A Military History of Japan

A Military History of Japan
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A Military History
of Japan
From the Age of the Samurai
to the 21st Century
John T. Kuehn
Copyright 2014 by John T. Kuehn
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of
brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the
publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kuehn, John T.
A military history of Japan : from the age of the Samurai to the 21st century /
John T. Kuehn
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–1–4408–0393–2 (hardback) — ISBN 978–1–4408–0394–9 (ebook)
1. Japan—History, Military. I. Title.
DS838.K84 2014
355.00952—dc23 2013033793
ISBN: 978–1–4408–0393–2
EISBN: 978–1–4408–0394–9
18 17 16 15 14 1 2 3 4 5
This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.
Visit www.abc-clio.com for details.
Praeger
An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC
ABC-CLIO, LLC
130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911
Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911
This book is printed on acid-free paper
Manufactured in the United States of America
For Robert “Suki” Kuehn; Tyler Wade Kuehn;
Captain John L. Kuehn, MC, USNR (retired); and
especially Sei-Chan, my second “mother,”
who took me to see the Tokyo Tower strapped to her back.
Contents
Illustrations ix
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xv
Selected Chronology xvii
Chapter 1 From the Sun Goddess to the Samurai 1
Chapter 2 The Wild East: Emergence of the Samurai and the
Collapse of the Regency 25
Chapter 3 Military Dictatorship: From the Genpei War to the
Onin War 61
Chapter 4 Warring States: From the Onin War to the Death of
Oda Nobunaga 87
Chapter 5 Taming the Samurai: From the Reunification of Japan
to the Last Samurai 111
Chapter 6 From the Yalu to the Yasukuni Shrine 145
Chapter 7 The Failure of Liberalism and the Triumph of
Militarism 169
Chapter 8 The Greater East Asian War 193
viii Contents
Chapter 9 After the Samurai 227
Notes 247
Bibliography 269
Index 281
Illustrations
MAPS
1.1 Geographic Areas of Japan 2
1.2 Provinces of Japan 3
1.3 Ancient Korea 13
2.1 Eastern Japan and the Tohoku Campaigns 30
2.2 The Kanto Plain Region: Masakado’s Rebellion 37
3.1 The Genpei War 63
3.2 The Mongol Invasions 78
4.1 Battles of the Sengoku 90
5.1 Battles in the Reunification of Japan 115
5.2 War in Korea, 1592–1598 121
5.3 The Meiji Restoration and Satsuma Rebellion 137
6.1 Japan, Korea, China, and Russia, 1880–1906 148
8.1 The Pacific Theater 202
FIGURES
4.1 The Battle of Nagashino, 1575 107
x Illustrations
5.1 The Battle of Sekigahara, 1600 129

6.1 “Crossing the T” 156
A photo essay follows page 144.
Preface
My first memories are of Japan. My father had convinced the U.S.

Navy to pay for his final years of medical school and in 1958 he
received orders to Atsugi, Naval Air Station. Atsugi is located on the
broad Kanto Plain west of Tokyo Bay. It was surrounded by rice fields
and binjo ditches (sewer or irrigation) as far as the eye could see. To-
day it is wall-to-wall houses and people. One can see the foothills of
the mountains that form the footstool for Mount Fuji and on clear days
one also sees the snow-capped cone of Fuji in the distance. Atsugi and
Japan were very different back then. To a two-and-a-half-year-old
what may have seemed alien to others equated to normal. By 1961,
the year our family moved back to the United States, I had experi-
enced two distinct cultures—that of the U.S. Naval Air Station and
then everything outside of it. Japan was still very much an occupied
country back then.
Two images especially remain. The first is of my mama-san, Sei-
Chan our maid. All the Navy wives had maids, and my mother was
no exception. My mother had four children, and the two youngest
were in Sei-Chan’s care—my younger brother Robert still goes by
Sei-Chan’s pet name of Suki today. The second image is of the young
me in front of a Marine F-8 Crusader jet on the runway at Atsugi.
My biological mother had arranged for me to see the aircraft because
of my childish interest in airplanes. Evidently my mom knew better
xii Preface
my inclinations than me or anyone else. In the background of the pho-

tograph sits an EC-121 Super Constellation of the Navy’s Fleet Air
Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VQ-1).
Twenty-one years later I received my first Navy orders to VQ-1 in
Guam as a new ensign and naval flight officer. A short three weeks
after reporting to Guam, I was back in the same Atsugi Bachelor
Officers’ Quarters (BOQ) that had been there over two decades
before. Even the Quonset hut my family had temporarily lived in still
stood in the same place with the same pine trees surrounding it. Talk
about déjà vu. My next three years in the Pacific involved flying out
of Atsugi for a period of time totaling an entire year—although the
Navy was kind enough to let me return to Guam to see my wife occa-
sionally.
* * *
My goal with this general military history was to survey the span of
Japanese martial history from 300 AD (or Common Era, CE) to the
present. This was a tall order given the span of nearly two millennia.
To do this I intend to concentrate on broad cultural, social, and even
religious themes that have shaped how Japanese societies have man-
aged violence and who has been allowed to wield it. My approach is
derivative from the work of Sinologist Mark Edward Lewis in Sanc-
tioned Violence in Early China. Lewis follows the formulation of the soci-
ologist Max Weber who proposes that “. . . a state is a ‘human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory . . ..’ ” Lewis further
advances the notion of violence as a “definer of groups.”1
The major themes that emerge from a broad study of Japanese
military history revolve around who managed violence and how
institutions were created to perform this function. Foremost among
these themes stands the emergence of the samurai class within Japa-
nese society and its virtual monopolization of violence for much of
Japan’s history. A second theme addresses the role of the emperor
as a supreme warlord or as a pawn used by supreme warlords
(Shogun) and the emergence of the Bakufu (military dictatorship) system
of government. Another theme is that of the preference in Japanese
military history for the defeated hero. Finally, congruent with these
themes exists the tension between centralized versus decentralized
power found throughout Japan’s history. This tension existed
Preface xiii
between Daimyo (“great name”) lords in medieval Japan, the Meiji

oligarchs and militarists from 1868 to 1945, and perhaps the Zaibatsu
industrialists and their political allies of today.
This work relies primarily on secondary sources in English by
scholars of Japan. Some translated memoirs and primary sources
(e.g., Nihon Shoki, Onin War, Musashi’s Five Rings) were also used,
but most of the factual information comes from previously published
sources. Some of the modern military history includes primary sour-
ces in English from U.S. archival sources. The book strives for a broad
synthesis of the military history of Japan. As such it is only a starting
point for other scholars and historians to continue to work as well as
the debates it may ignite to “fill in the gaps.” The book also seeks to
reach a broad audience interested in understanding Japan culturally
from the perspective of how war, politics, and violence shaped Japa-
nese society and events.
* * *
My final time in Atsugi was with my own family (wife and three
young children), from 1991 to 1993, again working for the Navy. My
family also lived at “Atsugi-Base,” and our third child was born in
the Yokosuka Naval Hospital in 1992, just in sight of Admiral Togo’s
flagship the Mikasa across the harbor (see Chapter 6). I served on a
busy operational staff and still regret not taking more advantage of
living in Japan, being more of a tourist, and learning the language
beyond basic pidgin Japanese. I did get to work closely with the Fleet
Air Force (FAF) component of the Japanese Maritime Defense Force
(JMSDF) and met the “modern” Japanese naval aviators, the offspring
of those pilots who had once dominated the skies of Asia and the
Pacific, the heirs of the samurai warrior legacy. I flew with them,
planned with them, and socialized with them at their karaoke clubs
in Yamato City and Iwakuni. They still serve the emperor and their
nation. I console myself that in these close allies a bit of the old
samurai spirit lives on. This book is for them, too.
Note to Reader: The text has been Anglicized and does not use the
Japanese accents that are found in some writing on the topic. In most
cases, Japanese words are italicized on first use and the Japanese/
Asian format of last name first (patronymic) observed—for example,
Yamamoto Isoruku versus Isoruku Yamamoto. This work strives to
keep this usage consistent until the nineteenth century, when
xiv Preface
individuals began to go almost exclusively by their clan or family

names, for example, General Yamagata Aritomo is Yamagata, not
Aritomo.
Acknowledgments
Particular thanks go to David Graff for his invaluable suggestions

about sources and style, and his super advice on several chapters.
Similarly, Jonathan M. House rendered yeoman editorial work and
advice, and he corrected many a logical and grammatical error on
my part. Susan Rosell was generous with her time in solving several
problems associated with pictures and maps, and Mark Gerges also
helped me master the art of simple map reproduction. Sadao Asada
also provided excellent advice and assistance. My intellectual debt
of gratitude goes far and wide and includes Kenneth Swope, Mark
Peattie, Richard Frank, John Lundstrom, Ed Miller, Jon Sumida,
Mark Parillo, Tom and Trent Hone, Jon Parshall, Edward Drea,
Stephen Turnbull, Karl Friday, William Farris, and the list goes on.
I have even met some of these wonderful people. All mistakes, mis-
interpretations, hyperbole, and errors in taste and judgment are mine
and mine alone.
Selected Chronology1
ca. 660 BC Accession of first emperor, Jimmu, now celebrated as a

national holiday on February 11
ca. 500 BC Arrival of Asiatic invaders
ca. 200 AD Emperor Sujin, beginning of Yamato period
646–793 Nara period
794–1184 Heian period
1185–1367 Kamakura period
1367–1575 Muromachi period
1467–1615 Sengoku, or Age of Warring States
1567–1614 Azuchi-Momoyama period
1615–1867 Edo or Tokugawa period
1866–present Meiji restoration and modern period
Chapter 1
From the Sun Goddess

to the Samurai
Japan’s location and terrain, her geography, have had a profound role
in shaping the Japanese psyche, and this is reflected in the mythology
of her beginnings. This psyche in turn has shaped Japan’s military his-
tory from the beginning. Tossed by typhoons, shaken by earthquakes,
and ravaged by fires rained down by volcanoes or stimulated by
earthquakes and lightning, Japan’s stark beauty exists side by side
with the violence of her geographic circumstances. Indeed, this beauty
and violence resided together in the land of the Yamato race before
that race ever reputedly sprang from the loins of the gods. Japan’s geo-
graphic isolation as an oceanic archipelago further exacerbates this
violence and beauty, keeping it contained. To deny that such an envi-
ronment shaped the Japanese psyche and history is to deny that leav-
ing a baby abandoned in the woods has no role in shaping its physical
and psychological development. A narrative without this acknowl-
edgment would be insufficient and incomplete.
Geography shapes society. The culture of Japan, molded by gods
and by nature, can be considered Japan’s human terrain. While the
impact of Japan’s natural environment is undeniable, both collectively
and on the individual, the impact of humans on humans will always
be difficult to discern. We do not know the beginnings of the story;
we do know the myths archaeologists and anthropologists can tell
2 A Military History of Japan
Map 1.1 Geographic Areas of Japan
us. The picture that seems to emerge centers on individuals rather

than collective groups of peoples. These individuals are divine (the
Sun Goddess Amateratsu), later semidivine (Ninigi, Amateratsu’s
grandson), and finally human (Prince Yamato, son of the tenth
emperor). Did the samurai hero “inherit” his traits from the traditions,
or did the Japanese later choose to infer the traits of their heroes back-
ward in time onto the myths? It is probably a bit of both. Of themes
and institutions this history highlights—the samurai, the emperor,
and the shogun—all have precursors at the beginning.
* * *
It all began with the gods. Those divine beings so often blamed for
beginning human history. From Homer to the ancient Chinese scribes
to the Japanese scholars in the seventh and eighth centuries AD, the
gods, or a God, receive the blame for getting the engine of human his-
tory going. It is no accident that the first histories are almost always
military histories. As soon as man conquered the elements and
learned to tame or coexist with the lesser beasts, he immediately
began to fight with his neighbors. For Japan the story began with the
Fire God and his older sister the Sun Goddess Amateratsu. The Fire
From the Sun Goddess to the Samurai 3
Map 1.2 Provinces of Japan
God was slain with a mythical sword by his father Izanagi. Japan was
created by Izanagi and his goddess wife Izanami when they created its
islands as drops of the ocean dripped back to earth from a celestial
spear they had poked into the earth. With the Fire God gone, the earth
with its most beautiful possession Japan (Nihon) was bequeathed to
Amateratsu. From the first, Japan’s mythology has identified its begin-
nings with weapons.1
Once Amateratsu “inherited the Earth” she proceeded to send her

grandson Ninigi to rule over it. Thus it was that the imperial line made
its claim as being descended from the Sun Goddess and installed itself
on the throne of Japan. Included in Ninigi’s inheritance were three
objects his grandmother had given him—jewels, a mirror, and a
sword. The sword was known as the Cloud Cluster Sword, and all
three objects became the crown jewels of Japan and part of the Kokutai,
or divine imperial essence, which they remain to this day. Ninigi
reputedly arrived directly from heaven to the summit of Mount
Takachiko on the southern island of Kyushu. The imperial relics
passed into the hands of Ninigi’s grandson Jimmu, who became
Japan’s first emperor (king) at the dawn of Japanese history in the
seventh century BC.2
As can be seen, the monarch was by definition a warrior. It was no
accident that a special, highly venerated sword became essential to
this mythology. Time would prove that he needed it to rule his new
empire. Returning to nonmythological issues for a moment, the origi-
nal Japanese natives were a hairy aboriginal race who had lived in
Japan since the melting of the glaciers after the Ice Age had separated
Japan from Asia proper. Archaeologists and anthropologists tell us
that humans have lived in Japan for at least 100,000 years. However,
by the sixth century BC, a century after Jimmu reputedly became the
first king, the races of mainland Asia began to arrive and intermix
with, as well as kill, the original inhabitants of the isolated islands.3
It is now that one must turn to the physical geography of Japan
proper. The main island of Japan (see Map 1.1) is Honshu, with the
smaller major islands of Kyushu and Shikoku to the south and
Hokkaido to the north. For most of this story the doings of the Ainu
aboriginal natives in Hokkaido will not concern us—nor will the
Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) to the south until more modern times. The
bulk of our story centers on the three big southern islands, but most
especially Honshu. This is because the largest amount of arable land in
Japan can be found on the eastern shores of Honshu in three great
plains, the Kanto (Edo, modern Tokyo), the Kinai (surrounding Kyoto
and later Osaka), and the Nobi (adjacent to Nagoya). Because of the rich
soil, the dense population in these regions, and these regions’ suitability
for raising horses, they would develop into locations that naturally
attracted warlike types of individuals, outlaws, and out of power lords
and samurai fleeing after defeats and catastrophes—especially the
Kanto.4 The ubiquitous mountains of Japan could hide such individuals,
too, but to build and so regain power, one needed access to people and
food. These rich plains would become the centers of gravity for Japanese
military history.5
The first real evidence of war in Japan can be dated to circa 100 AD.
Archaeologists found skeletons, including one pierced by over a
dozen arrows, at Doigahama in Western Honshu. This evidence sup-
ports the argument that the primary samurai weapon, and the pri-
mary Japanese weapon until early modern times, is not the sword
but rather the bow and arrow. This sort of violence, many centuries
after the assimilation of the Asiatics into the Japanese race (and per-
haps partial genocide of the aborigines), aligns with other evidence
that indicates war came to Japan as it did to other parts of the globe
via the process of the creation of additional wealth, which led to strug-
gles due to unequal distribution of harvested surplus food.6
Returning to the mythological account, we now come to the legend
of the warrior-prince Yamato. He was the grandson of the tenth king
of Japan, Sujin, who ruled Japan circa 200 AD. By this time the line
between divinity and humanity had blurred, and the monarchs and
their progeny displayed more and more human traits. The initial parts
of the Yamato myth highlight him as a temperamental and cunning
trickster. After killing his brother (while on the privy!), Yamato was
sent by his father King Keiko to quell rebellions in the south on
Kyushu.7 En route Yamato visited his great aunt, a high priestess at
the holy shrine of Ise. Here she presented him with the famous Cloud
Cluster Sword. As with all mythologies the story moves from reason-
able descriptions of Yamato’s actions to the fantastic with the heroic
prince fighting a giant, talking to a serpent, miraculously cutting his
way through burning fields of grass, and falling in love with a beauti-
ful maiden. As Yamato proceeds on his adventures an archetype
emerges—that of the wandering tragic hero.8
The final act in the myth of Yamato encompassed his departing from
his great love, the maiden Iwato-hime, to return to the duties assigned
by his father the king. He left Cloud Cluster with Iwato-hime as a token
of his true love. As he proceeded he encountered his old enemy the great
serpent. As before he escaped the serpent but was poisoned as he
vaulted over it. His dying moments were spent in the company of his
true love Iwato-hime, who had followed him unseen. She comforted
him until he died, at which point his spirit was transformed into a white
crane, presumably returning his spirit to heaven. One observer notes,
“The idea of the samurai as an individual heroic warrior is one that
has persisted to our times, and Yamato is the first of the line.” Prince
Yamato’s pattern is also seen in historical figures such as the famous
samurai lord Minamoto Yoshitsune of the Kamakura period and in more
modern times the Meiji enigma Saigo Takamori. However, one need not
go far into a history of Japan to find dozens of other tragic heroes whose
lives end in failure.9
The story of Prince Yamato—despite its fantastical elements—helps
us understand Japan during this period. First, horses are absent.
Although they probably were present in southern Japan, they were
not in general use across Japan. Also, it tells us that the monarch is
not all-powerful and has clans and tribes that do not adhere to his
authority, so he must send his son to quell their rebellions. Another
point to remember is that the concept of the samurai as both a servant
or as a warrior (or both), although foreshadowed by the Yamato narra-
tive, did not yet exist. 10 The institution of the samurai had yet to
develop. Instead, the real story here is the development of the monar-
chical institution, the increasing power and influence of the king who
had sent Yamato forth in the first place. This period came to be known
as the Yamato period from the Yamato region south of Kyoto (not the
prince) and lasted until 645, when the king’s royal power became
firmly established.11
In addition to the development of the monarch, in the earliest court
records of the history Japan, The Chronicles of Japan (Nihon Shoki), one
sees reference to the use of shoguns (commander in chief/general)
for specific purposes by the monarch. The following text from the
Chronicle for Yamato’s grandfather, the King Sujin, shows how the
shoguns were often used:
Winter, Tenth month. On the first day, the Emperor proclaimed to
the myriad ministers, “Now, the traitors have been executed. The
problems of the court have been resolved. However, the people
in the areas outside of our control continue to make noise and
are not checked. Now, I will dispatch shoguns in the four direc-
tions.” On the 22nd day, the shoguns were all dispatched.12
Although the veracity this account is in question (as is any account
from the Nihon Shoki), the idea of a military man assigned for special
missions was firmly established by the time the chronicles were writ-
ten. The story of the Yamato period is not so much one of the develop-
ment of the samurai, but rather an ongoing seesaw of conflict between
the kings and their would-be subjects, especially the powerful noble
families that surrounded the throne and sometimes controlled it. It

also saw the creation, as a part of the king’s ongoing power struggles,
of the important office of shogun. The term itself was borrowed from
the Chinese and probably did not come into common use in Japan
until around the fifth century AD.
Returning to 300 AD we can summarize: Japan had a royal institu-
tion, a king—later an emperor (the Japanese word is o-kimi or “great
king”)—trying to build his power, either by force or by alliances with
the powerful clans that ruled Japan while often using special generals
appointed as shoguns to administer large-scale violence.13 Into this
dynamic entered horses, as well as the Iron Age, which came to Japan
in the fourth century. Until this point Japanese armies, such as they
were, had been composed predominantly of infantry armed with
bows, swords, and spears. However, Japan was iron poor, which prob-
ably accounted for her becoming involved in the Korean Peninsula,
where iron was much more common. Natural resources related to
geography might be identified as the root cause for the long and belli-
cose history of Japan’s relationship with Korea, right down to our own
day.14 Too, Korea was one of the few places that the Yamato fleet, re-
ally a large collection of barely seaworthy rafts, could hope to navigate
outside of the Japanese Islands themselves, and then only in the lee-
ward shore of the Japanese southern islands across what is today the
Tsushima Strait.15
According to the Chronicles of Japan, an invasion of Korea occurred
during the reign of Queen Jingo (or Jingu). After a favorable divination,
she crossed the sea to subjugate the “jewel country” (the Japanese name
for Korea at that time). The chronicles also tell us that she was pregnant
during her Korean campaign and that when she returned to Japan she
gave birth to her son, the future king Ojin. The chronicles make this
expedition, which occurred sometime in the third century, appear to be
a divinely assisted “cakewalk,” although portions of the account empha-
size her lenient policies as being the key to her victories.16 Ojin, whose
birth in warlike and martial circumstances reputedly endowed him with
warlike talents, was later deified as Hachiman, the War God. Hachiman
later came to be greatly venerated by the samurai.17
To this point the Japanese armies, especially those that had gone to
subjugate Korea, had been primarily infantry. However, in the fifth
century the Koreans reputedly revolted, aided by another Korean
kingdom not under the Yamato Kingdom’s tribute. The circumstances
of their successful revolt help explain why the Japanese began to take
the horse more seriously as a weapon of war. Around 400 AD the

Yamato warriors were put to flight by mounted Koreans of the King-
dom of Koguryo. It was not long after this defeat that the Japanese
began to use horse-mounted units in their military formations. The
continental Asians had invented the stirrup around the third century
AD, and the Japanese also benefited from this military innovation.
During the seventh century the Japanese invented their own pouch-
like stirrup that served them all the way to 1853. One of the great
ironies of history is that it was the Koreans, later adversaries of the
Japanese, who bequeathed to the future samurai their equestrian
“birthright.”18
Other things also entered Japan from Korea. Along with iron ore
and horses, the religion of Buddhism, already a millennium old,
entered Japan in the sixth century. This pantheistic and attractive reli-
gion had been assimilated into Chinese culture and rather than dis-
placing Confucianism, the two seemed to buttress each other. The
same occurred in Japan with Buddhism and Shintoism. Instead of dis-
placing the Japanese Godhead of divinities and venerated ancestors
(who sometimes became divine), Buddhism provided an additional
justification with its doctrine of the Bohdisattva, one who has attained
enlightenment but chooses to remain in this world to help others
achieve salvation. The most powerful adherents to the new religion
included the powerful Soga clan that often married its daughters into
the imperial line and who shaped imperial decision making via this
means as well as served as principal ministers to emperor. In 587 Soga
Umako crushed the most bellicose of the rival clans at the battle of
Shigisen, effectively destroying the most powerful opponents to the
new religion. In the first decade of the seventh century, a crown prince
named Shotoku embraced Buddhism’s teachings.19 After the prince’s
death a high-ranking courtier named Fujiwara Kamatari continued
to proselytize and advance Buddhism. Japan’s first permanent city at
Nara centered on the new religion and within a generation Emperor
Shomu had gained the concurrence of the priests at the shrines of the
Sun Goddess at Ise that Japan’s protective deity approved of the new
religion. It was in this manner that Japan’s emperors followed the path
blazed by their forerunners in China. All of this had the effect of
strengthening the power of the emperor as well as his authority to
administer and control violence. We also see the appearance of the
powerful Fujiwara family that will be so important in later Japanese
history. Like the Soga family before them (who they helped
overthrow), the Fujiwaras are a type of powerful family one sees

throughout the history of Japan, often serving as the power behind
the throne.20
Returning to the sixth century, the rich area of the Kanto Plain on
the eastern side of the big island of Honshu became the nexus for
horse breeding and mounted activity. Because of the iron shortage,
Japanese warriors tended to favor archery, even though it required
much practice. Also, arrows used less iron for arrowheads than did
swords. The Japanese saw the advantage of combining expert archery
with horsemanship, and so was born the penultimate template for the
samurai of later times—the mounted bowman. Also, the Japanese had
by this time abandoned most plate armor in favor of lamellar armor.
This type of armor consists of many small armor plates called lamel-
lae, often stitched together with leather. It allowed more flexibility
for archery and equestrian skills, especially given the small size of
Japanese horses. By 553 the Japanese were ready to return to Korea
for continued interventions and war, this time mounted.21
Japan’s Yamato emperors had not lost their foothold in Korea. Japan
continued to receive tribute (or at least the Chronicles say they did)
from the Kingdom of Paekche (Baekje) in southwest Korea. Reputedly
Paekche sent emissaries to King Kimmei with the following request
around 553:
Also the lands beyond the sea are all considerably poor in bows
and horses from the past until now, and receiving the Emperor’s
gift they became stronger. Humbly we request you make good on
these words, granting many bows and horses.22
Note especially the request for horses and bows. Not long after,
Paekche went to war with the Kingdom of Koguryo. Eventually Japan
got involved in the fighting, first sending 1,000 troops and 100 horses
on 40 ships. This was evidently not enough, and eight months later the
emperor ordered 10,000 troops dispatched to aid Paekche. There was
no mention of horses, but if the ratio of 10 to one in the early request is
extrapolated, then there may have been as many as 1,000 horses. How
these troops fought, in what sort of units, and how they were controlled
is not apparent from the chronicles. However, it is almost certain that the
Japanese learned much from the Koreans about these things because
Korean armies tended to operate like the Tang armies of the Chinese,
although there is no firm evidence about organization and so much of
what can be surmised is entirely speculative. By 562 superior armies
from Silla evicted the Japanese from the small area along Korea’s
southern coast known as Mimana.23
However, Japan’s rulers continued to meddle in Korea, and an even
larger Japanese expedition proceeded forth in the year 602 with Prince
Kume commanding as shogun to invade the Kingdom of Silla (near
modern-day Pusan). The Japanese expedition included over 25,000
troops as well as numbers of Shinto priests. Here for the first time is
clear evidence of the close relationship between religion and war that
came to be a feature of Japanese military history throughout the ages.
Prince Kume’s expedition also included a cadre of non-noble leaders,
or “local servants of the Court.” These men are the first evidence of
the emperor separating court politics (conducted by nobles) from the
administration of distant military affairs. According to historian
William Farris these local strongmen fought as horsemen and com-
manded various units of peasants in the Yamato armies. These men
did not, however, have the authority to “tax the people.” 24 These
may in fact be the forerunners of both the daimyo (great lords) and
their samurai retainers. However, there were also noble families that
specialized in military affairs. They went by the name of gunji shizoku
(military aristocrats). This group’s duties included commanding the
emperor’s archers as well as holding some of the Shinto priest posi-
tions with the armies. As one might expect, many of these men were
mounted, and the evidence suggests they tended to come from the
eastern provinces around the Kanto Plain (see Map 1.2).25
THE NARA PERIOD (710–793) AND THE MILITARIZATION OF JAPAN
The entire period from 646 to 793 might be considered one of almost
continuous reform—in military affairs, legal affairs, land ownership,
and spiritual affairs that saw the virtual adoption of Buddhism as the
state religion. Reform usually does not come without some sort of forc-
ing function. In the case of Japan, that function involved clear military
threats, those domestically to the regime and the external threat posed
by China. A pivotal year in the history of Japan—and not just its military
history—was 645 AD. It was in this year that several members of the
royal family assassinated the leader of the powerful Soga family in the
presence of the empress. It was more than just a “palace coup” insti-
gated by several princes (including the future emperor) and their
confederate Fujiwara Kamatari. It was the beginning of a series of
reforms whereby the Japanese polity adopted Chinese forms of imperial

government. The event also provided a precedent for an act of “imperial
restoration” by patriots that would be cited more than once in the future,
especially during the Meiji Restoration of the mid-nineteenth century.
In the seventh century, however, the significance had more to do with
the creation of a new political system. In turn, following from Carl von
Clausewitz’s maxim that “war is . . . an extension of policy,” so too did
a new military system emerge.26
In the next 30 years the cycle launched by the palace coup combined
with a disastrous campaign in Korea and civil war at home to bring the
emperor back to the fore in military affairs as both the initiator and
the court of final appeal for violence. In addition to the resentment by
the court faction of the Soga family, the other occasion for the coup
involved Japan’s foreign policy in Korea. She had played a game of
balancing the three major Korean kingdoms—Koguryo, Silla, and
Paekche—against each other. Of the three, Paekche was most important
to Japan and Silla the most hostile, although all three presented gifts when
the Emperor Kotoku came to the throne. However, it was a dispute
between the Chinese and the Koguryo Kingdom that brought the Chinese
to the very door of Japan. A disastrous campaign by the short-lived, but
powerful, Sui Dynasty against Koguryo had caused the new Tang
Dynasty to regard this more northerly kingdom as an enemy.27 As the
Tang armies began to invade and campaign against the Koreans, members
of the Japanese court decided that a more aggressive foreign policy
was needed to aid their Korean allies in Koguryo, but especially Paekche.
The coup plotters took action because of the urgency of the situation in
Korea—in other words, the coup was not just a court power struggle but
a struggle over the defense of Japan.28
The new emperor, Kotoku, took measures that emphasized how
urgent he and his confederates deemed the military situation. He
appointed eight military governors, again from the ranks of the non-
noble leaders (hereafter military leaders). These military leaders went to
the key eastern provinces around the Kanto Plain to sequester for the
crown all the weapons they could find. Not only would the weapons be
used to outfit armies to defend against the emerging Tang threat, but
the move also pre-empted rebellious elements at court from using them
to challenge the new leaders. Following the lead of the Koreas, Prince
Naka—the power behind the throne—also began organizing other areas
of Japan along military lines for defense as well as dividing the districts
of precoup military leaders, a divide and conquer strategy. These
military measures went hand-in-hand with the Taika Reform Edict

(Taika is the reign name for Kotoku) that switched the Japanese legal
model to a Chinese one. Especially important in the edict were the crea-
tion of “Border Guards” (for both the north and for Kyushu) and the offi-
cial direction of people to turn in their weapons (including drums and
flags). The addition of the flags and drums is important because it indi-
cates the crown worried about command and control measures for
troops as well as their weapons. These measures indicated a militariza-
tion of Japanese foreign and domestic policy—and the tightening by the
emperor and his clique of control over organized violence.29
Meanwhile, the Tang advanced again into Korea after the ignomini-
ous defeat of their first expedition. Silla, historically at odds with the
other two Korean kingdoms, aligned herself as an ally of the Tang.
While Koguryo reeled under the assault of the large Tang armies (num-
bering often as many as 100,000), the invaders turned their attention to
Japan’s closest ally in Korea, the Kingdom of Paekche, to open a second
front against Koguryo from the south (see Map 1.3). The Tang launched
an amphibious invasion of Paekche across the Yellow Sea from Shang-
dong in 660. Initially all went well for the Tang forces, and the enemy
capital Churyu/Churyusong (near modern-day Gongju) was captured.
However, as the Tang focused their efforts on Koguryo in the north,
the people of Paekche rose up in an effort to expel the Tang in the winter
of 660–661. By 663 an uneasy stalemate had settled over Paekche, with
the Tang focused on capturing the principal base of the rebels at Churyu.
To this end Paekche had already sent envoys to the emperor of Japan
requesting aide. Japan dispatched 5,000 troops as a vanguard in 661. In
662 the court sent a fleet of 170 ships to aid the Koreans in controlling
the Kum River, which was essential to both the Tang and rebels. Accord-
ing to the Chronicles, some of these troops and ships aided Koguryo
against the Tang. Finally, in response to the Tang siege of the rebel base
at Churyu in 663, Japan sent a force of 27,000 troops under General
(shogun) Abe no Hirafu, composed principally of infantry but inclu-
ding valuable mounted troops, which indicates the seriousness
of Japan’s effort. The Chronicles state the decision as follows: “The . . .
shoguns . . . were sent at the head of 27,000 men to attack Silla.” In this
case Silla included, of course, the large Tang forces.30
Abe had to get his troops up the river to relieve the rebel fortress.
The Tang commander, the experienced general Liu Rengui, brought
his fleet down the mouth of the river to prevent the Yamato fleet from
ascending it. The actual battle occurred in the river not far from
Map 1.3 Ancient Korea
modern-day Kunsan. The Tang fleet had to be driven off, so the

Japanese were forced into the tactical offensive. Based on accounts of
the battle, several features emerge. First, the Japanese and Paekche
operated as a loose military coalition and probably had more vessels
than the Tang fleet did, possibly twice as many. The Tang fleet had a
superior position, and the Japanese account claims that the first
Japanese units to arrive attacked without proper support. This attack
probably occurred the day before the main battle on October 14, 663.
Second, while the Japanese and Koreans cooperated little in their
attack, the Tang forces maintained “strict” discipline and formation, as

observed by the Japanese chroniclers. Finally, a second combined
attack by the Japanese and their Korean allies became strung out,
probably because of either the Japanese or Korean captains’ desire to
be first to engage the enemy by (and thus get the glory). This allowed
the Chinese fleet to conduct an envelopment of the Japanese-Korean
fleet and annihilate it. According to some sources the Japanese and
their Korean allies lost as many as 400 ships; 10,000 men; and 1,000
horses (which must have been loaded aboard the ships to go ashore
after the presumed naval victory). The sources mention 170 Tang
ships, which makes the victory all the more a result of Tang tactical
excellence, even factoring in that perhaps the Tang “cooked the books”
to make the victory look like an even bigger achievement than it was.
Nonetheless, it was a paradigm-changing military defeat for Japan.
Japan had lost the bulk of her disposable military force, and the way
lay open for the Tang to attack Japan. The loss of the horses was par-
ticularly grievous. By 668 the Tang had destroyed or absorbed the last
remaining allies of the Japanese in Korea, placing rulers friendly to
themselves in charge of the peninsula.31
Tensions were so high after the defeat that the Chinese feared their
envoys, sent in 671, would be attacked as the vanguard of an invasion
fleet. Emperor Tenji came to an understanding with the Tang that led
to a truce, but relations remained strained. The militarization of Japan
continued, and the court nobility now wore sidearms. The court was
also moved further north toward Lake Biwa and the mountain of Hiei
on a temporary basis for more safety should the Chinese and their
Korean allies appear from the sea. Northern Kyushu was further forti-
fied and strengthened, the Border Guards were deployed to the Island
of Tsushima, and a system of watch-fire beacons was created as a
warning system for invasion. It was by these means that the latest for-
tress and fortification technology found its way into Japan via expatri-
ate Korean military experts.32
THE WARLORD EMPERORS, CIVIL WARS, AND

THE PATH TO THE SAMURAI
While all these activities were taking place, civil war erupted in 672.
Tenji’s younger brother Prince Oama, the future emperor Tenmu
(Temmu), had been in self-imposed exile but decided the time was
ripe to use his retainers and military governors’ troops from the key
province of Yamato (in the southern Kinai plain) to challenge his
brother’s heir for the throne. Oama used a slashing series of maneu-
vers by three separate armies to keep the imperial forces led by Prince
Otomo off balance. The key to Oama’s eventual victory lay in his early
decision to cut off the court’s access to the military resources in the key
eastern provinces, using mounted troops to block the critical moun-
tain passes in Ise and Mino Provinces. The other distinguishing mili-
tary feature of this campaign involved the heavy use by both sides of
mounted troops and foreign military experts from Korea and China.
These highlight the beginnings of a switch in the paradigm of military
power from infantry to cavalry. The introduction and use of the mili-
tary experts show how the Chinese military tradition contributed to
a nascent military professionalism in the Yamato military system.
Another result of the civil war was reduced numbers of court nobility
and military governors opposed to increased imperial power. This
conflict is also known as the Jinshin Civil War.33
In 673 Oama was installed as Emperor Tenmu. By 684 the court
scribes transcribed the following statement by Temmu: “In a
government, military matters are the essential thing.” Although one
would expect an emperor who came to absolute power to say such a
thing, compare this with the following statement written by the
Chinese sage and theorist Sunzi (Sun Tzu) approximately 1000 years
earlier: “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province
of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be
thoroughly studied.” Given that Tenmu had employed Tang Chinese
prisoners captured in Korea as advisors during his rise to power, it is
possible that he, or one of his advisors, was familiar with the elements
of Sunzi’s Art of War. In any case, the Chinese way of war reflected
Sunzi’s thinking, even it was not directly in Japanese hands. Again
we see the Chinese influence in the military tradition of Japan. It was
also in this same edict that Tenmu mandated that all military and civil
officers should “diligently practice the use of arms and riding on
horseback.” He also emphasized the importance of these same offi-
cials having horse-mounted units as well as making military training
a priority. Tenmu also outlawed the private possession of large weap-
ons caches and armories, expropriating to the sovereign the mainte-
nance of these and of command and control devices such as horns,
flags, and drums. Accordingly, he accelerated the process of confiscat-
ing unauthorized weapons for the crown, as well as his predecessor’s
policy of being ready to repel an invasion from Korea or (more likely)

China. Tenmu thus expropriated the administration of sanctioned vio-
lence on anything but the smallest scale unto the nascent imperial
institution and himself. After his death he became known as the Heav-
enly Warrior Emperor.34
Clear evidence exists that by 693 the imperial leadership had
imported Chinese teachers to instruct the imperial family and court
nobility. By this time the emperor’s land reforms had resulted in two
layers of geographic organization for Japan, the district and the larger
provinces. Court aristocrats were used as governors for the provinces,
and the districts (initially numbering around 400) were parceled out as
magistracies to the heads of prominent loyal district families. These
men tended to be the former military governors mentioned earlier
who had been loyal during the civil war. Implicit in their designation
was the military nature of their appointment. These appointments
were for life and tended to become hereditary. In 702 Emperor
Mommu changed the character used to designate these magistrates
to the same one used in China, although the Chinese did not appoint
their magistrates for life. As one can see, with the requirements for
horse ownership, weapons, training, and now political power, a new
non-noble class was emerging in Japan that was directly loyal to the
crown—or whoever controlled the crown.35
Between 702 and 718 the Japanese adopted in toto the Chinese legal
system, not even bothering to convert the Chinese characters of the
new Taiho Code into Japanese characters. At the same time the con-
version of the country to Buddhism proceeded apace. A final social
process that also affected political and military developments was
the institution of land reform that was part of the so-called Great
Reforms in the late seventh and eighth centuries. The initial idea had
been to distribute small parcels of land to every Japanese male as a
means of ensuring a comprehensive tax base. However, these reforms
soon became corrupted into the kishin (or shoen) system by which the
emperor could “gift” land to nobles and to Buddhist monasteries that
then did not have to pay taxes. In other words, to buy loyalty the
emperor allowed for a land-based tax evasion scheme. At the same
time, the safety of Nara still being a problem (more due to internal
threats than real external threats), the idea of moving the capital north
started to take hold. A Buddhist monk founded a new monastery on
Mount Hiei in 788. By this point the Buddhist priesthood had become
both wealthy and powerful, and it wielded ever more influence over
the court and policy. It was in part due to the lucky location of the first
monastery in the shadow of the traditionally dangerous northeast
direction that caused the town below to thrive. Eventually the town
became known as Heian Kyo, or Kyoto. The court moved there in
794 on a semipermanent basis (ostensibly for protection given Nara’s
exposed position), which is how historians have bounded the end of
the Nara period.36
The Fujiwara family, which was still playing a powerful role behind
the scenes, was part and parcel of all that happened. They often con-
trolled the assignment of kishin. At the same time they reputedly bred
the most beautiful daughters, whom they often married to the
imperial princes, either as empresses or official consorts. These
women soon became, more often than not, the mothers of many of
the future emperors. From the seventh to the nineteenth centuries,
over two thirds of those who became emperors were progeny of
Fujiwara mothers.37
Because of its importance and evolution as a military institution, a
brief structural description of the Chinese-style army, “the Emperor’s
Army,” created by Tenmu and his successors is in order. Two things
must be emphasized about this force. First, although the Emperor’s
Army was copied from a Tang Chinese model, it was adapted to suit
unique Japanese needs. Second, this army was never a stationary
entity, but rather a dynamic evolving entity. Historians have criticized
the Taiho reforms for failing to create a workable Chinese-style army,
but the imperial army as an institution always had its unique Japanese
features and changed as threats to the imperial polity changed. Keep-
ing this in mind, the key reform that established the army involved the
requirement for universal conscription for all males between the ages
of 20 and 59. This army was a truly “national” force. To do this, Ten-
mu’s successors had to have a good idea about who was liable for ser-
vice, so the creation of the army went hand in glove with the first ever
census of the Japanese population, which was begun under imperial
control in 689 by Empress Jito. This census also served to determine
both corvee (compulsory state) labor and the tax bases for all the
emperor’s subjects. The bulk of the army conscripted in this manner
was thus peasants who served in an infantry regiment, with each
province producing one regiment. These regiments were administra-
tive units, not tactical units, but basically from them came the tactical
battalions used either locally or for special expeditions beyond the
local province. The size of these regiments was anywhere from several
hundred to over a thousand from some of the more populous prov-

inces.38
Service was on a temporary rotational basis in one’s home province
except in three instances. The first instance was for guard duty on the
frontiers in Kyushu or northeastern Japan. The second instance
involved guard duty in the “Five Guards” at the capital to augment
the guards derived from the nobility who guarded the imperial family
and the court. The third instance, already mentioned, involved special
expeditions, for example, to pacify the emishi in the north (see Chap-
ter 2) or to put down rebellions. The officers for this largely infantry
army came from the court and provincial nobility and these, and their
grooms, tended to also serve as the cavalry for the army. They were
directed specifically by the codes to maintain their riding and
mounted archery skills. As one would anticipate, the area providing
the bulk of frontier forces and expeditions to manage rebellions came
from the Kanto. The frontier area of Kyushu, the most immediate area
threatened by the Tang, provided the Sakimori frontier guards, but
they rarely—if ever—deployed to the north in the same manner we
see the Kanto-bushi deploying out of area. A third component of the
army, developed over time, were the crossbowmen on foot with heavy
crossbows (Oyumi, another Chinese import) to augment the staying
power of the conscript infantry. In this manner, large forces could be
fielded, but this was no standing army, but rather a large national mili-
tia, officered by mounted warriors of military families and augmented
with special mounted and foot “professionals.” The final feature of
this army was complete civil-military separation down to the basic
tactical level of the regiment. Previously, regional officials had com-
bined both military and civil roles into one office, but with the reforms
no district official could also hold the office of colonel (daiki) or lieuten-
ant colonel (shoki) in the local regiment. This kept the entire of chain of
command directly responsible up the chain to the court or to tempo-
rarily appointed shoguns who answered directly to the court.39
It must be emphasized that this army changed over time, as we
shall see. It relied more and more on the specialists and warrior elites
from the Kanto and less and less on the conscripted infantry until
the point that universal (but not all) conscription was ended near the
end of the eighth century (791). The revolt in 740 by a member of the
key Fujiwara family illustrates this evolution. This episode also pro-
vided a key test of the Emperor’s Army implemented via the Taiho
codes.40
Prior to 740 Japan had witnessed both extensive famine and plague,
especially a deadly smallpox epidemic in 735 that killed a significant
number of the adult male population. Especially hard hit was the
Fujiwara family, which lost all of its first-generation male heirs to the
disease. The son of one these brothers, Fujiwara no Ason Hirotsugu,
found himself ousted from the prestigious governorship of Yamato
Province by the family’s bitter rivals of the Tachibana family in 738.
Tachibana consigned him to duty in a remote part of Kyushu, which
was regarded as the frontier. Here Hirotsugu plotted to seize power
from his hated rivals. He officially notified the court of his demands,
essentially his return to power, calling the recent catastrophes punish-
ments from heaven for bad government. At the same time his letter
was delivered, he hoisted the standard of revolt and began raising
troops in Kyushu. In response, the imperial government acted deci-
sively, raising 17,000 troops under the command of Great Shogun
Ono Azumabito. Of note, there were several ranks of shoguns and
though the great shogun was nominally the highest rank, lesser rank-
ing shoguns with more clout sometimes commanded, as did General
Abe at the Paekchon battle. Hirotsugu found himself at a severe disad-
vantage in Kyushu. His campaign was a train of misfortunes and mis-
steps in the face of decisive action by Ono and the court. The court
later added another 4,000 troops to these forces, showing how rapidly
it could raise troops, including many elite mounted units. At the battle
of the Itaitsu River, the imperial forces repulsed Hitrotsugu, despite
his reputedly having 10,000 cavalry in his army. These mounted
troops almost certainly did not have the expertise of the mounted war-
riors from the Kanto. Not long after this, Hirotsugu was captured and
beheaded.41
Hirotsugu’s revolt offers some interesting points for discussion.
First, a key betrayal by the bulk of Hirotsugu’s mounted troops helped
turn the tide. This argues that despite the infantry focus of the Chinese
pattern, the “center of gravity” for most of these armies was their
mounted archer units. Also, Hitrotsugu’s ability to raise his forces so
quickly as well as the government’s ability to raise large numbers of
mounted forces argues that the deweaponization program had not
been as successful as the Japanese chroniclers portray it. There were
more arms in the countryside than the law allowed, which is one rea-
son these forces were probably raised so rapidly, on both sides.
The revolt also highlights how more and more troops were coming
from special units, that is, not conscripted peasants, but from existing
bands of retainers, often mounted, belonging to court nobles and mag-

istrates. This was especially true of the new “guard” units allowed for
under the Taiho codes and subsequent modifications. Finally, the prec-
edent was confirmed, as it was in Tenmu’s time, that he who con-
trolled the martial eastern provinces of Honshu, with its key Taiho
mandated pastures for horse breeding, triumphed in an internal con-
flict. This pattern would continue for the remainder of Japanese mili-
tary history until the advent of modern firearms negated the power
of mounted troops on the eve of the Meiji Restoration.42
After Hirotsugu’s revolt, ironically, the Fujiwara managed to regain
power. A cousin, Fujiwara no Ason Nakamaro, was appointed by
Emperor Shomu to command his military escort as he traveled to the
imperial shrine at Ise to pray for his regime. Obviously not all the Fuji-
wara were in the doghouse, even with a major member of the family
turned rebel. Afterward Nakamaro bided his time, slowly advancing
in rank until he reached the official rank at which he could hold a pro-
vincial governorship. By 746 at the age of 40—old by Japanese stan-
dards of the time—he had achieved the extremely prestigious
position as an advisor (sangi) on the all-noble Council of State.43 When
Emperor Shomu abdicated, Nakamaro had Shomu’s daughter by a
Fujiwara consort declared empress (Koken), probably because he
thought her more pliable than an adult male. Both Shomu and Koken
did things to augment the imperial guard forces with troops loyal to
themselves to protect their position. All throughout this time Naka-
moro attempted to reduce the numbers of standing forces maintained
by the other families while using the Taiho laws to his advantage to
create a personal army of armed retainers loyal to the large Fujiwara
presence inside the capital. He capped off his control of military affairs
by gaining control of the key access points to the military resources of
the eastern provinces. There was a weak coup attempt by his enemies,
but it failed due to his tight grip on military power and influence.44
Fujiwara Nakamaro’s fortunes eventually declined after he placed
another of his candidates on the throne in 760. Included in his grandi-
ose schemes was a return to Korea via an invasion of Silla (which the
Japanese had never forgiven for its support of the Tang in the previous
century). By 764 the situation in Nara had deteriorated into open con-
flict between two of Fujiwara’s imperial clients, the retired empress
(Koken) and the current emperor (Junnin). Full-scale civil war again
broke out, with Nakamaro essentially kidnapping the emperor along
with the seals of power and attempting to flee to the east to raise an
army to challenge the empress. He failed. The pattern was adhered to

when the empress sealed the passes using the magistrates and their
forces, and Nakamaro was forced into a disadvantageous archery bat-
tle with superior imperial forces—mostly raised in the east—as he
tried to circumnavigate Lake Biwa to get to those same military re-
sources himself. Nakamaro was defeated, captured, and beheaded.
The empress resumed the throne—displacing Junnin—and declared
herself Emperor Shotoku, using a male name to emphasize her power.
She might be regarded as the last of the warrior emperors.45
Several other trends must be commented on in this final episode of
the Nara military period. First, the number of armed warriors in the
capitals had reached a point where key nobles had their own private
armies (thus Koken’s actions in augmenting her guards). Additionally,
the rise and dominance of the Fujiwaras (discussed in more detail in
the next chapter) emphasizes more and more how the emperors were
becoming puppets for the real powers behind the throne, in this case
powerful court aristocrats. As time went on the practice came to be one
of having the monarch abdicate in favor of another (usually much youn-
ger and malleable) relative so that the key noble family in power could
call the shots from “behind the throne.” Historian William Farris also
emphasizes the public and private nature of these noble and non-noble
armed retainers, the non-nobles often going by the same title, bushi (war-
rior), that they would in later Japanese medieval times. He emphasizes
that they were not yet the bushi that we think of as samurai from the
eleventh century onward, but he stresses that the intermingling of these
men during campaigns and at court events, such as at a demonstration
of Japanese mounted martial abilities for Tang emissaries, created
opportunities “for ties of loyalty” to form in the manner that would
become all-important during the samurai period.46
* * *
The period of the founding of Japan is of necessity, due to lack of sour-
ces and evidence, mostly about great men and leaders, what is some-
times referred to in military history circles as “the great man
history.” The Japanese story has women in it too, but they also fit the
great-individuals-of-history category. Nonetheless, archaeologists
and anthropologists have been able to provide some means to under-
stand history a little from “the bottom up.” One can come to some gen-
eral conclusions about the management of violence up to the level of
what we call war, and of military affairs, in early Japan until the end of
the Nara period. First, Japanese society was organizing the
administration of violence as it became more complex. By the third
century a family of kings had established itself as the focal point for
Japanese leadership. These kings arrogated unto themselves the right
to enforce their will on the surrounding chieftains and associated
tribes. With Prince Yamato the race acquired its name as did the kings,
who later named themselves emperors and empresses. In reality they
behaved and acted more like kings than emperors. The troops that
served under these early monarchs were spear and bow wielding
infantry.
The expansion of Japanese interests into Korea brought Japan more
into the category of what one usually considers an empire and intro-
duced the insular Japanese to a much larger, more complex world.
They learned of horses and brought them back to Japan. Poor in re-
sources, the Japanese started to develop composite units of troops that
began to include small numbers of lethal horse-mounted archers,
although the bulk of the Yamato armies remained infantry. The
Japanese fascination with Korea drew them back into a period of for-
eign adventurism in Korea that eventually resulted in their expulsion
from mainland Asia. Returning to Japan for good along with her
defeated armies and leaders was a new religion, Buddhism, which
was assimilated into the existing Japanese Shinto religion. Finally, the
Japanese returned to a focus on domestic challenges while harboring
fears that Asian neighbors might invade Japan and integrate it into
the galaxy of tribute kingdoms that orbited around the “middle king-
dom” of China.47
As for the management of violence, in the earlier times we saw the
Yamato kings delegate specific military missions to specially
appointed generals known as shoguns. By the end of the Yamato
period, the established practice delegated the administration of vio-
lence down from the level of the monarch to trusted subordinates.
The monarch-warlord was no longer the model. This follows a similar
pattern in China that had to do with a powerful narrative fabricated
by the Chinese bureaucrat-historians that officially disesteemed vio-
lence as a means to ends. The reality was different, both in China
and Japan. As the Chinese and (less so) Japanese cultures came to
esteem the absence of violence as a sign of the approval of heaven, the
tension remained that violence must be administered to solve the con-
stant problems of lawlessness, invasion, and rebellion.
Japan’s unique geographic circumstances caused her to depart from

the Chinese pattern on this point. The biggest concerns for the emper-
ors soon became rebellion and lawlessness. Nonetheless, the need for
intermediaries, known as shoguns in Yamato Japan, to resolve this
tension makes perfect sense. However, when the state or dynasty itself
was threatened, we see again the individuals at the top, or those who
were vying for power at the top, coming to the fore as both political
and military leaders and warlords.48
The Nara period saw reforms that transformed the imperial polity
into a more coherent state. The armies remained predominately com-
posed of infantry levies with special horse-archer troops led by sho-
guns, who were often powerful court nobility and their retainers.
This was because of the perceived threat of the Chinese and the
Koreans. When this threat never developed, two things happened. First,
the armies decreased in size and second, horse-mounted warriors conse-
quently became more important to how the emperors used organized
violence on behalf of the state. The second consequence spelled the
end of the activist warlord emperors. The Japanese emperor, in the par-
lance of today, was no longer the commander in chief. With the Heian
period, as we shall see, the transition to a new polity and a new power
structure occurred. Also, the stage was set for the appearance of a new
player, the bushi as they called themselves, who would eventually be
known to myth and history as the samurai.49
Chapter 2
The Wild East: Emergence

of the Samurai and the Collapse
of the Regency
English-speaking audiences will be familiar with the concept of the

