitutions of states in the United States which recognize
the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any
statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a
referendum. These states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama,
Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind
of laws to which initiative and referendum apply is also
without limitation, except for emergency measures, which
are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added
that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the
petition, the requirements of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to
electors are substantially similar to the provisions in
American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political
structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said, is
a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the Bill
is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and
recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners saw the
system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument
which can be used should the legislature show itself to be
indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he
claimed, why now is an opportune time to pass the Bill even
as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws
which are necessary to safeguard individual rights and
liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative
and referendum as advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He
stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political
judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of the general
electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely;
the initiative to amend the Constitution once every five
years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to define rules and
regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent
of the people on measures that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a
referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by presenting a
petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of
registered voters at which every legislative district is
represented by at least three percent of the registered
voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition,
the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the
petition, publish the same, and set the date of the
referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is
approved by the required number of votes, it shall become
effective 15 days following the completion of its publication
in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed
that the Members cannot ignore the people's call for
initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve
House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared
text of his speech together with the footnotes be reproduced
as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's
initiative to amend the Constitution was stressed by then
Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador Escudero III in
his sponsorship remarks, viz:7
x x x           x x x          x x x
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been
clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever since,
especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A
substantial segment of the population feels, he said, that the
form of democracy is there, but not the reality or substance
of it because of the increasingly elitist approach of their
representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution
has provided a means whereby the people can exercise the
reserved power of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article
VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution be made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is
needed for the aforecited Constitutional provisions. While
the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong competition
among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it
will hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the
government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and
produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the
Bill will also give street parliamentarians the opportunity to
articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the
early approval of the Bill so that it can be initially used for
the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of
House Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set
aside their personal and political consideration for the
greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505 were threshed out in a Bicameral Conference Committee.8 In
the meeting of the Committee on June 6, 1989,9 the members agreed
that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that the consolidated
version should include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as
contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting
states:
x x x           x x x          x x x
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any
rate, as I have said, because this is
new in our political system, the Senate
decided on a more cautious approach
and limiting it only to the local
government units because even with
that stage where . . . at least this has
been quite popular, ano? It has been
attempted on a national basis. Alright.
There has not been a single attempt.
Now, so, kami limitado doon. And,
second, we consider also that it is only
fair that the local legislative body should
be given a chance to adopt the
 legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong
sinasabing indirect system of initiative.
If after all, the local legislative assembly
or body is willing to adopt it in full or in
toto, there ought to be any reason for
initiative, ano for initiative. And, number
3, we feel that there should be some
limitation on the frequency with which it
should be applied. Number 4, na the
people, thru initiative, cannot enact any
ordinance that is beyond the scope of
authority of the local legislative body,
otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila
ng power that is broader and greater
than the grant of legislative power to
the Sanggunians. And Number 5,
because of that, then a proposition
which has been the result of a
successful initiative can only carry the
force and effect of an ordinance and
therefore that should not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to declare it null
and void for want of authority. Ha, di
ba? I mean it is beyond powers of local
government units to enact. Iyon ang
main essence namin, so we
concentrated on that. And that is why . .
. so ang sa inyo naman includes iyon
sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa
amin, if you insist on that, alright,
although we feel na it will in effect
become a dead statute. Alright, and we
can agree, we can agree. So ang
mangyayari dito, and magiging basic
nito, let us not discuss anymore kung
alin and magiging basic bill, ano,
whether it is the Senate Bill or whether
it is the House bill. Logically it should be
ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It
is one of the first bills approved by the
Senate kaya ang number niyan,
makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating
pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really
iyong features ng national at saka
constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na
natin na consolidation of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall
consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation
of the Senate and House Bill No. so
and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval,
then Congressman Roco upon interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo
Albano, again confirmed that it covered people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. The record of the House Representative states: 11
x x x           x x x          x x x
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The
Gentleman from Camarines Sur is
recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions between Senate Bill No.
21505 which refers to the system
providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
Speaker, we consolidated the Senate
and the House versions, so both
versions are totally intact in the bill. The
Senators ironically provided for local
initiative and referendum and the
House Representatives correctly
provided for initiative and referendum
on the Constitution and on national
legislation.
I move that we approve the
consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What
is the pleasure of the Minority Floor
Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished
sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The
Gentlemen will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say
that the only difference in the two bills
was that in the Senate version there
was a provision for local initiative and
referendum, whereas the House
version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version
provide purely for local initiative and
referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national
and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding
therefore, that the two provisions were
incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have
a complete initiative and referendum
both in the constitutional amendment
and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as
municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr.
Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and
referendum is in consonance with the
provision of the Constitution whereby it
mandates this Congress to enact the
enabling law, so that we shall have a
system which can be done every five
years. Is it five years in the provision of
the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr.
Speaker. For constitutional
amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it
is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we
cannot have multiple initiatives and
referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically,
there was no substantial difference
between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were
filled by the Senate which, as I said
earlier, ironically was about local,
provincial and municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were
consolidated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to
approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the
motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement
the people's initiative to amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty
to interpret the law as it was intended by the legislature. We have
ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as
old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, that interpretation which
will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be
adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to
effectuate its intent to implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text of said law to reach the
conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A.
No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose
amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by
which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution. Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein."
It also states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five
(5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b)
states that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of
the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of
R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments
that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy thrust of
section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be
expected for laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the
Constitution does not require our legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to
write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like
Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to
effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written. As the
distinguished Vicente Francisco 13 reminds us: "Many laws contain words which
have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or
words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be ascertained.
The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical
expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying
the meaning the legislature intended that they bear, although such a
construction necessitates a departure from the literal meaning of the words
used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's
initiative to amend the Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the
subject should be given the weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory
construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a statute
may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are
entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the
enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce
the manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative
to amend the Constitution. It blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete that
the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the law is its body but
its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the stewardship of
Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the
procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
This is in accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is hereby
empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation of power be
assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17
this Court, thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to
determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) to fix standard —
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law,
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is
worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation
of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It
does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above
referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the
COMELEC in promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the
law. As aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of
the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances,
or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread
out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to
the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the
law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, 18
directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should
do upon filing of the petition for initiative, 20 how a proposition is approved, 21
when a plebiscite may be held, 22 when the amendment takes effect 23 and
what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure, these
standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is
intended to map out the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the
legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate." 25
In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its
power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close
look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided the
procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. The debates 26 in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that the rules of procedure to enforce the people's
initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner
Davide's amendment, it is possible for
the legislature to set forth certain
procedures to carry out the
initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
x x x           x x x          x x x
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's
amendment does not prevent the
legislature from asking another body to
set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is
correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided
the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not
destroy the substantive right to initiate.
In other words, none of the procedures
to be proposed by the legislative body
must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the
Constitution can the procedures which I
have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27 Father
Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response to questions of Commissioner
Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the legislature
over the process: it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form
before (the amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize
another body to check the proper form. It could also authorize the
COMELEC, for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of
 petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the
substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to
be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is
to impair the substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to
the Constitution. It is not, however, prohibited from legislating the
procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it to
another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from
invalidating administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative
standard to guide their promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz,
"even if the law itself does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will
bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it
can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling in Hirabayashi v. United
States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular
standard to which orders of the military commander are to
conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to
any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and
the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other.
They were parts of a single program and must be judged as
such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by
Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations.
The Proclamations themselves followed a standard
authorized by the Executive Order — the necessity of
protecting military resources in the designated areas against
espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A.
No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss them. They were not
written by our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and standards can
also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the
standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other
cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards such as
"simplicity and dignity," 30 "public interest," 31 "public welfare," 32
"interest of law and order," 33 "justice and equity,"34 "adequate and
efficient instruction," 35 "public safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater
national interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and
subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and "promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in government." 40 A due regard and respect
to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government,
should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws
unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with
respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly
baseless. The records show that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin
alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The
Pedrosas did not join the petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene
and was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before
the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed by the
petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto
Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the
People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an
original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only
allegation against the Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA
which proposes to undertake the signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization was not
impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the Pedrosas
". . . to desist from conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas
". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining
order against the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for
contempt against them without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures
to start a people's initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not
engaged in any criminal act. Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed
in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which provides
that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed
in section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican
state "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of the
voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no
power can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The
right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall
not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987
Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In
soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in
the political decision-making process of our people. The Constitution says their
right cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question
mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the
Constitution is an exercise of their freedom of speech and expression and their
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. We have
memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos
Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our
rulings that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important
rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of speech enervates the essence of
the democratic creed of think and let think. For this reason, the Constitution
encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution does not depend on any law, much
less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution
can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no
irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the
predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long
recognized the truism that the only constant in life is change and so should the
majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in
the 1987 Constitution. On October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is
no longer a myth but an article of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30,
1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check excesses of
government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's
initiatives ought to be rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . .
this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
protect and promote their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few days ago, or on
March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in
Caloocan City involving the mayor and ordered that he submits his right to
continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the people. Thus far, we have
succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque abstraction to a robust
reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom
in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the
Constitution without setting back the flowering of people empowerment. More
important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people who are pro-change but not
those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change into
a sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a
monologue for in a democracy nobody can claim any infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
 
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to
engross, let alone to commit, itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by
the parties. What is essential at this time would only be to resolve whether or not
the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his
capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and
seeking through a people initiative certain modifications on the 1987
Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due course. The
Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment under this method, is explicit.
Section 2, Article XVII, thereof provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the
constitutional imperatives, the petition would rather have much of its burden
passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to
schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary
publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation," and to
instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations at the time and on the useless surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of
dates designated for the purpose. adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, That this is the legislative intent is further shown by the deliberations
consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover in Congress, thus:
only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or . . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of
contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative. provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the was noted:
governed themselves. The postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a MR. ROCO. On the Conference
perceived myth but a veritable reality. The past has taught us that the vitality of Committee Report on the disagreeing
government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead as in the consent provisions between Senate Bill No. 17
of those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its and the consolidated House Bill No.
true meaning if it comes with the correlative end of being heard. 21505 which refers to the system
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and providing for the initiative and
substance, it behooves the Court, I most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
resolving the question of whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively Speaker, we consolidated the Senate
and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people and the House versions, so both
to directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view formulated versions are totally intact in the bill. The
by the Court at this point would at best be only a non-binding, albeit possibly Senators ironically provided for local
persuasive, obiter dictum. initiative and referendum and the
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the House of Representatives correctly
TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas provided for initiative and referendum
of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments. an the Constitution and on national
  legislation.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring: I move that we approve the
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has consolidated bill.
prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. is the pleasure of the Minority Floor
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all Leader?
government authority emanates from them.1 Unlike our previous constitutions, MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished
the present 1987 Constitution has given more significance to this declaration of sponsor answer just a few questions?
principle for the people are now vested with power not only to propose, enact or THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What
reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local legislative body, but to does the sponsor say?
propose amendments to the constitution as well.2 To implement these MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989 enacted Republic Act No. 6735, THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The
otherwise known as "The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, Gentleman will please proceed.
amply covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained by MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say
petitioners is based principally on the alleged lack of sub-title in the law on that the only difference in the two bills
initiative to amend the constitution and on their allegation that: was that in the Senate version there
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law was a provision for local initiative and
after publication in print media. [And] [t]his indicates that referendum, whereas the House
Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not version has none.
constitutional amendments, because constitutional MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version
amendments take effect upon ratification not after provided purely for local initiative and
publication.3 referendum, whereas in the House
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the version, we provided purely for national
law, for under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of and constitutional legislation.
Initiative or Referendum Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding,
providing that: therefore, that the two provisions were
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the incorporated?
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite. MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be construed together with the a complete initiative and referendum
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 both in the constitutional amendment
Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in and national legislation.
isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the MR. ROCO. That is correct.
statute as a whole.5 MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as " the power municipal resolutions?
of the people to propose amendments to the constitution or to propose and MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr.
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose".6 The same Speaker.
section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative on MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and
the constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the referendum is in consonance with the
constitution"7 Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the provision of the Constitution to enact
electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution is approved or the enabling law, so that we shall have
rejected by the people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative on a system which can be done every five
the Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following: years. Is it five years in the provision of
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must the Constitution?
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr.
of the registered voters as signatories, of which every Speaker. For constitutional
legislative district must be represented by at least three per amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on is every five years." (Id. [Journal and
the constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years Record of the House of
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June
every five years thereafter. 1989, p. 960; quoted in Garcia v.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293
being to provide for the implementation of the right to propose an [1994]; emphasis supplied)
amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative. "A legal provision", . . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have
the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to be a comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
 consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and
as approved and enacted into law, the proposal included
initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the
constitution. Any other construction as what petitioners foist upon the
Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit behind the
enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at
present, cannot take any action (such as those contained in the Commission's
orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of
its having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents' petition. This is
so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that
proof of procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the time
the petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five (5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required
signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the
refiling of their petition once compliance with the required percentage
is satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence,
therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on
Elections, any determination of whether private respondents' proposal
constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that
R.A. No. 6735 is an "inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. I, however, register my concurrence
with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition for initiative
before public respondent Commission on Elections until the same be supported
by proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
 
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the
majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the "initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the
people through initiative," there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735
is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show
the required number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered
voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district — no public
funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative
to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any
petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the
majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the
Constitution cannot be amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by
Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not even by all the voters of the country
acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify,
abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the
very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on
whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at
present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed
by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too
extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats,
and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the
Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future
effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the
Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its
proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and
for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735
and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to Implement
Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly
concedes — intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it
contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution.1 I
completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato
S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on
initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to
the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on,
are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for
initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to
facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted
thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In
recognition of this, RA 6735 wisely empowered 4 the Commission on Election
"to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated
"to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on
Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac,
Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C.
Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed
Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe
any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to
give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws
and local legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There
is no basis for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the
Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally,
the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec
Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate
and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited
Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative.
In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private respondents
should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec
should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help
them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain
them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to
the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free assembly.
And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking
freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent
Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree
with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion.
Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the
Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-
admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed
expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our
people to be used as their final weapons against political excesses,
opportunism, inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved
instruments to exact transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their
chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be
resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be carefully
nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al.
and to DIRECT Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin
Petition on the ground of prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon
by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued on 18
December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret,
however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the
Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
I without limitation, except for emergency measures, which
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people
to initiate amendments to the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover
the meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the search of the intent of our
lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature is
the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation.1 Stated otherwise, intent is
the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought
to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was a
consolidation of House Bill No. 215053 and Senate Bill No. 17.4 Senate Bill No.
17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject
any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body." Beyond
doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5
expressly included people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Congressman
(now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder
on the constitutional basis of the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential
system which was introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw
the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973
Constitution the principle remained applicable, the 1981
amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of
legislative powers between the Legislature and the
Executive departments. Transcending changes in the
exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the
Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a republican
state where sovereignty resides in the people and all
sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still
preserved in Congress; however, to institutionalize direct
action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution,
the Constitution recognizes the power of the people,
through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress does not have plenary powers since reserve
powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the
same Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest
possible time, a bill on referendum and initiative, and to
share its legislative powers with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other
hand, vests in the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon
petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of
registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's
response to the duty imposed on Congress to implement
the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system
of initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited
Section 99 of the Local Government Code which vests in
the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative
processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports
of the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of
the power of initiative and referendum. He added that the
holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are likewise
provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that
pertinent quotation on the subject which he will later submit
to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of his
sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar
to those contained in the instant Bill among which are the
constitutions of states in the United States which recognize
the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any
statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a
referendum. These states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama,
Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind
of laws to which initiative and referendum apply is also
are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added
that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the
petition, the requirements of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to
electors are substantially similar to the provisions in
American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political
structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said, is
a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the Bill
is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and
recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners saw the
system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument
which can be used should the legislature show itself to be
indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he
claimed, why now is an opportune time to pass the Bill even
as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws
which are necessary to safeguard individual rights and
liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative
and referendum as advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He
stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political
judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of the general
electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely;
the initiative to amend the Constitution once every five
years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to define rules and
regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent
of the people on measures that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a
referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by presenting a
petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of
registered voters at which every legislative district is
represented by at least three percent of the registered
voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition,
the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the
petition, publish the same, and set the date of the
referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is
approved by the required number of votes, it shall become
effective 15 days following the completion of its publication
in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed
that the Members cannot ignore the people's call for
initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve
House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared
text of his speech together with the footnotes be reproduced
as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's
initiative to amend the Constitution was stressed by then
Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador Escudero III in
his sponsorship remarks, viz:7
x x x           x x x          x x x
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been
clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever since,
especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A
substantial segment of the population feels, he said, that the
form of democracy is there, but not the reality or substance
of it because of the increasingly elitist approach of their
representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution
has provided a means whereby the people can exercise the
reserved power of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article
 VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution be made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is
needed for the aforecited Constitutional provisions. While
the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong competition
among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it
will hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the
government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and
produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the
Bill will also give street parliamentarians the opportunity to
articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the
early approval of the Bill so that it can be initially used for
the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of
House Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set
aside their personal and political consideration for the
greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505 were threshed out in a Bicameral Conference Committee.8 In
the meeting of the Committee on June 6, 1989,9 the members agreed
that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that the consolidated
version should include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as
contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting
states:
x x x           x x x          x x x
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any
rate, as I have said, because this is
new in our political system, the Senate
decided on a more cautious approach
and limiting it only to the local
government units because even with
that stage where . . . at least this has
been quite popular, ano? It has been
attempted on a national basis. Alright.
There has not been a single attempt.
Now, so, kami limitado doon. And,
second, we consider also that it is only
fair that the local legislative body should
be given a chance to adopt the
legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong
sinasabing indirect system of initiative.
If after all, the local legislative assembly
or body is willing to adopt it in full or in
toto, there ought to be any reason for
initiative, ano for initiative. And, number
3, we feel that there should be some
limitation on the frequency with which it
should be applied. Number 4, na the
people, thru initiative, cannot enact any
ordinance that is beyond the scope of
authority of the local legislative body,
otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila
ng power that is broader and greater
than the grant of legislative power to
the Sanggunians. And Number 5,
because of that, then a proposition
which has been the result of a
successful initiative can only carry the
force and effect of an ordinance and
therefore that should not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to declare it null
and void for want of authority. Ha, di
ba? I mean it is beyond powers of local
government units to enact. Iyon ang
main essence namin, so we
concentrated on that. And that is why . .
. so ang sa inyo naman includes iyon
sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa
amin, if you insist on that, alright,
although we feel na it will in effect
become a dead statute. Alright, and we
can agree, we can agree. So ang
mangyayari dito, and magiging basic
nito, let us not discuss anymore kung
alin and magiging basic bill, ano,
whether it is the Senate Bill or whether
it is the House bill. Logically it should be
ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It
is one of the first bills approved by the
Senate kaya ang number niyan,
makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating
pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really
iyong features ng national at saka
constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na
natin na consolidation of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall
consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation
of the Senate and House Bill No. so
and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval,
then Congressman Roco upon interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo
Albano, again confirmed that it covered people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. The record of the House Representative states: 11
x x x           x x x          x x x
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The
Gentleman from Camarines Sur is
recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions between Senate Bill No.
21505 which refers to the system
providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
Speaker, we consolidated the Senate
and the House versions, so both
versions are totally intact in the bill. The
Senators ironically provided for local
initiative and referendum and the
House Representatives correctly
provided for initiative and referendum
on the Constitution and on national
legislation.
I move that we approve the
consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What
is the pleasure of the Minority Floor
Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished
sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The
Gentlemen will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say
that the only difference in the two bills
was that in the Senate version there
was a provision for local initiative and
referendum, whereas the House
version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version
provide purely for local initiative and
referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national
and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding
therefore, that the two provisions were
incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have
a complete initiative and referendum
both in the constitutional amendment
and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as
municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr.
Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and
referendum is in consonance with the
provision of the Constitution whereby it
mandates this Congress to enact the
enabling law, so that we shall have a
system which can be done every five
years. Is it five years in the provision of
the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr.
Speaker. For constitutional
 amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it
is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we
cannot have multiple initiatives and
referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically,
there was no substantial difference
between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were
filled by the Senate which, as I said
earlier, ironically was about local,
provincial and municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were
consolidated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to
approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the
motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement
the people's initiative to amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty
to interpret the law as it was intended by the legislature. We have
ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as
old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, that interpretation which
will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be
adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to
effectuate its intent to implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text of said law to reach the
conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A.
No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose
amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by
which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution. Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein."
It also states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five
(5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b)
states that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of
the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of
R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments
that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy thrust of
section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be
expected for laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the
Constitution does not require our legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to
write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like
Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to
effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written. As the
distinguished Vicente Francisco 13 reminds us: "Many laws contain words which
have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or
words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be ascertained.
The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical
expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying
the meaning the legislature intended that they bear, although such a
construction necessitates a departure from the literal meaning of the words
used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's
initiative to amend the Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the
subject should be given the weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory
construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a statute
may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are
entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the
enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce
the manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative
to amend the Constitution. It blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete that
the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the law is its body but
its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the stewardship of
Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the
procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
This is in accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is hereby
empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation of power be
assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17
this Court, thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to
determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) to fix standard —
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law,
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is
worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation
of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It
does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above
referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the
COMELEC in promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the
law. As aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of
the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances,
or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread
out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to
the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the
law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, 18
directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should
do upon filing of the petition for initiative, 20 how a proposition is approved, 21
when a plebiscite may be held, 22 when the amendment takes effect 23 and
what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure, these
standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is
intended to map out the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the
legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate." 25
In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its
power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close
look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided the
procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. The debates 26 in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that the rules of procedure to enforce the people's
initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner
Davide's amendment, it is possible for
the legislature to set forth certain
procedures to carry out the
initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
x x x           x x x          x x x
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's
amendment does not prevent the
legislature from asking another body to
set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is
correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided
the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not
destroy the substantive right to initiate.
In other words, none of the procedures
to be proposed by the legislative body
must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the
Constitution can the procedures which I
have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27 Father
Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response to questions of Commissioner
Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the legislature
over the process: it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form
before (the amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize
another body to check the proper form. It could also authorize the
COMELEC, for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of
petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the
substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to
be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is
to impair the substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to
the Constitution. It is not, however, prohibited from legislating the
procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it to
another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from
invalidating administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative
standard to guide their promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz,
"even if the law itself does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will
bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it
can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling in Hirabayashi v. United
States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular
standard to which orders of the military commander are to
conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to
any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and
the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other.
They were parts of a single program and must be judged as
such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by
Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations.
The Proclamations themselves followed a standard
authorized by the Executive Order — the necessity of
protecting military resources in the designated areas against
espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A.
No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss them. They were not
written by our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and standards can
also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the
standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other
cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards such as
"simplicity and dignity," 30 "public interest," 31 "public welfare," 32
"interest of law and order," 33 "justice and equity,"34 "adequate and
efficient instruction," 35 "public safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater
national interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and
subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and "promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in government." 40 A due regard and respect
to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government,
should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws
unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with
respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly
baseless. The records show that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin
alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The
Pedrosas did not join the petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene
and was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before
the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed by the
petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto
Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the
People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an
original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only
allegation against the Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA
which proposes to undertake the signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization was not
impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the Pedrosas
". . . to desist from conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas
". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining
order against the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for
contempt against them without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures
to start a people's initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not
engaged in any criminal act. Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed
in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which provides
that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed
in section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican
state "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of the
voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no
power can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The
right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall
not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987
Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In
soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in
the political decision-making process of our people. The Constitution says their
right cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question
mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the
Constitution is an exercise of their freedom of speech and expression and their
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. We have
memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos
Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our
rulings that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important
rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of speech enervates the essence of
the democratic creed of think and let think. For this reason, the Constitution
encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution does not depend on any law, much
less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution
can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no
irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the
predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long
recognized the truism that the only constant in life is change and so should the
majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in
the 1987 Constitution. On October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is
no longer a myth but an article of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30,
1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check excesses of
government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's
initiatives ought to be rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . .
this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
protect and promote their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few days ago, or on
March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in
Caloocan City involving the mayor and ordered that he submits his right to
continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the people. Thus far, we have
succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque abstraction to a robust
reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not
in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the constitutional amendments, because constitutional
Constitution without setting back the flowering of people empowerment. More amendments take effect upon ratification not after
important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people who are pro-change but not publication.3
those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change into which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the
a sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a law, for under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of
monologue for in a democracy nobody can claim any infallibility. Initiative or Referendum Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur. providing that:
  The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting: votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be construed together with the
engross, let alone to commit, itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4
the parties. What is essential at this time would only be to resolve whether or not Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in
the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the
capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and statute as a whole.5
seeking through a people initiative certain modifications on the 1987 In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as " the power
Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due course. The of the people to propose amendments to the constitution or to propose and
Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment under this method, is explicit. enact legislations through an election called for the purpose".6 The same
Section 2, Article XVII, thereof provides: section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative on
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be the constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a constitution"7 Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution is approved or
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be rejected by the people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative on
represented by at least three per centum of the registered the Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
authorized within five years following the ratification of this have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years of the registered voters as signatories, of which every
thereafter. legislative district must be represented by at least three per
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on
exercise of this right. the constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
constitutional imperatives, the petition would rather have much of its burden every five years thereafter.
passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent
schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary being to provide for the implementation of the right to propose an
publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation," and to amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative. "A legal provision",
instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to be a
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations at the time and on the useless surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of
dates designated for the purpose. adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, That this is the legislative intent is further shown by the deliberations
consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover in Congress, thus:
only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or . . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of
contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative. provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the was noted:
governed themselves. The postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a MR. ROCO. On the Conference
perceived myth but a veritable reality. The past has taught us that the vitality of Committee Report on the disagreeing
government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead as in the consent provisions between Senate Bill No. 17
of those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its and the consolidated House Bill No.
true meaning if it comes with the correlative end of being heard. 21505 which refers to the system
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and providing for the initiative and
substance, it behooves the Court, I most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
resolving the question of whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively Speaker, we consolidated the Senate
and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people and the House versions, so both
to directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view formulated versions are totally intact in the bill. The
by the Court at this point would at best be only a non-binding, albeit possibly Senators ironically provided for local
persuasive, obiter dictum. initiative and referendum and the
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the House of Representatives correctly
TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas provided for initiative and referendum
of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments. an the Constitution and on national
  legislation.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring: I move that we approve the
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has consolidated bill.
prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. is the pleasure of the Minority Floor
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all Leader?
government authority emanates from them.1 Unlike our previous constitutions, MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished
the present 1987 Constitution has given more significance to this declaration of sponsor answer just a few questions?
principle for the people are now vested with power not only to propose, enact or THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What
reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local legislative body, but to does the sponsor say?
propose amendments to the constitution as well.2 To implement these MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989 enacted Republic Act No. 6735, THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The
otherwise known as "The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, Gentleman will please proceed.
amply covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained by MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say
petitioners is based principally on the alleged lack of sub-title in the law on that the only difference in the two bills
initiative to amend the constitution and on their allegation that: was that in the Senate version there
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law was a provision for local initiative and
after publication in print media. [And] [t]his indicates that
 referendum, whereas the House
version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version
provided purely for local initiative and
referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national
and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding,
therefore, that the two provisions were
incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have
a complete initiative and referendum
both in the constitutional amendment
and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as
municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr.
Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and
referendum is in consonance with the
provision of the Constitution to enact
the enabling law, so that we shall have
a system which can be done every five
years. Is it five years in the provision of
the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr.
Speaker. For constitutional
amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it
is every five years." (Id. [Journal and
Record of the House of
Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June
1989, p. 960; quoted in Garcia v.
Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293
[1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have
comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and
as approved and enacted into law, the proposal included
initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the
constitution. Any other construction as what petitioners foist upon the
Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit behind the
enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at
present, cannot take any action (such as those contained in the Commission's
orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of
its having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents' petition. This is
so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that
proof of procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the time
the petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five (5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required
signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the
refiling of their petition once compliance with the required percentage
is satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence,
therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on
Elections, any determination of whether private respondents' proposal
constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that
R.A. No. 6735 is an "inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. I, however, register my concurrence
with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition for initiative
before public respondent Commission on Elections until the same be supported
by proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
 
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the
majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the "initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the
people through initiative," there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735
is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show
the required number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered
voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district — no public
funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative
to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any
petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the
majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the
Constitution cannot be amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by
Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not even by all the voters of the country
acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify,
abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the
very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on
whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at
present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed
by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too
extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats,
and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the
Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future
effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the
Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its
proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and
for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735
and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to Implement
Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly
concedes — intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it
contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution.1 I
completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato
S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on
initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to
the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on,
are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for
initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to
facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted
thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In
recognition of this, RA 6735 wisely empowered 4 the Commission on Election
"to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated
"to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on
Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac,
Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C.
Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed
Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe
any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to
give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws
and local legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There
is no basis for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the
Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally,
the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec
Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate
and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
 Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa 9 The section reads:
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
order issued by this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private respondents for any length of time shall not be considered as an
should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help for which he was elected.
them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain 10 Rollo, 19.
them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to 11 Annex "B" of Petition, Rollo, 25.
the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free assembly. 12 Order of 12 December 1996, Annex "B-1" of Petition,
And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking Rollo, 27.
freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent 13 Id.
Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the 14 Citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949]; Sanidad
death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 [1976].
with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."5 15 Rollo, 68.
Epilogue 16 Rollo, 100.
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. 17 Rollo, 130.
Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the 18 A Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world- 19 Section 26, Article II, Constitution.
admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed 20 Citing Commissioner Ople of the Constitutional
expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our Commission, I Record of the Constitutional Commission,
people to be used as their final weapons against political excesses, 405.
opportunism, inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved 21 Rollo, 239.
instruments to exact transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their 22 Rollo, 304.
chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be 23 Rollo, 568.
resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be carefully 24 These were submitted on the following dates:
nurtured and zealously protected. (a) Private respondent Delfin — 31
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. January 1997 (Rollo, 429);
and to DIRECT Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin (b) Private respondents Alberto and
Petition on the ground of prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon Carmen Pedrosa — 10 February 1997
by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued on 18 (Id., 446);
December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and (c) Petitioners — 12 February 1997 (Id.,
Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing 585);
amendments to the Constitution. (d) IBP — 12 February 1997 (Id., 476);
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur. (e) Senator Roco — 12 February 1997
Footnotes (Id., 606);
1 Commissioner Blas Ople. (f) DIK and MABINI — 12 February
2 Commissioner Jose Suarez. 1997 (Id., 465);
3 I Record of the Constitutional Commission, 371, 378. (g) COMELEC — 12 February 1997
4 Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution and Section (Id., 489);
1(1), Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution. (h) LABAN — 13 February 1997 (Id.,
5 Annex "A" of Petition, Rollo, 15. 553).
6 Later identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, 25 Rollo, 594.
Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity. 26 Annex "D" of Roco's Motion for Intervention in this case,
7 These sections read: Rollo, 184.
Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years 27 Rollo, 28.
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at 28 232 SCRA 110, 134 [1994].
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their 29 II The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
election. Commentary 571 [1988].
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive 30 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 370-371.
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of 31 Id., 371.
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the 32 Id., 386.
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was 33 Id., 391-392. (Emphasis supplied).
elected. 34 Id., 386.
xxx xxx xxx 35 Id., 392.
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall 36 Id., 398-399.
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, 37 Id., 399. Emphasis supplied.
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth 38 Id., 402-403.
day of June next following their election. 39 Id., 401-402.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for 40 Id., 410.
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation 41 Id., 412.
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered 42 II Record of the Constitutional Commission 559-560.
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full 43 The Congress originally appeared as The National
term for which he was elected. Assembly. The change came about as a logical
8 The section reads: consequence of the amended Committee Report No. 22 of
Sec. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be the Committee on Legislative which changed The National
elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years Assembly to "The Congress of the Philippines" in view of
which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next the approval of the amendment to adopt the bicameral
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the system (II Record of the Constitutional Commission 102-
same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be 105). The proposed new Article on the Legislative
eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as Department was, after various amendments approved on
President and has served as such for more than four years Second and Third Readings on 9 October 1986 (Id., 702-
shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. 703)
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive 44 V Record of the Constitutional Commission 806.
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length or 45 See footnote No. 42.
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the 46 As Stated by Commissioner Bernas in his interpellation
continuity of the service for the full term for which he was of Commissioner Suarez, footnote 28.
elected.
47 Entitled "Initiative and Referendum Act of 1987,"
introduced by then Congressmen Raul Roco, Raul del Mar
and Narciso Monfort.
48 Entitled "An Act Implementing the Constitutional
Provisions on Initiative and Referendum and for Other
Purposes," introduced by Congressmen Salvador Escudero.
49 Entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum, and the Exceptions Therefrom, Whereby
People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose
and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or
Reject Any Ordinance or Resolution Passed By the Local
Legislative Body," introduced by Senators Gonzales,
Romulo, Pimentel, Jr., and Lina, Jr.
50 IV Record of the Senate, No. 143, pp. 1509-1510.
51 VIII Journal and Record of the House of
Representatives, 957-961.
52 That section reads:
Sec. 1. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under
a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose
and enact resolutions and ordinances or approve or reject,
in whole or in part, any ordinance or resolution passed by
any local legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed.
53 It must be pointed out that Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505, as approved on Third Reading, did not
contain any subtitles.
54 If some confusion attended the preparation of the
subtitles resulting in the leaving out of the more important
and paramount system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it was because there was in the Bicameral
Conference Committee an initial agreement for the Senate
panel to draft that portion on local initiative and for the
House of Representatives panel to draft that portion
covering national initiative and initiative on the Constitution;
eventually, however, the Members thereof agreed to leave
the drafting of the consolidated bill to their staff. Thus:
CHAIRMAN GONZALES.
. . . All right, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang
mangyayari dito, ang magiging basic nito, let us not discuss
anymore kung alin ang magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is
the Senate Bill or whether it is the House Bill. Logically it
should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin, eh. It is one of
the first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang number
niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating pag-usapan.
Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng national at saka
constitutional, okay. Pero gagawin na nating consolidation
of both bills. (TSN, proceedings of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on 6 June 1989 submitted by Nora,
R, pp. 1-4 — 1-5).
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO. So how do we proceed from this? The staff
will consolidate.
HON. GONZALES. Gumawa lang ng isang draft. Submit it
to the Chairman, kami na ang bahalang magconsult sa
aming mga members na kung okay,
HON. ROCO. Within today?
HON. GONZALES. Within today and early tomorrow.
Hanggang Huwebes lang tayo, eh.
HON. AQUINO. Kinakailangang palusutin natin ito. Kung
mabigyan tayo ng kopya bukas and you are not objecting
naman kayo naman ganoon din.
HON. ROCO. Editing na lang because on a physical
consolidation nga ito, eh. Yung mga provisions naman
namin wala sa inyo. (TSN, proceedings of Bicameral
Conference Committee of 6 June 1989, submitted by E.S.
Bongon, pp. III-4 — III-5).
55 Sec. 5(a & c), Sec. 8, Section 9(a).
56 Sections 13, 14, 15 and 16.
57 It would thus appear that the Senate's "cautious
approach" in the implementation of the system of initiative
as a mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, as
expressed by Senator Gonzales in the course of his
sponsorship of Senate Bill No. 17 in the Bicameral
Conference Committee meeting and in his sponsorship of
the Committee's Report, might have insidiously haunted the
preparation of the consolidated version of Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505. In the first he said:
Senate Bill No. 17 recognizes the initiatives and
referendum are recent innovations in our political
system. And recognizing that, it has adopted a
cautious approach by: first, allowing them only
when the local legislative body had refused to act;
second, not more frequently than once a year;
and, third, limiting them to the national level. (I
Record of the Senate, No. 33, p. 871).
x x x           x x x          x x x
First, as I have said Mr. President, and I am
saying for the nth time, that we are introducing a
novel and new system in politics. We have to
adopt first a cautious approach. We feel it is
prudent and wise at this point in time, to limit
those powers that may be the subject of initiatives
and referendum to those exercisable or within the
authority of the local government units. (Id., p.
880).
In the second he stated:
But at any rate, as I have said, because this is
new in our political system, the Senate decided
on a more cautious approach and limiting it only
to the local general units. (TSN of the
proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on 6 June 1989, submitted by
stenographer Nora R, pp. 1-2 to 1-3).
In the last he declared:
The initiatives and referendum are new tools of democracy;
therefore, we have decided to be cautious in our approach.
Hence, 1) we limited initiative and referendum to the local
government units; 2) that initiative can only be exercised if
the local legislative cannot be exercised more frequently
that once every year. (IV Records of the Senate, No. 143,
pp. 15-9-1510).
58 Section 20, RA. No. 6735.
59 People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]; ISAGANI A.
CRUZ, Philippine Political Law 86 [1996] (hereafter CRUZ).
60 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; CRUZ, supra, 87.
61 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965, 974 [1965].
62 Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481,497 [1970].
63 Sec. 7, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
64 Sec. 28, id.
65 Sec. 29, id.
66 Sec. 30, id.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting::
1 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 38, citing,
inter alia, US v. Tamparong 31 Phil. 321; Hernani v. Export
Control Committee, 100 Phil. 973; People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542.
2 Ibid, citing Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141.
3 Prepared and sponsored by the House Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms on the basis of H.B. No.
497 introduced by Congressmen Raul Roco, Raul del Mar
and Narciso Monfort and H.B. No. 988 introduced by
Congressman Salvador Escudero.
4 Introduced by Senators Neptali Gonzales, Alberto
Romulo, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Jose Lina, Jr.
5 It was entitled "An Act Providing a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds therefor.
6 Journal No. 85, February 14, 1989, p. 121.
7 Ibid.
8 The Senate Committee was chaired by Senator Neptali
Gonzales with Senators Agapito Aquino and John Osmena
as members. The House Committee was chaired by
Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol with Congressmen
Raul Roco, Salvador H. Escudero III and Joaquin Chipeco,
Jr., as members.
9 Held at Constancia Room, Ciudad Fernandina, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila.
10 See Compliance submitted by intervenor Roco dated
January 28, 1997.
11 Record No. 137, June 8, 1989, pp. 960-961.
12 Agpalo, op cit., p. 38 citing US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 7
(1910); US v. Navarro, 19 Phil 134 (1911).
13 Francisco, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., (1968) pp.
145-146 citing Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 337-
338.
14 Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation
of the Laws (2nd ed), pp. 258-259. See also Commissioner
of Custom v. Relunia, 105 Phil 875 (1959); People v. Yabut, There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
58 Phil 499 (1933). a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which
15 Alcantara, Statutes, 1990 ed., p. 26 citing Dwarris on refers to a petition proposing
Statutes, p. 237. amendments to the Constitution;
16 Entitled In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the a.2 Initiative on statutes which refers to
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and a petition proposing to enact a national
Referendum on National and Local Laws and promulgated legislation; and
on January 16, 1991 by the COMELEC with Commissioner a.3 Initiative on local legislation which
Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairperson and refers to a petition proposing to enact a
Commissioners Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
Dimaampao. x x x           x x x          x x x
17 15 SCRA 569. (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process
18 Sec. 5(b), R.A. No. 6735. by which an initiative on the
19 Sec. 5(b), R.A. No. 6735. Constitution is approved or rejected by
20 Sec. 7, R.A. No. 6735. the people
21 Sec. 9(b), R.A. No. 6735. (f) "Petition" is the written instrument
22 Sec. 8, R.A. No. 6735 in relation to Sec. 4, Art. XVII of containing the proposition and the
the Constitution. required number of signatories. It shall
23 Sec. 9(b), R.A. No. 6735. be in a form to be determined by and
24 Sec. 10, R.A. No. 6735. submitted to the Commission on
25 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., p. 98. Elections, hereinafter referred to as the
26 See July 8, 1986 Debates of the Concom, p. 399. Commission
27 1995 ed., p. 1207. x x x           x x x          x x x
28 Cruz, op cit., p. 99. Sec. 5 Requirements. — . . .
29 320 US 99. (b) A petition for an initiative on the
30 Balbuena v. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil 150 (1910). 1987 Constitution must have at least
31 People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil 328 (1939). twelve per centum (12 %) of the total
32 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726 (1940). number of registered voters as
33 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 669 (1919). signatories, of which every legislative
34 International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 district must be represented by at least
Phil 602 (1940). three per centum (3%) of the registered
35 Phil. Association of Colleges and Universities v. voters therein. Initiative on the
Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806 (1955). Constitution may be exercised only
36 Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1990); Agustin v. Edu, 88 after five (5) years from the ratification
SCRA 195 (1979). of the 1987 Constitution and only once
37 Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. vs. Municipality of Tanawan every five (5) years thereafter.
Leyte, 69 SCRA 460 (1976). Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. —
38 Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991). x x x           x x x          x x x
39 Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703 (1993). (b) The proposition in an initiative on
40 Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995). the Constitution approved by a majority
41 Garcia v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 111511, October 5, of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
1993. become effective as to the day of the
42 Garcia, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 111230, plebiscite.
September 30, 1994. x x x           x x x          x x x
43 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, et al., (c) The petition shall state the following:
G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996. c.1 contents or text
44 Malonzo vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 127066, March of the proposed
11, 1997. law sought to be
FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting: enacted, approved
1 Article II, Section 1, 1987 Constitution. or rejected,
2 Article VI, Section 32, and Article XVII, Section 2, 1987 amended or
Constitution. repealed, as the
3 Petition, p. 5. case may be;
4 Paras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123619, c.2 the proposition;
December 4, 1996. c.3 the reason or
5 Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953, 980. reasons therefor;
6 Section 3 (a), Republic Act No 6735. c.4 that it is not one
7 Section 3(a) [a.1], Republic Act No 6735. of the exceptions
8 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890, 893 provided herein;
9 Petition in Intervention filed by Sen. Raul Roco, pp. 15-16. c.5 signatures of
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting: the petitioners or
1 Apart from its text on "national initiative" which could be registered voters;
used by analogy, RA 6735 contains sufficient provisions and
covering initiative on the Constitution, which are clear c.6 an abstract or
enough and speak for themselves, like: summary
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people proposition in not
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly more than one
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the hundred (100)
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution passed by any words which shall
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of be legibly written or
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. printed at the top of
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the every page of the
following terms shall mean: petition.
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people xxx xxx xxx
to propose amendments to the Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The
Constitution or to propose and enact Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not
legislation's through an election called inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all
for the purpose. initiatives and referenda.
Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is
hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
2 G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996.
3 237 SCRA 279, 282, September 30, 1994.
4 Sec. 20, R.A. 6735.
5 United States vs. Rosika Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655
(1929).
G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L.
QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,
BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel
Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona
Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito
Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-
Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana
de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned
Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity
of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health
Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and
AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA,
Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION
(PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL
VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU
PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V.
SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,,
Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative
petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino
and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups 1 and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section
5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4
of Article VII (Executive Department) 5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for
the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM,
AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to
the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections 8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. 9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August
2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding
precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the
parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of
the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require
respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be
cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in
Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-
intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined
causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the
Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735
and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of
initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or
opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors 10 uniformly
hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying
on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors 11 hold the contrary
view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing
intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition;
(2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the
Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage
of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a)
of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September
2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case
submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of
the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need
to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on
the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional
provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning
of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters
want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the
people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready
and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they want to
propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people
"before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they
sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned"
that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of
the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint,
to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed 14 the concept of people's
initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause. In almost all States 15 which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that
the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several
decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person
supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or
she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of
the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud.
A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative
petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example,
omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the
petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a
vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to
qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by
initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose
of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so
that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign
the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended
constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector
to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or
subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this
knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote
in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the
nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive
and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal
that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on
a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as
valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do
not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy
of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino
Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11
October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments
was the signature sheet attached 21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature
sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We
reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Legislative District: Barangay: Verified
Signatur
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI
AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER
TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN
GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO
ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My
signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
Precinct Name Address Birthdat
Number Last Name, First Name, MM/DD
M.I.
1        
2        
 3         PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
4         COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
5         INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION;
6         DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting
7         held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila. 23
8         (Underscoring supplied)
9         ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to
10         prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition,
filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the
_________________ _________________ porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change
Barangay Official Witness through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission 24 are vastly
different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino
2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to
provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory
it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before
Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and
this Court on 26 September 2006.
the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift
Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of
proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of
Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than
Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the
six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
Article XVII of the Constitution.
does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering
draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with
from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the
the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave
signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they
doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition
later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also
together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However,
changes.
Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC,
the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August
the Lambino Group declared:
2006 petition.
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft
proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically,
of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in
paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the
February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B.
Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly
Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well
reflect their proposed amendments.
as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because
follows:
the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in
February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group
my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the
alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30
the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to
copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they
Authorities of the Philippines" 22 has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-
circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
02, which provides:
The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the
PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER
Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
with the COMELEC," thus:
AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the
(sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to
referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on
that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S.
Charter Change;
S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of
registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated
Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
together with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC
reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority
the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition
October 2005;
for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu
Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the
Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets
1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December
did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply,
2005;
the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments
failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino
in Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of
finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of
amending the 1987 Constitution;
the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a
the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent
signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition
assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional
cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the
reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED,
authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be
THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL
AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE
attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires
the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must
be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not
incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's
citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated,
from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of
the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The
Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that
they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or
amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group
circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the
Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the
petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they
printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six
months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked
other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not
state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed.
Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000
copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the
Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the
printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x
x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any
doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed
changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature
sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have
received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent
distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of
the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have
circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten
signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets
with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition
before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically
impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen
the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one
million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of
the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as
attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this
admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere
reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so
include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the
initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the
initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They
could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among
which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and
thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its
members, who are almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of
the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own
term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments
or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the
Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets
had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed
changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined
these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of
the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group
assured the people during the signature-gathering that the elections for
the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the
proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the
text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in
the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of
the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be
held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires
that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the
local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed
changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of
all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the
regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the
ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next"
allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their
own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of
Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and
possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty.
Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories,
and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely
on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result
is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that
the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who
signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim
Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The
proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with
the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a
"surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from
being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts
the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire
proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire
proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v.
Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes
"logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean
anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed
amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know
what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic
explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must
give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted
on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The
very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will
affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed
amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v.
McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth
and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems
that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase
the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for
"inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process.
The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or
supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their
proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing)
provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative
promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to
potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read
the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no
process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal.
These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment
mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions
to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel
the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days
from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In
the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the
discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed
Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to
immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in
amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do
not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents
want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the
nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not
"directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the
nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended
petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory
Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of
Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the
present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will
all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present
Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of
the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the
Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June
2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House
of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators.
The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used
to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime
Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and
can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution
requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a
petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's
fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be
hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people
even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign
the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption:
the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before
they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of
the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all
its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third
mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
"[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of
Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative.
This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report.
With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report
No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be
limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend
to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment
or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of
initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would
the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead
of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a
while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to
include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation
to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in
the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it
not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and
wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments
to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the
people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States.
Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the
Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting
 or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and
does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is
thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished
only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined
hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative
measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad
that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present
state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first
agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by
petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in
which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who
favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of
one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that
there is a difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is
obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is
not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is
used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in
large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the
'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative
Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority
vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence
failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure
sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of
the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure
as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it
is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the
manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can
only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally
prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one
backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific
modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be
revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument
itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner
other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably
treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it
is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they
have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at
will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to
the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in
adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the
people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental
law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution,
cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear
command of the Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend, never
revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a
revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the
scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a
revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the
distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent
and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its
revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying
principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety
of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.
On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies
such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument
as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of
the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to
the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part
test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks
whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions." 36 The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such
far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount
to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a
proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative
is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and
Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic
plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to
a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as
when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive
Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the
system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision
of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond
doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino
Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically
alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission,
writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch
from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional
structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the
Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and
unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other
provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the
initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968
Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only
many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a
change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which
has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the
states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be
difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of
a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It
would not only radically change the whole pattern of government
in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution,
 but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on
government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment
were adopted by the people at the General Election and if the
Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further
amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and
conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate
amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos
would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would
obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to
provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could
be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point
unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men
and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about
the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts
and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-
date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to
hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative
petition here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present
petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral
to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative
departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive
department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida
Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105
provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino
Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and
"revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group
posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same
substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do
not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their
Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional
provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision"
when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the
same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it
speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is
based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the
common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the
matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their
occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the
legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to
work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation,
profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words
"revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or
procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of
interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and
"revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the
correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group
wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed
changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the
Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group
trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts
do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 45 Any theory
espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant
consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies
in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid
of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution,
only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in
government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in
American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe
v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes
to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article
XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does
not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a
wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through
the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between
amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and
subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not
limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that
this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of
the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing
fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's
relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that,
because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic
principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held
that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot
without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1),
does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v.
Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the
constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the
provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes
the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon
Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means
of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said:
"It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means for
constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual,
through the initiative, may place such a measure before the
electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII,
section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by
initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the
express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green
for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of
the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an
amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far
end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a
radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several
sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the
Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years 47 is an amendment
and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass
media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional
qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. 49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or
articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of
checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red
end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a
revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a
revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
"republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II 50 of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change
will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other
provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully
crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of
the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of
a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited
to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies
or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments
and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended
and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall
be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating
that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The
effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be
amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty.
Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a
future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate
the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails
in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
"Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be
resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino
Group's proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or
New Zealand models, which are among the few countries with unicameral
parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional
and well-known parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French,
Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which
have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets
realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New
Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions
of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several
provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the
Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a
revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change
the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit
Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a
statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds.
Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on
some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the
constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not
change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying
with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires
that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the
"petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the
amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty.
Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed
the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group,
claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the
signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and
amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735
stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory
Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in
the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one
subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the
electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still
fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in
Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc
merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for
Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this
Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On
this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this
Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R.
No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost
respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the
Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly
specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in
unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of
the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside
the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political
group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for
the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the
total votes cast53 − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11
February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the
full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the
prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by
the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes
that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means
subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution.
This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian
of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and
protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people
decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's
fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes
easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering
signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the
bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However,
the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the
verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its
unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits
that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be
wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present
initiative.
 This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the
Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is
the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by Constitution."
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to __________________
allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration
is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
w, there can be no lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.
1
McLachlin
ada
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the
parties' respective arguments -- both oral and written -- as well as the
enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my esteemed colleagues, I
am fully convinced that the present Petition must be dismissed.
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent
with my previous Opinions and votes on the two extant Supreme Court cases
involving an initiative to change the Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined "that taken together
and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII,
Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than
sufficient
__________________
'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and
all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to
exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain.
What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we
should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in3 People's Initiative for Reform,
initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec, I joined the rest of the members
proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion
use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time could be attributed to the Comelec in dismissing the petition filed by
and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,
the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority
openly concedes — intended by the legislature to cover and, I
respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an
initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and
inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice
Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative,
sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments
to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor
elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en
banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on
Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally
construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs.
Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's
initiatives ought to be rejected."
"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details.
In recognition of this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the Commission
on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto,
the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such
Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on
national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on
Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B.
Yorac, Comms. Alfredo
E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama
and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed
Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we
cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest,
sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our
people.
"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to
national laws and local legislations, it is void in reference to
constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation.
The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, R.A.
6735.
"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and
liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and
Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to
implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as
it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from
exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining
order as against private respondents should not have been issued, in
the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from
using public funds and government resources to help them gather
signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain
them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose
amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free
speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and
despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others
to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, 'I may
disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to
say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but
as Justice Holmes wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'
Epilogue
"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate
Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a new and treasured
feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are
institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power.
Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of
popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people
to be used as
__________________
Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not
direct parties in Santiago, nonetheless the Court's injunction against
the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition which
was the immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago,
I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred in
rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the
Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed
with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was
directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no
choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse
of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only
recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have
constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as
grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's
supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover
initiatives on the Constitution, and that whatever administrative
details may have been omitted in said law are satisfactorily
provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation of
Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec the power to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus
Election Code likewise empowers the electoral body to "promulgate
rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or
 other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer x x x." Finally and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735
specifically authorizes Comelec "to promulgate rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."
"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the
right thing at the right time and for the right reason." Let me explain
further.
The Right Thing
"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing
that citizens may avail themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new
and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. Even the
majority implicitly conceded its value and worth in our legal firmament
when it implored Congress "not to tarry any longer in complying with
the constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right
(of initiative) of the people x x x." Hence, in the en banc case of Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416,
September 26, 1996], this Court unanimously held that "(l)ike
elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes
of expressing popular
PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago
Decision.
__________________
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert
every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise."
The Right Way
"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken
together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300
provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and
realize our people's power to amend the Constitution." Let me now
demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms,
the steps to be taken – the right way – to amend the Constitution
through a people's initiative.
"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the
form of the petition which shall contain the proposition and the
required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition
shall state the following:
'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to
be x x x amended, x x x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly
explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than
one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.'
"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the
petition include a formal designation of the duly authorized
representatives of the signatories.
"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures
becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is
jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures, the Commission shall
motu proprio reject the petition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above
requirements, they may thence file the petition with the Comelec
which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof and to verify the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits
and voters' identification cards. In deciding whether the petition is
sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper
for an initiative, i.e., if it consists of an amendment, not a revision, of
the Constitution. Any decision of the electoral body may be appealed
to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice.
I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of
Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso
__________________
"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the
determination of its sufficiency, the Comelec shall publish the same in
Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. The conduct of the
plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than
ninety (90) days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of
the petition. The proposition, if approved by a majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the
adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will
not ipso facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a
plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others,
PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of elective
officials -- constitute a mere amendment and not a revision of the
Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the
petition? This question is relevant considering that under RA 8189, the
old registry of voters used in the 1995 national elections was voided
after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997, while the new list may
be used starting only in the elections of May 1998.
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really
emanate from the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or it is
the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such
move to advance their own political self-interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really
belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at least 12% of the
registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?
"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right
Reason. Question Nos. 1 and 2 above, while important, are basically
legal in character and can be determined by argumentation and
memoranda. However, Question No. 4 involves not only legal issues
but gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This to my mind is
the crucible, the litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein
petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just alleging --
that six million voters of this country indeed want to amend the
Constitution, what power on earth can stop them? Not this Court, not
the Comelec, not even the President or Congress.
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend
the Constitution. Far from it." I stressed that PIRMA must show the following,
among others:
__________________
"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at
EDSA, and the very rafters and foundations of the martial law society
trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other hand, PIRMA and its
co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered six million
signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million signatures are
fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a
signature-verification process conducted under our open system of
legal advocacy.
"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this
Court and as a citizen of this country, would like to seek: Are these six
million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new doctrine of
statutory inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the quest for
that truth.
The Right Reason
"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the
adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300
were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the proposed
change to the Constitution really emanate from the people who signed
the petition for initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term extension
who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political
self-interests? In other words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to
initiative being done in accordance with our Constitution and our
laws? Is such attempted exercise legitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along
with referendum, as the 'ultimate weapon of the people to negate
government malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic Bay, we
specified that 'initiative is entirely the work of the electorate x x x a
process of lawmaking by the people themselves without the
participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives.'
As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare on this principle:
The right to amend through initiative belongs only to the people –
not to the government and its minions. This principle finds clear
support from utterances of many constitutional commissioners like
those quoted below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are
dissatisfied with the National Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback
position of the people in the event that they are dissatisfied." --
Commissioner Ople
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and
resorted to] only if the legislature is not as responsive to the vital and
urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner Gascon
(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials --
"constitute[s] a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution."
_________________
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and]
reserved for the people [which] should not be frivolously resorted to."
-- Commissioner Romulo
"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or
even to revise it, our Charter itself provides them other ways of doing
 so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or constituting
Congress into a constituent assembly. These are officialdom's
weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.
"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate
people's organizations or are they merely fronts for incumbents who
want to extend their terms? This is a factual question which,
unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered anymore, because the
Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements it, RA
6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the
Constitutions are concerned. With such ruling, the majority effectively
abrogated a constitutional right of our people. That is why in my
Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such precipitate action
"is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and
to killing the patient to relieve him of pain." I firmly maintain that to
defeat PIRMA's effort, there is no need to "burn" the constitutional
right to initiative. If PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can be
exposed as such in the ways I have discussed – short of abrogating
the right itself. On the other hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be
legitimate – if it hurdles the four issues I outlined earlier – by all
means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory of
statutory inadequacy has pre-empted – unnecessarily and invalidly, in
my view – any judicial determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
It has silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of the PIRMA
petition.
The Right Time
"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto
may be proposed. Section 2 of Article XVII precludes amendments
"within five years following [its] ratification x x x nor oftener than once
every five years thereafter." Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution
has never been amended. Hence, the five-year prohibition is now
inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed at any
time.
"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present circumstances – that
there is no more time to lift term limits to enable incumbents to seek
reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls. Between today and the next
national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really
belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at
__________________
elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the
single issue of the sufficiency of RA 6735 was resolved, took this
Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide the
motion for reconsideration. The instant case, where the same issue is
also raised by the petitioners, took two months, not counting a
possible motion for reconsideration. These time spans could not be
abbreviated any further, because due process requires that all parties
be given sufficient time to file their pleadings.
"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of
RA 6735 – as I believe it should – and allow the Comelec to act on the
PIRMA petition, such eight-month period will not be enough to tackle
the four weighty issues I mentioned earlier, considering that two of
them involve tedious factual questions. The Comelec's decision on
any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, and
reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues may again
be sought.
"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million
signatures is enormously time-consuming, considering that any
person may question the authenticity of each and every signature,
initially before the election registrar, then before the Comelec on
appeal and finally, before this Court in a separate proceeding.
Moreover, the plebiscite itself – assuming such stage can be reached
– may be scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than ninety (90)
days, from the time the Comelec and this Court, on appeal, finally
declare the petition to be sufficient.
"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups
organizations or coalitions may start selecting their official candidates
for President, Vice President and Senators on November 27, 1997;
the period for filing certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to
February 9, 1998; the election period and campaign for national
officials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for
other elective officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time
PIRMA's proposition is ready – if ever – for submission directly to the
voters at large, it will have been overcome by the elections. Time will
simply run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for
the 1998 elections.
"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via
a people's initiative does not detract one whit from (1) my firm
conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate to implement this
constitutional right and, more important, (2) my faith in the power of
the people to initiate changes in local and national laws and the
Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two
items even more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free
from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After all,
jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but, more so, for the
hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by way of
epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our people's right to
initiative.
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein."
__________________
Epilogue
"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to determine our
own destiny.
"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of
enabling our people to express their will and chart their history.
Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and civil
strife. It is an inherent right of the people – as basic as the right to
elect, the right to self-determination and the right to individual liberties.
I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above
themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to
choose what is best for themselves and their posterity.
"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to
perpetuate a particular official or group of officials in power. Far from
it. Such perpetuation is anathema to democracy. My firm conviction
that there is an adequate law implementing the constitutional right of
initiative does not ipso facto result in the victory of the PIRMA petition
or of any proposed constitutional change. There are, after all,
sufficient safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such
constitutional right and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First,
initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution, only to amend it.
Second, the petitioners' signatures must be validated against an
existing list of voters and/or voters' identification cards. Third, initiative
is a reverse power of and by the people, not of incumbent officials and
their machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures
must be verified as real and genuine; not concocted, fictitious or
fabricated. The only legal way to do this is to enable the Commission
on Elections to conduct a nationwide verification process as mandated
by the Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears stressing, is
subject to review by this Court.
"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people
who gathered at EDSA in 1986, and yet they changed the history of
our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not just from the
National Capital Region but from all over the country. Is this claim
through the invention of its novel theory of statutory insufficiency, the
Court's majority has stifled the only legal method of determining
whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a popular
clamor to lift term limits of elected officials, and whether six million
voters want to initiate amendments to their most basic law. In
suppressing a judicial answer to such questions, the Court may have
unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of
legality and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it
burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously divested the
people of a basic constitutional right.
In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative]
in the right way at the right time and for the right reason."
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago
and PIRMA. Tested against them, the present Petition of Raul Lambino and
Erico Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is being
rushed in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me explain.
No Grave Abuse
of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the
Lambino Petition. After all, the Commission merely followed the holding in
Santiago permanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to
make it prevail. This mission is undertaken not only to resolve the
vagaries of present events but also to build the pathways of tomorrow.
The sum total of the entire process of adversarial litigation is the verity
of facts and the application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out in
this mission of discovery, our country and our people have been
deprived not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier noted, but
also of the judicial opportunity to verify the truth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any
jurisprudence.4 Neither can whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias
be attributed to the Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently followed this
Court's jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that
Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled question of law, this
Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect
to that action.6
The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA
in 1997. The differences pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due
respect, superficial. It is argued that, unlike the present Lambino Petition,
PIRMA did not contain verified signatures. These are distinctions that do not
make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a remand, because the
verification issue is "contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners. Clearly,
both the PIRMA and the Lambino Petitions contain unverified signatures.
Therefore, they both deserve the same treatment: DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v.
Comelec was that the Commission had "only complied" with this Court's
Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by Comelec in this case. The
Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even
remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed because
the signatures were unverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional
requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the
filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. 7 Without those signatures, the Comelec
shall motu proprio reject the petition."
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal
moorings of the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec
cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this Court's pronouncements.
Respondent Commission has no discretion, under any guise, to refuse
enforcement of any final decision of this Court.8 The refusal of the poll body
to act on the Lambino Petition was its only recourse. Any other mode of action
would appear not only presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have
constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down as
grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this
Court as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the
reasons given in my Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735
is indeed sufficient to implement an initiative to amend the Constitution, still, no
grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for merely following
prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its ruling in question.
Only Amendments,
Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject
of an initiative to change the Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from
even a layperson's reading of the basic law.9
I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to
parliamentary and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral
contemplates an overhaul of the structure of government. The ponencia has
amply demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the executive
branches under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any legal test and
under any jurisdiction," will "radically alter the framework of government as set
forth in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have an overall
implication on the entire Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important
and basic provisions. The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be
categorized, even by semantic generosity, as "amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution,
revisions (or amendments) may be proposed only through the first two: by
Congress or by a constitutional convention. Under the third mode -- people's
initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions have
cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of their respective
positions. I will not add to the woes of the reader by reiterating them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from
a revision is found in the Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when
the proposed change can be drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and
agreed upon after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative body
like Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed must necessarily be
scrutinized, as their adoption or non-adoption must result from an informed
judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987
Constitutions had to spend many months of purposeful discussions, democratic
debates and rounds of voting before they could agree on the wordings covering
the philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of government of our
Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local
governments take several weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and
debating before Congress can approve them. How much more when it comes to
constitutional changes?
A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral
to parliamentary-unicameral is monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit
this fact. So, why should a revision be rammed down our people's throats
without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a deliberative assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA
6735 expressly prohibiting petitions for initiative from "embracing more than one
subject matter."10 The present initiative covers at least two subjects: (1) the shift
from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government; and (2) the change
from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. 11 Thus, even under Republic Act
6735 -- the law that Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and valid -- the
Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds
Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the
constitutional requirement that it be supported by at least 12 percent of the
registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent of the registered voters
in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by Intervenors
One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a failure to meet
the minimum percentages required.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional
requirements involve "contentious facts," which have not been proven by the
Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand to the Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the
Constitution itself mandates the said requisites of an initiative petition. In other
words, a petition that does not show the required percentages is fatally
defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is
void and unconstitutional. It points out that the Petition dismally fails to comply
with the constitutional requirement that an initiative must be directly proposed by
the people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply established that petitioners
were unable to show that the Lambino Petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven
before the Commission, the Petition must still be dismissed for proposing
a revision, not an amendment, in gross violation of the Constitution. At the
very least, it proposes more than one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.
Summation
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the
words of Justice Puno who supports them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a
democracy."
I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion
in PIRMA that "initiative is a democratic method of enabling our people to
express their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe that Filipinos have the
ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative
wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their
posterity."
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to
change the Constitution, because the present Petition violates the following:
· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not
revisions, and requires definite percentages of verified signatures)
· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing
more than one subject)
· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition
then under consideration on the ground that, by following the Santiago ruling,
the Comelec had not gravely abused its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and
futile. More tellingly, it is a cop-out, a hand-washing already discredited 2000
years ago. Instead of finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the issues
head on, because the people expect no less from this august and venerable
institution of supreme justice.
Epilogue
At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative, like
referendum and recall, is a treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. It was born out of our world-admired and often-imitated People Power,
but its misuse and abuse must be resolutely rejected. Democracy must be
cherished, but mob rule vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government
and the people, between each individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it,
the people have solemnly expressed their will that all of them shall be governed
by laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants to promote the
common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of Law and reject the rule of the
mob, we must faithfully abide by the processes the Constitution has
ordained in order to bring about a peaceful, just and humane society.
Assuming arguendo that six million people allegedly gave their assent to the
proposed changes in the Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the
social covenant -- the present Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater
majority almost twenty years ago. 14 I do not denigrate the majesty of the
sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest perch, because our
government must remain as one of laws and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn
oath to uphold the Constitution. Being the protectors of the fundamental law as
the highest expression of the sovereign will, they must subject to the strictest
scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be trivialized and degraded by the
 assaults of the mob and of ill-conceived designs. The Court must single-
mindedly defend the Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to the
sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when
ranged against incessant voices from the more powerful branches of
government, it should never cower in submission. On the other hand, I daresay
that the same weakness of the Court becomes its strength when it speaks
independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the supremacy of the
Constitution and the Rule of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not in its
lack of brute power, but in its moral courage to perform its constitutional duty at
all times against all odds. Its might is in its being right.15
During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and
innuendoes about alleged carrots offered and sticks drawn by those interested
in the outcome of this case. 16 There being no judicial proof of these allegations, I
shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the Good Book, which
says, "There is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and nothing secret that
will not be known and come to light." 17
Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision,
the Court and each of its members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty
years, a hundred years -- or even a thousand years -- from now, what the Court
did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be talked about, either
in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate, the
abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to
this day.
Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known
throughout the nation and the world for its independence, integrity, industry
and intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
RTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
ief Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q.
SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, JR. and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that
the Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC1 is not a binding precedent.
However, it is my position that even if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act
No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient law for the purpose of people's
initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition for initiative in this case must
nonetheless be dismissed.
There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735,
even as they blindly invoke the said law to justify their alleged people's initiative.
Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735 requires that "[a] petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein."
On the other hand, Section 5(c)2 of the same law requires that the petition
should state, among others, the proposition3 or the "contents or text of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed." If we were to apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the
Constitution, as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by the
required number of voters should incorporate therein a text of the proposed
changes to the Constitution. However, such requirement was not followed in the
case at bar.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere
100,000 copies of the text of the proposed changes to the Constitution.
According to him, these were subsequently distributed to their agents all over
the country, for attachment to the sheets of paper on which the signatures were
to be affixed. Upon being asked, however, if he in fact knew whether the text
was actually attached to the signature sheets which were distributed for signing,
he said that he merely assumed that they were. In other words, he could not
tell the Court for certain whether their representatives complied with this
requirement.
The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this
Court, indubitably establish that the full text of the proposed changes was not
attached to the signature sheets. All that the signature sheets contained was the
general proposition and abstract, which falls short of the full text requirement of
R.A. 6735.
The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in
the petition for initiative to be signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed.
To begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally states
that "[a]mendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein."
Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they must,
in the first instance, know exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that
they merely possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the
Constitution speaks of a "direct" proposal by the people.
Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the
constitutional right of initiative to Congress, it might be noted that they
themselves reasonably assumed that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendments would be shown to the people during the process of signature
gathering. Thus –
MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides:
"upon petition of at least 10 percent of the registered voters." How will
we determine that 10 percent has been achieved? How will the voters
manifest their desire, is it by signature?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.
MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters
want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people
when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and
shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.4
It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735,
the full text of the proposed changes must necessarily be stated in or attached
to the initiative petition. The signatories to the petition must be given an
opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the proposed
changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-informed choice on
the matter.
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the
proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and
deception. If the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or attached
to the petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we
be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the people and that the
signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.
If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or
deception in the initiative and referendum process, such provision must be
viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply
therewith is fatal. 5 The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with the full
text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally defective.
The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one
subject rule under Section 10(a) of R.A. 6735:
SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the subject
of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to
the electorate; x x x
The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has
the same object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article
VI, Section 26(1)6 of the Constitution.7 To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule
was designed to do away with the practice of inserting two or more unrelated
provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one provision would be compelled to
adopt the others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of both provisions
could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing alone, could
succeed on its own merits.
As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed
to prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate. It is meant to safeguard the
integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are
concealed within the terms of the proposed amendment. This in turn guarantees
that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope and purpose of the
proposed amendment.
Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for
initiative relate only to one subject matter, that is – the shift from presidential to a
parliamentary system of government. According to petitioners, all of the other
proposed changes are merely incidental to this main proposal and are
reasonably germane and necessary thereto.8 An examination of the text of the
proposed changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.
The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond
the main proposal espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift from the
presidential to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes
include the abolition of one House of Congress, 9 and the convening of a
constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to the Constitution. 10
Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration that those constitutional
provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent with the unicameral-
parliamentary form of government, shall be deemed amended to conform
thereto.
It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a
shift in the form of government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects that are
not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly
sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of government does not
necessarily result in the adoption of a unicameral legislature. A parliamentary
system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms of government, which may or
may not embrace unicameralism.11 In other words, the shift from presidential to
parliamentary structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is
neither the cause nor effect of the other.
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the
proposed change in our system of government. As a subject matter, the
convening of a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a range
of issues that is far removed from the subject of a shift in government. Besides,
the constituent assembly is supposed to convene and propose amendments to
the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of government has
already taken place. This only goes to show that the convening of the
constituent assembly is not necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary
system of government.
The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are
inconsistent with a unicameral-parliamentary system of government shall be
deemed amended is equally bothersome. The statement does not specify what
these inconsistencies and amendments may be, such that everyone is left to
guess the provisions that could eventually be affected by the proposed changes.
The subject and scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be spelled
out with certainty. There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the
other constitutional provisions.
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people's initiative
under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Taken together, the proposed
changes indicate that the intendment is not simply to effect substantial
amendments to the Constitution, but a revision thereof. The distinction between
an amendment and revision was explained by Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as
follows:
"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations
of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the
rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results
the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.
That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be
altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a
change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to
amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire
constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to
improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it
provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to
suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect."12
The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and
revision has indeed guided us throughout our constitutional history. However,
the distinction between the two terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the
context of our past constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987
Constitution. The reason for this is apparent. Under our past constitutions, it was
Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or by calling out a
constitutional convention, that exercised authority to either amend or revise the
Constitution through the procedures therein described. Although the distinction
between the two terms was theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference was not as material
because it was only Congress that could effect constitutional changes by
choosing between the two modalities.
However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for
the two modes of either Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or
calling out for a constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for
proposing changes to the Constitution. This mode refers to the people's right to
propose amendments to the fundamental law through the filing of a petition for
initiative.
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision
under the past constitutions is not determinative of what the two terms mean
now, as related to the exercise of the right to propose either amendments or
revision. The changes introduced to both the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973
could have indeed been deemed an amendment or revision, but the authority
for effecting either would never have been questioned since the same
belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly limits
the right of the people to directly propose constitutional changes to amendments
only. We must consequently not be swayed by examples of constitutional
changes effected prior to the present fundamental law, in determining whether
such changes are revisory or amendatory in nature.
In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q.
Antonio in Javellana v. Executive Secretary 13 related to the procedure to be
followed in ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a constitutional
convention. The authority or right of the constitutional convention itself to effect
such a revision was not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what
constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a people's initiative, therefore, we
have neither relevant precedent nor prior experience. We must thus confine
ourselves to Dean Sinco's basic articulation of the two terms.
It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may either be of the
whole or only part of the Constitution. The part need not be a substantial part as
a change may qualify as a revision even if it only involves some of the important
provisions. For as long as the intention and plan to be carried out contemplate a
consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution "to determine which should
be altered or suppressed, or whether the whole document should be replaced
with an entirely new one," the proposed change may be deemed a revision and
not merely an amendment.
Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the
same may be considered as either an amendment or revision. In so determining,
another overriding factor is the "original intention and plan authorized to be
carried out" by the proposed changes. If the same relates to a re-examination of
the entire document to see which provisions remain relevant or if it has far-
reaching effects on the entire document, then the same constitutes a revision
and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative
and qualitative test is necessary in assessing what may be considered as an
amendment or revision. It is not enough that we focus simply on the physical
scope of the proposed changes, but also consider what it means in relation to
the entire document. No clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the
two terms and each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own
peculiar conditions. The determination lies in assessing the impact that the
proposed changes may have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an
arithmetical appraisal of the specific provisions which it seeks to affect.
In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid down the
groundwork for the combination of quantitative and qualitative assessment of
proposed constitutional changes, in order to determine whether the same is
revisory or merely amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found the
proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles contained in the
California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or substantially
altered, and four new topics would be introduced. However, it went on to
consider the qualitative effects that the proposed initiative measure would have
on California's basic plan of government. It observed that the proposal would
alter the checks and balances inherent in such plan, by delegating far-
reaching and mixed powers to an independent commission created under the
proposed measure. Consequently, the proposal in McFadden was not only
deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having
a substantive effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of
California.
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the
California Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmeijan.15 Proposition 115, as the
initiative in that case was called, would vest in the United States Supreme Court
all judicial interpretative powers of the California courts over fundamental
criminal defense rights in that state. It was observed that although quantitatively,
the proposition did "not seem so extensive as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions," the same, nonetheless, "would substantially alter the substance and
integrity of the state Constitution as a document of independent force and
effect." Quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State
Board of Equalization,16 the Raven court said:
". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions
and amendments involving many constitutional articles, 'even a
relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to
a revision also…[A]n enactment which purported to vest all judicial
power in the Legislature would amount to a revision without regard
either to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of
existing articles or sections affected by such change.'" (Underscoring
supplied and citations omitted)
Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines
both the quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposed measure on its
constitutional scheme. Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a
revision.17
I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner.
The experience of the courts in California is not far removed from the standards
expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out to differentiate between
amendment and revision. It is actually consistent, not only with our traditional
concept of the two terms, but also with the mindset of our constitutional framers
when they referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.18 We must
thus consider whether the proposed changes in this case affect our Constitution
in both its substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether
these are simple or substantial, amount to a revision as to be excluded
from the people's right to directly propose amendments to the
fundamental law?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining
the nature of the proposed changes. These tests are consistent with Dean
Sinco's traditional concept of amendment and revision when he explains that,
quantitatively, revision "may result in the rewriting either of the whole
constitution, or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its provisions." In
any case, he continues, "the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is
the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out." Unmistakably, the
latter statement refers to the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.
It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the
proponents in this case will affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of
the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII
(Executive Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth
transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a parliamentary-unicameral
structure of government. The quantitative effect of the proposed changes is
neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the
1987 Constitution.
However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious
qualitative consequences on the Constitution. The initiative petition, if
successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic governmental plan, but also
redefine our rights as citizens in relation to government. The proposed changes
will set into motion a ripple effect that will strike at the very foundation of our
basic constitutional plan. It is therefore an impermissible constitutional revision
that may not be effected through a people's initiative.
Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from
the presidential to the parliamentary system. An examination of their proposal
reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive and legislative departments
into one parliament that will be elected on the basis of proportional
representation. No term limits are set for the members of parliament except for
those elected under the party-list system whose terms and number shall be
provided by law. There will be a President who shall be the head of state, but
the head of government is the Prime Minister. The latter and his cabinet shall be
elected from among the members of parliament and shall be responsible to
parliament for the program of government.