Wild West as encompassing a period of time in American history of
the areas generally west of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers during
much of the nineteenth century. The American West became idealized
as a land of cowboys, Indians, outlaws, posses, hired gunslingers,
and hard-bitten professional lawmen. These lawmen were often depu-
tized experts with firearms, in some cases hardly different from the out-
laws they hunted. This analogy compares to some degree with Japan’s
eastern frontier—the Kanto region and the undeveloped emishi areas to
the north. When using an analogy like this, we need to keep in mind
its limitations, especially regarding context, culture, and geography.
Nonetheless, the eight provinces of the Kanto/Bando were the “land of
opportunity” as well as the nexus for the development of “bands” of
bandits as well as the constabulary forces that hunted them.1
By the twelfth century, the east was dominated by these warrior
bands (bushidan), who constantly fought with one another and often
took the law into their own hands. However, all it took was a decree
of the imperial court to turn one of these bands into an officially recog-
nized posse (in effect deputizing the participating samurai with
ostentatious official titles). In some cases, this week’s posse was next
week’s outlaw band and vice versa. Additionally, just as with the
Earps and the Clantons at the OK Corral, gangs emerged around
famous warrior families—including a sub-branch of the Fujiwara
(sometimes called the Bando Fujiwara) and, especially, the famous
Minamoto and Taira clans. Disputes and feuds developed between
these clans and their allies, and—given the nature of the evolving rela-
tionships between local, provincial, and court entities—these disputes
tended to have vertical—that is between members of clearly different
rank—consequences. There were cases of horse thievery (or butchery
of stables), which elicited serious reactions from and interest by the
provincial elites and the court. Horses occupied a central role in the
bushi military specialist as well as in the court’s ability to apply military
power with the move away from the infantry-centric armies during
this period. Unlike America, however, once the frontier was tamed,
these groups tended to increase in influence rather than wane as they
did in late nineteenth-century America. Just as the American West
had its hired guns, so too did the “Wild East” have its “hired swords,”
although their horses and bows were more critical to their lethality.2
In addition to these developments, the period from the founding of
Kyoto in 794 to the establishment of the first Bakufu presents a com-
plex and diffuse picture to the political historian.3 As theorist Clause-
witz stressed, war is an extension of political processes.4 In Japan’s
case, this political process was dominated by a system that has become
known as the Fujiwara Regency. By the mid-ninth century (858), the
northern branch of the Fujiwara (hokke) had created a system of
hereditary rule in Kyoto. From about 850 to 1167—over three centu-
ries—Japan’s political structure and policy were dominated by this
wealthy, ubiquitous family that included members of military clans
in the Kanto. One observer captured the larger lesson for the develop-
ment of Japanese institutions over the long term in this manner:
The development of a form of government in which the full sov-
ereign power is exercised on a virtually hereditary basis by mem-
bers of a great family acting as Regents is characteristic of
Japanese political evolution. . . . It therefore deserves some study
as an aspect of the general history of institutions, and it also is of
great interest because of the nature of the society which came into
being under the dominance of successive leaders of the Fujiwara
clan.5 [emphases added]
The Wild East: Emergence of the Samurai and the Collapse of the Regency 27
And so it was by this mechanism that politics influenced the develop-

ment of military institutions, and by extension war, during a period
regarded as a golden age for Japanese society, letters, religion, and cul-
ture.6
Against the backdrop of the extended rule of the Fujiwara in Kyoto,
the period has been portrayed as one of relative calm and stasis. The
threat from China and Korea had faded, but on Japan’s northeastern
frontier of Honshu, a protracted conflict took place between the court
and the indigenous peoples of that region. That region goes by the
name of Tohuku and the people came to be known as the emishi,
although they were also known at court as the “eastern barbarians.”
This 38-year struggle (774–812) helps explain the continued rise of
the Fujiwara as well as this family’s preferred approach of using the
proxy use of sanctioned violence to solve security problems and com-
bat revolts, bandits, and pirates. This in turn helps explain the devel-
opment of the great warrior clans, the “Kanto-bushi,” who became
the samurai.7 In short, the wars on the northeastern frontier that strad-
dle the beginning of the Heian period served as an additional crucible
within which a further decentralization of military power from
the court to the provinces occurred. In turn, this power diffused to
the chiefs of the great clans living in the Kanto, especially the Mina-
moto and Taira clans. These Kanto-bushi chieftains, loyal to the court
by way of the Fujiwara, did the dirty work, so to speak, policing the
northern frontier. They provided the necessary combat power that
the Taisho conscript army could not against opponents like the emishi.
Over time, during the three centuries prior to the battle of Dannoura in
1185, the loyalty of these chieftains to the Court (and the Fujiwara)
eroded as their own power base and ties of loyalty with subordinate
retainers and vassal clans (families) increased. Too late did the Fuji-
wara realize that in monopolizing political power and influence at
court—and in focusing their talents on the maintenance of that
power—they had allowed the control of military power to escape their
grasp. Ironically, the Fujiwara courts were the agents for this transfer
of power by means of the decisions they made to use these military
bands as a matter of state policy.8
Similarly, the imperial family became disenchanted with the regent-
dictators. Although limited in its power, the imperial institution
remained the nexus for the spiritual leadership of Japan. But the real
power of the imperial throne declined even while it transferred its
authority, and even allegiance, from regents to the warrior class.9 The
basis for power in Japan remained material wealth and the ability to
tax it. This mechanism became ever more decentralized as court after
court continually ran out of money, expanded the collection of taxes,
and then had to compromise and share ever more power with the
developing power centers, often run by military aristocrats who had
earned their titles in battle—against barbarians, bandits, or rebels.
Thus, as the samurai slowly monopolized military power, they also
came to perform the function of tax farmers and collectors—and in
some cases simply armed shakedown men!10 Slowly over a three-
century period, the strongest of these clan chieftains came to gather
more and more power unto themselves until finally the most powerful
two came into direct conflict. Simultaneously, against this extremely
turbulent and complex backdrop, the samurai emerged as the key
class in Japan. These military specialists—Karl Friday calls them war-
bands—attained status as the real political power brokers by the time
of the demise of the Fujiwara Regency during the time known as the
Taira Ascendency (1155–1181).11 They would retain this power until
well into the nineteenth century, and their descendants still wielded
great influence in the first half of the twentieth.12
THE PACIFICATION OF THE NORTHEAST, 774–812
Before proceeding more directly to the lengthy process whereby the

Fujiwara political dictatorship gave way to the military dictatorship
of the Bakufu, we must first go back to the late eighth century and
the court’s attempts to pacify the northeastern provinces using the
conventional military power of the once impressive Taiho armies led
by appointed court favorites. Tension on the frontier was nothing
new. The first direct fighting between the Nara court and the people
of the Tohoku (the provinces of Mutsu and Dewa) had occurred over
a century earlier when general Abe no Omi Hirafu came by sea to
the region around modern-day Niigata on the Sea of Japan to cow
the inhabitants in 658. Abe’s expeditions were an expression of the
new spirit at court after the overthrow of the Soga family to subdue
and civilize all of Honshu.13 The court’s methods thereafter involved
a classic approach of pacification that included building numerous
manned forts and strongholds over the next 100 years along seacoasts,
in river valleys, and at mountain passes to support the extensive logis-
tical needs of the many garrisons created thereby. The emishi pushed
back against this program with numerous insurrections, with the final
one during this period taking place in 737. It was suppressed by
Shogun Ono no Azumabito—the same Ono who later helped quash
Hirotsugu’s insurrection (see Chapter 1)—and a period of relative
uneasy peace remained until 774.14
The kind of warfare that took place could be categorized as irregu-
lar warfare because there were few pitched battles between organized
armies. In today’s vernacular, this type of warfare is categorized as
asymmetric—that is, the main strengths of the two opposing forces
bore no resemblance to each other—and the campaigns conducted
by the court fit a style of warfare similar to one that the United States
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) found themselves
conducting in Afghanistan during the first decade of the twenty-first
century.15 The big Taiho conscript army might be fine for defense
against an invading Chinese or Korean army, and it also fought in
the occasional civil wars of this period, but it was always fighting war-
riors and tactics of its own kind and culture. The emishi, or barbarians
as the court condescendingly referred to these people, fought using
hit-and-run tactics. The Nara and later Heian courts were trying to
civilize these peoples; however, projecting power with the Chinese-
style Taiho armies proved halting and expensive. It was through this
process involving inconsistent application of force, and measures to
correct these applications for more efficacious results, that Japan’s
military evolved. Both technology and tactics played a role in this evo-
lution and in this environment, the precursors of what became the
samurai continued to develop in response to complex forces driven
by court politics and the exigencies of protracted conflict on the bor-
der. At the same time, the Heian court nobles and the Fujiwara regents
began to dismantle and change the character of the Taiho army so that
by the advent of the first Bakufu under the Minamoto shoguns, a com-
pletely different military system was in place. In the meantime, the
Fujiwara had established a system of hereditary regents that came to
supplant the imperial family as the arbiters of political (and thus mili-
tary) power. This precedent for a hereditary system of rule as the
“power behind the throne” was a precursor to the eventual shogun-
bakufu system of military dictatorship.16
Returning to the northeastern frontier, recall that the emishi occu-
pied the lands bordering Japan’s most martial region, the provinces
of the Kanto Plain, sometimes known as the Bando. Trouble broke
out in the province of Mutsu in 774 when the indigenous population
Map 2.1 Eastern Japan and the Tohoku Campaigns
revolted near Fort Monofu (see Map 2.1). One might compare the level
of control in these provinces to that of the U.S. military control of the
American west prior to its civil war. The court controlled only those
areas garrisoned by its troops. The court raised new forces from the
provinces of the Kanto to deal with this situation. Between 774 and
812, it raised five major expeditions to pacify the region—and they
succeed only with the last. By the end of this period, the government
had bankrupted itself while at the same time creating many new
nobles and practically abandoning the use of its Chinese-style army
in favor of forces more suited to a protracted war of counterinsur-

gency.17
The first expedition to quell the rebellion in Mutsu did not proceed
until 776, and it was characterized by foot dragging and marginal
results. At the same time, rebellion also broke out in Dewa. The hope
of the court had been that a large Chinese-style army would simply
cow the rebels into obedience. Instead, the campaign fizzled out and
the region remained unpacified. The court attempted to build upon
what little success was achieved in this expedition by building addi-
tional forts in 780, but locally raised levies turned on their
commanders, and the rebels raided to the south and burned the key
logistics and command hub at Fort Taga. This event provided the
impetus for an attempted second expedition from a rebuilt Fort Taga,
but the generals again offered excuses and delayed while the emishi
continued to dominate the regions of Dewa and Mutsu to the north
using hit-and-run raids and guerilla warfare. One contemporary
account captures the essential asymmetry between the government’s
forces and those of the emishi:
the barbarians’ custom is battle as mounted archers; 10 of our
commoners can not rival one of the enemy. . . . They swarm like
bees and gather like ants . . . But when we attack, they flee into
the mountains and forests. When we let them go, they assault
our fortifications. . . . Each of their leaders is as good as 1000 [of
our] men.18
The year of 781 brought to power Emperor Kammu and a renewed
will to see the situation in the north remedied by a more vigorous mili-
tary policy. However, Kammu had other distractions, and it was only
in 788 that a second expedition finally proceeded against the emishi
insurgents. Even so, it took a year to build up the stock of supplies
for the three columns (“armies”) of the expeditionary force that were
to be used to pacify the region. The operational design seems to have
been to simply cow the rebels with the large Chinese-style force—even
though it was composed mostly of military specialists raised from the
Kanto and numbered over 50,000 (including porters). The other key
tactic seems to have been village burning (the chroniclers kept assidu-
ous track of how many “hamlets” were destroyed on the expedition).
However, the generalship for this expedition was poor. The
commanders, cooperating loosely, allowed themselves to be attacked
while strung out during a crossing of the Koromo River in Mutsu.
The result was a fiasco on a large scale as the emishi used several col-
umns as well as deception to defeat the Japanese force in detail. In the
recriminations after this serious defeat, blame was affixed not to the
architects of the fiasco, but rather their subordinates so that the fiction
of the infallibility of the court-appointed leaders could be maintained.
Nonetheless, Kammu was furious as a new round of excuses flowed
south to the court about why operations could not be resumed.19
The battle on the Koromo demonstrated the impotence of the mili-
tary power of the courts. Perhaps what had always been needed was
simply a general with some talent rather than a court-appointed gran-
dee. This occurred as the court built up power for another expedition.
A general named Sakanoue no Tamuramaro (or Tamura Maro)—a
member of the military aristocracy from the provinces and not a court
favorite—served in a subordinate role, but soon his talent and perfor-
mance raised him to the upper echelons of command. The expedition
of 794 was another punitive expedition with a large unwieldy army,
but there were no disastrous defeats on the scale of the Koromo.
Despite the fierce resistance of the emishi, these scorched earth opera-
tions exacted a toll, and some of the emishi chiefs surrendered and
placed their villages under imperial control. The alternative was to
have them burned. The court seemed to understand that the key was
new leadership as well as a policy that included active assimilation
by colonization of the intractable areas of rugged Mutsu with the
hardy folk from the pacified areas and the Kanto. In 797, we see the
first of the type of shogun we often think of in Japanese military his-
tory with the elevation of Tamuramaro for his conduct of operations
under his control as “The Great General Who Quells the Barbarians
[seii taishogun].” However, the post was only temporary, not the per-
manent position it later became.20
The rebellion had not been completely pacified, though, and
Tamuramaro, now in overall command as Shogun, led a force of
reputedly 40,000 men against the center of the rebellion in the area of
Izawa (northern Mutsu). His arms were crowned with success, result-
ing in the construction of forts in areas previously beyond the control
of the court as well as the capture of the main rebel leader. Tamura-
maro was rewarded with court rank, a considerable achievement for
an officer with no familial connections to the court. Not long after,
operations were suspended for lack of funds because taxes could no
longer be collected due to the heavy burdens already levied on the
small farmers.21 It was only in 811 that the final expedition, under a
protégé of Tamuramaro, succeeded in finally pacifying the northeast

on a semipermanent basis. This general was also appointed as seii
taishogun. A unique feature of this campaign involved use of local
levies and emishi who had switched sides, especially in the most
important battle—thus emphasizing a principle of counterinsurgent
warfare that operations must eventually be conducted by local forces
as much as by “outsiders.”22
Despite the cancellation of general conscription prescribed by the
Taiho system in 792, the system still remained in place on the frontier,
and the Taiho-sized armies remained the military paradigm. Addi-
tionally, a military meritocracy developed during the 40-year war that
saw the promotion of non court, and even common (those not associ-
ated with the provincial aristocracy), people to higher ranks. Men like
Tamuramaro could even be promoted to high civil court rank.
Another development coming out of this period of protracted war
with implications for the future concerns the establishment of the
highest level of military command, not just shogun, but a super sho-
gun. It was this rank that Japanese military men would compete for
in the centuries to come. Finally, the decision to move the hardy folk
as settlers into the newly pacified regions as pioneers came at a cost.
The new colonists were offered the tax exempt lands (at the expense
of the locals in some cases) and came to form “some the hardiest and
most intractable military families in the history of Japan . . . ” When
the court later tried to collect taxes from them to support its many
projects, the military families evaded these taxes and established a
“tradition” of ignoring the central government.23
In the realm of military technology, the northern campaigns
resulted in a transformation from the Chinese style of weaponry and
armor to that of the basic samurai bushi of the eleventh century. As
we have seen, mounted archers worked best in the irregular type of
warfare that was conducted against the emishi. Recall, too, that the
Kanto had become the premier horse-breeding region of Japan.
Although it was not the only region, it far and away produced the
most horseflesh. The Japanese court allowed the locals in this area,
usually the families of the district magistrates, to independently raise
horses. Although many samurai came from the lands they cultivated,
significant numbers also came from families that raised horses and
hunted—two attributes that developed the martial skills that were
often in demand when the court needed mounted components for its
Taiho conscript armies. 24 The court also decided to switch to the
lamellar type of armor discussed earlier as the standard, both for its
ease of use and maintenance—although the court enjoined the prov-
inces not to discard the older plate and Asian-style mail armor. Finally,
during the campaigns the use of curved swords of a type that became
known as the samurai sword (warabite to) also became standard. The
technological “kit,” as it were, of the samurai was complete.25
Another development during the eighth and ninth centuries was a
decline in the use of the crossbow that typified the Chinese-style Taiho
armies. Recall that the crossbow was an ideal weapon for conscripts
given that it could be mastered and employed with little training.
The downside of the crossbow in Japan was the expense of producing
them. The court paid the production costs for new crossbows; thus,
they were never as numerous in Japan as in China and became less
numerous the more strapped for cash the court became. Nonetheless,
both crossbows and the Taiho system they reflected were still impor-
tant during ninth century. In the 860s, the Kingdom of Silla threatened
invasion of Japan, and the court gathered up crossbow experts to help
defend Kyushu and the endangered areas on the Sea of Japan.26
Events soon validated the continued importance and use of the
crossbow. In 880, rebel emishi in the northeast seized Fort Akita and
burned it. They made sure to destroy over 100 crossbows they found
in the armory, a grievous loss to the government given the cost of pro-
ducing them. Finally, in 894, Silla actually did attempt an attack on the
island of Tsushima in the strait between Japan and Korea. The cross-
bow proved pivotal to the defense against the Sillan navy when the
Japanese Army delivered a lethal crossbow barrage from behind a
shield wall. Despite this evidence that the crossbow was still useful,
its use declined. It was not a weapon produced privately and never
in numbers sufficient to arm large numbers of conscripts. Over time,
those who were “experts” in their use could find no employ because
the government had to pay their wage. So cost, ease of production,
and the declining Taiho system all contributed to the demise of the
crossbow in Japan during this period so that by 914, even the court
disesteemed its use. Finally, the cheaper mounted archers of the Kanto
played their role in making their form of warfare a more attractive and
economical choice when the fiscally strapped court in Kyoto had to
raise forces to deal with the rebellions of the tenth century.27
The troubles of the tenth century go back to the theme of the contin-
uing loss of control by the court in Kyoto over events in the provinces.
The Fujiwaras permanently solidified their hold on power in Kyoto
with Fujiwara no Motosune becoming the first Fujiwara regent (kam-

paku) for an adult emperor in 880 and issuing orders just as if he were
the emperor. The regency also became hereditary very much in the
manner of European primogeniture except with the dowager
empresses often as enforcers of the succession for regents.28 Troubles
in the hinterlands beyond the control of the central government are
reflected in an incident at the mouth of the Hirono River between
forces of the adjoining provinces of Mino and Owari (located between
the Kanto and Kyoto). The magistrates of two Mino districts formed
up 700 foot and horse troops and attacked laborers working on a
court-sanctioned water project. “The river flowed red with
blood . . . ” according to the court account, and the wording makes
clear that most of the damage was done by archers. This not only dem-
onstrates the increasingly violent situation in the countryside, but the
ability of local officials to raise troops independently of the court. It
was precisely these sorts of military forces the court would come to
rely on more and more to project military power.29 Increasing lawless-
ness was a feature of the Kanto area and the newly pacified provinces
of the emishi as well as areas that the emishi had been forcibly moved
to after the government’s victories in 811–812. The northern half of
Dewa Province essentially achieved autonomy for a period after
administering a severe defeat to government troops along the Akita
River in 878. A member of the Tamuramaro house was included in
the expedition to reclaim these lands. In Fujiwara style, they brought
the province back by removing the governor and providing famine
relief to the inhabitants. More and more famines and epidemics, seen
in Confucian culture as signs of heaven’s displeasure with rulers,
undermined the court’s prestige and authority during the ninth cen-
tury. These troubles would continue into the tenth century and be
exacerbated by the rise of arson against government grain ware-
houses, often by local officials whose gangs had expropriated the con-
tents.30
TAIRA NO MASAKADO: THE FIRST SAMURAI?31
Into this stewpot of dictatorship, lawlessness, decaying institutions,

famine, and disease came the most serious internal threat to the court
since the rebellion of Fujiwara no Ason Hirotsugu (see Chapter 1). To
understand the revolt of Taira no Masakado, whose family came to
play such an important role over the next two centuries, one must
return to the court. Recall that the emperors not only married, but also
had concubines of various pedigrees. The result was that there was
often an excess of imperial princes around with no prospects for
the future. A policy of farming these excess nobles out to the pro-
vinces was already in place when the court decided to send Prince
Takamochi to the Kanto. He was made governor of Kazusa Province
and granted the surname Taira, which means “to pacify.” He had
five sons, all of whom remained in the east. In this manner, from
imperial blood, the Taira clan had its roots.32
The Minamoto clan had similar origins. They were descended from
Emperor Seiwa (reigned 858–876). By the same means as the Taira,
they too lost their princely title and privileges, and they went to the
“land of opportunity” in the east—although they maintained their ties
to the court. The Minamoto are also known as the Seiwa Genji. Genji
means “Minamoto family,” and it was Minamoto no Tsunemoto, a
grandson of the emperor Seiwa, who was vice governor of Musashi
Province (on the other side of the bay) when Taira no Masakado
revolted in 935. Similarly, because of the Taira clan’s descent from
Emperor Kammu, they are also known as the Kammu Heishi. Thus, in
the Kanto, the two great warrior clans—Taira and Minamoto—were
well established. The revolt of a Taira kinsman signalled the beginning
of a series of conflicts between Taira and Minamoto that would even-
tually contribute to the end of the Fujiwara Regency.33
Taira no Masakado has been called the first samurai because his
clan and his career match so many of the themes discussed in this
chapter about the origins and rise of the samurai, their warrior net-
works, and the relations of these warrior bands to other powerful war-
rior organizations as well as the court.34 The Taira clan that Masakado
came from can be classified as miyako no musha (warriors at court).
They “ . . . were men of the provincial governor class—men of fourth
or fifth court rank—who used the profession of arms as a vehicle for
more general career advancement.” Their other distinguishing feature
is that they maintained their connections and presence at court.35 In
Masakado’s case, his ancestors fit the pattern of the motto “go east
young man,” and they were descended from the imperial line but
removed enough to no longer meet the genealogy criteria (after the
sixth generation) to remain in the court nobility class that lived in the
capital. Taira Takamochi, the founder of the clan, fathered six sons.
His third son, Yoshimomochi, had 12 sons, of whom Masakado was
Map 2.2 The Kanto Plain Region: Masakado’s Rebellion
third. This plethora of male members of a military clan resulted in

much infighting in the Taira clan. As with his uncle, who served as
vice governor of Kazusa (see Map 2.2) after having spent time at court,
Masakado also returned to the court seeking a job as a police commis-
sioner (investigator) in 930. This aspect emphasizes again how the
miyako no musha might maintain his court connections. Masakado,
however, did not receive the commissioner job and returned to the
provinces a disappointed man, though he did have a local post that
he could return to.36 For miyako no musha, loss of presence at court
was loss of influence at court, which might explain the source of Masa-
kado’s resentment that contributed to his eventual rebellion against
the court. It was after his return that the trouble began.
One way for a samurai leader to gain influence was through mar-
riage to someone who was well connected. Masakado attempted to
accomplish this by marrying his cousin, the daughter of his uncle
Taira Yoshikane, but his reckless individuality was reflected in his
refusal to live with the bride’s family. This behavior supports the idea
that samurai preferred vertical alliances rather than horizontal alli-
ances with perceived “co-equals.”37 Yoshikane was Takamochi’s old-
est son and head of the clan, and he took great offense at Masakado’s
spiriting his daughter away to live apart from the main family. This
incident began an internecine conflict at the top of the Taira clan. The
infighting in the Taira clan soon spread to larger conflict between
Masakado and members of the Minamoto clan, and it earned the
enmity of the court.38
The first open fighting began in 935 when Masakado attacked Min-
amoto Mamoru—his uncle’s father-in-law—in Hitachi Province (thus
the broadening of the conflict to include Minamoto). Notice, too, how
connected these two clans were. Masakado marched from his base in
Shimosa Province and attacked the forces of Yoshikane and Mamoru
at the battle of Nomoto, which was primarily an archery duel. He
killed Mamoru’s sons and Yoshikane’s brother Kunika and then
burned and sacked Nomoto. This episode highlights a “tactic” of the
samurai we saw used against the emishi, burning and destroying
logistics bases (usually villages). Mamoru, chastened, called upon
other members of the Taira clan that he was related to by marriage to
suppress Masakado. Masakado defeated these forces as well. At this
point, Yoshikane got directly involved and raised his own army from
Shimosa and Kazusa Provinces, at the same time convincing Taira
Sadamori (head of another major branch of the Taira clan) to join his
forces. Sadamori had earlier promised Masakado to remain at least
neutral in these squabbles, so the element of offended honor entered
into the energy of Masakado’s revolt.39
Meanwhile, Masakado gathered up 100 mounted warriors (and an
undetermined number of infantry) and advanced rapidly on Yoshi-
kane’s reputedly larger forces near the border between Shimotsuke
and Hitachi Provinces. This battle is interesting for a number of rea-
sons in highlighting the state of tactics and warfare in early tenth-
century Japan. Masakado used his infantry to overcome Yoshikane’s
defenses, a line of large implanted shields, and captured 80 prisoners.

Yoshikane fled, but Masakado captured him and the rest of his army
in the provincial headquarters of Shimotsuke. This battle reflects the
still important role of infantry as well as the numbers involved, prob-
ably only several hundred on Masakado’s side with a slightly larger
force on his uncle’s side. The mounted archers were probably a
reserve to be used to pursue a beaten enemy. Remember, too, that
one of the grisly post battle practices was for these early samurai to
behead their dead enemies—a practice also seen during the emishi
wars and the reigning method of determining “body count” other
than numbers of prisoners. In special cases of notorious bandits, reb-
els, and pirates, the principal leader was beheaded (alive or dead)
and the head sent to the capital for verification. Note, too, that these
early samurai did not execute or mistreat prisoners en masse (unlike
the Imperial Japanese Army in World War II) because they were valu-
able collateral in the conflict for negotiation and even ransoms.
Another valuable use for retainers in this system involved simply add-
ing them, after oaths and assurances, to one’s own forces. In fact,
Masakado released his captured uncle and some of his retainers to
avoid further alienating other members of his clan and the “censure
of the Court.”40
Imperial officials complained back to the court about the size of the
forces involved in these combats—which goes to show how little con-
trol the regency had over important events like the mustering of sig-
nificant military forces in the provinces of the Kanto. It also
emphasizes that the official policy that prohibited raising forces of
more than 20 men without court permission from the old imperial
system still remained in place—at least for reporting purposes. 41
Minamoto Mamoru had already complained to the court, which now
summoned Masakado to Kyoto to be examined. However, as a musha,
his patron at court was none other than the Fujiwara regent Tadahira.
Initially censured, Masakado was given a full pardon in 937, and a
general amnesty was declared for all involved.42
Masakado returned home, but the status quo antebellum peace
never had a chance. En route, Masakado was turned back at the Kokai
River crossing by Yoshikane, who then burned Masakado’s key stables
in the Toyoda district. This incident implies that horses were consid-
ered vital to Masakado’s success and tactics. The conflict continued
as a war of raids on each other’s bases for most of the fall and into
the winter of 937. However, late in the year, Yoshikane attempted a
surprise attack on Masakado’s forces at Iwai in Shimosa. Masakado

again prevailed, rallying his forces to defeat his uncle, who had not
achieved complete surprise in his approach. After Iwai, Masakado’s
other adversary, Taira Sadamori, successfully broke through Masaka-
do’s forces and marched for the capital to again try to convince the
court to declare Masakado an outlaw. Sadamori returned in 939 with
a court summons for Masakado to again go to the capital to be exam-
ined by the Council of State. At this point, Yoshikane died and
Sadamori attempted to flee to the north but was prevented by his rival
from doing so. Sadamori, leading the nominal “posse” to arrest the
outlaw, himself became a hunted man, living a hand-to-mouth exis-
tence hiding in the rugged eastern Kanto, which was now controlled
by Masakado.43
While all of this was taking place, a separate conflict was underway
in Musashi (on the western side of Tokyo Bay) between the
government district magistrate of Adachi on one side and Prince
Okiyo (the governor) and his vice governor Minamoto Tsunemoto on
the other. The occasion involved tax collection in the province. Prince
Okiyo and Tsunemoto claimed that the district magistrate had ille-
gally collected taxes—although the opposite was almost certainly the
case. These two had probably withheld taxes and the magistrate had
simply seized what legally belonged to the state. The two governors
then raised forces (illegally), attacked the magistrate, and then burned
and looted the homes of the people in his district. At this point, Masa-
kado took it upon himself, with Sadamori still roaming about the
countryside at his rear, to try and mediate this new conflict. However,
in solving the dispute between the magistrate and Prince Okiyo,
Masakado—perhaps unwittingly—enabled the magistrate to attack
Tsunemoto, who fled. Thus, Masakado had alienated another member
of the Minamoto clan. Masakado’s communications with the regent,
and his control of news getting into and out of the provinces under
his control, resulted in his patron throwing Tsunemoto into prison
after that unfortunate individual arrived in Kyoto to lodge his com-
plaints. However, the court took the precaution of sending new
inquisitors to the Kanto to assess the situation.44
While Masakado awaited the arrival of these men, he made a num-
ber of decisions that permanently ruptured his relationship with, and
protection by, the Fujiwara court. Responding to a warrant by the gov-
ernor to arrest a corrupt landowner in Hitachi Province, he instead
fought a battle with the governor ’s son, Fujiwara Tamenori, and
defeated a force three times the size of his own. Tamenori, though,
escaped. As usual, Masakado’s forces looted the provincial head-
quarters after seizing the keys and seals of government. Now, egged
on by Prince Okiyo, he decided to broaden his objectives by establish-
ing himself as emperor based on his descent from Emperor Kammu.
His reasoning probably stemmed from his string of fabulous successes
and the protection by his powerful client in Kyoto. He is reputed to
have written to the Regent that “ . . . my destiny lies in the martial arts
(bugei). Come to think of it, who among my comrades can rival Masa-
kado!” Emboldened, he essentially seceded with the eight provinces
of the Kanto, appointing his men as provincial governors and declar-
ing himself “new emperor” (shinno). Despite this seeming final suc-
cess, Masakado had both Tamenori and Sadamori still unpacified
inside his domains.45
Tadahira now formerly declared Masakado a rebel and issued
orders for his suppression. The secession of the Kanto under
Masakado could not have come at a worse time for the court. Masakado’s
rebellion had inspired an adopted member of the Fujiwara clan—
Fujiwara Sumitomo, who was based the southwestern island of
Shikoku—also to rebel against the court. This particular individual led
a pirate fleet that preyed on the waterborne traffic in Japan’s inland
sea. Sumitomo also raided eastward to Kyushu. This pirate activity
was part of a general piracy problem in western Japan that had
increased in frequency since 930. By the time of Sumitomo’s rebellion,
the number of boats he used in his raids was reported to be as high as
1,000. The court appointed a new governor to replace Sumitomo, and
this governor used a combination of the carrot and the stick, offering
an amnesty with a bounty for all pirates who would turn themselves
in. Over 2,500 pirate warriors seem to have accepted this offer. The court
went on full alert in both the east and the west, appointing two shoguns
for “search and destroy” against Masakado and Sumitomo. With their
orders, these men were also given official authorization to raise troops
to accomplish their mission—emphasizing how pieces of the old
imperial system remained in effect—although the troops raised would
come from provincial warrior bands (bushidan).46
In addition to these measures, and the obligatory special prayers in
the monasteries and shrines, the court released Minamoto Tsunemoto
from prison and promoted him in rank, giving him a commission to
assist the new armies being raised against Masakado. They also tem-
porarily bought off Sumitomo with an increase in court rank, and
Sumitomo suspended his operations as a result. The court also

appointed Masakado’s enemies, many of them regarded only recently
as outlaws and rebels themselves, as the new governors of the prov-
inces in the Kanto, including two of Yoshikane’s sons as well as the
elusive Taira Sadamori. Before these new forces arrived in the Kanto,
the situation rapidly came to a climax. Meanwhile, Masakado’s
lengthy campaign during the winter after the harvest had caused his
large force to dwindle to about 1,000 men.47
In early 940, Masakado marched again on Hitachi to try and capture
Fujiwara no Hidesato, who the court had pardoned and elevated in
rank. He met Hidesato’s and Sadamori’s combined forces in what is
known as a meeting engagement—a type of engagement where two
armies collide with neither really deployed for battle. In this case, the
engagement occurred with the entire combined armies of Hidesato
and Sadamori against Masakado’s isolated rear guard, which engaged
instead of withdrawing. This force was annihilated, and the court’s
forces pursued the greatly weakened Masakado. Near Kawaguchi,
they caught him and pummeled his smaller force. By this time, Masa-
kado’s plight was critical, as he was cut off from his supply bases and
abandoned by the bushidan previously allied with him. On the thir-
teenth day of the second month of the New Year, Sadamori led his
vanguard against Masakado, now little more than a guerilla leader,
in Masakado’s home province of Shimosa. Sadamori began by burn-
ing the villages and turning the population against Masakado. In
response to these depredations, Masakado—according to the Tale of
Masakado—sallied forth from his mountain sanctuary leading a
mounted archery attack in his armor with his last 400 retainers. At first
he had the advantage of the wind (which caused his enemies’ arrows
to be less effective and his more so) and achieved great success against
Sadamori’s superior numbers. However, the wind changed, and
Masakado was hit by an arrow that was reputedly fired by Sadamori.
Hidesato then jumped in and beheaded the wounded Masakado.
Thus, the great rebel leader was defeated by local forces, led by men
much like himself, before the appointed shoguns could arrive to do
the same thing. Or perhaps before Masakado could cut a deal and
escape again! With its inspirational leader gone, the entire rebellion
quickly collapsed and not long after, Prince Okiyo was also captured
and beheaded, and this appendage was dispatched to a grateful court
in Kyoto.48 Not long after Masakado’s head was mounted on a spike
in Kyoto, it disappeared. Thus began the legend of the curse of the fly-
ing head of Masakado, and many misfortunes befalling Japan there-
after were ascribed to it.49
In the west Sumitomo remained unpacified. He had even been
rewarded for his poor behavior and depredations. With Masakado
subdued, the court now outlawed Sumitomo, who promptly resumed
his destructive seaborne raids. Retribution for the seaborne warrior
bands came in the following year. Pirate heads soon started to flow
to the capital as the mobilized forces of the court counterattacked. Fuji-
wara no Kunikaze attacked Sumitomo’s superior forces in a sea battle
near the pirate base in Iyo Province (located on Shikoku). Aided by
excellent intelligence provided by a treacherous pirate subordinate,
Kunikaze’s 200 ships virtually annihilated the larger pirate fleet in
the waters close to shore (a result that recalls the ancient Greek sea bat-
tle of Salamis), but Sumitomo escaped via the open sea (presumably
he had a few ships that were more seaworthy than Kunikaze’s). Pirate
activity abated, but Sumitomo soon resumed the offensive. This
turned out to be a great error, and during the fifth month of 941,50
the overall shogun charged with the “search and destroy” mission—
Ono no Yoshifuru, with Minamoto Tsunemoto and Sademori as his
assistants—cornered Sumitomo in Hakata Bay off Kyushu. In another
epic land and sea battle, Sumitomo’s forces suffered an irreversible
defeat, many taking their own lives rather than risking losing their
heads to the court. Sumitomo escaped again, but without bases or
local support, he was soon cornered, captured, and beheaded—and
his joined the many heads already on display in Kyoto.51
These revolts displayed the ability of the court to raise substantial
forces to defend itself against serious threats, but the bulk of the com-
bat power it raised consisted of retainers of the musha and the provin-
cial chieftains. Another factor that favored the crown included
substantial numbers of the leaders of the three great military families
supporting it as well—Taira, Minamoto, and the Bando Fujiwara.52
They also emphasize that the court still controlled the application of
violence, not through the old system, but through a system where
the bushi had a “monopoly over the means” but not over the “applica-
tion” of military force (the ends to which the means were applied).53
Over the next 150, years these bushi—who can now be referred to as
the samurai—would eventually appropriate unto themselves the
ends, ways, and means for the control violence on behalf of the state.
TAIRA AND MINAMOTO
The next century saw Japan at relative peace, although it was plagued
by famines and epidemics. During the eleventh century, the political
dynamic changed. As this paradigm changed the dominance of the
Fujiwara Regency was undermined. Against this political backdrop,
new institutions emerged or matured. The two of most concern to this
book involve a system of retired emperors (Insei) that began to chal-
lenge the regents and undermine their power, while at the same time
the samurai themselves began an internecine struggle that eventually
eclipsed both the Fujiwara civil dictatorship and the Insei, and
replaced them with a military dictatorship in Kyoto. The conflict origi-
nated between the two great warrior families, Minamoto and Taira,
and led to a period known as the Taira Ascendency (1159–1181). The
rebellions that occurred in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, then,
will be examined as catalysts that contributed to the process of the tri-
umph of the samurai as Japan’s leading political, as well as military,
class.
First, we must examine the political changes that slowly under-
mined the power of the Fujiwara regents, whose hold on power gave
the Heian period both its character and its air of political stability. By
1020, Heian culture had reached its highest point with the circulation
of The Tale of Genji, a story loosely based on a political figure humili-
ated and exiled by the Fujiwara regents. Fujiwara no Michinaga
reigned as the archetypal regent, unchallenged as the tenth century
became the eleventh. The long cycle of regency by one family created
longstanding, even hereditary, animosities against the Fujiwara. Many
problems remained unsolved in the countryside outside the glittering
court at Kyoto. 54 The situation might be compared to that of the
“benign neglect” of the British North American colonies in the seven-
teenth century, whereby those neglected figured out how to rule them-
selves—or rather to enrich themselves—while rendering nominal
subservience and military duty to their British monarchs. Similarly,
these musha and their provincial bushi counterparts, often the vice
governors of the provinces, policed things and served as tax farmers.
The result was a government that had less and less income and an
increasingly wealthy provincial elite. However, conditions did not
improve regarding the solution of longer-term problems.
One trend, seen already in the story of Masakado, was misrule by
the provincial elites. This misrule began to create a backlash from the
long-suffering peasants—who often had no advocate to plead their

case beyond the government’s magistrates, who tended to be part of
the problem rather than the solution. These men often did not plead
the case of the peasants at all for fear of their very lives. Recall how
Prince Okiyo and his confederate threatened the life of a magistrate
who attempted to collect the court’s legal taxes.55 Just prior to the
dawn of the eleventh century, this dynamic led to the first well-
documented peasant protest in Japanese military history, the Owari
peasant petition. As we shall see, this particular phenomenon, protest
by the peasants (which sometimes was violent), would become a part
of the Japanese cultural landscape of violence and might still be seen
in recent Japanese history as well (see Chapters 6 through 9).
Before taking a close look at the Owari petition and the later revolt
of Taira no Tadutsune, it is worth looking at a “snapshot” of the
military institutions in late tenth-century Japan before proceeding to
the final period of evolution in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to
the political triumph of the samurai. First, military institutions can be
easily divided into two groups, those located and used by the court
in and around the capital (imperial) and those in use in the provinces.
By 1000, the most important components in the imperial sector were
generally composed of those retainers and assistants used by the
courtiers and nobles in Kyoto, especially the musha, who tended to
have their small private armies inside the capital. In a foreshadowing
of the Onin War (1467–1477), these imperial warrior bands might occa-
sionally battle each other in the streets, as in fact did occur with an
archery battle in seventh month of 995 between two clans. The other
imperial component included the investigators who were assigned,
as in the example of Masakado, to apprehend especially important
criminals, rebels, and bandits. The investigators included on call war-
riors to accompany them in the performance of their commissions.
However, these “deployable” forces never numbered more than sev-
eral hundred and seem to have been drawn mostly from specific fam-
ilies that lived around the capital. They augmented the investigator’s
personal retinue of retainers and normally consisted of a mixed foot
and mounted force numbering in the dozens, that is, it was rarely
more than company-sized (100–150 men).56 The American idea of a
posse composed of veterans of previous posses led by a marshal and
several deputies provides an extremely rough analogy to understand
this dynamic.
The final imperial component, last seen during Sumitomo’s threats

to the capital in 940–941, constituted the imperial guards of the old
system. By 1000, these had become an almost entirely ceremonial
and a local police force that was not used for military missions except
in extremis. Thus, it is fair to say that the most substantial component
of the imperial forces in the capital were really the musha and their
bushi retainers. Recall, too, that to get ahead, the sons of the provincial
warrior classes would come to the capital to “intern,” to try to form
that vertical relationship with a higher-level court aristocrat. They
might not serve in a warrior job per se, but that did not mean they left
their warrior skills in the Kanto! Thus it was that Kyoto had substan-
tial numbers of warriors, not all of them yoked to the same purpose,
in the eleventh century. This was nothing really new, but the numbers
and the skill levels had increased substantially.57
As should be clear, the bulk of the military forces available to the
court could be found in the provinces, especially those in the Kanto
and in the pacified north. These forces coalesced around the person-
age of the governor of the province, usually an absentee tax farmer
who spent much of his time in the capital. If this governor happened
to be from the Kanto or one of the other more martial provinces (e.g.,
Dewa), he was probably a musha. Normally he left the day-to-day
activities of tax collecting and keeping the peace (often closely related
and in direct proportion to each other) to his vice governor. Again, in
the Kanto, the vice governor was almost always from one of the prin-
cipal warrior families. The governor’s forces consisted of either armed
troops stationed in the provincial capital, or the forces of a local
strongman he was allied with. Thus the governor, to be effective, had
to forge alliances with local strongmen as well as the major military
families who provided vice governors or risk becoming ineffective in
collecting provincial taxes as well as suppressing bandits and rebel-
lions. The provincial headquarters bushi were of three types—the per-
sonal retainers (roto) of the governor and vice governor, those warriors
serving in other various jobs in the capital (and their roto), and finally
local warriors living in the immediate vicinity of the capital and avail-
able for use.58 The behavior that spawned the Owari petition and the
career of yet another Taira rebel shows us what this system looked like
in actual practice.
Owari is a province located between the Kanto and Kyoto near
Honshu’s other extensive plains, the Nobi, near modern-day Nagoya.
As mentioned earlier, the big losers as the Heian period progressed
were the peasants, who were straining under evermore rapacious and
greedy governors that were barely restrained by the extravagant Fuji-
wara court. Fujiwara no Motonaga, governor of Owari, stood out as
one of the most oppressive of these officials. In addition to rape, mur-
der, and arson, he is said to have collected three times the amount of
taxes officially authorized by the court. By 988, the peasants, with the
support of the long-suffering imperial magistrates, petitioned the
court with an account of Motonaga’s abuses. Part of the peasant peti-
tion follows and gives one an idea of what some of the governor’s roto
were like:
For the sake of their own honor and reputations they willfully
pluck out people’s eyes. Arriving at people’s homes, they do
not dismount but enter on horseback. Mounted retainers and fol-
lowers tear down wooden screens from homes and carry off tax
goods. Those who dare to protest this injustice are meted out
punishment. Only those who offer bribes are spared . . .59
Motonaga was duly dismissed but managed to take up residence with
little regret in the capital.60 Meanwhile, the court continued to spend
profligately. Michinaga indulged the court, and himself, by building
a huge and expensive Hojoji monastery for the repose of his soul after
he died. In 1022, he dedicated its crowning feature, the Golden Hall,
with an elaborate and expensive ceremony. He passed on his extrava-
gant habits to his son and successor, and as the mid-eleventh century
approached, these unwise and unsustainable expenditures on behalf
of the vanity of the Heian court rapidly undermined its hold on
power.61
Shortly thereafter, another Taira warrior chieftain unsettled the
equanimity of the court. Taira no Tadatsune fits the description pro-
vided previously of the provincial warrior chieftain, often serving as
a vice governor and then settling in the provinces with this position
as a de facto hereditary post. Another descendent of Takamochi,
Tadatsune terrorized the three provinces that we saw Masakado pri-
marily operate within—Kazusa, Shimosa, and Awa. According to
accounts, though, Tadatsune ravaged these lands to a far greater
degree than Masakado had. At one point, he had served as vice gover-
nor of both Kazusa and Shimosa. After the death of Michinaga in 1027,
Tadatsune decided to go on the offensive, resigning the Kazusa job
and returning to Shimosa to gather up his forces. In early 1028, he
attacked his enemies in both Kazusa and Awa, burning the governor
of Awa to death after capturing the provincial headquarters.62
The court reacted by attempting to enlist the powerful Minamoto
Yorinobu to suppress Tadatsune; however, Yorinobu declined the
commission and instead the court sent two investigators—Taira no
Naokata and Nakahara Narimichi—with the types of troops discussed
earlier to apprehend him. Orders were also sent to the northern prov-
inces to raise levies against Tadatsune, which indicates that the court
was not too confident in the military suasion of the forces with the
two investigators. Narimichi was not a military investigator but more
a legal scholar, and he protested his assignment to this martial mis-
sion. As Narimichi dragged his feet, Tadatsune continued to ravage
the provinces. Eventually the court fired Narimichi and by 1030, its
patience with Naokata, who had bickered with his co-commander,
ran out. In the interim, Tadatsune attacked the newly appointed gov-
ernor of Awa and forced him to flee. With the situation dire and at an
impasse, the court again asked its first choice, Minamoto Yorinobu,
to suppress the “bandit.” In 1031, he accepted the commission. Part
of the reason probably had to do with Yorinobu being Tadatsune’s
patron at court, which again emphasized the vertical relationship of
a powerful (and dangerous) provincial military aristocrat with the
next rung up the chain, the musha aristocrat Yorinobu. Yorinobu also
had an insurance policy, as one of Tadatsune’s sons was his hostage.
Tadatsune surrendered to Yorinobu’s large army at his camp (Bakufu)
with two more of his sons and three of his most powerful vassals. For-
tuitously, Tadatsune fell ill and died on the trip back to Kyoto. Yori-
nobu dutifully detached the rebel’s head and provided it to the
court. The court granted amnesty to the remainder of Tadatsune’s
sons, who were still at large, preferring not to mar this bloodless vic-
tory with the additional expense of hunting them down.63
The entire episode emphasizes how dependent the court had
become on powerful samurai like Yorinobu. It also highlights the
power of the vertical relationship between the patron and his vassal
lord—only the most heinous acts, however, moved Yorinobu to action
against his client. Finally, the episode illustrates how powerful the
Seiwa Genji had become as well as the close ties between the two pre-
mier military families in the state. The Minamoto name had become
synonymous with the actual military power that really underlay the
ostentatious material display of that glory by men like Michinaga.
Also, because of the pardon, no doubt engineered by Yorinobu, Tadat-

sune’s sons remained his clients—even though he had suppressed
their father. Another critical event that occurred after Yorinobu’s tri-
umph took place when Taira Naokata gifted his estate in Kamakura
in Sagami Province to Yorinobu’s son. Thus, the Minamoto were resid-
ing in the seat of their future government.64
The visible decline of the Fujiwara political dictators was not long
in coming—their impotence in preventing the despoliation of three
rich provinces not only underlined their waning power, but also cut
into revenues. As usual, this decline was further accelerated by
another rebellion and war—in this case 12 years of conflict spread
out over 30 years. It occurred in that other wild region, the Tohuku,
beginning in 1051. The first phase, known as the Early [or Former]
Nine Years War, began in the province of Mutsu—the same province
where the emishi had been the most recalcitrant three centuries earlier.
A local chieftain who served as the military adjunct to the governor (a
post unique to the northern provinces) took it into his head to ignore
the orders of the provincial governor. Abe Yoritoki was from another
of those military families (Abe) who had turned what was technically
an appointed position into a hereditary post passed down from father
to son. In the case of the Abe, the family descended from the warlike
emishi who had gone over to the government rather than continue to
resist. The governor complained, and the court took action. Not sur-
prisingly, the court turned again to the Minamoto. It selected Yorino-
bu’s son Yoriyoshi to lead the military response. Yoriyoshi and his
teenage son (Yoshiie) took to the field accompanied by many Kanto
bushi, most of them personal retainers, but taking a page from his
father’s book he brokered a peace with Abe Yoritoki after a general
amnesty was issued by the court. However, he probably used this
device more as a truce or armistice and resumed the campaign in the
rugged country of the north in 1056 on the pretext of a raid conducted
by Yoritoki’s son, Sadato:
Yoritoki was punctilious in his attentions to [Yoriyoshi]. He pre-
sented him with fine horses and treasures and also offered gifts
to his warriors. But near the Akuri River one night, as Yoriyoshi
was returning to the provincial capital, a man approached him
unobtrusively with a tale of men and horses killed and wounded
in the camp of Mitsusada Motosada, the sons of the acting gover-
nor, Fujiwara-no-ason Tokisada.65[emphases added]
This passage shows that the way to inflame passions was to destroy
warriors and horses. The pattern of these operations reverted again
to the type of hit-and-run warfare seen during the pacification of the
emishi. The Abe knew the ground and used it their advantage. For
half of the year the weather, too, was harsh.66
The campaign ground on, and in 1057, Yoritoki died from a wound
during one of the many skirmishes that occur in this type of warfare;
however, his son Sadato continued the fight. Sadato was a reputed
“mighty man” and soon exacted retribution on Yoriyoshi. While wait-
ing for the court to raise additional troops, Yoriyoshi and his son Yosh-
iie, in an ill-advised move, advanced to the rebel base at Kinomi to try
and end the rebellion at one stroke. On a snowy battlefield, Sadato
administered a harsh defeat and Yoriyoshi and his son barely escaped
as Sadato pursued them in the middle of a blizzard. However, it was
at this battle that Yoshiie was first lauded by the chroniclers as the
son of the god of war:
[Yoshiie] shot arrows from horseback like a god; undeterred by
gleaming blades, he lunged through the rebels’ encirclements to
emerge on their left and right. With his great arrowheads he
transfixed one enemy chieftain after another. . . . The barbarians
fled rather than face him, calling him the firstborn son of Hachi-
man, the god of war.
Yoriyoshi did not give up, and the court renewed his commission,
having little choice given the paucity of forces on hand for this distant
campaign. Yoriyoshi renewed the struggle using the same sort of tac-
tics as the great Tamuramaro. He conducted a slow but sure campaign
of encirclement, relying heavily on help from an “ex-barbarian chief-
tain” named Kiyohara Mitsuyori from Dewa for additional troops.
With an overwhelming force, he surrounded Sadato at his stronghold
of Kuriyagawa on the Kitakami River (see Map 2.1). During a fierce
two-day battle in 1062, he assaulted the stronghold. He and his son
first diverted any water that Sadato could use to fight fires, set fire to
the palisade, and then conducted the assault that compelled Sadato
to surrender. During these battles, Yoshiie proved himself again with
many acts of valor. Yoshiie was given the honor of bringing the heads
of the rebels to the capital and came to be venerated by the Minamoto
as the founder of their fighting tradition.67
Yoshiie’s triumph did not end the war, however. Twenty years later,
the revolt flared up again. This phase of the war came to be known as
the Later Three Years War, although it lasted from 1083 to 1087. Recall
that the Kiyohara had aided Yoriyoshi and his son against Sadato.
Afterward, Kiyohara’s clan became the rulers of Mutsu (which is
probably why they helped in the first place) and began to abuse their
power through misrule and excessive taxes. On top of all of this, they
fought among themselves for ascendancy. These things, again, came
back to the court and again the embattled court (see later in this dis-
cussion) dispatched the Minamoto to solve the problem—this time
with Yoshiie, the Hachiman Taro (son of the god of war), as the gover-
nor (he had no military commission). Yoshiie brought with him many
of the veterans and their sons from the earlier conflict, hard-bitten
warriors of the Kanto—but it was still a difficult campaign in grueling
conditions.68
In a complicated series of moves, he tried at first to solve the prob-
lem as his grandfather did, peaceably and bloodlessly—however, the
Kiyohara were no more amenable to this method than the Abe and
in 1086, Yoshiie took to the field with his retainers and what provincial
troops he could find (without the approval of the court). Trying the
same move as he and his father had at Kuriyagawa, he attempted to
reduce the Kiyohara forces at their stronghold at Numa in the dead
of winter. This time it did not work out so well and he had to raise
the siege due to the hunger and exposure of his men. In the meantime
the Kiyohara brought up a relief army and joined forces further north
at the Kanezawa palisade. These operations took place in the same
region of the earlier emishi campaigns around Fort Akita, no accident
given the terrain and how it channeled any but the smallest forces.
Meanwhile, Yoshiie called on his brother Yoshimitsu for help and he
came north from Kyoto, using the type of capital warriors discussed
earlier (i.e., his personal retainers that lived in the capital with him
plus a few imperial guards). Even this was not enough, but Fujiwara
Kiyohira also provided additional troops (he had already joined Yosh-
iie prior to the Numa siege). Another epic siege ensued that ended this
time with a successful assault against the weakened, starved garrison.
The Minamoto army sacked the fort and took 48 heads from the lead-
ing rebels.69
Portions of this siege as reflected in the chronicles are worth empha-
sizing to show various features of the maturing form of the samurai at
this time. First, Yoshiie was a general who shared the privations of his
troops and knew how to inspire them, not an effete court aristocrat.
Yoshiie rewarded bravery and punished poor performance
(“cowardice”) in the seating arrangements for his men. Too, during

the siege there were several “ritualized” combats where warriors from
the fort sallied forth and engaged in mounted one-on-one combat with
Yoshiie and his warriors. As one historian observes, “ . . . all the char-
acteristics of samurai fighting style were in place by the time of the
Latter Three Years’ War . . . ”70 Returning to other changes in tactics
and weapons, by the time of these wars other significant develop-
ments can be noted. Although the general strategies look similar to
the emishi campaigns, modes of fighting and weaponry had changed,
even since the time of Masakado. One thing that did not seem to have
changed was the size of the forces, but the predominance of siege war-
fare was significantly different. Unlike the emishi, the Abe and the
Kiyohara fought from inside ninth- and tenth-century forts, taking full
advantage of the defense and the attackers’ difficulties with supply.
Too, though the bow remained the predominant weapon, more of the
actual combat occurred between mounted warriors and on an individ-
ual basis. In other words, individual combat, usually during the siege
or at its climax, tended to be between the mounted archers of both
sides. Again, these men constituted the “center of gravity” in the
forces of the two sides at the critical points in the battle or the cam-
paign. Although use of masses of infantry still occurred and were
needed to conduct sieges, they were less important in actual battle.
Ruses, assassinations, tunneling, fire, and any other method that could
precipitate either surrender or a sally by the defending garrison also
seem to have become more common.71
It was against this backdrop that the Fujiwara system came to a cri-
sis point. Yoshiie’s campaign was illegal. The court had not authorized
Yoshiie to raise troops to settle matters; it had only appointed him gov-
ernor. Some historians have identified this campaign as the beginning
of European-style feudalism in Japan because Yoshiie, not the court,
paid for it and rewarded his hard-fighting warriors from his own re-
sources after it was over—the way a European baron might reward
his vassals without reference to the crown. There is certainly some
truth in this, but the more important feature reflected here relates to
the power of Yoshiie. Despite being removed as governor, he was
autonomous enough to return to his estates in the Kanto, and his rep-
utation provided an example to the other samurai of what might be
obtained with the power they held. The Later Three Years War was a
private war. Nonetheless, even though the court removed Yoshiie
from his governorship, once he paid the taxes he had diverted to fight
his private war, the court promoted him. It eventually welcomed

Yoshiie back to Kyoto as a privileged and honored aristocrat. He died
peaceably in 1106, a favorite of one of the In—the retired emperor and
a new force in Japanese politics.72
To understand the system of retired emperors and how a pariah of
the court could return and be protected by it, we must return to the
capital during the period of these northern wars and look at the health
of the Fujiwara Regency. Recall that the Fujiwara had been losing the
influence and power needed to maintain them atop the imperial sys-
tem. When they needed significant military help, they employed the
warrior families to accomplish their ends. Without it they risked over-
throw by their enemies, who were many, and a continued loss of rev-
enue due to governors who failed to forward the imperial cut in
taxes. Loss of income, especially, was loss of what little leverage they
still retained. Most of these conflicts, as we have seen, were linked
with the tax revenues in the provinces. Among their enemies were
the dispossessed founders of the Japanese state, the imperial family
and especially the many former emperors who lived long lives after
abdicating their thrones to younger or more malleable crown princes.
Michinaga’s son Yorimichi (1016–1068) reigned for 50 years after his
father, his reign encompassing not just Tadatsune’s revolt, but also
the Former Nine Years’ War. He served as regent for three emperors
during this time period. When Emperor Go-Reizei (Reizei the Later)
died in 1068, a new emperor, Go-Sanjo (Sanjo the Later), assumed the
throne. At this point, personality comes into play. Because of the lon-
gevity and malleability of the previous emperor, as alluded to earlier,
the new emperor had time to mature and become his own man. Even
more importantly, his mother was not a Fujiwara daughter. Addition-
ally, Yorimichi antagonized the young man, creating further animosity
between the crown prince and the Fujiwara.73
Go-Sanjo began to rule directly, picking advisors who were not Fuji-
wara or their clients. He also began a system of land reforms intended
to bring the problem of the lack of income due to the shoen system
under central control. One of the results of these reforms involved
the creation of smaller administrative units centered on villages. The
goal was to increase the power of the central government that had lost
control of revenue by limiting and even scaling back shoen creation. It
also served as a means to get land devastated by revolts, famines, and
epidemics back into production. One by-product of these reforms was
that warriors became personally involved in the restoration of these
lands to cultivation. During the late eleventh century and into the
twelfth century, more warriors than previously seen became involved
in land ownership and stewardship. This process was accelerated to
some degree throughout Japan by Go-Sanjo’s attempted (and ulti-
mately failed) reforms.74
Go-Sanjo was unable to continue his program of reform, dying only
four years after assuming power. However, his passing did not see the
reinstitution of the absolute power by the Fujiwara regents. Before he
died (in 1073), he abdicated the throne to his minor son, but instead
of giving the power to the Fujiwara Regent, the “retired” emperor
retained it for himself while moving himself to retirement in a monas-
tery or cloister. Michinaga, as regent, had highlighted this method,
having done the same thing himself at the time of the dedication of
the Hojoji Monastery, “retiring” superficially into the life of a novice
Buddhist monk. This move gave the emperor access to the shoen rev-
enues of the monastery. This system became known as cloister
government (Insei) and the retired emperor (In) ruled behind the
scenes, much as the regent had. With Go-Sanjo dead one might imag-
ine the Fujiwara would move to the fore again, but the break was final,
and the loss of influence and power by Fujiwara serious enough, that
in 1086 Go-Sanjo’s son Shirakawa did the same thing, abdicating in
favor of his son until his own death in 1129. This long life resulted in
his domination of the government for the reigns of three subsequent
emperors, who were kept so busy with court rituals that they ruled
only in name, not in fact. Meanwhile, Shirakawa, unencumbered with
the cares of the court rituals, had time to effectively rule from his mon-
astery. It was not long before one might find more than one retired
emperor—often a father and son team—ruling in retirement while a
younger brother or grandson sat on the throne. In summary, the Fuji-
wara regent was less powerful (but not eliminated) and supplanted
by an imperial regent.75
It was against this backdrop of a fundamental change in the politi-
cal dynamic that the Taira made a play for supplanting this system
and that of the Fujiwara with a warrior-based system of court
government in Kyoto. It also helps explain Emperor Shirakawa’s
rather bold policy of not rewarding Minamoto Yoshiie as one way of
bringing him to heel and of emphasizing his newfound power as
opposed to the Fujiwara, who probably would have promoted him.
It further explains why Shirakawa might “adopt” Yoshiie in his wan-
ing days as he joined his new “patron,” the retired emperor in
semiretirement near the capital, as the most honored warrior in the

land. What seems more surprising, however, is that it was not the
Minamoto who first grasped for ultimate power as chief of all Japan’s
bushi, but rather their sometime allies and rivals the Taira. This
process began in the mid-twelfth century with Taira no Kiyomori
and led to a cathartic civil war also known as the Genpei War in
1180 between the Taira (Kammu Heishi) and the Minamoto (Seiwa
Genji).
THE HOGEN AND HEIJI INSURRECTIONS
An event known as the Hogen Insurrection served as occasion for

Taira Kiyomori’s ascendancy as the first samurai political leader in
Japanese history. The cause of the insurrection stemmed from the dif-
ferent bases for power between Minamoto, whose prestige was great,
and the Taira. The Taira held more direct material advantage in lands,
wealth, and estates than the Minamoto, but the Minamoto—by virtue
of Yoshiie’s legacy as Hachiman Taro—held more loyalty among the
members of the samurai class. Initially money would trump loyalty.
Too, another possible reason the Taira were wealthier had to do with
their far greater experience in war at sea and on other bodies of water,
having recently had one of their generals (Taira no Tadamori) sup-
press a serious piracy problem on the Inland Sea in the first half of
the twelfth century. This also conferred to them the advantages and
wealth of trade by sea. Open conflict had broken out between Taira
and Minamoto when Yoshiie’s son was suppressed by a Taira general
in 1108. After this point, the Taira played a political game of aligning
themselves with the In at every occasion, even when it seemed to con-
flict with their interests, as one way to undermine the Minamoto at
court. Tadamori had proved particularly adept at this tactic. Kiyomori
was Tadamori’s son, and he inherited his father’s ambitions and ben-
efited from his careful cultivation of the In.76
During the period of the rule of the In, the Fujiwara family contin-
ued to fill key positions in the government. Fujiwara Yorinaga rose to
the position of minister of the Left in 1150. Yorinaga was the favorite
younger son of the regent Tadazane. We know mostly about Yorinaga,
a powerful and wealthy man, from his own memoirs, and it is clear he
was impulsive and “ . . . and in all things inclined to take risks.” He
married his daughter (another Fujiwara) to Emperor Konoe and when
this emperor died in 1155, conflict ensued over the succession. When
the new emperor refused to appoint Yorinaga as a tutor to the heir ap-
parent, Yorinaga collected troops to march upon the capital. It was at
this point that the Taira saw their chance. Yorinaga was able to raise
only a few hundred warriors to his cause, a reflection of how the
power of these officials had declined. Against him were the prestige
of the actual emperor, his own older brother Tadamichi, supported
by leaders of the great warrior clans of Taira and Minamoto.77
This brief violent rebellion was internecine in nature because it
included members of two institutions in decline—the regency and
the In/imperial family. Another ally that Yorinaga called on was
from a different branch of the Minamoto family close to the capital,
Minamoto Tameyoshi. The decisive clash took place in Kyoto itself at
the palace of the retired emperor Sutoku, who had been joined by the
forces of Yorinaga. Here they were attacked by the forces of the current
emperor led by Taira Kiyomori and his ally Minamoto Yoshitomo,
who had brought additional troops from the Kanto. Kiyomori and
Yoshitomo had over 1,500 men and simply smoked out Yorinaga and
his ally Sutoku, attacking them as they emerged from the burning pal-
ace. Yorinaga and Sutoku escaped, but Yorinaga died from an arrow
wound as he fled. Sutoku, being a former emperor, earned an exile
on the island of Shikoku, while Tameyoshi was captured and executed
by capital police troops (investigators) led by a lower-ranking Mina-
moto. This officer committed suicide after executing his kinsman—
another sign of the developing attributes of mature bushido (code of
the warrior).78
Also called the Hogen Disturbance (Hogen comes from a calendar
name for the era), the significant result of Yorinaga’s insurrection
was the ascendancy of Taira Kiyomori to supreme military power.
One near-contemporary observer cites this date as the beginning of
“the age of the warrior.” As we have seen, though, the earlier parts
of the Heian period did not lack for martial exploits, nor for the war-
riors to accomplish them. After the battle, Kiyomori used the occasion
to humiliate the Minamoto. While Emperor Go-Shirakawa rewarded
Kiyomori with fourth court rank and a prestigious governorship,
Minamoto Yoshitomo was promoted one rank lower and made an offi-
cer in the stables. Kiyomori, with the court’s backing, tried to have
Yoshitomo execute Tameyoshi, but Yoshitomo refused this onerous
commission. There was a virtual reign of terror against Yorinaga’s
supporters and those of Sutoku. These excesses overruled a precedent
that had lasted nearly 300 years against capital punishment for court-
iers inside the capital.79
Four years later, the final break between the top Taira and Mina-
moto chieftains took place in 1160 during the so-called Heiji Disturb-
ance (again named for a calendar era). While Kiyomori was absent
from the capital, Yoshitomo and a young Fujiwara ally launched a
coup against the government. Kidnapping the reigning emperor, they
forced him to appoint Fujiwara Nobuyori as chancellor and began to
govern. However, in an incident later borrowed by the author James
Clavell in his best-selling novel Shogun, Kiyomori, who had returned
to the capital with many more troops than the Minamoto conspirators,
liberated Emperor Nijo by smuggling him out of Minamoto hands dis-
guised as a lady-in-waiting to the empress. Kiyomori then gathered
his superior forces and attacked Yoshitomo, who had barricaded him-
self in the Great Inner Palace. At first, the defenders seemed to have
rebuffed the assault, but Kiyomori feigned a retreat that resulted in
an ill-advised counterattack by the Minamoto warriors and weakened
defenses elsewhere. Kiyomori’s forces attacked at these weak points.
At this juncture, the defense faltered and Yoshitomo attempted to re-
treat over Mount Hiei, where his defeated forces were attacked by
armed monks. As one can see, almost everyone in Japan now seemed
to have their own groups of armed forces to protect their lands, pala-
ces, and holdings—although it was rare for these disparate groups
(other than Kiyomori) to create united forces exceeding several hun-
dred.80
As the flight of Yoshitomo indicates, another armed group in Japan
included sects of monks, especially those around Kyoto. Monks had
begun arming themselves in large numbers in the tenth century, prin-
cipally to defend themselves against marauding warriors and over-
zealous tax collectors. Recall, too, that when the capital had moved
from Nara to Kyoto near Mount Hiei, animosity developed between
the monks from these two locales—but over time, animosities devel-
oped between monks contiguous to each other, such as the Todai-ji
and Kofuku-ji around Nara. By the eleventh century, the monasteries
started to recruit acolytes specifically for their martial skills, with
spiritual attributes secondary. They began to wear armor, their princi-
pal weapon was the naginata (an edged spear-like glaive), and they
were known as sohei—warrior-monks. In addition to those mentioned
previously, major factions included the Enryaku-ji (Hiei) and the Mii-
dera (near Lake Biwa). Pitched battles, usually over land or “prestige,”
were fought in 989, 1006, 1081, 1113, 1140, and 1142 between various
rival temples. It is no wonder Yoshitomo ran afoul of these bellicose
monastics!81
In the wake of the 1160 Heiji battle in Kyoto, Kiyomori brutally pur-
sued and crushed the Minamoto, effectively removing them as a threat
to his power until the last year of his life. Yoshitomo and his sons fled
through snowstorms (a common theme in this period of history), and
he killed one of his young sons who had been wounded in the fighting
to prevent him from being captured and cruelly executed by Kiyo-
mori. Not long after, Yoshitomo was slain in his bath by an assassin,
and his body was not allowed a proper burial. Another son was killed
after returning to Kyoto to try and assassinate a Taira leader as
revenge for his dead father and brother. Yoshitomo’s three youngest
sons (Yoritomo, Noriyori, and Yoshitsune) survived and Kiyomori,
having crushed the Minamoto, spared these children. He sent one to
a monastery and held the other two as hostages within his own family
until they were old enough to send to monasteries as well. Had Kiyo-
mori been able to see into the future, he would probably have
executed all of them. Meanwhile, other members of the Minamoto
clan submitted themselves to the new order of things and bided their
time, secretly plotting their return to power. In 1167, Kiyomori had
himself declared prime minister (daijo daijin), formally ending the
regency system. As for the In, the retired emperor Go-Shirakawa (him-
self a monk) challenged Kiyomori in 1177 in a dispute over the increas-
ingly disrespectful behavior of the monasteries. Kiyomori swiftly
punished him, essentially ending the “cloister system” by actually
cloistering the former emperor under close house arrest.82
* * *
Kiyomori spent his remaining years fretting over plots against his
hold on power. He attempted a further measure of control, sup-
pressing some of the armed monasteries as well as attempting to move
the court (and thus the capital) next to the sea at his domain at Fuku-
wara. By this time Kiyomori, too, had taken holy orders. He decided
to move the court back to Kyoto in 1180. Upon their return, the court-
iers celebrated extravagantly, although many of their lavish homes
had fallen into ruin. Meanwhile, his abuse of power had prompted
the imperial prince Mochihito to send a request to warriors across
the countryside to rebel against the Taira. In truth most warriors
ignored it, but one in particular would not—Minamoto Yoritomo, eld-

est of three surviving sons of Yoshitomo, who was quietly nursing his
dreams of revenge in eastern Japan.83 Taira Kiyomori died not long
after on March 21, 1181, after a civil war had ignited. His legacy
ensured that “violence became an accepted political tool” thereafter.84
Chapter 3
Military Dictatorship: From the

Genpei War to the Onin War
The Bakufu period starts with the dramatic overthrow of the Taira by
the Minamoto brothers Yoritomo and Yoshitsune in an event known
as the Genpei Wars (1180–1185), one of the most important conflicts
in Japanese history. After the overthrow of the Taira, the brothers
turned on each other—with the politically savvy Yoritomo triumphing
over the younger Yoshitsune. Yoritomo then established the first
warrior-based dictatorship at Kamakura, nicknamed after a general’s
tent in the field—Bakufu. The establishment of the Kamakura Bakufu
(also known as the shogunate) changed the political dynamic for the
next 600 years, becoming the paradigm to which Japan’s new ruling
class, the samurai, always returned.
During the same era, Japan’s military rulers faced the most danger-
ous threat from mainland Asia since the seventh century—the Mongol
invasions. Some scholarship claims that Japan may have been invaded
much earlier by horse-mounted warriors from the continent, but there
is no doubt about the seriousness of the threat from the Mongol
Dynasty of China.1 Japan’s system of military dictatorship, in this
light, looks serendipitous as a coherent means to address a national
threat of unprecedented scope. From these campaigns would arise
the great adjunct to the Japanese military mythos, the kamikaze (divine
wind) that the gods sent to protect their chosen people. The samurai
and the Bakufu have tended to get second billing to the fortuitous
weather, but they, too, contributed to turning back the invaders from
the sacred shores of Japan.
THE GENPEI WAR
In the summer of 1180, the imperial prince Mochihito anonymously

called for the overthrow of Taira Kiyomori when the prime minister
placed his three-year-old grandson on the throne. Mochihito, the son
of the cloistered emperor Go-Shirakawa, had a better claim. Kiyomori
called for Mochihito’s arrest, which led to that individual’s flight with
Taira troops in pursuit. Egging Mochihito on was Minamoto Yori-
masa. Yorimasa was a warrior-aristocrat, writing poetry and living in
Kyoto near the emperors and patrons he served. Now in his seventies,
Yorimasa was the real instigator behind the war due to his poor treat-
ment by the Taira and slow advancement in court rank. The conflict’s
name—from the combination of the kanji characters for Minamoto
(genji) and Taira (heike) and pronunciation in Chinese as “Genpei”—
means the Minamoto-Taira War.2
Mochihito took refuge with the armed monks at the Mii-dera Mon-
astery and was joined there by Yorimasa and 50 retainers after Kiyo-
mori ordered Yorimasa to arrest the rebel prince. At the same time,
the proclamation made its way to Izu in the east and then to the Kanto,
where Yoshitomo’s oldest son Yoritomo lived in exile with his Hojo in-
laws and guardians. Meanwhile, the Taira marched on Mii-dera with a
large army. Although the army was almost certainly not the size the
chronicles say it was (20,000), it was much larger than the 300 odd
samurai and armed monks with Yorimasa and Mochihito. After
rejecting Yorimasa’s advice for a night attack and arson on the Taira
headquarters, the small band decided to flee to another friendly mon-
astery near Nara. The goal was to try and buy time for the risings that
they expected in the east as well as to add to their own numbers.3
Unfortunately for Mochihito and Yorimasa, the Taira caught up
with them at the Uji River (see Map 3.1) just south of Kyoto, although
the small Minamoto band had made it to the south side. An archery
duel commenced (the monks were good archers) and was soon fol-
lowed by several intrepid monks advancing on the bridge to defend
at a place where Yorimasa’s samurai had ripped up some planks to
create a “trench” between the north and south sides of the bridge.
Military Dictatorship: From the Genpei War to the Onin War 63
Map 3.1 The Genpei War
The monks and their samurai allies performed so well that the Taira
generals, Kiyomori’s two sons, considered outflanking the position
further down the river. One of their allies at this battle, Ashikaga
Tadatsuna, eschewed this delay and forded the river with his band
of about 300 samurai. Tadatsuna was reputedly the first ashore on
the far side, and here the chronicles record that Tadatsuna proclaimed
his heritage before galloping into the outnumbered rebel forces. The
Taira troops, somewhat upstaged, also followed across the river and
with their arrival on the south bank, the battle was lost. Yorimasa
famously retreated into the Byodo-In monastery next to the river, com-
posed a death poem (another samurai norm), and then committed
painful hara-kiri. His death poem read:
Like a fossil tree from which we gather no flowers
Sad has been life, fated no fruit to produce.
This was true enough, his sons having been killed in the battle. Tra-
dition has it that a faithful retainer cut off the old man’s head and
weighted it with rocks in the river to prevent it from falling into the
hands of his enemies.4 As Mochihito fled toward Nara, the pursuing

Taira cornered him at a Shinto shrine, where he died “in a hail of
arrows.” Had he escaped, he would have joined an army of 7,000
armed sohei that had already begun to sortie from Nara toward the
Uji. His head and those of Yorimasa’s sons were sent in triumph to
Kyoto, while Kiyomori punished the rebellious monks by allowing
his samurai to sack the Mii-dera monastery. Next, he turned south,
where his men savagely attacked and burned most of Nara and its sur-
rounding monasteries to the ground. They incinerated over
3,500 monks and their supporters. More than 1,000 heads were taken
and posted gruesomely around the devastation in Nara or sent back
to Kyoto.
The battle of the Uji has several elements worth highlighting for
their military interest. First, the bulk of the rebel forces were armed
monks, which shows how significant a military factor the monasteries
had become. Additionally, Ashikaga’s announcement of his pedigree,
whether a literary device or not, indicates that the mature samurai
period had arrived. Finally, the death of Yorimasa highlights the
honorable suicide of the leaders, assisted by faithful retainers. In Yori-
masa’s case, his sons also bought him time with their lives so that he
could sanguinely write a death poem while the battle raged literally
on the other side of the wall. If these things were anomalies or
fabrications it did not matter; they would soon be celebrated in Japa-
nese literature and history as the proper mode of behavior, bushido.
This sort of social construction has a way of becoming reality—and
later warriors would behave in these ways because they wanted to
emulate the warrior behavior in the chronicles.5
This rebellion might well have been another footnote of history but
for the fact that Yoritomo had waited two decades for his moment of
revenge against the Taira for the murder of his father. Mochihito’s
proclamation caused Yoritomo to decide that the time to act had come.
Yoritomo not only had the occasion for rebellion, but he had some-
thing more important to the success of his project—“a radical new
vision” for an autonomous eastern warrior state. In addition, as he
built up support among the bushi of the Kanto, he promised everyone
what they had wanted for some time, security and protection for prop-
erty rights. Even so, he initially had a difficult time gaining many
adherents to his cause, but it would prove a rallying point for other
rebellions elsewhere in Japan, which would enable him to survive an
initial shaky start and build up his base in the Kanto.6
The war had four phases. The initial phase, just discussed, involved
Yorimasa and Mochihito. The next two phases, or rather processes,
overlapped because they took place non contiguously to each other
in the eastern and western portions of Japan. Although there was sig-
nificant fighting in the vicinity of Kyoto, the war was polarized
between the traditionally warrior power regions in Kyushu and the
Kanto. In the east, the activity revolved around Minamoto Yoritomo
and his brothers, who served as his generals. In the west and around
Kyoto, various rebellions broke out; however, the most significant
leader that emerged against the Taira was a cousin of Yoritomo’s, Kiso
Yoshinaka. The final phase of the war occurred after the capture of
Kyoto by Yoshinaka—Yoritomo conducted multiple campaigns
against both Yoshinaka and the remaining Taira and triumphed com-
pletely at the battle of Dannoura in 1185.7
Yoritomo formally declared against the Taira in August 1180. His
initial goal was probably not the complete overthrow of the Taira in
Kyoto, but rather the secession of the Kanto and the formation of an
autonomous warrior state, somewhat like Masakado. Unlike Masa-
kado, he promised to redress grievances and restore justice; however,
he reserved unto himself the decision as to which grievances were
just. Yoritomo proceeded cautiously—20 years under semi arrest and
the fate of other rebellions had taught him patience and circumspec-
tion. Kiyomori forced the issue by asking the local deputy governor
of Izu to arrest and execute Yoritomo. Yoritomo had his retainers con-
duct a surprise attack on the headquarters of the local governor at
Yamagi, whom they killed, and they captured the village as well.
Yoritomo had stayed at his own headquarters at the Hojo compound,
praying. He was no field general, but rather an extremely skilled poli-
tician and strategist, even though he was the senior surviving member
of one of Japan’s pre-eminent warrior clans. With this minor victory,
he now led his forces north into Sagami to unite with the first of the
Kanto warrior families to join his cause—the Miura. The local Taira
strongman reacted swiftly to this threat, moving to attack Yoritomo
and his allies in a night attack. The Taira outnumbered Yoritomo
almost 10 to one. Catching the Minamoto unawares in a narrow defile
along Sagami Bay near Ishibashiyama, a fierce, confused, and bloody
night combat ensued that almost saw the end of Yoritomo. However,
the confusion ultimately worked to Yoritomo’s advantage, and he
escaped to the east through the rugged country while his small force
was being annihilated. Taking to the water, he and a few surviving
retainers moved their camp to the modest fishing village of Kama-

kura, an area populated with Minamoto supporters.8
Yoritomo’s escape and retreat were probably his greatest personal
military “victory.” Geography and demography now swung to his ad-
vantage against the Taira, who were still fighting other rebellions in
the west as well as suppressing the armed monks around Kyoto and
Nara. Kamakura is in a rugged part of the southern Kanto, protected
on one flank by the sea and on the north by the Hakone Mountains
that make access to it difficult. The Taira now had to operate far from
their base in enemy territory. As time passed, Yoritomo only grew
stronger and the Taira risked all on another sudden attack, hoping to
destroy Yoritomo and his growing cause once and for all. Against Yor-
itomo’s large force Kiyomori sent his brother and another relative,
Taira Koremori. Yoritomo had his Hojo allies attack the Taira lines of
communication in Sugura Province while he boldly took the offensive
down the main highway to Kyoto, the Tokaido Road. On the southern
side of Mount Fuji at the Fujigawa River, he confronted the Taira forces
in full battle array on November 9, 1180. The two armies were approx-
imately the same size. Although accounts differ, it seems clear that lit-
tle combat actually occurred and that the Taira simply calculated their
odds of winning against the large, determined Minamoto force and
decided to withdraw. Even if they had defeated Yoritomo, it is more
than likely their quarry would simply have retreated to the impreg-
nable Ashigara Pass. Sunzi said that the acme of strategy is to win
without fighting, and if this is the case, then Yoritomo must be counted
among the great strategists. His gambit in confronting the Taira paid
off, and they left him to his own devices in the Kanto for the next three
years. The retreat turned out to be a fatal error on their part because as
they withdrew, the discipline and cohesion of their army fell apart.
Kiyomori’s bitter regret at Yoritomo’s success is reflected in his dying
request, not for Buddhist services but instead that the head of Mina-
moto Yoritomo adorn his crypt.9
The Taira had good cause to conserve their strength, as another
Minamoto had begun to give them trouble much closer to their base
of power around Kyoto and in the west. This was none other than
Minamoto Yoshinaka, also known as Kiso Yoshinaka, who also
responded to Mochihito’s call and began raising troops in late 1180
to overthrow the Taira. His uncle Yukiie (Yoritomo’s brother) had also
rebelled but had been checked by Taira troops early in 1181 in the
province of Mino. However, this was another pyrrhic victory because
the Taira troops promptly started to starve in their winter cantonments

and Yukiie, like Yoritomo, managed to escape with some of his forces.
After Kiyomori’s death in March 1181, the conduct of the government
fell into the hands of the still-cloistered emperor Go-Shirakawa. Now
the father of the dead rebel prince was the imperial authority under-
writing Taira power. Adding to the irony, various rebelling Minamoto
all linked their actions as “. . . acting on Behalf of His Imperial Maj-
esty.”10 Go-Shirakawa was simply a hostage of the Taira; however,
legitimacy for both sides would remain centered on whichever clan
or branch had actual possession of the imperial family and relics.
Yukiie sortied again that spring, and the Taira met him with
13,000 men at the Sunomata River in Owari Province. They again
defeated Yukiie but were too weak to pursue their foe and seal the vic-
tory. These operations had the result of allowing the other Minamoto
—Yoritomo and Yoshinaka—time to continue to build up military
power. Yoshinaka, joined by his defeated uncle, now took the fight to
the enemy. Like his cousin Yoshitsune (Yoritomo’s younger half-
brother), Yoshinaka was young, impetuous, and a gifted field com-
mander, but he lacked the political skill and sophistication of Yori-
tomo. He came from the island of Shikoku in the west, where he had
come of age in the mountainous district of Kiso (thus his adopted sur-
name). Yoshinaka invaded the province of Echigo in 1181 and dis-
played his martial prowess by defeating a Taira attack that autumn.
Weather and disease then played a role in bringing the fighting to a
halt as famine and epidemics halted military operations from 1181
to 1182. It was during this time that cracks began to appear in the
Minamoto block. Yoshinaka and Yoritomo both claimed leadership of
the Minamoto clan, with Yoritomo demanding that Yoshinaka for-
mally submit to his authority. Yoshinaka and Yoritomo agreed to a
truce, but this changed as Yoshinaka won victory after victory against
the Taira.11
The Taira again attempted to chastise Yoshinaka in Echigo after the
suspension of military activity due to the great famine. There he
unceremoniously dispatched another Taira army in 1183. Yoritomo
was still biding his time in the Kanto and Yoshinaka, correctly worried
that his cousin might turn on him, continued southwest, avoiding the
provinces under Yoritomo’s control. He advanced rapidly to within
40 miles of Kyoto by late summer and then halted to let the lingering
famine, which had been much worse around Kyoto, continue to
undermine the strength of the Taira. At this point Yoritomo, worried
at the success of his cousin, sent an army to threaten his rear. But again
a truce was negotiated. Now Yoshinaka turned on his Taira enemies,
who had raised a huge conscript army (some accounts list it as
100,000 strong) and were approaching his rear areas through Echizen
Province. Kiyomori’s brother Koremori commanded and had most of
the high level family leaders with him. The army looted and plun-
dered its way through Taira provinces, undermining support for itself
as it ate what little food remained after the famines.12
Yoshinaka met them with his smaller army at the Kurikara Pass
near Mount Tonamiyama on June 1–2, 1183. The various chronicles
of the battle give an interesting view into the unique generalship of
Yoshinaka. He evidently used deception to get the Taira to pause at
the crest of the pass instead of coming down into the narrow valley
below. Having the high ground, the Taira felt safe. Yoshinaka then
infiltrated some of his best warriors behind the Taira position that
night and commenced a desultory archery duel the next morning in
front of their positions. Yoshinaka seems to have taken advantage of
the ritualized style of fighting that had developed by this time and
slowly fed warriors into individual combats and then in larger groups
for group-on-group combat—almost like a tourney. As darkness
approached, he unleashed several surprises. First, he stampeded a
herd of cattle with flaming pine torches attached to their horns into
the enemy’s front and once this tactic caused a disruption in the Taira
ranks, he had his men in the rear attack. The result was a slaughter
that, if the accounts are true, was a veritable battle of Cannae in the
narrow Japanese mountain pass. The Chronicles read: “Thus did some
seventy thousand horsemen of the Taira perish, buried in this one
deep valley; the mountain streams ran with their blood and the
mound of their corpses was like a small hill . . .”13
These numbers are almost certainly inflated, the actual numbers
involved probably being around 40,000 on the Taira side and 5,000
Minamoto. Nonetheless, it was a victory worthy of a Hannibal that
had lasting results. It broke the power of the Taira to defend Kyoto,
and they fled with the toddler emperor Antoku in their possession to
their strongholds in the west as Yoshinaka closed in from the north
and his uncle Yukiie approached from the west. Meanwhile, the
retired emperor Go-Shirakawa slipped away, joined the combined
Minamoto armies, and gave them imperial sanction to destroy the
Taira. However, at the hour of his great triumph, Yoshinaka under-
mined his cause when he lost control of his troops, who now
ransacked Kyoto and its environs. Word of the poor treatment of civil-
ians and courtiers made its way back to Yoritomo, who eventually
issued an order—as the head of the Minamoto clan—to chastise Yosh-
inaka. As the third phase of the civil war was winding to a close, the
fourth phase was about to begin.14
Go-Shirakawa, eager for revenge against the Taira, pressed Yukiie
and Yoshinaka to pursue the Taira forces retreating along the north
shore of the Inland Sea to the west. Yoshinaka now had to focus in
three directions: the Taira to his west, Yoritomo in the rear, and
another group of Taira with the young emperor, the crown jewels,
and the imperial family that had taken refuge in the stronghold of
Yashima on Shikoku, which oddly was also where Yoshinaka had
taken refuge for so many years. Although the Taira had lost Kyoto
they had not yet lost the war, and they were now in the provinces most
loyal to them and fighting at sea, which was their forte. Marching west
along the Inland Sea, Taira Shigehira and Taira Tomomori defeated
Yoshinaka’s forces in a sea-land battle near Mizushima in Novem-
ber 1183. Yukiie was similarly defeated a week later at Muroyama.
From this point on, nothing went right for Yoshinaka. Yoritomo,
already scheming with Go-Shirakawa, sent an army westward under
his two younger brothers, Noriyori and Yoshitsune (of whom we will
hear much of soon). The alliance between Yoshinaka, Yukiie, and Go-
Shirakawa fell apart as Yoshinaka tried to emulate Yoritomo by setting
up his own warrior state. The large eastern army under the command
of Yoritomo’s brothers now cleared up this confused situation. Yoshi-
naka, greatly weakened by his defeats and infighting, attempted a
defense along the Uji River, as did Yorimasa before him, against the
combined armies of Yoshitsune and Noriyori. In a forlorn stand at
the Seta and Uji bridges in March 1184, Yoshinaka and his followers
were defeated. Yoshinaka was cornered in a frozen field and beheaded
by Yoritomo’s samurai. Go-Shirakawa was again established as the
legitimate imperial authority in alliance with the now unified Mina-
moto clan.15
The final phase of the war then began and centered on the fascinat-
ing character of Yoritomo’s youngest half-brother Yoshitsune, co-
general of the armies that had overthrown Yoshinaka. Yoshitsune
was an odd character whose life is so surrounded by legend and myth
that it is difficult to ascertain what is true and false. He seems a
composite of Robin Hood, Prince Yamato, and Billy the Kid. Like
Yamato and Billy the Kid he was a loner, probably as a result of his
turbulent childhood that saw his father murdered while he was still in
the crib. Kiyomori, though, spared his life and that of his beautiful
mother, who lived for a time with Kiyomori in Kyoto before he mar-
ried her to a member of the powerful Fujiwara family. Later, he was
sent from Kyoto as a Buddhist acolyte north to the domain of Fujiwara
Hidehira, the leader of the powerful northern branch the Fujiwara in
Mutsu Province. It was during this sojourn that he formed a lasting
friendship with the giant warrior-monk Benkai (Friar Tuck to Yoshit-
sune’s Robin Hood), another character around whom much myth
exists. It was from Mutsu that Yoshitsune came south to join his older
half-brother in his efforts against the Taira. 16 Although various
accounts describe Yoshitsune as a physically powerful and handsome
man of pale complexion, one chronicle probably gets it right in
describing him as “a small pale youth with crooked teeth and bulging
eyes.”17 He must have been a substantial person, however, because his
brother placed him in command of one of the armies he sent against
Yoshinaka in 1183 and, as we have seen, he succeeded brilliantly.
Yoshitsune now came into his own as a commander of the main
forces to be used against the Taira. Yoritomo had remained in Kama-
kura, preferring to place his brothers under the command and control
of the retired emperor in the prosecution of the war. Yoritomo’s hands-
off conduct of the war strikes one as a modern approach in this “age of
the warrior.” The Taira, meanwhile, had taken advantage of the inter-
necine Minamoto fighting to land troops from Shikoku on the coast of
the Inland Sea closer to Kyoto. These troops began building a fortified
series of camps at Fukuwara and Ichinotani as the young emperor
waited at sea on a boat to come ashore for the triumphal return to
Kyoto. Yoshitsune moved rapidly, defeating a Taira covering force
and then advancing on the main fortifications at Ichinotani and Fuku-
wara that anchored the Taira position. Because of the strength of these
fortifications and their dominance at sea, the Taira believed them-
selves secure. However, Yoshitsune divided his forces, sending the
bulk against the northern part of the Taira defenses at Fukuwara to
distract them and taking a flying column of about 100 mounted war-
riors to the heights above Ichinotani. The Taira believed these heights
impassible. Yoshitsune attacked boldly down the cliff at dawn on
March 20, 1184, while Noriyori attacked with the main force further
east. Yoshitsune supposedly tested his theory of getting down the
slope in the darkness by sending down two horses with monkeys on
them. If true, not only did this prove the concept, but it probably
motivated his samurai—who did not want to be shown up by a couple