The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the
executive and legislature shall be one and the same, such that parliament will be
the paramount governing institution. What this implies is that there will be no
separation between the law-making and enforcement powers of the state, that
are traditionally delineated between the executive and legislature in a
presidential form of government. Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent
in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential system will be eliminated.
The workings of government shall instead be controlled by the internal political
dynamics prevailing in the parliament.
Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among
the three branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to
the application of laws. This separation is intended to prevent a concentration of
authority in one person or group that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse
in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. In the words of
Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to secure action,
to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain efficiency.19
In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal
institutional checks on the legislative and executive powers of the state, since
both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn from
parliament. There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and
parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority. This goes
against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that distributes
the powers of government and provides for counteraction among the three
branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary systems are
theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and
resulting governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.
Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government
cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will require a total
overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a re-orientation in the
cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure.20 It cannot, by any standard, be deemed as a mere
constitutional amendment.
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment
is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that
may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates
a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to
determine how and to what extent they should be altered. 21
(Underscoring supplied)
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows
the intention of the proponents to effect even more far-reaching changes in our
fundamental law. If the original intent were to simply shift the form of
government to the parliamentary system, then there would have been no need
for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose further amendments to
the Constitution. It should be noted that, once convened, a constituent assembly
can do away and replace any constitutional provision which may not even have
a bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of government. The inclusion of
such a proposal reveals the proponents' plan to consider all provisions of the
constitution, either to determine which of its provisions should be altered or
suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely
new one.
Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the
alleged people's initiative. The proposal to convene a constituent assembly,
which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the
entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents,
as reflected in their proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of government
from the presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend
to the "fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state."
To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government
is therefore a fallacy. To repeat, the combined effect of the proposed changes to
Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions under Article
XVIII indubitably establish the intent and plan of the proponents to possibly
affect even the constitutions of liberty and sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason
exists for authorizing further amendments or revisions to the Constitution if the
intention of the proposed changes is truly what it purports to be.
There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be
undertaken through a people's initiative and not a revision, as textually reflected
in the Constitution itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially from a
comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4 of Article
XVII, which state:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
xxxx
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification
by the Commission of Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
(Underscoring supplied)
It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the
Constitution is limited to amendments and does not include a revision thereof.
Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to
distinguish its scope from the rights vested in Congress under Section 1. The
latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both amendments and a revision
of the Constitution by either convening a constituent assembly or calling for a
constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other hand, textually commits to the
people the right to propose only amendments by direct action.
To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments
amounting to revision obliterates the clear distinction in scope between
Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the
above provisions, is to provide differing fields of application for the three modes Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they themselves have
of effecting changes to the Constitution. We need not even delve into the intent ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to defy their self-imposed
of the constitutional framers to see that the distinction in scope is definitely constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a revolutionary situation. 26
marked. We should thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard for this It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican
distinction. Again, McFadden22 is instructive: state.27 Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should
". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; not forget that, first and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy. To
more accurately it is between two procedures and between their uphold direct democracy at the expense of the fundamental law is to sanction,
respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow not a constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond
elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to the powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper
have a substantial field of application, not to be x x x a mere of the Constitution.
alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No.
must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but 174153.
also a field of application appropriate to its procedure. The people of
this state have spoken; they made it clear when they adopted CONSUELOarticle YNARES-SANTIAGO
XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided Associate
the Justice
formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection ____________________
against improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they EN BANC
understood that there was a real difference between amendment and G.R. NO. 174153
revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH
amendment of 1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
difference. On the contrary, the distinction appears to be x x x vs.
scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the amendment THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
x x x that the power to propose and vote on "amendments to the TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-
Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative intervenors,
proceedings, while leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA,
relative to constitutional revision, which revisional power and petitioners-intervenors,
procedure, it will be remembered, had already been specifically SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors' contention--that any PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION
change less than a total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the (PTGWO) AND VICTORINO F. BALAIS, petitioners-intervenors,
rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L.
Each situation involving the question of amendment, as contrasted QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND CARLOS P.
with revision, of the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its MEDINA, JR., oppositors-intervenors,
own facts." ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
Constitution, with the provisions on amendments and revisions under Article BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL
XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when they limited BISHOPS FROUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
people's initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental law and excluded ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO SAN JOSE,
revisions in its scope. In this regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS,
people's voice, as expressed unequivocally through the Constitution. oppositors-intervenors,
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA
sovereignty" because it defines the constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of the HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, oppositors-intervenors,
people." It is through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
the expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO
would otherwise be plenary. By approving these provisions, the sovereign F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in the exercise BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND
of their sovereign power.23 They are thus bound by the constitution and are AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND
24
through the means prescribed by the Constitution itself. SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P.
It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND
Constitution through people's initiative because their representatives, whose PANFILO M. LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
power is merely delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment oppositors-intervenors,
and revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU
sovereign power. In the words of Cooley: CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have ANTONIO L. SALVADOR AND RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, oppostors-
not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in intervenors,
their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
power to control the governments they create, and the three MANUEL VILLAR, JR., oppositor-intervenor;
departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, G.R. NO. 174299
changed or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q.
exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of SAGUISAG, petitioners,
the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force vs.
only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN
themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution, or S. ABALOS, SR. AND COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA,
which, consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR. ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
pointed out for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, respondents.
however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
working of the agencies of government at any other time or in any CONCURRING OPINION
other mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:
statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should
and repressed by the officers who, for the time being, represent be exercised in choosing one's battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to
legitimate government.25 (Underscoring supplied) one's cause. In its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase
Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source." Nor means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated
is it one where the people's sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, "nec audiendi qui
plane than that of Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae
absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since proxima sit," meaning, "And those people should not be listened to who
self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign power. The people keep on saying, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the
have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power by virtue of the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness."1 Perhaps, it is
by providence that the true meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon
petitioners and their allies – that they may reflect upon the sincerity and
authenticity of their "people's initiative."
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of
God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justified – all
these transpired as man boasted of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners and
their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people's
initiative is the "voice of the people" and, therefore, the "voice of God." After a
thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his
ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God. It
is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power of
initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in
their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents."2 The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor
of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor, is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while
five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to
rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered
their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the
minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who
participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion,
while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion. 3
A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a
similar case, entitled People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections 4 on the ground that the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed PIRMA's Petition for
Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution "it appearing that that it
only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no.
127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need
to re-examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735.
Another Justice concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar is
not the proper vehicle for such re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined
otherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures
in support of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which entail a
change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary, thus:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to
read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in
a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many
members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the
provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred
thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must
have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a
resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be
elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years
without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the
party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose
number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership
coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are
hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State.
The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the
assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a
majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He
shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve
until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June
2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987
Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the
members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from
office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall
succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability,
resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President
and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the
powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended
and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to
"Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all
references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime
Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby be amended and
Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other
Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent
with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to
"Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all
references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to
read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime
Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the
Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent
Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also
be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for
the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive,
shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament,
an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of
the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the
various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities
as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
 (2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The
duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the
powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until
the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand
portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of
the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the
present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system
of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and
economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein
petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the
Constitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging
that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3
million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the
signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of
registered voters appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve
per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative
district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters,
were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.
Several organizations opposed the petition. 6
In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the
petition, citing as basis this Court's ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it
"from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court
set aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter tocomply with Section
4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification
by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the
petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners
pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why
they should not be punished for contempt 7 of court for disregarding the
permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
I overturned. It only shows that the opposite view fails to muster enough votes to
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the
resolution of the present petition hinges on this singular issue -- did the
COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this Court's
Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still,
the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of "grave abuse of discretion" on the part
of the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered
as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.8
The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for
initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any
way, be characterized as "capricious or whimsical," "patent and gross," or
"arbitrary and despotic." On the contrary, it was the most prudent course to
take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently enjoins
respondent COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient
law shall have been validly enacted." It being a fact that Congress has not
enacted a sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere
to Santiago. Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As succinctly
stated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his
Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:9
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it,
too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent
Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had
no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse
open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have
constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as
grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's
supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns
supreme. All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial
functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the last word on
what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other
words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
courts should take their bearings.10 As a warning to lower court judges who
would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,11 held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission
of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by
this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his
conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than
disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must
first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the
Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid
down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel,
unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants.
And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he
cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to
place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of
having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and
he has only one legal way to do that.
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
the petition of Lambino, et al. for it merely followed this Court's ruling in
Santiago.
Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous Court implicitly
recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the established doctrine and that the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's
obedience and respect to the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago
It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or
eight (8) Justices (as against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No.
6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied via an
equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the Decision was
modify or reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was
upheld.13 In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14 this Court
ruled that the denial of a motion or reconsideration signifies that the
ground relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without
merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the
judgment or final order.
With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative,
petitioners persistently stress that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its
re-examination.
I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates
"stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled."15 As used in our
jurisprudence, it means that "once this Court has laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same as in the earlier controversy."16
There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a
good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus
on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of
justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the
Judicial Process stated:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of
litigants and the opposite way between another. 'If a group of cases
involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It
would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite
principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I
was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am
plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment
and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material
and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the
rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-
handed administration of justice in the courts.17
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be
appreciated by considering the observation of American philosopher William K.
Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:
 The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two
similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them is
treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of
injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and
unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant
dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned and their
circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged. 18
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if
need be, overruling prior decisions, "It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential
policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the
case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices.
This policy x x x 'is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability
and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e.,
that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into
relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.19
Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly onerous task,
the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the
age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and private reliance
on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here,
petitioners failed to discharge their task.
Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more
than nine (9) years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically
the law practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire judiciary and
litigants have recognized this Court's Decision as a precedent. In fact, the
Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA.
Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been
introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom
why it should be overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition of
Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Court's conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned remains a precedent
and must be upheld.
III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not mere
amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment
and revision. Thus:
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
(2) A Constitutional Convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered votes, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means
by which the people can directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not
provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2)
Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an
amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process. This is
not so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an amendment
and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under
the system of people's initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional
Convention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section
2, Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report
No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be
limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend
to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment
or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent
of the amendment yield to a few questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line I refers to "amendments." Does it
not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision"
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is
imperative to examine whether petitioners' proposed changes partake of the
nature of amendments, not revisions.
The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to
amend the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article
VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-
presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present
Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the
terms of Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister who shall
be vested with executive power.
Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of
amendments, hence, within the coverage of a "people's initiative."
I disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, characterized an amendment
and a revision to the Constitution as follows:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific
portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original intention and
plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for
the document to determine how and to what extent they should
be altered.21
Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction
between the two must be based upon the degree of change contemplated. In
Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison
of the two terms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of
working changes in the charter, and are sometimes used in exactly
the same sense but there is an essential difference between them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft
without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of
the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or
charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to
prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired changes
from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of
the general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to
better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests
fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form
of government may be accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases
which so hold seem to involve statutes which only distinguish between
amendment and totally new charters. 23 However, as in Maine law, where the
statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter amendment" and
"charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change in the form of government
of a home rule city may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by
its amendment."24
In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and
scheme would probably be interpreted as a "revision" and should be achieved
through the more thorough process of deliberation.
Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated
and specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear
that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our government
and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes
will have a "domino effect" or, more appropriately, "ripple effect" on other
provisions of the Constitution.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to
effect changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend anysection in
such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would "be complete
within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other
section or article of the Constitution or require further amendments to the
Constitution to accomplish its purpose."25 This is clearly not the case here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects
the well-enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in
our Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary
Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the Executive Branch is to a
certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as
expressed through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this doctrine of
separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution,
that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised
constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x x.
Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative measure
now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a
substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be
effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a
mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter27:
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968
Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not
only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a
change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which
has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the
states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be
difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of
a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It
would not only radically change the whole pattern of the
government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.
Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than
amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the following "omnibus provision":
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary form of
government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory
Provisions" which shall read, as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x
x x and all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless
they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case
they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral
Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .
xxxxxxxxx
Section 4. (1) x x x
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
Interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other
provisions of the Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of
unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With one sweeping stroke, these
proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of the Constitution.
In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court to be in the nature
of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote
the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various
and many articles and sections of our present Constitution which
would be affected, replaced or repealed. It purports only to add one
new article but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus
provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any section,
subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict
with any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection,
sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby
repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative
measure now before us is so broad that if such measure become law
a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be
effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention.28
Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere
amendments which will only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be
changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect
considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of our form of
government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are
connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our Constitution.
Accordingly, it has been held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping
that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is
plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution
and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a
convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed."29
I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a
revision of the Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an initiative. On
this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The
answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long deliberation
on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is
practicality. In other words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it
to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is
nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional
structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What
debates ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting
the provisions which may be found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention,
decisions are reached after much purifying debate. And while the
deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved. It
is only after the work of an authorized body has been completed that it
is presented to the electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is
important because the electorate tends to accept what is
presented to it even sight unseen. 30
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an
enabling law is imperative for its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However, as
previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No.
6735. Congress neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its
deficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn,
enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a
sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right
of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent
of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement the people's
initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735
demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument to
implement people's initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only
initiatives on national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the
Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on
national and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical,
and exhaustive enumeration on their implementation, 31 however, as regards
initiative on the Constitution, the law merely:
(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32
(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;33
(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the
people;34
(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition;35 and
 (e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition. 36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on
the Constitution may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law
contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor
Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago,
various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for a
complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such as:
· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be
registered voters;
· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof
sought to be amended and the proposed amendment;
· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a
petition by any individual, group, political party or coalition with
members in the congressional district;
· The language used: the petition should be printed in English and
translated in the local language;
· Signature stations to be provided for;
· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is,
after the signatures shall have been verified by the Commission, the
verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in the
respective municipal and city halls where the signatures were
obtained;
· Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the
authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and
decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus,
demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.
V Court was the appropriate institution to define the substantive content of
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative
VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6735
I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and
inseparable. The determination of whether petitioners are proper parties to file
the petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an
examination of whether they have complied with the provisions of Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right. (Underscoring supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical.
For a people's initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be present:
1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose"
"amendments" to the Constitution;
2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters;"
and
3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered
voters "must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters" of "every legislative district."
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino
and Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in the
"Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping" contained in
their petition, they alleged under oath that they have caused the preparation of
the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters "and as
representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters. This goes to
show that the questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million
people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters, as required by Section 2. Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself
could be found the signatures of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the
signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed therein "as
representatives" of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition
for people's initiative contemplated by the Constitution.
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the
petition "as representatives" of the alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such
act of representation is constitutionally proscribed. To repeat, Section 2
strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution shall be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously, the phrase
"directly proposed by the people" excludes any person acting as representative
or agent of the 12% of the total number of registered voters. The Constitution
has bestowed upon the people the right to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being
the people's representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of
representation. For it is only "the people" (comprising the minimum of 12% of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who
are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado is not a people's initiative. Necessarily, it must fail.
Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's voice"
is baseless and misleading. There is no people's voice to be heard and
heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue
that: (1) "the validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to
amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six
million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for initiative is a
purely political question;" and (2) "[t]he power to propose amendments to the
Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the
determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments
under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the
ambit of a political question."
The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court
in Luther v. Borden.37 Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme
republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B.
Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in every State resides in the people,
as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the circumstances of
the case, a political question to be settled by the political power." In other
words, the responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to the
legislative and executive branches of the government.
The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of Rhode
Island. Due to increased migration brought about by the Industrial Revolution,
the urban population of Rhode Island increased. However, under the 1663 Royal
Charter which served as the State Constitution, voting rights were largely limited
to residents of the rural districts. This severe mal-apportionment of suffrage
rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining remedies for their
disenfranchisement from the state government, suffrage reformers invoked their
rights under the American Declaration of Independence to "alter or abolish" the
government and to institute a new one. The reformers proceeded to call for and
hold an extralegal constitutional convention, drafted a new State Constitution,
submitted the document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The
State government, however, refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous
situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing state
governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.
The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and
searched the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter. He brought suit against
Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel
argued that since the State's archaic Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful
address of grievances through democratic processes, the people of Rhode
Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty
of replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The US Supreme
Court deemed the controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate for
judicial resolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political
thicket" to describe situations where Federal courts should not intervene in
political questions which they have neither the competence nor the commission
to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded
the apportionment of legislative districts in Illinois "as a political question and
that the invalidation of the districts might, in requiring statewide elections,
create an evil greater than that sought to be remedied."
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket,"
nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a definition of the term "political
question." Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,39 this Court ruled that properly, political
questions are "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government." In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,40 the Court
held that the term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in
Baker v. Carr42 in determining whether a question before it is political, rather
than judicial in nature, to wit:
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or
 2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or
3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an
independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due the
coordinate branches of government; or
5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or
6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this
Court. Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is at stake here is the
legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are
political in nature, it is not precluded from resolving them under its expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
following Daza v. Singson.43 As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,44 the
present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens
the scope of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would
have normally and ordinarily left to the political departments to decide.
CONCLUSION
In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that
the so-called people's initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the
people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by
petitioners, during the oral arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million registered
voters who affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In fact,
petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and
the proposed amendments were not explained to all those registered voters.
Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty,
whether they really understood what petitioners and their group asked them to
sign.
Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary.45 The Court then ruled that "This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect," although it had notice that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the
people in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among
others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies "was and is null and
void ab initio." That was during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices
were scared of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law
regime. There is, therefore, no reason why this Court should allow itself to be
used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called people's initiative for those who
want to perpetuate themselves in power.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present
government structure. Consequent1y, we must not change it. America has a
presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has become a super
power. It is then safe to conclude that what we should change are some of
the people running the government, NOT the SYSTEM.
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient,
more economical and more responsive government.
Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may
be elected as members and leaders of the unicameral-parliament? Or will the
present members of the Lower House continue to hold their respective positions
with limitless terms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the
marginalized? Will it be able to provide homes for the homeless, food for the
hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for the weak?
This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial
with transcendental significance. And history will judge us on how we resolve
this issue – shall we allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are duty
bound to guard and revere, on the basis of a doubtful people's initiative?
Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or
structure is a herculean task affecting the entire Filipino people and the future
generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people
elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.
Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances
in this case, the voice of God is not audible.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to
GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
NGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
sociate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q.
SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the
amended petition before it. The proposals of petitioners incorporated in said
amended petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the
amended petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed
with the COMELEC a petition entitled "IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING
AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES
VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM." The case was docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006,
petitioners filed an amended petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition
for initiative.
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own
behalf and together with those who have affixed their signatures to the signature
sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and registered
voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve percent (12%) of all
the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is
represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is
based on their constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987
Constitution by way of people's initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII
thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right."
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he Congress
shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right," the provisions
of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735, 1 are
sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. The said
sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters
as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred
(100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the
top of every page of the petition.
xxxx
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE,
to give due course to the petition for initiative, in compliance with the INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
constitutional directive for the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and II.
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC
referendum and recall."2 ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE
Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY
to be incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING
an order: LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article III.
XVII of the 1987 Constitution; THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY
ninety days after the Certification by this Honorable Commission of VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND
the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE
their sovereign will on the proposition. PEOPLE.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the A.
premises. THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
denying due course and dismissing the petition for initiative. The COMELEC 1.
ruled that: THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND
relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative. THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL
provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative. PROVISION
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides: 2.
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO
directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be POWER OF INITIATIVE AND RECALL HAS
represented by at least three per centum of the registered BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD
voters therein. x x x. 3.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO
exercise of this right." PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self- QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED
executory provision needed an enabling law for its implementation. SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people 4.
under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE
resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735. DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO
Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned B.
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT
be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the C.
implementation of the system. THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE DELFIN PETITION.
required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, 1.
of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE
centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN
given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT
6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
to the Constitution. IV.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR
the right of the people under a system of initiative. However, neither NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY
can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in LAW.
the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains A.
nothing but an "empty right," and that this Commission is permanently THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE. 3
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.) Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
The Petitioners' Case Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that: exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
I. excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL may require.
VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
 and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out
in the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. x x x4
The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must
be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.
For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in
accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law
traditions.5
There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it
acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough.6 The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess
thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. 7 An error of judgment is one in
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is
reversible only by an appeal. 8
In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC
that it denied the petition for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this
Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.9 In said case, the Court En Banc
permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
When the COMELEC denied the petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid
law enacted by Congress to provide for the implementation of the system.
It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due
course to the petition for initiative as "capricious, despotic, oppressive or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In fact, in
so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the
Court's ruling in Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision and
requires an enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was
found by the Court to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
and conditions" to implement the constitutional provision on initiative.
Consequently, the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for
the implementation of the system." The decision of the Court En Banc
interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. 10 And no
doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc may be modified or
reversed except by the Court En Banc,11 certainly not by the COMELEC. Until
the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound to
follow the same.12 As succinctly held in Fulkerson v. Thompson:13
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as
finally settled. The inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree
as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to
the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or judicially examine it
for any other purpose than execution. It can give no other or further
relief as to any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where
there is error apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it further
than to execute the mandate and settle such matters as have been
remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme Court….
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by
the authority of adjudged cases. And any further departure from them
would inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring
its parts into conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder,
and incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides, any rule allowing
the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme
Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be
repugnant to the principles established by the constitution, and
therefore void.14
At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the
pronouncement made by the Court therein. Like petitioners in the instant case,
in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution as
they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, By People's Initiative" (the Delfin petition). They
asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and date for signature
gathering all over the country; causing the necessary publications of said order
and their petition in newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing
municipal election registrars in all regions all over the country and to assist
petitioners in establishing signing stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC
issued the order prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court,
speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the
petition as it declared:
1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned";
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 15 invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and
3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of
signatures of registered voters.
The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide
sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the
Delfin petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is
made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED as against private respondents.16
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with
the Court by PIRMA and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were
parties in Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v. Commission on Elections.17 The said
petitioners, undaunted by Santiago and claiming to have gathered 5,793,213
signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying, inter alia, that COMELEC
officers be ordered to verify all the signatures collected in behalf of the petition
and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for the
purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the Delfin
petition in Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a
plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of
elected officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in
PIRMA has no basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997,
dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining order issued
against it by the Court in Santiago. PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa forthwith
elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby dismissing,
their petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA
and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely
complied with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in Santiago and,
hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in
dismissing the petition before it:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June
10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to
resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the
Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the
Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted
that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was
no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case a bar
is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of
the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and
Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a re-
examination. x x x
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. 18 (Underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of
petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in
Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent injunction therein
referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by
pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996
that was made permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin
petition.
The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's
decision in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must
not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision
of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no
specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered
in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts
of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.19
The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently
enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system" is thus as
much a part of the Court's decision as its dispositive portion. The ruling of this
Court is of the nature of an in rem judgment barring any and all Filipinos
from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in
denying due course to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution conformably with the Court's ruling in Santiago did not commit
grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the
salutary principle of hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find the COMELEC to
have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the
ruling of this Court in Santiago would be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court
from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings." 20 This truism
applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all,
judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution "assume the
same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which
must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but
also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."21
Petitioners Cannot Ascribe
Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not
the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority
cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit
unconvincingly, that the Court's declaration therein on the inadequacy,
incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of
initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority
opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices, 22 or the
majority of the members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations
thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,23 while voting for the dismissal of the
Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion
as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the
system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices,
concurred in the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735
is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" constitutes a
definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the
Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the
majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the
motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the requisite majority of the Court
to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977." 24 In fine, the
pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997
remains the definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the
issue posed by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote
of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and
Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the
issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need for the re-
examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago
remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court
in Santiago, the Court should have resolved to set aside its original resolution
dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the
petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared
that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court in Santiago in
dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno
concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent
from the ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
precisely on the ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in
Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was
a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly
propose constitutional amendments through the system of initiative had already
been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these
decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio
Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of
Representatives,25 have filed separate bills to implement the system of initiative
under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In
the Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act
Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator
Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for
People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a
System of People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution
introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House
Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed
by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative
Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo
Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for People's
Initiative to Amend the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly
recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern the process by which
constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly through the
system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of
any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the
system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would
warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply
to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As
earlier shown, Congress and other government agencies have, in fact, abided
by Santiago. The Court can do no less with respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a
law cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who
compose it – the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined RA
6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" and
therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in the Court's
composition.26 Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in the courts in adhering to
decisions deliberately made after ample consideration. Parties should not be
encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate on
fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.27
Proposals to Revise the Constitution,
As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its
pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with other
extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended
petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition,
the proposals of petitioners to change the form of government from the present
bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government are
actually for the revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this
manner:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as
follows:
"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in
a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many
members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the
provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred
thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must
have at least one member.
"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a
resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be
elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years
 without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the
party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose
number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership
coming from the parliamentary districts."
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby
amended to read, as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State.
The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the
assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a
majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He
shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-
Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall
be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read as
follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve
until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June
2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987
Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the
members of the interim parliament.,
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from
office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall
succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability,
resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President
and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the
powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended
and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to
"Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "House of
Congress," "Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of
Representatives" and "House of Congress" shall be changed to read
"Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of the
House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of
Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or
"Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and
Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other
Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent
with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to
"Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all
references therein to "Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or
"Member[s] of the House of Parliament" and any and all references to
the "President" and of "Acting President" shall be changed to read
"Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the
Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent
Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also
be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its session for
the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive,
shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament,
an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of
the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the
various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities
as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials.
[Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member of Parliament, shall
immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its
session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of all its members, from among
themselves.] The duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the
interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President.28
Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters
have been complied with, i.e., the signatories to the petition constitute twelve
percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative
district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters
therein. Certifications allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election
Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these signatures were attached
to the petition for initiative. The verification was allegedly done on the basis of
the list of registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list used in the
immediately preceding election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino
people in a plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM,
AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
29
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would
effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government. The
parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative
and executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and
provide faster and more decisive governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and
procedures for proposals for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the
Constitution may be proposed by –
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may
be likewise directly proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and
"revision" and provided for their respective modes and procedures for effecting
changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between the two
concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman of the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions, explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is,
"amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use the
terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by
the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the
connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of
our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous –
or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by
Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution:
"Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the
other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of
specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific
 parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already
considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter embodying
new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two
terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article governing
amendments or revisions to the new Constitution. 30
Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to
reserve the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress or the
constitutional convention. Stated in another manner, it was their manifest intent
that revision thereof shall not be undertaken through the system of initiative.
Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by Congress or by a
constitutional convention.
It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative
was included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The
original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in
Article __ Section __ of the Constitution. 31
However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the
Commission agreed to remove the provision on the system of initiative from
Section 1 and, instead, put it under a separate provision, Section 2. It was
explained that the removal of the provision on initiative from the other "traditional
modes" of changing the Constitution was precisely to limit the former (system of
initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the system
of initiative should not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative.
This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report.
With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report
No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited
to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation
of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x32
The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be
undertaken through the system of initiative was reiterated and made clear by
Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas
Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the
provisions of Section 4, except that in Section 4, as it is presently
drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative
mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution which would
further require the process of submitting it in a plebiscite, in which
case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off
period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a
while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include
the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the
Committee.33
Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the
clarification with respect to the observation of Commissioner Regalado
Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when
he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned,
it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."34
After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following
wording of Section 2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(4) A constitutional convention.
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a
substantial differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two
procedures and their respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the system of
initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the
Constitution is strictly limited to amendments – not to a revision – thereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for "amendment"
and "revision" as different modes of changing the fundamental law, were
cognizant of the distinction between the two terms. They particularly relied on
the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in
Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the controversial decision which gave
imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as
follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an
existing constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole
constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand,
envisages a change of only specific provisions. The intention of an act
to amend is not the change of the entire constitution, but only the
improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of the
addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a
mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new
fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.36
Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is
enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an eminent authority on
political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations
of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the
rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results
the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.
That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be
 altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a
change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to
amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire
constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to
improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it
provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to
suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.37
In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of
Trustees38 had the occasion to make the distinction between the two terms with
respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which "amended" the 1877 Constitution of
Georgia. It explained the term "amendment:"
"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It
repeals or changes some provision, or adds something thereto. A law
is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to remain, and
something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way changed or
altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to
accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some
other object or purpose.39
On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US appellate
court:
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected
on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered
house, or do you have a new house? Some of the materials contained
in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be
constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have
altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument
as contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an
amendment to the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a
completely revised or new constitution. 40
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional
Commission, expounded on the distinction between the two terms thus:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment
is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that
may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate
a re-examination of the entire document – or of provisions of the
document (which have overall implications for the entire document or
for the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of the document) – to
determine how and to what extent it should be altered. Thus, for
instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to
a unicameral system because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not
the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental
qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I must reject the
puerile argument that the use of the plural form of "amendments"
means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction of a
multiplicity of amendments!41
Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-
reaching effects on the Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the said
mode from the system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the framers
of the present Constitution four months from June 2, 1986 until October 15,
1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as described by the
venerable Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took shape through the
crucible of sustained sometimes passionate and often exhilarating debates that
intersected all dimensions of the national life."42
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should,
in like manner, be a product of the same extensive and intensive study and
debates. Consequently, while providing for a system of initiative where the
people would directly propose amendments to the Constitution, they entrusted
the formidable task of its revision to a deliberative body, the Congress or
Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles
upon which the government is founded, and regulating the division of sovereign
powers, directing to what persons each of those powers is to be confided and
the manner in which it is to be exercised. 43 The Philippines has followed the
American constitutional legal system in the sense that the term constitution is
given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument, under
which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.44
The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An
overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the
plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2,
1987.45 In expressing that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the
method and manner by which the same can be amended and revised, and when
the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner
in which the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards
that express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.46
Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where
the validity of a constitutional amendment or revision depends upon whether
such provisions have been complied with, such question presents for
consideration and determination a judicial question, and the courts are the only
tribunals vested with power under the Constitution to determine such question. 47
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment"
and "revision," clearly makes a differentiation not only between the two terms but
also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. On this
point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan48 is instructive. In that case, a "purported
initiative amendment" (referred to as the proposed measure) to the State
Constitution of California, then being proposed to be submitted to the electors
for ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated
as "California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208
subsections which would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25
articles of the California State Constitution and add at least four new topics.
Among the likely effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative and
judicial functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation system and
reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure also
included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and
naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed
measure to the electors for ratification because it was not an "amendment" but a
"revision" which could only be proposed by a convention. It held that from an
examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in relation to the terms
of the California State Constitution, it was clear that the proposed initiative
enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision, rather than
amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State Constitution
specifies (Article XVIII §2 thereof) that it may be revised by means of
constitutional convention but does not provide for revision by initiative measure,
the submission of the proposed measure to the electorate for ratification must be
enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden,
the differentiation required (between amendment and revision) is not merely
between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between
their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary
principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial
field of application, not to be a mere alternative procedure in the same field.
Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not
only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure.49
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the
nature of safety-valves – they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their
peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-
pipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with such
difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode the
machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is, in this particular, one
of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for progress
with the requisites for safety.50
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is, despite its denomination, one for its revision. It purports to seek
the amendment only of Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to
provide transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the amendment
of these two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous provisions of the
Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific powers of Congress and
the President. These powers would have to be transferred to the Parliament and
the Prime Minister and/or President, as the case may be. More than one
hundred (100) sections will be affected or altered thereby:
1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to
impose the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes;
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to
provide for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a
system for absentee voting;
3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):
- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts;
- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the
qualifications of judges of lower courts;
- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC)
which includes representatives of Congress as ex officio
members and on the power of the President to appoint the
regular members of the JBC;
 - Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the
members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts;
- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual
report to the President and Congress.
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);
- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make
annual report to the President and Congress;
- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for
the standardization of compensation of government officials;
- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer
shall accept, without the consent of Congress, any present,
emolument, etc. x x x"
- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the
Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments;
- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to
recommend to Congress measures to minimize election
spending x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to
recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to
the President and Congress a report on the conduct of
election, plebiscite, etc.;
- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the
favorable recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant
pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules and regulations;
- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor
of organization registered under party-list system;
- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system;
- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint
the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of
Appointments;
- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the
President and Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local
government code;
- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise
general supervision over local government units (LGUs);
- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own
sources of income x x x, subject to such guidelines as
Congress may provide;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special
metropolitan political subdivisions;
- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for
regional development councils x x x;
- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise
general supervision over autonomous regions;
- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act
for each autonomous region as well as the power of the
President to appoint the representatives to the regional
consultative commission;
- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under
the Constitution to pass the organic act for autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public
Officers):
- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-
President, etc.);
- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power
of the House to initiate complaint and sole power of the
Senate to try and decide impeachment cases);
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the
Ombudsman and his deputies;
- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or
guaranty shall be granted to the President, Vice-President,
etc.
- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and
liabilities by public officials including the President, Vice-
President, etc.
9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and
Patrimony):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law,
small-scale utilization of natural resources and power of the
President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of
lands of public domain;
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific
limits of forest lands;
- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for
applicability of customary laws;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an
independent economic and planning agency to be headed
by the President;
- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino
citizens or domestic corporations(at least 60% Filipino-
owned) certain areas of investment;
- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant
franchise for public utilities;
- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency
to promote viability of cooperatives;
- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except
by general law, form private corporations;
- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-
President, etc. and the power of Congress to adjust the
same;
- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central
monetary authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human
Rights):
- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest
priority to enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of people x x x
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention
limits in agrarian reform;
- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human
Rights to recommend to Congress effective measures to
promote human rights;
- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other
cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and
Technology, etc.):
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino
equity participation in educational institutions;
- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as
Congress may provide, the Government shall sustain the
use of Filipino as medium of official communication;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national
language commission;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for
incentives to promote scientific research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name
for the country, new national anthem, etc.;
- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which
may be extended by the President in times of war or
national emergency declared by Congress;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or
prohibit monopolies in mass media;
- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create
consultative body to advise the President on indigenous
cultural communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):
- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by
Congress;
- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the system of initiative;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional
convention to amend or revise the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987
Constitution will not be affected."51 Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly
seeking to amend only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing
transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other numerous
articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative effects, however, the
revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent from the qualitative
effects it will have on the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the
revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the
entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change; while
amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in
a constitution.52
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean
Sinco's more comprehensive differentiation of the terms:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations
of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the
rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results
the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.
That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be
altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a
change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to
amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire
constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to
improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it
provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to
suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.53
A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary, following the above distinction, entails a revision of the
Constitution as it will involve "alteration of different portions of the entire
document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the
greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions."
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt,
fundamentally change the basic plan and substance of the present Constitution.
The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law divides governmental
powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the legislative, executive and
judicial. Legislative power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral body
consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to
make laws and to alter them at discretion. Executive power, vested in the
President who is directly elected by the people, is the power to see that the laws
are duly executed and enforced. Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court
and the lower courts, is the power to construe and apply the law when
controversies arise concerning what has been done or omitted under it. This
separation of powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which guards
against the establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of
power is dissolved as there is a fusion between the executive and legislative
powers. Essentially, the President becomes a mere "symbolic head of State"
while the Prime Minister becomes the head of government who is elected, not
by direct vote of the people, but by the members of the Parliament. The
Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by legislative
districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government, does not have a fixed term
of office and may only be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament.
Under this form of government, the system of checks and balances is
emasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be
effected, not to mention that the Constitution's basic plan and substance of a
tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of powers
underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no
other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would
constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or "such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed." 54 As has
been shown, the effect of the adoption of the petitioners' proposition, rather than
to "within the lines of the original instrument" constitute "an improvement or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed," is to "substantially alter the
purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as
now cast."55
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than a
total one is amendatory would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so
carefully erected and preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where
the question would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the line of
demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the
entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a
unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is
not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental
qualitative alteration that effects revision."56
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners
Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is
barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on
Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the
system of initiative and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution
must state the following:
1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
2. The proposition;
3. The reason or reasons therefor;
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred
(100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every
page of the petition.
Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures.
This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he
cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a
verification of signatures made by persons other than the election registrars has
no legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners
showed that the verification of signatures was made, not by the election
registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the certification of the election
officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION57
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the
Barangay Officials in this City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2)
witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of the 2nd
Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names
appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed
initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of
bonafide resident of the said Barangays and correspond to the names
found in the official list of registered voters of the Commission on
Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or voters' identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the
registered voters for the City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL
SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets is ONE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Underscoring supplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the
certifications, similarly worded as above-quoted, of the election registrars of
Buldon, Maguindanao;58 Cotabato City (Special Province); 59 Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Maguindanao;60 Matanog, Maguindanao;61 Parang, Maguindanao;62 Kabantalan,
Maguindanao;63 Upi, Maguinadano;64 Barira, Maguindanao; 65 Sultan, Mastura;66
Ampatuan, Maguindanao;67 Buluan, Maguindanao;68 Datu Paglas,
Maguindanao;69 Datu Piang, Maguindanao; 70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao; 71
Pagalungan, Maguindanao; 72 Talayan, Maguindanao;73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun,
Maguindanao;74 Mamasapano, Maguindanao; 75 Talitay, Maguindanao; 76
Guindulungan, Maguindanao; 77 Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao; 78 Datu
Unsay, Maguindanao;79 Pagagawan, Maguindanao;80 Rajah Buayan,
Maguindanao;81 Indanan, Sulu;82 Jolo, Sulu;83 Maimbung, Sulu;84 Hadji Panglima,
Sulu;85 Pangutaran, Sulu;86 Parang, Sulu;87 Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu; 88 Luuk,
Sulu;89 Panamao, Sulu;90 Pata, Sulu;91 Siasi, Sulu;92 Tapul, Sulu;93 Panglima
Estino, Sulu;94 Lugus, Sulu;95 and Pandami, Sulu. 96
Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by
the election registrar, and by no one else, including the barangay officials. The
foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their cause,
justify the outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the illegal
verifications made by barangay officials in the above-mentioned legislative
districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative has failed to comply
with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications
because they themselves submitted the same to the COMELEC and to the
Court in the present case to support their contention that the requirements of RA
6735 had been complied with and that their petition for initiative is on its face
sufficient in form and substance. They are in the nature of judicial admissions
which are conclusive and binding on petitioners. 97 This being the case, the Court
must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative for being, on its
face, insufficient in form and substance. The Court should make the adjudication
entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done
in other cases.98
It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct
in relying on Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the
Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the people's
will. The fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the right of the
sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution, which right has
already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act
of the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC
should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution
via a writ of mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is
unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and
to compel the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the
Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for
a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the
petition is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public official and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. 101 In this case, petitioners failed to
establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing
disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the
COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for
initiative has complied with the requisite number of signatures of at least twelve
percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered
voters therein, involves contentious facts. The dissenting opinion cites the
petitioners' claim that they have complied with the same while the oppositors-
intervenors have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging, inter alia, that the
signatures were not properly verified or were not verified at all. Other oppositors-
intervenors have alleged that the signatories did not fully understand what they
have signed as they were misled into signing the signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative
and its compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its
implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at
the first instance. It thus remands the case to the COMELEC for further
proceedings.
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is
nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that
it is valid to implement the former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to
conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary
hearing or administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that "[a]n initiative shall
be conducted under the control and supervision of the Commission in
accordance with Article III hereof." Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article
III of the said implementing rules provide as follows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. – The Commission shall
act on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not
been obtained, the petition shall be deemed defeated and the
Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been
obtained, the Commission shall set the initiative or referendum in
accordance with the succeeding sections.
Sec. 32. Appeal. – The decision of the Commission on the findings of
the sufficiency and insufficiency of the petition for initiative or
referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not
authorized to conduct any kind of hearing to receive any evidence for or against
the sufficiency of the petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of
the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the annexes submitted
by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form and
substance. The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence
of the parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the
abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not
empowered to do.
The Present Petition Presents a
Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of government.102 A political question has two aspects: (1) those matters that are
to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity; and (2) matters
which have been specifically designated to some other department or particular
office of the government, with discretionary power to act.103
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,104 Senior
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the doctrine of political question
vis-à-vis the express mandate of the present Constitution for the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition
will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "... to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not
granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was also
not xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution.
The CONCOM [Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny
by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded
and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases
involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
xxxx
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as
a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to
penetrate the shield with new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction."
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of
purportedly more than six million registered voters who have signified their
assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes a
justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question. There is no doubt that
the Constitution, under Article XVII, has explicitly provided for the manner or
method to effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question,
therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the terms of the
Constitution is for the Court to pass upon. 105
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,106 the State Supreme Court of
Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the petition questioning the result of the
general election holding that "an examination of the decisions shows that the
courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of
the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments." The
cases cited were Dayton v. St. Paul,107 Rice v. Palmer,108 Bott v. Wurtz,109 State
v. Powell,110 among other cases.
There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them."111 However, I find to be tenuous the asseveration that "the argument that
the people through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change
the Constitution turns sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission
constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the
people."112 In effect, it is theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section suffer, whoever or whatever may be 'voted up or voted down,' no sacrilegious
2, Article XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the hand must be laid upon the constitution."120
system of initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to
disregard the said provision. GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
ROMEO
can disregard the Constitution altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate
fundamental constitutional theory that while indeed "the ultimate sovereignty is Justice
in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority"; nonetheless, "by the ____________________
Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official EN BANC
agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor G.R. No. 174153 (RAUL LAMBINO, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON
the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in ELECTIONS, ET AL.) and
opposition to this fundamental law."113 The Constitution, it should be G.R. No. 174299 (MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON
remembered, "is the protector of the people, placed on guard by them to save ELECTIONS, ET AL.).
the rights of the people against injury by the people." 114 This is the essence of x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
constitutionalism: SEPARATE OPINION
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political AZCUNA, J.:
institutions and ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically "Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."
always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become -- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.
restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves Article XVII of the Constitution states:
over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
115
that now men, democratic men, would try to live by their word. proposed by:
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
only to proposals to amend to the Constitution, and does not extend to its (2) A constitutional convention.
revision. The Filipino people have bound themselves to observe the manner and Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
method to effect the changes of the Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
of the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
but did not extend the same to the revision thereof. The petition for initiative, as every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
it proposes to effect the revision thereof, contravenes the Constitution. The centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this
fundamental law of the state prescribes the limitations under which the electors section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
of the state may change the same, and, unless such course is pursued, the this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
mere fact that a majority of the electors are in favor of a change and have so The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
expressed themselves, does not work a change. Such a course would be this right.
revolutionary, and the Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
116
form. call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its
The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of convention.
the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
nature.117 cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision in Article XVII of the Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure that revision.
these safety valves embodied in the Constitution to guard against improvident Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
and hasty changes thereof are not easily trifled with. To be sure, by having a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people believed that it is "a earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification
good Constitution" and in the words of the learned Judge Cooley: by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it Constitutions have three parts – the Constitution of Liberty, which states the
must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, fundamental rights of the people; the Constitution of Government, which
or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober establishes the structure of government, its branches and their operation; and
second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be the Constitution of Sovereignty, which provides how the Constitution may be
allowed efficiency. Changes in government are to be feared unless changed.
the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.
and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So when
evil may succeed and worse.118 Congress acts under this provision, it acts not as a legislature exercising
Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental legislative powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising constituent powers.
importance. Accordingly, I have approached and grappled with them with full The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply,
appreciation of the responsibilities involved in the present case, and have given or do not apply strictly, to the actions taken under Article XVII.
to its consideration the earnest attention which its importance demands. I have Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the
sought to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I implementation of the exercise of the people's right directly to propose
share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:119 "it is for the amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress pursuant
protection of minorities that constitutions are framed. Sometimes constitutions thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a constituent act.
must be interposed for the protection of majorities even against themselves. As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the
Constitutions are adopted in times of public repose, when sober reason holds people of the right to propose a law or amendments to the Constitution is, with
her citadel, and are designed to check the surging passions in times of popular respect to the right to propose amendments to the Constitution, a constituent
excitement. But if courts could be coerced by popular majorities into a disregard measure, not a mere legislative one.
of their provisions, constitutions would become mere 'ropes of sand,' and there The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates
would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of to proposing amendments to the Constitution, is that the requirements for
temperance can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would statutory enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and the like, do not and
be at all comparable to the injury to republican institutions which a violation of should not strictly apply. As long as there is a sufficient and clear intent to
the constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class of moral reformers provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right, it should be
which so justly demands the observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by
to take its first reformatory step by a violation of the constitution. How can it the Constitution.
consistently demand of others obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the
The people can in a short time re-enact the amendment. In the manner of a procedure for proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be
great moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming forward upon the For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec1 should be re-
stage of political action must be educated to venerate it; those already upon the examined and, after doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the
stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or may insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise to this proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion and insertions, the
of this sovereign right. wordings of which are practically automatic and non-discretionary.
And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,2 penned by As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of Constitution would read if we were to change Congress from one consisting of
this Court interpreting a law forms part of the law interpreted as of the time of its the Senate and the House of Representatives to one consisting only of the
enactment, Republic Act No. 6735 should be deemed sufficient and adequate House of Representatives. It only affects Article VI on the Legislative
from the start. Department, some provisions on Article VII on the Executive Department, as
This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the petition for well as Article XI on the Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on
initiative herein involved complies with the requirements of that law as well as Transitory Provisions. These are mere amendments, substantial ones indeed
those stated in Article XVII of the Constitution. but still only amendments, and they address only one subject matter.
True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind the
Principles, to emphasize precisely that there are instances recognized and present initiative, which is to provide for simplicity and economy in government
provided for in the Constitution where our people directly exercise their and reduce the stalemates that often prevent needed legislation.
sovereign powers, new features set forth in this People Power Charter, namely, For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the
the powers of recall, initiative and referendum. filing of an appropriate initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution to
Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a democracy under change Congress into a unicameral body. This is not say that I favor such a
the rule of law. This equally important point is emphasized in the very Preamble change. Rather, such a proposal would come within the purview of an initiative
to the Constitution, which states: allowed under Article XVII of the Constitution and its implementing Republic Act,
". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . ." and should, therefore, be submitted to our people in a plebiscite for them to
Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the Constitution. decide in their sovereign capacity. After all is said and done, this is what
The power is subject to limitations under the Constitution itself, thus: The power democracy under the rule of law is about.
could not be exercised for the first five years after the Constitution took effect
and thereafter can only be exercised once every five years; the power ADOLFO
only S. AZCUNA
extends to proposing amendments but not revisions; and the power needs Associate
an Justice
act of Congress providing for its implementation, which act is directed and ____________________
mandated. EN BANC
The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the G. R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006
Constitution set forth in the petition for initiative herein involved are mere RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952
amendments or rather are revisions. REGISTERED VOTERS
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it. vs.
The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
people through initiative is a practical one, namely, there is no one to draft such G.R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006
extensive changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with a MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q.
single extensive document through a direct proposal from each of them. SAGUISAG
Someone would have to draft it and that is not authorized as it would not be a vs.
direct proposal from the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
of proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or a ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA,
Constitutional Convention created under the same provision. Furthermore, there FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
is a need for such deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings SARMIENTO, and NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe
and debates are duly and officially recorded, so that future cases of x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
interpretations can be properly aided by resort to the record of their proceedings. "It is a Constitution we are expounding…"1
Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition for – Chief Justice John Marshall
initiative herein involved will show on its face that the proposed changes DISSENTING OPINION
constitute a revision of the Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of PUNO, J.:
government from that which is bicameral-presidential to one that is unicameral- The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy is
parliamentary. the critical understanding of the first and foremost of our constitutional
While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as the principles — "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
petition and text of the proposed changes themselves state, every provision of resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." 2
the Constitution will have to be examined to see if they conform to the nature of Constitutionalism dictates that this creed must be respected with deeds; our
a unicameral-parliamentary form of government and changed accordingly if they belief in its validity must be backed by behavior.
do not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of
stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a system, the Parliament respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006,
is supreme, and thus the Court's power to declare its act a grave abuse of denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L.
discretion and thus void would be an anomaly. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some
Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and how 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures thereon, and
should the changes be worded? The proposed initiative does not say who nor praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
how. COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision amendments to the Constitution in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the
but it also suffers from being incomplete and insufficient on its very face. 1987 Constitution.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement
providing for the power under the Constitution. for People's Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign people's power to directly
Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative under Section 2,
that not more than one subject shall be proposed as an amendment or Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin,
amendments to the Constitution. The petition herein would propose at the very filed with the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a "Petition to Amend the
least two subjects – a unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form of Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (Delfin
government. Again, for this clear and patent violation of the very act that Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
provides for the exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie. Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting the
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners. provisions on the term limits for all elective officials.
For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted
nature – a unicameral legislature is one; a parliamentary form of government is to the people and would be formally filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by
another. The first is a mere amendment and contains only one subject matter. at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters in the
The second is clearly a revision that affects every article and every provision in country. It thus sought the assistance of the COMELEC in gathering the
the Constitution to an extent not even the proponents could at present fully required signatures by fixing the dates and time therefor and setting up
articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing changes the signature stations on the assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that
nature and extent of which they do not as yet know exactly what. the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature
The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a gathering all over the country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the
change in the legislature from a bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a petition for initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (3)
unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes instructing the municipal election registrars in all the regions of the Philippines to
needed to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is limited
assist petitioner and the volunteers in establishing signing stations on the dates
and time designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla
and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition before this
Court, seeking to restrain the COMELEC from further considering the Delfin
Petition. They impleaded as respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto
and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding members of the
People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was
likewise engaged in signature gathering to support an initiative to amend the
Constitution. They argued that the constitutional provision on people's initiative
may only be implemented by a law passed by Congress; that no such law has
yet been enacted by Congress; that Republic Act No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin
does not cover the initiative to amend the Constitution; and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules adopted by the COMELEC on the
conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to amend the
Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325,
entitled Santiago v. Commission on Elections. 3
Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the
Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for
prohibition. The Court ruled that the constitutional provision granting the people
the power to directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not self-
executory. An enabling law is necessary to implement the exercise of the
people's right. Examining the provisions of R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8)
members of the Court held that said law was "incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned," 4 and thus voided portions of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It was also held that
even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to amend the Constitution and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the Delfin Petition should still be
dismissed as it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law.
Under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A.
6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least
twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered
voters therein. The Delfin Petition did not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. The decision stated:
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be
given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry
any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for
the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of
the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to
the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is
made permanent against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED
as against private respondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices
Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M.
Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the
majority opinion.
While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation 6 agreed
that the Delfin Petition should be dismissed for lack of the required signatures,
five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S.
Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban,
held that R.A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to implement the people's right
to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 validly provided the details for the actual exercise of such right. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to
resolving the issue of whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the law on initiative, and there was no need to rule on the
adequacy of R.A. 6735.
The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the Court's decision.
After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7 of the eight (8)
majority members maintained their position that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to
implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima submitted a
Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that R.A. 6735 sufficiently
covers the initiative to amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen (13)
members of the Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6) members,
namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide,
Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and
six (6) members, namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained
his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. The motions for
reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or
reverse the decision of March 19, 1997. 8
On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to
Propose Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition
was supported by around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R.A.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC,
among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at
least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order all election
officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and submit
these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the
following proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the
President the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with
the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the land can
serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the
term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving
Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose,
Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of
Article X, respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent
restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to
set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA
argued that the Court's decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC
from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the
deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was
no identity of parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also
urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution
dated September 23, 1997. It explained:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June
10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to
resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the
Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the
Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted
that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was
no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case at bar
is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of
the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, and
Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re-
examination x x x x9
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice
Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize
anew the system of initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to change the
form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary
system.
Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), embarked on a nationwide drive to gather
signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of government in
the country through charter change. They proposed to amend the Constitution
as follows:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to
read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be
vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed
of as many members as may be provided by law, to be
apportioned among the provinces, representative districts,
and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand
inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and
each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on
the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least
one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified
voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation
as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list
system which shall be provided for by law and whose
number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total
membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are
hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head
of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime
Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of
Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible
to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President
shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the
thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise
their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached
by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In
case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal
from office of both the incumbent President and Vice
President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the
powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article
VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24
which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are
hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2,
ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that
any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate,"
"House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall
be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all
references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)"
or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be
changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and
all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are
hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which
are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed
amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary
System of government; provided, however, that any all
references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of
Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be
changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and
all references to the "President" and or "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue
until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been
elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the
Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a
Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall
head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim
Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the
election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker
shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the
members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of
June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief
Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the
interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries
and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may
be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of
the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized
and held simultaneously with the election of all local
government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall
continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.10
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which
were written the abstract of the proposed amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of
the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the
present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system
of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and
economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government
organizations and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials.
Copies of the draft petition for initiative containing the proposition were also
circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral groups.
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which
culminated on March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform the people and explain to
them the proposed amendments to the Constitution. Thereafter, they circulated
the signature sheets for signing.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for
verification based on the voters' registration record. Upon completion of the
verification process, the respective local election officers issued
certifications to attest that the signature sheets have been verified. The verified
signature sheets were subsequently transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan
for the counting of the signatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the
Constitution entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987
Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential
to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII;
and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to
the Parliamentary System." They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006
to reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was actually presented to the
people. They alleged that they were filing the petition in their own behalf and
together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their
signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Petitioners appended to the
petition signature sheets bearing the signatures of registered voters which they
claimed to have been verified by the respective city or municipal election
officers, and allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered
voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least
three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred
that Section 5 (b) and (c), together with Section 7 of R.A. 6735,
provide sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the
power. Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order:
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at
least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than
ninety days after the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency
of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign
will on the proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the
petition for initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod,
Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople,
and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal,
Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy
Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana
Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops
Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of
Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and
Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron
D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C.
Tabayoyong.
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for
Initiative. It cited this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC 11 permanently
enjoining the Commission from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus praying that the Court set aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of
the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4, Article
XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of the plebiscite. They state the
following grounds in support of the petition:
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and to give due course
to the petition for initiative, because the cited Santiago ruling of 19
March 1997 cannot be considered the majority opinion of the
Supreme Court en banc, considering that upon its reconsideration and
final voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to declare
Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in
standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189
and existing appropriation of the COMELEC provide for sufficient
details and authority for the exercise of people's initiative, thus,
existing laws taken together are adequate and complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and in refusing to give
due course to the petition for initiative, thereby violating an express
constitutional mandate and disregarding and contravening the will of
the people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law,
respondent COMELEC cannot ignore the will of the
sovereign people and must accordingly act on the petition
for initiative.
1.
The framers of the Constitution intended to give
the people the power to propose amendments
and the people themselves are now giving vibrant
life to this constitutional provision.
2.
Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19
March 1997, the right of the people to exercise
the sovereign power of initiative and recall has
been invariably upheld.
3.
The exercise of the initiative to propose
amendments is a political question which shall be
determined solely by the sovereign people.
4.
By signing the signature sheets attached to the
petition for initiative duly verified by the election
officers, the people have chosen to perform this
sacred exercise of their sovereign power.
B.
The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to
the instant petition for initiative filed by the petitioners.
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC
only applies to the Delfin petition.
1.
It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not
other statements in the body of the decision that
governs the rights in controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or
neglected to act or perform a duty mandated by
law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is
to set the initiative for plebiscite.12
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B.
Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and
Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party,
Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr.
Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S.
Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada;
Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia
Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C.
Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this case and filed their respective
Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo,
Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P.
Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City
and Cebu Province Chapters; former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and
Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate of the Philippines, represented by
Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective motions for
intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement
Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya,
Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization, and Victorino F. Balais
likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a Petition-in-
Intervention. All interventions and oppositions were granted by the Court.
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition for
initiative as it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as
affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the principle of stare
decisis; that there is no sufficient law providing for the authority and the details
for the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution; that the
proposed changes to the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere
amendments; that the petition for initiative does not meet the required number of
signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; that it was not
shown that the people have been informed of the proposed amendments as
there was disparity between the proposal presented to them and the proposed
amendments attached to the petition for initiative, if indeed there was; that the
verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures
attached to the petition for initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for
initiative.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court's
resolution of September 5, 2006, filed its Comment to the petition. Affirming the
position of the petitioners, the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition at
bar and render judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as
reasonably sufficient to implement the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards for subordinate
legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting
aside the assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (4)
directing the COMELEC to grant the petition for initiative and set the
corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the
petition for initiative is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it merely
adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared that
R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement the constitutional provision on
initiative to amend the Constitution. It invoked the permanent injunction issued
by the Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have
been passed by Congress. It asserted that the permanent injunction covers not
only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving constitutional
initiatives.
On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required
to argue on the following issues:13
1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to
file the present Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters
who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.
2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on
Elections complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
127325, March 19, 1997) bars the present petition.
4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC that there is no sufficient law implementing or authorizing
the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative
filed with the COMELEC have complied with its provisions.
5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and
substance.
5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one
subject matter.
6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution.
6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject
of an initiative.
7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution is a political question to be determined solely by the
sovereign people.
8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Petitions for Initiative filed before it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:
I stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the
present Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who
allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not
the proper parties to file the instant petition as they were not authorized by the
signatories in the petition for initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the
petition for initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The petition for
initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was
accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the intent
of the signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated above their
signatures in the signature sheets is the following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing
thereof.14
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute
separate documents to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in
their behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado
to file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari and
mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court x x x x.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station x x x and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal,
board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the
appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the
proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the
standing to file the petition at bar.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of
Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing
and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. 15
Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation." 16 As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable;" (2)
where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the
binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."17
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of
the U.S. Constitution. 18 According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are
necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." 19 Madison agreed but
stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or
repealing the law, it should be rejected."20 Prof. Consovoy well noted that
Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." 21 He added that their ideas
"reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of
law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict
that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries."22
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States.
Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. 23 The first,
known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply
the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must
follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical
stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis,
has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. 24 Indeed,
stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis —
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.25 Constitutional
stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important
for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the
doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose,
Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable
command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be
followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided." 26 In the
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone
of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about
it."27 In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of
statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has
been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by
other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear
as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." 28 This stance
reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts'
limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, 29
viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and,
(3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the
stare decisis rule where30 (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and
political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional
law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the
policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare
decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases.31 The most famous of these
reversals is Brown v. Board of Education32 which junked Plessy v.
Ferguson's33 "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a
state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In
Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is
inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis,
the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of
inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be
straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,34 we reversed our original ruling
that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,35 we overturned our first ruling and held, on
motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show
that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before
overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening
developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the
prior decision and its merits.36
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis
rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.37 It
established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule
has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned
doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not
bar the reexamination of Santiago. On the factor of intolerability, the six (6)
justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it provided no standard
to guide COMELEC in issuing its implementing rules. The Santiago ruling that
R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional is an
intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet. It improperly
assails the ability of legislators to write laws. It usurps the exclusive right of
legislators to determine how far laws implementing constitutional mandates
should be crafted. It is elementary that courts cannot dictate on Congress the
style of writing good laws, anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write
literate decisions. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to
invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress for courts can construe
laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the ruling of the six (6)
justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the
sovereign right of the people to amend the Constitution via an initiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not
induce any expectation from the people. On the contrary, the ruling smothered
the hope of the people that they could amend the Constitution by direct action.
Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in the case at bar for it is more appropriate to
consider in decisions involving contracts where private rights are adjudicated.
The case at bar involves no private rights but the sovereignty of the people.
On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground
cannot be blinked away. The urgent need to adjust certain provisions of the
1987 Constitution to enable the country to compete in the new millennium is
given. The only point of contention is the mode to effect the change - - - whether
through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or people's initiative.
Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million registered voters
who want to amend the Constitution through people's initiative and that their
signatures have been verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6)
justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement the direct
right of the people to amend the Constitution through an initiative cannot
waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers of our sovereignty
and from whom all government authority emanates. New developments in
our internal and external social, economic, and political settings demand the
reexamination of the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for
this Court to allow the people to step into the future with a blindfold.
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to
implement the people's initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient to implement Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing
amendments to the Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through
initiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life
to the intent of legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that
Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the people, thru
initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. This all-
important intent is palpable from the following:
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people
to initiate changes to the Constitution:
The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election
called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an
initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people."
It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution,
viz:
(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein;"38 and
(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only
once every five (5) years thereafter."39
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides
that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority
of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite."
Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the
lawmakers to use it as the instrument to implement people's initiative. No less
than former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago,
concedes:40
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to
cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is
a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x
The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly
demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In his sponsorship remarks, the late
Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of the House of Representatives)
emphasized the intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the people can
propose amendments to the Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks:41
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee, we
wish to speak in support of House Bill No. 497, entitled: INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which later on may be called
Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this
particular bill. The grant of plenary legislative power upon the
Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, Mr.
Speaker, was based on the principle that any power deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere.
This was a citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the
application of the principle of separation of powers. While under the
parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained
applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973
Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang
Pambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative
power between the legislature and the executive.
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the
declaration in the Philippine Constitution that he Philippines is a
Republican State where sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its
citizens participating through the right of suffrage and indicating
thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in
Congress. However, to institutionalize direct action of the people as
exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there is a practical recognition of
what we refer to as people's sovereign power. This is the recognition
of a system of initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution, Congress
does not have plenary powers. There is a reserved legislative power
given to the people expressly.
Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the
Constitution provides, and I quote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body
after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least
ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, or
which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes
legislative power, there are reserved powers given to the people. In
Section 32, we are specifically told to pass at the soonest possible
time a bill on referendum and initiative. We are specifically mandated
to share the legislative powers of Congress with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section
2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker. Under the provision on amending the
Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to
implement the exercise by the people of the right of initiative and
referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr. Speaker, is the
response to such a constitutional duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where
initiative and referendum under Philippine law has occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a
very limited extent, the system is provided for in our Local
Government Code today. On initiative, for instance, Section 99 of the
said code vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate
legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports of the
sangguniang barangay. There are variations of initiative and
referendum. The barangay assembly is composed of all persons who
have been actual residents of the barangay for at least six months,
who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the Philippines. The
holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum is also provided in
Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but will
just submit the same to the Secretary to be incorporated as part of my
speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively
applied by the Local Government Code as it is now mandated by the
1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of
initiative and referendum similar to what is now contained in House Bill
No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions and House Bill No. 21505,
the various constitutions of the states in the United States recognize
the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or
to reject any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These
states are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and
referendum applies is also without ay limitation, except for emergency
measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill
No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill – from the filing of the
petition, the requirement of a certain percentage of supporters to
present a proposition to submission to electors – is substantially
similar to those of many American laws. Mr. Speaker, those among us
who may have been in the United States, particularly in California,
during election time or last November during the election would have
noticed different propositions posted in the city walls. They were
propositions submitted by the people for incorporation during the
voting. These were in the nature of initiative, Mr. Speaker.
Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative and
referendum is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and
House Bill No. 21505 through the various consolidated bills is
patterned after American experience in a great respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to
bring our colleagues slowly through the bill. The bill has basically only
12 sections. The constitutional Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this
system of initiative and referendum as an instrument which can be
used should the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the
people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely, since we seem to
be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to pass this bill on
referendum and initiative now. While indifference would not be an
appropriate term to use at this time, and surely it is not the case
although we are so criticized, one must note that it is a felt necessity
of our times that laws need to be proposed and adopted at the
soonest possible time to spur economic development, safeguard
individual rights and liberties, and share governmental power with the
people.
With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone, together
with the Senators when they are minded to agree with us, are left with
the burden of enacting the needed legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process
advocated by the bill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative
essentially is what the term connotes. It means that the people, on
their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration and voting
of the general electorate a bill or a piece of legislation.
Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative. One is
an initiative to amend the Constitution. This can occur once every five
years. Another is an initiative to amend statutes that we may have
approved. Had this bill been an existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most
likely that an overwhelming majority of the barangays in the
Philippines would have approved by initiative the matter of direct
voting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing
to enact regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay laws or
ordinances. It comes from the people and it must be submitted directly
to the electorate. The bill gives a definite procedure and allows the
COMELEC to define rules and regulations to give teeth to the power
of initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the
people to approve or reject something that Congress has already
approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or the
barangays into two or three, we must first get the consent of the
people affected through plebiscite or referendum.
Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However,
referendum can also be petitioned by the people if, for instance, they
do not life the bill on direct elections and it is approved subsequently
by the Senate. If this bill had already become a law, then the people
could petition that a referendum be conducted so that the acts of
Congress can be appropriately approved or rebuffed.
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As
envisioned in the bill, the initiative comes from the people, from
registered voters of the country, by presenting a proposition so that
the people can then submit a petition, which is a piece of paper that
contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I have been
citing is whether there should be direct elections during the barangay
elections. So the petition must be filed in the appropriate agency and
the proposition must be clear stated. It can be tedious but that is how
an effort to have direct democracy operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all
that easy to have referendum or initiative petitioned by the people.
Under Section 4 of the committee report, we are given certain
limitations. For instance, to exercise the power of initiative or
referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3
percent of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These
numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are mandated
by the Constitution. There must be a requirement of 10 percent for
ordinary laws and 3 percent representing all districts. The same
requirement is mutatis mutandis or appropriately modified and applied
to the different sections. So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative
or referendum for a barangay, there is a 10 percent or a certain
number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a district,
there is also a certain number required of all towns of the district that
must seek the petition. If it is for a province then again a certain
percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these are based
with reference to the constitutional mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised and
shall be upon the call of the Commission on Elections. However,
within a period of 30 days from receipt of the petition, the COMELEC
shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same and
set the date of the referendum which shall not be earlier than 45 days
but not later than 90 days from the determination by the commission
of the sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The
petition must first be determined by the commission as to its
sufficiency because our Constitution requires that no bill can be
approved unless it contains one subject matter. It is conceivable that
in the fervor of an initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be
more than two topics sought to be approved and that cannot be
allowed. In fact, that is one of the prohibitions under this referendum
and initiative bill. When a matter under initiative or referendum is
approved by the required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall
become effective 15 days following the completion of its publication in
the Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to
 do is to enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino
people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot
ignore or cannot be insensitive to the call for initiative and referendum.
We should have done it in 1987 but that is past. Maybe we should
have done it in 1988 but that too had already passed, but it is only
February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have enough time this year at
least to respond to the need of our people to participate directly in the
work of legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues
to approve House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated in Committee Report
No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my
speech, together with the footnotes since they contain many
references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction, be reproduced
as part of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of
former Representative Salvador Escudero III, viz:42
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years
highlighted the need to heed the clamor of the people for a truly
popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who actively
participated in the parliament of the streets, some of whom are now
distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of the
population feel increasingly that under the system, the people have
the form but not the reality or substance of democracy because of the
increasingly elitist approach of their chosen Representatives to many
questions vitally affecting their lives. There have been complaints, not
altogether unfounded, that many candidates easily forge their
campaign promises to the people once elected to office. The 1986
Constitutional Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide for a
means whereby the people can exercise the reserve power to
legislate or propose amendments to the Constitution directly in case
their chose Representatives fail to live up to their expectations. That
reserve power known as initiative is explicitly recognized in three
articles and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely: Article VI
Section 1; the same article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and
Article XVII, Section 2. May I request that he explicit provisions of
these three articles and four sections be made part of my sponsorship
speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory.
There is a need for an implementing law that will give meaning and
substance to the process of initiative and referendum which are
considered valuable adjuncts to representative democracy. It is
needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will probably
open the door to strong competition of the people, like pressure
groups, vested interests, farmers' group, labor groups, urban dwellers,
the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of legislation.
Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider
that through this bill we can hasten the politization of the Filipino which
in turn will aid government in forming an enlightened public opinion,
and hopefully produce better and more responsive and acceptable
legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of the
streets and cause-oriented groups an opportunity to articulate their
ideas in a truly democratic forum, thus, the competition which they will
offer to Congress will hopefully be a healthy one. Anyway, in an
atmosphere of competition there are common interests dear to all
Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals can still take
place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished
Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this Representation filed our
respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the bill
would be approved early enough so that our people could immediately
use the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject matter or as a take-off
point.
However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on Local
Government, it took sometime before the committee could act on
these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw at magaling ay
naihahabol din. The passage of this bill therefore, my dear colleagues,
could be one of our finest hours when we can set aside our personal
and political consideration for the greater good of our people. I
therefore respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately
approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts have
the duty to interpret the law as legislated and when possible, to honor the clear
meaning of statutes as revealed by its language, purpose and history."43
The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices,
nevertheless, ruled that "x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned" for the following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2) the Act
does not provide for the contents of the petition for initiative on the
Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the
right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A.
6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution by direct action. The fact that the legislature
may have omitted certain details in implementing the people's initiative in R.A.
6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient. What
were omitted were mere details and not fundamental policies which
Congress alone can and has determined. Implementing details of a law can
be delegated to the COMELEC and can be the subject of its rule-making power.
Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been recognized by this Court. In
ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional, the
six (6) justices failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of the
sovereign people to amend the Constitution.
IV
The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are
mere amendments and can be undertaken through people's
initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution, only allow the use of people's initiative to amend and not to revise
the Constitution. They theorize that the changes proposed by petitioners are
substantial and thus constitute a revision which cannot be done through
people's initiative.
In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing
substantial amendments amounting to revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite
the following deliberations during the Constitutional Commission, viz:44
MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that
this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a
while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense
that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include
the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same
view:45
MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by
initiative, to submit a proposal for amendment only, not for revision,
only once every five years x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it cover
the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision?"
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned,
it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S.
Azcuna also clarified this point 46 -
 MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I
suggest that we add to "Amendments" "OR REVISIONS OF" to read:
"Amendments OR REVISION OF this Constitution."
MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by
initiative.
MR. OPLE. How is that again?
MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the
Constitution by initiative but merely by amendments.
MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.
MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will
"change the very system of government from presidential to parliamentary, and
the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral," among others. They
allegedly seek other major revisions like the inclusion of a minimum number of
inhabitants per district, a change in the period for a term of a Member of
Parliament, the removal of the limits on the number of terms, the election of a
Prime Minister who shall exercise the executive power, and so on and so forth. 47
In sum, oppositors-intervenors submit that "the proposed changes to the
Constitution effect major changes in the political structure and system, the
fundamental powers and duties of the branches of the government, the political
rights of the people, and the modes by which political rights may be exercised." 48
They conclude that they are substantial amendments which cannot be done
through people's initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that only
simple but not substantial amendments can be done through people's
initiative.
With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words "simple" and
"substantial" are not subject to any accurate quantitative or qualitative test.
Obviously, relying on the quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert that
the amendments will result in some one hundred (100) changes in the
Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also arguable that petitioners
seek to change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the
1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII
(Executive Department), together with the complementary provisions for a
smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a parliamentary
unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be
affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of Principles and
State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial
Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI
(Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII
(Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education, Science and Technology,
Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even
XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we
use simple arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are
"simple" or "substantial."
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to
determine whether the said changes are "simple" or "substantial" as to
amount to a revision of the Constitution. The well-regarded political scientist,
Garner, says that a good constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of
provisions: the constitution of liberty which sets forth the fundamental rights of
the people and imposes certain limitations on the powers of the government as
a means of securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of
government which deals with the framework of government and its powers,
laying down certain rules for its administration and defining the electorate; and,
the constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the mode or procedure for
amending or revising the constitution. 49 It is plain that the proposed changes
will basically affect only the constitution of government. The constitutions of
liberty and sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes will
not change the fundamental nature of our state as "x x x a democratic and
republican state."50 It is self-evident that a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government will not make our State any less democratic or any less republican
in character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test resolve the
issue of whether the proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."
For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative
or qualitative test to determine whether an "amendment" is "simple" or
"substantial." Nor did they provide that "substantial" amendments are
beyond the power of the people to propose to change the Constitution.
Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional distinction between
"amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means change, including
complex changes while "revision" means complete change, including the
adoption of an entirely new covenant. The legal dictionaries express this
traditional difference between "amendment" and "revision." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal revision or addition proposed or
made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically,
a change made by addition, deletion, or correction." 51 Black's also refers to
"amendment" as "the process of making such a revision." 52 Revision, on the
other hand, is defined as "[a] reexamination or careful review for correction or
improvement."53 In parliamentary law, it is described as "[a] general and
thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which the entire document is
open to amendment."54 Similarly, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines
"amendment" – as "[a] correction or revision of a writing to correct errors or
better to state its intended purpose" 55 and "amendment of constitution" as "[a]
process of proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x
constitution."56 In contrast, "revision," when applied to a statute (or constitution),
"contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter contained in the
statute (or constitution), and the substitution of a new, and what is believed to
be, a still more perfect rule."57
One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot
of intellectual debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of the University of the Philippines
College of Law, (later President of the U.P. and delegate to the Constitutional
Convention of 1971) similarly spelled out the difference between "amendment"
and "revision." He opined: "the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers
to a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such
change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or
to be altered in a constitution."58
Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected
changes in our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the changes to the
1935 Constitution which included the conversion from a unicameral system
to a bicameral structure, the shortening of the tenure of the President and
Vice-President from a six-year term without reelection to a four-year term with
one reelection, and the establishment of the COMELEC, together with the
complementary constitutional provisions to effect the changes, were
considered amendments only, not a revision.
The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was,
however, considered a revision since the 1973 Constitution was "a
completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and
economic concepts."59 Among those adopted under the 1973 Constitution were:
the parliamentary system in place of the presidential system, with the leadership
in legislation and administration vested with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet;
the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking body instead of the two-
chambered, which would be more suitable to a parliamentary system of
government; the enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years of
age instead of twenty-one (21), and the abolition of literacy, property, and other
substantial requirements to widen the basis for the electorate and expand
democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the civil service system, and the
Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of the ownership and
management of mass media; the giving of control to Philippine citizens of all
telecommunications; the prohibition against alien individuals to own educational
institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the
conditions of the masses.60
The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes in
1976, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The two significant innovations introduced in
1976 were (1) the creation of an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of the
interim National Assembly, and (2) Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the
President the power to issue decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, whenever
the Batasang Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason
that in his judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave emergency or
threat or imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to form
part of the law of the land. In 1980, the retirement age of seventy (70) for
justices and judges was restored. In 1981, the presidential system with
parliamentary features was installed. The transfer of private land for use as
residence to natural-born citizens who had lost their citizenship was also
allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was
reapportioned by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro Manila instead of by
regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created while the executive
committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social housing programs
were strengthened.61 These substantial changes were simply considered as
mere amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the
1973 Constitution. She governed under Proclamation No. 3, known as the
Freedom Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a
plebiscite and superseded the Provisional or Freedom Constitution. Retired
Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the outstanding features of the 1987
Constitution which consists of eighteen articles and is excessively long
compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based.
Many of the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those
pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have been restored
because of the revival of the bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the
strictly presidential system. The independence of the judiciary has been
strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto and an increase in its
authority, which now covers even political questions formerly beyond its
jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like
those on the Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still the new
1987 Constitution was deemed as a revision of the 1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and
revision was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of
Article XVII gives the power to amend or revise to Congress acting as a
constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional Convention duly called by
Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said, limited the
people's right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple
amendments. In other words, the people cannot propose substantial
amendments amounting to revision.
With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors who
peddle the above proposition rely on the opinions of some Commissioners
expressed in the course of the debate on how to frame the amendment/revision
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that
opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue,
are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe
guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its force as a
fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of
the people) who have ratified and adopted it. 62 "Debates in the constitutional
convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views
of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law.'"63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional
Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no
abandonment of the traditional distinction between "amendment" and
"revision." For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to the
concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary,64 that stressed the traditional distinction between
amendment and revision, thus:65
MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term and
that is, "amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use
the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called
by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the
connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of
our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous –
or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by
Honorable Justice Makasiar,66 wherein he made the following
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing
Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole
Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution
envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act
to amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the
improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed
essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of
parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the
times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter embodying
new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two
terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article governing
amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.
To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his concurring opinion,
used an analogy – "When a house is completely demolished and another is
erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered
house, or do you have a new house? Some of the material contained in the old
house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but
this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new house."67
Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the
word "revision," they had in mind the "rewriting of the whole Constitution," or
the "total overhaul of the Constitution." Anything less is an "amendment" or
just "a change of specific provisions only," the intention being "not the change of
the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition
of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the
elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of
the times." Under this view, "substantial" amendments are still "amendments"
and thus can be proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the
Commissioners on the difference between "simple" and "substantial"
amendments or whether "substantial" amendments amounting to revision are
covered by people's initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in
interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give effect to the intention of
the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well,
viz:68
x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention
which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they
have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed,
but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to
the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief
that that was the sense designed to be conveyed. These proceedings
therefore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the
instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction
of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we
seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of
the people through the discussion and deliberations of their
representatives. The history of the calling of the convention, the
causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before the
people at the time of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be
quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to be gathered form
the proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical
principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object
of its establishment and carry out the great principles of government – not
to defeat them.69 One of these great principles is the sovereignty of the people.
Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a
mode to amend the 1987 Constitution. We start with the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies which Sinco describes as "the basic political creed
of the nation"70 as it "lays down the policies that government is bound to
observe."71 Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1, Article II
of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is a republican
state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." In a republican state, the power of the sovereign people is
exercised and delegated to their representatives. Thus in Metropolitan
Transportation Service v. Paredes, this Court held that "a republican state, like
the Philippines x x x (is) derived from the will of the people themselves in freely
creating a government 'of the people, by the people, and for the people' – a
representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the
powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and
general welfare."72
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated to
Congress or to a convention, the power to amend or revise our fundamental
law. History informs us how this delegated power to amend or revise the
Constitution was abused particularly during the Marcos regime. The
Constitution was changed several times to satisfy the power requirements of the
regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving unprecedented
legislative powers to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of
circumstances from above and below, however, brought down the Marcos
regime through an extra constitutional revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the
people. A main reason for the people's revolution was the failure of the
representatives of the people to effectuate timely changes in the
Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly or by calling a
constitutional convention. When the representatives of the people defaulted
in using this last peaceful process of constitutional change, the sovereign
people themselves took matters in their own hands. They revolted and
replaced the 1973 Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987
Constitution as it stressed the power of the people to act directly in their
capacity as sovereign people. Correspondingly, the power of the
legislators to act as representatives of the people in the matter of
amending or revising the Constitution was diminished for the spring
cannot rise above its source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: "the Philippines is a
democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission explained the addition of the word "democratic,"
in our first Declaration of Principles, viz:
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions
that we are now adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For
example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to
participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of
interference by the people through people's organizations x x x x73
MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic" to
"republican," and, therefore, the first sentence states: "The Philippines
is a republican and democratic state x x x x
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word
"democratic" to "republican"? The constitutional framers of the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was this done
merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x "democratic" was added because of the
need to emphasize people power and the many provisions in the
Constitution that we have approved related to recall, people's
organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the
participation of the people in policy-making in certain
circumstances x x x x
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and
I think it does meet a need x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid,
"democracy" here is understood as participatory democracy. 74
(emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and
Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the same import:75
 MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state,
are we referring to representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under
the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions which used the words "republican
state" because "republican state" would refer to a democratic state
where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the
people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are
stressing the participation of the people x x x x So the word
"republican" will suffice to cover popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the
committee felt that in view of the introduction of the aspects of direct
democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it was necessary
to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism, of
representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word
"democratic" to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are
instances where the people would act directly, and not through
their representatives. (emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative,
referendum, and recall were enthroned as polestars in the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, Commissioner Blas F. Ople who introduced the provision on people's
initiative said:76
MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when
we should introduce an innovative mode of proposing amendments to
the Constitution, vesting in the people and their organizations the
right to formulate and propose their own amendments and
revisions of the Constitution in a manner that will be binding upon
the government. It is not that I believe this kind of direct action by the
people for amending a constitution will be needed frequently in the
future, but it is good to know that the ultimate reserves of
sovereign power still rest upon the people and that in the
exercise of that power, they can propose amendments or
revision to the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's initiative as a safety
valve, as a peaceful way for the people to change their Constitution, by citing
our experiences under the Marcos government, viz:77
MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this
particular provision, but we are providing a channel for the expression
of the sovereign will of the people through this initiative system.
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not sufficient
channel for expression of the will of the people, particularly in the
amendment or revision of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what
happened during the 20 years under the Marcos administration.
So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of speaking, is operating
under the thumb of the Prime Minister or the President as the case
may be, and the required number of votes could not be obtained, we
would have to provide for a safety valve in order that the people
could ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for amendment to
the Constitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring
the National Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent
assembly or to call a constitutional convention, the members
thereof would not heed the people's desire and clamor. So this is
a third avenue that we are providing for the implementation of what is
now popularly known as people's power. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people's initiative
could avert a revolution, viz:78
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution
could actually avert a revolution by providing a safety valve in
bringing about changes in the Constitution through pacific means.
This, in effect, operationalizes what political law authors call the
"prescription of sovereignty." (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which
expressed the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the
Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated
power of Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has to be adjusted
downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be
reminted and now provides: "The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum."
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people
through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the
Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the submission
constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of
the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who they claim can only be
trusted with the power to propose "simple" but not "substantial" amendments
to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be
strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law. 79
Legal sovereignty, he explained, is "the possession of unlimited power to
make laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any
other party endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not
subject to law 'for it is the author and source of law.' Legal sovereignty is
thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence."80
To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of
the people's will over the state which they themselves have created. The state is
created by and subject to the will of the people, who are the source of all political
power. Rightly, we have ruled that "the sovereignty of our people is not a
kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and
bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its
broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the
absolute right to govern."81
James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary
lawyer in the United States in the 1780s, laid down the first principles of popular
sovereignty during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention of the 1787
Constitution of the United States:82
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which
there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be termed
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.
x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient
accuracy our political systems, would answer that, in our
governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions x x x
x This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth, but does not
reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our
constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are
superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this last
instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our
constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the
people is sovereign - - - not the elected President, not the elected Congress,
not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which is
indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of government. Only its exercise
may be delegated to any of them. In our case, the people delegated to
Congress the exercise of the sovereign power to amend or revise the
Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this power to amend or
revise the Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign people who
delegated the power has no power to substantially amend the Constitution by
direct action? If the sovereign people do not have this power to make substantial
amendments to the Constitution, what did it delegate to Congress? How can the
people lack this fraction of a power to substantially amend the Constitution
when by their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It will take some
mumbo jumbo to argue that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the
point:83
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of
sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the organs and agents of the
state which constitute its government, for it is only through this
instrumentality that the state ordinarily functions. However ample and
complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless subject to
withdrawal at any time by the state. On this point Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete
autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right
to control of so slight and so negative a character as to
make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet so
long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the
autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a
grant and continuing consent of the mother countries the
sovereignty of those mother countries over them is
complete and they are to be considered as possessing only
administrative autonomy and not political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the
Constitution is shared with the people. We should accord the most benign
treatment to the sovereign power of the people to propose substantial
amendments to the Constitution especially when the proposed
amendments will adversely affect the interest of some members of
Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public weal to private
interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate the
power of the people to determine their destiny (the principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging
the right of the people to exercise initiative and referendum are liberally and
generously construed in favor of the people.84 Initiative and referendum
powers must be broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the
people.85 We followed this orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v.
Commission on Elections. 86 There is not an iota of reason to depart from it.
V
 The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign
people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that
over six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for
Initiative, is a purely political question which is beyond even the very long arm
of this Honorable Court's power of judicial review. Whether or not the 1987
Constitution should be amended is a matter which the people and the people
alone must resolve in their sovereign capacity." 87 They argue that "[t]he power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the
sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right
to propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and
falls squarely within the ambit of a 'political question.'"88
The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by
Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, viz:89
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers
to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the
wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.
Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would
merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his
theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's
authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in
the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious cycle. Is
it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for
the authority and procedure for the amending process when they
ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that
constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves – of course –
who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in
whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional
norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry
must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to
and ratification by the people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for
the exercise of the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
amendments must be proposed by the people "upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter."90 Compliance with these requirements is clearly a justiciable
and not a political question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be resolved by
the people is addressed to them and to them alone.
VI
Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves
contentious issues of fact which should first be resolved by the
COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks the
required number of signatures under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Said provision requires that the petition for initiative be supported by at least
twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors contend that no proper
verification of signatures was done in several legislative districts. They assert
that mere verification of the names listed on the signature sheets without
verifying the signatures reduces the signatures submitted for their respective
legislative districts to mere scribbles on a piece of paper.
Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification
dated August 23, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer IV,
Third District and OIC, First and Second District, Davao City, stating that his
office has not verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's
initiative. The certification reads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District,
Davao City) HAS NOT VERIFIED the signatures of registered voters
as per documents submitted in this office by the proponents of the
People's Initiative. Consequently, NO ELECTION DOCUMENTS
AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY HIGHER SUPERIORS used as basis
for such verification of signatures.91
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified
that although Atty. Casquejo and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer
IV, First District, Davao City, later issued certifications stating that the Office of
the City Election Officer has examined the list of individuals appearing in the
signature sheets,92 the certifications reveal that the office had verified only the
names of the signatories, but not their signatures. Oppositors-intervenors submit
that not only the names of the signatories should be verified, but also their
signatures to ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the
signature sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed to
obtain the signatures of at least three per cent (3%) of the total number of
registered voters in the First Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First
District of South Cotabato, petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for General
Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308 signatures for Tampakan and
10,301 signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488 registered
voters of said district. Antonino, however, submitted to this Court a copy of the
certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8,
2006, showing that the signatures from Polomolok were not verified because the
Book of Voters for the whole municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Polomolok, South Cotabato. 93
Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from the total number of signatures
from the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a total of 8,676
signatures which falls short of the three per cent (3%) requirement for the
district.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino
likewise submitted to this Court a certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio,
City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that the list of names
appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the names of registered
voters in the city, thereby implying that they have not actually verified the
signatures.94
The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered by
Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which submitted copies of similarly worded
certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga del Sur95 and from
Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the regularity
of the verification process as it alleged that verification in some areas were
conducted by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election officers. It filed
with this Court copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing
that the verification was conducted by local officials instead of COMELEC
personnel.97
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the
election officers sufficiently complied with the requirements of the Constitution
and the law on initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of verification
in Davao City and in Polomolok, South Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed
that the same election officers cited by the oppositors-intervenors also issued
certifications showing that they have verified the signatures submitted by the
proponents of the people's initiative. He presented copies of the certifications
issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third Legislative
Districts of Davao City stating that he verified the signatures of the proponents of
the people's initiative. His certification for the Second District states:
This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals
as appearing in the Signature Sheets of the Registered Voters of
District II, Davao City, submitted on April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO
BOLOS, Punong Barangay, Centro, Davao City for verification which
consists of THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO
(30,662) signatures.
Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) individuals, only TWENTY-TWO
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT (22,668) individuals were
found to be REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized List of
Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY.98
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification
regarding the verification process conducted in Davao City. It reads:
Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this
Office has previously issued two (2) separate certifications for the 2 nd
and 3rd Districts of Davao City on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006,
respectively, specifically relating to the voters who supported the
people's initiative. It was stated therein that the names submitted,
comprising 22,668 individual voters in the 2nd District and 18,469
individual voters in the 3 rd District, were found [to] be registered voters
of the respective districts mentioned as verified by this Office based
on the Computerized List of Voters.
It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in
error and by mistake for the reason that the signature verification has
not been fully completed as of that date.
I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the
voters as appearing in the signature sheets and has compared these
 with the signatures appearing in the book of voters and computerized
list of voters x x x 99
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8,
2006 issued by Polomolok Election Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their claim
that said officer had conducted a verification of signatures in said area. The
certification states:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this
municipality, as of the May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with
signatures were submitted for verification and out of which 10,301
were found to be legitimate voters as per official list of registered
voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of registered
voters of this Municipality.100
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous
legislative districts, allegations of fraud and irregularities in the collection of
signatures in Makati City were cited by Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit:
(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may
be concerned, by the Makati COMELEC Office that signature sheets
have already been submitted to it for "verification." The camp of Mayor
Binay was able to witness the "verification process" only because of
their pro-active stance;
(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405
signatures for verification. 36,219 alleged voters' signatures (83% of
the number of signatures submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186
signatures allegedly "passed" COMELEC's initial scrutiny. However,
upon examination of the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail
Binay, the said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty.
Binay manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word "OK"
and 3,443 signatures marked with a check, giving only 6,236
"apparently verified signatures." Before the COMELEC officer issued
the Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted to the said office not
less than 55 letters of "signature withdrawal," but no action was ever
taken thereon;
(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification.
23,521 alleged voters' signatures (80% of those submitted) were
rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures which allegedly passed the
COMELEC's initial scrutiny, some more will surely fail upon closer
examination;
(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the
COMELEC personnel did not know how to treat the objections and
other observations coming from the camp of Mayor Binay. The
oppositors too did not know where to go for their remedy when the
COMELEC personnel merely "listened" to their objections and other
observations. As mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not
even know what to do with the many "letters of signature withdrawal"
submitted to it;
(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other
forgeries appear on the Sigaw ng Bayan Signature Sheets. There is
even a 15-year old alleged signatory;
(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;
(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly
signed the Signature Sheets.101
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what
they have signed as they were merely misled into signing the signature sheets.
Opposed to these allegations are rulings that a person who affixes his signature
on a document raises the presumption that the person so signing has
knowledge of what the document contains. Courts have recognized that there is
great value in the stability of records, so to speak, that no one should commit
herself or himself to something in writing unless she or he is fully aware and
cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on him. 102 In the same vein, we
have held that a person is presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a
document he has signed.103 But as this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot
resolve the issue.
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the
constitutional requirement that the petition for initiative be signed by at least
twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the
registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its resolution will
require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the COMELEC
according to its rules. During the oral argument on this case, the COMELEC,
through Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law Department, admitted that it has not
examined the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the petition
for initiative, as well as the documents filed by the oppositors to buttress their
claim that the required number of signatures has not been met. The exchanges
during the oral argument likewise clearly show the need for further clarification
and presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.104
The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was
this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It
has yet to rule on the sufficiency of the form and substance of the petition.
I respectfully submit that this issue should be properly litigated before the
COMELEC where both parties will be given full opportunity to prove their
allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its
compliance with the requirements of R.A. 6735 on initiative and its
implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at
the first instance, as it is the body that is mandated by the Constitution to
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.105
VII
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due
course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC
relied on this Court's ruling in Santiago permanently enjoining it from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the system.
Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance on Santiago constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case
did not establish the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to
implement the constitutional provision allowing people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. To recapitulate, the records show that in the original decision,
eight (8) justices106 voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five (5)
justices107 voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1) justice 108 abstained
from voting on the issue holding that unless and until a proper initiatory pleading
is filed, the said issue is not ripe for adjudication.109
Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration. On June 10, 1997, the Court denied the motion. Only thirteen
(13) justices resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself. 110 Of the
original majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that
R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice Hermosisima, originally part of the
majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and joined the minority of five (5)
justices. He opined without any equivocation that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law,
thus:
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster;
another to think under fire – to think for action upon which great
interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so I
am guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the holding of the
majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation" and now to
interpose my dissent thereto.
xxx
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing
the legal basis for the exercise by the people of their right to
amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings and to
uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it
does not sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for initiative
proceedings to amend the Constitution without the required names
and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A.
6735. In fine, the final vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6
with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule on the
ground that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is
an insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine that could serve as a precedent.
Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a
non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the late
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is instructive, viz:
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations
on the issue of whether the motion for reconsideration of the March
19, 1997 decision should be granted or not, only the following justices
sided with Mr. Justice Davide, namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and
Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices Melo,
Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned
voted to grant the motion; while Justice Vitug "maintained his opinion
that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication." In other words,
only five, out of the other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide's
June 10, 1997 ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its
failure to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency standards"
tests. The "concurrence of a majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations" which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution requires to declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond
dispute, not complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of
the "majority" was initially reached in the March 19, 1997 ponencia,
the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a
 motion for reconsideration. It was only on June 10, 1997 that the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was settled with finality, sans the
constitutionally required "majority." The Court's declaration, therefore,
is manifestly grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating,
in my view, the reexamination of the Court's decision in G.R. No.
127325. It behooves the Court "not to tarry any longer" nor waste this
opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve
the Court's pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is
well-settled. Thus, in the United States, an affirmance in the Federal Supreme
Court upon equal division of opinion is not an authority for the determination of
other cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v.
Biggers,111 which was a habeas corpus state proceeding by a state prisoner, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioner's
state court conviction was not an "actual adjudication" barring subsequent
consideration by the district court on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-
binding effect of an equal division ruling, the Court reviewed the history of
cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided Court:"
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition "affirmed
by an equally divided Court." On what was apparently the first
occasion of an equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed.
268 (1825), the Court simply affirmed on the point of division without
much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a similar division during
the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall
explaining that "the principles of law which have been argued, cannot
be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the court being divided in
opinion upon it." Etting v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78,
6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later elaborated in such cases, it is the
appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's
decree. "If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no
order can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore,
stands in full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such case to
enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient
mode of expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in
conformity with the action of the court below, and that that court can
proceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if
the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed." Durant v. Essex Co., 7
Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an
equally divided Court entitled to precedential weight. Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d
1708 (1960).xxx"
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited
with approval in a number of subsequent cases, 112 and has been applied in
various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor Child,113
wherein a putative father sought to set aside a decree granting petition for
adoption of an Indian child on grounds of noncompliance with the requirements
of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that its
decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),114 which lacked majority opinion
supporting holding that an action such as the putative father's would be
governed by the state's one-year statute of limitations, was not entitled to stare
decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting did not agree on a
common rationale, as two of four participating justices agreed that the state's
one-year statute of limitations applied, one justice concurred in the result only,
and one justice dissented. There was no "narrower" reasoning agreed upon by
all three affirming justices. The concurring justice expressed no opinion on the
statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he reasoned that
ICWA did not give the plaintiff standing to sue. 115 The two-justice plurality,
though agreeing that the state's one-year statute of limitations applied,
specifically disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing issue. 116
Because a majority of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any
one ground for affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis effect by the state
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis
does not apply to plurality decisions in which no majority of the justices
participating agree to the reasoning and as such are not authoritative
interpretations binding on the Supreme Court.117
In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an
equally divided opinion on the matter,119 held that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933
must be allowed to stand, dismissing a quo warranto suit without prejudice. The
Court held:
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be
declared unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor operation judicially
interfered with, except by the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court sitting in the cause wherein the
constitutionality of the statute is brought in question or judicial relief
sought against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state
Constitution.
Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of
this court in holding unconstitutional said chapter 15938, supra, not
having been had, it follows that the statute in controversy must be
allowed to stand and accordingly be permitted to be enforced as a
presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that this proceeding in
quo warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt
(Fla.) 147 So. 282. This decision is not to be regarded as a judicial
precedent on the question of constitutional law involved concerning
the constitutionality vel non of chapter 15938. State ex rel. Hampton
v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal
division of the court on question of constitutionality of statute involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court
by an equally divided vote of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that
property of a New York branch of a Russian insurance company was outside the
scope of the Russian Soviet government's decrees terminating existence of
insurance companies in Russia and seizing their assets, while conclusive and
binding upon the parties as respects the controversy in that action, did not
constitute an authoritative "precedent."
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals Second
Circuit, in holding that printed lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs'
lyrics, but which were in form a parody of the latter, did not constitute
infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v.
Loew's, Inc.,122 which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was not
binding upon it, viz:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by reason
as well as by authority, an affirmance by an equally divided court is as
between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of
the matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having
been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case
from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases,
either in this or in inferior courts.123
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the Supreme Court of Illinois
dismissed the appeal as it was unable to reach a decision because two judges
recused themselves and the remaining members of the Court were so divided, it
was impossible to secure the concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally
required. The Court followed the procedure employed by the U.S. Supreme
Court when the Justices of that Court are equally divided, i.e. affirm the
judgment of the court that was before it for review. The affirmance is a
conclusive determination and adjudication as between the parties to the
immediate case, it is not authority for the determination of other cases, either in
the Supreme Court or in any other court. It is not "entitled to precedential
weight." The legal effect of such an affirmance is the same as if the appeal was
dismissed.125
The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents, 126 an
affirmance by an equally divided Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive
determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law
involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents
the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either
in that or in inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is
that, the affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes of the present
controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law; the affirmance
leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled to
precedential weight or value. In other words, the decision only has res judicata
and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon other parties
as respects the controversies in other actions.
Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the
Delfin Petition in the Santiago case which will prevent the Santiago ruling from
binding the present petitioners. To start with, the parties are different. More
importantly, the Delfin Petition did not contain the signatures of the required
number of registered voters under the Constitution: the requirement that twelve
per cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country wherein each legislative
district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters
therein was not complied with. For this reason, we ruled unanimously that it was
not the initiatory petition which the COMELEC could properly take cognizance
of. In contrast, the present petition appears to be accompanied by the
signatures of the required number of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin
Petition prayed that an Order be issued fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado petition, prayed for
the calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign
will on the proposition. COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material
differences.
Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition on
the basis of its mistaken notion that Santiago established the doctrine that R.A.
6735 was an insufficient law. As aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who
do not represent the majority lacks precedential status and is non-binding on the
present petitioners.
The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to say operation of the rule on res judicata if the party against
that we dismissed the PIRMA petition on the principle of res judicata. This was whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the
stressed by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz: first action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily by simply joining new parties.
dismissed: The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings petition but were not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect
filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March the operation of the prior judgment against those parties to the PIRMA
1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is substantially Petition who were likewise parties in Santiago v. COMELEC, as they
identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the are bound by such prior judgment.
principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res
parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs judicata binds only PIRMA but not the petitioners.
are raised and prayed for in both cases. VIII
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR Finally, let the people speak.
REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses "It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the great Chief
ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self- Justice John Marshall of the United States in the 1819 case of M'cCulloch v.
described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and Maryland.129 Our Constitution is not a mere collection of slogans. Every syllable
existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, of our Constitution is suffused with significance and requires our full fealty.
Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," Indeed, the rule of law will wither if we allow the commands of our Constitution
with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its to underrule us.
"officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of
founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the body of the the people. We ought to be concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent
petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive for a right of the sovereign people to decide whether to amend the Constitution.
people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right
PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of to make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly and categorically
PIRMA. says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all government
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly authority emanates. This right of the people to make decisions is the
represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation
short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his from this Court. If there is any principle in the Constitution that cannot be
petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for People's diluted and is non-negotiable, it is this sovereign right of the people to decide.
Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise of
said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for their sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or destroy the sovereign right of
Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their the people to decide be warned. Let not their sovereignty be diminished by
Comment to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny those who belittle their brains to comprehend changes in the Constitution as if
that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments, the people themselves are not the source and author of our Constitution. Let not
demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of manipulation who misrepresent
or his cause. themselves as the spokesmen of the people.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that complies with the
and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the requirement that it "must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of
operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3%
elaboration. (emphasis supplied) of the registered voters therein" is but the first step in a long journey towards
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds: the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed, the case at bar involves
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment but a proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be debated
must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having by the people and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe method of telling what
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a will be the result of the debate. There will still be a last step to the process of
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and amendment which is the ratification of the proposal by a majority of the people
second actions identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and in a plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the proposal is approved
identity of causes of action.127 by a majority of the people in the plebiscite will it become an amendment
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the to the Constitution. All the way, we cannot tie the tongues of the people. It
elements of res judicata are present. For sure, our Decision in is the people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in our
Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated on 19 March 1997, Constitution.
and the motions for reconsideration thereof denied with finality on 10 The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let us
June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was rendered by heed them. Let us not only sing paens to the people's sovereignty. Yes, it
this Court which had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under is neither too soon nor too late to let the people speak.
Rule 65. Our judgment therein was on the merits, i.e., rendered only IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the
after considering the evidence presented by the parties as well as Commission on Elections dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the
their arguments in support of their respective claims and defenses. Petition for Initiative filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their
And, as between Santiago v. COMELEC case and COMELEC Special own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their
Matter No. 97-001 subject of the present petition, there is identity of signatures thereon and to REMAND the petition at bar to the Commission on
parties, subject matter and causes of action. Elections for further proceedings.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not
REYNATO
identical to the parties in the instant case as some of the petitioners in S. PUNO
the latter case were not parties to the former case. However, Associate
a Justice
perusal of the records reveals that the parties in Santiago v. ____________________
COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses EN BANC
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members G. R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006
of PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra, another founding RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952
member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
instant case, Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the spouses Alberto vs.
and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent; TRADE UNION
parties to the petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT,
make it appear that the PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
separate and distinct group by removing some of the parties involved FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-
Geralde v. Sabido128- Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and
judicata by simply including additional parties in the CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
subsequent case or by not including as parties in the later QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
case persons who were parties in the previous suit. The HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA,
joining of new parties does not remove the case from the GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, whether a parliamentary system of government should replace the present
and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO presidential system.
AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI 5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of
ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), the form of government as a political question soonest. (This I say without fear
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, of media opinion that our judicial independence has been tainted or imperiled,
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. for it is not.) Thus I vote for the remand of the petition. Thereafter, as prayed for,
AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER COMELEC should forthwith certify the Petition as sufficient in form and
AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, substance and call for the holding of a plebiscite within the period mandated by
JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days from said
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH certification. Only a credible plebiscite itself, conducted peacefully and honestly,
EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED can bring closure to the instant political controversy.
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A.LEONARDO LAT, A. QUISUMBING
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE Associate
OF Justice
THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., ____________________
Oppositors-Intervenors; EN BANC
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006 G. R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952
SAGUISAG, Petitioners REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, G. R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q.
SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x vs.
SEPARATE OPINION HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
QUISUMBING, J.: ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and the FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
dissent of J. Reynato S. Puno, I view the matter before us in this petition as one SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.
mainly involving a complex political question. 1 While admittedly the present x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
Constitution lays down certain numerical requirements for the conduct of a DISSENTING OPINION
People's Initiative, such as the percentages of signatures – being 12% of the CORONA, J.:
total number of registered voters, provided each legislative district is The life of the law is not logic but experience. 1 Our collective experience as a
represented by at least 3% – they are not the main points of controversy. Stated nation breathes life to our system of laws, especially to the Constitution. These
in simple terms, what this Court must decide is whether the Commission on cases promise to significantly contribute to our collective experience as a nation.
Elections gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition to submit the Fealty to the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines is not merely a
proposed changes to the Constitution directly to the vote of the sovereign people republican State but a democratic one as well behooves this Court to affirm the
in a plebiscite. Technical questions, e.g. whether petitioners should have filed a right of the people to participate directly in the process of introducing changes to
Motion for Reconsideration before coming to us, are of no moment in the face of their fundamental law. These petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is
the transcendental issue at hand. What deserve our full attention are the issues an opportune time for this Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the people.
concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and constitutional limitations I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently
on the conduct of the People's Initiative. explained the rationale for upholding the people's initiative. However, I wish to
2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers share my own thoughts on certain matters I deem material and significant.
the people to "directly" propose amendments through their own "initiative." The Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin Petition
subject of the instant petition is by way of exercising that initiative in order to The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly
change our form of government from presidential to parliamentary. Much has on the basis of this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC2 that: (1) RA 6753
been written about the fulsome powers of the people in a democracy. But the was inadequate to cover the system of initiative regarding amendments to the
most basic concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people and that all Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was permanently enjoined from entertaining
government authority emanates from them. Clearly, by the power of popular or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative regarding amendments to the
initiative, the people have the sovereign right to change the present Constitution. Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide for the
Whether the initial moves are done by a Constitutional Convention, a implementation of the initiative provision.
Constitutional Assembly, or a People's Initiative, in the end every amendment -- However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin
however insubstantial or radical -- must be submitted to a plebiscite. Thus, it is in 1997. It would be unreasonable to make it apply to all petitions which were yet
the ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that matters.2 unforeseen in 1997. The fact is that Santiago was focused on the Delfin petition
3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of Messrs. alone.
Lambino, et al. For the COMELEC was just relying on precedents, with the Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate changes to the
common understanding that, pursuant to the cases of Santiago v. COMELEC3 Constitution via initiative claim that Santiago barred any and all future petitions
and PIRMA v. COMELEC,4 the COMELEC had been permanently enjoined from for initiative by virtue of the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata. The
entertaining any petition for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution by no argument is flawed.
less than this Court. In denying due course below to Messrs. Lambino and The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating
Aumentado's petition, I could not hold the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of to stare decisis. Hence, I will address the argument from the viewpoint of res
discretion when they merely relied on this Court's unequivocal rulings. Of judicata.
course, the Santiago and the PIRMA decisions could be reviewed and reversed Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
by this Court, as J. Reynato S. Puno submits now. But until the Court does so, jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
the COMELEC was duty bound to respect and obey this Court's mandate, for privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action
the rule of law to prevail. involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. 3 It has the following
4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition of requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have been
Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties;
examination of the factual requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On page 4 (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must be identity of
of the assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006, the parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and second
COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that "even if the signatures in the actions.4
instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the
number of registered voters", the COMELEC could not give the Petition due COMELEC was also the respondent in Santiago, the petitioners in that case and
course because of our view that R.A. No. 6735 was inadequate. That, however, those in this case are different. More significantly, there is no identity of causes
is now refuted by Mr. Justice Puno's scholarly ponencia. Now that we have of action in the two cases. Santiago involved amendments to Sections 4 and 7
revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is only one clear task for of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution
COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left for the COMELEC, once while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of Article VI and
factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due course to the petition for Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC
the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on
 committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the present petition for
initiative was barred by Santiago and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.
The present petition and that in Santiago are materially different from each
other. They are not based on the same facts. There is thus no cogent reason to
frustrate and defeat the present direct action of the people to exercise their
sovereignty by proposing changes to their fundamental law.
People's Initiative Should Not
Be Subjected to Conditions
People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves
exclusively. Neither Congress nor the COMELEC has the power to curtail or
defeat this exclusive power of the people to change the Constitution. Neither
should the exercise of this power be made subject to any conditions, as some
would have us accept.
Oppositors to the people's initiative point out that this Court ruled in Santiago
that RA 6735 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution and, thus, no law existed to enable the people to directly
propose changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is seriously objectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of
place. It was unprecedented and dangerously transgressed the domain reserved
to the legislature.
While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the
validity and sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution, 5 that procedure
cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege. 6 In the same vein, this Court
cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the people's right to directly
propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply for
lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions.
Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people will be severely
emasculated, if not rendered illusory.
People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly
Should not be Unreasonably Curtailed
If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere
representative bodies, can propose changes to the Constitution, there is no
reason why the supreme body politic itself – the people – may not do so
directly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of
"direct democracy" as opposed to "representative democracy." The system of
initiative allows citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments for the
general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls, particularly in a plebiscite.
While representative government was envisioned to "refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations,"7 the exercise of "direct democracy" through initiative
reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by providing them a method to
make new laws via the constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes. 8 Efforts
of the represented to control their representatives through initiative have been
described as curing the problems of democracy with more democracy.9
The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them."10 Unless the present petition is granted, this constitutional principle will be
nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of substance for those whom it seeks to
empower.
The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the
Constitution is a fundamental right and must be jealously guarded. 11 The people
should be allowed to directly seek redress of the problems of society and
representative democracy with the constitutional tools they have reserved for
their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.
ENATO C. CORONA
sociate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L.
ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN
MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE
B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V.
OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO
UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO,
and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO
AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI
ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON,
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER
AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III,
JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 entitled
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q.
SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J:
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-froid,
inimitable lucidity, and luminous scholarship are all so characteristic of the
author that it is hardly a waste of pen and ink to write separately if only to
express my deep admiration for his disquisition. It is compelling because it
derives from the fundamental democratic ordinance that sovereignty resides in
the people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual
empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice Puno's opinion will in the short
term engender reactions on its impact on present attempts to amend the
Constitution, but once the political passion of the times have been shorn, it will
endure as an unequivocal message to the taongbayan that they are to be
trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's opinion. I only write
separately to highlight a few other points which also inform my vote to grant the
petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and PIRMA v.
COMELEC2 had not acquired value as precedent and should be reversed in any
case. I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a
majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand as
precedent. That principle has informed the members of this Court as they
deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this consideration is
not ultimately reflected on the final draft released for promulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped
upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not invalidate any
provision of the statute. All the Court said then was that the law was
"inadequate". Since this "inadequate" law was not annulled by the Court, or
repealed by Congress, it remained part of the statute books. 3
I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly "inadequate", the Court in
Santiago should not have simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not
minded to invalidate the law itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that "[n]o
judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws." 4 As explained by the Court recently in
Reyes v. Lim,5 "[Article 9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in the
revered Justice Cardozo's words,] 'fills the open spaces in the law.'" 6 Certainly,
any court that refuses to rule on an action premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on
the ground that the law is "inadequate" would have been found in grave abuse
of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to "fill the open spaces" in
Santiago further highlights that decision's status as an unfortunate aberration.
I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of having recently
decried a majority ruling that was clearly minded to reverse several precedents
but refused to explicitly say so.7 Yet the principle is not immutable. 8 The
passionate words of Chief Justice Panganiban in Osmeña v. COMELEC 9 bear
quoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the
Court is maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with its previous
holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges reverence for
the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that more
important than consistency and stability are the verity, integrity and
correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law
must be stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct itself
and move in cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and
illogic should not be perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in
 many cases, has deviated from stare decisis and reversed previous
doctrines and decisions.10 It should do no less in the present case.11
Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as
constitutional, yet declare its provisions as inadequate to accomplish the
legislative purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law. That ruling is
erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.
II.
Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why Santiago should not be
respected as precedent, I agree that the COMELEC's failure to take cognizance
of the petitions as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of
discretion correctible through the petitions before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v. COMELEC12,
Sanchez v. COMELEC13, and Sambarani v. COMELEC14 that "the functions of
the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and
administrative in nature". 15 More pertinently, in Buac v. COMELEC16, the Court
held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to a plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of the poll
body under its constitutional mandate "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of a xxx plebiscite".17
Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary
task of the COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the
said law, functions that are essentially executive and administrative in nature.
Even the subsequent duty of the COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the
petitions after they have been filed is administrative in character. By any
measure, the COMELEC's failure to perform its executive and administrative
functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under
Republic Act No. 6735 as they allegedly embrace more than one subject.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 classifies as a "prohibited measure," a petition
submitted to the electorate that embraces more than one subject. 18 On this point,
reliance is apparently placed on the array of provisions which are to be affected
by the amendments proposed in the initiative petition.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-enshrined
constitutional principle that the laws passed by Congress "shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof". 19 The one-subject
requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 20 An
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general object.21
The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the Constitution
should apply as well in the interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For
as long as it can be established that an initiative petition embraces a single
general subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the number of
constitutional provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments are
germane to the subject of the petition.
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose
the changing of the form of government from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as comprehensive,
necessitating as it will the reorganization of the executive and legislative
branches of government, nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses only a single
general subject still.
The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is susceptible to
division into several general spheres. To cite the broadest of these spheres by
way of example, Article III enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people under
the Bill of Rights; Articles VI, VII and VIII provide for the organizational structure
of government; while Articles II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI enunciate policy
principles of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under Section 10 of
Rep. Act No. 6735 is an initiative petition that seeks to amend provisions which
do not belong to the same sphere. For example, had a single initiative petition
sought not only to change the form of government from presidential to
parliamentary but also to amend the Bill of Rights, said petition would arguably
have been barred under Section 10, as that petition ostensibly embraces more
than one subject, with each subject bearing no functional relation to the other.
But that is not the case with the present initiative petitions.
Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more than one
subject since the proposed amendments seek to affect two separate branches
of government. The very purpose of the initiative petitions is to fuse the powers
of the executive and legislative branches of government; hence, the
amendments intended to effect such general intent necessarily affects the two
branches. If it required that to propose a shift in government from presidential to
parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII (Executive Branch) have to be
segregated to a different petition from that which would propose amendments to
Article VI (Legislative Branch), then the result would be two initiative petitions ─
both subject to separate authentications, consideration and even plebiscites, all
to effect one general proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility
that one petition would ultimately fail while the other succeeds, could thus allow
for the risk that the executive branch could be abolished without transferring
executive power to the legislative branch. An absurd result, indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section
10. The Constitution indubitably grants the people the right to seek amendment
of the charter through initiative, and mandates Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right." In doing so, Congress may not
restrict the right to initiative on grounds that are not provided for in the
Constitution. If for example the implementing law also provides that certain
provisions of the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that
prohibition should not be sustained. Congress is tasked with the implementation,
and not the restriction of the right to initiative.
The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a bar to
amendment under the Constitution. Arguments can be supplied for the merit of
such a requirement, since it would afford a measure of orderliness when the vital
question of amending the Constitution arises. The one-subject requirement does
allow the voters focus when deliberating whether or not to vote for the
amendments. These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to detract from the
fact that the one-subject requirement imposes an additional restriction on the
right to initiative not contemplated by the Constitution. Short of invalidating the
requirement, a better course of action would be to insist upon its liberal
interpretation. After all, the Court has consistently adhered to a liberal
interpretation of the one-subject, one-title rule. 22 There is no cause to adopt a
stricter interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule under Section 10 of
Rep. Act No. 6735.
IV.
During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of
the Constitution amended through initiative would not have the benefit of a
reference source from the record of a deliberative body such as Congress or a
constitutional convention. It was submitted that this consideration influenced the
Constitutional Commission as it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which expressly
provided that only amendments, and not revisions, may be the subject of
initiative petitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to
the record of deliberations of a constitutional convention or commission in the
interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of a record of deliberations
stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which change
a constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by
the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these
petitions, I would like to point out that resort to the records of deliberations is
only one of many aids to constitutional construction. For one, it should be
abhorred if the provision under study is itself clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity. As the Court held in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary: 23
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk . . . We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." 24
Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional
interpretation, the constitutional record does not provide the exclusive or
definitive answer on how to interpret the provision. The intent of a constitutional
convention is not controlling by itself, and while the historical discussion on the
floor of the constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive.
The Court has even held in Vera v. Avelino25 that "the proceedings of the
[constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the proper construction of the
fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a
statute, since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature that courts seek,
while in the former courts are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people
through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives."26 The proper
interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than the framers' understanding thereof.27
If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for
interpretation of any amendments adopted via initiative, such absence would not
preclude the courts from interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent
with how courts generally construe the Constitution. For example, reliance will
be placed on the other provisions of the Constitution to arrive at a harmonized
and holistic constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly the
Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.
V.