of monkeys. They burst into the Taira rear just as the main attack was
delivered, setting fire to everything in the camp and causing panic and
havoc. Taira Tadamori, the suppressor of the Nara monks, was killed
and Taira Shigehira captured. Out of about 5,000, only 3,000 Taira
troops escaped back to Yashima with the young emperor in tow. Min-
amoto losses were negligible by comparison.18
Yoshitsune’s impetuous victory had not endeared him to his elder
brother back in Kamakura. Whether it was simple jealousy or worry
about having another charismatic Minamoto competitor like Yoshi-
naka, the official credit for the victory at Ichinotani went to Noriyori,
who was also appointed overall commander. The military, or rather
naval, problem was a difficult one that had yet to be solved. All of
the main Taira strongholds were islands, which meant that the Mina-
moto would have to somehow defeat their opponents at sea. For the
next six months, there was little military activity as Yoshitsune and
Noriyori awaited reinforcements from their brother in the Kanto while
gathering supplies and ships.19 While Yoshitsune and Noriyori pre-
pared to do battle with the Taira, Yoritomo obediently, and ruthlessly,
executed the orders of Go-Shirakawa to suppress warrior transgres-
sions in the wake of the general lawlessness that had afflicted the
countryside since active operations had resumed in 1183. In this man-
ner, Yoritomo further solidified his base of power by rewarding loyal
subordinates and purging would-be competitors while extending his
warrior-based rule beyond the Kanto.20
In October 1184 a combined sea-land operation began with Noriyori
advancing along the north shore of the Inland Sea toward the Taira
lands to the west. He fought one minor action near Kojima with Taira
Tomomori but had outrun his logistical support and stalled by Febru-
ary 1185. While he distracted the Taira, his flamboyant brother initi-
ated the next phase of the campaign. Yoshitsune had gathered up
enough ships to convey his forces across the sea to Shikoku for a raid
on the Taira stronghold of Yashima, with the possibility of capturing
the child-emperor and the imperial regalia. His goal was to avoid a
sea battle at all costs because the Minamoto lacked experience and
skill in this type of warfare. He chose March 22 to embark his army
and sail at night during a fearsome storm in order to both cover his
crossing and avoid the Taira fleet. His audacity was rewarded with a
successful passage and once ashore, his men moved quickly to attack
the unsuspecting Taira in their camp at Yashima. As usual, Yoshitsune
set everything on fire as he attacked, using the morning sea breeze to

blow the smoke and cover his advance. Unwilling to risk battle ashore
and dismayed by the sudden appearance of so many mounted
samurai, the Taira embarked aboard their fleet anchored in the shal-
low water between Yashima and Shikoku. The result was the strange
spectacle of horsemen exchanging arrow volleys with men aboard
ships. Yoshitsune prevailed, and the Taira sailed away, taking
Emperor Antoku and the imperial regalia with them to their island
base at Hikoshima at the mouth of the Shimonoseki Strait.21
The biggest windfall of Yoshitsune’s success at Yashima involved
the defection of many seafaring chieftains to the Minamoto cause.
Yoshitsune and Noriyori proceeded west reinforced by these new
forces. They included over 850 ships, many of them crewed by former
Taira mariners. In late April, the two fleets sailed out to meet each in
the narrows between Kyushu and Honshu near the village of
Dannoura. The Minamoto fleet outnumbered the Taira two to one,
but the Taira were counting on their superior expertise at sea to over-
come this disadvantage. In addition, their best general—Taira Tomo-
mori—was in overall command. Initially, the battle went their way
because they had the tide with them. Then a series of catastrophes
overtook the Taira as the tide literally turned against them, giving
the Minamoto ships the advantage in a sort of violent pushing match
at sea. Simultaneously, a key Taira ally defected and indicated which
ship had Emperor Antoku aboard. Yoshitsune directed the efforts of
the Minamoto fleet against this vessel, and he ordered his archers to
aim for the helmsmen and the rowers because the current change
would unhinge the Taira defense if their ships could not maintain
steerage. The Taira fleet was soon in confusion, and Tomomori coun-
seled mass suicide by the courtiers and imperial family. Chaos ensued
with a frenzy of imperial and Taira suicides. In short order, the child-
emperor was grabbed by his grandmother (Kiyomori’s widow), and
together they went over the side. They were followed by the dowager
empress (the child’s mother), who did not die but was fished out by a
Minamoto samurai. The Taira also attempted to throw the sacred mir-
ror and sacred sword, reputedly passed down from the Sun Goddess,
over the side. The mirror was dropped on deck, but the sword disap-
peared beneath the waves and reputedly remains there to this day.
Tomomori is said to have worn two suits of armor for his suicidal leap,
and two of his brothers used anchors to weigh themselves down. The
clan chief, Munemori, tried to swim for it and was captured. The battle
of Dannoura encompassed the utter destruction of the Taira, who now

disappeared from the stage of Japanese military history.22
THE KAMAKURA BAKUFU AND THE MONGOLIAN INVASIONS
The civil war was over, and a general peace ensued for most of the
provinces as Yoritomo consolidated power. He directed Noriyori to
mop up in Kyushu and to seize Taira lands. At the same time,
Yoritomo decided to get Yoshitsune, the hero of the hour, out of Kyoto
by ordering him to bring the prisoners and regalia to him at his capital
in Kamakura (which he had been constructing and adding to since
1181). Both brothers dutifully obeyed, and the political signal sent to
Go-Shirakawa that there was “a new sheriff in town,” or rather in
another town—Kamakura.23 Yoshitsune’s dramatic victories—two of
which were officially credited to Noriyori—had marked him as Yorito-
mo’s next target. It is likely Yoritomo did not want a situation to
develop as had with Kiyomori and Yoshinaka whereby a military dic-
tator took up residence in Kyoto. He evidently feared that Yoshitsune
might do just that under the heady influence of the wily Go-
Shirakawa. There was nothing in Yoshitsune’s behavior to indicate
such a move, but Yoritomo had found pre-emptive ruthlessness an
exceptionally efficient means of solving problems before they
occurred—he did not intend to share his nearly absolute power with
anyone, especially his popular younger half-brother. Go-Shirakawa
further muddied the waters by showering Yoshitsune with favors,
including naming him as a fifth-rank lieutenant in the imperial police.
It is from this action that the idiomatic Japanese phrase “sympathy for
the lieutenant” comes, meaning rooting for the underdog. None of
Yoshitsune’s rewards had the sanction of Yoritomo. Yoritomo stopped
Yoshitsune just outside of Kamakura, ordered him to remain where he
was until further instructed, and then shortly thereafter sent him back
down the road to Kyoto. Upon Yoshitsune’s return to Kyoto, the new
Shogun issued a formal order to arrest his brother in late Novem-
ber 1185 along with the dispatch of an assassination team. Yoshitsune
and his party defeated the attempt. In response, Go-Shirakawa
ordered Yoshitsune and his luckless uncle Yukiie to chastise Yoritomo.
Completely aware of their precarious situation, Yoshitsune, Yukiie,
and their retainers immediately fled the capital, leaving the realm of
history and entering that of legend and literature.24
Yoshitsune’s flight provided Yoritomo several opportunities to

expand and consolidate his power. He used the excuse of a great man-
hunt for Yukiie and Yoshitsune to force Go-Shirakawa (who claimed
Yoshitsune had forced him to act under duress) to grant him the
authority for expanded tax collection as well as the authority to
appoint both provincial stewards (jito) and constables (shugo) in all
provinces, not just those in the east. Yoritomo meanwhile captured
Yukiie and executed him in 1186. The second opportunity that came
due to the flight of the unfortunate Yoshitsune involved the last unrec-
onciled threat to Yoritomo’s hegemony, the domain of Fujiwara Hide-
hira in rugged Mutsu. Recall that it had taken the renowned warriors
Tamuramaro and Yoshiie the Hachiman Taro (son of the God of War)
much effort and time to pacify this region during the Heian period.
The old warlord of Mutsu had remained mostly neutral during the
Genpei War, sheltering Yoshitsune for a time at the outset but giving
little aid to either side. Hidehira welcomed the fugitive as a beloved
son into his province in 1187. Yoritomo continued his policy of cau-
tion, waiting for Hidehira’s death in 1188 before sending the first of
three orders to Hidehira’s son and successor Yasuhira to arrest Yoshit-
sune. In June, as Yoritomo gathered his armies to invade Mutsu, Yasu-
hira finally moved against Yoshitsune. His forces accosted Yoshitsune,
his wife and children, the faithful Benkai, and less than a dozen other
retainers at his hideout on the Koromo River on June 15. Benkai reput-
edly held off a vastly superior samurai force in the river with his
trusty naginata while Yoshitsune bled to death after disemboweling
himself. A trusted retainer killed Yoshitsune’s wife and two children
and then set fire to the house. Yoshitsune’s body was pulled from the
fire, and the head was detached and sent to Kamakura. Yoshitsune
was 30, the same age as Prince Yamato when he died—alone and for-
saken.25
Yasuhira had not acted soon enough to escape Yoritomo’s wrath, as
three armies now invaded Mutsu. The invaders crushed everything
before them and Yasuhira fled, only to be captured and beheaded later
that year. Yoritomo now reigned supreme and after Go-Shirakawa’s
death in 1192, the new emperor appointed Yoritomo as seii taishogun
—permanently as it would turn out. It was now “. . . government of
the samurai, by the samurai and for the samurai . . .”26 In Japanese
memory, Yoritomo is not remembered for his innovative building of
a new samurai state; instead, Japanese celebrate the tragic rise and fall
of his doomed younger brother.
In 1191, Yoritomo died after a fall from his horse. The new style of
government encountered difficulties involving the succession to Sho-
gun, but its survival bears witness to Yoritomo’s success at
institution-building and the cohesiveness of the samurai class. The
new government was geographically dualistic with the poles in Kyoto
and Kamakura—the Shogun ruled the east directly in all matters and
the rest of Japan by proxy through the court. The issue of succession
was overcome in much the same way the Japanese solved earlier suc-
cession crises for the court with the advent of a strong family taking
over regency of the shogunate and running the warrior administration
from Kamakura. This came about in 1205 when Hojo Yoshitoki
became the first shogunal regent (shikken) with the abdication of Yori-
tomo’s son Yoriie in favor of his brother. When Yoshitoki (the new Sho-
gun’s maternal uncle) became regent, he was already serving in this
capacity. The fascinating aspect here is that these Hojo were in fact of
Kammu Heishi (Taira) origin, so the Taira influence over affairs lived
on in an attenuated fashion under Minamoto lordship. The In system
also survived and contributed to the eventual downfall of the Kama-
kura shogunate in the fourteenth century.27
Another factor in the cohesion and identity of the samurai class of
this period pertains to its close association with the new form of Bud-
dhism known as Zen. The whole issue of the ethos of bushido and the
precepts of Zen reminds one of “the chicken and the egg” dilemma. A
more viable explanation resides in the congruence of certain elements
of bushido with this new interpretation of Buddhism from China. The
basic precepts of Buddhism, involving righteous living through a
number of lives leading to the end of suffering and nirvana, appealed
to the Japanese tradition of hierarchy, as did the concept of karma. One
could advance in station not necessarily in the life one was living, but
in the next life. One might also be demoted, an idea that spurred a
righteous lifestyle. The return of monk Eisai from China in 1191 with
the new doctrine introduced the Rinzai school of Zen Buddhism to
Japan, and Eisai eventually gained shogunal patronage. The compo-
nent of Zen that most appealed to the samurai involved Zen’s propo-
sition of one’s life as a series of riddles to be solved—not just
through righteous living, but as an active intellectual pursuit involv-
ing both action and meditation. In other words, Zen’s emphasis on
cosmic analysis appealed to the existing problem-solving ethos of the
samurai, who had just solved the great problem of the civil war. Zen
rapidly spread among the warrior class in the thirteenth century,
providing another element of social cohesion to samurai culture. As if

to emphasize this point, one of Japan’s most noteworthy landmarks,
the Great Buddha of Kamakura, was completed in 1238.28
Of the myths surrounding Yoshitsune, none is more intriguing than
the one that claims he escaped destruction at the Koromo River,
crossed to mainland Asia, assumed the name and title of Genghis
Khan, and then returned to chastise the Minamoto Bakufu. Like all
conspiracy theories, it is has more holes than Swiss cheese; however,
his name in kanji characters can be read as Genji-kei and so the myth
lives on. This interesting bit of lore points us to the next great event
in the military history of the Kamakura Bakufu—the Mongol inva-
sions in the thirteenth century. The Japanese converting to a military
dictatorship on the eve of a century that would see the advent of the
greatest threat to the nation seems serendipitous. Meeting an internal
threat rather an external one was probably closer to what Yoritomo
had in mind when he gained control of the constables, provincial
headquarters, and land stewards. But it must be admitted that any
reorganization that rationalized and improved the government’s abil-
ity to control military force was bound to have a secondary, perhaps
unintended, consequence of making Bakufu-type government more
effective in dealing with foreign invasions.29
Japan endured another minor civil conflict prior to the Mongolian
invasions. Known as the Jokyu War, the occasion for its outbreak came
after the assassination of Shogun Sanemoto (Yoritomo’s son) in 1219.
The state was thrown into turmoil for the next two years, although
the institution of the Hojo Regency saved the Bakufu system from col-
lapse. There was another retired emperor who proved as difficult as
Go-Shirakawa. When the regent Yoshitoki asked to appoint a new
Shogun in 1221, the retired emperor Go-Toba refused, attacked the
local Kamakura officials in Kyoto, and defeated them. He then
ordered the arrest of Yoshitoki. Yoritomo’s intrepid Hojo widow, still
alive, made an impassioned plea to the warriors of the east to back
the Kamakura government. The war lasted only about five weeks,
with the Bakufu raising three armies that approached Kyoto from
three different directions. The final battle took place near the all-too-
familiar Uji River, scene of so much drama during the Genpei War,
and resulted in the complete destruction of Go-Toba’s forces. His sup-
porters were either executed or banished like himself. The change in
the warriors’ attitude is best illustrated by a conversation recorded in
the chronicle Mirror of the East (Azumi Kagami) between two shogunal
samurai prior to a mounted battle at Oido: “Listen! Here’s the truth of

the matter. If Kamakura is victorious, we’ll adhere to Kamakura, and if
Kyoto is victorious, we’ll adhere to Kyoto. Such is the way of those
who wield the bow and arrow.” Raw military power was now the ulti-
mate arbiter of legitimacy. During this rebellion, Kamakura had at
least 10 times as many warriors as Go-Toba. Most of the battles were
decided in the initial clash of mounted forces, with infantry following
if a siege or protracted combat was necessary. After 1225, stable
government based on cooperation between Kyoto and Kamakura
was the rule. Such was the case when the Mongols turned their gaze
east to the rising sun and Japan.30
The genesis for the Mongol invasion lay in their establishment of a
dynasty in China known as the Yuan. The founder of this dynasty
was the new Mongol head chieftain, Kublai Khan, whose power base
was in north China. To eliminate the remnants of the Song Dynasty
in the south of China, Kublai Khan had to create a navy—something
the Mongols had little experience with. He turned to his Chinese and
Korean vassals and in 1270, they proceeded to build at a prodigious
rate with the goal of producing 5,000 ships. Japan had already entered
the Khan-emperor’s gaze with its rejection of his overtures for submis-
sion and tribute in 1268. The Japanese component of Kublai Khan’s
grand strategy, then, was really that of a punitive expedition against
some “rude” island savages who needed to be taught a lesson in
humility—but it occurred against the backdrop of a much bigger effort
against southern China that would eventually include seaborne
attacks on Vietnam as well. In other words, the conquest of Japan
was not Kublai Khan’s only military effort.31
The Mongol military machine never did anything by halves and
after the latest round of Japanese rejections, it invaded and subdued
the islands of Tsushima and Iki in late 1274 before moving on to
Kyushu (see Map 3.2). The Mongols reputedly had 90,000 men aboard
several thousand ships, mostly veterans from recent fighting against
the Song Chinese the previous year. Two things stand out in the Japa-
nese response. First, some 80 horsemen met the initial wave, which
must have included several thousand Mongol warriors. They seem
not to have realized that the Mongols did not fight in the same way
that they did, as individuals prior to a general engagement. The Mon-
gol group tactics simply brushed this annoyance aside. Second, and
more important, the Bakufu system used the centrally controlled land
stewards and constables to perform two functions of national
Map 3.2 The Mongol Invasions
mobilization. First, they notified Kamakura of the threat, and second,

they initiated the process of raising substantial numbers of troops
from provincial headquarters as a sort of “emergency first response”
force while the administrators used the local records to call out more
warriors from the various estates. The urgency of the situation was
far greater than that of the Jokyu War, and thus the numbers of war-
riors generated in Kyushu probably exceeded what might normally
have been seen in the first stages of a domestic war.32
Meanwhile, the Mongols continued to roll, with their main force
invading Kyushu at Hakata Bay. The Japanese again tried the same
tactics, opening the combat with a single warrior firing a single arrow,
and “All at once the Mongols down to the last man started laugh-
ing.”33 The Mongols then executed their advance and retreat tactics,
controlled by a general on a hill with drums, and defeated the oppos-
ing Japanese force. Japanese chronicles highlight the bravery of the
warriors in defending against the Mongolian steamroller, but they
managed only to slow the enemy down as the Bakufu’s forces con-
ducted a fighting retreat toward the interior of Kyushu at Mizuki.
What happened next supports the theory that this was merely a puni-
tive expedition rather than a full-fledged invasion. The Mongols sud-
denly withdrew late in 1274 from in front of the fortifications of
Mizuki. They then put to the flame the area around Hakata before re-
embarking on their ships to sail away, taking their garrisons in
Tsushima and Iki with them. The ships were needed in 1279 for a
series of sea and river battles near modern Hong Kong that once and
for all destroyed the Song.34
The Japanese expected the Mongolians to return and prepared for
the invasion that could come at any moment. The burden of conscrip-
tion and warrior service for these campaigns fell naturally upon the
warriors of Kyushu, which included those most experienced in sea-
land warfare. The government also wisely sent Kyushu warriors home
from distant guard duty in Kyoto and elsewhere so that they could
defend their hearths. The Mongols dispatched another emissary in
1275, which supports the view that the original invasion had been
punitive, and the shogunate beheaded him in reply. The Japanese also
made the first tentative plans to conduct a counter invasion of Korea
as part of their ancient strategy of using that peninsula as a buffer
between themselves and Asian threats. Another precaution taken by
the Bakufu involved recruiting as many warrior mariners and helms-
men as possible. At the same time, they used the extra manpower they
had gathered to construct a lengthy wall along the shore of Hakata
Bay as a countermeasure against a Mongolian descent again at this
location. The Mongols were busy with other more pressing matters,
but in 1281 they returned to Japan, probably with the aim of conquest
given that the Song no longer distracted them.35
The Mongolians had organized two armies to subdue Japan, having
no shortage of ships and men for this purpose. The first consisted of
approximately 100,000 Chinese and the second comprised a coalition
of Mongols, Koreans, and Chinese about half the size of the first army.
The strategy was for the smaller army to capture the strait islands and
then to descend on Honshu in the province of Nagato, possibly as a
feint. The larger force returned to Hakata on Kyushu. The Mongols
encountered samurai-manned walls both at Hakata and Nagato that
had been built to deny them an easy landing at the first or to contain
their landing at the beach at the second. At the islands of Shika and
Noko off the coast of Kyushu, the smaller army waited in reserve but
came under attack by embarked samurai like Takeazki Suenaga, who
afterward commissioned an illustrated narrative of the invasion. It
was this situation, with the Japanese conducting a forward defense at

the walls, that found the Mongol fleet intemperately anchored in
Hakata Bay and the Imari Gulf. A great typhoon, known forever after
as the kamikaze (divine wind), destroyed as much as two thirds of the
Mongol fleet, drowning many of its warriors. The Japanese came out
afterward to mop up and kill any survivors. The Mongols withdrew
and returned to the mainland, threatening a future invasion that kept
the Bakufu mobilized for several more years. The Mongols decided
to try their luck with naval power further south against Vietnam that
same year and again in 1287. Their hegemony did not last, and they
themselves were displaced in the following century by the powerful
Chinese Ming Dynasty.36
Thus was established the myth of the divine deliverance of Japan by
the gods. A more sober analysis should attribute equal credit to the
organizational structure of the Bakufu, especially the tireless work of
the Hojo regent Tokimune. Credit also goes to the strong performance
of the warriors against an alien, and superior, military threat and their
innovative use of fortifications along the beaches. Also, the Mongols
were not interested in a lengthy campaign and probably thought the
Japanese easy pickings given their first invasion in 1274. Credit for
the victory goes to the entire system rather than to any one general;
however, it is hard to imagine the samurai prevailing against the
Mongols had the enemy put significant forces ashore with room to
maneuver.
There were several unintended consequences for Japan. In the
political dimension, the invasions altered the relationship between
Kamakura and Kyoto, giving the Bakufu more control over warriors
and rewards while further eroding the power of the court. Another
consequence, as we saw, involved the idea of a buffer zone against
the barbarians in Korea. The Bakufu never fully implemented such a
strategy, but the adoption of this scheme as a sort of “final solution”
of the Asian barbarian problem lodged itself in the Japanese psyche.37
After 250 years, at the end of Sengoku, the great Shogun military lead-
ers would again try to establish a Japanese-controlled buffer region in
Korea against the foreign threat, and once more they would be driven
from the continent. After the Mongols, the Japanese homeland would
not be seriously threatened again by an outside power until the “black
ships” of Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived almost 600 years
later.
THE FALL OF KAMAKURA AND THE RISE OF THE ASHIKAGA

BAKUFU
Another consequence of the Mongol crisis related directly to the Hojo

overlords of the Bakufu governing from Kamakura. In previous Japa-
nese wars, the winners enriched themselves at the losers’ expense.
However, the Mongols had left nothing with which to reward the war-
riors. This problem was further exacerbated because the warriors of
Kyushu had born the brunt of the burden due to the localized nature
of the invasions. For the most part, these warriors had aligned with
the court or the Taira in past conflicts. When they went unrewarded
after their heroic efforts in repelling the “barbarians” for the Hojo
overseers of the shogunate, they focused their resentment on Kama-
kura generally and the Hojo regents specifically.38 Another source of
resentment against the Kamakura Bakufu related to religion. In 1299,
the Hojos established the “five-mountain network (Gozan)” of Zen
temples, causing much resentment among the still-armed monks of
older Buddhist schools and religious sects. Ironically, these state-
sponsored temples would be used by the Ashikaga Shoguns to under-
write their power after the overthrow of the Kamakura Bakufu. These
monastic groups formed another locus of resentment important in the
downfall of the Kamakura Bakufu.39
The agent for the Kamakura downfall can be traced to the emperors
and retired emperors in Kyoto who had more freedom of action to
challenge the Shogun’s regents for power. Such was the occasion with
the accession of a new emperor in 1318 who was already in his thirties
when he came to the throne—Emperor Go-Daigo. Go-Daigo’s inde-
pendent streak caused friction between the court and the Bakufu,
especially over the issue of his successor, whom the Bakufu and not
the emperor chose. Go-Daigo’s response was to refuse abdication
unless his picked successor for crown prince was verified by the
Bakufu. The Bakufu itself was under very poor administration, which
made things worse. Go-Daigo began to intrigue with local Buddhist
monks as well as with other anti-Bakufu groups. However his plans
were exposed by a treacherous subordinate and in 1331, he fled with
his followers to a remote monastery at Mount Kasagi. There he was
joined by an “obscure warrior,” Kusunoki Masashige, who vowed to
restore him to the throne. Given the mores of the times, the relation-
ship between the supreme imperial authority and a lowly samurai
was unprecedented—which indicates how weak Go-Daigo’s support

really was.40
Masashige hailed from the lower ranks of the rough and tumble
warriors of the mountainous Kawachi province west of Yamato. Pre-
dictably, troops of the Bakufu attacked Go-Daigo at Kasagi, easily
overcame his forces, and then captured the emperor as he fled—pre-
sumably on his way to join Masashige in his castle at Akasaka near
Mount Kongo (east of modern Osaka). Go-Daigo was deposed and
exiled to a small island offshore, and a new emperor of the Bakufu’s
choosing was installed. However, neither Go-Daigo nor his “cham-
pion” Masashige intended to leave matters in this state. Masashige
had also escaped capture at Kasagi, possibly leaving before
Go-Daigo and agreeing to join forces again at Masashige’s castle. To
buy himself time, Masashige put out a rumor that he had committed
suicide and then in 1332 joined forces with Prince Morinaga
(Go-Daigo’s son) for the commencement of a guerilla war against the
Bakufu. This activity kept the revolt alive—but it also elicited a major
response by the Bakufu to suppress it after they had outlawed Masa-
shige and Morinaga and issued rewards for their chastisement.41
By this point, Masashige had gathered a larger force, including
many mounted warriors, around his clan’s small castle at Akasaka.
The chronicles invariably inflate the Bakufu forces to astronomical fig-
ures with no basis in reality, but if we accept that Masashige’s forces
were never more than 1,000 warriors strong at this stage, we can esti-
mate the Bakufu army at Akasaka at around 10,000. The siege of Aka-
saka provides many insights into Japanese warfare in the fourteenth
century, so we will examine it a bit more closely to highlight features
and characteristics. The reaction of the Bakufu’s forces reflects Masa-
shige’s lower social rank because upon seeing his “castle,” they
described it thusly:
It looked as if it had been built in a hurry. There was no proper
moat; and the fortifications . . . contained only about two dozen
hastily constructed towers, [which] were surrounded by a single
wooden wall. Looking at the castle, the soldiers thought, “Ah,
what a pathetic enemy! We could pick up that castle of theirs in
a single hand and throw it on the ground. Let us hope that Masa-
shige manages to hold out for at least a day so that there will be
time to capture some booty and win honour that will bring us
future rewards.”42
This passage also emphasizes the link between level of military effort
and subsequent rewards. In the end, the Bakufu army got more than
it bargained for, deciding to attempt a coup de main without any prepa-
ration. Masashige had prepared for just such a tactic and prior to the
first attack had placed about 300 mounted warriors commanded by
his brother Shichiro further up the mountain and hidden in the mists
and trees. Masashige had hidden his archers in his dilapidated towers
and had them hold fire until the Bakufu’s warriors were in the shallow
ditch and then unleash a deadly volley at close range. This was
enough to cause the enemy to pull back and devise a more deliberate
assault. Once they made camp and relaxed their guard, they were hit
from two sides by the mounted archers coming down out of the mist,
who they at first thought were their own men. As panic and mayhem
broke out in the camp, Masashige sortied from the fort with another
300 warriors. This caused a precipitate retreat by the Bakufu’s forces
down the mountain, and they reputedly abandoned horses and arms
in their flight.43
This engagement emphasizes both Masashige’s tactical skill in
attacking a superior force and that the main effort in fluid combat
remained the mounted archer. The Bakufu returned with a more cir-
cumspect plan and after attempting another series of assaults, com-
pletely invested the small fort and settled in to starve the garrison
out. Again Masashige employed deception to escape the enemy, exfil-
trating most of his garrison in “civilian” clothes one dark night after it
was clear the castle would fall. He had gathered all the bodies of the
dead enemy soldiers and placed them in the armor and style unique
to his men in a pit in the small courtyard. After he and his men made
good their escape, a stay-behind confederate fired the pit and the cas-
tle. Upon seeing this, the Bakufu soldiers rushed into the fort, found
the charred bodies in armor, and assumed Masashige had committed
hari-kiri, which was what he wanted them to think. It was with
engagements like this that Masashige’s reputation, especially his
expertise at deception, grew and encouraged Go-Daigo and his
loyalist supporters. The other aspect of this conflict is its regional
character, with the clear distinction between the eastern warriors
(often called “eastern savages” in the chronicles) and those from the
“west” who supported the Go-Daigo. In subsequent accounts, Masa-
shige appears as a sort of compassionate Robin Hood, fighting for
the legal sovereign of his nation.44
Masashige retreated to another stronghold further south in Chi-

haya, and here the Bakufu sent the bulk of its military resources to
exterminate the pesky upstart warrior. In the meantime, reputedly at
Masashige’s urging, Go-Daigo escaped from his island exile in the
Sea of Japan and raised the standard of rebellion on the west coast
with loyal warriors already there in 1333. The hard-pressed Bakufu
dispatched a large force to the coast to suppress Go-Daigo but en
route, the commanding general was killed in an ambush. This force
now came under the command of a younger general named Ashikaga
Takauji, a direct descendent of the Minamoto clan. The Ashikaga, with
their stellar pedigree and combat legacy, were also known for being
quite ambitious. This trait soon revealed itself when Takauji arrived
at Kyoto and switched sides, declaring for the emperor. With
Masashige tying down the bulk of Bakufu forces at Chihaya and
Ashikaga commanding the only substantial reserves, Kyoto was
quickly secured. The Bakufu raised the siege of Chihaya to try and
retrieve the situation. Hojo power now collapsed as other generals
jumped on the imperial bandwagon. After Kamakura fell to a loyalist
army, the regent and the majority of his family committed mass
suicide. It seemed that this newest civil war was over and the restora-
tion of imperial authority complete. However, Go-Daigo was no
Tenmu and the warriors, who controlled the real power, were less than
willing to cede absolute power to him.45
Go-Daigo made things much worse for himself by immediately
alienating the warrior base that had restored him to the throne. For
example, instead of Takauji, he installed his son as Shogun. Go-Daigo
also rewarded Masashige with control of Settsu and Kawachi along
with a lower court rank, and this, too, irritated aristocratic warriors
like Takauji. Fed up with Go-Daigo’s arrogant and authoritarian way
of ruling, Takauji led another warrior revolt in 1335, seizing Kamakura
from a resurgent Hojo attempt to re-establish its power in the east. War
raged from Kamakura all the way to Kyushu and in 1336, Takauji’s
forces seized control of Kyoto. Go-Daigo appealed to his champion
to again retrieve the day and the loyal Masashige responded, joining
forces with Nitta Yoshisada, a former Ashikaga ally, but now a staunch
loyalist for the emperor. They counterattacked and forced Takauji
from the capital, bringing Go-Daigo back to the city. Takauji, now
sponsored by the deposed emperor Kogon, wisely decided to retreat
to Kyushu, where more disaffected warriors awaited him. After
pacifying the loyalist forces there, he set sail in early 1136 from the
same Hakata Bay where the Mongols had met defeat 50 years earlier.46
Takauji’s fleet and army confronted Yoshisada’s smaller army
encamped on the Kobe plain at the mouth of the Minato River. March-
ing with another army by land from the Kanto was Takauji’s brother.
Masashige allowed himself to be manipulated by the feckless emperor
into joining Yoshisada to battle against Takauji’s armies. Masashige
had advised the emperor to abandon the capital so that more forces
could be gathered, but the headstrong emperor would not hear of it.
On a hot summer day in 1336, the four armies collided in an epic
seven-hour sea and land battle along the Minato River. The loyalist
forces were probably outnumbered by more than two to one, and in
a battle reminiscent of Philippi, Takauji defeated Yoshisada—who
withdrew, leaving Masashige to battle the combined Ashikaga forces.
After the complete annihilation of his forces, Masashige, his brother,
and 50 of their retainers committed mass hari-kiri.47
Takauji, triumphant, entered Kyoto and captured Go-Daigo as he
fled, and he was forced into retirement once again. A new emperor,
Komiyo, was installed (Kogon having entered a monastery). Not long
after, the wily Go-Daigo escaped to Yoshino and established a
southern court in opposition to the northern court dominated by the
new Bakufu of Ashikaga Takauji. This reality was formalized in 1338
when Takauji finally received official appointment as Shogun by
Komiyo. This period of the Ashikaga founding is also known as the
Restoration, and it would be emulated by the samurai 500 years later
when another Bakufu was perceived to be weak and unresponsive to
the needs of Japan.48
***
The final result of Go-Daigo’s uprising (also known as the Kemmu
Revolt) was a “simmering civil war” between the two courts for the
next 52 years. The details of this low-level conflict need not concern
us here other than to mention that the conflict drained everyone’s
power to conduct military operations because of the difficulty of pro-
visioning the troops. No faction was strong enough to prevail, and
the warriors became more localized, refusing more and more to serve
outside their provinces. The Ashikaga shoguns increasingly delegated
authority to their constables (shugo) to run things. Takauji suppressed
a rebellion by his brother from 1350 to 1351 while he was still fighting
with the south (Go-Daigo had died in 1339). To retain the support of
the constables, he instituted a half-tax (hanzei) that gave them even

more wealth and power. It was by these processes that the power of
the constable daimyo increased. These powerful barons started to
fight their own private wars with each other. Ever since Go-Daigo’s
overthrow, the Ashikaga had found it more expedient to rule from
Kyoto than Kamakura and in 1378, Shogun Yoshimitsu formally
moved the government into the Kyoto district of Muromachi. By
1392, the conflict with the south finally ended with the surrender of
the southern court. The military paradigm remained the mounted
samurai bowman.49
As if to emphasize the pernicious effect of almost 70 years of con-
stant conflict accompanied by government misrule, in the ninth lunar
month of 1428 a large-scale peasant revolt spurred by rice speculation
broke out against the Bakufu in the provinces around Kyoto and Nara.
A chronicle captures the amazement of the ruling classes at this spon-
taneous outburst:
The peasants in the country are in revolt. They are demanding a
“virtuous government” [an edict abolishing debts] and
destroying . . . storehouses, sake brewers’ houses, and temples.
They are seizing anything they want and taking back the cash
they owe in debts. . . . This is the first time we have heard of peas-
ant revolts in Japan!50
Recall that the most similar incident prior to this had occurred during
the Taira Ascendancy over 250 years earlier and had been merely a
petition. The appropriation of violence by the lowest levels of society
did not bode well for the future and until the breakdown of order in
1467, peasant revolts—usually because of usurious debt—became a
feature of the social landscape. The Bakufu and constables made
common cause in both mollifying this new threat, but its outbreak
emphasizes the weakness of the central government and general dis-
satisfaction with the ruling classes, from Muromachi on down. It was
this situation that found a weak Ashikaga Shogun in power when
internecine fighting broke out between two constable daimyo families
inside Kyoto in the year of Onin in 1467.51
Chapter 4
Warring States: From the Onin

War to the Death of Oda
Nobunaga
The Sengoku (warring states) period began with the outbreak of open
violence in Kyoto in 1467. The vassals of two rival daimyo clans
fought the equivalent of a modern-day gang war in Japan’s capital city
while the ostensible keeper of the peace, the Ashikaga Shogun, impo-
tently watched from the sidelines. After this, a centripetal process in
Japan decentralized power as powerful lords supplanted their daimyo
overlords. At the beginning of this period, the Japanese warrior para-
digm was still best represented by the mounted, armored samurai
archer, often fighting against or from behind wooden palisades
and towers as much as in the open. However, a process that historian
Geoffrey Parker calls the “challenge and response dynamic” contrib-
uted to the transformation of warfare in Japan into something new.1
From 1467 to 1600, Japan saw profound changes in warfare that
some scholars label “a military revolution.”2 These scholars have also
identified smaller changes in warfare, often human-controlled, inside
earthquake-like military and social revolutions that no one controls.
These smaller systemic and organizational changes—named revolu-
tions in military affairs (RMAs)—have tended to be built around spe-
cific operational constructs combined with new technology. Much
like Europe, although not really deriving from European trends, these
uniquely Japanese RMAs were reflected in military architecture, gun-
powder weaponry, and the return of infantry as the dominant force
on the battlefield.3 In some sense, the chaos and violence of the period
served as crucible of war that accelerated these developments, just as
it had in China around 400 BC and as it was doing in both Islamic
and Christian areas of the globe around the same time.4 With these
developments came social changes that catalyzed military change
and was influenced by it. Among these changes was the transfer of
controlled violence into the hands of the vassals under the constable
daimyo, who had been the purveyors of military power on behalf of
the Shoguns since the late twelfth century. One might label this a
democratization of violence. This process began in earnest during the
Ashikaga shogunate. By the time of the Onin War, it merely needed
an occasion to accelerate. As such, a brief review of the rise of the con-
stable daimyo, who held power for much of the period of the first two
Bakufu, is in order.
Recall that the advent of Shogun-controlled offices of powerful
stewards acting on behalf of the state happened during Minamoto
Yoritomo’s consolidation of power after the Genpei War. He obtained
extraordinary powers from the court in his efforts to include the
authority to appoint provincial constables directly answerable to him
in Kamakura. The rise of these constable daimyo as super provincial
stewards responsible to the Shogun took place over a period of three
centuries during the Kamakura and Muromachi Bakufu. The increase
in the power and influence of these daimyo caused the later Shoguns
and daimyo to strike a delicate balance of power that was eventually
undermined by their mutual dependence on each other. Eventually,
because of the decline of real power in the shogunate, a commensurate
decline in the power of the constable daimyo also occurred, resulting
in their vassals turning on them and each other as well as a lengthy,
costly, and localized conflict (the Onin War) in Kyoto. While the atten-
tion of the ruling elites focused narrowly on Kyoto, the influence of the
central government collapsed and the hidden executors of the for-
merly centralized power, the local samurai class of lords underneath
the daimyo, continued their consolidation of power from the bottom
up. These men, who were of a more practical bent, would in turn
become the new warlords, not answerable to the court, Shogun, or
their nominal daimyo overlords. Their only goal was the attainment
of as much land and power as their wits could get them.5
Warring States: From the Onin War to the Death of Oda Nobunaga 89
THE ONIN WAR
With these trends in mind, it is time to examine the outbreak and agents
for the conflict that catalyzed Japan’s military revolution during the
Sengoku. The Ashikaga Bakufu had the veneer of real power, so much
so that the Ming Dynasty invested the Ashikaga Yoshimitsu with the
title king of Japan. The cost was the symbolic recognition of the Ming
as Japan’s overlords, but this was in name only, and the important result
was increased trade with both China and the Kingdom of Choson in
Korea. Japan converted to an economy that increasingly relied upon coin
specie instead of payment in kind (usually rice).6 Japan, although going
through a period of weakening central government, was becoming more
integrated into a larger East Asian economic system under the aegis of
the powerful Ming.7 This meant more wealth for Japan’s overlords, but
this wealth did not spread to those below the elites (court, shogun, dai-
myo). Shogun Yoshimitsu would expend some of this new wealth in
the construction of the great Golden Temple outside Kyoto as a monu-
ment to his power and glory (see Map 4.1). By the time his grandson
Yoshimasa came to power, though, the coffers were empty, and
Yoshimasa presided over an attempt to build the Silver Temple, which
reflected his own impotence. The downside of integrating into a more
open regional trading order involved resentment and frustration at
home, and as we have seen, those resentments by the lower social
groups in Japan expressed themselves in unprecedented peasant
uprising and riots.8
Another dynamic in play involved the issue of succession to impor-
tant shogunal offices. Just as with the court, regents, and then the
Shoguns (and their regents), conflict occurred over the succession for
the hereditary position of constable daimyo. A series of these succes-
sion battles led to the Onin War. The first was a dispute in 1454
between members of the Hatakeyama family, who hailed from the
key province of Musashi in the Kanto. On one side was Hatakeyama
Masanaga and on the other Hatakeyama Yoshinari. The defunct
Hatakeyama family name was revived by a member of the Minamoto
clan at the time of the founding of the Ashikaga Bakufu. By tying his
fortunes to the new Bakufu founder, Hatakeyama Kunikiyo became
deputy of Izu and Kii Provinces, with holdings in the Kyoto region
and the Kanto. Over the years, their power base shifted to Masashige’s
old haunt in Kawachi and north of the Kanto into the provinces of
Noto and Etchu, and it was in these locales that they became constable
Map 4.1 Battles of the Sengoku
daimyo with wide-ranging authority and influence. This made them

one of the “three great” warrior-producing houses for the Bakufu,
along with the powerful Hosakawa and Shiba clans.9
The Hatakeyama shared the succession of the key deputy shogun
office with the Shiba and Hosakawa clans. Underneath the Hatakeyama
were powerful up-and-coming vassals of the type mentioned previ-
ously, those men the next level down under the daimyo. In some
sense, this dynamic is similar to the “careers open to talent” one
would see during the Napoleonic Wars, where talented military offi-
cers could rise as far as their wits and military (or political) talent
could take them.10 Of the two claimants to the Hatakeyama headship,
one was an adopted son of the clan chief (Masanaga) and the other the
son of a concubine (Yoshinari). Initially, the Hosokawa and Yamana
clans backed Masanaga, even though the Shogun validated the succes-
sion for Yoshinari. This was probably due to a victory Yoshinari
won using pike-armed infantry against cavalry in Kii province in
1454. This was the first significant instance of pikemen defeating

cavalry and foreshadowed the coming dominance of infantry. Shortly
thereafter, the Shogun removed Yoshinari at the instigation of
Yoshinari’s vassals for incompetence and a “haughty manner.” So
much for samurai loyalty to a liege lord! At this point, direct fighting
broke out between Yoshinari and Masanaga over leadership as dai-
myo of the clan. The Hosokawa still backed Masanaga and in
1459 managed to have him recalled to the capital by the Shogun. This
threatened to move the seat of sporadic fighting from the hinterlands
into Kyoto. In the meantime, Masanaga, now armed with the standard
shogunal commission to chastise Yoshinari, pursued his rival into
Kawachi. There he was surprised at dawn by Yoshinara’s vanguard
under Yusa Kunisuke. However, the battle went ill for the Yusa.
Kunisuke and many of his senior warrior commanders were killed
and their troops routed. Yoshinari fled to his stronghold on Mount
Take for a last stand.11
Thus, the Onin War was preceded by desultory and widespread
fighting between two “brothers” of the Hatakeyama clan, bringing
supporters from outside the clans like the Hosokawa and also vassals
like the Yusa. Meanwhile Masanaga besieged Yoshinari at Mount Take
over the winter of 1460–1461. In one attack, Yoshinari surprised
Masanaga’s encircling troops, but evidently a planned smoke screen
from burning vegetation caused more confusion for the attackers than
the attacked, and the sortie failed to break the siege. The siege contin-
ued and went into a second year because there was still one unblocked
road into the stronghold. When Masanaga finally cut this route in
early 1463 (after an epic two-and-a-half-year siege), Yoshinara snuck
out with a small group of vassals and went into hiding. Masanaga
returned to Kyoto in triumph with a view to succeeding Hosokawa
Katsumoto as deputy shogun. It was at this point, in 1463, that the
Hatakeyama were no longer important. Now their patrons outside
the family from above (like the Hosokawa) and vassals inside and
below (like the Yusa) took control of their fortunes as they used the
Hatakeyama dispute as a way to fight over dividing up their substan-
tial lands to enrich themselves. One might regard this event as an in-
stance of those from “below [overthrowing] those above” (gekokujo),
a practice that would wreak much havoc in premodern and modern
Japanese military history. Although both the Hosokawa and Yamana
backed Masanaga, only the Hosokawa had benefited when in 1464
Masanaga was appointed deputy shogun. Yamana Sozen, the clan
chief, now began to plot the downfall of his perceived rivals, the
Hosokawa, who had increased in power at his expense.12
The order to chastise Yoshinara by the Shogun (not the emperor)
highlights the transition in the control of violence. Previously, imperial
sanction was needed to chastise in these warrior disputes, but then the
warriors came into a position of centralized power versus the Bakufu.
Now the shoguns were in the same position as the emperors, but this
time the power would not transition to a new Shogun, regent, or even
emperor. Instead, it now diffused—permanently—to the various vas-
sals via their daimyo. Note how Masanaga and Yoshinara had already
started fighting before Shogun Yorimasa issued a chastisement—
shogunal legitimacy appears as an afterthought. The daimyo and their
lower-ranking vassals would soon dispense with it altogether,
although the Ashikaga Bakufu as an institution would remain in place
until 1573. 13 Another internecine “great house” fight was that of
the Shiba. It, too, involved a succession dispute between two Shiba
claimants—Yoshitoshi and Yoshikado, the latter being the choice of
the “three big vassals,” the Kai, Asakura, and Oda. By 1461, these
vassals had vanquished the forces of Yoshitoshi, who—like Yoshinari—
went into hiding as a fugitive. All of the pieces were now in place for
the outbreak of war.
But why Kyoto? In the first place, the great Ashikaga Shogun
Yoshimitsu had established the habit of having his daimyo and their
retainers attend him in the capital as one means of keeping an eye on
them. This was a preview of the more formal system of daimyo-
required residence in Edo (now Tokyo) by the Tokugawa shoguns. In
any case, the war began in Kyoto because that is where the principals
resided in their various mansions out of long-ingrained habits encour-
aged by the Ashikaga shoguns.14
And so it was, with truces in place for both the Shiba and
Hatakeyma succession conflicts, that the mother of all disputes broke
out in late 1465 over who was to succeed the Shogun. Yamana Sozen
and Hosokawa Katsumoto placed themselves at the head of opposing
camps. If one took one position, the other would now take the oppo-
site, and precisely that happened when Shogun Yoshimasa decided
to step down as shogun in favor of his younger brother Yoshimi.
Katsumoto backed Yoshimi, but then—before Yoshimasa officially
retired—his strong-willed wife Tomiko gave birth to an heir. Tomiko
obtained the support of Yamana Sozen to press the claim for her son.
The Chronicle of Onin succinctly reads: “it was this desire of the part
of Lady Tomiko to place her son in line for the succession that eventu-
ally led to disturbance in the land.”15 Events now moved swiftly as the
two fugitive daimyo claimants for Hatekeyama (Yoshinari) and Shiba
(Yoshitoshi) returned to the capital as the newly installed heads of
their clans in late 1466 due to the court intrigues by the nefarious Lord
of Ise, one of the Shogun’s principal advisors. Yamana now supported
Yoshinari, while Hosokawa backed Yoshitoshi. This had the effect of
bringing great numbers of warriors into the capital in support of one
side or the other in late 1466. These warriors began to rampage around
the city, despite a hastily arranged truce. Unfortunately, an accident of
real estate now played a role in the outbreak of more general fighting.
Masanaga, whose mansion was too close to the Yamana, moved his
base of operations to the Goryo Shrine in the northern suburbs of the
city in the first month of 1467, the first year of the Onin period. The
Shogun issued a stern warning to both Hosokawa and Yamana to
remain neutral in the impending rematch between Masanaga and the
resurgent Yoshinari. Yamana Sozen instead covertly aided his candi-
date, and Hosokawa Katsumoto remained aloof. As a result, Yoshinari
stormed Masanaga’s stronghold using mostly Yamana warriors and
drove his “brother” from the city. Several weeks later, Hosokawa
troops directly attacked their Yamana adversaries. The Onin War had
begun.16
The war became a lengthy urban conflict inside Kyoto, with
the Yamana and their allies in the western parts of the city and the
Hosokawa in the east. The Chronicle of Onin lists astronomical
numbers of troops in and around the city—over 200,000—with the
Hosokawa having numerical superiority. Most of the Hosokawa
troops were Kanto warriors, although there were some disaffected
western samurai in their ranks. Similarly, most of the Yamana warriors
were from the Kyushu region. Although the Yamana were weaker in
number of troops, they held the advantage of position, controlling
most of the routes into the city with a much bigger “footprint” inside
the city. The Hosokawa found themselves “cramped” into a small por-
tion of the northeastern part of the city. The actual fighting involved
the samurai equivalent of urban raids, arson, and ambushes in the
streets and against the various palaces of the principals and their
retainers, fighting for objectives block by block. The numbers are exag-
gerated, but there probably were at least the tens of thousands on both
sides. Kyoto swallowed up the majority of available warriors in the
entire country. As a result, the provinces were left with very few
warriors to run things and defend the interests of their masters who
were tied down in Kyoto.17
At this time, arson was a standard tactic used by the samurai. Arson
first of all served the purpose of clearing out areas of land to enable the
mounted samurai to maneuver. A second tactic involved the use of the
smoke these fires created, and attackers often used this tactic to con-
ceal their approach and make aiming difficult for the enemy’s archers
(though shifting winds sometimes made this tactic a double-edged
sword). It was easy to find combustibles in Japan’s forested areas
and wooden villages and towns. However, during the Sengoku
period, fortifications would increasingly be built of stone. This was
done in part to prevent arson, but also due to the increasing popula-
tion of Japan that provided laborers to do the work. Finally, during
the late Sengoku period, stone fortifications provided a late response
to the arrival of gunpowder weapons, especially cannon that could
make short work of earthen and wooden fortifications. Too, the larger
scale of armies dictated that stone be used to build bigger castles that
could hold more stores and men and—as important—withstand the
besieging forces of a larger army.18
The accounts in the Chronicle of Onin narrate the activities of two
armies of arsonists armed with swords, pikes, and bows. For example,
here is an excerpt from the Battle of Goryo:
[Yoshinari’s Yusa troops] quickly set fire to Shomon-ji village
beside the torii; but just as they were doing so a storm blew down
from Atago Mountain. Swirling snow and flames blew into the
eyes and mouths of the attackers.19
From a later engagement that year, here is an account of fighting in the
interior of Kyoto:
At daybreak on the twenty-sixth enemy and ally lined up and the
battle of arrows began. The Yamana had previously planned to
hold the Jisso-in and Shojitsubo from the Yamana camp to
occupy a position from Isshiki’s mansion to the shogunal palace.
But now Isshiki had abandoned his mansion and had fled in
haste to the western camp.20 [emphasis added]
The style of war, as we see in these examples, still revolved around an
initial combat with arrows—sometimes ambushes, sometimes more
formal—and arson. Handheld edged weapons like swords and pikes
became increasingly important in the close episodic fighting that took