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the sufficiency of the
initiative petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735
clearly reposes on the COMELEC the task of determining the sufficiency of the
petitions, including the ascertainment of whether twelve percent (12%) of all extinction of democracy or democratic institutions. Such a consideration should
registered voters, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every of course properly play its course in the public debates and deliberations
legislative district have indeed signed the initiative petitions. 28 It should be attendant to the initiative process. Yet as a result of the harum-scarum, the
remembered that the COMELEC had dismissed the initiative petitions outright, temptation lies heavy for a member of this Court perturbed with the prospect of
and had yet to undertake the determination of sufficiency as required by law. constitutional change to relieve those anxieties by simply voting to enjoin any
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative legal procedure that initiates the amendment or revision of the fundamental law,
petitions that the Court may at this juncture pronounce the initiative petitions as even at the expense of the people's will or what the Constitution allows. A vote
insufficient. The derivation of the factual predicates leading to the suggestion is so oriented takes the conservative path of least resistance, even as it may gain
uncertain, considering that the trier of facts, the COMELEC in this instance, has the admiration of those who do not want to see the Constitution amended.
yet to undertake the necessary determination. Still, the premise has been floated Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution
that petitioners have made sufficient admissions before this Court that and the elements of democracy on which our rule of law is founded. Direct
purportedly established the petitions are insufficient. democracy, as embodied in the initiative process, is but a culmination of the
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we evolution over the centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-governance.
should ask, I submit, is whether it serves well on the Court to usurp trier of facts The reemergence of the Athenian democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical
even before the latter exercises its functions? If the Court, at this stage, were to rules arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to favored
declare the petitions as insufficient, it would be akin to the Court pronouncing an classes. The Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and self-
accused as guilty even before the lower court trial had began. governance only to a few English nobles; the American Constitution was
Matugas v. COMELEC29 inveighs against the propriety of the Court originally intended to give a meaningful voice only to free men, mostly
uncharacteristically assuming the role of trier of facts, and resolving factual Caucasian, who met the property-holding requirements set by the states for
questions not previously adjudicated by the lower courts or tribunals: voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as it may have already
[P]etitioner in this case cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's findings by been within the first few years of the American Union, met resistance from no
introducing new evidence before this Court, which in any case is less a revered figure as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian
not a trier of facts, and then ask it to substitute its own judgment Howard Zinn attributes these disconcerting words:
and discretion for that of the COMELEC. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not
raised for the first time on appeal, and documents forming no part of true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge
the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct
disposing of the issues of an action. This is true whether the decision permanent share in the government… Can a democratic assembly
elevated for review originated from a regular court or an administrative who annually revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily
agency or quasi-judicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check
case, a special proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal the imprudence of democracy…33
30
presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly justice. This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age
Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the petitions of modern democracy where a person's poverty, color, or gender no longer
constitutes in effect a trial de novo, the Justices of the Supreme Court virtually impedes the exercise of full democratic rights. Yet a democracy that merely
descending to the level of trial court judges. This is an unbecoming recourse, guarantees its citizens the right to live their lives freely is incomplete if there is
and it simply is not done. no corresponding allowance for a means by which the people have a direct
VI. choice in determining their country's direction. Initiative as a mode of amending
The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a plea that it a constitution may seem incompatible with representative democracy, yet it
make the choice whether to amend the Constitution or not. This is a matter embodies an even purer form of democracy. Initiative, which our 1987
which should not be left to fifteen magistrates who have not been elected by the Constitution saw fit to grant to the people, is a progressive measure that is but a
people to make the choice for them. continuation of the line of evolution of the democratic ideal.
A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987 Constitution. It is By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional
merely a vote to allow the people to directly exercise that option. In fact, the amendments, the initiative process should be acknowledged as the purest
position of Justice Puno which I share would not even guarantee that the implement of democratic rule under law. This right granted to over sixty million
Lambino and Sigaw ng Bayan initiative petitions would be submitted to the Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of less than eight magistrates for
people in a referendum. The COMELEC will still have to determine the reasons that bear no cogitation on the Constitution.
sufficiency of the petition. Among the questions which still have to be I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.
determined by the poll body in considering the sufficiency of the petitions is
whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters nationwide, includingDANTE three O. TINGA
Associate
percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district, have indeed signed Justice
the initiative petitions.31 ____________________
And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter EN BANC
of whether the Constitution should be amended would still depend on the choice G. R. No. 174153
of the electorate. The oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952
amendments proposed, or the imputed motives behind the amendments. A REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
referendum, should the COMELEC find the petitions as sufficient, would allow vs.
them to convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
proponents of the amendment to defend their proposal. The campaign period TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L.
alone would allow the public to be involved in the significant deliberation on the ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN
course our nation should take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
more politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on whether the WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Constitution should be amended would lie directly with the people. The initiative Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE
process involves participatory democracy at its most elemental; wherein the B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V.
consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,
the hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO
and town halls, the academic yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA,
areas in the homes of the affluent and the impoverished alike. GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO,
engaged in by a people who are actually empowered in having a say whether and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO
these changes should be enacted, gives fruition to the original vision of pure AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI
democracy, as formulated in Athens two and a half millennia ago. The great ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
hero of Athenian democracy, Pericles, was recorded as saying in his famed CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON,
Funeral Oration, "We differ from other states in regarding the man who keeps FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
aloof from public life not as 'private' but as useless; we decide or debate, AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER
carefully and in person all matters of policy, and we hold, not that words AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III,
and deeds go ill together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY
undertaken undiscussed."32 ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH
Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has been EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED
peddled that an act or vote that assists the initiative process is one for the willful BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q.
SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the
creature of their will, and lives only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible
power to make or unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not in
any subdivision of them."
-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257,
287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the
persuasive and erudite dissent of Justice Reynato S. Puno. However, I make
some additional observations in connection with my concurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine
Constitution of 1987 for being the supreme law of the land, we should not lose
sight of the truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is
also subordinate – the will of the people. No less than its very first paragraph,
the Preamble,1 expressly recognizes that the Constitution came to be because it
was ordained and promulgated by the sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle
reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which explicitly
declares that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." Thus, the resolution of the issues and controversies raised by the instant
Petition should be guided accordingly by the foregoing principle.
If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in
the event that the people change their will, so must the Constitution be revised
or amended to reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend the
Constitution inherently resides in the sovereign people whose will it is supposed
to express and embody. The Constitution itself, under Article XVII, provides for
the means by which the revision or amendment of the Constitution may be
proposed and ratified.
Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the
Constitution may be made (a) by Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or (b) by constitutional convention. The Congress and the
constitutional convention possess the power to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, the Constitution not simply because the Constitution so provides,
but because the sovereign people had chosen to delegate their inherent right to
make such proposals to their representatives either through Congress or
through a constitutional convention.
On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly empowered
by the People Power Revolution of 1986, reserved to themselves the right to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, to wit –
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.2
The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to
amend the Constitution because, as previously discussed, such right is inherent
in them. The section only reduces into writing this right to initiate amendments to
the Constitution where they collectively and willfully agreed in the manner by
which they shall exercise this right: (a) through the filing of a petition; (b)
supported by at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered
voters nationwide; (c) with each legislative district represented by at least three
percent (3%) of the registered voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that no
such petition may be filed within five years after the ratification of the
Constitution, and not oftener than once every five years thereafter; and (e) a
delegation to Congress of the authority to provide the formal requirements and
other details for the implementation of the right.
It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative is more superior than the
power they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or
revise the Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign people the
voice to express their collective will, and when the people speak, we must be
ready to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and
guarantees the sovereign people's right to initiative, rather than limits it. The
enabling law which Congress has been tasked to enact must give life to the said
provision and make the exercise of the right to initiative possible, not regulate,
limit, or restrict it in any way that would render the people's option of resorting to
initiative to amend the Constitution more stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as
compared to the other constitutional means to amend or revise the Constitution.
In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of the
Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent
reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions,
and which has led me to the conclusions, in support of the dissent of Justice
Puno, that (a) The Commission on Election (COMELEC) had indeed committed
grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution filed by herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado; (b) The Court should revisit the pronouncements it made in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections;3 (c) It is the sovereign people's inherent
right to propose changes to the Constitution, regardless of whether they
constitute merely amendments or a total revision thereof; and (d) The
COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for
initiative and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, determine the factual issues
raised by the oppositors before this Court.
I
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it
summarily dismissed Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative entirely on
the basis of the Santiago case which, allegedly, permanently enjoined it from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution in the absence of a sufficient law.
After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in earnest that
the permanent injunction actually issued by this Court against the COMELEC
pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to all
subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Conclusion4 in the majority opinion in the Santiago case reads –
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be
given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry
any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for
the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the
DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is
made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court made
permanent the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on 18 December
1996 against the COMELEC. The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative. 5 It was this restraining order,
more particularly the portion thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which was
expressly made permanent by the Court. It would seem to me that the
COMELEC and all other oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for
initiative gave unwarranted significance and weight to the first paragraph of the
Conclusion in the Santiago case. The first and second paragraphs of the
Conclusion, preceding the dispositive portion, merely express the opinion
of the ponente; while the definite orders of the Court for implementation
are found in the dispositive portion.
We have previously held that –
The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually constitutes the
resolution of the court and which is the subject of execution, although
the other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to
determine the ratio decidendi for such a resolution. Where there is
conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court
contained in the text of the decision, the former must prevail over the
latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while
 the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence execution
must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the
dispositive portion of the decision.6
Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and the
dispositive portion of the Santiago case? Apparently, there is. The first
paragraph of the Conclusion states that the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until the enactment of a valid law. On the other
hand, the fallo only makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC enjoining it
from proceeding with the Delfin Petition. While the permanent injunction
contemplated in the Conclusion encompasses all petitions for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, the fallo is expressly limited to the Delfin
Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of the Court as it is stated in the
dispositive portion or the fallo should be controlling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado's petition for
initiative on the basis of this Court's Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in
the case of People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
The Commission on Elections, et al.8 The Court therein found that the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the PIRMA
Petition for initiative to amend the Constitution for it only complied with the
Decision in the Santiago case.
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on
the basis of res judicata because PIRMA participated in the proceedings of the
said case, and had knowledge of and, thus, must be bound by the judgment of
the Court therein. As explained by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in
his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case –
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed
here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997)
may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is substantially
identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the
principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable,
parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs
are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR
REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses
ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-
described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403,
Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City,"
with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its
"officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as
founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the body of the
petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive for a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the
PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of
PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly
represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In
short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his
petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that
said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their
Comment to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSA'S did not deny
that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments,
demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin
or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA
and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the
operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further
elaboration.9
While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata, the
same cannot be said to the Petition at bar. Res judicata is an absolute bar to a
subsequent action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former
judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on the
merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action. 10
Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the
last has not been complied with. Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the
present Petition involve different parties, subject matter, and causes of action,
and the former should not bar the latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was
filed by Delfin alone. His petition does not qualify as the initiatory pleading over
which the COMELEC can acquire jurisdiction, being unsupported by the
required number of registered voters, and actually imposing upon the
COMELEC the task of gathering the voters' signatures. In the case before us,
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and
Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their
signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Their petition prays that the
COMELEC issue an Order –
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at
least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than
ninety days after the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency
of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign
will on the proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution, the personalities concerned and the other factual circumstances
attendant in the two cases differ. Also dissimilar are the particular prayer and
reliefs sought by the parties from the COMELEC, as well as from this Court. For
these reasons, I find that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it summarily dismissed the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and
Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord due course to a petition which
on its face complies with the rudiments of the law. COMELEC was openly
negligent in summarily dismissing the Lambino and Aumentado petition. The
haste by which the instant Petition was struck down is characteristic of bad faith,
which, to my mind, is a patent and gross evasion of COMELEC's positive duty. It
has so obviously copped out of its duty and responsibility to determine the
sufficiency thereof and sought protection and justification for its craven decision
in the supposed permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the
Santiago case. The COMELEC had seemingly expanded the scope and
application of the said permanent injunction, reading into it more than what it
actually states, which is surprising, considering that the Chairman and majority
of the members of COMELEC are lawyers who should be able to understand
and appreciate, more than a lay person, the legal consequences and intricacies
of the pronouncements made by the Court in the Santiago case and the
permanent injunction issued therein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII,
Section 4, imposes upon the COMELEC the mandate to set a date for plebiscite
after a positive determination of the sufficiency of a petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, viz –
SEC. 4. x x x
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification
by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
As a rule, the word "shall" commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion, and that the presumption is that the word
"shall" when used, is mandatory. 11 Under the above-quoted constitutional
provision, it is the mandatory or imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a)
determine the sufficiency of the petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and issue a certification on its findings; and (b) in case such petition
is found to be sufficient, to set the date for the plebiscite on the proposed
amendments not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its certification.
The COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional mandate under
the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, through the summary dismissal
of the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado, when such petition
is supported by 6.3 million signatures of registered voters. Should all of these
signatures be authentic and representative of the required percentages of
registered voters for every legislative district and the whole nation, then the
initiative is a true and legitimate expression of the will of the people to amend
the Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by silencing
their voice based on a patently inapplicable permanent injunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by
the Court in its Decision in the Santiago case, especially as regards the
supposed insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 as the enabling
law for the implementation of the people's right to initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or
inadequate actually gave rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the
fact that there has never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated
a law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration
thereby impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in the Santiago
case, to provide the following clarification in his separate opinion to the
Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus –
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that
portion of R.A. No. 6735 relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure
to comply with the "completeness and sufficient standard tests" with
respect to permissible delegation of legislative power or subordinate
legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the language in
Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable; the portion of R.A. No. 6735
was held to be unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case
pronounced repeatedly that Republic Act No. 6735 was insufficient and
inadequate, there is no categorical declaration therein that the said statute was pointed out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the changes proposed to transform
unconstitutional. The express finding that Republic Act No. 6735 is our form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
unconstitutional can only be found in the separate opinion of former Chief parliamentary, would not affect the fundamental nature of our state as a
Justice Davide to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, which was not concurred in democratic and republican state. It will still be a representative government
by the other members of the Court. where officials continue to be accountable to the people and the people maintain
Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago case, that control over the government through the election of members of the Parliament.
Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient and inadequate, is already tantamount to a Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion
declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, it was rendered in violation of or even the whole of the Constitution, what or who is to stop them? Article XVII,
established rules in statutory construction, which state that – Section 2 of the Constitution which, by the way it is worded, refers only to their
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who right to initiative on amendments of the Constitution? The delegates to the
attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity Constitutional Convention who, according to their deliberations, purposely
beyond a reasonable doubt (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' limited Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution to amendments? This Court
Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact, this Court does not decide which has the jurisdiction to interpret the provision? Bearing in mind my earlier
questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly declaration that the will of the sovereign people is supreme, there is nothing or
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a no one that can preclude them from initiating changes to the Constitution if they
determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis choose to do so. To reiterate, the Constitution is supposed to be the expression
mota presented (Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority, 152 and embodiment of the people's will, and should the people's will clamor for a
SCRA 540 [1987]). revision of the Constitution, it is their will which should prevail. Even the fact that
First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well avoided the issue of the people ratified the 1987 Constitution, including Article XVII, Section 2
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 by ordering the COMELEC to dismiss thereof, as it is worded, should not prevent the exercise by the sovereign people
the Delfin petition for the simple reason that it does not constitute an initiatory of their inherent right to change the Constitution, even if such change would be
pleading over which the COMELEC could acquire jurisdiction. And second, the tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision thereof, for their actual
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 has not been adequately shown. It exercise of the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation which
was by and large merely inferred or deduced from the way Republic Act No. the said provision imposes upon it. It is the inherent right of the people as
6735 was worded and the provisions thereof arranged and organized by sovereign to change the Constitution, regardless of the extent thereof.
Congress. The dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in the Santiago IV
case reveal the other side to the argument, adopting the more liberal Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due course to
interpretation that would allow the Court to sustain the constitutionality of and take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative to
Republic Act No. 6735. It would seem that the majority in the Santiago case amend the Constitution. I reiterate that it would be a greater evil if one such
failed to heed the rule that all presumptions should be resolved in favor of the petition which is ostensibly supported by the required number of registered
constitutionality of the statute. voters all over the country, be summarily dismissed.
The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not necessarily
Santiago case and again open to judicial review the constitutionality of Republic mean that the same would be found sufficient and set for plebiscite. The
Act No. 6735; in which case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its constitutionality, COMELEC still faces the task of reviewing the petition to determine whether it
having satisfied the completeness and sufficiency of standards tests for the valid complies with the requirements for a valid exercise of the right to initiative.
delegation of legislative power. I fully agree in the conclusion made by Justice Questions raised by the oppositors to the petition, such as those on the
Puno on this matter in his dissenting opinion 12 in the Santiago case, that reads – authenticity of the registered voters' signatures or compliance with the requisite
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide number of registered voters for every legislative district, are already factual in
the COMELEC in promulgating the law's implementing rules and nature and require the reception and evaluation of evidence of the parties. Such
regulations of the law. As aforestated, Section 2 spells out the policy questions are best presented and resolved before the COMELEC since this
of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative Court is not a trier of facts.
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of the
or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by COMELEC dated 31 August 2006 denying due course to the Petition for
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act Initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado be reversed and set aside for having
is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and
R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to that the Petition be remanded to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.
Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a
people's initiative, directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, Associate Justice
how a proposition is approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when ____________________
the amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject EN BANC
of any initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate. G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006
III RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952
The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on the REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
difference between an "amendment" and a "revision" of the Constitution. Allow respondent.
me also to articulate my additional thoughts on the matter. G.R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative argue that the MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q.
proposed changes therein to the provisions of the Constitution already amount SAGUISAG, petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by
to a revision thereof, which is not allowed to be done through people's initiative; Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR., and Commissioners
Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution on people's initiative refers only to RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A.
proposals for amendments to the Constitution. They assert the traditional BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe,
distinction between an amendment and a revision, with amendment referring to respondents.
isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision as a revamp or rewriting of the x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
whole instrument.13 SEPARATE OPINION
However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no quantitative VELASCO, JR., J.:
or qualitative test that can establish with definiteness the distinction between an Introduction
amendment and a revision, or between a substantial and simple change of the The fate of every democracy, of every
Constitution. government based on the Sovereignty of the
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado's petition people, depends on the choices it makes between
for initiative basically affect only Article VI on the Legislative Department and these opposite principles: absolute power on the
Article VII on the Executive Department. While the proposed changes will one hand, and on the other the restraints of
drastically alter the constitution of our government by vesting both legislative legality and the authority of tradition.
and executive powers in a unicameral Parliament, with the President as the —John Acton
Head of State and the Prime Minister exercising the executive power; they In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly
would not essentially affect the other 16 Articles of the Constitution. The 100 or persuasive opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno upholding the people's initiative
so changes counted by the oppositors to the other provisions of the Constitution and raise some points of my own.
are constituted mostly of the nominal substitution of one word for the other, such The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the Constitution was
as Parliament for Congress, or Prime Minister for President. As eloquently once discussed in the landmark case of Santiago v. COMELEC.1 Almost a
decade later, the issue is once again before the Court, and I firmly believe it is
time to reevaluate the pronouncements made in that case.
The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its
proponents and opponents will understandably take all measures to advance
their position and defeat that of their opponents. The wisdom or folly of Charter
Change does not concern the Court. The only thing that the Court must review is
the validity of the present step taken by the proponents of Charter Change,
which is the People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall
be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that
section had been fulfilled. It determined that Congress had not provided for the
implementation of the exercise of the people's initiative, when it held that
Republic Act No. 6735, or "The Initiative and Referendum Act," was "inadequate
to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation." 2
With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must
disagree.
Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional
amendments and it should not have been considered inadequate.
The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the
drafting of the law, in the failings of the way the law was structured, to come to
the conclusion that the law was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the
legislators' intent, but disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting. The
Court then saw the inclusion of the Constitution in RA 6735 as an afterthought.
However, it was included, and it should not be excluded by the Court via a
strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the law should not serve
to frustrate the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people
the power to propose amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic precept in
statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in
the interpretation of a statute.3 The intent of the legislature was clear, and yet RA
6735 was declared inadequate. It was not specifically struck down or declared
unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA 6735 was
not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.
It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should have been more
flexible. It is also a basic precept of statutory construction that statutes should be
construed not so much according to the letter that killeth but in line with the
purpose for which they have been enacted. 4 The reading of the law should not
have been with the view of its defeat, but with the goal of upholding it, especially
with its avowed noble purpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose
amendments to the Constitution, in accordance with the Constitution itself. It
should not be the Supreme Court that stifles the people, and lets their cries for
change go unheard, especially when the Constitution itself grants them that
power.
The court's ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present petition
because the fallo in the Santiago case is limited to the Delfin petition.
The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, et al., against the COMELEC, et al., which sought to prevent the
COMELEC from entertaining the "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin.
In the body of the judgment, the Court made the following conclusion, viz:
This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition or initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be
given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry
any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for
the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
In the said case, the Court's fallo states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide
sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the
DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is
made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is
elementary that when there is conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of
the decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the
judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on
the disposition, not on the body, of the decision. 5 The dispositive portion is its
decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of execution. The other parts of the
decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for the
disposition. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the
opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the
former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive
portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering
nothing. Hence, the execution must conform with that which is ordained or
decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision. 6
A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal
expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or
decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms
no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and
conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision
and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is
not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the
court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often
encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and
generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the
otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the
dispositive part, so called, of the decision. 7
Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately becomes
apparent that the disposition in the latter case categorically made permanent the
December 18, 1996 Temporary Restraining Order issued against the COMELEC
in the Delfin petition but did NOT formally incorporate therein any directive
PERMANENTLY enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably, the
perpetual proscription against the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over
any other petition on Charter Change through a People's Initiative is just a
conclusion and cannot bind the poll body, for such unending ban would trench
on its constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall
under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the COMELEC the
jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition on the initiative under
Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it
cannot be barred from entertaining any such petition.
In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any
petition on initiative under RA 6735 and it can rule on the petition and its action
can only be passed upon by the Court when the same is elevated through a
petition for certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said petitions
since jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said law has not been
declared unconstitutional and hence still valid though considered inadequate in
the Santiago case.
Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA
v. Commission on Elections 8 confirmed the statement of the Court in the
Santiago case that the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Much reliance
is placed on the ruling contained in a Minute Resolution which reads:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
Discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this Court in
G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution
of June 10, 1997.
Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19,
1997 Decision. To reiterate, the dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer
specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO being made permanent against the
COMELEC but do not pertain to a permanent injunction against any other
petition for initiative on amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or even affirmed
in the Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the December 18,
1996 TRO which became permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of RA
6735, and the annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly
not the alleged perpetual injunction against the initiative petition. Thus, the
resolution in the PIRMA case cannot be considered res judicata to the Lambino
petition.
Amendment or Revision
 One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under
RA 6735, since only amendments to the Constitution may be the subject of a
people's initiative.
The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it
is merely an attempt to amend it. The term amendment has to be liberally
construed so as to effectuate the people's efforts to amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9 explained:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations
of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the
rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results
the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.
That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be
altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a
change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to
amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire
constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to
improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it
provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to
suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.
In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire
Constitution. It was never its intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely
concerns itself with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter.
When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the
sovereign people's political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal
interpretation favoring the people's right to exercise their sovereign power.
Conclusion
Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus
deserves the highest respect even from the courts. It is not something that can
be overruled, set aside, ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of
technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of the law.
As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the People's
Initiative, I vote to grant the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and dismiss the petition
in G.R. No. 174299. The Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul
L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado should be remanded to the COMELEC for
determination whether or not the petition is sufficient under RA 6735, and if the
petition is sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as required
by RA 6735.
It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it was twenty years
ago. And should this voice demand a change in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court should not be one to stand in its way.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Including Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
(ULAP).
2
This provision states: "Requirements. — x x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters
as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100)
words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page
of the petition."
3
This provision states: "Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar
shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election."
4
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in
a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many
members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the
provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred
thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must
have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a
resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be
elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years
without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the
party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose
number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership
coming from the parliamentary districts.
5
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The
executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of
the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the
Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the
Parliament for the program of government.
6
Sections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the
expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall
continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached
by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from
office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall
succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability,
resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President
and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the
powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended
and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to
"Congress", "Senate", "House of Representatives" and "Houses of
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all
references therein to "Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or
"Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to
read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime
Minister".
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and
Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other
Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent
with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided however that any and all references therein to
"Congress", "Senate", "House of Representatives" and "Houses of
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all
references therein to "Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or
"Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to
read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime
Minister".
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the
Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent
Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also
be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for
the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or

revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive,
shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament,
an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of
the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the
various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities
as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials.
Thereafter, the Vice President, as Member of Parliament, shall
immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its
session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of all
its members, from among themselves. The duly elected Prime
Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the
term of incumbent President and Vice President.
7 12
As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4 (paragraph 3)
and a modified paragraph 2, Section 5, thus:
Section 4. x x x x
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
xxxx
Section 5. x x x x
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The
duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the
powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until
the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.
8
336 Phil. 848 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.
9
The COMELEC held:
We agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has the solemn
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other
provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non self-
executory provision needed an enabling law for its implementation.
Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people
under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago vs.
Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the
required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be
given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared R.A.
No. 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of
the right of the people under a system of initiative. However, neither
can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in
the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains
nothing but an "empty right", and that this Commission is permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Considering the foregoing, We are therefore constrained not to
entertain or give due course to the instant Petition.
10
Arturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya;
Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO); Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines; Sulong Bayan Movement Foundation, Inc.
11
Onevoice Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III,
Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative
Law Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete Quirino Quadra; Bayan, Bayan Muna, Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela
Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby
Santiago, Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Loretta Ann P. Rosales, and Mario Joyo
Aguja, Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo,
Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P.
Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate of the Philippines; Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador and
Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cebu City and Cebu
Province Chapters; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and
Senators Sergio R. Osmeňa III, Jamby Madrigal, Jinggoy Estrada, Alfredo S.
Lim and Panfilo Lacson; Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang
Pilipino.
This provision states: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years."
13
I RECORD, 387-388.
14
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento made the following report (I RECORD 389):
MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, I am happy that the Committee
on Amendments and Transitory Provisions decided to retain the
system of initiative as a mode of amending the Constitution. I made a
survey of American constitutions and I discovered that 13 States
provide for a system of initiative as a mode of amending the
Constitution — Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. The initiative for ordinary laws only is
used in Idaho, Maine, Montana and South Dakota. So, I am happy
that this was accepted or retained by the Committee.
xxxx
The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss
beginning in 1898 when South Dakota adopted the initiative in its
constitution. The Swiss cantons experimented with initiatives in the
1830s. In 1891, the Swiss incorporated the initiative as a mode of
amending their national constitution. Initiatives promote "direct
democracy" by allowing the people to directly propose amendments to
the constitution. In contrast, the traditional mode of changing the
constitution is known as "indirect democracy" because the
amendments are referred to the voters by the legislature or the
constitutional convention.
15
Florida requires only that the title and summary of the proposed amendment
are "printed in clear and unambiguous language." Advisory Opinion to the
Attorney General RE Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, No.
90160, 22 January 1998, Supreme Court of Florida.
16
State ex. rel Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933); Whitman
v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942); Heidtman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 99 Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E. 2d 644 (1954); Christen v. Baker, 138
Colo. 27, 328 P.2d 951 (1958); Stop the Pay Hike Committee v. Town Council of
Town of Irvington, 166 N.J. Super. 197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979); State ex rel Evans
v. Blackwell, Slip copy, 2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.), 2006-Ohio-
2076.
17
407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990). Affirmed by the District Court of Massachusetts in
Henry v. Conolly, 743 F. Supp. 922 (1990) and by the Court of Appeals, First
Circuit, in Henry v. Conolly, 9109 F. 2d. 1000 (1990), and cited in Marino v.
Town Council of Southbridge, 13 Mass.L.Rptr. 14 (2001).
18
89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).
19
Stumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).
20
Exhibit "B" of the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006.
21
Annex "B" of the Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete Quirino-
Quadra filed on 7 September 2006.
22
www.ulap.gov.ph.
23
www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.html.
24
The full text of the proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter
Change can be downloaded at its official website at www.concom.ph.
25
The Lambino Group's Memorandum, p. 5.
26
Under the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution, members of
Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years "without limitation as to the
number thereof."
27
Under the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, the interim Parliament "shall continue until the Members of the
regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified." Also, under
the proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII, of the same Transitory Provisions, the
interim Parliament "shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament."
28
Under the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, the interim Parliament, within 45 days from ratification of the
proposed changes, "shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of,
this Constitution."
29
448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.
30
698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).
31
I RECORD 386, 392, 402-403.
32
196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948). See also Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or.App. 1, 882 P.2d
91 (1994).
33
392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964).
34
930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.
35
Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).
36
Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization,
583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (1978).
37
Id.
38
Legislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509 (1991).
39
California Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4 th 792,
836 (2003).
40
See note 44, infra.
41
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, p. 1294 (2003).
42
238 So.2d 824 (1970).
43
Id. at 830-832.
44
As stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the 26 September
2006 oral arguments.
45
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November
2003, 415 SCRA 44; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
142 Phil. 393 (1970); Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259
(1938).
46
882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994). On the merits, the Court in Lowe v. Keisling found
the amendment in question was not a revision.
47
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
48
Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution.
49
Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution.
50
This section provides: "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them."
51
Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760 (2001); Intia Jr. v. COA,
366 Phil. 273 (1999).
52
G.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.
53
Presidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987, entitled
"Proclaiming the Ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
Adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance
Appended thereto."
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
1
Chief Justice McLachlin spoke on "Liberty, Prosperity and the Rule of Law" in
her speech before the Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity held on October
18-20, 2006 in Manila. She further stated: "Without the rule of law, government
officials are not bound by standards of conduct. Without the rule of law, the
dignity and equality of all people is not affirmed and their ability to seek redress
for grievances and societal commitments is limited. Without the rule of law, we
have no means of ensuring meaningful participation by people in formulating
and enacting the norms and standards which organize the kinds of societies in
which we want to live."
2
GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 336 Phil. 848. For ease of reference, my
Separate Opinion is reproduced in full:
"Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing
for the majority, holds that:
'(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the 'initiatory' Delfin Petition.
'(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to 'be directly proposed
by the people through initiative,' there is no implementing law for the
purpose. RA 6735 is 'incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.'
'(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2300, 'insofar as it prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void.'
"I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory
petition can show the required number of signatures — in this case,
12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in
every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no
government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the
Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition
absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the
majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
"Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's
majority, the Constitution cannot be amended at all through a people's
initiative. Not by Delfin, not by PIRMA, not by anyone, not even by all
the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively
but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the
people's right to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority
holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass
a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at
present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is
guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction,
oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments
to exact transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their
chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must
be resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise
should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
"WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D.
Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commission on Elections
to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but not
on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT
the temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar
as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa
from exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to
the Constitution."
3
GR No. 129754, September 23, 1997 (still unpublished in the Philippine
Reports or in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated). Again, for ease of
reference, I reproduce my Separate Opinion in full:
"Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent
Commission dismissing their petition for a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Said petition before the Comelec (henceforth, PIRMA
petition) was backed up by nearly six (6) million signatures constituting
about 16% of the registered voters of the country with at least 3% in
each legislative district. The petition now before us presents two
grounds:
"1. In refusing to act on the PIRMA petition, the Comelec allegedly
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and
"2. In declaring R.A. 6735 "inadequate to cover its system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution" and "declaring void those parts of
Resolution 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of [an] initiative [on] amendments to the
Constitution," the Supreme Court's Decision in G.R. No. 127325
entitled Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Commission on Elections
(hereafter referred to as Santiago) should be reexamined because
said Decision is allegedly "unconstitutional," and because, in any
event, the Supreme Court itself, in reconsidering the said issue per its
June 10, 1997 Resolution, was deadlocked at six votes one each side.
"The following in my position on each of these two issues:
First Issue:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in Comelec's Refusal to Act
"The Respondent Commission's refusal to act on the "prayers" of the
PIRMA petition cannot in any wise be branded as "grave abuse of
discretion." Be it remembered that the Court's Decision in Santiago
permanently enjoined the Comelec "from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
4
Republic v. COCOFED, 423 Phil. 735, December 14, 2001.
5
Well-entrenched is this definition of grave abuse of discretion. Id.; Benito v.
Comelec, 349 SCRA 705, January 19, 2001; Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona
Jr., 359 Phil. 276, November 18, 1998; and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor,
231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994.
6
In PIRMA, I submitted as follows: "I believed, and still do, that the majority
gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction [that covered ANY
petition, not just the Delfin petition], but I cannot fault the Comelec for complying
with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi.
Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It
had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Regusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to
the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the
Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and
contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies."
7
42 Am. Jr. 2d, §26, citing Birmingham Gas Co. v. Bessemer; 250 Ala 137, 33
So 2d 475, 250 Ala 137; Tacker v. Board of Comrs., 127 Fla 248, 170 So 458;
Hoxie V. Scott, 45 Neb 199, 63 NW 387; Gill v. Board of Comrs., 160 NC 176,
76, SE 204.
8
Partido ng Manggagawa v. Comelec, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006.
9
Article XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
 16
"SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be See, for instance, the front page Malaya report entitled "Lobbyists soil dignity
proposed by: of Supreme Court" (October 23, 2006).
17
(1) The Congress, upon the vote of three-fourths of all its Lk 8:17.
Members; or YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1
(2) A constitutional convention. G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
2
"SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly SEC. 5. Requirements.— x x x
proposed by the people though initiative upon a petition of at least (c) The petition shall state the following:
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this c.2. the proposition;
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of c.3. the reason or reasons therefore;
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
"SEC. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all c.6. an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred
its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every
convention. page of the petition.
3
"SEC. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— For purposes of this Act, the following terms
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes shall mean: x x x
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor (d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
4
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or I Record, Constitutional Commission 387-389 (July 9, 1986).
5
revision. Community Gas and Service Company, Inc. v. Walbaum, 404 P.2d 1014, 1965
"Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified OK 118 (1965).
6
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
7
by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition." The late Senator (then Congressman) Raul S. Roco stated this fact in his
10
Republic Act 6735, Sec. 10, provides: sponsorship presentation of H.B. No. 21505, thus:
"SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures. – The following cannot be the subject xxxx
of an initiative or referendum petition: D. Prohibited Subjects.
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be The bill provides for two kinds of measures which cannot be the
submitted to the electorate; and subject of an initiative or referendum petition. A petition that embraces
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment more than one subject cannot be submitted to the electorate as it
of which are specifically vested in Congress by the would be violative of the constitutional proscription on passing bills
Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety containing more than one subject, and statutes involving emergency
(90) days after its effectivity." measures cannot be subject to referendum until 90 days after its
11
The principle of separation of powers operates at the core of a presidential effectivity. [Journal and record of the house of representatives,
form of government. Thus, legislative power is given to the legislature; executive Second Regular Session, Vol. 6, p. 975 (February 14, 1989).]
8
power, to a separate executive (from whose prominent position in the system, Memorandum of petitioner Aumentado, p. 117.
9
the presidential nomenclature is derived); and judicial power, to an independent The proposed Section 4(3) of Article XVIII of the Constitution states that
judiciary. This system embodies interdependence by separation. Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of parliament until
On the other hand, a parliamentary system personifies interdependence by noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. No counterpart provision was provided for
integration, its essential features being the following: "(1) The members of the members of the House of Representatives who, as members of the interim
government or cabinet or the executive arm are, as a rule, simultaneously parliament under the proposed changes, shall schedule the elections for the
members of the legislature. (2) The government or cabinet, consisting of the regular parliament in its discretion.
10
political leaders of the majority party or of a coalition who are also members of The proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII of the Constitution states that the
the legislative, is in effect a committee of the legislature. (3) The government or interim parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the
cabinet has a pyramidal structure, at the apex of which is the Prime Minister or Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes.
11
his equivalent. (4) The government or cabinet remains in power only for as long The United Kingdom, for instance, has a two-house parliament, the House of
as it enjoys the support of the majority of the legislature. (5) Both government Lords and the House of Commons.
12
and legislature are possessed of control devices with which each can demand of Philippine Political Law [1954 ed.], Vicente G. Sinco, pp. 43-44, quoted in
the other immediate political responsibility." These control devices are a vote of Separate Opinion of J. Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
no-confidence (censure), whereby the government may be ousted by the 129754, September 23, 1997, p. 7.
13
legislature; and the power of the government to dissolve the legislature and call 151-A Phil. 35 (1973).
14
for new elections. (J. BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 196 P. 2d 787 (Cal. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
15
THE PHILIPPINES A COMMENTARY, Vol. II, 17-18 (1988 ed.). 801 P. 2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
16
With respect to the transformation from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, 583 P. 2d 1281 (Cal. 1982).
17
the change involves the form of representation and the lawmaking process. Raven v. Deukmeijan, supra, citing Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P. 2d 274 (Cal.
12
Attached to the Opposition-in-Intervention of Intervenors OneVoice Inc., etc., 1982).
18
is a photocopy of the Certification dated August 23, 2006, issued by Atty. Marlon Supra note 13. It may well be pointed out that in making the distinction
S. Casquejo, the election officer for the 3rd District and the officer-in-charge for between amendment and revision, Justice Antonio relied not only in the analogy
the 1st and the 2nd Districts of Davao City. The Certification states that "this office presented in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E. 2d 322, but cited also the
(First, Second and Third District, Davao City) has not verified the signatures of seminal ruling of the California Supreme Court in McFadden v. Jordan, supra.
19
registered voters x x x." Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., Justice Isagani A. Cruz, p. 71, citing
13
In People v. Veneracion, the Court held: "Obedience to the rule of law forms Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 57.
20
the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guide of religious or The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., Fr.
political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 1161.
21
which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law Id.
22
becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise Supra note 14.
23
of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1 st ed., Fr. Joaquin
system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought 'to protect and enforce G. Bernas, S.J., p. 567, citing B. Schwartz, I The Powers of Government (1963).
24
it without fear or favor,' resist encroachments by governments, political parties, 16 C.J.S. §3 at 24.
25
or even the interference of their own personal beliefs." (249 SCRA 244, October 14 T.M. Cooley, II Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (1927), p. 1349.
26
13, 1995, per Kapunan, J.) A bogus revolution, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2006, Fr. Joaquin
14
An American professor on legal philosophy, A. Altman, puts it thus: "By Bernas, S.J., p. A15.
27
ratifying the constitution that included an explicit amendment process, the Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
sovereign people committed themselves to following the rule of law, even when SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
1
they wished to make changes in the basic system of government." A. ALTMAN, Works, Letter 164.