place. Trying to adhere to the older paradigm of mounted archery also
spurred the burning of dwellings to give the horsemen room to
maneuver. Much of Kyoto would be burned as a stalemate inside the
city continued interminably.21
As seen in the Hatekeyama and Shiba disputes, “minor” fighting
had already started in the provinces (Kawachi and Echizen). With
the outbreak of the Onin War, the seat of conflict moved to Kyoto.
But it did not take long for grudge matches in the capital to spill over
to the provinces. The fighting over the past three to four centuries
had resulted in routs that had seen warriors abandon valuable armor,
weapons, and even horses in various flights by the losers. During the
Siege of Akasaka (1332), the chronicles specifically mention towns-
people and peasants retrieving abandoned weapons and equipment.22
This now meant that a much larger percentage of the population,
including peasants and not just warriors or monks, was armed to the
teeth. Again, this points to a further democratization of war, another
feature of military revolutions.23 Another development during the
Onin War was the rise of the new mercenary warrior (ashigaru), whose
only liege lord was money or booty. As time went on, these troops were
used more and more by the two warring camps.24 This characteristic
and others are similar to those found in the ancient Peloponnesian War
(431–404 BC) and the later Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) in Europe. In
fact, similarities between these three complex wars are striking: a com-
plicated set of origins involving a maze of relationships (alliances); a
localized war whose seat moved further and further afield from the ori-
gin as the conflict stalemated; and finally chaos and a breakdown of soci-
ety that became the norm as a result of widespread use of mercenaries,
looting, arson, and lawlessness. These three wars gave birth to entirely
new regional political schemes. In Japan’s case, however, that scheme
(violent anarchy) lasted over 100 years, until forces of centralization pro-
duced the early modern state of Japan under the Tokugawa shoguns.
The dynamics driving the war had changed so much that by its seventh
year (1473), the deaths of both of the commanding generals—Katsumoto
and Sozen—did not stop the fighting; rather, it continued on under their
vassals. The conflict officially ended in 1477 with the departure of the
majority of the warriors back to their various provinces. But war did
not end, it simply moved. 25 These, then, were the attributes and legacies
of the Onin War.
A HUNDRED YEARS’ WAR?
The final result, of the Onin War was the replacement of the
Bakufu-constable daimyo partnership government by no government
at all as those warriors still remaining in Kyoto in 1478 joined their
comrades in the east and west fighting to secure their individual pro-
vincial domains and prerogatives. In a very literal sense, all politics
and government now became local. From the start of the Onin War
(1467) to the re-entry of Oda Nobunaga (first of the late Sengoku “cen-
tralizers”) into Kyoto (1568), one can characterize the entire period as a
hundred-year war.26 The conflict in Japan became regional, with vas-
sals and daimyo struggling for provincial hegemony rather than
national hegemony. In a sense, dozens of Onin wars broke out all over
Japan in the major regions. New daimyo, sometimes called
“provincial-wars daimyo,” emerged and took power over the next
several generations. These men came not from the ranks of the “reign-
ing” constable daimyo, but predominately from the local warriors,
including some serving as deputy constables.27 Rather than try to nar-
rate the hundreds of engagements over the course of the next 90 years,
the account provided here will follow one of the great clans in the
Kanto to give a sense of how the course of military affairs changed
during the military anarchy of the period. It will then summarize
selected regional developments as they relate to changes in warfare
until the more powerful and successful regional warlords began a pro-
cess of centralization again in the second half of the sixteenth century.
Interestingly, the powerful clan we will follow for five generation
became known as the Hojo. These Hojo emerged when the lowly
samurai opportunist Ise Soun adroitly began to gain and consolidate
power in the provinces of Suruga and Izu. Soun, who reputedly
started his rise to power with only six retainers, obtained that power
much as Masakado had—by offering his services to correct wrongs
for patrons more senior than himself. In this manner, he gained his
own “castle” in Suruga and then added lands in Izu when he aided
the Shogun in putting down a rebellion by an in-law in that province.
By deception and treachery similar to a plotline from Macbeth, he man-
aged to seize Odawara castle, which became his headquarters. In 1512,
he captured Kamakura, which had fallen on hard times, and began to
rebuild it. It was at this point that in honor of the Hojo who had died
en masse in Kamakura several centuries before he renamed himself
Hojo Soun, thus founding the Sengoku-period Hojo clan and taking
the extinct family’s coat of arms as his own. Soun’s style of fighting
reflects the military revolution in Japan by his use of infantry wielding
16-foot pikes—a necessary defense against his horse-mounted foes on
the Kanto Plain. He also focused on seizing and improving castles to
control his rapidly expanding domains. The Hojo expansion in the
Kanto benefitted from the larger population base in that region, which
meant more soldiers could be recruited, especially non samurai as ashi-
garu pikemen. Soun and his successors became good at keeping records
to identify and link military service to income, which led to the creation
of very large armies compared to other daimyo. This also helps explain
their long tenure and dominance in the Kanto against a multitude of
enemies. The Hojo were among the first warlords to clothe their armies
in uniforms, again reflecting the organizational innovation that uniforms
represent in helping one keep track of one’s own forces on the battlefield
while at the same time helping identify the enemy.28
By the time Soun was succeeded by his son Ujitsuna, the Hojo
controlled both Izu and Sagami Provinces. Ujitsuna continued to
expand the Hojo into the neighboring province of Musashi, which
held the fishing village of Edo, where a castle had been built by the
powerful Uesugi family. The castle was betrayed to the Hojo, who also
defeated a nearby Uesugi force, and a generation of war now began
between these two clans, with sieges being more common than open
battle. During this time, the Hojo were hard pressed from both the east
and the west, and they lost Kamakura at one point to their enemies.
The war expanded into Masakado’s old province of Shimosa, where
in 1537 Ujitsuna fought the great battle of Konodai near the border,
prevailing after his men killed the opposing general and his son. By
the middle of the sixteenth century, the principal towns of the Hojo
dominion were Odawara, Edo, and Kamakura. In 1540, the greatest
of the Odawara Hojo daimyo came to power upon the death of
Ujitsuna. Hojo Ujiyasu, like Edward III of England, was blessed with
both military skill and relatives with military skill (seven sons and
one brother). He needed all of them because three great daimyo clans
surrounded and assailed him—the horse-mounted Takeda, who
fought more often with mounted lancers than archers; the Imagawa;
and their old enemies the Uesugi. In 1545, a huge Uesugi coalition
army besieged Ujiyasu’s brother at Kawagoe castle in central Musashi.
In a brilliant—but risky—tactical move, he and his brother attacked
the lackadaisical Uesugi lines at night with a force one eighth the size
of the enemy’s and defeated them.29
In 1561, the Uesugi returned under their greatest leader, Kenshin,

for a two-month siege of Odawara. However, the Takeda had switched
sides, and their attacks forced Kenshin to withdraw to defend himself
elsewhere. In 1564, the Hojo advanced again into Shimosa to punish
the Satomi allies of the Uesugi and clashed with Satomi Yoshihiro at
the old battleground of Konodai. This time, they had the numbers,
and they attacked from two directions, trapping the withdrawing
Satomi army between them, crushing it, and then capturing the unde-
fended castle. However, in 1569, their former allies the Takeda treach-
erously attacked the Hojo lands in the west. The great Takeda general
Shingen moved toward Odawara but had to leave two castles in his
rear stoutly defended by Ujiyasu’s sons. He should probably have
retreated, but believing in the superiority of his cavalry tactics, he
pressed on to lay siege to Odawara. Once he arrived, he burned the
town outside the walls and then retreated after three days. In tactical
terms, Shingen had culminated and he knew it. As he withdrew north,
Ujiyasu pursued him with the goal of catching him in a mountain pass
where the fearsome Takeda lancer cavalry (it included mounted arch-
ers, too) would be at a disadvantage. He caught Shingen’s larger army
at the pass of Mimasetoge in the mountains north of Odawara. The
Takeda managed to break out and save much of their army, but this
sharp rebuff spelled the defeat of their campaign that year.30
Ujiyasu died the following year (1570) and now his son, Ujimasa,
succeeded him as super daimyo of lands encompassing more than five
provinces of the Kanto. By this time, both handheld firearms (harque-
buses) and cannon had been introduced and were being used exten-
sively by the warlords of western and central Japan (see later in this
discussion). The first weapons actually made their way to the Kanto
in 1553; however, few of them (and no cannon) found their way into
Hojo hands. The small numbers of firearms in armies like those of
the Takeda had little direct impact on the great eastern battles of the
1560s. Ujimasa was also fortunate in that his two most dangerous
opponents—Uesugi Kenshin and Takeda Shingen—died during the
first decade of his reign. Too, Oda Nobunaga, now the most powerful
warlord in Japan, kept the Takeda busy and eventually destroyed
them completely as he subjugated central Japan. The final generation
of the Hojo, however, was not so lucky because Toyotomi Hideyoshi,
the powerful lieutenant who succeeded Nobunaga after his murder
(see later in this discussion) turned his efforts to the complete subjuga-
tion of the Kanto. Hojo Ujinao, who at first expanded the Hojo
dominion over almost the entire Kanto, was cornered by Hideyoshi,

his lieutenant Tokugawa Ieyasu, and a huge army of over
100,000 men (some accounts say 200,000) at Odawara in 1590. Like
Julius Caesar’s famous siege of Alesia, Hideyoshi built a huge fortifi-
cation around Odawara and simply waited out the Hojo while he
and his men feasted in mockery of the starving defenders. After a
three-month siege, the Hojo lost hope and surrendered, resulting in
the exile of Ujinao and the suicides of his father (the retired Ujimasa)
and brother. The Hojo, among the most innovative of the Sengoku dai-
myo, had been defeated by an army even larger than theirs—the gods
were evidently on the side of big battalions.31
Turning back the clock several decades, the rest of Japan had been
as hectic and chaotic as the Kanto had been during the rise and fall
of the Hojo. Around Kyoto, and to some degree in the provinces, most
daimyo paid lip service to the much-diminished institution of the
Shogun. However, in 1490, after Shogun Yoshimasa’s death, the
Hosokawa replaced the new Shogun and for the first time, a direct
attack took place on a sitting Ashikaga shogun. As a sign of the times,
the Hosokawa daimyo was assassinated by a vassal in 1508. These
events at the very top show how the practice of gekokujo became more
common, if not the norm, and also reflect the displacement of the con-
stable daimyo by a new breed of warrior daimyo pulling themselves
up by their bootstraps. This in fact became the case for the Hosokawa,
who were replaced by a deputy constable family, the Miyoshi, in cen-
tral Japan. In 1549, the Miyoshi used 900 pikemen to expel Shogun
Ashikaga Yoshiteru from Kyoto.32 Further east, as alluded to earlier,
the Uesugi and Takeda clans clashed with each other repeatedly at
the battleground of Kawanakajima. At their fourth engagement there
in 1561, the armies fought one of the bloodiest battles of the Sengoku
when Uesugi Kenshin and Takeda Shingen reputedly met each other
in single combat at the height of the battle (they both survived).33
In the south and west of Japan, conflict centered upon sea power
around the Inland Sea as well as over control of Japan’s conduit to
Chinese and Korean trade through Kyushu. The Mori clan emerged
to take power in western Japan and fought incessant battles with their
longtime enemies, the Otomo of Kyushu, over an island that con-
trolled the Shimonoseki Strait and access to Japan’s west coast. The
final battle reflected the growing presence of gunpowder weapons,
especially seaborne cannon, that were used in alliance with another
new force, the Portuguese, in reducing a wooden fortress in 1561.34
It is with this event that it becomes time to turn to the introduction of

firearms, foreigners, and Christianity into Japan because their impact
would move from the southwest to the northeast along a trajectory
that came to encompass not the breakup of Japan, but rather its reuni-
fication.
THE SENGOKU MILITARY REVOLUTION AND THE INFLUENCE

OF ODA NOBUNAGA
Gunpowder weapons had existed in Asia for centuries, having origi-

nated there with the invention of explosive gunpowder (requiring
75 percent saltpeter) by the Chinese sometime in the twelfth or thir-
teenth century. From there, they spread east and west, coming into
the Korean Peninsula by the thirteenth century; however, both the
Chinese and Koreans made strenuous efforts to keep the powerful
technology a secret from the Japanese. Even so, the Japanese almost
certainly knew of gunpowder’s existence because of their encounters
with the Mongols as well as the fifteenth-century repulse of Japanese
pirates by Koreans and Chinese using firearms.35 All of this changed
in 1542 and in a most dramatic fashion. With the opening of the
globe to maritime navigation, Europeans accidently facilitated the
transfer of this technology to Japan when a Chinese junk with several
Portuguese in possession of the latest firearms was blown ashore on
Tanegashima, an island just off the southern coast of Kyushu. The
ever-enterprising Europeans demonstrated for the local daimyo how
their harquebuses worked and then sold two to him. The harquebus
was an early handheld firearm that used a matchlock mechanism to
ignite gunpowder that propelled a missile or pellet. That these were
the latest in firearms technology meant that the Japanese pace of
change leapfrogged and accelerated accordingly. The local daimyo
eventually reproduced them, but the biggest challenge was getting
the mix of the gunpowder right as well as maintaining reliable access
to saltpeter. Interestingly, monks and merchants traveled to the island
to study the new technology, and one monk took it back to the Negoro
temple, a center of training for ashigaru in the province of Kii.36
Not long after, a smith at the temple mastered the technology and
founded the first gunsmith guild in the merchant city of Sakai (near
Osaka). The location of Japan’s first gun foundry near one of her busi-
est commercial sectors ensured that the technology would spread
rapidly, although the provincial-war daimyo would try to prevent its

spread to their adversaries. In Kyushu, local daimyo families could
purchase arms from Tanegashima or directly from the Europeans,
who were eager to sell to the Japanese and export Christianity to them
on the side. Accordingly, the first Jesuits arrived not long after the
guns in 1549. These first missionaries made the sale of weapons to
local daimyo contingent upon their access to the population for evan-
gelism. Several daimyo converted to Christianity in Kyushu as a
result.37 The genii of firearms and Christianity were now out of the
lamp in Japan and would not be stuffed back in for another 90 years.
With the advent of gunpowder weapons and their rapid spread, it
becomes time to turn to the reunification of Japan, which resulted, in
part, from the confluence of firearms technology with the first of the
great unifiers of Japan—Oda Nobunaga, who became shogun in
everything but name.38
Oda Nobunaga hailed from a minor daimyo family in the central
Japanese province of Owari. His small domain was contiguous with
the larger domains of the Imagawa clan, whose lands straddled the
key Tokaido road that linked eastern and western Japan. While the
Hojo, Takeda, Uesugi, and Mori all had large enough armies, it was
the Imagawa who were best positioned geographically as well as mili-
tarily to bring Japan back together. While the others fought to essen-
tially protect their autonomous “kingdoms,” Imagawa Yoshimoto
had the vision to do much more. The means for doing this involved
advancing along the Tokaido road to seize control of Kyoto, the sym-
bol of political power in Japan for a millennium. With the Takeda,
Uesugi, and Hojo battling each other to the east, the time seemed ripe
for an ambitious program of Imagawa expansion. Unfortunately for
Yoshimoto, he had to go through the province of Owari to secure the
road all the way through to Kyushu, in other words, right through
the domains of Oda Nobunaga.39
Nobunaga was another of the daimyo whose lands did not favor
cavalry, so his primary military method employed infantry: a mix of
archers, harquebusiers, and pikemen. His pikemen carried a much
longer weapon than other armies, up to 21 feet in length according to
some sources. This length gave him an additional advantage against
cavalry and other infantry armed with shorter pikes.40 Early in his
career, during infighting among his clan for hegemony in Owari, he
used a 50:50 tactical ratio of missile troops (archers and harquebusiers)
to pikemen. He often used his firearms to keep his enemy’s heads
down, or off the walls in attacks on forts, so that his other infantry
could approach unmolested. Certainly Nobunaga was among the
most innovative of the daimyo fighting during this period of the
Sengoku. However, he was still a very small fish in a big sea. In 1558,
he won the Battle of Ukino using his integrated pike and firearms tac-
tics. He followed up this victory with the siege of Iwakura. According
to a contemporary chronicle:
We drove [the Hashimoto] into Iwakura and set fire to the town,
rendering it defenseless. [Nobunaga] ordered sturdy “fascines
two and three deep” on all four sides. The patrols were tight-
ened, and for two or three months the army stuck close by, shoot-
ing fire-arrows and firearms into [the castle] . . .41
As one can see, arson was still a major element in siege tactics. The
capture of Iwakura gave Nobunaga complete control of Owari just in
time to face the greater threat from Imagawa Yoshimoto. In 1560, he
met Yoshimoto’s forces at the battle of Okehazama. Nobunaga’s forces
numbered 2,000 as compared to a reputed 45,000 for the Imagawa.
Taking advantage of a sudden thunderstorm, he surprised the larger
force in a ravine, killed Yoshimoto in the sudden rush, and behead
him for good measure. Yoshimoto’s army fell apart and ran away.42
A possible explanation for some of these stunning victories that
involve the deaths of key leaders points to the fact that in many cases,
samurai no longer felt bound once the chief was dead. They also
thought that by continuing to fight, they might lose some advantage
back in the home province as the former leader’s lands were fought
over in the inevitable succession battles.
Nobunaga’s victory over the Imagawa now placed him among the
upper ranks of provincial-war daimyo. Like the Imagawa, Nobunaga
had bigger plans, and he would bring to the equation the kind of
political ruthlessness and savvy not seen in Japan since Minamoto
Yoritomo. Unlike Yoritomo, his military skills matched or even
exceeded his formidable political skills. Displaying these political
skills, he now turned to his eastern flank. He decided to make
common cause with a young, up-and-coming daimyo from Mikawa
Province named Tokugawa Ieyasu who had served as a hostage in
the Oda household for a time. Like Nobunaga, Ieyasu was attempting
to extend his dominions and secure his base. Ieyasu had formerly been
a vassal of the Imagawa, but after Nobunaga’s stunning victory at
Okehazama, he allied himself with his powerful neighbor. While
Tokugawa protected his southeastern flank, Nobunaga began a

lengthy campaign to seize control of Mino Province from his in-laws
of the Saito clan (Mino is just north of Owari). Using his tried-and-
true siege tactics, he was able to finally capture Gifu castle in Mino in
1567. Now, with his eastern flank secured by possession of Mino and
Ieyasu in Mikawa, Nobunaga turned west.43
The occasion for Nobunaga’s monumental decision to march on
Kyoto reflects how much residual symbolism both the imperial and
shogunal institutions still carried as icons of legitimacy, even during
the anarchy of the Sengoku. Nobunaga was armed with both a request
from the imperial court to repair its palace as well as a request by one
of Ashikaga claimants to the office of shogun—Ashikaga Yoshiaki—
for assistance in securing that powerfully symbolic office. Clothed in
these robes of legitimacy, Nobunaga marched in 1568 on Kyoto and
seized it with an army of 50,000. Control of Kyoto also gave Nobunaga
access to the firearms of Sakai. And he would need them. His position
in Kyoto with a large army and potential control of the gun foundries
of Sakai made him the nexus for the disparate forces that had been fight-
ing each other—he had unified the opposition. This opposition included
the many armed monks around the capital, Nara, and Osaka; the power-
ful western and eastern daimyo like the Takeda; independent merchant
cities like Sakai that were jealous of their prerogatives; and peasants
aligned with these factions. After 100 years of warfare, peasants were
armed and numerous, presenting challenges to any would-be national
dictator. Many of these peasants were actively recruited by the militant
Buddhist monasteries and temples to serve in their military organiza-
tions, especially popular movements such as the Ikko-ikki (also known
as the True Pure Land Sect).44 There was no doubt, despite his careful
political moves, that Nobunaga was intent upon more territorial aggran-
dizement. The “seal he used to sign documents, was [the characters]
tenka fubu, ‘to extend military control over the realm.’ ”45 This control,
however, was nominally on behalf of the emperor—Nobunaga was
another in the tradition of the restorationists claiming to reassert
imperial control via proxy, in this case himself.
Nobunaga decided to confront the enemies that were closest to him
and that posed the biggest immediate threat. These included the local
daimyo clans of the Asakura and Asai, as well as their sometime allies
the armed monks of the Ikko-ikki based in Osaka. 46 Nobunaga
marched first on the Asakura and Asai. They had made common
cause with Shogun Ashikaga Yokshiaki, who had had a falling out
with Nobunaga and fled Kyoto to join these families in the northern
lands around Lake Biwa. This development threatened Nobunaga’s
communications with Tokugawa Ieyasu protecting his eastern flank
and rear. As Nobunaga marched out of Kyoto, he passed the menacing
armed monasteries of the militant Buddhist monks on Mount Hiei and
made a note to take care of this threat to his lines of communications
after chastising the Asakura and Asai. This campaign is noteworthy
because it included the presence of his two principal lieutenants—
Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, the other two men who
would help unify Japan. He caught up with his enemies in Omi
Province in the spring of 1570. Confronted by much larger forces,
Nobunaga decided to withdraw. He employed over 500 harquebusiers
along with 30 archers as his rear guard—jointly commanded by
Hideyoshi and Ieyasu—to increase its firepower as a surprise for his
pursuing foes. In this unique manner, his lieutenants prevailed in
protecting the withdrawal of the main army.47
Nobunaga and Ieyasu returned later that summer with a much
larger force (including fresh troops from Mikawa) to relieve a siege
of Yokoyama castle. The final battle occurred along the shallow river-
bed of the Anegawa stream in front of the castle on July 21, 1570.
Nobunaga divided his army into two wings, the main army (which
he commanded personally) and a second wing under Tokugawa
Ieyasu. Nobunaga intended to attack on the right against his brother-
in-law Asai Nagamasa while Ieyasu attacked the Asakura. Ieyasu
had further divided his force into four divisions under his principal
vassals, including the colorful Honda Tadatsugu, who wore a helmet
flamboyantly adorned with antlers. Nobunaga still had less than one
tenth of his forces armed with harquebusiers, but accounts of the battle
highlight how their smoke obscured visibility. It did not obscure Ieyasu’s
vision, however, because as the Asai delivered a devastating attack that
threatened Nobunaga himself, the Tokugawa general directed two of
his divisions (including Honda) to disengage from the Asakura
and attack the Asai’s rear left flank. He then committed his fourth
division—the reserve—to support Nobunaga’s right flank on the near
side of the river, holding off the Asakura with his final division. With
the battle now in the balance, the garrison of the castle sortied
forth and provided the final push to force the Asai and Asakura forces
from the field and into a retreat back to their home bases.48
In a defensive campaign reminiscent of Napoleon’s famous
northern Italian campaign in 1796, Nobunaga turned his attentions
back to the south against the Ikko-ikki in Osaka. These forces threat-
ened his source of firearms and gunpowder in Sakai and from the
Negoro monastery in Kii. In fact, harquebusiers from Negoro were in
his force of 20,000 men, which included 3,000 with firearms. The
Osaka campaign also saw Nobunaga first use cannon in a siege. In
another example of how Nobunaga had temporarily unified Japan
against him, the powerful Mori clan of western Japan materially sup-
ported the defenders of Osaka. The monks and their troops, though,
put up a stout enough resistance such that when the Asai and Asakura
again threatened Nobunaga’s rear, he broke off the action and pro-
ceeded north. Now his fears regarding the armed monks of the
Enryaku-ji on Mount Hiei were realized. They attacked his army in
the flank that winter as he pushed the forces of the Asai and Asakura
north through the mountain passes. This allowed his adversaries to
escape north with relatively few losses, and Nobunaga withdrew to
the environs of Kyoto.49
The next two engagements will be discussed in a bit more detail
because they give one a feel for the generalship of both Nobunaga
and Ieyasu. As noted earlier, the Enryaku-ji were among the oldest
factions (the Tendai order) of Buddhists monks and regarded the
Ikko-ikki as heretics. Nonetheless, Nobunaga had made strange bed-
fellows of them all. Nobunaga decided to eliminate the threat they
posed once and for all in his most ruthless campaign. In the predawn
darkness of September 29, 1571, against the advice of some of his gen-
erals, he countermarched his very large army (between 20,000 and
30,000 troops) to Mount Hiei and established a secure perimeter
around the mountainous approaches to the monastery. He then
methodically advanced, burning and killing everything in sight.
A contemporary European priest who witnessed it wrote:
he burnt Sakamoto with two other villages at the foot of the
mountain, and [under cover] of the smoke his men climbed
up . . . and put all to the fire and sword. They made a horrible
slaughter of [the monks]. . . . others hid themselves in grottos
and caves; but Nobunaga had concerted his business so well that
not one of them escaped.50
The complex was completely destroyed, and neither women nor chil-
dren were spared. A persistent threat to Nobunaga’s operations had
been permanently eliminated. Also, this move indicated a change in
strategy for Nobunaga, who now proceeded more methodically
against his enemies, dealing as ruthlessly as possible with the threats

closest to him. He now turned his attention back to the Ikko-ikki and
its allies to his south—but the fortified monastery of the Ishiyama
Honganji (Osaka) would defy his efforts for many years to come.51
While Nobunaga dealt with Mount Hiei, the ever-reliable
Tokugawa Ieyasu had been guarding the east against the increasingly
active probes of the powerful Takeda. Recall that the Takeda had made
common cause in 1571 with the Hojo. In the fall of 1572, a combined
Hojo-Takeda army of over 20,000 advanced along the Tokaido road
through Tokugawa domains on Kyoto. Ieyasu met them near the coast
at Hamamatsu castle (east of Nagoya) after receiving needed rein-
forcements, including precious harquebusiers, from Nobunaga. The
battle is noteworthy for Ieyasu’s ability to snatch victory from defeat
and his sanguine display of will power. He decided to attack uphill
in a snowstorm at the end of the day against the much larger Takeda
army, actually tricking them into attacking first with a spoiling attack,
reputedly throwing by rocks (to save arrows and bullets). Despite the
impetuosity of Ieyasu’s actions, the Takeda heavy cavalry, wielding
lances and swords, charged his infantry and sent them back toward
the castle. Ieyasu managed to get part of his army back into the castle
and then left the gate open, as if he had set a trap. The Takeda forces
pulled up, suspecting foul play, and decided against a coup de main.
The open gate allowed even more of Ieyasu’s men to save themselves.
After the Takeda had encamped for the night, Ieyasu sortied again in
the dark using a small mixed force of harquebusiers and infantry
who harassed the Takeda army and managed to cause some of them
to ride to their deaths in a ravine. The next morning, having spent a
restless night with an apparently defiant and active foe ensconced in
a strong castle to their front, Takeda Shingen and his advisors decided
to withdraw to the east and wait for better weather. Ieyasu, by his
aggressive tactics and posture, had snatched a victory of strategic
importance from an initial tactical defeat.52
Nobunaga now faced a concerted alliance of the Ikko-ikki, Takeda,
Asai, and Asakura—to say nothing of their supporters from eastern
and western Japan such as the Mori and the Hojo. However, Nobunaga
was favored by that other component of great commanders—luck. After
the snows had melted, Takeda Shingen again advanced westward in
1573 toward Kyoto with another large army. As he laid siege to the small
castle of Nodo en route he was wounded, mortally as it turned out, by a
bullet fired by one of the harquebusier-armed defenders. The Takeda
offensive stalled with the death that April of its clan chief. This in turn
necessitated the usual round of succession intrigues and alliance shift-
ing, leaving no time or will to advance eastward. Nobunaga now took
the opportunity to have the Court depose the Ashikaga Shogun, who
had been stirring up resistance to Nobunaga. Japan was now officially
without a seii taishogun for the first time since the twelfth century. The
next year, Nobunaga turned his attentions to his ongoing campaign
against the Ikko-ikki, attacking their recruiting grounds among the com-
moners in the Nagashima Delta (adjacent to Nagoya) and using cannon-
equipped ships to smash their riverside fortresses.53
The following year, 1575, saw one of the most famous battles in
Japanese history near the castle of Nagashino (see Figure 4.1) in the
Tokugawa province of Mikawa with the army of Takeda Katsuyori.
Here the full might of Takeda heavy cavalry was brought against
Nobunaga’s pike- and harquebus-equipped infantry. The framework
for the battle involved Nobunaga marching to relieve the besieged cas-
tle. Subsequently, Katsuyori’s famous cavalry were caught between
Nobunaga and Ieyasu in the fort. Nobunaga emplaced his thousands
of harquebus-equipped troops behind a crude low wooden palisade
Figure 4.1 The Battle of Nagashino, 1575

as the Takeda attempted to defeat the relief force before the Tokugawa
could sortie from the castle. Nobunaga also used deception at this bat-
tle, having a subordinate offer to defect and thus further stringing out
Takeda’s outnumbered forces for a counterstroke by Hideyoshi. The
guns had their effect, creating extremely heavy (by the standards
of the day) Takeda casualties, although it is probably a myth that
Nobunaga delivered a complicated early form of countermarching
volley fire. As the Takeda formations lost their cohesion, the scale of
the victory was sealed, just as in earlier conflicts, by a vigorous assault
on the Takeda rear by the garrison of the castle.54
With the fall of the Takeda, Nobunaga’s eastern flank was finally
secure, and he turned again to his most intractable opponents, the
Ikko-ikki around Osaka. Because these opponents fought much as
Nobunaga did, leveraging all the power of the defense, this campaign
proved the most protracted of all. Nobunaga’s first problem was to cut
them off from seaborne supply by the Mori, and he now had a cannon-
equipped navy to do this. He proceeded to implement a seaborne
blockade and when the Mori attempted to break it in 1576–1577 with
their own cannon-armed ships, they found that Nobunaga had hung
steel plates off the sides of several ships—perhaps the first ironclads
in history. One Jesuit wrote: “I was amazed that something like this
could be made in Japan . . . [each ship] carries three pieces of heavy
ordinance, and I have no idea where these could have come from.”55
Nobunaga fought several subsequent naval engagements as the Ikko-
ikki and their Mori allies tried desperately to break the siege. In
November 1578, Nobunaga defeated a fleet of over 600 boats sent to
relieve Osaka, again using his cannon for the margin of victory. By
1580, the emaciated defenders surrendered, and the power of the mil-
itant monks was forever broken—to the great relief of not only Nobu-
naga, but also many of his enemies whose schemes had also been
frustrated by one or the other of these religious-militant groups.56
Nobunaga had little time to continue his efforts at expansion
and consolidation. His constant wars, campaigns, political moves,
and ruthlessness had created many enemies. Worse, gekokujo still
reigned as a social norm among the samurai. He was still battling foes
that surrounded his conquests in central Japan while sending Hide-
yoshi westward to subdue his longtime opponents from the Mori clan.
In so doing, he denuded himself of many of his troops and when
he sent more reinforcements to Hideyoshi in the summer of 1582,
the general of that force—a secretly disgruntled samurai named Ake-

chi Mitsuhide—turned on him. Countermarching to Kyoto, Akechi’s
forces attacked Nobunaga in the Honnoji temple and set it on fire.
Seeing that all was lost, Nobunaga committed suicide. It was in this
abrupt fashion that the career of one of Japan’s most innovative
military leaders ended.57
* * *
At the time of his death, Oda Nobunaga had unified the central
third of Japan. He still had powerful enemies in the east (principally
the Hojo) and the west (the Mori, among others). It would fall to his
two lieutenants—Hideyoshi and Tokugawa—to complete his work,
which would take another 33 years. Constant warfare had kept him
from implementing reforms and building institutions similar to those
of the first Kamakura Shogun (Yoritomo). However, Nobunaga laid
the groundwork for any would-be successor who might choose to fol-
low his model. He had reinvigorated the imperial institution by his
support of its authority and prerogatives. The court had gained influ-
ence by associating itself with the most powerful daimyo in Japan.
At every turn, Nobunaga took pains to emphasize his legitimacy by
using of the imperial institution, both in assisting and removing the
Shogun. Nobunaga was also modern in his economic policies; calling
him a free-market capitalist might be going too far, but he did take
active measures to encourage economic development by eliminating
medieval barriers such as tolls and “free guilds . . . and by removing
taxes on merchants and on the buying and selling of goods.”58 He
established economic and policy precedents that his successors would
wisely adopt and institutionalize.
Historians have recently argued that Nobunaga and his successors
did not so much drive change in Japan as much as manage and shape
a general trend toward reunification and a more modern state.59 How-
ever, in the area of military developments Nobunaga—and, as we
shall see, his two important successors—can be characterized as an
agent of innovation and transformation. Nobunaga not only fielded
and employed radical new technologies (the harquebus and cannon),
but he pioneered and mastered the new infantry-dominated approach
to warfare. His innovative modification and employment of long pikes
as well as early use of combined arms tactics using pikes, archers,
and eventually musketeers in various experimental organizational
groupings meets, at the very least, the criteria for a revolution in mili-
tary affairs. 60 The Sengoku period birthed a modern Japan that
seemed a throwback to tried-and-true ways as much as it went for-
ward. The next chapter will help us understand how the new, more
modern Tokugawa state reflected these adaptations of older tradi-
tional forms and institutions. A military revolution may have
occurred, but the political changes reflect more of an evolution.
Chapter 5
Taming the Samurai:

From the Reunification of Japan
to the Last Samurai1
The theme of taming the samurai helps one understand the turbulent
military history of Japan from 1582 to 1882. Restraining and controlling
the samurai class was job one—from the bellicose rule of Toyotomi
Hideyoshi to the advent of a European-like constitutional monarchy
after the Meiji Restoration. Japan moved both forward and backward
politically during this period. After an invasion and two failed cam-
paigns in Korea at the end of the sixteenth century, Japan moved from
a military dictatorship under Hideyoshi back to the Bakufu system under
the Tokugawa shoguns—an institution that was well established in
memory and tradition. In turn, this system itself harked back to the
model of Minamoto Yoritomo, with a Bakufu government established
in a geographically separate location and as the senior ruling partner
with the court. Like the Minamoto, this government ruled from the
Kanto, not at Kamakura but in Edo (modern Tokyo). In contrast, Japan
moved forward in economics, warfare, and—eventually—with new
political institutions during the Meiji Restoration.2
Ruling from Edo, the Tokugawa essentially stopped military history
while isolating Japan from the outside world (sakoku). Although the
extent of this isolation has been overstated, it served to help keep
Japan at peace for over 200 years. At the same time, the Tokugawa
shoguns institutionalized controls begun by Hideyoshi that were
intended to suppress the phenomenon of gekokujo and that had, in
part, empowered men like Nobunaga and Hideyoshi in the first
place.3 The samurai became landless vassals tied directly to their dai-
myo lords who were in turn “managed” by the shogunate in such a
way so as to prevent, for over 200 years, any domestic threat to the
peace or the government. Thus, as one historian writes, “The early
modern period witnessed a paradoxical shift: As the samurai were
codified as an elite and exclusive social class, their role as purveyors
of violence—seemingly their raison d’etre—was dramatically cur-
tailed by a rebellion-wary shogunate.”4
What was the role of the samurai during the long period of
Tokugawa stasis? In many ways it was similar to that of the original
bushi—as local peacekeepers and policemen who would only occasion-
ally be called out en masse, like gendarmes in modern Western democ-
racies, to suppress and manage protests and riots, usually by the
long-suffering peasant farmers. Finally, as forces of globalism and mod-
ernization in the nineteenth century pressed in upon Japan, the age-old
tendency toward restoring secular power to the imperial institution
recurred. Voices were raised in support of the emperor as the titular
and actual executor of power in partnership with the reformers known
as the Meiji oligarchs. The Meiji Restoration—installation of Emperor
Meiji as the supreme political executive—resulted from an alliance
between the court and the samurai against the Bakufu in the 1860s.
These broad trends and processes inform this period of Japanese mili-
tary history, which included a peace bracketed by Hideyoshi’s and
Tokugawa’s campaigns at the beginning and those of the Meiji reform-
ers at the end. That end would serve as a new beginning.
* * *
It may seem odd to start a chapter that looks at the large theme of
taming the samurai with the career of the super warlord Toyotomi
Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi represents the penultimate self-made samurai
who rose to the pinnacle of power in Japan. Nonetheless, in the career
of Hideyoshi one continues to see elements of Japan’s attempts to
reconcile itself to nearly 500 years of warrior rule and misrule.
Hashiba Hideyoshi rose from humble beginnings and only later
adopted the more prestigious Toyotomi name, much as the founder
Taming the Samurai: From the Reunification of Japan to the Last Samurai 113
of the Odawara Hojo had. His father was a peasant farmer from Owari
Province.5 Father and son, reflecting the unsettled times, were among
the peasants who had armed and trained themselves in martial skills.
Hideyoshi’s father passed down his sometime service as a soldier to
his son (men like these served as fertile ground for recruitment by
the daimyo and sects like the Ikko-ikki). Hideyoshi—and many like
him—“earned” their place in the ranks of the samurai, which reflected
the meritocracy of Nobunaga, who valued talent over blood. How-
ever, Hideyoshi saw, from his own personal experience, what this sort
of social mobility could lead to: armed peasants and independent-
minded and ambitious warriors from across the social spectrum—
none of whom knew their “place.” One of the great ironies would be
that Hideyoshi, who came to power as a result of these trends, would
then turn around and deliberately apply policies to neutralize them.
The occasion for Hideyoshi’s rise, Nobunaga’s overthrow involving
gekokujo by a trusted vassal, underlined the fundamental problems
with the samurai system. To restore stability, Hideyoshi would have
to do more than simply punish Nobunaga’s treacherous subordinate.
He would also have to put measures in place to prevent such rebel-
lions from recurring in the future, both for himself and his successors.
Hideyoshi started this process, but it would fall to Tokugawa Ieyasu to
complete it. First, Hideyoshi had to solidify his claim to leadership of the
alliance Oda Nobunaga had put together. Upon learning of Nobunaga’s
demise, Hideyoshi moved swiftly against Akechi Mitsuhide. He hastily
concluded a truce with the Mori at the castle he was besieging, broke
camp, and force-marched his troops to Kyoto. There he debouched on
the unprepared Mitsuhide and his forces near Yamazaki. Hideyoshi’s
troops easily scattered Mitsuhide’s forces. The disloyal vassal was mur-
dered by armed peasants in the weeks afterward as he fled, highlighting
the generally armed and dangerous state of the population.6
Hideyoshi then turned from military to political matters, declaring
the son of Oda Nobunaga’s oldest son and heir (who had died shortly
after his father) as the heir to the Oda clan. He then adopted the surviv-
ing youngest (fourth) son of Nobunaga into his clan. Two adult brothers
remained to be reconciled. By favoring one of the two uncles over the
other as regent for Nobunaga’s grandson, Hideyoshi divided the poten-
tial opposition against him. After some touch-and-go campaigning in
the mountains east of Lake Biwa, Hideyoshi defeated his challengers
and further cemented his power. During this campaign, he first used
explosive mines to conclude a successful siege—something the

Europeans had not yet fully mastered. He also used a daring strike by
his heavy cavalry, rather than his usual pike and harquebusier infantry,
to take advantage of an enemy misjudgment that required rapid maneu-
ver. At the battle of Shizugatake (1583), this force conducted a surprise
attack at dawn, with the cavalry moving uphill with some infantry in
support from a nearby friendly fort.7 Like Ieyasu, Hideyoshi was a
master of being able to instantly size up a situation and terrain, make a
decision, and then deliver a well-timed stroke to unhinge an enemy.
As these events transpired, the powerful Tokugawa Ieyasu had
remained neutral. When Hideyoshi’s forces moved into Tokugawa
domains, they confronted each other at two battles similar to those
that would take place in Europe 100 years later, with two lines of pike-
men and musketeers blazing away at each other in a firefight—with
cavalry on the wings or in reserve. Both battles proved indecisive, if
bloody, but they seemed to satisfy the honor of both men, who
promptly concluded an alliance with an exchange of hostages to
ensure good faith. It was in this manner that Hideyoshi transformed
his most dangerous potential opponent into a solid ally. This short—
but important—campaign emphasizes that Hideyoshi and Ieyasu
probably shared the same vision of a unified Japan. Ieyasu realized
he had more to gain with Hideyoshi than against him.8
Up to this point, Hideyoshi had been fielding armies of 20,000–
30,000 men. As he turned to the west, he called upon his new allies
and vassals to supply him with troops to subdue the other still-
defiant clans to the west and in Kyushu. His style of war-making
now solidified around the use of the carrot and the stick. The stick
would be his huge armies of more than 100,000 troops, the carrot
would be generous offers of clemency and leniency for those who sur-
rendered or joined him. Those who did not wish to see their posses-
sions distributed to the loyal, or newly loyal, daimyo could join him.
Opposition meant destruction. Returning to the conflict with the
western daimyo, firearms had originated in their domains, and they
had long practice with them. They also had experience with cannon,
although with these they had been unable to break the siege of Osaka.
Too, they were the masters of war at sea and might be excused for
thinking Hideyoshi was at a disadvantage in that domain. However,
these daimyo had not yet seen the new style of war practiced by the
“new breed” in central Japan. Because of these factors, they underesti-
mated their opponent and exaggerated their own chances of a
Map 5.1 Battles in the Reunification of Japan
successful defense. With the Tokugawa (now allies) guarding his rear
against the Hojo, Hideyoshi acted against the west—deciding to first
address the easier problem of subduing Japan’s third-largest island
Shikoku, much as Yoshitsune had done. Here Hideyoshi had to bran-
dish the stick, casually sweeping aside the first outnumbered levies,
to get the two most important clans to accept the carrot. He then
cleaned up some of the resistance still in place in central Japan, includ-
ing the powerful arms-producing Buddhist temples such as Negoro in
Kii Province.9
With his flank and rear both secured, he now faced the apparently
difficult problem of Kyushu. Like the Hojo in the Kanto, the clans in
Kyushu fought among themselves while Nobunaga and Hideyoshi
subdued their neighbors to the west and north. By the time Hideyoshi
turned his gaze upon Kyushu, only two clans remained to dispute his
complete control of the island—the Shimazu and the Otomo. Because
the Shimazu now had the upper hand, the Otomo appealed to Hide-
yoshi to support their cause. In one stroke, Hideyoshi neutralized
the problem of landing on a hostile shore. With a base of support on
the island available, Hideyoshi transported two huge armies to

Kyushu that totaled nearly 200,000 troops when combined with those
of the Otomo. It was a triumphal march, with local overlords—
overawed by the legions of well-armed infantry—transferring their alle-
giance to Hideyoshi as he marched through their domains on both sides
of the island (see Map 5.1). The Shimazu fought one major action against
Hideyoshi’s forces at the Sendai River. Realizing they could not with-
stand his army in open battle, they broke off the action and retreated to
their castle at Kagoshima after sustaining heavy losses. Here, in 1587,
they opted for surrender rather than a lengthy siege followed by annihi-
lation. Hideyoshi’s campaign had been the biggest military operation in
Japanese history. It was followed by his equally gargantuan campaign in
1590 against the Odawara Hojo in the Kanto (see Chapter 4), who
unwisely opted for annihilation when they resisted to the bitter end.
One of the results of this campaign was a long-awaited payoff by
Hideyoshi to Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was granted the Hojo domains as
a reward, making him the second most powerful man in Japan. Upon
Hideyoshi’s recommendation, Ieyasu moved the capital of his dominion
from Odwara to the castle at the fishing village of Edo along the
northwestern shore of what is now Tokyo Bay.10
Before proceeding to Hideyoshi’s ill-advised campaigns in Korea,
we must return to the measures he began to implement in the 1580s
to bring the gekokujo culture of the daimyo, samurai, and peasants
under control. He instituted broad policies to address and control all
three groups. For the peasants, the policy would be disarmament.
Over the centuries, they had stored swords, pikes, and other edged
weapons and now were beginning to stock up on the latest firearms.
To disarm this potential threat to his power and the stability of Japan,
Hideyoshi conducted the first of his famous “sword hunts” in 1588.
He promulgated an edict declaring that all swords, bows, muskets,
spears, arrows, and other items of war were prohibited for the peasant
farmers and then sent his magistrates (with supporting samurai) out
to enforce this edict. In a move intended to show his peaceful purpose,
he designated that the swords were to be melted down to help con-
struct a huge new Buddha in Kyoto. He further declared that farmers
were no longer allowed to serve as soldiers, freezing them into place
as a disarmed agrarian class.11
For the samurai, he issued an edict in 1591 declaring that they no
longer could own and farm land. They now belonged to their lords.
Samurai without lords (ronin) were to be returned to previous lords who

they had served and they were frozen in place in rank and in some cases
demoted. This had the effect of urbanizing the samurai, taking them off
of the land and putting them in the now growing towns around the cas-
tles. This policy had the broad support of the other daimyo, who had
grown tired of the shifting loyalties of their vassals. Hideyoshi had
established two rigidly fixed social classes—the peasants and the
samurai—who no longer had the sort of social mobility that had become
the norm during the previous several centuries. Hideyoshi can
be regarded as the father of the bushido trait of absolute loyalty by the
samurai, as prior to this, loyalty had been a contingent attribute of the
samurai. Hideyoshi also accompanied these initiatives with a series of
land surveys to rationalize the tax base.12
One subgroup of samurai remained—Hideyoshi’s daimyo confeder-
ates at the top. Hideyoshi proceeded carefully with these men because
they were essential to his enforcement of the policies affecting the other
groups. He continued initiatives begun by Nobunaga, slowly creating
norms that his successor Ieyasu would formally institutionalize to
achieve the long Tokugawa peace. Hideyoshi used the technique
employed by Nobunaga to reward and punish the daimyo. He dispos-
sessed his most recalcitrant opponents and then rewarded both loyalty
and performance by distributing the lands of the rebels on the basis of
merit. The most obvious case of this was his transfer of the Hojo
domains to Ieyasu. Another case involved a warrior from his own vil-
lage, Kato Kiyomasa. Kato performed well under Hideyoshi and
became his most loyal vassal. He was rewarded with de facto overlord-
ship of newly conquered Kyushu and later picked for a prestigious com-
mand in Korea.13 On the other hand, if daimyo performed poorly on the
battlefield, ruled their domains badly, or failed to produce a male heir,
Hideyoshi had them demoted or removed. The policy vis-à-vis an heir
is particularly important when one remembers all of the succession bat-
tles that had led to wars. Even if they performed their governing roles
adequately, he moved many of them around to different provinces to
keep them from cultivating a regional power base.14 Others, such as
Kato Kiyomasa, he would send to Korea to lead his armies of conquest.
Finally, Hideyoshi made extensive efforts to rebuild Japan’s damaged
infrastructure, as well as his public works projects like the great Buddha
in Kyoto. Hideyoshi could not resist building a magnificent palace for
himself in Kyoto, the Jurakutei, a sign of his growing vanity.15
KOREAN ADVENTURES: TAMING THE SAMURAI OVERSEAS
Historians believe that Hideyoshi invaded Korea with his lethal

samurai legions as a result of megalomania fed by military and politi-
cal success in Japan. He had been adopted into a branch of the
Fujiwara family in 1585, allowing him to be appointed by the emperor
to the highest office available, imperial regent (kampaku). He could
technically not be appointed seii taishogun because he did not have
the proper bloodline.16 The war involved Japan, Korea, and Ming
China. Accordingly, it has sometimes been called Asia’s first modern
“regional world war.” 17 It might also be regarded as the occasion
when the samurai’s overseas ambitions were tamed.
Hideyoshi had reached the top without actually displacing the
emperor and by 1591, following the tradition of scores of predecessors,
he became a retired imperial regent (taiko) but continued to exercise
supreme power. His reasons for invading Korea had to do with sup-
posed slights by the Ming to Hideyoshi’s overtures for trade, which
the Ming had terminated due to Japan’s failure to stop piracy. How-
ever, Hideyoshi’s real purpose was to use Korea as a base from which
to overthrow the Ming, much as the Mongols had overthrown the
Song. Too, memories of the Mongol invasions launched from Korea
remained. Heedless of Japan’s misfortunes a millennium earlier in
attempting to create a Korean buffer state, Hideyoshi pressed on with
preparations to descend on Korea with an army of 150,000 troops
armed with the latest harquebus muskets and tactics refined during
the reunification wars. Artillery remained Hideyoshi’s weakest link
and would prove to be his Achilles heel. A final possible reason for
Hideyoshi’s move may have been his desire to get his warlike and
sometimes rebellious samurai out of Japan proper to continue to con-
solidate his rule of the now reunified nation.18
Recent scholarship has found that Hideyoshi’s legions were
defeated by more than just massive Ming armies employing large
numbers of cannon. The Ming armies were often of a similar size to
those of the Japanese they faced. However, this conflict (1592–1598)
included guerrilla and naval components—both of which foreshad-
owed twentieth-century events in Japanese military history. Logistics
in the new type of modern conflict had become a challenge for the
Japanese way of war, and the naval and guerilla forces the samurai
armies encountered would once again show why professionals pay
attention to logistics. Hideyoshi’s big armies had been campaigning
on their own turf, with plenty of castles stocked with food, which is
why capturing castles in Japan was so important. But when this
Japanese way of war was transferred to mainland Asia, the samurais’
lack of experience in overseas logistics soon became apparent. In con-
trast, the Ming carefully prepared their logistics for this campaign—
something they had had to master to displace the Mongols and to
defend against the numerous mounted steppe warriors assailing their
flanks. This advantage became apparent when the Ming launched
their first serious offensive in the winter of 1592–1593.
On the Japanese side, the problem was much different. Culminated
and dispersed into six widely separated columns—those furthest
north under Kato Kiyomasa (in the east) and Konishi Yukinaga (in
the west)—the strung-out Japanese endured the attacks of partisans
and irregular Korean forces on their lengthy supply lines. Finally, the
Japanese had to maintain their sea lines of communication with Japan.
The Korean-Chinese alliance attacked all three elements of Japan’s
military position in a type of warfare known today as joint compound
warfare. The conflict was compound because of the use of a regular
well-armed Chinese-Korean army against the main Japanese western
army, along with irregular attacks by guerillas against the landward
supply routes. The joint aspect comes from Korean naval attacks
against the Japanese fleet and lines of communication. 19 At first,
however, Hideyoshi’s arms were crowned with success.
In the late spring of 1592, under So Yoshitoshi and the Christian dai-
myo Konishi Yukinaga, 150,000 veteran Japanese troops debauched at
Pusan in southeast Korea and took the city after a bitter fight, using
muskets to drive the Korean defenders from the walls during a coup
de main. The Koreans responded with bravery, bows, and arrows—
and lost.20 One of the Korean officials identified this technological
advantage as key to this and subsequent Japanese victories:
everything was swept away. Within a fortnight or a month the
cities and fortresses were lost. . . . Although it was [partly] due to
there having been a century of peace and the people not being
familiar with warfare . . . it was really because the Japanese had
the use of muskets that could reach beyond several hundred paces,
that always pierced what they struck . . . came like the wind and
the hail, and with which bows and arrows could not compare.21
The Ming had already been warned that the attack was coming, but
they were tied up putting down a mutiny along their northern frontier
and could only send their Korean allies assurances that they would
eventually come and help them against the Japanese.
The Japanese armies pressed north toward Korean king Sonjo’s
capital at Seoul. The Korean general Sin Ip, who was charged with
defending the road to the capital, unwisely believed his heavy cavalry
could sweep away the Japanese musketeers, and he abandoned a superb
defensive position in the mountain passes south of the Han River. On
June 7, 1592, the two Japanese columns under Konishi Yukinaga and
Kato Kiyomasa met Sin Ip’s forces at the Battle of Chungju (see Map
5.2). The Japanese discomfited the Koreans by launching a “flaming ox
attack” similar to Minamoto Yoshinaka’s use of flaming cattle at the
Kurikara Pass 500 years earlier. They also used the standard tactic of fir-
ing at the Koreans from the heights with their muskets, out of range of
the Korean longbows. Sin Ip’s army broke, many were drowned in their
disorganized flight across the Han River, and casualties exceeded 3,000
killed in this disaster. The Japanese generals (who disliked each other)
then pressed on to capture Seoul, but Sonjo and his court had already
fled north to Pyongyang.22 Upon learning of the capture of Seoul, Hide-
yoshi wrote to his nephew: “I now intend to command the country of
the Great Ming . . . The conquest of Korea and China will not take
long.”23 There was good reason for his optimism—it had taken less than
two months to capture the capital and destroy most of the Korean
armies.
Another Korean disaster occurred along the Imjin River, where
Yukinaga and Kiyomasa lured another Korean force across this defen-
sible river and shattered it. After this victory, the two generals sepa-
rated, with Yukinaga pressing north to Pyongyang and taking it
easily that July after being reinforced by another column of troops
under Kuroda Nagamasa. Pleading for help from the Ming, Sonjo
now retreated all the way to the border town of Uiju on the Yalu River
and awaited help from Emperor Wanli of the Ming.24 Meanwhile,
Kato Kiyomasa was given the task of protecting Yukinaga’s flank by
advancing north through the wilds of northeastern Korea to the
border with Manchuria. His advance would place him well out of sup-
porting distance should Yukinaga need assistance.25
The seizure of Pyongyang by strong Japanese forces—only 80 miles
from China—alarmed the Ming enough to cause them to enter Korea
for the first time with troops. Unfortunately, most of the Ming troops
were still putting down a mutiny in Ningxia to the west, but some
troops were available in the Mobile Corps stationed along the border.
Map 5.2 War in Korea, 1592–1598
Zu Chengxun, vice commander of Liaoyang, took these troops—about

3,000 in all—in what was basically a reconnaissance in force that
August against Pyongyang. Zu was an experienced commander
against mounted steppe warriors, but he had little knowledge of or
respect for the Japanese. He rushed headlong into Pyongyang on the
morning of August 23—straight into a trap Yukinaga had set for him.
His force was annihilated in a crossfire by Japanese musketry, small
cannon, and arrows. Zu escaped with “only a few dozen” of his troops
and his second-in-command was killed. After this latest disaster on
land, it seemed that Hideyoshi’s proud words would be fulfilled. But

now the advance of Japanese forces, except for Kiyomasa’s operations
to the east, stalled as their opponents attacked their lines of communi-
cation on land and at sea with guerillas and ships.26 Although few of
the Japanese commanders knew it, Pyongyang was to be the high
water mark of their land war in Asia.
As the Japanese armies pressed inland, the naval stage of the war
began in earnest. Hideyoshi’s strategic design involved sending a sec-
ond huge echelon of troops to Korea to invade China because he
anticipated that his original invasion force would be fought out and
strung out in protecting the invasion route into China. However, the
new troops—as well as the resupply of firearms, gunpowder, and all
the needs of war not available in Korea—had to come by water from
Japan. Southwest of Pusan, in the islands off the Korean coast, the
Korean navy—commanded by the intrepid admiral Yi Sunsin—
remained a “fleet in being,” and it now began a series of engagements
that slowed to a trickle the flow of arms and troops to Korea. Admiral
Yi’s forces included the Koreans’ secret weapon—a flotilla of “turtle
boats.” These amazing vessels had been invented early in the fifteenth
century—although not by Yi, as is sometimes claimed. However, by
the time Yi took command of the flotilla that included these vessels, they
were formidable weapons. Essentially an enclosed galley, they were not
subject to the vagaries of winds and tides. They were encased in hard
wood, reputedly reinforced in spots with metal plates and armed with
cannon mounted around the entire circumference of the ship. The
exterior also included spikes that made boarding these vessels with
grappling hooks difficult. Finally, the Koreans carried ovens in the mast-
heads to create a noxious smoke that they used to both discomfit their
opponents as well as to screen their approaches and withdrawals. These
vessels would cut a swath through an ad hoc Japanese fleet that relied
principally upon small arms–equipped infantry whose primary tactic
was boarding. Yi began his campaign that June as Kato Kiyomasa and
Konishi Yukinaga entered Seoul. In the Battle of Hansan Island and sub-
sequent operations in July, Yi reputedly destroyed 56 of 70 Japanese
ships. As historian Kenneth Swope emphasizes, it was not just the turtle
boats (of which there were only about a dozen), but the entire Korean
navy that outclassed the Japanese. The Koreans also received assistance
from the Ming Navy, a force whose tradition included the great river
battles that had put the Ming into power in the first place.27
The Japanese were outclassed in the naval realm, and Yi’s series of
victories reflect more than just his inspired leadership. Yi’s operations
and those of the other Korean and Chinese mariners prevented Hide-
yoshi from sending his huge second echelon across to Korea in 1592
and continuing the invasion of China. These operations also severely
limited resupply from Japan. The Korean partisans now rising in the
countryside and attacking the supply routes north further exacerbated
the vulnerable logistics situation. Guerillas limited the Japanese troops
to their garrisons, and it is no wonder that Yukinaga was unable to
advance further once he got to Pyongyang. The Japanese had a much
smaller force on hand at the critical battle of Pyongyang because of
having to supply their troops at the end of their embattled supply
lines. They also had to commit troops to defend these same lines
against the guerillas.28
As the Japanese languished in their garrisons that fall and their
fleets suffered at sea, the Ming continued intensive preparations to
retake Pyongyang. They decided to build up supplies of food, gather
and build over 200 cannon, and then wait for the dead of winter to
enable them to bring 75,000 men and the cannon on wagons over the fro-
zen ground against the exposed Japanese outpost in North Korea. In
command was Li Rusong, one of the Ming’s most celebrated generals.
A contemporary account describes him as: “Wearing a nine-dragon hel-
met and pure gold armour adorned with images of the sun and
moon . . . of nine-foot stature . . . on his Red Rabbit horse and [holding]
a Blue Dragon sword.” It was this hero who now advanced swiftly over
the frozen landscape on Pyongyang. Li had just put down the Ningxia
Mutiny, and many of his troops were veterans of that campaign. He
arrived in early January with sweeping powers and instructions to use
everything from diplomacy and peace talks to a winter counteroffensive.
His army probably numbered no more than 50,000, of which 20,000 were
Korean allies. The advance began the day after he arrived (January 11).29
Li’s army was about half cavalry and half infantry, but his ace in the
hole were his heavy cannon, which far exceeded in weight and num-
ber the light hand cannons that the Japanese used. Often the Japanese
used a type of canister shot in these weapons, which made them even
more limited in range (although lethal in close). The key advantage
was the same one the Japanese had over the Koreans—weapons
range. The Chinese could pound the Japanese from afar with their
heavier cannon should they manage to get them to stand and fight or
trap them in a city. Li knew his advantage and boasted, “Japanese
weapons have a range of a few hundred paces while my great cannon

have a range of five to six li [nearly two miles]. How can we not be vic-
torious?”30 Using diplomacy to lull the Japanese into complacency
while moving with his cannon secured to wagons, Li rapidly
approached Pyongyang. He attempted to further surprise the Japa-
nese by asking for a meeting with envoys to work out the details for
a peace treaty between the Ming and the Japanese. Li’s goal was to
capture the envoys and then, while Yukinaga awaited their return
with the good news, the Ming army would debouch on Pyongyang
and surround it on all sides with around 200 cannon. Li’s goal was
the complete annihilation of the two Japanese “armies” (really divi-
sions) garrisoning the city. As it turned out, the ambush did not suc-
ceed and those that escaped sounded the alarm, but Li had still
stolen many marches on his foes. His vanguard under his younger
brother Li Rubo managed to cut Yukinaga and a contingent of troops
off from the walled city in their camp on a nearby hill. Yukinaga was
rescued, however, by So Yoshitosi, and he and his remaining troops
were brought into the city.31
Li Rusong arrived the following day and surrounded the city, put-
ting his Korean forces on the eastern side and disguising some of his
men as Korean soldiers at the southwest corner. He then launched fire
arrows and noxious smoke grenades into the city. Yukinaga decided to
attack the Ming, and if not defeat them, at least bring his army away.
At dawn on February 8, his drums sounded a general attack. The
fighting lasted almost three days, but in the end the longer range
of Li’s cannon, plus much hard fighting against the determined
Japanese, decided the issue against the Japanese and their muskets,
spears, and disciplined infantry. The high point of the battle came
when Yukinaga decided to break out against the “Korean” troops at
the southwest corner of the city, and when these were revealed as
Ming veterans, the Japanese troops lost their composure. Yukinaga
was able to retreat via a different route, however, and according to
some accounts, this was because Li offered him this choice to prevent
further Chinese losses, having already suffered high casualties. Those
Japanese that escaped retreated in relatively good order, administer-
ing a sharp rebuff to a pursuing force as they moved south toward
Yongson. This very modern battle saw high casualties on all sides,
and even the Koreans had fought well. Overall casualties for the
Japanese totaled nearly a third of their force, probably around 7,000,
with many of those killed. On the Chinese side, the Ming admitted to
795 killed in action, and certainly the Korean numbers were as high or
higher.32
The results of the battle were far reaching. The Japanese would
never meet the main Ming armies in a set piece battle again and
instead resorted to raids, ambushes, or protracted sieges (often as the
besieged). Their momentum was halted, and some observers compare
this reversal of initiative to that which overtook the Japanese Navy at
the Battle of Midway in 1942. However, they were not utterly defeated
and during his pursuit with about 3,000 cavalry, Li received a sharp
check in an ambush about 90 miles north of Seoul, although the
Japanese continued their retreat to that place after the engagement.33
Once in Seoul, they assessed their situation and then continued south
after the Chinese and Koreans had destroyed a critical grain storage
depot nearby. This emphasizes the impact of Korean guerilla warfare
and Yi Sunsin’s victories on the fragile Japanese logistics situation.
As the Korean king moved back to Pyongyang, and then Seoul, nego-
tiations between the Ming and the Japanese began in earnest. By the
spring of 1593, the Chinese had agreed to a truce with the Japanese
that left the Japanese in a small pocket around Pusan. They did this
without consulting their Korean allies. The similarities here with the
twentieth-century Korean War are striking.34
This truce lasted for four years as various envoys, whose real inter-
est was to allow trade to resume between all the parties, deceived both
the Ming court and Hideyoshi about whom would submit to whom.
Hideyoshi, aged and in poor health, finally lost his patience over the
duplicity of the envoys and renewed the conflict using the bridgehead
around Pusan to bring in large numbers of troops. In the interim, the
Koreans, too, had decided to avoid pitched battles and to use their
wooded mountains to fight a guerilla war using archers and ambushes
to negate the Japanese advantage in firepower. In the past, the
Japanese had solved this problem—whether for mounted archers or
musketeers—by setting everything on fire to clear the battle space, but
burning down an entire country was beyond their means in the short
term. Thus, two of the belligerents in the upcoming second phase of
the war would deliberately avoid battle. Another adjustment made
by the Japanese would be improvements to their navy, especially its
firepower.35
Hideyoshi raised another huge army of 140,000 troops to send
across to Korea in early 1597. He was fortunate that political infighting
had deprived Yi Sunsin of his command. The improved Japanese
Navy secured sea lines of communication by trouncing the Korean

fleet under the command of Yi’s drunken rival early that summer.
Meanwhile, the new wave of troops went ashore with orders to avoid
the Ming and punish the Koreans, killing or impressing the adult male
Koreans they encountered. The Japanese relied even more on muske-
teers, drastically scaling back the cavalry in their contingents and
increasing the numbers of muskets as much as possible. The Japanese
were initially successful, occupying much of the country south of
Seoul. The Korean response has been discussed; on the other hand,
the Ming began to deploy troops outfitted with bulletproof body
armor. The need by the Japanese to besiege and garrison the many
cities in South Korea caused the offensive to culminate short of Seoul.
Too, the besieged Korean garrisons did not sally forth as in the earlier
conflict, attriting and slowing the Japanese armies—there would be no
blitzkrieg toward the Yalu as in 1592.36
As the Japanese armies bogged down in a fruitless siege of the
fortress of Chiksan south of Seoul, Yi returned to command the naval
forces. He sortied the fleet, assisted by the Chinese, and defeated
Japanese naval forces at the Battle of Myongnyang in the fall of 1597.
Again the tyranny of protracted war and logistics caused the Japanese
to fall back to an expanded perimeter in the southeast around Pusan.
The Ming and Korean armies moved against this defensive front with
over 57,000 troops, including over 1,200 cannon. The first great siege at
Ulsan during the winter of 1597–1598 exacted a stiff toll on the
Chinese attackers of at least 20,000 men while the Japanese lost many
both to combat and starvation. Even Hideyoshi acknowledged the
futility of the war, saying, “How could I have sent 100,000 soldiers to
become ghosts?” His generals advised him to withdraw and end the
war, and some sources indicate he had in fact made this decision
before he died on September 18, 1598. The Japanese had already
begun to withdraw some of their troops before Hideyoshi’s death.
That December, the withdrawal became general after Yi won his final
naval victory, smashing a Japanese fleet at the Noryang Straits. How-
ever, like Nelson at Trafalgar, Yi died victorious in battle. The Japanese
pulled out in a vicious manner, burning, raping, and killing as
discipline broke down—losing ugly. Hideyoshi’s death did not end
the war, Japanese overreach and stalemate did. Historian Kenneth
Chase’s epitaph for the war is apt: “The Japanese experience in Korea
is yet another reminder . . . that advanced weaponry does not
guarantee victory.” The legacy of this ill-advised war troubles the

region to this day.37
TAMING THE SAMURAI AT SEKIGAHARA
After Hideyoshi’s death in 1598, the cycle of power struggles

resumed, and civil war came again to Japan. Tokugawa Ieyasu, now
in his fifties, was one of five regents appointed over Hideyoshi’s five-
year-old heir Hideyori—included among these regents were the heads
of the still-powerful Mori and Uesugi clans. Ieyasu’s position was
strong, with domains stretching from his new capital in Edo along
the Tokaido road through Mikawa to Kyoto. He had not taken his vet-
eran troops to Korea and now occupied the central position much as
Oda Nobunaga had. One of the returning samurai generals from
Korea was Ishida Mitsunari, who immediately began to forge a coali-
tion to seize power to protect the rights of the young Hideyori. This
caused an open split among the regents in 1600, with many of
Hideyoshi’s rough and tumble generals like Honda Tadakatsu and
Kato Kiyomasa supporting Ieyasu. Mitsunari gathered up many of
the daimyo who had been late to submit to Hideyoshi, including the
Mori, Uesugi, and Shimazu. His forces also included a number of vet-
eran Korean War generals such as Konishi Yukinaga, Ukita Hideie,
and most importantly Kobayakawa Hideaki (who had opposed sign-
ing the truce with the Ming in 1593).38
Ieyasu established himself in Osaka castle, gathered intelligence on
his enemies, and stockpiled arms, including muskets, cannon, and
gunpowder. It became clear that Mistunari’s intention was to draw
Ieyasu away from Osaka and Kyoto by using the Uesugi from
their domains north of the Kanto to threaten Ieyasu’s capital of Edo.
Ieyasu’s intent was to manipulate the coalition against him into a set
piece battle, as he desired to spare Japan and himself the sort of long
and protracted wars of siege and position that might undo the stability
Nobunaga and Hideyoshi had worked so hard to establish. Ieyasu
decided to feign a reaction to the threat from the northeast and moved
his army east, abandoning Osaka. In a complicated series of maneu-
vers, Ieyasu used a devoted vassal’s defense of Fushimi castle outside
Kyoto astride a key line of communication to delay the advance of
Mitsunari’s army through central Japan upon Ieyasu’s supposedly
undefended rear. The ploy succeeded, and he pulled Mitsunari into
the mountainous area east of Lake Biwa to which he rapidly counter-

marched. There he managed to box Mitsunari’s army to the north of
the main roads to Kyoto that he controlled with two castles. Ieyasu
now decided to employ one more element of operational deception
by seeming to mask Mitsunari’s army as he marched to the west to
recapture Kyoto and Osaka. Mitsunari decided to conduct a forced
night march in horrible weather to intercept the road and attack Ieya-
su’s rear guard with his entire army where the roads joined up near
the little village of Sekigahara along the Fuji River (see Figure 5.1).39
Like the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo, Ieyasu had picked the
ground for the battle ahead of time. Unlike Wellington, he would be
facing a wet, exhausted, and outmaneuvered enemy, even though his
74,000 troops were outnumbered by the western army’s 80,000. Ieyasu
aligned his forces along some foothills astride the road and the river.
Mitsunari was trapped; with no nearby armies coming to his relief,
he had to fight. According to contemporary accounts, the battlefield
was covered in a dense fog on the morning of October 21, 1600. In his
final instructions to his generals, the sanguine Ieyasu reportedly told
them to either come back with a bloody head or without their own head
attached to their body. The wily Ieyasu could well be confident. He had
already arranged with the commander of Mitsunari’s right flank,
Koboyakawa Hideaki, who nursed a grudge from the Korean campaign,
to betray Mitsunari. Ieyasu’s generals launched a pre-emptive attack
against Mitsunari’s wet minions, first skirmishing, then unleashing a
volley from the musketeers, and finally charging with pikes into hand-
to-hand combat. Parts of the battle became pushing matches between
sword- and pike-wielding infantry. Mitsunari signaled for Kobayakawa
to attack as well as the Shimazu (in reserve), who remained aloof from
the fray. Ieyasu decided to push Kobayakawa “off the fence” and had
his musketeers fire some shots at the enemy’s right flank. This action
spurred Kobayakawa to turn and roll up the flank of his nominal ally.
As disaster engulfed the western army and Ishida Mitsunari, Shimazu
Yoshihiro realized his peril and he and his men cut their way through
the Tokugawa forces and retreated to Kyushu. There they found
Kato Kiyomasa ravaging their domains and those of Konishi Yukinaga.
Yukinaga and Ishida were both captured after the battle and put to
death—Konishi, in obedience to his Christian faith, refused to commit
suicide when offered the option.40
Mitsunari’s decision to put men of doubtful loyalty in the key posi-
tions on his flank and in reserve probably did the most to contribute to
Figure 5.1 The Battle of Sekigahara, 1600
the disaster. Nonetheless, Ieyasu had more forces in reserve marching to

the battle, and it is unlikely his army would have been rolled up in the
manner of Mitsunari’s had the treachery not occurred. Instead, every-
thing went nearly according to plan, and his instincts proved correct
about trying for a decision in a provoked battle. As for the butcher’s bill,
many of the cutting wounds at the battle can be attributed to the pikes
rather than the swords. Of the missile weapons, most of the casualties
came from gunfire, although 20 percent also came from bows. Due to
their lack of mobility (especially on a muddy field like Sekigahara), can-
non did not play a significant role in this battle, although they would in
Tokugawa Ieyasu’s final battles 14 years later.41
Sekigahara did not end the fighting, but it did lead the emperor
to appoint Tokugawa Ieyasu as seii taishogun in 1603 because the
Tokugawa could trace their lineage back to the Minamoto. With that,
the third (and last) Bakufu was established in Edo. Ieyasu continued
policies initiated by his predecessors that froze the social order, dis-
armed the farmers, and limited both the samurai and the daimyo. He
also took extensive measures to eradicate Christianity in his domains
and its most forceful sponsors, the Portuguese—whom the Tokugawa
would expel entirely from Japan in 1639. However, as Ieyasu continued
his predecessor’s policies, the flames of rebellion reignited. Hideyoshi’s
heir Hideyori continued to be the rallying point for rebellions against
Ieyasu. By 1614, Hideyori was a young man, and he gathered around
himself many of the disenfranchised and dissatisfied warriors who were
alienated by Ieyasu’s policies. The Shogun had allowed Hideyori and
his family to continue living in their impressive castle in Osaka, and it
became a haven for disaffected samurai and ronin who formed an
armed force that threatened the Tokugawa peace.42
Ieyasu ordered Hideyori to disband these forces and move to either
Edo (as his hostage) or be the “guest” of some other daimyo that
Ieyasu trusted. When Hideyori refused, two epic sieges resulted, one
in the winter of 1614 and then another in the summer of 1615. It was
here that the “cannon revolution” seen in Europe came, briefly, to
Japan. Ieyasu had always appreciated the value of cannon, but now
he used them to deadly effect in his reduction of Osaka. Hideyori com-
mitted suicide, and in another signal of his intent to tame the samurai,
Ieyasu lined the road from Osaka to Fushimi with the severed heads of
his ronin adversaries on pikes. As a message it could not be misinter-
preted: breaking the peace would be ruthlessly punished. Ieyasu,
signaling no turning back, oversaw the execution of Hideyori’s
children—his own great-grandchildren—to eliminate any future
Toyotomi challenge to Tokugawa hegemony.43
FROM TOKUGAWA TO MEIJI: KEEPING THE SAMURAI TAMED
In the year prior to his death in 1616, Ieyasu issued his most
far-reaching code to control the samurai, the Laws for Military
Households (Buke Shohatto). These broad laws further formalized the
constraints on the daimyo and through them control of the samurai.
Daimyo were to “. . . cultivate civilian skills, report any trouble or
troublemakers . . . refrain from unauthorized castle construction or

marriage arrangements, visit him at his headquarters [Edo], live fru-
gally, and appoint officials who would govern wisely.”44 The unsaid
message implied that any daimyo who failed to follow these
rules would be at best moved to another lesser domain and at worst
remain in Edo permanently or be executed along with his family.
Because the previous two unifiers had already been constraining the
prerogatives of this daimyos, the response of the daimyo to these
latest rules was one of resignation. No one wanted the complete
destruction of his life’s work and his head on a pike alongside a road
somewhere.
Rebellions did occur occasionally on a smaller scale, but usually far
from the power base at Edo through the mid-seventeenth century. The
Tokugawa had engineered political stability by moving the most
powerful daimyo far from Edo to put distance between themselves
and a potentially rebellious lord so that they would have time to react.
Much has been made of the samurai “giving up the gun” after this
period, yet firearms were not given up so much as they were collected
and maintained under tight control by the daimyo. True, the bulk of
the samurai now went about armed only with a short and a long
sword, but the guns were never very far away should the need for
them arise. Some daimyo even collected their taxes in saltpeter for
the local production of gunpowder! But under the Buke Shohatto, only
the samurai and daimyo could possess or handle guns—Hideyoshi’s
disarming of the other classes of Japanese society remained in effect.
These classes, in addition to the small imperial aristocracy in Kyoto,
consisted of farmers, merchants, and specialized artisans (manufac-
turers). This followed a Confucian model, with the samurai class
equating to the gentlemen (shi) class—in China, this was the class of
educated bureaucrats who governed for the emperors. In Japan, it
was the became cultured bureaucrats and infrequent enforcers of the
Tokugawa peace. With Japan in loose isolation and with no real threats
from either Europe or China, these men found themselves asked to
perform the violent side of their duties less and less.45 One historian
has characterized this apparent contradiction between the subordina-
tion of the proud individual to a larger sense of warrior honor while
bound to keep the peace as “honorific individualism.” Whatever one
calls the dynamic that kept this armed class quiescent, the popular
image of the samurai really comes from this period, not from his more
violent and querulous predecessors of the previous 500 years.46
Emerging during this period is the fascinating tale of one of these

landless vassals, the iconic samurai swordsman Musashi. He had
been on the losing side at Sekigahara—which again emphasizes the
Japanese cultural predilection for the noble loser. His postwar career
was that of a nomadic renaissance man—a poet, writer, and artist
who also expressed his life through mastery of the martial arts, espe-
cially a style of kendo fighting with two swords that he popularized
forever after in his Book of Five Rings.47 Most of his contests were elabo-
rate fencing matches with wooden swords and staffs. The enemy he
fought was not so much other opponents in mortal combat but his
own lifelong efforts to master and discipline himself.
Of the various peasant protests and uprisings that occurred during
Japan’s period of Tokugawa “peace,” among the most serious was the
episode that reflected the Tokugawa policy of eradicating Christianity
and that raised again the theme of the “nobility of failure”—the
Shimbara Revolt of 1637–1638. As we have seen, Kyushu, far from
the centers of power and very poor, became a nexus for Christianity
due to its location as the conduit through which this faith entered
Japan. Daimyo such as Konishi Yukinaga converted to the new faith.
The Portuguese Jesuits, especially, spread the new faith zealously,
and it sent deep roots in Kyushu. After Christianity was outlawed,
many people in Kyushu, especially in the Shimbara Peninsula and
Amakusa Islands south of Nagasaki (Konishi’s former domains), con-
tinued to practice their faith. This all changed in 1612 when Ieyasu
instituted a pogrom to eradicate Christianity as part of his long-term
policy to eliminate divisive movements from Japan, especially those
involving foreigners. Over the next 20 years, almost 90 percent of the
people of these two regions were executed, thrown in jail, or forced
to recant. All the foreign missionaries were tracked down and killed.
Many of the horrifying torture and execution methods one finds in
James Clavell’s novel Shogun about Sengoku Japan were actually
methods used against the Christians of western Kyushu—boiling to
death, bamboo saws, crucifixion (which the Japanese had learned
about from the Christians!), and water torture. Despite these outrages,
the peasants and their leaders in these provinces did not revolt—
although many fled to the Goto Islands in the East China Sea. Others
recanted but secretly adhered to the “one true Faith.”48
In the 1630s, economic conditions in this region worsened, first due
to crop failures and then due to extortionate tax rates by the local dai-
myo. In December 1637, the first open revolt broke out in Shimbara
after a pregnant female, seized to ensure tax payments, died aboard a

prison ship. Although the peasants were disarmed, the leading land-
owning farmers were often former samurai who had “switched
classes” and so had martial skills. Many ronin had also sought refuge
in the region and converted. The revolt was led by these men, starting
for economic reasons but then assuming its “war of religion” character
that served the ends of both the rebels and the shogunate—who used
the occasion of the revolt to justify its brutal policies of the preceding
25 years. A charismatic young Christian, Amakusa Shiro, emerged as
a spiritual leader for the movement, which soon swelled as other mal-
contents and ronin came to the area and joined the rebels. The rebels
had seized local armories and managed to arm sizable numbers of
people, many of them warriors. Because of the almost three weeks
of travel needed to get any message of trouble to Edo, they were able
to achieve many successes against the local Tokugawa troops.49
The Tokugawa Shogun (Iemitsu) reacted quickly, despite the
tyranny of distance. However, he was pre-empted in bringing an
early end to the revolt when the rebels led by Shiro abandoned the
Amakusa Islands and moved across the strait to the abandoned castle
of Hara at the tip of the Shimbara Peninsula. Here the final showdown
between the Shogun’s forces and the rebels occurred, culminating in a
bloody and hard-fought siege in 1638. Shiro had between 25,000 to
40,000 men, women, and children, about one fourth of whom were
armed. They did have matchlock muskets captured from the armor-
ies they had sacked, but not nearly enough, and they had to be
extremely careful with their gunpowder and ammunition. One rea-
son for the high losses of the besieging shogunal army was that many
of them had switched to swords and were no longer as skilled with
firearms; otherwise, the tactic of sweeping the battlements with mus-
ket fire seen in battles of the previous 100 years would have made
short work of the defenders. The Shogun did not have time to retrain
his samurai, wanting to crush the insurgency as rapidly and ruth-
lessly as possible. Shogunal forces paid in blood and required the
help of military engineers. They built mines under Hara’s massive
walls and used cannon and siege engines to batter them from above
ground. As the siege ground on, Iemitsu and his advisors sent a sec-
ond army, more heavy cannon, and a new commander to assist those
already at Hara. General Itakura Shigemasa, hearing of his upcoming
relief, launched an ill-advised assault in February 1638, losing many
men and his own life, which gave the rebels a morale-boosting
victory.50
The new commander, Matsudaira Nobotsuna, arrived and decided
to ask the Dutch for help by employing their cannon-equipped ships
to attack the seaward side of the fortress. The Dutch, eager to maintain
good trade relations and not averse to killing Catholic Christians—
having themselves revolted against their Catholic overlords 100 years
earlier—bombarded the castle at the end of February, damaging the
defenses and demoralizing the defenders. Still, Hara did not fall, and
Matsudaira tried to broker surrender in the manner of Hideyoshi.
Shiro and his followers rejected these overtures, and Matsudaira
decided to simply starve them and then assault when their powers
of resistance were diminished. On April 12, the signal to assault the
fortress was sent in error and as one division attacked, the others
joined in. The battle raged for three days—with no quarter asked or
given. In a preview of the suicide cliff in Saipan over 400 years later,
to avoid being captured, women threw themselves and their children
into the fires started by the attackers. By April 15, the battle became
an outright massacre, and Shiro was beheaded in the final hours.
Matsudaira’s casualties probably exceeded 15,000 men, and the
defenders died almost to the last man, woman, and child. As many
as 10,000 heads were gathered and then posted on sticks in front of
the burnt out castle.51
Shiro’s motto on his battle flags had been in Portuguese: “Lovvoad
Seia O Sactissim Sacramento” (“Praised be the most Holy
Sacrament”). It was no wonder that the Tokugawa ejected the Portu-
guese and banned them from Japan the following year (1639). It was
also shortly after this revolt that the Tokugawa closed Japan to
Western tourism and trade except for the Dutch (isolated at Deshima
in Nagasaki Bay). The Koreans, Ryukyus, and Chinese continued to
trade, principally through Kyushu.52
The Tokugawa Bakufu provided Japan great stability, but it was a
fragile system, not really a strong central government. It reflected a
consensus by the most powerful class in Japan, the samurai, that peace
was more important than freedom of conscience and personal aggran-
dizement. It was a loose coalition between the daimyo and shoguns
that was maintained because of a lack of any real impetus to replace
it with something better. By the end of the seventeenth century, the
Shogun ruled with a light hand. The daimyo managed their affairs
with very little interference from the shogunate other than the
required periods in Edo as “guests” (hostages) of the Shogun. Too,

outside forces that might have called into question the efficacy of the
Bakufu, as did the Mongols in an earlier time, did not darken Japan’s
coasts until the first half of the nineteenth century. Once these forces
did appear, the local daimyo took action, realized their weaknesses
(and more importantly those of the shogunate), and decided to chal-
lenge the Bakufu for the first time in 200 years.53
Japan was not entirely closed by the Tokugawa, as we have seen,
but access was severely limited, and the Dutch and Chinese managed
Japan’s awareness of advances in military technology and provided
the Bakufu with most of its intelligence on what was going on in the
rest of the world. Accordingly, Japan fell behind in military technol-
ogy, but, as we will see, she would adopt and adapt as quickly as she
had in the sixteenth century once presented with evidence of Euro-
pean superiority. This evidence came to her in the most dramatic fash-
ion in 1853 when the U.S. navy sailed into Tokyo Bay on its “black”
coal-burning ships and demanded a treaty of trade and friendship.
Nevertheless, from the mid-seventeenth century to the mid-
nineteenth century, the only organized violence visited upon Japan
would be infrequent peasant protests and riots, which were usually
caused by recurring famine and disease as much as by the onerous
tax policies of the shoguns.
THE MEIJI RESTORATION, CIVIL WAR, AND

THE SATSUMA REBELLION
Japan’s production of cash crops such as silk and manufactured items

like pottery and bone china attracted the attention of Western trading
powers looking to export these commodities as well as to open
new Japanese markets for their own goods. Commodore Matthew C.
Perry was not the first to try to do this. Russian probes had in fact
caused the Shogun to take direct control of sparsely populated Ezo
(Hokkaido) in the late eighteenth century from the local lords, who
they assessed as unable to defend it should the Russians invade. The
shogunate was also aware of and concerned about the defeat of Qing
Dynasty forces by the British during the Opium Wars of the early
1840s, but no uniform policy was enacted about how to deal with
these threats beyond the shogunate abandoning its policy of opening
fire on unauthorized ships approaching its coast. Among the few
incidents of ships having been fired on was an American ship in 1838

that was trying to determine the fate of some shipwrecked sailors.54
In 1853, the new U.S. administration decided to more directly
coerce the issue of a relationship with Japan and dispatched Commo-
dore Perry on his famous mission. Perry arrived that July with four
ships and a draft treaty of friendship between the United States and
Japan. The Shogun kept Perry waiting while his advisors consulted
with the major daimyo about what to do. There was no consensus, so
the Shogun refused to negotiate. Perry departed believing his request
would be delivered to the emperor and returned the following year
with seven ships. The Shogun was faced with a dilemma—it seemed
clear the Americans might come ashore and force the issue, and they
had over 1,600 men and strange smoke-belching ships loaded with
modern cannon. The Japanese feared the power of these weapons,
especially so close to Edo. The steamships in particular worried them.
They seemed beyond the control of the elements—the last time the
Japanese had faced ships belching smoke under their own power
had been their defeats at the hands of Admiral Yi. After stalling and
equivocating, the Shogun finally acted while Perry landed shore par-
ties with howitzers to protect his envoys and awaited a response. On
March 31, 1854, Perry and the Japanese shogunal envoys signed the
Treaty of Kanagawa, establishing a “permanent friendship” between
the two nations, guaranteeing safety for shipwrecked Americans,
ensuring coal for American ships, and providing the promise of future
trade. Included in Perry’s gifts were the latest firearms and a small
steam locomotive with passenger car and rails (most of these gifts
were specifically designated for the emperor). With this momentous
event, Japan’s isolation from the West was shattered, and the United
States permanently entered Japan’s martial narrative.55
Shortly thereafter, the Shogun again took over control of Ezo, evi-
dently worried that the Russians might now land and set up trading
posts.56 Treaties with the other European powers followed, and Japan
now seemed to be on the same slippery slope toward extraterritorial-
ity that afflicted Qing China. Perry had unwittingly set in motion a
chain of events that would unseat the Tokugawa shoguns. The shogu-
nate’s inept handling Perry’s visits made its hold on power less firm
and provided its critics a rallying point around Emperor Komei, who
had refused to approve of the treaty when it was sent to him. Komei’s
action brought the imperial institution, long on the sidelines, back into
the political dynamics of Japan. Many lower- and middle-ranking
samurai began to rally around the old idea of a “restoration” of the

emperor to his rightful place at the head of the Japanese state.57
The British and French again humiliated the Qing in the Second
Opium War in 1860, marching on Beijing and burning the Summer
Palace. In reaction, the shogunate established new cannon foundries,
ordered a steam warship from the Netherlands as the first step in cre-
ating a navy, and imported great numbers of small arms. With the other
European powers now hungrily eyeing Japan, a series of incidents took
place that further undermined the Shogun’s authority and legitimacy.
Two western clans dominated the developing struggle between the
emperor and his party and the moderates in the Bakufu—Satsuma
(Kyushu) and Choshu (in the former domains of the Mori). Satsuma
was the more moderate of the two, but in 1863, xenophobic extremists
had Emperor Komei issue an order to the Bakufu to eject all the foreign-
ers. That summer, in the Shimonoseki Strait (see Map 5.3), Choshu
extremists attacked Western shipping interests. The West’s response
was swift and devastating—U.S. and French warships sank a Choshu
vessel and pounded the shore batteries from a safe distance with their
Map 5.3 The Meiji Restoration and Satsuma Rebellion

rifled cannon. The French landed and spiked the inferior Japanese guns,
seized as many arms as they could, and burned many dwellings.
Similarly, the British descended on Kagoshima in Satsuma to demand
retribution for the death of one of their agents at the hands of the same
samurai agitating against the Bakufu. This time a kamikaze-like storm
aided the Japanese as the British commander sailed within range of the
Japanese guns during the storm. These guns inflicted 66 casualties on
the British, who responded with rockets and cannon fire, setting
Kagoshima alight. These humiliations did not accrue to their authors,
the Choshu and Satsuma samurai; rather, they were seen as weaknesses
of the Bakufu in Edo for failing to protect Japan’s sacred soil.58
The leaders of Satsuma and Choshu, though, were inspired to learn
lessons from these incidents, hired Western advisors to teach them the
new methods of war, and created their own private armies, although
technically these troops belonged to the Shogun. The conflict now
became a power struggle over who would control the imperial court,
the radicals from Choshu or the more moderate reformers from
Satsuma. As in the Onin War, the Bakufu watched impotently as
Satsuma and Choshu battled over control of the emperor and Kyoto.
In mid-August 1864, clan forces fought a battle just outside the imperial
palace grounds. Satsuma’s combination of excellent Aizu swordsmen
and cannon defeated the muskets of Choshu. Although Choshu lost,
its ranks included future leaders of Meiji Japan—including Yamagata
Oritomo and Ito Hirubumi. Another leader, Takasugi Shinsaku,
espoused modern military organizations, including using musket and
rifle armed militia units (kiheitai) to create flexible military forces. He also
broke with samurai tradition, cutting his hair knot to show his break
with the past and foreshadowing eventual disestablishment of the
Tokugawa samurai class—which Takasugi believed had become soft
and effete.59
The fallout from this battle opened the next phase of the Meiji
revolutionary process. With Kyoto again a burned and ruined city, the
emperor and the court aristocrats demanded that the Shogun punish
Choshu. This provided the occasion for the first armed test of the mili-
tary power of the Bakufu since the seventeenth century. Choshu, which
had alienated many of the other daimyo, lost the first round to a huge
150,000-man coalition army (which included Satsuma units) that
invaded Choshu and replaced the leadership in that region. However,
young radicals like Takasugi did not disband their kiheitai, instead con-
tinuing the fight using irregular tactics against government forces in the
countryside. Among them was another key radical restorationist named