2
ARGUING ABOUT LAW 94 (2001). G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
15 3
See my Separate Opinion in Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, 415 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
SCRA 45, November 10, 2003.
4 18
G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.,)
founding members, spouses Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa. 1973, p. 49.
5 19
Entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.
20
through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a July 9, 1986. Records of the Constitutional Commission, No. 26.
21
Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the COMMENTARY, 1996 Ed., p. 1161.
22
Parliamentary System." 242 N. W. 891 259 Mich 212.
6 23
Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel State v. Orange [Tex. x. Civ. App.] 300 SW 2d 705, People v. Perkins 137, p.
L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, 55.
18
Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, City of Midland v. Arbury 38 Mich. App. 771, 197 N.W. 2d 134.
25
Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Adams v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.
26
Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, 196 P.2d 787.
27
Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Adams v. Gunter Fla. 238 So.2d 824.
28
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Mc Fadden v. Jordan, supra.
29
Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501, p. 505 (Fla. 1958).
30
Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT OR REVISION, Philippine
Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Daily Inquirer, September 25, 2006.
31
Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. See Sections 8-12 for national initiative and referendum, and sections 13-19
Tabayoyong. for local initiative and referendum.
7 32
"Grounds for contempt Section 2. Statement of Policy. – The power of the people under a system of
3. From the time the so-called People's Initiative (hereafter PI) now initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole
subject of Lambino v. Comelec, was initiated, respondents did or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
nothing to stop what was clearly lawless, and even arguably legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
winked at, as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste and affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
33
misuse of its personnel, time, facilities and resources on an Section 3. Definition of terms.-
enterprise that had no legal basis and in fact was permanently xxx
enjoined by this Honorable Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
it is time to disenthrall them. amendments to the Constitution;
3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the Senate xxx
34
on August 29, 2006 (on other business) when respondent Chair See Section 3(e).
35
sought to be stopped by the body from commenting on PI out of Section 5 (b) – A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have
prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On contentious at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
issues, he volunteered that Sigaw ng Bayan would not cheat in signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
Makati as it was the opposition territory and that the fact that out three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
of 43,405 signatures, only 7,186 were found authentic in one Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the
Makati District, to him, showed the "efficiency" of Comelec 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
personnel. He could not appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no choice xxx
36
but to get the constitutionality-required 3% in every district, [- Section 9 (b) – The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by
Const., Art. VII, Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise, including a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day
administration critics' turfs, and 2) that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) of the plebiscite.
37
falsus in omnibus, in an exercise that could never be free, 7 How (48 US) 1 (1849).
38
orderly, honest and credible, another constitutional requirement. 328 US 549 (1946).
39
[Nothing has been heard about probing and prosecuting the falsifiers.] 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
40
xxxxxxxxx 103 Phi. 1051 (1957).
41
3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers G.R. No. 35546, September 17, 1974, 50 SCRA 559.
42
that respondent Chairman, straining at the leash, was lawyering for 369 US 186 (1962).
43
Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It was discomfiting that he would G.R. No. 85344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.
44
gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of 96.30% of the G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668.
45
signatures in an exercise with no credibility! Even had he been Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, and L-36283, March 31, 1973, 50
asked, he should have pled to be excused from answering as the SCRA 30.
matter could come up before the Comelec for an official collegial CALLEJO, SR., J.:
1
position (different from conceding that it is enjoined). Entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
xxxxxxxxx Appropriating Funds Therefor.
2
4. Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution.
3
for their part, even issued widely-publicized written directives to Petition, pp. 12-14.
4
the field, [Annex C, as to Commissioner Brawner; that as to Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25,
Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the Commission itself was 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 480.
5
trying to be careful not to be explicit in what it was abetting Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appears, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004,
implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997. 431 SCRA 469, 480.
8 6
Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.
7
72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 246. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Construction Co., G.R.
9
Supra. No. L-35630, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664.
10 8
Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 59; People v. Court of Appeals, supra.
9
Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
10
23 SCRA 948. Article 8, New Civil Code provides that "[j]udicial decisions applying or
11
56 O.G. 3546 cited in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
id. Philippines."
12 11
Supra. Suson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126749, August 27, 1997, 278 SCRA
13
Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, G.R. No. 129754, 284.
12
September 23, 1997. Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254.
14 13
G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234. 974 S.W.2d 451 (1998).
15 14
Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 Id. at 453.
CSRA 307, citing Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (1988), 3 rd ed. (citing 15
Entitled In Re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative in
Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397, [1947]). the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
16 16
Id., citing Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, Supra note 10, p. 157.
17
305 SCRA 303, citing Government v. Jalandoni, No. 837-R, August 30, 1947, 44 G.R. No. 129754.
18
O.G. 1840. Minute Resolution, September 23, 1997, pp. 1-2.
17 19
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.
London: Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 33-34.
20 86
Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila, No. L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 Annex "1401."
87
SCRA 948. Annex "1402."
21 88
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, Annex "1404."
89
1994, 235 SCRA 506. Annex "1405."
22 90
Then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Annex "1406."
91
Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan and Justo P. Torres, Annex "1407."
92
Jr. fully concurred in the ponencia of Justice Davide. Annex "1408."
23 93
Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Vicente V. Mendoza, Reynato S. Puno, Ricardo J. Annex "1409."
94
Francisco, Jr. and Artemio V. Panganiban (now Chief Justice). Annex "1410."
24 95
The voting on the motion for reconsideration was as follows: Six Justices, Annex "1411."
96
namely, Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Annex "1412."
97
Bellosillo and Kapunan, voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, G.R. No. 147012, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 423.
98
Justices, namely, Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Jr., Regino C. See, for example, Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62089, March 9, 1988,
Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained 158 SCRA 508.
99
his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. Justices Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA
Teodoro R. Padilla and Torres inhibited from participation in the deliberations. 394.
25 100
House Bill No. 457 filed by then Rep. Nachura during the Twelfth Congress. Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA
26
See Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 154569, September 23, 639.
101
2002, 389 SCRA 480. Teope v. People, G.R. No. 149687, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 540.
27 102
London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375, Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
103
cited in COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 117-118. Id.
28 104
Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7. G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268, 311-312.
29 105
Id. at 7. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fernando in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,
30
I Records of the Constitutional Commission 373. supra note 36.
31 106
Id. at 371. 119 N.W. 408 (1909).
32 107
Id. at 386. 22 Minn. 400 (1876).
33 108
Id. at 392. 96 S.W. 396 (1906).
34 109
Id. at 402-403. 63 N.J. Law 289.
35 110
No. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30. 77 Miss. 543 (1900).
36 111
Id. at 367. Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
37 112
SINCO, Philippine Political Law 43-44. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 49.
38 113
37 S.E.2d 322 (1946). COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 56, cited in Ellingham
39
Id. at 330. v. Dye, supra.
40 114
Id. Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal. Co., 154 N.W. 1037 (1915).
41 115
Sounding Board, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006. ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT THE LAW 94 (2001), citing AGRESTO, THE
42
Introduction to the Journal of the Constitutional Commission. SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)
43 116
BLACK, Constitutional Law 1-2, citing 1 BOUV. INST. 9. McBee v. Brady, 100 P. 97 (1909).
44 117
SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1. McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
45 118
Proclamation No. 58, 83 O.G. No. 23, pp. 2703-2704, June 8, 1987. Cooley, Am.Law.Rev. 1889, p. 311, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
46 119
See McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97 (1909). 15 N.W. 609 (1883).
47 120
Id. Id. at 630.
48
196 P.2d 787 (1948). AZCUNA, J.:
49 1
Id. at 798. G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 and June 10, 1997.
50 2
Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 (1912). 100 Phil. 501 (1956).
51
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 36. PUNO, J.:
52 1
Id. at 39. M'cCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
53 2
Supra note 38. Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
54 3
McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48. 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997.
55 4
Id. at 799. Id. at 153.
56 5
Supra note 41. Id. at 157.
57 6
Annex "1363." Justice Teodoro R. Padilla did not take part in the deliberation as he was
58
Annex "1368." related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of petitioners.
59 7
Annex "1369." Justice Davide (ponente), Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado,
60
Annex "1370." Romero, Bellosillo, and Kapunan.
61 8
Annex "1371." Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
62 9
Annex "1372." People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
63
Annex "1374." Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
64 10
Annex "1375." Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.
65 11
Annex "1376." G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
66 12
Annex "1377." Petition, pp. 12-14.
67 13
Annex "1378." Advisory issued by Court, dated September 22, 2006.
68 14
Annex "1379." Exhibit "B," Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.
69 15
Annex "1380." Barnhart, Principled Pragmatic Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 80 Notre
70
Annex "1381." Dame Law Rev., 1911-1912, (May 2005).
71 16
Annex "1382." Ibid.
72 17
Annex "1383." Id. at 1913.
73 18
Annex "1385." Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis:
74
Annex "1387." Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 53 Utah
75
Annex "1388." Law Rev. 53, 67 (2002).
76 19
Annex "1389." Id. at 68.
77 20
Annex "1391." Id. at 69.
78 21
Annex "1392." Id. at 67.
79 22
Annex "1393." Id. at 69.
80 23
Annex "1395." Consovoy, supra note 18, at 57.
81 24
Annex "1396." Id. at 58.
82 25
Annex "1397." Id. at 64.
83 26
Annex "1398." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 405-06 (1932) (Justice Brandeis,
84
Annex "1399." dissenting).
85
Annex "1400."
27 92
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-492 (Justice Certification dated April 21, 2006 issued by Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Annex
Frankfurter, concurring). "B," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated
28
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987) (Justice April 20, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Annex "C," Memorandum of
Stevens, dissenting). Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 26, 2006 issued by
29
Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1922. Atty. Marlon S. Cascuejo, Annex "D," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor
30
Id. at 1921. Pimentel, et al.
31 93
Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights and Annex "1," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Antonino.
94
Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 Boston College Third World Law Journal, Annex "10-A," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
335, 343 (Summer 1991). et al.
32 95
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Annexes 1-29, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Alternative Law Groups,
33
163 U.S. 537 (1896). Inc.
34 96
G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1. Annexes 30-31, Id.
35 97
G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377. Annexes 44-64, Id.
36 98
Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1915. Consolidated Reply of Petitioner Aumentado, p. 54.
37 99
112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992). Exhibit "E," Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.
38 100
Section 5(b). Annex "A," Consolidated Response of Petitioner Aumentado.
39 101
Ibid. Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Pimentel, et al., pp. 12-13.
40 102
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, supra note 11, at 145. Helvey v. Wiseman, 199 F. Supp. 200, 8 A.F.T.2d 5576 (1961).
41 103
85 Record of the House of Representatives 140-142 (February 14, 1989). BNO Leasing Corp. v. Hollins & Hollins, Inc., 448 So.2d 1329 (1984).
42 104
85 Record of the house of representatives 142-143 (February 14, 1989). ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
43
Zeringue v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 467 So. 2d 1358. How many copies of the petition, that you mention(ed), did you print?
44
I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 386, 392 (July 9, 1986). ATTY. LAMBINO:
45
Id. at 400, 402-403. We printed 100 thousand of this petition last February and we
46
v record, constitutional commission 806 (October 10, 1986). distributed to the different organizations that were volunteering to
47
Opposition-in-Intervention filed by ONEVOICE, p. 39. support us.
48
Opposition-in-Intervention filed by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., p. 30. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
49
Introduction to Political Science, pp. 397-398. So, you are sure that you personally can say to us that 100 thousand
50
Section 1, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution. of
51
Eighth Edition, p. 89 (2004). these were printed?
52
Ibid. ATTY. LAMBINO:
53
Id. at 1346. It could be more than that, Your Honor.
54
Ibid. xxxxxxxxxxxx
55
Third Edition, p. 67 (1969). ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
56
Id. at 68. But you asked your friends or your associates to re-print, if they can(?)
57
Id. at 1115. ATTY. LAMBINO:
58
Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 2nd ed., p. 46. Yes, Your Honor.
59
Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Executive Secretary, No. L-361432, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367-368. Okay, so you got 6.3 Million signatures, but you only printed 100
60
J. M. Aruego, The New Philippine Constitution Explained, iii-iv (1973). thousand. So you're saying, how many did your friends print of the
61
E. Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 422-425 (1984). petition?
62
N. Gonzales, Philippine Political Law 30 (1969 ed.). ATTY. LAMBINO:
63
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, I can no longer give a specific answer to that, Your Honor. I relied
1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337 quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Alt. only to the assurances of the people who are volunteering that they
220 (1886). are going to
64
L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367. reproduce the signature sheets as well as the draft petition that we
65
i record, constitutional commission 373 (July 8, 1986). have given them, Your Honor.
66
The opinion was actually made by Justice Felix Antonio. xxxxxxxxxxxx
67
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 64, citing Wheeler v. Board of ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327 (1946). Did you also show this amended petition to the people?
68
T. M. Cooley, I A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 143-144 (8th ed. 1927). ATTY. LAMBINO:
69
H.C. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law S. 47, p. 67 (2 nd ed. Your Honor, the amended petition reflects the copy of the original
1897). petition that we circulated, because in the original petition that we filed
70
V. Sinco, supra note 58. before the COMELEC, we omitted a certain paragraph that is, Section
71
Ibid. 4 paragraph 3 which were part of the original petition that we
72
No. L-1232, 79 Phil. 819, 826 (1948). circulated and so we have to correct that oversight because that is
73
IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (September 17, 1986). what we have circulated to the people and we have to correct that…
74
Id. at 752. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
75
Id. at 769. But you just stated now that what you circulated was the petition of
76
Id. at 767-769. August 25, now you are changing your mind, you're saying what you
77
Id. at 377. circulated was the petition of August 30, is that correct?
78
Id. at 395. ATTY. LAMBINO:
79
Sinco, supra note 58, at 22. In effect, yes, Your Honor.
80
Id. at 20-21. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
81
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996, 257 So, you circulated the petition of August 30, but what you filed in the
SCRA 727. COMELEC on August 25 was a different petition, that's why you have
82
G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 530. to amend it?
83
Sinco, supra note 58, at 29. ATTY. LAMBINO:
84
State v. Moore, 103 Ark 48, 145 SW 199 (1912); Whittemore v. Seydel, 74 Cal We have to amend it, because there was an oversight, Your Honor,
App 2d 109 (1946). that
85
Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 1998 MT 53 (1998). we have omitted one very important paragraph in Section 4 of our
86
G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 492, 516-517, citing 42 proposition.
Am. Jur. 2d, p. 653. xxxxxxxxxxxx
87
Memorandum for petitioner Aumentado, pp. 151-152. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
88
Id. at 153-154. Okay, let's be clear. What did you circulate when you gathered the
89
L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 360-361. signatures, the August 25 which you said you circulated or the August
90
Section 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution. 30?
91
Annex "3," Opposition-In-Intervention of Oppositors-Intervenors ONEVOICE, ATTY. LAMBINO:
INC., et al. Both the August 25 petition that included all the provisions, Your
 7
Honor, and as amended on August 30. Because we have to include Balitzer, Alfred, The Initiative and Referendum: A Study and Evaluation of
the one that Direct Legislation, The California Roundtable 13 (1981). The American Founding
we have inadvertently omitted in the August 25 petition, Your Honor. Fathers recognized that direct democracy posed a profound threat to individual
xxxxxxxxxxxx rights and liberty. The U.S. Constitution was "designed to provide a system of
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: government that would prevent either a tyranny of the majority or a tyranny of
And (you cannot tell that) you can only say for certain that you printed the few." James Madison "warned against the power of a majority or a minority
100 thousand copies? of the population 'united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
ATTY. LAMBINO: of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
That was the original printed matter that we have circulated by the aggregate interest of the community.'
8
month of February, Your Honor, until some parts of March, Your Gilbert Hahn & Steven C. Morton, Initiative and Referendum – Do They
Honor. Encourage or Impair Better State Government? 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 927
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: (1977).
9
That is all you can assure us? Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Initiatives and
ATTY. LAMBINO: Referenda: Issues in Citizen Lawmaking (1986).
10
That is all I can assure you, Your Honor, except that I have asked Sec. 1, Article II, Constitution.
11
some In re Initiative Petition No. 362 State Question 669, 899 P.2d 1145 (Okla.
friends, like for example (like) Mr. Liberato Laos to help me print out 1995).
some more of this petition… (TSN, September 26, 2006, pp. 7-17) TINGA, J.:
105 1
Section 2 (1), Article IX – C, 1987 Constitution. G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
106 2
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Florenz G.R. No. 129754, 23 September 1997.
3
D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Petitioner Aumentado aptly refers to the comment of the late Senator Raul
Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres. Roco that the Santiago ruling "created a third specie of invalid laws, a mongrel
107
Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. type of constitutional but inadequate and, therefore, invalid law." Memorandum
Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban. for Aumentado, p. 54.
108 4
Justice Jose C. Vitug. See Civil Code, Art. 9.
109 5
Only fourteen (14) justices participated in the deliberations as Justice 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
6
Teodoro R. Padilla took no part on account of his relationship with the lawyer of Id., at 10; citing I Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines 43 (1990)
one of the parties. and Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 113
110
Citing conscience as ground. (1921).
111 7
409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972). See Dissenting Opinion, Manila International Airport Authority v. City of
112
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Arkansas Parañaque, G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006. In my ponencia in Globe Telecom
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1730 n. 7, 95 L. Ed. 2d (1987); v. NTC, G.R. No. 143964, 26 July 2004, 435 SCRA 110, I further observed that
France v. Nelson, 292 Ark. 219, 729 S.W. 2d 161 (1987). while an administrative agency was not enslaved to obey its own precedent, it
113
40 P. 3d 886 (2006). was "essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an
114
781 P. 2d 973 (Alaska, 1989). administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action, that it explain
115
Id. at 982-84 (Compton, J., concurring). thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous
116
Id. at 975-78. standards should no longer apply or should be overturned." Id., at 144. Happily,
117
Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W. 2d 98 (1976). Justice Puno's present opinion expressly elucidates why Santiago should be
118
112 Fla. 734, 151 So. 284 (1933). reversed.
119 8
Penned by Justice Whitfield, and concurred in by Chief Justice Davis and As Justice Frankfurter once wrote: "We recognize that stare decisis embodies
Justice Terrell; Justices Ellis, Brown and Buford are of the opinion that chapter an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is
15938, Acts of 1933, is a special or local law not duly advertised before its rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare
passage, as required by sections 20 and 21 of article 3 of the state Constitution, decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
and therefore invalid. This evenly divided vote resulted in the affirmance of the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence
validity of the statute but did not constitute a binding precedent on the Court. involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically
120
62 S. Ct. 552 (1942). sounder, and verified by experience… This Court, unlike the House of Lords,
121
329 F. 2d 541 (1964). has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction."
122
239 F. 2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-121 (1940).
123 9
Citing Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 S. Ct. 621 (1910). 351 Phil. 692 (1998).
124 10
331 N.E. 2d 65 (1975). As Chief Justice Panganiban then cited: "For instance, Ebralinag vs. Davision
125
Neil v. Biggers, supra note 108. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, March 1, 1993, reversed
126
Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 Mees. & W. 261; Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas. the Court's 34-year-old doctrine laid down in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education,
274. 106 Phil 2, August 12, 1959, and upheld the right of Jehovah's Witnesses "to
127
Maglalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85692, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs." Similarly,
808, 811, 812; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, G.R. No. Olaguer vs. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, May 22, 1987, abandoned the
96921, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118. 12-year-old ruling in Aquino Jr. vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546, May 9,
128
No. L-35440, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 839, citing Anticamara v. Ong, No. 1975, which recognized the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try civilians for
L-29689, April 14, 1978, 82 SCRA 337. offenses allegedly committed during martial law. The Court likewise reversed
129
Supra note 1. itself in EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, April 29, 1987, when it vacated its
QUISUMBING, J.: earlier ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245, June 29,
1
Political questions have been defined as "Questions of which the courts of 1983, on the validity of certain presidential decrees regarding the determination
justice will refuse to take cognizance, or to decide, on account of their purely of just compensation. In the much earlier case of Philippine Trust Co. vs.
political character, or because their determination would involve an Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, December 8, 1933, the Court revoked its holding in
encroachment upon the executive or legislative powers; e.g., what sort of Involuntary Insolvency of Mariano Velasco & Co., 55 Phil 353, November 29,
government exists in a state…." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1319 citing Kenneth 1930, regarding the relation of the insolvency law with the then Code of Civil
v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L.Ed. 316. Procedure and with the Civil Code. Just recently, the Court, in Kilosbayan vs.
2
See 1987 Const., Art. XVII, Sec. 2. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995, also abandoned the earlier grant of
3
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106. standing to petitioner-organization in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110,
4
G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. May 5, 1994." Id., at 780.
11
CORONA, J.: Ibid.
1 12
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616. 129 Phil. 507, 516 (1967).
2 13
336 Phil. 848 (1997). G.R. Nos. L-78461, L-79146, & L-79212, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67, 75.
3 14
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134787, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA G.R. No. 160427, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 319, 326.
15
1. Ibid.
4 16
Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, vol. I, 2001 edition, p. 419. G.R. No. 155855, 26 January 2004, 421 SCRA 92.
5 17
Sec. 30, Petitions and initiatives by the people, 16 Am Jur 2d 380, citing State Id., at 104. Relatedly, the Court held that "[c] ontests which do not involve the
ex rel. Stenberg v. Beermann, 240 Neb. 754, 485 N.W. 2d 151 (1992). election, returns and qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to the
6
Id. citing Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 83 Ill. 2d exercise of the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative
236, 47 Ill. Dec. 363, 415 N.E. 2d 368 (1980). agencies". Ibid.
18 8
See e.g., Memorandum of Oppositors-Intervenors Senators Pimentel, Jr., et. G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
9
al., pp. 19-22; Memorandum for Intervenor Senate of the Philippines, pp. 34-35. V. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concept 46 (1962).
19
See 1987 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26(1). See also Section 19[1]. 1987 Const, Art.
VIII.
20
See e.g., Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291 (1941); Cordero v. Hon.
Jose Cabatuando, et al., 116 Phil. 736, 741 (1962).
21
See Tio v. VRB, G.R. No. L-75697, 18 June 1987, 151 SCRA 208, 214-215;
citing Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 8 A.L.R. 466, 470. See also
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147387 & 152161, 10 December
2003, 417 SCRA 503, 519.
22
"As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title - one
subject rule." Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359
(1997).
23
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815; 22
February 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
24
Id. at 337. I have previously expressed my own doubts in relying on the
constitutional or legislative deliberations as a definitive source of construction. "It
is easy to selectively cite passages, sometimes out of their proper context, in
order to assert a misleading interpretation. The effect can be dangerous.
Minority or solitary views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude
witticisms, may improperly acquire the mantle of legislative intent by the sole
virtue of their publication in the authoritative congressional record. Hence, resort
to legislative deliberations is allowable when the statute is crafted in such a
manner as to leave room for doubt on the real intent of the legislature." Southern
Cross Cement Corporation v. Phil. Cement Manufacturers, G.R. No. G.R. No.
158540, 8 July 2004, 434 SCRA 65, 95.
25
77 Phil. 192 (1946).
26
Id. at 215.
27
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 23, at 338; citing
Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203 S.W. 2d 734, 356 Mo. 808.
28
See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 Const., Sec. 2, Art.
XVI.
29
G.R. No. 151944, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 365.
30
Id., at 377. Emphasis supplied.
31
See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 Const., Sec. 2, Art.
XVI.
32
From the "Funeral Oration" by Pericles, as recorded by Thucydides in the
History of the Peloponnesian War.
33
H. Zinn, A People's History of the United States (1980 ed.), at 95.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
The full text of the Preamble reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God,
in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure
to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.
2
Article XVII, Constitution.
3
G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
4
Id. at 157.
5
Id. at 124.
6
Olac v. Rivera, G.R. No. 84256, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 321, 328-329;
See also the more recent cases of Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108, 27
April 2005, 457 SCRA 400; and PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 421
Phil. 821 (2001).
7
Supra note 2 at 124.
8
G.R. No. 129754.
9
Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. to the
Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in G.R. No. 129754, PIRMA v.
COMELEC, pp. 2-3.
10
Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 628, 650 (1999).
11
Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, 16 October 1997.
12
Santiago v. Comelec, supra note 2 at 170-171.
13
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 352.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
1
G.R. No. 127535, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
2
Id.
3
Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No.
141386, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 196, 202.
4
United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of
International Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002, 391
SCRA 522, 533.
5
PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Carlos M. Farrales, G. R. No.
109648, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 155, 166-167.
6
Id.
7
Florentino v. Rivera, et al., G. R. No. 167968, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA
522, 529.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE
AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA,
PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN,
JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and
JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf. After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention
held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first
Constitutional Convention. formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on
September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1
Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. reading thus: .
Intervenors in their own behalf.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on
Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which
the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,
submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of
the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing
resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of
law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring
the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done
by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for
being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the
COMELEC, the Count required that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor
General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action
as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its
answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and
considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in
a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the
expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also
ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first
appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon
Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments
and even possible confusion, and considering that with the principal parties
being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately
protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the
ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest
in the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus,
Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan,
Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all
distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly.
The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all
interests involved should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any
rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave to intervene or
to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other
delegates and some private parties, the latter in representation of their minor
children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with the records and
the Court acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in
the extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of
1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the
Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution
namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16,
1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention
were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing
legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2
read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from
each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those
required of Members of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and
considered part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in an election at which they are submitted to the people for their ratification
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the
different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE
TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is
amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over
and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for
one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the
Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to
coincide with the local elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for
the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will
be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00
from its savings or from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced
plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no savings or unexpended
sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per
diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called
upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above)
resolution." The said letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known
as the Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the
Convention implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional
Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official
ballots, election returns and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its
expense; jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which
printing and shipment of said ballots and election forms; and concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very
case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice
time so that they could be distributed at the same time that the Commission will Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the elections on November
8, 1971. As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court —
speaking through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared
Governors' statement of the genesis of the above proposal: that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."
Committee to implement the Resolution.
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the issue submitted thereto as a political one declined to pass upon the question
President who then transmitted them to the Commission on Elections. whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed
amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental
the implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v.
enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of transmittal above referred Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851,
to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum). March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias
v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that
RECESS RESOLUTION the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the
approved a resolution authored by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
calling for a recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to November 9, necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by
1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said
Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest
are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively). number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as
members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by the representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground
Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the
Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced
Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with said in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were political questions the
implementation. determination of which is beyond judicial review.

Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto
and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1,
Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the
holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, people — as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours
provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of (Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to
Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the
plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1,
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is
exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the said that Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as
Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly.
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, (Of
and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and amending the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the
intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government including
details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention the Constitution itself.
may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a
necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the
this power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise,
accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet
that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly
jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political question and that confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power
the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution),
such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent
has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a
Auditor of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their constituent assembly — violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable not
answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one. political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view
may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are
of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the unanimous on this point.
members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the
other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the
jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and
impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents and
by taking them out of context. intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional
Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in check and balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
the case of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
entirely new government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
or of a revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
the convention is completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers
as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly the
of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came into being limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should
only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting be in any living Constitution. In the United States where no express
as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
Constitution which provides: moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS more than one and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted,
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three- if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our
fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives Constitution.
voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any department of the existing invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with the obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its officers and This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this
Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike
subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it is conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner
equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
resolution providing for the taking of private property without just compensation expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare departments of the government.
war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy between But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our
private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation of the Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of
distribution of powers in the Constitution. James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ...
cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, aggression on the authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate
the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a analysis then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to
citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation
existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or rooms and court chambers.
not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the
Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December
on some authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated system of 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the
government established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December
intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making. election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly;
notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National
very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading: the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no
effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral
departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the
and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should
hard to say where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social be upheld.
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt
to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican
among the integral or constituent units thereof. government established in our country in the light of American experience and of
our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries.
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting The Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow
that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the
English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is
interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which
have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in
their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret
the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be
the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume
what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921
expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of
statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa.
Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional
Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts.
121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional
courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by
the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and
undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system
which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask
these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority,
we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case,
this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in
Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority
between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all
such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them,
on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like
the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies
constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic
or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of
the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the
present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the
people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by
authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the
Court over the present case. It goes without saying that We do this not because
the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the
control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are
subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and
authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn
duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which
petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it
within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own
fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment
reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1
of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution
No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent
implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most
accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue which the Court is called
upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the
constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a
matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and
that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the
proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people for ratification,
his only purpose in filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to
prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines
even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most laudable
undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this
case is limited solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within the power
of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the
constitutional amendment proposed in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No.
1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject
question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers,
at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge
and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the
preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments affecting other
parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself
expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed "shall be without
prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971
Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other
portions of the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may
say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or
means the individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the
fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to
vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt
in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it
will not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may be
presented to the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of
the youth have not blinded them to the absolute necessity, under the
fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed,
of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity
of purpose cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the
problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a
great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of
the Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their
incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful
changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental
institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-
being and economic security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well
as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources
and the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of
achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm
which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the
streets, plazas and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the
rest of the people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence;
what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the
pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the
present order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to
the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in
deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the
imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other departments of
the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the
Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by
interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper
parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other
cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for
constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced that meaningful change is
the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any
obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there
are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the
existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from
which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments
which shall form part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in
principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective
judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of
things, as they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the
Convention may propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing
constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it
may be to resolve, this grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider
this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional
duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them
in which respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have
them squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the
imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be
of the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and
unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as signed mission in the
manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear up
doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to the
specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional
crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a
very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be
resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and
this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must
accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the government, and
certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that
regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that
the Convention came into being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant
to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this
opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation
and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the
Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all
the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter
task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions
of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the
framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same
should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an
ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power, second to
none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding
fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations
generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future
and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the
country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in
preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it is
intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study.
It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no
less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be
conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very
nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed
earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that
they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent
conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of
the latter see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily
mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more importantly,
because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for
some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the
needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against
precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods
or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations
and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in
regard to the process of their amendment. And when such limitations or
conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in the
delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and
disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their
original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the
number and nature and the scope and extent of the amendments the
Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass
on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or
not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to
be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be
exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power can be exercised
concurrently by the Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of
present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question,
grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a
consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the
need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case,
for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the
plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any
pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more
appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important
and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or
condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the
act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is
the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It
being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the
plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of
the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of
the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec
in that direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt
says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a
convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that
Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely
provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt
as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment
or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or
convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means
only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and
appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution
is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed,
any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only
because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if
it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one
hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive
articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and
nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is
inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any
part which is out of tune with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for
the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people
play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is
submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated
whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they
can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a
study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts
and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted
to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can
study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing
constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment
as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding
already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is
evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally
will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the
constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the
right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote
intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed
that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to
eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he
does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication
whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for
future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes
in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to
approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether
the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or
not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for
each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the
difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and
aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine
the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which
the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification
of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the
voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the
nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the
present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the
merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing
Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them
cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present
Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or
"election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can
base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present
Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that
intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed
amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the
proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking
for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the
Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on
the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the
Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution
which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not
the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light
God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned
plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the
constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution
No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate
the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose.
We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment;
We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the
same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the
other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic
Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing
acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of
a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent
Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null
and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any
action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do
executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or
spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote
blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of
extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word "submitted"
can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we
are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000
citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of
the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in
effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification,
should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or
rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is
ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers
of this concurring opinion, in the following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such
amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon is to be
diverted by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national
officials. The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character
thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could
have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered
and voted upon an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention
to the subject.4
you not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?," would seem to be
uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which
appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all.

Separate Opinions A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the
MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote — average voter. Why should the voting age be lowered at all, in the first place?
Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old
majority of the Court on just one ground, which to be sure achieves the result so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In
from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to
validity of the premises postulated and conclusions reached in support of the vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past elections, has not
dispositive portion of the decision. However, considering the urgent nature of performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will
this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion on the particular the Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an
issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and the fact that a dissent on the unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional Convention in having this
said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the
the petition are also considered and ruled upon — a task that would be members of the Convention have future political plans which they want to begin
premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to this reservation. to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is
approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring: the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be required to
render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be
inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we do not express our unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment,
which is not in issue here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a
addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people. domain (of searching questions) the bounds of which are not immediately
ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional litany. And the answers cannot be had except as the questions are debated
dimension which, although they would seem to be superfluous because of the fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.
reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main
opinion, nevertheless appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by
scope. election time will not be, sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects
of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively
amendments and submit each separately to the people for ratification, we are distracted from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits
nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of title of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local
proposed amendment in question within the meaning and intendment of Section elections and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the
1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election is not the wisdom of the proposed amendment.
proper election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on words, "at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not
Elections,2 expounded his view, with which we essentially agree, on the been met.
minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper
submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This is what FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
he said:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo, constituent power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state
characterized by clarity and vigor, its manifestation of fealty to the rule of law decisions."4
couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution
occupies the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and 2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously
Constitutional Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to its stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any limitation on the power the
supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads:
what is allowable, if not indeed required by the Constitution, my conformity does "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the
not extend as far as the acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
presented is indeed novel, not being controlled by constitutional prescription, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
definite and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express recognition in purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
the Constitution of the powers of the Constitutional Convention to propose approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
amendments, I cannot discern any objection to the validity of its action there are submitted to the people for their ratification."
being no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach
all the more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to be done Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two
is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according to our Constitution, steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent
sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself unable bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein
to join my brethren. provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once
assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the Philippines,
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may
by reliance on, implicit in the petition and the answer of intervenors, such determine what amendments it would have the people ratify and thereafter take
concepts as legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by all the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may
petitioner on the one hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional be obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed
sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is gratifying to note that during the oral of all the necessary authority to assure that whatever amendments it seeks to
argument of petitioner and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there introduce would be submitted to the people at an election called for that
apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all parties, as should be purpose. It would appear to me that to view the convention as being denied a
the case, expressly avowing the primacy of the Constitution, the applicable prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be
provision of which as interpreted by this Court, should be controlling on both to place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable.
Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in at least one Congress and constitutional convention are agencies for submitting proposals
American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing the under the fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the
doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a constitutional convention are other. No justification for such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice
dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred exists.
directly by the fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to
the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary
the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made legislation before the convention could be enabled to have its proposals voted
subordinate to the legislature. Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously on by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive
expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its holding though branches that could, whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the
finds no support under our constitutional provision. amending process. I am the first to admit that such likelihood is remote, but if
such a risk even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional force of an applicable constitutional provision requires otherwise. Considering
convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution that a constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional
is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom restrictions on the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for
sovereignty resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to interpret
convention. It is an agency entrusted with the responsibility of high import and Article XV in such a way that would not sanction such restraint on the authority
significance it is true; it is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is that must be recognized as vested in a constitutional convention. There is
what sovereignty connotes. It has to yield to the superior force of the nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a reasonable
Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by which freed from pernicious
an alter ego of the people. It is to be admitted that there are some American abstractions, it would be easier to accommodate a constitution to the needs of
state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v. Fredericks,3 a an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that
Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different conclusion. The time inevitably brings in its wake.
doctrine therein announced cannot bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that
the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the
termed constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or challenged resolution was well within the power of the convention. That would
proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of
popular approval. appraising the legitimate scope of its competence. That would be, for me, to give
added vigor and life to the conferment of authority vested in it, attended by such
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and grave and awesome responsibility.
constitutional convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are coordinate,
there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power 3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV
of proposing amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional providing that such amendment shall be valid when submitted and thereafter
convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar
which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that
to the legislative body that the call to a convention must proceed, but once there is to be only one election and that therefore the petition must be sustained
convened, it cannot in any wise be interfered with, much less controlled by as only when the convention has finished its work should all amendments
Congress. A contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate, proposed be submitted for ratification. That is not for me, and I say this with
and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be looked upon as if respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is true that the Constitution uses the
it were one of the three coordinate departments which under the principle of word "election" in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should
separation of powers is supreme within its field and has exclusive cognizance of be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling force in
matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language
appropriate principle that should govern the relationship between a constitutional in the singular but from the mosaic of significance derived from the total context.
convention and a legislative body under American law is that found in Orfield's It could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does
work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was not commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive
absolute. The convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed. Petitioner's stress on
other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and
subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A third and It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional
intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not and therefore is not such as was contemplated in this article. I do not find such
sovereign, is a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did seek to
constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its consult the wishes of the people by the proposed submission of a tentative
amendatory provision is an argument for its validity. It might be said of course
that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the
electorate. There is plausibility in such a view. A literal reading of the
Constitution would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me,
be satisfied. From its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy
to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the
popular will. In that sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas
Reed Powel, is not silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem the more
important consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate
his source of authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the
principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers by the
express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of
thinking be inconsistent with the fundamental principle that it is in the people,
and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of
extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word "submitted"
can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we
are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000
citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of
the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in
effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification,
should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or
rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is
ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .

4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority,
an action to restrain or prohibit respondent Commission on Elections from
conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the
Commission on Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in
its capacity as the constitutional agency to take charge of all laws relative to the
conduct of election. That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article
X of the Constitution.5 It is not precluded from assisting the Constitutional
Convention if pursuant to its competence to amend the fundamental law it
seeks, as in this case, to submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the
electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be implied that under the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons
from the Convention to aid it in the legitimate discharge of its functions.6
The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force
that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no alternative but to dissent
from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic
premises, the conclusion arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any
wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers
of this concurring opinion, in the following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such
amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon is to be
diverted by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national
officials. The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character
thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could
have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered
and voted upon an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention
to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do
you not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?," would seem to be
uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which
appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all.

Separate Opinions A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the
MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote — average voter. Why should the voting age be lowered at all, in the first place?
Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old
majority of the Court on just one ground, which to be sure achieves the result so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In
from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to
validity of the premises postulated and conclusions reached in support of the vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past elections, has not
dispositive portion of the decision. However, considering the urgent nature of performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will
this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion on the particular the Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an
issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and the fact that a dissent on the unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional Convention in having this
said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the
the petition are also considered and ruled upon — a task that would be members of the Convention have future political plans which they want to begin
premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to this reservation. to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is
approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring: the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be required to
render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be
inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we do not express our unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment,
which is not in issue here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a
addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people. domain (of searching questions) the bounds of which are not immediately
ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional litany. And the answers cannot be had except as the questions are debated
dimension which, although they would seem to be superfluous because of the fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.
reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main
opinion, nevertheless appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by
scope. election time will not be, sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects
of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively
amendments and submit each separately to the people for ratification, we are distracted from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits
nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of title of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local
proposed amendment in question within the meaning and intendment of Section elections and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the
1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election is not the wisdom of the proposed amendment.
proper election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on words, "at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not
Elections,2 expounded his view, with which we essentially agree, on the been met.
minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper
submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This is what FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
he said:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo,
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or characterized by clarity and vigor, its manifestation of fealty to the rule of law
spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution
blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original occupies the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a Constitutional Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to its
supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of
what is allowable, if not indeed required by the Constitution, my conformity does
not extend as far as the acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question
presented is indeed novel, not being controlled by constitutional prescription,
definite and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express recognition in
the Constitution of the powers of the Constitutional Convention to propose
amendments, I cannot discern any objection to the validity of its action there
being no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach
all the more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to be done
is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according to our Constitution,
sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself unable
to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved
by reliance on, implicit in the petition and the answer of intervenors, such
concepts as legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by
petitioner on the one hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional
sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is gratifying to note that during the oral
argument of petitioner and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there
apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all parties, as should be
the case, expressly avowing the primacy of the Constitution, the applicable
provision of which as interpreted by this Court, should be controlling on both
Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in at least one
American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing the
doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a constitutional convention are
dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred
directly by the fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to
the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to
the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made
subordinate to the legislature. Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously
expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its holding though
finds no support under our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional
convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution
is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom
sovereignty resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a
convention. It is an agency entrusted with the responsibility of high import and
significance it is true; it is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is
what sovereignty connotes. It has to yield to the superior force of the
Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is
an alter ego of the people. It is to be admitted that there are some American
state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v. Fredericks,3 a
Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different conclusion. The
doctrine therein announced cannot bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that
the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately
termed constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or
proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to
popular approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and
constitutional convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are coordinate,
there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power
of proposing amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional
convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the Constitution
which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is
to the legislative body that the call to a convention must proceed, but once
convened, it cannot in any wise be interfered with, much less controlled by
Congress. A contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate,
and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be looked upon as if
it were one of the three coordinate departments which under the principle of
separation of powers is supreme within its field and has exclusive cognizance of
matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the
appropriate principle that should govern the relationship between a constitutional
convention and a legislative body under American law is that found in Orfield's
work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was
absolute. The convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the
other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and
subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A third and
intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not
sovereign, is a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing
constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its
constituent power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state
decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously be satisfied. From its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy
stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any limitation on the power the to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the
Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads: popular will. In that sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas
"The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two
steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent
bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein
provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once
assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the Philippines,
possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may
determine what amendments it would have the people ratify and thereafter take
all the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may
be obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed
of all the necessary authority to assure that whatever amendments it seeks to
introduce would be submitted to the people at an election called for that
purpose. It would appear to me that to view the convention as being denied a
prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be
to place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable.
Congress and constitutional convention are agencies for submitting proposals
under the fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the
other. No justification for such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice
exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary
legislation before the convention could be enabled to have its proposals voted
on by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive
branches that could, whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the
amending process. I am the first to admit that such likelihood is remote, but if
such a risk even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling
force of an applicable constitutional provision requires otherwise. Considering
that a constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional
restrictions on the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for
that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to interpret
Article XV in such a way that would not sanction such restraint on the authority
that must be recognized as vested in a constitutional convention. There is
nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a reasonable
interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by which freed from pernicious
abstractions, it would be easier to accommodate a constitution to the needs of
an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that
time inevitably brings in its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the
challenged resolution was well within the power of the convention. That would
be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of
appraising the legitimate scope of its competence. That would be, for me, to give
added vigor and life to the conferment of authority vested in it, attended by such
grave and awesome responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV
providing that such amendment shall be valid when submitted and thereafter
approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar
to the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that
there is to be only one election and that therefore the petition must be sustained
as only when the convention has finished its work should all amendments
proposed be submitted for ratification. That is not for me, and I say this with
respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is true that the Constitution uses the
word "election" in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should
be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling force in
constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language
in the singular but from the mosaic of significance derived from the total context.
It could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does
not commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive
vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed. Petitioner's stress on
linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.
It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional
and therefore is not such as was contemplated in this article. I do not find such
contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did seek to
consult the wishes of the people by the proposed submission of a tentative
amendatory provision is an argument for its validity. It might be said of course
that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the
electorate. There is plausibility in such a view. A literal reading of the
Constitution would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me,
Reed Powel, is not silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem the more Representatives, shall place at the disposal of the Convention such personnel
important consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate premises, and furniture thereof as can, in their judgment be spared without
his source of authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the detriment to public service, without cost, refund or additional pay."
principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers by the
express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of
thinking be inconsistent with the fundamental principle that it is in the people,
and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.

4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority,
an action to restrain or prohibit respondent Commission on Elections from
conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the
Commission on Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in
its capacity as the constitutional agency to take charge of all laws relative to the
conduct of election. That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article
X of the Constitution.5 It is not precluded from assisting the Constitutional
Convention if pursuant to its competence to amend the fundamental law it
seeks, as in this case, to submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the
electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be implied that under the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons
from the Convention to aid it in the legitimate discharge of its functions.6

The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force
that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no alternative but to dissent
from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic
premises, the conclusion arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any
wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.

Footnotes
1 Under Section 36, Rule 138 as amended, no one may appear as amicus
curiae unless invited or allowed, by the Court.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:
1 L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 816-817.
2 L-28224, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 816-817.

3 Per Justice J.B.L. Reyes, concurred by Justices Arsenio P. Dizon, Calixto O.

Zaldivar, Fred Ruiz Castro and Eugenio Angeles.
4 21 SCRA 821.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1 Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874) cited in Malcolm and Laurel. Cases in
Constitutional Law, pp. 1, 4-5 (1936). It was therein stated: "In a governmental
and proper sense, law is the highest act of a people's sovereignty while their
government and Constitution remain unchanged. It is the supreme will of the
people expressed in the forms and by the authority of their Constitution. It is
their own appointed mode through which they govern themselves, and by which
they bind themselves. So long as their frame of government is unchanged in its
grant of all legislative power, these laws are supreme over all subjects
unforbidden by the instrument itself. The calling of a convention, and regulating
its action by law, is not forbidden in the Constitution. It is a conceded manner,
through which the people may exercise the rights reserved in the bill of rights. ...
The right of the people to restrain their delegates by law cannot be denied,
unless the power to call a convention by law, and the right of self protection be
also denied."
2 According to Sec. 1 of Art. II: "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." .
3 11 So. 472. The following excerpt appears in the opinion: "We have spoken of
the constitutional convention as a sovereign body, and that characterization
perfectly defines the correct view, in our opinion, of the real nature of that august
assembly. It is the highest legislative body known to freemen in a representative
government. It is supreme in its sphere. It wields the powers of sovereignty,
specially delegated to it, for the purpose and the occasion, by the whole
electoral body, for the good of the whole commonwealth. The sole limitation
upon its powers is that no change in the form of government shall be done or
attempted. The spirit of republicanism must breathe through every part of the
framework, but the particular fashioning of the parts of this framework is
confided to the wisdom the faithfulness, and the patriotism of this great
convocation, representing the people in their sovereignty." The Sproule decision
was cited with approval four years later by the Mississippi Supreme Court anew
in Dickson v. State, 20 So. 841. A 1908 decision of the Southern State of
Oklahoma, State v. Scales, 97 P. 584, admitted the controversial character of
the Sproule dictum.
4 Orfield on The Amending of the Federal Constitution, 45-46 (1942).
5 According to Sec. 2 of Article X of the Constitution: "The Commission on
Elections shall have exclusive charge of its enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions
which may be conferred upon it by law." Cf. Abcede v. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136
(1958).
6 "According to Sec. 14 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act
(1970):"Administration and Technical Assistance. -- All government entities,
agencies and instrumentalities, including the Senate and House of
Republic of the Philippines form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear to be a
SUPREME COURT perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General
Manila expressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued
EN BANC raised in said case.
G.R. No. L-28196      November 9, 1967
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit
vs.
and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts
GENERAL, respondents.
from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his
G.R. No. L-28224      November 9, 1967
answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is
vs.
"merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and filed an
No. 28196:
opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear before
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no
Juan T. David as amicus curiae Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the
No. 28224:
legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that the petition,
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
if granted, would, in effect, render in operational the legislative department; and
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
JURISDICTION
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No.
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court — speaking through
4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite
one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected
for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint
professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines,
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots,
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing
among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs.
in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic
Lopez Vito,5 this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political
Act No. 4913; and
one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void. cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which
was being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House
vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 6 Avelino vs.
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article Cuenco,7 Tañada vs. Cuenco, 8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the
VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest
member; number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said first party, as members, for the second party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal;
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to
each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the
be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. 10 It is part
on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty in a
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions republican state, such as ours11 — to make, and, hence, to amend their own
No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution
which shall be held on November 14, 1967. merely because the same explicitly grants such power. 12 Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements
October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents. of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine Constitution derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing
Association — hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA — were allowed to the same function,13 for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution —
argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution
likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred until after a itself .
substantially identical case brought by said organization before the Commission
on Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the
would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court — had been submitted thereto Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
for final determination, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in both Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise,
petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review by certiorari of the resolution of the they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet
Commission on Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly
answer of respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply confers upon the Supreme Court, 14 the power to declare a treaty
memorandum of respondent in L-28224. unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character of treaty-making
power.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a
taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a
for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although constituent assembly — violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth of political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view
this allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or information to may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter
should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under
unanimous on this point. legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the
conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal
THE MERITS
or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers.
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of not made a valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law. The effect
all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .
for their ratification.
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed,
make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or
either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In
becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall
either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the
the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such
expiration of said period.
amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in
to the people for their ratification." 1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made necessarily
before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the Commonwealth
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been
of the Philippines, or in 1938. 19 The assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for
approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would
House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged
be made. Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be
that said resolutions are null and void because:
certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as enumeration, would expire after the elections in 1938.
well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best,
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly
de facto Congressmen;
those on the legislative department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose — amendments bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said amendment,
or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both — that is to say, propose incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution regarding the
amendment and call a convention — at the same time; apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have known that the
three-year period therefor would expire after the elections scheduled to be held
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be and actually held in 1941.
submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in
which officers of the national and local governments — such as the elections Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 — will be chosen; and original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly
indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of the
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the
amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.
such conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to give the people a
reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last
amendments. enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows
that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963,
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore,
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on
provides: December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de
jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members,
one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among or at least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their
the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of respective offices, and were de facto officers.
their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one
Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a
three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision
Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are not
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither
fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse
representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law
and compact territory. on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a
mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress
of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to
Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence
facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after
Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably
No. 4913, are null and void. held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating
Congress — with a House of Representatives composed of members elected by
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said
three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a elections — remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the House
bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040, 17 purporting to make said of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of
apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the period
ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according aforementioned.
to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines. 18
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period stated in the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the
Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and that, in enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main
consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de facto function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory
officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or
provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of every ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article
IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be done is a
not automatic. political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a
Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the
General Election?
existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of
persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, Article XV of the Constitution provides:
likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished from the officer
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-
in question — is concerned. 21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and
fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from them
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold, before dealing with
Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments
them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices,
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
positions or employments. 22 One can imagine this great inconvenience,
submitted to the people for their ratification.
hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. 23 There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to
It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous
may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification
de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under
into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the
amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval
acts therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are not
independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact
third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs.
that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed amendments is
Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge
likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the
Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that,
choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial
meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held that the
and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are
objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto
addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election
Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko
of public officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either
was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one of the
alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the
parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as yet,
abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more
finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights had
patent when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the
vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet,
choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the
Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is
word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to
concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested and Republic
women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in connection
therewith. Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of
the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election. Some
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration
members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite,"
is untenable.
without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that
Available Alternatives to Congress constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not
transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either
focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon
propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose,
may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the
but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that
merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by
the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or."
extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations
Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances —
that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.
and none has brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the
amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which
vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26 should be promoted. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. The question
whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the
the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer
constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for
and those who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find
ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention
themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the
in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In
Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be
other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H.
deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter
Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and
of sheer speculation.
3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be
proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to
although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional — as ably set forth in the opinion
taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words, penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
they were not passed at the same time.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof the Spirit of the Constitution?
anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the
contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16,
sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically
any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question. Then again,
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to (1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the
propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;"
convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be (2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a
submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and in
argument must be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall
taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to remain posted therein until after the election;"
permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the
constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without (3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling
place, to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;" parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution — except,
perhaps, the woman's suffrage — and, consequently, debated thereon at some
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said political
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal
parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being
native languages, for free distributing:" and
contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place
ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967. — on a rather limited scale — on the latest proposals for amendment, have
been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon. A
inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals for legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain
amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time
the people of the amendment sought to be made. of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or
subject submitted to them for ratification, from the original Constitution down to approval of the law.
the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency
Act No. 4200, provides: or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends — in the view of those
published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute
consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a the minority — upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such
printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said
thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum
provincial government office building and in each polling place not number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under
later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty- R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to run for
five, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge
termination of the election. At least ten copies of the Constitution with the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We —
the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be who constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such
kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
electors during election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the
principal local dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by R. B.
Interior shall also be kept in each polling place. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however,
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful
No. 34, reading: reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof.
Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments
Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and the text of
least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots they will use.
posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office
building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or
of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional
continually until after the termination of the plebiscite. At least ten Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell
copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in English and in Spanish, such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the
shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3
qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run
in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place. We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom
amendments, is of the following tenor: of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not the authority of
Congress to approve the same.
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down
prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth in the
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers,
office building and in every polling place not later than May eighteen, pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere. The
nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be
the election. At least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative
each polling place to be made available for examination by the sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has
qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it
principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter
the Interior, shall also be kept therein. thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond
improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6)
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
effect that: violate the spirit of the Constitution.
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in
prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
office building and in every polling place not later than February
eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
therein until after the election. At least, ten copies of the said Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the
amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available question of jurisdiction.
for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When Separate Opinions
practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:
each polling place.
I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would make some
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in additional observations in connection with my concurrence. Sections 2 and 4 of
connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted Republic Act No. 4913 provide:
 Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three consecutive Ramon A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. come to this Court in separate petitions.
A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in
municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling
representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for
place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission on Elections,
seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least
Director of Printing and Auditor General from implementing and/or complying
five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling place
with Republic Act 4913, assailing said law as unconstitutional.
to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation,
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of Resolutions
shall be kept in each polling place. The Commission on Elections shall of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 of March 16, 1967.
make available copies of each amendments in English, Spanish and,
Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to the Filipino
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
people for approval the amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines
distribution.
proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of Both Houses
xxx      xxx      xxx Numbered 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the
date and manner of the election at which the aforesaid proposed amendments
Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the approval
shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.
of said amendments shall be printed in English and Pilipino and shall
Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two amendments to the
be in the size and form prescribed by the Commission on Elections:
Constitution: the first, to amend Sec. 5, Art. VI, by increasing the maximum
Provided, however, That at the back of said ballot there shall be
membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160
printed in full Resolutions of both Houses of Congress Numbered One
of said 180 seats and eliminating the provision that Congress shall by law make
and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and
an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration; the
sixty-seven, proposing the amendments: Provided, further, That the
second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by allowing Senators and Representatives to
questionnaire appearing on the face of the ballot shall be as follows:
be delegates to a constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five of Article
Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they are considered
VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?
together herein.
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section sixteen of
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as follows: (1)
Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?
Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, in submitting the
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall proposed amendments to the Constitution, to the people for approval, at the
write the word "yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect in general election of 1967 instead of at a special election solely for that purpose;
the blank space after each question; to vote for the rejection thereof, (2) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, since it was
he shall write the word "No" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint session required when Congress proposes
dialect. amendments to the Constitution, said Republic Act being a step in or part of the
process of proposing amendments to the Constitution; and (3) Republic Act
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without reference to
4913 violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Art.
extraneous factors and circumstances, the manner prescribed in the aforesaid
III), in not requiring that the substance of the proposed amendments be stated
provisions is sufficient for the purpose of having the proposed amendments
on the face of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed
submitted to the people for their ratification, as enjoined in Section 1, Article XV
amendments, such as by stating the provisions before and after said
of the Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else should have been required by
amendments, instead of printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed
the Act to make it adhere more closely to the constitutional requirement.
amendments.
Certainly it would have been out of place to provide, for instance, that
government officials and employees should go out and explain the amendments Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the procedure for amending
to the people, or that they should be the subject of any particular means or form the Constitution is concerned, the issue is cognizable by this Court under its
of public discussion. powers to review an Act of Congress to determine its conformity to the
fundamental law. For though the Constitution leaves Congress free to propose
The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act No. 4913 seems to
whatever Constitutional amendment it deems fit, so that the substance or
me predicated on the fact that there are so many other issues at stake in the
content of said proposed amendment is a matter of policy and wisdom and thus
coming general election that the attention of the electorate, cannot be entirely
a political question, the Constitution nevertheless imposes requisites as to the
focused on the proposed amendments, such that there is a failure to properly
manner or procedure of proposing such amendments, e.g., the three-fourths
submit them for ratification within the intendment of the Constitution. If that is so,
vote requirement. Said procedure or manner, therefore, from being left to the
then the defect is not intrinsic in the law but in its implementation. The same
discretion of Congress, as a matter of policy and wisdom, is fixed by the
manner of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for ratification
Constitution. And to that extent, all questions bearing on whether Congress in
may, in a different setting, be sufficient for the purpose. Yet I cannot conceive
proposing amendments followed the procedure required by the Constitution, is
that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law may be made to depend
perforce justiciable, it not being a matter of policy or wisdom.
willy-nilly on factors not inherent in its provisions. For a law to be struck down as
unconstitutional it must be so by reason of some irreconcilable conflict between Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1, Art. XV clearly does
it and the Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid, according not bear him on the point. It nowhere requires that the ratification be thru an
to circumstances not found in its provisions, such as the zeal with which they are election solely for that purpose. It only requires that it be at "an election at which
carried out. To such a thesis I cannot agree. The criterion would be too broad the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification." To join it with
and relative, and dependent upon individual opinions that at best are subjective. an election for candidates to public office, that is, to make it concurrent with such
What one may regard as sufficient compliance with the requirement of election, does not render it any less an election at which the proposed
submission to the people, within the context of the same law, may not be so to amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. To prohibition
another. The question is susceptible of as many views as there are viewers; and being found in the plain terms of the Constitution, none should be inferred. Had
I do not think this Court would be justified in saying that its own view on the the framers of requiring Constitution thought of requiring a special election for
matter is the correct one, to the exclusion of the opinions of others. the purpose only of the proposed amendments, they could have said so, by
qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely" or
On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification must necessarily be
"exclusively". They did not.
in a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such
procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is wise, or that it would
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their not have been better to provide for a separate election exclusively for the
ratification," and I do not subscribe to the restrictive interpretation that the ratification of the proposed amendments. The point however is that such
petitioners would place on this provision, namely, that it means only a special separate and exclusive election, even if it may be better or wiser, which again, is
election. not for this Court to decide, is not included in the procedure required by the
Constitution to amend the same. The function of the Judiciary is "not to pass
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation". 2 It is limited to
It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law, that no one can determining whether the action taken by the Legislative Department has violated
exercise any authority over the rights and interests of others except pursuant to the Constitution or not. On this score, I am of the opinion that it has not.
and in the manner authorized by law.1 Based upon this principle, petitioners
Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is deficient for not Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or wisdom of the
having been passed by Congress in joint session by 3/4 vote. proposed amendments. These are for the people in their sovereign capacity to
decide, not for this Court.
Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress cannot both call a
Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-
convention and propose amendments; second, that the present Congress is a
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
de facto one, since no apportionment law was adopted within three years from
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
the last census of 1960, so that the Representatives elected in 1961 are de
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments
facto officers only. Not being de jure, they cannot propose amendments, it is
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
argued.
of the votes cast at an election to which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification. As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress "may propose
amendments or call a convention for that purpose". The term "or", however, is
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution? If by the
frequently used as having the same meaning as "and" particularly in permissive,
term "propose amendment" is meant to determine WHAT said amendment shall
affirmative sentences so that the interpretation of the word "or" as "and" in the
be, then Republic Act 4913 does not; Resolutions of Both Houses 1 and 3
Constitution in such use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v.
already did that. If, on the other hand, it means, or also means, to provide for
Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it should be pointed out that
how, when, and by what means the amendments shall be submitted to the
the resolutions proposing amendments (R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from
people for approval, then it does.
that calling for a convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better
A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense. is the one or wise to amend the Constitution before a convention called for is elected, it
intended. Said Section has two sentences: in the first, it requires the 3/4 voting should not be fettered from doing so. For our purposes in this case, suffice it to
in joint session, for Congress to "propose amendments". And then in the second note that the Constitution does not prohibit it from doing so.
sentence, it provides that "such amendments . . . shall be submitted to the
As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art. VI of the
people for their ratification". This clearly indicates that by the term "propose
Constitution provides in part that "The Congress shall by law make an
amendments" in the first sentence is meant to frame the substance or the
apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not
content or the WHAT-element of the amendments; for it is this and this alone
otherwise". It however further states in the next sentence: "Until such
that is submitted to the people for their ratification. The details of when the
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have
election shall be held for approval or rejection of the proposed amendments, or
the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly,
the manner of holding it, are not submitted for ratification to form part of the
who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly
Constitution. Stated differently, the plain language of Section 1, Art. XV, shows
districts." The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a valid redistricting law
that the act of proposing amendments is distinct from — albeit related to — that
since the time the above provision was adopted, does not render the present
of submitting the amendments to the people for their ratification; and that the 3/4
districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself provides for its
voting requirement applies only to the first step, not to the second one.
continuance in such case, rendering legal and de jure the status quo.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be done thru an
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act
ordinary statute passed by Congress. The Constitution does not expressly state
4913, and fully concur with the opinion of the Chief Justice.
by whom the submission shall be undertaken; the rule is that a power not lodged
elsewhere under the Constitution is deemed to reside with the legislative body, FERNANDO, J., concurring:
under the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore validly enacted
At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The opinion prepared
Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner of submitting the
by the Chief Justice discusses the matter with a fullness that erases doubts and
proposed amendments to the people for their ratification. Since it does not
misgivings and clarifies the applicable principles. A few words may however be
"propose amendments" in the sense referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
added.
Constitution, but merely provides for how and when the amendments, already
proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same does not need the 3/4 vote in We start from the premise that only where it can be shown that the question is to
joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution. Furthermore, be solved by public opinion or where the matter has been left by the Constitution
Republic Act 4913 is an appropriation measure. Sec. 6 thereof appropriates to the sole discretion of any of the political branches, as was so clearly stated by
P1,000,000 for carrying out its provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution the then Justice Concepcion in Tañada v. Cuenco,1 may this Court avoid
states that "All appropriation . . . bills shall originate exclusively in the House of passing on the issue before it. Whatever may be said about the present
Representatives". Republic Act 4913, therefore, could not have been validly question, it is hard to speak with certitude considering Article XV, that Congress
adopted in a joint session, reinforcing the view that Sec. 1, Art. XV does not may be entrusted with the full and uncontrolled discretion on the procedure
apply to such a measure providing for the holding of the election to ratify the leading to proposals for an amendment of the Constitution.
proposed amendments, which must perforce appropriate funds for its purpose.
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this Court through
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913 offends against Justice Tuason followed Coleman v. Miller, 3 in its holding that certain aspects of
substantive due process. An examination of the provisions of the law shows no the amending process may be considered political. His opinion quoted with
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The publication in the approval the view of Justice Black, to which three other members of the United
Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting of notices in States Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself is political in its entirety,
public buildings not later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until after the "from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is
elections, the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." In a sense
places, aside from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient that would solve the matter neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at times
opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process arduous and in every case soul-searching process of determining whether the
refers only to providing fair opportunity; it does not guarantee that the procedure for amendments required by the Constitution has been followed.
opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and
the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity to be At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress, which cannot be
judicially inquired into at any rate, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a
informed is given, and it is, the due process clause is not infringed.
failure to observe the requirements of Article XV would occur. In the event that
Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand, and the judicial intervention is sought, to rely automatically on the theory of political
printing of the full proposed amendments at the back of the ballot instead of the question to avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy might under certain
substance thereof at the face of the ballot, do not deprive the voter of fair circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as nothing less than judicial
opportunity to be informed. The present wording of the Constitution is not being abdication or surrender.
veiled or suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to know them and
they are available should he want to check on what he is conclusively presumed What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an esteemed jurist, the late
to know. Should the voters choose to remain ignorant of the present Justice Tuason, would no longer be controlling. There is comfort in the thought
Constitution, the fault does not lie with Congress. For opportunity to familiarize that the view that then prevailed was itself a product of the times. It could very
oneself with the Constitution as it stands has been available thru all these years. well be that considering the circumstances existing in 1947 as well as the
Perhaps it would have been more convenient for the voters if the present particular amendment sought to be incorporated in the Constitution, the parity
wording of the provisions were also to be printed on the ballot. The same rights ordinance, the better part of wisdom in view of the grave economic
however is a matter of policy. As long as the method adopted provides situation then confronting the country would be to avoid the existence of any
sufficiently reasonable chance to intelligently vote on the amendments, and I obstacle to its being submitted for ratification. Moreover, the Republic being less
than a year old, American Supreme Court opinions on constitutional questions
think it does in this case, it is not constitutionally defective.
were-invariably accorded uncritical acceptance. Thus the approach followed by
Justice Tuason is not difficult to understand. It may be said that there is less
propensity now, which is all to the good, for this Court to accord that much City, for instance, may balk at the specific apportionment of the 160 seats set
deference to constitutional views coming from the quarter. forth in Resolution No. 1, and ask for a Congressman of their own, on the theory
of equal representation. And then, people may question the propriety of
Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to do injustice to his
4 permitting the increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in the forthcoming
memory. For as he stated in another major opinion in Araneta v. Dinglasan, in
constitutional convention and future conventions for fear that they may dominate
ascertaining the meaning to be given the Emergency Powers Act, 5 one should
its proceedings. They may entertain the belief that, if at all, increase in the
not ignore what would ensue if a particular mode of construction were followed.
number of Congressmen should be a proper topic for deliberation in a
As he so emphatically stated, "We test a rule by its results."
constitutional convention which, anyway, will soon take place. They probably
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed amendment on the would ask: Why the hurry? These ponderables require the people's close
economic survival of the country, an erroneous appraisal it turned out later, scrutiny.
constituted an effective argument for its submission. Why not then consider the
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy behind the
question political and let the people decide? That assumption could have been
constitutional directive that constitutional amendments be submitted to the
indulged in. It could very well be the inarticulate major premise. For many it did
people for their ratification.
bear the stamp of judicial statesmanship.
A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike a statute which
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear why as of this
may suffer amendments three or more times in the same year, it is intended to
date and in the foreseeable future judicial inquiry to assure the utmost
stand the test of time. It is an expression of the people's sovereign will.
compliance with the constitutional requirement would be a more appropriate
response. And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of submission for
ratification of amendments is that reasoning on the basis of the spirit of the
SANCHEZ, J., in separate opinion:
Constitution is just as important as reasoning by a strict adherence to the
Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep appreciation to Mr. Justice phraseology thereof. We underscore this, because it is within the realm of
Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro for their invaluable possibility that a Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths of the
contribution to the substance and form of the opinion which follows. Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the all important;
Bill of Rights in its entirety. We believe it to be beyond debate that in some such
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the constitutionality of situations the amendments ought to call for a constitutional convention rather
Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967. This Act seeks to implement than a legislative proposal. And yet, nothing there is in the books or in the
Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives Constitution itself. which would require such amendments to be adopted by a
on March 16, 1967 with the end in view of amending vital portions of the constitutional convention. And then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we
Constitution. are sure, forbids that proposals therefor be initiated by Congress and thereafter
Since the problem here presented has its roots in the resolutions aforesaid of presented to the people for their ratification.
both houses of Congress, it may just as well be that we recite in brief the salient In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words "submitted to the
features thereof. Resolution No. 1 increases the membership of the House of people for their ratification", if construed in the light of the nature of the
Representatives from 120 to 180 members, and immediately apportions 160 Constitution — a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people,
seats. A companion resolution is Resolution No. 3 which permits Senators and an — expression of their sovereign will — is that it can only be amended by the
Congressmen — without forfeiting their seats in Congress — to be members of people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the
the Constitutional Convention1 to be convened, as provided in another resolution Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for
— Resolution No. 2. Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They
Constitution (Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the people for their are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
ratification next November 14, 1967. Resolution No. 2 just adverted to calls for a original provisions compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to
constitutional convention also to propose amendments to the Constitution. The reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the
delegates thereto are to be elected on the second Tuesday of November 1970; incubus of extraneous or possibly in insidious influences. We believe, the word
the convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the amendments proposed by the "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities,
convention to be submitted to the people thereafter for their ratification. should strain every effort to inform very citizen of the provisions to be amended,
Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing the number of and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By
members of the House of representatives under Resolution No. 1, and that in this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or
Resolution No. 3 which gives Senators and Congressmen the right to sit as 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the
members of the constitutional convention to be convened on June 1, 1971. meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the
Because, these are the two amendments to be submitted to the people in the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment
general elections soon to be held on November 14, 1967, upon the provisions of for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
Section 1, Republic Act 4913, which reads: framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of
ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission
The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent, consent or
the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of both Houses rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendment no
Numbered One and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For, the people decree their
hundred and sixty- seven, shall be submitted to the people for own fate.
approval at the general election which shall be held on November
fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, in accordance with the Aptly had it been said:
provisions of this Act. . . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in this
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust upon us — the respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge
manner in which the amendments proposed by Congress just adverted to be Cooley, who has said "A good Constitution should beyond the reach
brought to the people's attention. of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed
for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people;
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that proposed not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved the excitement
amendments to the Constitution may become effective, Section 1, Article XV or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the
thereof commands that such amendments must be "approved by a majority of government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. . . . Changes in
the votes cast at an election at which amendments are submitted to the people government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign
for their ratification."2 The accent is on two words complementing each other, says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not
namely, "submitted" and "ratification." necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse." Am.
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the problem facing us. Law Rev. 1889, p. 3113
And this, because the amendments submitted are transcendental and 3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this proposition: If the people
encompassing. The ceiling of the number of Congressmen is sought to be are not sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to
elevated from 120 to 180 members; and Senators and Congressmen may run in conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner can
constitutional conventions without forfeiting their seats. These certainly affect the it be said that in accordance with the constitutional mandate, "the amendments
people as a whole. The increase in the number of Congressmen has its are submitted to the people for their ratification?" Our answer is "No".
proportional increase in the people's tax burdens. They may not look at this with
favor, what with the constitutional provision (Section 5, Article VI) that Congress We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967 — the statute that
"shall by law make an apportionment", without the necessity of disturbing the submits to the people the constitutional amendments proposed by Congress in
present constitutionally provided number of Congressmen. People in Quezon Resolutions 1 and 3. Section 2 of the Act provides the manner of propagation of
the nature of the amendments throughout the country. There are five parts in reflected in the sequence of uniform past practices. The Constitution had been
said Section 2, viz: amended thrice — in 1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case, the amendments were
embodied in resolutions adopted by the Legislature, which thereafter fixed the
(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive issues of
dates at which the proposed amendments were to be ratified or rejected. These
the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election.
plebiscites have been referred to either as an "election" or "general election". At
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in no time, however, was the vote for the amendments of the Constitution held
every municipality, city and provincial office building and in every simultaneously with the election officials, national or local. Even with regard to
polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and the 1947 parity amendment; the record shows that the sole issue was the 1947
sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. parity amendment; and the special elections simultaneously held in only three
provinces, Iloilo, Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were merely incidental thereto.
(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each
polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that guard against
electors during election day. indiscriminate changes in the Constitution that is theirs. Is it too much to ask that
reasonable guarantee be made that in the matter of the alterations of the law of
(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may the land, their true voice be heard? The answer perhaps is best expressed in the
be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each following thoughts: "It must be remembered that the Constitution is the people's
polling place. enactment. No proposed change can become effective unless they will it so
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said through the compelling force of need of it and desire for it."4
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be stricken down
principal native languages, for free distribution. as in violation of the Constitution.
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for dissemination of Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
information regarding the amendments effectively brings the matter to the Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result.
people. A dissection of the mechanics yields disturbing thoughts. First, the
Official Gazette is not widely read. It does not reach the barrios. And even if it REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
reaches the barrios, is it available to all? And if it is, would all under stand
I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez. To
English? Second, it should be conceded that many citizens, especially those in
approve a mere proposal to amend the Constitution requires (Art. XV) a three-
the outlying barrios, do not go to municipal, city and/or provincial office buildings,
fourths (3/4) vote of all the members of each legislative chamber, the highest
except on special occasions like paying taxes or responding to court
majority ever demanded by the fundamental charter, one higher even than that
summonses. And if they do, will they notice the printed amendments posted on
required in order to declare war (Sec. 24, Article VI), with all its dire
the bulletin board? And if they do notice, such copy again is in English (sample
consequences. If such an overwhelming majority, that was evidently exacted in
submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General) for, anyway, the statute does
order to impress upon all and sundry the seriousness of every constitutional
not require that it be in any other language or dialect. Third, it would not help any
amendment, is asked for a proposal to amend the Constitution, I find it
if at least five copies are kept in the polling place for examination by qualified
impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such
electors during election day. As petitioner puts it, voting time is not study time.
amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast
And then, who can enter the polling place, except those who are about to vote?
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
Fourth, copies in the principal native languages shall be kept in each polling
ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon to be diverted
place. But this is not, as Section 2 itself implies, in the nature of a command
by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials.
because such copies shall be kept therein only "when practicable" and "as may
The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof,
be determined by the Commission on Elections." Even if it be said that these are
and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have only
available before election, a citizen may not intrude into the school building where
meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted
the polling places are usually located without disturbing the school classes being
upon at an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the
held there. Fifth, it is true that the Comelec is directed to make available copies
subject. That this was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated
of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever practicable, in the
in the case of all other constitutional amendments in the past, that were
principal native languages, for free distribution. However, Comelec is not
submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively devoted to the issue
required to actively distribute them to the people. This is significant as to people
whether the legislature's amendatory proposals should be ratified or not.
in the provinces, especially those in the far-flung barrios who are completely
unmindful of the discussions that go on now and then in the cities and centers of Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
population on the merits and demerits of the amendments. Rather, Comelec, in Footnotes
this case, is but a passive agency which may hold copies available, but which 1
Urging the latter to refrain from implementing Republic Act. No. 4913 and from
copies may not be distributed at all. Finally, it is of common knowledge that submitting to a plebiscite in the general elections to be held on November 14,
Comelec has more than its hands full in these pre-election days. They cannot 1967, the Constitutional amendments proposed in the aforementioned R.B.H.
possibly make extensive distribution. Nos. 1 and 3.
2
Dated October 30, 1967.
Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even the official sample 3
78 Phil. 1.
ballot submitted to this Court would show that only the amendments are printed 4
63 Phil. 139, 157.
5
at the back. And this, in pursuance to Republic Act 4913 itself. Supra.
6
81 Phil. 818.
Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper notice of the 7
L-2851, March 4 and 14, 1949.
proposed amendments thru dissemination by publication in extenso. People do 8
L-10520, February 28, 1957.
9
not have at hand the necessary data on which to base their stand on the merits L-18684, September 14, 1961.
10
and demerits of said amendments. Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines.
11
Section 1, Art. II, Constitution of the Philippines.
We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the proposed 12
Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines.
13
constitutional amendments within the meaning and intendment of Section 1, Of amending the Constitution.
14
Article XV of the Constitution. And, inferentially, to lower courts.
15
Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution.
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the present election 16
Supra.
17
campaign the focus is on the election of candidates. The constitutional Approved, June 17, 1961.
18
amendments are crowded out. Candidates on the homestretch, and their Macias vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
19
Under the original Constitution providing for a unicameral legislative body,
leaders as well as the voters, gear their undivided efforts to the election of
whose members were chosen for a term of three (3) years (Section 1, Art. VI, of
officials; the constitutional amendments cut no ice with them. The truth is that the Original Constitution).
even in the ballot itself, the space accorded to the casting of "yes" or "no" vote 20
Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution.
would give one the impression that the constitutional amendments are but a 21
Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez and De los Angeles, 37 Phil. p. 192; Nacionalista
bootstrap to the electoral ballot. Worse still, the fortunes of many elective Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil., 126; Codilla vs. Martinez, L-14569, November 23,
officials, on the national and local levels, are inextricably intertwined with the 1960. See, also, State vs. Carrol, 38 Conn. 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell
results of the votes on the plebiscite. In a clash between votes for a candidate [N.Y.] 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheenan's Case, 122 Mass., 445; 23 Am. Rep.,
323.
and conscience on the merits and demerits of the constitutional amendments, 22
Torres vs. Ribo, 81 Phil. 50.
we are quite certain that it is the latter that will be dented. 23
Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, supra.
24
5. That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to People vs. Rogelio Gabitanan, 43 O.G. 3211.
25
53 Phil. 866.
equally ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement, is
26
50 Am. Jur., Sec. 282, pp. 267-268, citing Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, 284
Mich. 677, 280 NW 79, citing RCL; Robson v. Cantwell, 143 SC 104, 141 SE
180, citing RCL; Geiger v. Kobilka, 26 Wash 171, 66 P 423, Am. St. Rep. 733
and many others.
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
1
United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273.
2
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 1958, Justice Laurel, ponente.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
1
103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
2
78 Phil. 1 (1947).
3
307 US 433 (1939).
4
84 Phil. 368 (1940).
5
Commonwealth Act No. 671 (1941).
6
Araneta v. Dinglasan, supra, at p. 376.
SANCHEZ, J., separate opinion:
1
The text of the law reads: "He (Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives) may, however, be a Member of Constitutional Convention."
2
Emphasis supplied.
3
Ellingham vs. Dye, 99 N.E. pp. 4, 15; Emphasis supplied.
4
Elingham vs. Dye, supra, at p. 17; emphasis supplied.