Omura Yasujiro. While civil war raged in Choshu, the dispirited Bakufu
dispatched a much weakened second expedition (now without Sat-
suma) to the region in 1866. The accounts of the advance of this second
army read like the British army’s retreat from Concord to Boston during
the American Revolution. Omura’s units harassed and harried the
advance of the Shogun’s army with accurate, galling rifle fire. At the
same time, Takasugi and Yamagata led their forces across the Shimono-
seki Strait into Kyushu and employed similar tactics to drive the sho-
gunal forces into Nagasaki. By late 1866, Omura had prevailed on
the northeastern front and forced the shogunal forces to withdraw.
While these events transpired, the old Shogun died and was replaced
by the moderate and “erudite” Yoshinobu, who would become the last
of the Tokugawa Shoguns. The year 1867 saw the death of two key per-
sonalities, Emperor Komei and the charismatic Takasugi (to tuberculo-
sis). Omura took over leadership of the Choshu forces and the new
emperor, the 14-year-old Mutsuhito, ascended to the throne as the coun-
try fell into a general civil war known as the Boshin War.60
The court, influenced by radicals in the imperial family, now openly
aligned with the insurgents, legitimizing their cause. The new shogun
initially pulled his troops back from around Kyoto to Osaka and
promised to resign. However, the emperor issued an imperial edict
(rescript) authorizing the Satsuma-Choshu coalition to overthrow
Yoshinobu in his name. The Shogun, divested of his lands and power,
decided to fight, ordering his troops to advance from Osaka on Kyoto
in January 1868. The samurai leader Saigo Takamori commanded the
Satsuma detachments and thwarted the first advance along the Toba
highway from Fushimi to Kyoto. In a series of subsequent victories,
the better led, armed, and disciplined forces of Satsuma, Tosa, and
Choshu defeated those of the Shogun. During the pursuit, Saigo used
an imperial prince to lead a key assault that finally shattered the
Shogun’s army.61 Following Hideyoshi’s policies, the restorationists
co-opted many of these defeated troops by granting a blanket amnesty
and then adding their former adversaries to the “new” army. The
momentum now built up for a restoration of direct imperial
government under Mutsuhito. The various units operating under the
Choshu generals and the leading Satsuma general, Saigo Takamori,
were consolidated and reorganized several times into a new national
army under the control of the emperor. The restorationists proceeded
almost immediately to create departments and bureaucracies for the
imperial government that they intended to use to replace the discred-

ited shogunal government in Edo.62
Saigo now led the advance of the unified imperial army against the
Shogun’s capital at Edo. Saigo negotiated a peaceful surrender of the
town, but pro-Shogun forces that had retreated north of the city coun-
terattacked and were easily repulsed, many of the diehards fleeing to
rugged northern Japan to continue the struggle from the Tohuku.
Meanwhile, militant pro shogun counterrevolutionaries of the League
to Demonstrate Righteousness (Shogitai) now controlled portions of
Edo. Saigo tried to co-opt this group, but the government had different
ideas and sent Omura to take the overall command. In a bloody and
clumsy battle where Omura’s cannon malfunctioned, Saigo personally
led several bloody assaults against the militants, finally defeating
them without much help from Omura on July 4, 1868. The important
decision was made to move the seat of imperial power from Kyoto to
Edo. Following the Chinese model, Edo was renamed the Eastern
Capital (Tokyo), and Mutsuhito was given the reign name of Meiji
(enlightened rule). The Tokugawa Bakufu era of government was
over.63
Formal establishment of the Meiji imperial government in Tokyo
did not eliminate the fighting. Long-standing regional conflicts, muted
by the years of Tokugawa peace and aggravated by the sanctuary
given by the northern domains such as Aizu to opponents of the resto-
ration, led to hard fighting for the rest of 1868 by the new imperial
army in the north. Foreign military advisors had entered the picture
in the previous 10 years, with the French often advising the Shogun
and anti-imperial government forces and the British advising the
Satsuma-Choshu forces. Fighting in the north was fierce and bloody,
but by the end of the year, Honshu was secured.64 The soldiers of
Aizu, who were regarded as traitors, were not allowed honorable bur-
ials and were often simply executed after capture and left where they
lay. Fleeing north from Sendai, the remaining antigovernment forces
seized Hokkaido and occupied the fortress of Hakodate, which had
been built to resist the Russians. Here they continued to resist in 1869
and, as usual, the final battle involved a siege of the diehards in a for-
tress. The new Meiji navy battered the remains of the Shogun’s navy to
bits on May 11, and the new imperial army besieged the fortress on the
landward side. The defenders were shelled and starved into surrender
on May 25. It was at this time that Japan fully incorporated Hokkaido
into the nation. At Saigo’s suggestion, unemployed samurai served as
colonists for this new territory. However, the population remained

sparse and needed help to suppress uprisings by the indigenous Ainu
population.65
The Meiji reformers now turned to policies for building up Japan
along the twin pillars of fukoku kyohei—“rich country, strong army.”
Thus, Japan’s new Western-style government retained a strong mili-
tary character. Saigo, Yamagata, and Omura can be considered the
fathers of the new Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), with the French
advising them on matters of organization, military policy, and tactics.
They built a mass conscript army from scratch, although many of the
former samurai were incorporated into a new imperial bodyguard of
over 6,000 troops. The Meiji reformers such as Yamagata and Omura
encountered the same sorts of political opposition to conscription that
the Europeans faced in the nineteenth century. Also, minor revolts
plagued the new state until a final cathartic rebellion in 1877 by Saigo
Takamori saw the end of organized opposition. To control discipline in
the new army, the reformers had Meiji issue an imperial rescript in
February 1870, promulgating the new army’s ethos in eight articles:
“. . . That set the standards of conduct for the new army by enunciating
a soldier ’s duties based on . . . loyalty to the throne, obedience to
orders, courtesy and respect for superiors, and the prohibition
of . . . disruptive conduct.” Thus was established the emperor’s direct
control of his new military, which would be explicitly enshrined in
the Meiji Constitution, Article 11, as the “Right of Supreme Com-
mand” (1889). Simultaneously, the modernizers among the Meiji
reformers rapidly industrialized Japan, building on the foundation
begun earlier by the Shogun after the Perry visit.66
The Meiji reformers, often referred to as the Meiji oligarchs,
adopted Western manner and began an extended program of sending
young Japanese to be educated abroad in France, the United States,
and Great Britain. Among the most active of the early Westernizers
was Omura, who was assassinated by a reactionary warrior gang in
September 1869 during a visit to a new French-style military academy
in Kyoto. This event proved a harbinger of the recurrence of modern
gekokujo, political assassination as an acceptable course of action
when one, usually an ex-samurai or junior officer, disagreed with the
government’s military policy.67 Saigo Takamori, one of the architects
of the Meiji state, believed that the emperor’s advisors were straying
from their original focus and rejecting too many of Japan’s traditional
values—such as getting rid of all outward signs of the samurai
culture—and secretly decided to revolt against the state in the early

1870s. This rebellion subsequently became known as the Satsuma
Rebellion because that region was Saigo’s base, and it was at
Kagoshima that the final embers of rebellion against the Meiji state
were extinguished. However, this rebellion occurred simultaneously
with other smaller warrior revolts. The occasion for these warrior
revolts was the outlawing of the wearing of samurai swords and their
replacement by Western-style sabers in March 1876. This order fol-
lowed the suppression of a small revolt led by a lower-ranking
samurai that year at Saga castle in Kyushu.68
Saigo had resigned his position as commander of the Imperial
Guard in 1873 in response to the Council of State’s decision not to send
a military expedition to Korea. He then retired to his stronghold of
Kagoshima to plot against the government and build up military
power. By 1876, he had created his own private military academies
in Satsuma to train noncommissioned and junior officers to serve as
the backbone of an army to displace the “disloyal” men surrounding
the emperor. Saigo’s actions were a strange mix of reticence and
equivocation. He had many arms and over 13,000 troops by 1876,
including many veteran samurai from the Boshin War. Unfortunately
for Saigo, he was consumed by the monster he had created. Reaction-
ary firebrands from his academies instigated the revolt earlier than
Saigo wanted, attacking government forces in late 1876. With the
motto “Respect Virtue: Reform Government,” Saigo led his forces into
open revolt in early 1877. His first move was against the government
forces that had put down the revolt in Kumamoto, but the com-
mander, armed with the latest Enfield and Snider rifles, holed up in
the castle and in February tied down Saigo in a lengthy siege.69
The government, placing its forces under the command of an inex-
perienced imperial prince, sent three forces to Kyushu to relieve
Kumamoto and suppress Saigo. The IJA numbered only 25,000 troops,
but it was reinforced with over 13,000 ex-samurai now serving as
police. These reinforcements included many Aizu warriors who
wanted revenge against Saigo and Satsuma for their harsh tactics in
Aizu in the closing months of the Boshin War. The plan was for two
of the columns to approach Kumamoto from the north and the south,
one under General Yamagata and the other under General Kuroda
Kiyotaka. The third force, commanded by Admiral Kawamura
Sumiyoshi, was to descend on Kagoshima, cut Saigo’s lines to his base
of operations there, and denied it as a future haven. As with the Ming
versus the samurai in Korea almost 300 years earlier, the government
forces had a decisive advantage in artillery—almost seven to one.
Their stolid defense of Kumamoto gave the somewhat amateurish
government forces the initiative while Saigo passively reacted to
events instead of trying to set the tempo. By mid-April, his army was
shattered after some hard defensive fighting north and south of
Kumamoto. The castle was relieved, and Kagoshima was easily seized
by Kawamura. Saigo became a hunted man, and he committed suicide
in a cave north of Kagoshima. Often referred to as “the last samurai,”
Saigo triumphed in death more than in life, being used by the
government to bolster support and nationalism as it approached a
decade of military adventure and expansion beginning in the 1890s.
His supposedly principled revolt against his emperor later led to his
rehabilitation in 1889, with his old nemesis Yamagata attending the
dedication of a statue to him in Ueno Park in Tokyo in 1898!70
* * *
From Hideyoshi’s efforts near the end of the Sengoku period,
through the enforced civility levied on the samurai by Tokugawa
Ieyasu, to the aftermath of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, the process
of taming, managing, and eventually abolishing the samurai played
out. That it was samurai who wrought this transformation upon them-
selves makes this social process a fascinating topic for study—as a
result, the popular stereotypes of the samurai must be revised. Equally
fascinating is the return of many of the samurai in both the Tokugawa
and Meiji periods to their original function, as policemen and keepers
of the peace. The samurai abolished themselves as a class, but they
could not abolish the habits of the warrior ethos, nor could they abol-
ish the institutional behavior of six centuries. The great irony of the
Meiji Restoration was that in attempting to replace the samurai with
a new civil-military paradigm, the Meiji oligarchs created a system
that would gravitate toward professional officers as the “new
samurai,” serving their emperors and leading their men as they saw
fit. Gekokujo would rise again.
Heian Procession. Circa 11th-century image from Japanese Tea Box covering. Note
the warriors in black cloaks with their main weapon, the composite bow. (From
the private collection of the author)
Defending the bridge. A 12th- or 13th-century samurai defends a bridge, a
common event in Japanese military history. Note his deflection of arrows. (Cour-
tesy Department of Military History display, US Army Command and General
Staff College)
Samurai helmet, circa 14–15th century. These helmets became more elaborate as
more and more samurai forces switched to uniform dress. (Courtesy US Army
Command and General Staff College)
Korean Turtle Ship of type that defeated Japanese in late 16th century off Korea.
(Courtesy US Army Command and General Staff College)
Japan opened up. Japanese woodblock print of one of Perry’s “black ships” in
Tokyo Bay. (Courtesy Navy History and Heritage Command)
Gaijin warriors. Contemporary Japanese print depicting two of the U.S. Marines
with Commodore Perry’s command. Note how the Marines have samurai swords
in this print. (Courtesy Navy History and Heritage Command)
The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922. The Japanese delegation appears
to be on the left. (Courtesy US Army Center for Military History)
Kato Tomosaburo, hero in peace and war. Postcards of statues of Admiral Kato in
Hiroshima before World War II (this page) and the new statue of Kato in civilian
garb erected in the 21st century (facing page). (From the private collection of the
author)
Founding member of Kido Butai. IJN carrier Kaga, converted under the terms of
the Washington Naval Treaty from a battleship into an aircraft carrier. She met
her fiery death at Midway, June 1942. (Courtesy Navy History and Heritage Com-
mand)
Kamikaze victim. The destroyer USS Aaron Ward after being damaged off
Okinawa by one of the Emperor’s “cherry blossoms.” (Courtesy Navy History
and Heritage Command)
The beginning of a new relationship. Japanese pilots help U.S. Navy officers deter-
mine anchorage for the USS Missouri into Tokyo Bay in August 1945 for the sur-
render of Japan ceremony. (Courtesy Navy History and Heritage Command)
Allies. U.S. and Japanese Fleet Air Force maritime patrol aircraft flying together
with Mount Fuji in the background in the 1990s. (From the private collection of
the author)
Chapter 6
From the Yalu to the

Yasukuni Shrine
By the late nineteenth century, the global civilization created by the Euro-
pean powers had reached its apogee. A worldwide movement sought to
tame war with international agreements at the Hague and Geneva, and
cultural elites looked forward to continuing the long peace in place ever
since the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. Japan participated in
this system as a new member of the reigning international collective.
Great Britain, France, and Germany had provided considerable support
in developing the military institutions of the newly modernized Japanese
state along European lines. The 1890s and turn of the century saw Japan
test the Meiji oligarchs’ motto of “Rich Nation, Strong Army” (fokoku kyo-
hei). Japan looked to Europe for intellectual, technological, and educa-
tional means of developing itself. Unlike China, Japan had no foreign
concessions on her soil, and she intended to keep it that way. During this
period, Meiji modeled his own behavior and dress on the European mon-
archs. The world was undergoing what most observers now recognize as
the first great wave of modern globalization. Japan, too, participated in
this process of globalization—as a sort of British junior partner in the
Far East. For the Europeans, this “proud tower” came crashing down in
1914 and did not recover until the late twentieth century.1
* * *
The 1880s saw the Japanese military make great strides, but the evolu-
tion of the Japanese Army and Navy from the embryonic organiza-
tions of the Meiji was not smooth. In the army, which controlled
national security policy as the senior service, a faction of older more
traditional officers dominated, and they did not see a need for a pro-
fessional standing army. They believed instead in a short-term con-
script force—a sort of modern throwback to the Ritsuryo system of
ancient Japan. Another faction patterned themselves on the Prusso-
German army and had a more expansive vision for the use of military
force. These officers, from Satsuma and Choshu, had suppressed Saigo
and included Generals Oyama Iwao and Yamagata Aritomo. They
were interested in rationalizing defense and by 1890, they had built a
modern army with a solid professional officer corps that was well
versed in tactics and operations. Conscription laws had produced
trained reserves that could be readily mobilized. By 1890, develop-
ments in Asia convinced Oyama and Yamagata—war minister and
prime minister, respectively—that Japan could no longer rely on a pas-
sive defense posture. Both men believed Japan needed a buffer zone in
Korea to keep the European imperial powers at bay—especially
Russia. 2 At the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War
(1894–1895), Japan had a standing regular army of almost 80,000
well-trained officers and men, although its equipment was about a
generation behind that of the European powers—only the Imperial
Guard and one division (the 4th), for example, had multi round
repeating rifles.3
As for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), the decade prior to the
Sino-Japanese War saw considerable improvement—although in the
case of the Kaigun (navy), the improvements in equipment came first.
The reforms to the navy grew out of Japan’s security concerns. Naval
policy and planning was contained within the Navy Ministry, and a
naval general staff was not established until 1889, although it
remained under the control of the ministry. For the navy’s leaders,
the bigger immediate threat to Japan was the German-built Chinese
fleet. Initiating a propaganda campaign for “maritime Japan,” the
naval leadership took advantage of public enthusiasm to improve
the fleet. Japan acquired two lightly armored big-gun cruisers, Mat-
sushima and Itsukushima, in 1891. The navy was controlled by a faction
composed of samurai-officers from Satsuma, the key leader being
Navy Minister Saigo Tsugumichi, the loyalist younger brother of the
fiery Saigo Takamori. Tsugumichi was an army general, not a sailor,
From the Yalu to the Yasukuni Shrine 147
although he was granted the title of full admiral in 1894 in honor of his
efforts in building up the IJN.4
Within the IJN the key leader, though, was Yamamoto Gombei (no
relation to the admiral of World War II fame), who looked to Great
Britain to model the modern IJN and who has been compared by his-
torians to the British naval reformer Admiral John “Jacky” Fisher.
Yamamoto is often considered the real “father” of the IJN. He secured
a position as the personnel manager of the IJN in the early 1890s and
swept away much of the “deadwood” in the fleet. His partisanship
for a large navy eventually put him at odds with the IJA and the begin-
ning of the poor relationship through World War II between the two
services. When the army leaders claimed, just prior to the war, that it
was with its forces that any decision could be achieved in the war, Yama-
moto countered that the army would need really good engineer units to
build a long bridge if they were to get to Korea without the navy! By the
beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, Saigo, Yamamoto, and their confed-
erates had built a formidable “fleet-in-being.” This “Combined Fleet”
numbered 24 major warships under the command of Admiral Ito Yuko,
formerly the head of Japan’s Naval Staff College. Ito’s second in com-
mand, Rear Admiral Tsuboi, had trained with the U.S. navy as a youn-
ger officer. This fleet’s great advantage over the Chinese ships would
be its high speed and the better training of its crews.5
THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR
The international political context within which Japan now found

herself put her into conflict with the tottering Qing Dynasty. Korea,
as usual, served as the source of conflict between Japan, China, and
Russia. China, after many European humiliations, was attempting to
reform herself via a “self-strengthening effort.” China’s successful
generals from the various wars, especially Zeng Guofan and Li
Hongzhang, led the effort to modernize weapons production in
China. This effort, similar to that being undertaken at the same time
by the Meiji oligarchs, slowed considerably in 1874 as the forces of
reaction pushed back. Nonetheless, the Chinese military reforms con-
tinued, and the most capable and modernized forces—both army
and navy—were under the control of the viceroy of North China, Li
Hongzhang. The naval reforms had the result that by the 1890s, the
Chinese had a respectable fleet, although it still had some way to go.6
Map 6.1 Japan, Korea, China, and Russia, 1880–1906
Japan’s real concerns, though, had to do more with Russia than

with China. Yamagata feared that once the Russians completed the
Trans-Siberian railroad, they might use Korea as a springboard to
invade Japan and subject her to the same treatment as China. With this
in mind, in 1890, the IJA conducted an exercise designed to repulse a
hypothetical Russian invasion at Nagoya using the new railroad and
telegraph system to control and concentrate forces. Meiji served as
commander in chief and appeared in an army uniform at the climax
of the exercise when the invaders were repelled. However, Japan’s
efforts to quietly build up a buffer state in Korea against Russia
brought them into conflict with the Chinese.7
Chinese efforts had been somewhat successful in combating the
encroachment of Russia and Japan. As seen, Japan’s leaders—samurai
all—were drawn to Korea and, less so, Taiwan (where Japan’s forces
had had to be withdrawn in 1874). The ancient historic pattern seemed
to be reasserting itself—a strong Japanese state meant trouble for
Korea, which in turn meant trouble between China and Japan. The
occasion for the outbreak of war involved the appointment by the
Qing court of a “resident” in Seoul to protect its “special relationship”
with the Korean court. The Japanese used an outbreak of rebellion
against the Korean king as an excuse to intervene in Korea to protect
their interests, which would become a rationale for Japanese interven-
tions for the next 50 years. The Japanese 5th Division landed at Inchon
in July 1894 and on July 21, the Japanese seized the Korean royal pal-
ace an installed a “regent” loyal to them. Open hostilities broke out
as the Chinese rushed troops across the Yellow Sea to Korea (see
Map 6.1). Admiral Ito put to sea on July 23 with the combined fleet.
A “flying squadron,” commanded by the American-trained Admiral
Tsuboi, stumbled on the lightly escorted Chinese troop convoy and
sank a gunboat and a Chinese transport, causing the deaths of nearly
1,000 soldiers and sailors. It was with this “surprise” naval attack that
the hostilities began. This opening would be the pattern for most
Japan’s major wars.8
War was formally declared on August 1 and not long after, Chinese
and Japanese troops clashed at Kunsan. When the navy was unable to
pin down the Chinese fleet in August, the army then faced the pros-
pect of a lengthy fall-winter campaign up the Korean Peninsula.
Yamagata was put in overall command of the first two divisions in
Korea—now named the First Army. This turn of events caused the
small Chinese forces to retreat to the north as the IJA resigned itself
to a long campaign aimed at a final confrontation with the main
Chinese Army on the Zhili Plain north of Beijing because amphibious
forces could not be landed further north. As Yamagata occupied
Pyongyang in mid-September, stunning news came from the mouth
of the Yalu River, where the Chinese were attempting to land rein-
forcements. The Imperial Japanese Navy had defeated the Chinese
Navy in a battle at the mouth of the Yalu River.9
Returning to that battle, the centerpiece of the new Chinese Navy
were its German-built battleships Chen Yuen and Ting Yuen, flagship
of Admiral Ding Ju Chang’s Northern Fleet. The battle resulted when
the Chinese Northern Fleet rendezvoused with a troop convoy at the
mouth of the Yalu and then covered its disembarkation in case of an
attack by the Japanese fleet under Vice Admiral Ito. On the night of
September 16–17, the convoy arrived at the Yalu and the transports,
escorted by gunboats and smallest torpedo boats, proceeded upriver
to unload troops. Admiral Ding was under strict orders to cover
the convoy closely and according to his second in command, the
American Commander Philo McGiffen, he was restricted from even
searching for the Japanese fleet.10
Ito’s fleet of 12 warships, none displacing more than 4,300 tons,
arrived at the mouth of the Yalu around midday on September 17.
McGiffen described them as follows:
Monday . . . was a beautiful day, a light breeze gently ruffling the
surface of the water. . . . [The] Japanese ships, forming apparently
a single line and preserving station and speed throughout most
beautifully, could not but excite a feeling of admiration.11
The Chinese fleet also consisted of 12 ships, but it had the weight of
tonnage and armor on its side, principally due to the two battleships
(including McGiffen’s Chen Yuen). Two of the Chinese ships, an ar-
mored cruiser and a torpedo cruiser, were in the mouth of the Yalu
and would not join the fleet until after 1400 (2 PM). The Japanese had
audacity and initiative on their side. Almost immediately, the
Chinese lost two of their warships as their captains fled in a cowardly
manner to the safety of Port Arthur’s protected harbor to the north.
Meanwhile, the two fleets started to pound each other. The Chinese
had the armor and balance of heavier guns, but the Japanese had the ad-
vantage in maneuverability and rapid-fire smaller-caliber weapons and
machine guns. Two older Chinese cruisers were obliterated at the end
of the Chinese line by the Japanese soon after the engagement began.12
The battle had now degenerated into a slugfest between the
Japanese fleet and the two modern “battleships” Chen Yuen and Ting
Yuen, with the Japanese ignoring the remaining smaller Chinese ves-
sels. The range of the gunnery varied between 1,000 to 2,800 yards,
and the carnage aboard the ships was incredible, although the armor
belts kept the two battleships from receiving any below waterline
damage. With the arrival of night, Ito gladly broke off the action as
the remaining six Chinese ships, most of them badly damaged,
retreated north to Port Arthur. This battle is often touted as an over-
whelming victory for the Japanese; however, the Japanese had
received a punishing fire from the Chinese. Five Chinese ships had
been sunk and four (including the battleships) heavily damaged as
compared to four seriously damaged Japanese warships (especially
Hiei). The Chinese suffered over 1,300 killed and wounded as com-
pared to the Japan’s nearly 300. Most of the 850 dead Chinese
drowned. McGiffen credited the Japanese victory to “better ships,
more of them, better and larger supplies of ammunition, better offi-
cers, and as good men.” The Imperial Japanese Navy had arrived as
a force to be reckoned with. In a manner similar to what would hap-
pen to the Russians over 10 years later, Admiral Ding took his fleet
to Weihaiwei, where it was bottled up by the Japanese in January 1895
and besieged by land.13
With the Chinese ceding command of the sea by their ill-advised re-
treat into the harbor at Weihaiwei, the Japanese Army now returned to
its original plan for an amphibious operation against Chinese
territory.14 Oyama, in command of the Second Army, landed on the
Liaogdong Peninsula and rapidly seized the port of Dairen (Luda) in
early November while Yamagata pursued the Chinese to the Yalu.
Oyama’s lead division, under General Nogi Maresuku, then assaulted
and captured Port Arthur on November 25, losing only 300 casualties.
These brilliant Japanese victories, though, were marred by poor logistics
planning. As for the Second Army, the planners wanted to conduct
another rapid amphibious descent across the Yellow Sea on the
Shandong Peninsula but were delayed by a lack of shipping for both
troops and supplies. As the Japanese sorted out their supply problems,
the Chinese began to build up combat power to the north. In a foreshad-
owing of the future, the IJA’s planners took shortcuts, relying on rapid
victory to obviate their logistics shortcomings.15 In another harbinger
of the future, Japanese officers lost control of their men after the capture
of Port Arthur, and at least 2,000 helpless Chinese (soldiers and civilians)
were massacred. Yamagata also cautioned his officers not to surrender to
the Chinese, although this was not for reasons of bushido (honor), but
rather because of reports of the Chinese torturing their prisoners.16
Yamagata launched a drive on Mukden in December without
informing Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ), which in turn had
not informed him of its own decision for him not to take the offensive.
This situation highlights the beginning of the unfortunate characteris-
tic of the IJA that was to bedevil Japanese policy and strategy right up
to surrender after the atomic bombs in 1945—field or disciplined ini-
tiative (gekokujo). This term (last seen in the Sengoku in its modern
sense) refers to the right of field commanders to initiate operations at
their own level, all the way to strategic level, if they felt it was in the
emperor ’s interest. More often than not, it was in their personal
parochial interest, but with Yamagata’s actions we see it highlighted

first. At this point, Yamagata became seriously ill and only a personal
request from the emperor brought him back to Hiroshima, the location
of IGHQ, to brief everyone on the situation. The army, meanwhile,
endured a fierce winter with few supplies as the offensive ground to
a halt in the bitter weather.17
With Yamagata’s First Army bogged down in the north, Prime
Minister Ito Hirobumi focused on the trapped Chinese fleet at
Weihaiwei Shandong Peninsula. Fortunately for the Japanese high com-
mand, the Chinese generals accommodated them, giving them the deci-
sive victories they needed before the war became long and drawn out.
Oyama’s army landed near Weihaiwei and took the fortress overlooking
the naval base on February 2, 1895. A simultaneous attack by torpedo
boats and artillery bombardment resulted in the sinking of much of the
Chinese fleet as the Qing commanders committed suicide. With warmer
weather, the First Army resumed offensive operations and defeated a
Chinese force near Shanhaiguan, the pass leading to the Zhili Plain.18
These events led to the Treaty of Shimonoseki between Japan and
China that April. According to its terms, Korea became an “independent
state,” and China ceded the Liaodong Peninsula and Taiwan as well as
railroad concessions in Manchuria to Japan. These results, in a bitter
blow for Ito and the Japanese people, were overturned by the Europeans
powers, principally at the instigation of Russia. After a complicated
series of post-treaty events, Russia gained Japan’s concessions to the
Liaodong Peninsula and Manchurian rail lines. After attempting a failed
coup attempt in Korea led by the Japanese ambassador, Japan signed an
agreement with Russia for a modus vivendi that recognized Japan’s
privileged position in Korea but with very few troops in country. Taiwan
revolted against Japanese rule, but the Japanese responded with a two-
division pacification campaign that stabilized Japan’s position there by
1907. While these events transpired, the other colonial powers carved
off more of China for themselves, including the acquisition of Weihaiwei
by the British and the Shandong Peninsula and the excellent harbor of
Qingdao for the Germans.19
THE BOXER REBELLION AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
After the war, Yamagata in the army and officers such as Yamamoto
Gombei in the navy argued for more funds for their services to protect
Japan’s gains. A strategic conundrum now began that bedeviled
Japan’s leaders for the next 50 years. With Taiwan and a foothold in
Korea, they would constantly be torn between a strategy of going
north or south for resources and interests. In the early twentieth cen-
tury, the northern option won first. Too, different visions of how to
defend Japan caused the army and the navy to become further divided
from each other as each claimed it should have a larger share of
the defense budget. Meanwhile, the slow dissolution of China and
the threat to Japan by the European powers, Russia in particular,
set the stage for Japan’s next two conflicts. Japan’s acquisitions ironically
made her less rather than more secure—bringing the European imperial
powers ever closer to her shores as Qing China transformed from one of
the most powerful empires in history into a failed state. It was this pro-
cess that caused the violence known as the Boxer Rebellion to break
out in China as a last spasm against the Europeans.20
Japan had shown herself a willing supporter of the existing order
when she cooperated in the European response to the siege of the dip-
lomatic legations in Beijing and the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion
in 1900. Because of the distance involved, the European powers found
themselves relying principally on the IJA for the largest component
of the military expedition to lift the siege in Beijing. Most of Britain’s
troops were tied down in the ongoing Boer War. At the height of the
expedition, Japan had more than 13,000 troops, or 40 percent of the
allied combat power. However, though Japan did have a good fighting
record, one observer criticized the Japanese for their needlessly high
casualties due to their over aggressiveness and “densely packed for-
mations.” In the looting that took place in Beijing after the relief of
the siege of the international legations, the Japanese troops were noted
for being the most “polite” as they looted as compared to the more
rapacious Europeans and even the Americans.21
As a part of “the international solution” to the Boxer crisis, Japan
reaped certain rewards, including expansions of her own concessions
inside China. Another of the windfalls she reaped were formalized
ties to Great Britain as an ally and partner in the new naval security
scheme for the British Empire. The Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer
Rebellion emphasized to the British strategic leadership that they
could no longer unilaterally influence events in Asia as they had in
the past. Following a “balance of power” strategy, they approached
the Japanese as one way to counter the influence of the Germans and
Russians, who posed bigger threats to British Far Eastern interests.
This made perfect sense, too, because Britain was now engaged in a
naval arms race with Germany. The IJN’s success in getting the budget
to build a “six-six” fleet—six new battleships and six new armored
cruisers—also gave Japan the leverage for Britain to consider her as a
partner rather than as an adversary. Accordingly, British and Japanese
representatives met, agreed on their mutual interests, and signed a
defensive Anglo-Japanese naval alliance in 1902. The treaty stipulated
strict neutrality in the event of war and intervention if a third party
(e.g., Germany or Russia) joined the conflict. It also committed Japan
and Britain to respecting each other’s’ interests in China and allowed
Japan to buy high-quality British coal for its warships.22
Based on the previous discussion and the dénouement of the
Sino-Japanese War, the causes for the Russo-Japanese War should
already be apparent. Japan’s humiliation after the Treaty of Shimonoseki
had led to Russian gains in Manchuria and Liaodong at Tokyo’s
expense. Russia soon signed a lease with the weak Qing court for Port
Arthur’s naval base for 25 years with rights for an extension. However,
in 1903, matters came to a head when Russia, which had deployed
troops to protect the rail trunk into Manchuria from the Trans-Siberian
railroad, kept those troops in place in violation of the Boxer Protocol.
The Russians were also improving the Trans-Siberian rail line into a dou-
ble rail line to increase their ability to build up forces in the Far East—
obviously with Japan in mind. Imperial Russia now posed a clear
naval threat from Port Arthur and a land-based threat from southern
Manchuria against the Korean buffer zone. Japan’s leaders met at
Yamagata’s residence in Kyoto to plan for war with Russia. Secretly,
one of Japan’s most intelligent officers—General Tamura Iyozo—began
planning offensive operations for the continent. Tamura, educated at
the prestigious German Kriegsakademie, was one of the few officers
in the IJA well versed in the theories of Carl von Clausewitz. He knew
the requirements for offense and defense and that the key to success in
both involved careful and detailed mobilization planning—especially
for the strategic offense.23
Similarly, the navy used the new treaty to gain Britain’s help in
diverting two modern armored cruisers built in Italy to the IJN in
anticipation of war. Naval planners studied the lessons of the
Sino-Japanese War and refined their tactics accordingly. In 1888,
Tsugumichi had established a naval staff college specifically for the
purpose of wargaming and to study and learn naval tactics at Tsukiji
on Tokyo Bay. The curriculum had been revamped after the
Sino-Japanese War by the French-educated rear admiral Sakamoto
Toshiatsu. These moves gave Japan one of the most doctrinally sophis-
ticated naval officer corps in the world.24 On December 28, 1903, in
anticipation of imminent war with Russia, the emperor reactivated
the Combined Fleet and the staff and organized it into two fleets.
The First Fleet consisted of the six battleships and their escorts, and
the Second Fleet boasted the six armored cruisers and escorts. The
remaining odds and ends, including obsolescent types, were grouped
into the Third Fleet. To command the Combined Fleet, Yamamoto
chose Admiral Togo Heihachiro, a taciturn officer who had sunk a
Chinese troop transport during the recent war with China. Togo was
chosen as much for his reputation for good luck as for his tactical acu-
men. British-trained and educated, Togo’s role model was the British
naval hero Admiral Horatio Nelson. Togo’s chief of staff was the
equally sanguine Kato Tomosaburo.25
The Combined Fleet repaired to its main base at Sasebo and
immediately began intensive training in the latest tactics. Addition-
ally, Japan had leveraged the latest in wireless telegraphy technology
for her larger ships—although for most tactical communication, she
would still use signal flags (day) and blinkered lights (night). Togo
pushed for submarine telegraph cable connections from headquarters
in Sasebo to all the major naval bases, including Chinhae in Korea.
Japan’s navy entered the war with the finest operational command,
control, and communications system (C3) in the world at that time.26
Japan’s premier tactician and naval thinker was Akiyama Saneyuki
on Togo’s staff—he had been to the United States and met A. T.
Mahan. He drafted the “Combined Fleet Battle Plan,” which served
as the basis for the navy’s engagements during the upcoming war.
He and Togo focused at the operational level on a Nelsonian single
decisive battle of annihilation. To achieve this, Akiyama outlined
using the battleships to “cross the T”—a naval maneuver whereby all
the gun power of a line of ships is directed in a converging manner
against a lead ship in another column (see Figure 6.1). To create this
T, the Japanese relied on their superior speed and seamanship. This
was only one part of the tactical plan, though, the other being the
“L” maneuver whereby another force of lighter ships (such as ar-
mored cruisers) arrived unexpectedly in a line parallel to the enemy
to further disrupt its formation with crossfire. These two elements,
seeking decisive battle and using main and deception forces, would
be a feature of Japanese naval operations and tactics all the way to
the IJN’s “death ride” at Leyte Gulf in 1944.27
Figure 6.1 “Crossing the T”
The strategic plans of the two nations have been characterized as

reflecting the ideas and theories of Helmut von Moltke on land and
Mahan at sea. However, the end result looked like “neither Mahan
nor Moltke.” The navy sought decisive battle to establish command
of the sea, as it had done at the Yalu. Similarly, the army sought a rapid
mobilization and advance to catch the Russians before they built up
combat power using their single lengthy Trans-Siberian rail line—
which was useless at certain times of the year. The concept was to
execute a Far Eastern battle of annihilation against the Russians by
an enveloping and swifter moving Japanese Army. Unfortunately for
Japanese planners, the war would slide into an attritional contest
decided in part by a decisive naval victory, but also by collapse and
revolution in European Russia.28
In the Japanese Army, the talented, but very senior, general Kodama
Gentaro took a demotion in rank in order to serve as the overall stra-
tegic planner for the land war. The IJA’s plans involved rapid and
decisive maneuvers predicated on control of the sea. This would allow
freedom to maneuver quickly by sea against the Liaodong Peninsula
and areas of northern Korea prior to invading Manchuria. Kodama
assigned three field armies to these tasks. The First Army would
advance rapidly to the Yalu (as Yamagata had), the Second Army
would land and establish a base of operations at the port of Dairen on

the Liaodong Peninsula, while a Third Army under General Nogi
would land and isolate Port Arthur. A smaller Fourth Army would
land in the Bohai Gulf to help protect the flanks of the first two armies
as they advanced into Manchuria from Liaodong and Korea, respec-
tively (see Map 6.1). Success was also contingent on the Russians offer-
ing themselves up for battles—both at land and sea—where the
Japanese could annihilate them and before the Russians could send
significant reinforcements from Europe. The Japanese planners esti-
mated this would take about six months—no plans were made for a
second year of campaigning or for any deep penetrations into Man-
churia.29 Like Napoleon’s plan to invade Russia in 1812, the goal was
to destroy the Russians on the frontier of North China (Zhili) and
Manchuria.
Japan’s goals were inherently limited—she had no intention of cap-
turing Moscow or even Vladivostok or any other Siberian city. Her
objective was simply to secure Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula, and
railroad and economic privileges in southern Manchuria—essentially
getting back what she had won by the end of the Sino-Japanese War.
These goals seemed reasonable if the Russians could be defeated
quickly. Russian strategic designs, however, were delusional. Russia’s
leadership, egged on by the naı̈ve tsar Nicholas II, planned to invade
Japan and conquer a peace by dictating to the cowed Orientals while
astride their capital, as had been done during the Boxer Rebellion with
the Chinese. But first the Russian Army would easily destroy the
Japanese forces in Korea. Few in the Russian court were brave enough
to tell the emperor he had “no clothes.” One of these few was the
Russian hero of the Russo-Turkish War, a rare individual who knew
how to think, write, and act decisively in war—Rear Admiral S. O.
Makarov. As Russia frittered away resources trying to match the Japa-
nese naval building program, Makarov recommended conciliation
with the Japanese while investigating means to only control local
waters around Port Arthur and Korea with light forces for interdicting
Japanese landings on the continent. His advice was ignored, Port
Arthur was built up, and a large squadron (still inferior in size to the
Japanese) was based there. Port Arthur was better suited to light
cruiser and torpedo forces rather than as a major fleet anchorage. As
it turned out, the Russian squadron found it easier to anchor in the
roadstead outside the harbor to allow easier access to the Yellow Sea
than to anchor inside the harbor and then spend most of the day
slowly filing one ship at a time through the narrow channel to the
open sea. This exterior anchorage left the Russians vulnerable to a sur-
prise attack.30
One result of what the army considered to be “civilian meddling”
during the war with China resulted in IGHQ now consisting of only
military officers—and excluding the civilian prime minister (Katsura
Taro) and the foreign minister. Katsura had to attend meetings not as
prime minister, but under his retired army rank as a general—and he
was not always invited. This exclusion of civil authority from military
decision making had deep roots in Japanese tradition, as we have
seen, and did not bode well for the strategic direction of the war.31
After much agonizing, Meiji authorized the decision for war after
negotiations with the Russians stalled. The army and the navy agreed
to open the war with a surprise naval attack on the vulnerable Russian
squadron at Port Arthur. To guard against the Russian armored
cruiser squadron based in Vladivostok that might come to reinforce
Port Arthur, Togo employed his Third Fleet to watch the Tsushima
Strait, the only possible approach for this force. Togo estimated that
even if he did not destroy the Russian fleet, it would not fight energeti-
cally to contest Japanese movements by sea. Togo focused first on pro-
tecting the army forces moving to the continent to win quickly before
Russian reinforcements could arrive by land and sea—not winning a
Nelsonian battle. His dual instructions—to destroy or bottle up the
Russian fleet and protect the army’s troops transports—would have a
negative effect on events, and soon. On February 6, diplomatic rela-
tions with Russia were severed—Togo’s fleet, trained and ready, set
sail the same day.32
Rear Admiral O. V. Stark commanded the Pacific Squadron for
Russia. Neither Stark nor the overall commander Vice Admiral E. I.
Alekseev had thought to take any extra precautions after the Japanese
severed diplomatic relations on the February 8. Togo decided to use
his battle line to screen the troopships and open the war with a
surprise torpedo attack by his lighter forces on the night of February
8–9. His caution prevented him from deploying the mass of his fleet
closer to his destroyers that were delivering the initial blow. Some-
what like Pearl Harbor almost 40 years later, the Japanese found their
adversary’s ships anchored obliviously in the roadstead with all their
lights on. Then things began to go wrong. The Japanese launched
20 torpedoes—most of them from too far away—several destroyers
then collided, and mass confusion reigned. Worse, Togo had divided
his destroyer forces—a most un-Mahanian action—sending another

division of destroyers to attack Dairen, which had no warships at all.
Even so, three Russian battleships were seriously damaged, and the
Russian fleet lay confused and helpless in the dark outside the safety
of Port Arthur, ripe for a dawn attack by Togo’s heavy ships. Togo’s
conservatism prevented his arrival with the battle line until noon off
Port Arthur. The Russians had regained their composure and shel-
tered under the big coastal guns of Port Arthur. The Russians now
gave as good as they got, and Togo pulled back to his anchorage off
the Korean coast for a distant blockade. The following day Emperor
Meiji, in his role as supreme warlord, formally declared war on
Russia.33
Togo’s subsequent efforts to block the Port Arthur channel by sink-
ing ships in the entrance failed. He left a Russian fleet-in-being in
place, and this dismayed the army planners who were relying on a
neutralized Russian fleet for their short decisive war. Now they not
only had to begin operations further south in Korea, but instead of
screening Port Arthur with light forces, they would have to devote
an entire army to take it. Togo’s failure to destroy or significantly dam-
age the Russian fleet meant that his ships would spend much more
time at sea in active operations maintaining a watch instead of being
available for other missions. Fortunately, Admiral Stark lethargically
retreated into the inner harbor and showed no intention of interfering
with the major Japanese amphibious movements for almost an entire
month. Also, the Russian high command failed to respond by sending
any ships out to reinforce Stark and in fact recalled a squadron to
St. Petersburg that was already in the Red Sea (due to fears about over-
seas Japanese torpedo boats). The only positive move made by the
Russians was to dispatch Admiral Makarov to Port Arthur to take
over command of the Pacific Squadron from Stark.34
The Japanese Army began to execute its revised plan of operations.
Troops had already landed at Chinhae and other locations in southern
Korea. In mid-March, the First Army landed on the west coast of
Korea near Pyongyang. However, plans to land on the Liaodong
Peninsula were put on hold because Makarov had arrived in Port
Arthur on March 7 and immediately made his presence known. He
infused the fleet with energy and purpose, working to repair his dam-
aged ships while attempting to bring his lackluster crews up to speed
with training and gunnery practice. He began to actively patrol with
his light forces in the roadstead. In mid-March, Togo responded by
bombarding the Russian ships inside the port by stationing a cruiser

with wireless telegraphy just outside the channel to relay spotting fires
as it looked down the channel into the harbor. Makarov countered by
tuning one of his wireless sets to this frequency and jamming the
cruiser while at the same time supplementing his coastal guns’ return
fire by counter flooding his battleships to give them a list for added
gun elevation to fire over the hills and back at Togo. He also used
observers with telephone lines on the hills to spot the effectiveness of
his return fire.35
This cat and mouse game continued into late March and April. On
the night of April 12–13, Togo had his ships lay a minefield just out-
side the entrance to the channel. With dawn, a Russian torpedo boat
patrolling the roadstead was surrounded and sunk by these ships.
Makarov responded with a sortie by his fleet, chasing these forces
away and attempting to rescue the crewmen of a lost vessel. When
several Japanese cruisers showed up to disrupt these activities,
Makarov pursued them with three of his battleships, including his
flagship Petropavlovsk. However, when Makarov sighted Togo’s main
battle force steaming on the horizon, he withdrew back to Port Arthur.
Here disaster struck when Petropavlovsk sailed through the minefield,
now at low tide. A mine detonated the forward magazine, and
Makarov was killed along with 650 of his crew as Petropavlovsk sank.
Another battleship also hit a mine but was only lightly damaged
because the explosion was attenuated by the ship’s coal bunker. How-
ever, this disaster took all the fight out of the Russian Pacific Squadron
as it limped back into port. Worse, the new commander, Rear Admiral
V. K. Vitgeft, now proceeded to undo much of Makarov’s good work.
The one positive action taken by the tsar was to appoint the promising
admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky as commander of the Baltic Fleet, now
renamed the Second Pacific Squadron, with the intention of sending
this force to relieve Port Arthur. However, this fleet would not get
underway until the first week of October.36
With the Russian fleet at Port Arthur now demoralized and under
feckless leadership, the prosecution of the land campaign picked up
speed. At the end of April, the First Army advanced and crossed the
Yalu near Andong, defeating a Russian screening force in a two-day
battle. This victory stunned the European nations because it was the
first major victory of an Asian nation over the forces of one of the
European great powers. In Japan, the battle was greeted with shock,
as the 900 causalities exceeded the entire number of killed and
wounded in the Sino-Japanese War. It began to dawn on the Japanese

leadership and public that they had a bloody, potentially lengthy war
on their hands. Meanwhile, with Togo covering Port Arthur, General
Oku Yasutaka’s Second Army landed northeast of Dairen (Luda) on
May 5 with the battleship Fuso providing support. Oku then turned
south to force the narrow neck of the Liaodong Peninsula at Nahshan
that led to Dairen and Port Arthur. Here Oku ran into a nasty surprise
and stormed a strong position defended by one Russian regiment with
parts of three divisions on May 26. Oku incurred fearful casualties
using wave after wave of massed infantry attacks in close order
against the Russian trenches and machine guns in a preview of World
War I. The Russians finally retreated, but only after inflicting 3,800
casualties on Oku’s troops. The IJA later characterized these men used
in these tactics as “human bullets,” as if to suggest they were an
expected result, but it now faced the reality of the lethality of modern
battle. Some Japanese officers adjusted their tactics accordingly,
switching to dispersed formations, infiltration tactics, and extended
skirmishing; however, these tactics were not uniformly adopted, and
brutal frontal assaults with packed columns occurred again. The
overall Russian ground commander, General A. N. Kuropatkin,
did nothing to prevent the Russian forces in the peninsula from being
cut off.37
While operations ashore continued to and beyond the Yalu and pro-
gressed toward Port Arthur, the Russians bestirred themselves against
Togo’s blockade as well as against Japan’s sea lines of communication.
Vitgeft had a minesweeper lay a minefield in May and on the fifteenth,
disaster struck when two of Togo’s battleships, a third of his battleship
force, sailed into it and sank. The day in and day out stress of closely
patrolling Port Arthur placed an incredible strain on the IJN, and
two cruisers collided in the fog. One subsequently sank. Vitgeft now
had superiority over Togo’s fleet in numbers of battleships, yet he
remained inert. At the same time, the IJN was hard-pressed by the
bold actions of Admiral N. I. Skrydlov and the Vladivostok squadron,
which raided the west coast of Japan and even penetrated the
Tsushima Strait and sank several troop transports. This further wors-
ened relations between the IJA and IJN. Vitgeft still made no efforts
to coordinate with this force, despite Togo’s fleet being stretched to
the breaking point. Nonetheless, Togo’s forces escorted and covered
the arrival of new troops into the key port of Dairen, allowing Oku’s
Second Army to turn north toward Manchuria while General Nogi’s
newly forming Third Army built up strength to advance against Port

Arthur and eliminate the Russian fleet once and for all.38
On June 10 at IGHQ in Japan, Yamagata, Katsura, War Minister
Terauchi Masatake, and Oyama—now a field marshal—gathered to
discuss strategy for the next phase of the war. Nogi’s Third Army
would reduce Port Arthur while Oyama turned north with the other
three armies to confront Kuropatkin. The line of operation quite natu-
rally followed the South Manchurian rail line from Liaodong to
Liaoyang and thence to southern Manchuria’s major city Mukden.
The main thrust of the operation aimed to achieve a sort of Japanese
version of von Moltke’s victories at Koninggratz (1866) and Sedan
(1870) whereby the Russian Army would be annihilated by converg-
ing Japanese armies. The main effort was to be the strongest force,
General Kuroki Tamemoto’s First Army advancing from the Yalu to
take the Russians in the flank near Liaoyang. The Second and new
Fourth Armies would distract Kuropatikin’s attention from this vul-
nerable flank. The way would then be open to Mukden, which could
be captured before sufficient reinforcements arrived from further
west. This strategy’s great weakness was its absolute reliance on a
quick victory that annihilated the Russian field army. Victories would
come, but not quickly enough, and the Russian Army always man-
aged to escape and fall back on its lines of communications further
down the rail line while the Japanese armies advanced further and
further from their own supply bases.39
Nicholas II prodded Kuropatkin to attack south to relieve the
pressure on Port Arthur. On June 14–15, Oku defeated this force at
Wafangou, but this spoiling attack delayed the Japanese advance, and
the main Russian Army still lay further up the railroad. Field Marshal
Oyama now arrived at his command and accompanied First and Fourth
Armies on the advance north, driving in Kuropatkin’s advance guards.
These Russian reverses were not crippling, and the Japanese had been
delayed two months in their advance on Liaoyang. Arriving in front of
that city on August 25, Oyama fought a seven-day engagement.
Although the Japanese armies took the Russians in the flank, Russian
firepower and entrenchments prevented a disaster. Too, the Russians
simply refused their flank and then withdrew toward Mukden to avoid
encirclement. Many of the lower-level Japanese tactical commanders
continued to use dense infantry columns and incurred fearful casualties,
causing the shocked Oyama to relieve three generals—Japanese casu-
alties exceeded 23,000 troops. Meanwhile, Nogi wasted troops at an
even greater rate at Port Arthur. Pre war Japanese intelligence had
missed the fact that the Russians had turned Port Arthur’s landward
defenses into a formidable series of strongpoints with artillery support,
barbed wire, and machines guns. Russian troops have always fought
most effectively on the defense and Nogi, misled by his easy victory at
Port Arthur 10 years earlier, assaulted without a proper reconnaissance
on August 19–20, losing 16,000 killed and wounded, and continuing
futile attacks after it was clearly hopeless. Unfortunately, Nogi was
something of a national hero, and Oyama could not relieve him.40
Meanwhile, a week before Nogi’s ill-advised assault, the dire situa-
tion at Port Arthur had caused the tsar to order Vitgeft to try to escape
with his fleet and join Admiral Skrydlov in Vladivostok before it was
too late. Vitgeft attempted to escape with six battleships, four cruisers,
and eight destroyers on August 10. Togo met him later that day near
the entrance to the Yellow Sea and turned Vitgeft’s force back after
killing the Russian admiral and severely damaging his flagship, the
battleship Tsesarevich. Vitgeft’s second-in-command signaled the
squadron to return to Port Arthur. By the eleventh, the entire squad-
ron—minus Tsesarevich and two damaged cruisers that steamed off
to be interred in neutral ports—had returned to port, never again to
leave. Two days later, three of Skrydlov’s cruisers, rushing to
Tsushima to meet Vitgeft, ran into Admiral Kamimura’s cruisers,
which sank one and damaged another. Russian naval fortunes had
presumably reached their nadir.41
Back in Moscow, the Battle of the Yellow Sea was greeted with hor-
ror and finalized the decision to send Rozhestvensky to retrieve the
naval, if not the overall, situation. Togo, on the other hand, had no idea
that the Russians were so demoralized; after all, they still had five bat-
tleships. However, as a sign of the resignation of the Russians, a naval
infantry brigade was formed from the sailors whose leaders had no
intention of taking their ships out to face Togo again. Nogi’s army
became the instrument to destroy the Russian fleet, even though it
was already destroyed psychologically. The cost, not only in blood
but also in terms of subtracting Nogi’s troops from the main land cam-
paign, was considerable. The army’s high casualties caused a
manpower crisis in Japan. Sixty-five thousand replacements were
sent out to reconstitute Japanese divisions and on September 29,
the emperor activated four new divisions. He also doubled the reserve
obligation as well as lengthened the age for service to 37, all on the
advice of IGHQ. Meanwhile Nogi continued to bleed his army against
Port Arthur’s tenacious defenders. The bloody drama captured the

attention of the entire world—a doomed garrison fighting incredible
odds against a Japanese samurai hero (Nogi). The only truth to this
myth lay in the fact that the garrison was indeed doomed.42
Nogi assaulted Port Arthur’s defenses again in September, attempt-
ing to capture the key terrain feature known as Hill 203. Nogi assumed
he would succeed because he had been reinforced with heavy artillery.
The Japanese assaulted Hill 203 for two weeks and after 5,000 casu-
alties, suspended the offensive just short of final success. Nogi’s fail-
ure cost the Japanese another seven weeks. IGHQ sent General
Kodama to “advise” Nogi, though Kodama controlled all aspects of
the final assault. Kodama opened the third and final assault and by
early December had secured the heights. The siege now came to its
sad conclusion, with the last of the garrison surrendering two days
into the new year, 1905. None of the Russian fleet escaped, although
Captain Essen of the battleship Sevastopol anchored in the outer road-
stead firing his guns to the end and enduring repeated torpedo attacks
that damaged, but did not sink, his battlewagon. With the end in sight,
Essen and his crew scuttled their ship. Nogi lost over 59,000 men but
would go on to be lauded for this hollow “victory.” Japan would not
commit ground troops in large numbers to battle in World War I, but
she did not need to—she had suffered her own version of the Somme
at Port Arthur.43 Rozhestvensky’s fleet was still five months from
arriving in the theater, though no one thought to tell him to turn
around.
While Togo gave his crews and ships rest and maintenance, respec-
tively, the focus of operations shifted back to southern Manchuria.
Recall that as Nogi besieged Port Arthur, Oyama had resumed his
advance against Kuropatkin’s army at Mukden. The size of these
armies and the geographic scope of operations were stupendous—
which is one reason recent historians have nicknamed this conflict
World War Zero.44 Oyama had bogged down in front of Liaoyang,
although almost 41,000 Russian troops were lost compared to the
23,000 Japanese casualties. Oyama’s forces were also being ravaged
by disease, and a lull settled in as he rested and regrouped his armies
between Mukden and Liaoyang. In January, Kuropatkin launched a
counterattack, and the Japanese only succeeded in repulsing it at the
cost of 9,000 casualties in the bitterly cold weather. From February 22
through March 10, Oyama and Kuropatkin fought a titanic engage-
ment that involved half a million men around Mukden. Oyama tried
to envelope the Russians (who outnumbered him) with his three

armies, but again the Russians withdrew before Oyama could close
the trap. The casualties totaled 70,000 for the Japanese and 90,000 for
Kuropatkin, who lost his command after this disaster. IGHQ inter-
preted Mukden as a great victory, but Oyama knew that the truth
was that his offensive power was spent and the land war had stale-
mated—the Russian Army remained a force in being, and it could
replace its losses while the Japanese could not.45
Oyama relayed this information to Yamagata, who then conveyed
to the cabinet on March 23 that Japan needed to end the war by diplo-
matic means. Japan’s gambit for a decisive victory with a dictated
peace had failed. General Kodama severely criticized the decision
making of the War Ministry and reputedly “. . . called the vice chief
of staff [of the Imperial General Staff] a fool for starting a fire without
knowing how to put it out.” IGHQ resigned itself to a protracted war it
doubted it could win on favorable terms.46 The Russians now pro-
vided a measure of relief in their ill-advised dispatch of the Second
Pacific Squadron. Since October, this squadron had been slowly mak-
ing its way east. It had almost started a war with Great Britain when
it confused some British fishing boats with Japanese torpedo boats
and caused an international incident. Because the British-controlled
Suez Canal was unavailable for passage of Rozhestvensky’s force, it
had to go around Africa the long way. Port Arthur fell as Rozhestven-
sky crossed the Indian Ocean and any good reason for his dispatch
had disappeared. Meanwhile, Togo prepared relentlessly for battle,
repairing his ships and putting in place intelligence collection and
reconnaissance assets to track the Russians. He also decided to throw
caution to the winds, changing his conservative battle tactics and
deciding he would close to ranges where his gunfire couldn’t miss,
at 3,000 meters or less. Togo and his planners also predicted that
Rozhestvensky would go to Vladivostok when he finally appeared.
Accordingly, he took up a position in the Tsushima Strait and awaited
his prey.47
Rozhestvensky soon obliged him. His squadron contained over
40 ships, but it was a “cats and dog” force with many outdated and
obsolescent ships, including lumbering monitors that had been added
at the last minute. After a lengthy stay at Can Ranh Bay in Indochina,
Rozhestvensky pushed on in May with everything he had to attempt
to slip through the Tsushima Strait to safety at Vladivostok. Beyond
that he had no plans. Togo’s patience and intuition were rewarded
on May 26 when his scouts sighted the Russians in the East China Sea
east of Shanghai. 48 Battle was joined between the two forces on
May 27–28, 1905, and the results were predictable given Togo’s prepa-
ration and Rozhestvensky’s grim fatalism. Upon sighting the Russian
column, Togo sent a very Nelsonian signal to his crews: “[T]he exis-
tence of our Imperial country rests on this one action, and every man
of you must do his utmost.”49
Straining to “cross the Russian T,” Togo did not wait for the maneu-
ver to begin to destroy his quarry and had his ships open fire as soon as
the Russians were in range. His belief in the efficiency of his crews and
gunnery was rewarded and he crossed the T about 30 minutes after the
gunplay started. The Japanese achieved a command and control “kill”
when they knocked Rozhestvensky’s Suvorov out of the fight early with
the wounded Russian commander avoiding death on his sinking ship
only by transferring to a torpedo boat. The fleet fell into the incompetent
hands of Admiral N. I. Nebogatov. Throughout the rest of the day and
the night, the Japanese pursued, sank, and captured Russian vessels,
with Nebogatov surrendering two battleships, two coastal ships, and a
cruiser on May 28. The wounded Rozhestvensky was also captured
when the vessel carrying him surrendered. Of the 38 Russian ships that
attempted passage, 34 had been scuttled, sunk, interned in foreign ports,
or captured. Only four ships escaped.50
Tsushima was among the most complete naval battles in history,
and its impact now combined with the perceptions of Russian defeat
on land, even though Russia’s strong position in Manchuria had
caused Japan to seek a diplomatic solution. Tsushima did two things:
first, it contributed to the outbreak of antiwar demonstrations and
revolution at home in Russia, powerful factors that threatened the sur-
vival of the Romanov regime itself. In turn, because of the magnitude
of the defeat, it provided an opening for both parties to end the war.
U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt offered to host peace talks at Ports-
mouth, New Hampshire, and the Russians and Japanese gladly
accepted. Russia stood firm on not paying Japan an indemnity but
grudgingly ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island in the Sea of
Okhotsk to Japan, recognition of Japan’s rights in Korea, and—most
significantly—the railroad lines in southern Manchuria and the
Liaodong concession with China. Neither side was happy with the
peace—but Russia could not win at sea, and Japan had run out of sol-
diers on land. When the results of the treaty were announced in Japan,
there was an outpouring of resentment by the people, including
rioting. Public support for increased military expenditures became

more difficult to attain, although direct resentment against its cause,
the IJA, was muted.51
* * *
The cultural impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Japan and the
world could not have been more profound. Globally, the war demon-
strated to Western nations that Japan had arrived as a great power.
Inside Japan, the result led to increased bitterness between the IJA
and the IJN over budgets instead of leading to harmony. Because of
its victory, the IJN, with Togo as its Nelson-like hero, attained co-
equal status with the IJA. Worse, inside the IJA, new cultural norms
were being established to institutionalize myths about the Japanese
soldier. A new bushido was being manufactured, deliberately, from
the old samurai ethos. It included some very unsamurai-like attrib-
utes. The idea of futile sacrifice was enshrined as noble instead of
being investigated honestly. On the death of Emperor Meiji, Nogi,
the icon for both the myth as well as an example of the worst in the
“new ethos,” emulated the samurai practice of committing ritual
suicide to follow his “lord” into the afterlife. Nogi’s suicide also fol-
lowed the tradition we have seen of the nobility of failure, although
government and army propaganda had covered up much of his fail-
ure at Port Arthur. The shrine at Yasukuni near Tokyo “became a
centerpiece of militarism” after the war, and so began the formal cel-
ebration of the spirits of those fallen in defense of the Kokutai. The
period of the Russo-Japanese War and shortly after should be
regarded as the birth of the process toward institutional brutality
and pathology that would lead to the “Rape of Nanking” and the
“Bataan Death March” in the years ahead.52
Chapter 7
The Failure of Liberalism and

the Triumph of Militarism
Japan, victorious against Russia, now went through a constitutional

crisis that seemed to resolve key civil-military problems in the Meiji
polity. However, fundamental problems remained that were exacer-
bated by two human cataclysms, one in Asia and one in Europe. The
first involved the 1911 Chinese Revolution that toppled the Qing
Dynasty, replacing it with a nominal democracy led by a president.
In reality, the “Republic” of China was a facade of modern democracy
and soon devolved into a failed state overrun with feuding warlords.
In this chaos, Japan saw further opportunity for aggrandizement at
China’s expense, just as she had in the previous century.1 The second
event became known as World War I. For Europeans, their civilization
imploded in 1914 and did not recover until the late twentieth century.
The period from 1914 to 1945 has been nicknamed the War of the
World. Japan, the United States, and China dominated the modes
and flow of this conflict in East Asia. Ironically, this conflict did not
begin in earnest until after World War I came to an end. At the center
of it all—as both the instigator of conflict and eventual victim of it—
stood the Japanese Meiji state, a polity that had not completely shed
the customs and habits of the shogun, Bakufu, and the samurai.
* * *
The Russo-Japanese War heightened the civil-military split that had

already developed before the conflict. The conduct of the war had
been a military matter, with the cabinet excluded from strategic deci-
sion making (although informal means were used). With the navy
now a co-equal, the army found it difficult to share power with its
sister service. The two services had different visions of Japan’s future.
The navy looked to a southern maritime empire on the model of Great
Britain’s. The army had a continental view of the world and looked
more to expansion in the northwest, in China and Russia. Of the two,
the army had the stronger hand because of Japan’s new military com-
mitments in Korea and Liaodong (renamed Kwantung) and along the
southern Manchurian rail line. Although much of this real estate was
not part of Japan proper after 1906, Japan’s informal empire in Asia
was the purview of the army. The two services clashed not only over
the ends of strategy, but over the means. Neither one wanted to con-
cede to the other its vision for defending the empire. The army vision
meant building a force to defend against Russia, which the IJA
expected to renew its conflict with Japan. The tsar’s government, after
limited reforms of 1905–1906, did eventually initiate a huge rearma-
ment regime (known as the Great Program) aimed at both Japan and
Germany.2
Inside the army, two different factions emerged vis-à-vis the
Russian problem. General Kodama of Port Arthur fame represented
the first faction, which emphasized rational planning, modern fire-
power, and fiscal responsibility. He supported a modest two-division
increase. Against him were the “traditionalists,” who argued that
spiritual factors “could overcome a materially superior opponent”—
despite evidence from the recent war. Yamagata and Terauchi best rep-
resented this group and advocated a radical enlargement of the army
to 50 divisions, a 50 percent increase. These factions would coalesce
over the years into two hardened cliques that battled each other and
the navy for control of military expenditures. In the short term, the
“spiritual” faction won out when Kodama died suddenly in 1906.3
As for the IJN, it did not see the Russian Army as the enemy but
rather measured itself against the most capable fleet in the Pacific—
the U.S. Navy. As if to underscore this truth, President Theodore
Roosevelt, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize for ending the
Russo-Japanese War, sent “Great White Fleet” around South America
and across the Pacific for a visit to Tokyo in the summer of 1908. His
message: His fleet was not comprised of dilapidated Russian warships
The Failure of Liberalism and the Triumph of Militarism 171
commanded by incompetents and cravens. This gave rise to a com-

mensurate Japanese naval budget that eventually came to be known
as the “eight-eight fleet plan,” a force built around eight battleships
and eight battle cruisers, a warship design introduced by the visionary
navalist Admiral “Jacky” Fisher of Great Britain.4
Japan could not afford both a big land army and a big “blue-water”
fleet, but neither service was willing to give any ground to the other.
And so it was that after the Russo-Japanese War, the IJA and IJN
turned on each other in budget battles that led to a crisis. The Taisho
Crisis (from the reign name of the new emperor) occurred shortly after
Meiji died in 1912. Problems in the civil-military relationship had
existed almost from the beginning. The Japanese governments that
ruled in the name of the emperor and worked with the Diet (parliat-
ment) to pass legislation included both war (army) and navy minis-
ters. If this portfolio, in either service, was vacated and not filled, the
government fell. In 1900, Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu had asked
the emperor to allow him to use army officers from the inactive list to
fill the war minister job, but he was refused. And his government fell.
The new government that followed, led by Yamagata, enacted legisla-
tion that essentially restricted the war minister position to active duty
officers. This had the effect of increasing the emperor ’s “right of
supreme command” under the constitution, granting him veto author-
ity over any mere “civilian” government. It institutionalized military
control over the cabinet. The only real check on this system involved
the other service—if one service disliked what the other was doing, it
could undermine the government until it got what it wanted. This
was not only a recipe for nascent militarism, it was a recipe for what
today is known as government gridlock.5
The primary political party of Japan, the Rikken Seiyukai (Friends
of Constitutional Government), had been slowly increasing in power
since 1904, and in 1907 it passed legislation that sought to bring civil-
ians back into the conduct of strategy for the state. The law passed
by the Diet allowed the prime minister to “countersign orders submit-
ted” to the emperor, but only in peacetime. This brought a strong pro-
test from Yamagata and War Minister Terauchi. They rewrote army
regulations to exclude civilians and then appealed to the emperor to
back them. And he did. In 1911, Terauchi, who had been appointed
governor-general of Korea, resigned as war minister to devote himself
to the pacification of Korea, where an insurgency had sputtered along
since the end of the Russo-Japanese War. With Terauchi gone, trouble
soon developed. Meiji’s death in the summer of 1912 as well as the

death of Terauchi’s replacement opened the war minister position.
Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi, an ally of the liberals in the Seiyukai,
picked a Satsuma officer, Uehara Yusaku, to fill the post but rejected
the IJA’s demand for two more divisions. Uehara resigned in protest
and Saionji’s government fell.6
The army then manipulated the new Taisho emperor, who had
physical and mental disabilities, to over-rule the liberals and appoint
a new war minister. The cabinet proceeded toward approving the nec-
essary budget for two new divisions. However, this victory was short
lived. The navy now pulled the same trick, with the navy minister
resigning and the active duty navy officers refusing to serve in the
army-dominated cabinet. In the streets of Japan’s cities, the IJA’s tac-
tics backfired as it lost public support for threatening Japan’s system
of constitutional government. In the meantime, Admiral Yamamoto,
who had served as navy minister during the war, brokered a compro-
mise and became the prime minister, the first naval officer to do so. He
and the new war minister, Kigoshi Yasustuna, agreed to eliminate the
proviso that Meiji had approved, and now officers from the inactive
list could serve as war minister. The IJA responded with typical insub-
ordination, moving mobilization planning and strategic and opera-
tional policy into the Imperial General Staff. This had the effect of
undermining the authority of the war minister as well as pushing stra-
tegic decision making even further down into the army bureaucracy, a
trend that eventually led to the adoption of a modern form of geko-
kujo known as disciplined initiative that would eventually take policy
out of the hands of Japan’s senior leaders. In the interim, the army lost
much of its political power by instigating this civil-military crisis.
It would not regain its prestige and influence until the 1930s.7
One might regard the army’s attempts here as a throwback to the
institution of a sort of modern Bakufu, with a thin overlay of democ-
racy. Another older institution that these incidents reflect is that of
the regent or even the retired emperor (In) systems as reflected by
esteemed “elder statesmen” in the twentieth century. These men were
known as genro (“principal elders”) and constituted an informal oli-
garchy of former samurai from the Meiji era. Yamagata, for example,
acted in the role of a genro when he supported Terauchi in 1907, as
did Yamamoto during the Taisho Crisis. The key attribute of these
men was their extremely strong influence in either the navy or the
army through the officer corps and their ability to persuade informally
by their force of character backed up by their clear exploits (such as at

Tsushima) that had benefitted Japan.8
The world went to war in the summer of 1914 after the assassina-
tion of the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by a
Bosnian nationalist in Sarajevo. The crisis accelerated, and the provi-
sos of the Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty went into effect because both
German and Austria-Hungary declared war on Great Britain. Japan’s
participation in the war would be primarily maritime, helping Britain
as a naval auxiliary to protect British overseas interests from the
Germans—especially the squadron of Admiral Graf von Spee that
was built around the German armored cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneise-
nau operating out of the German base at Qingdao on the Shandong
Peninsula (see Map 6.1). Before capturing Qingdao, the Japanese had
to neutralize von Spee. Unfortunately for the British, von Spee had
already decided in the days just before the war began to go east across
the Pacific to the South American coast, escaping the Japanese fleet
and terrorizing British sea lines. After winning a spectacular victory
at Coronel, von Spee met his own fiery end at the hands of British bat-
tle cruisers off the Falkland Islands. This event underscored the
wisdom of Japan’s construction of the four excellent battle cruisers of
the Kongo class and must have had a secondary effect on the Japanese
naval leadership, causing them to redouble their own efforts to gain
the “eight-eight” capital ship structure they held so dear.9
With von Spee out of the picture, the Japanese now proceeded
against Qingdao. They used combined ground-sea operations against
the fortress in September 1914. The six-week campaign focused on
methodical siege operations highlighting artillery and engineers. The
navy contributed to the blockade and demonstrated the first-ever
offensive use of naval aviation in the form of seaplanes from a tender
to scout and bomb the German defenses. In November, some 5,000
Germans surrendered at a cost of 1,400 Japanese casualties. In stark
contrast to the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) in later wars,
Japan took good care of these men before repatriating them to
Germany at the end of the war. Meanwhile, the western front had
bogged down, and Japan’s allies asked for over a dozen divisions for
ground operations in France. But Japan would have none of it, claim-
ing a lack of shipping for sending these troops. Japan proved a reluc-
tant ally on the naval front as well, rebuffing a British request for
capital ships by sending her naval forces east to ostensibly chase von
Spee but in fact occupying German islands in the Marianas and
Carolines. Japan’s real goal in retaining her fleet in the Pacific was too
keep watch on the navy of the neutral United States, whose possession
Guam anchored the southern end of Japan’s new possessions in the
Marianas.10
Only the success of Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare cam-
paign finally caused Japan to send forces west to help its “allies.” Of par-
ticular concern was a combined German-Austrian submarine assault in
the Mediterranean where the Allies were most deficient in escorts. Japan
sent two divisions of her most modern destroyers under Rear Admiral
Sato Kozo. These ships arrived in April 1917 and immediately began
escorting troopship convoys between Africa and France. One Japanese
destroyer was torpedoed during this campaign, but overall the Japanese
gained valuable experience in this new type of warfare and earned the
admiration of the French and British navies for their “smart” ship han-
dling. These were lessons, however, that Japan would forget in the next
war. Japan gained no direct experience of the modern land warfare to
build upon that of the Russo-Japanese War—however, the Great War
cast a very long shadow indeed, particularly for the IJA, when it came
to the kind of war Japan expected to fight in the future.11
INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA AND THE WASHINGTON NAVAL

CONFERENCE
The Great War had ended, and the victorious powers included the
Japanese. Yet the Japanese had not been full partners in the war in
the view of the West. Despite their having entered the war at the outset
in 1914, Japan’s armies had contributed almost nothing to the Allied
cause in Europe. This secondary position in the ranks of the victors
had much to do with the “blood tax” the major powers had paid—
the Americans, entering the war three years after Japan, had suffered
the highest casualties in U.S. history during the Meuse-Argonne
Offensive. Nothing illustrates better Japan’s role than her absence at
the dedication of the Liberty Memorial in Kansas City, Missouri, in
the United States on November 1, 1921. Present in Kansas City were
supreme Allied commanders and Great War veterans from the United
States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy. Later that same
month—ironically—the major naval powers of the world met—at
the invitation of the United States—in Washington, DC, to inaugurate
the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments.
To understand the irony, one must return to the end of the Great
War and the Japanese and U.S. intervention in the Russian Civil War
in Siberia and Japan’s high-handed actions in China after that nation’s
1911 revolution. These factors created a now-forgotten “war scare”
between the United States and Japan from 1919 until the Washington
Conference in November 1921.12 Recall that Germany had made over-
tures to Japan in her diplomatic maneuverings against the United
States prior U.S. entry into the war. Recently declassified correspon-
dence from the period emphasizes that even after the United States
entered the war against Germany, her Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) seemed more concerned about a “stab in the back” by the
Japanese. The ONI actively spied on U.S. citizens of Japanese descent
both at home and abroad.13
World War I served as a backdrop for two trends in Japanese for-
eign policy related to military matters and, as usual, these tended to
divide into two spheres—naval-related concerns versus army con-
cerns. The capture of Qingdao opened the door for Japan to expand
upon her Chinese encroachments in Korea and Manchuria by adding
Qingdao and the German Shandong concession to her empire. The
result was that Japan became the main troublemaker vis-à-vis China.
Due to the ongoing revolution in China, a cold and hot war began
between Japan and various entities in China, a conflict that lasted until
1945. With Europe distracted by the cataclysm in the West, Japan
moved to fill the void in Asia. In 1915, Tokyo levied the infamous
“Twenty-One Demands” on the Chinese government, which gave
Japan virtually unchallenged sovereignty and commercial rights
throughout China and turned parts of China into a Japanese depen-
dency in the manner of Korea. The Chinese government’s craven
response led to a series of protests and anti-Japanese sentiment that
caused Japanese Army to adopt a paranoid attitude toward any
Chinese nationalism. The international community protested, espe-
cially the United States, whose Open Door policy this action most
affected. The Japanese government fell after it backtracked from these
demands. The 21 demands mark the beginning of the IJA’s policy of
expansion in Manchuria and North China.14
For strategists in the IJA, World War I suggested that future wars
would be total wars requiring absolute control of one’s own resources,
a concept known as autarky. The course of the Russo-Japanese War also
emphasized this apparent truth. For the officers of the IJA, autarky
could be obtained only by military means. The resources of Asia,
therefore, must be acquired for a future total war—but against who?

The new Soviet Union loomed large for the IJA’s officer corps; after
all, it seemed clear that Russia would someday try to exact revenge
for her humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Consequently,
the army’s policies focused on preparing for total war against Russia
by using the resources of Japan and those of a compliant China. This
could be done only by controlling China and Manchuria (indirectly
at first, though eventually the IJA would come to the “truth” that only
direct military control provided the security Japan needed in terms of
access to resources). The two factions discussed earlier evolved in
their thinking about how to achieve these ends. The followers of
Yamagata and Terauchi focused on manpower and spiritual factors
as the way to achieve Japanese ends, and these officers eventually
solidified into a faction known as the Kodo-ha (“Imperial Way”). The
other faction—including Tanaka Giichi, Tojo Hideki, and the
German-educated Ishiwara Kanji—focused on rational planning and
military control of national resources. They emphasized that the recent
World War meant advanced technology such as airplanes, tanks, gas,
and artillery must underwrite the new total war army. Like the
Germans, they relied staff planning and firepower to level the playing
field in future conflicts and became known as the Tosei-ha (“Control
Group”). Both factions’ visions meant a large budget for the IJA, either
for new modern equipment or for large numbers of men.15
Russia and Japan briefly became allies in 1914, but the October
Revolution in November 1917 brought into power the Bolsheviks under
V. I. Lenin, who posed a clear ideological threat to Japan’s imperialist
policies in China. Soon, anti colonialist Chinese were traveling to
Moscow (including Chiang Kai-shek) to be trained to take the
revolution—and Chinese nationalism—back home to challenge Japan.
Meanwhile, Japan—along with her other uneasy ally, the United
States—had been supplying both the tsarist and provisional govern-
ments in Russia with war materials through Vladivostok to keep Russia
in the war against Germany. Great Britain proposed that the Allies inter-
vene in Russia, ostensibly to keep these war materials from falling into
the hands of the Germans, but really as a means to battle the Bolsheviks.
Both the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to provide forces for the
intervention. President Woodrow Wilson announced this intention in
July 1918, with one force going to the Russian port of Archangel in
Europe and the other going to Vladivostok (see Map 6.1), although he
ordered U.S. troops to remain strictly neutral.16
Japan had bigger plans for the intervention in Siberia. It had already
intervened briefly in December 1917 with troops to restore order in
Vladivostok. The IJA saw the chance to set up a Siberian buffer zone
and in February established a secret committee that served as a hid-
den general staff to plan for an expedition into Siberia. With Britain
leading the way, the Allies began serious talks about intervening after
the Soviet government and the Germans signed a peace treaty in
March 1918 at Brest-Litovsk. Japan used this opportunity to offer
troops for the Siberian intervention and in April, Japanese naval
infantry landed at Vladivostok, ostensibly to keep the depots of war
material there from falling into German hands. The United States,
meanwhile, proposed a joint U.S.-Japanese force of 7,000 troops with
the narrow mission of securing the war materials, although a secon-
dary mission of aiding the stranded Czech Legion existed. This force
was made up of over 30,000 Czech POWs who went over to the Allies
and had refused to disarm when the Germans and Bolsheviks made
peace. The Japanese cabinet and emperor approved the intervention
in August; however, the Japanese Army sent far more troops than
agreed. This was at odds with Japanese political leaders, including
the Seiyukai chief Hara Kei and some in the navy. Eventually, the
American expedition, under the command of Major General William
Graves, totaled 10,000 troops while Japan agreed to a force level of
12,000—three times the original size proposed for the intervention.
The Japanese also got agreement that if they needed to reinforce their
contingent due to emergent needs west of Vladivostok, they could.17
The Japanese landed the 12th Division in Vladivostok on August 18,
and two more divisions followed shortly thereafter. The army staff
soon sent these forces to Siberia and began operating deep into Russia
along the Trans-Siberian railroad as far as Lake Baikal. Problems arose
almost immediately between the two “allies.” Graves, operating on
the understanding of strict neutrality, refused to subordinate himself
to the Japanese commander, General Otani Kikuzo. The Japanese
troops, on the other hand, openly aided the anti communist
government in Siberia, led by Admiral Alexander Kolchak, in its con-
flict with the Bolsheviks. Kolchak, ironically, had fought against the
Japanese at Port Arthur! The communists conducted a guerilla war
along the main river and rail lines of communication against Kolchak,
the Japanese, and the Americans. The Japanese found themselves
drawn into a quagmire and on the wrong side. Graves’s chief
complaint against Kolchak and the Japanese was their alienation
of the very population whose support they needed against the

communists.18
The Japanese Army reinforced failure in Siberia and continued to
use the loophole about additional troops until it had almost 70,000
troops deployed by late October 1918. The end of World War I that
November did not bring an end to this messy war in Siberia. Both
the Americans and Japanese became increasingly involved in counter
guerilla operations and by the spring of 1919, it seemed clear that the
Kolchak government could not sustain itself without Allied support.
That summer, after a vicious attack on a U.S. garrison near the Suchan
mining district, the Japanese, Americans, and Whites teamed up to
conduct a coordinated anti partisan sweep of that area. They managed
to kill over 500 communist guerillas, but the victory was Pyrrhic
because popular support was further eroded. In November, Kolchak’s
main army was crushed, and the Red Army captured his capital at
Omsk. The Americans slowly began to extricate themselves, remain-
ing long enough to cover the Czech Legion’s withdrawal, so that by
June 1920 the last American troops had left. The Japanese stubbornly
continued the intervention, despite clear unhappiness in Japan over
declining prices of exports, rice shortages, and inflation. Terauchi
was forced to resign as prime minister in September 1918 due to the
rice riots and was replaced by Hara Kei. Hara appointed one of the
advocates for the Siberian buffer state idea, Tanaka Giichi, as war min-
ister. Tanaka went on to become a member of Hara’s Seiyukai party,
and his service as the war minister who inherited the Siberian quag-
mire would moderate his views as he became a key member of the
Control faction.19
The year 1919 yielded victory after victory for the communists,
causing the Imperial General Staff (IGS) to request an increase of
Japanese troop levels to 250,000 to prop up its failed position in
Siberia. The finance minister rejected this request out of hand, and a
request to the Americans to send more troops was met by U.S. with-
drawal. In one last spasm of violence, the Japanese decided instead
to “cow” the virus of communism closest to their protectorate in Korea
by conducting a vicious campaign against “guerillas” near the conflu-
ence of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in early 1920. The pretext for this
attack on local Koreans was a massacre of Japanese civilians in the
town of Nikolaevsk in May 1920. This turned out to be the last major
IJA operation during this self-destructive intervention and pointed
ahead to the IJA’s tendency to lose its discipline and humanity in
circumstances of stalemate and military defeat. Nonetheless,

even though defeat was clear in 1920 and Hara was assassinated in
November 1921, the intervention dragged on until late 1922 when
the last Japanese troops finally came home.20
With the end of the Russian intervention, the army found itself
weaker than it had been since the creation of the Meiji state—its public
image was tarnished, its political opponents were in power, and the
navy had gained in prestige at its expense. Additionally, it had now
earned for itself and the Japanese nation the animosity of the radical
communist state that had taken over the Russian Empire, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In the minds of IJA leaders, the
threat of Soviet belligerence and expansion at the expense of Japan in
Asia remained.
With all of this in mind, it is now time to turn to the issue of the
navy. To understand the navy’s position, we must return to the policy
of building the eight-eight fleet. The chief advocate of this policy was
Togo’s brilliant chief of staff Admiral Kato Tomosaburo, whose family
came from Hiroshima. After commanding the Combined Fleet, Kato
became Japan’s navy minister in 1915 and remained in this powerful
position until after the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty—his
crowning achievement—in 1922. The pursuit of the eight-eight plan
put Tokyo into the front ranks as a naval power and, with the eclipse
of Germany, gave Japan the third most powerful navy in the world.
Unfortunately, Japan’s naval expansion stimulated a naval arms race
with the United States. The Wilson administration responded to
Japan’s construction program and to Britain’s actions vis-à-vis neutral
shipping with the passage of the 1916 Navy Act, a huge naval
expenditure that—if executed—would have given the United States
the largest fleet in the world and bankrupted both Japan and Britain
had the they tried to keep pace. By 1917, the United States was the
IJN’s enemy for budgetary reasons according to Kato’s justifications
to the cabinet. The Germans had tried to leverage U.S.-Japanese ani-
mosity in their catastrophic attempt to get both Japan and Mexico to
join them in a war against the United States exposed by the British in
their release of the infamous “Zimmerman Telegram.” Tensions
between the two nations were only temporarily dampened after
America’s entry into the war.21
In 1918, Kato participated in the formal process of the Revision of
Imperial Defense being conducted as a response to World War I with
Vice Minister of War Tanaka Giichi as the army’s proponent for the
redrafting. The completed revision predicted that the most likely occa-
sion for a future war would be a coalition of the United States, Russia
(later the Soviet Union), and China. Japan would fight all three and in
the process establish its dominance over China, carve out a buffer state
in Russia, and eliminate the U.S. threat by capturing the Philippines.
To accomplish this, the army and navy essentially would have their
own spheres of influence. The army would be the primary service to
accomplish the continental tasks against China and Russia while the
navy conquered the Philippines with minimal army support and
defeated the U.S. Navy if it attempted to an expedition to recapture
its lost territories. Guam, a huge thorn in Japan’s side, would be
gobbled up as well and added to Japan’s newly acquired territory in
the Marianas Islands. For the army to do this, it needed to modernize
along the lines proposed by enlightened officers such as Tanaka of
the Control faction. Similarly, the navy would have to complete the
eight-eight plan and any follow-on naval construction to account for a
U.S. response. This was a recipe for a budget disaster. Instead of
resolving the issues by changing strategy or focusing on fewer ene-
mies, the navy and the army for once aligned, with Hara’s support,
agreeing in 1920 to complete the naval portion of the plan by 1927
and after that to make the army the budgetary priority. Both Tanaka
and Hara stimulated intense resentment against themselves among
right-wing nationalists and with the Yamagata-Terauchi faction for
this compromise, despite Tanaka’s imperialistic plan for Japanese
expansion.22
In 1919, Kato Tomosaburo had a change of heart about the navy’s
strategy. He realized that the naval arms race had become ruinous
for Japan and that naval expenditures needed to underwrite the strat-
egy were not sustainable. This occurred during the aforementioned
war scare between Japan and the United States from 1919 to 1921.
Relations between the United States and Japan had been strained for
a long time, principally over the issue of Japan’s policies in China.
Racial policies in the United States that restricted both Japanese immi-
gration as well as virtual apartheid for Japanese American citizens in
the western states also exacerbated tensions. The U.S. Navy’s General
Board, its de facto strategic general staff, fiercely argued for an expan-
sion of fortification of U.S. bases in Guam and the Philippines, in part
because the United States had broken Japan’s diplomatic codes and
was reading her high-level traffic.23 Kato, in an astonishing reversal
of thinking for a high-ranking, highly esteemed officer, decided on a
completely different strategic approach for Japan’s national defense.

The navy’s battles with the army and problems with the army and
the civilian administrations had convinced Kato that only a civil-
military paradigm change could keep Japan from conflict with the
United States and destruction of constitutional government at home.
In planning for a possible war with the United States, he realized the
paradox that it would most likely be a protracted war and concluded
that Japan could not win such a war in any conventional sense due
to the opponent’s size, distance, and resources. He and his fellow
moderates in the navy were further influenced by the U.S. intention,
made clear at the Versailles peace talks after World War I, to force
Great Britain to abandon the Anglo-Japanese Naval Alliance. Kato des-
perately needed an occasion to both defuse tensions with Washington
and solve the problem of the naval arms race.24
In 1921, a new U.S. administration entered office committed to
reducing naval expenditures. The U.S. government invited the major
naval powers to a naval arms limitation conference to be held in
Washington, DC’s, Constitution Hall in November 1921. This offered
Kato his opportunity to underwrite a new strategy for the navy and
Japan. Prime Minister Hara had been assassinated on November 4 by a
right-wing student and, although it is difficult to say with certainty, the
impact of the assassination and change of government must have
also influenced Kato’s subsequent behavior and resolve as the senior
Japanese official and head of its delegation. President Warren Harding
and Secretary of State C. E. Hughes welcomed the delegates of the major
(and some minor) powers to the conference with great fanfare on
November 12. Hughes stunned the assembled delegates on the first
day with a naval arms limitation proposal that reduced the battleship
fleets of the United States and Great Britain to a maximum of approxi-
mately 535,000 tons and Japan’s 40 percent lower than that (300,000 tons).
He then outlined specifics, including a building “holiday” for battle-
ships and battle cruisers and ratios of 5:5:3 for aircraft carriers as well.
By the time he was finished, the entire hall was filled with cheering del-
egates.25 For Kato, it was just the occasion he needed. He decided to
accept the American proposal if he could get an American promise
to agree to the status quo on its fortifications in the western Pacific
(Guam and the Philippines). Kato’s skill in suppressing dissent within
his delegation was masterful. His chief opponent was the Navy Gen-
eral Staff representative Admiral Kato Kanji. Kanji argued that
Japan’s agreement to Hughes’s proposal would threaten her very
existence and tried to sway the new government against the senior
Kato. However, Kato, still serving as navy minister, used Captain
Nomura Kichisaburo to deliver his position to his mentor and friend
Admiral Togo, Japan’s most venerated genro. Togo, with Nomura’s
help, squelched all opposition to the treaty in Japan.26
Japan also signed a Four Power Pact between Japan, France, Great
Britain, and the United States that replaced the Anglo-Japanese alli-
ance as well as another key treaty between nine of the powers with
respect to each others’ rights in China (the Nine-Power Pact). These
last two treaties paled in importance to the Naval Treaty. All con-
cerned achieved an end to the expensive naval arms race and a 10-year
reprieve on building any new battleships. The United States achieved
its goal of numerical superiority over the Japanese and parity with
Great Britain in capital ships and aircraft carriers, while Great Britain
avoided a position of inferiority and was positioned for further sav-
ings and good relations with the United States. Japan was elevated to
the rank of the second-most powerful fleet in the world while, with
the status quo on fortifications, remaining theoretically at parity with
the United States in the western Pacific.27
Kato returned to Japan a hero of sorts but now faced the difficult
task of implementing the provisions of the treaty. His program con-
tained three key elements. His first job was to execute the provisions
within the Japanese Navy. Due to his charisma and proven record,
he became the de facto founder and leader of what came to be known
as the Treaty faction of the IJN. These officers typically served in the
Naval Ministry and supported moderate policies. Kato wanted to
transform the naval officer corps into a culture that submitted to civil-
ian control. This contrasted to the actions of Kato Kanji in Washington
or even Yamamoto Gombei during the earlier Taisho Crisis. Kato
Tomosaburo advocated that true civilians, such as Hara Kei, should
be eligible to serve as navy ministers. He realized that only Togo’s
strong support had allowed him to override the hardliners inside the
Naval General Staff and their opposition to Japan’s acceptance of the
inferior capital ship ratio.28
Kato believed that Japan’s future lay in a positive relationship with
the United States, and he therefore wanted to revisit the national
defense policy after the conference and focus on the goal of “avoid-
ance of war with America.” In June, due to his immense prestige, Kato
was appointed prime minister while remaining navy minister for
another year and holding both portfolios. He seemed well positioned
at the head of the nation’s government to achieve his goals, but in the
end he only partially achieved his first goal. In railroading the treaty’s
approval, he had earned the lasting enmity of Kato Kanji and his allies
in the Naval General Staff. On the day that the treaty was formally
approved by the government, Kanji had tears in his eyes and
exclaimed, “As far as I am concerned, war with America starts now.
We’ll get our revenge, by God.”29 Shrinkage of the navy led to person-
nel cutbacks, including among young officers and cadets that led
some of these to become dangerous radicals bent on achieving
revenge for the elder Kato’s “betrayal” of the emperor. Ultimately,
Kato Kanji achieved his goal because of Kato Tomosaburo’s untimely
death due to the strains of Washington, governance, and the Great
1923 Tokyo earthquake. Although his followers in the Treaty faction
continued to influence policy in the years to come, ultimately the
death of their leader undermined their position. The 1923 Imperial
Defense policy, adopted shortly before Kato’s death, rejected rap-
prochement with the United States and instead looked to “inevitable
war.” Kanji eventually headed the Naval General Staff and turned all
of his efforts toward building every last ton of naval shipping that Japan
was allowed while purging moderates when he could. His faction
became known as the Fleet faction, and their ascendancy began shortly
after the elder Kato died. It is hard to say what Kato might have
achieved had he lived longer, perhaps even the avoidance of the dark
road that led to Pearl Harbor. A statue to him in his naval uniform in
Hiroshima was melted down during the war for munitions; recently,
a new statue of Kato in the civilian garb he wore at Washington in
1921–1922 was erected, again, at Hiroshima.30
A TROUBLED PEACE
The 1920s and period of Taisho democracy were the low point for
the Japanese services. The army felt isolated from society and inside
the navy, the revolt against the Washington Treaty system and the leg-
acy of Kato Tomosaburo grew. However, Japan—as member of the
League of Nations—continued to pay lip service to peace, signing
(along with over 60 other nations) the Kellogg-Briand Pact that out-
lawed war as a tool of foreign policy. This diplomatic “achievement”
was belied by the breakdown in 1927 of a naval arms conference in
Geneva with the United States and Britain. Concurrently, Chiang
Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition caused Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi
to make several attempts to intervene to prevent Chiang from uniting

the country under Chiang’s nationalist party, the Guomindang
(GMD). Japanese officers of the Kwantung Army, exercising
“disciplined initiative,” had successfully assassinated the warlord of
Manchuria, Marshal Zhang Zoulin (Chang Tso-Lin), the same year as
the Kellogg-Briand Pact due to his support of Chiang and the GMD.
Tanaka attempted to discipline the army, but it fought back and
covered up the whole nefarious affair, classifying it as a state secret.
As expected, this only heightened tensions between Tanaka’s Control
faction and the Imperial Way faction led by General Araki Sadao.31
In December 1926, upon the death of the emperor, Meiji’s grandson
Hirohito ascended to the throne at the age of 25. Hirohito remains an
enigmatic and controversial figure. He lived until 1989 and according
to one of his biographers, he deliberately obscured the negative
aspects of his legacy. Hirohito was no mere figurehead, and his
apprenticeship as Japan’s overall warlord would be tumultuous. His
right of supreme command was both divinely and constitutionally
sanctioned. At key moments, in 1928 and 1936, he would be asked to
actively participate in events related to disciplining the army. He
would not do so in 1928 but would in 1936. Also, in 1930, he supported
the London Naval Treaty—an act of moral courage—but he must have
noted, too, the violent reaction against it as a potential threat to his
throne. He was more like his illustrious grandfather than his feeble-
minded father and was tutored by one of the last of the Meiji genro,
Prince Saionji Kinmochi. Like Meiji, he maintained his imperial dis-
tance when it served his image. Unlike Meiji, his reign did not preside
over expansion, victory, and glory in its first 30 years, but instead he
saw his empire dragged into catastrophic defeat. But, also like Meiji,
he would preside over a rejuvenated and prosperous Japanese state.
Perhaps his only real goal was to prevent the extinction of the imperial
institution—in this he was to prove successful against fearsome
odds. If survival is the ultimate measure of a supreme warlord, then
Hirohito proved one of the most durable.32
As the prosperous 1920s gave way to worldwide depression, mili-
tant elements inside Japan began to undermine the basis for peace in
the Far East. Outright mutiny broke out in Japan against the signing
of a second naval treaty in London in 1930, which limited auxiliary
warships to inferior ratios vis-a-vis the Americans, especially heavy
cruisers that Japanese naval doctrine considered essential to defeating
the U.S. Navy. Despite a compromise, the treaty was openly criticized
by the Japanese Navy and by extremists in the army. A series of politi-

cal assassinations followed, including a failed attempt that wounded
Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi, who had convinced Hirohito to
support the treaty and military spending cuts. However, the principal
result of the London Treaty was to put the Fleet faction in control of
naval policy. Up until this point, U.S. presidents, despite the pleas of
their general board to build to treaty limits, failed to build the war-
ships allowed by the Washington Treaty. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy
had fallen behind the Japanese, and it is ironic that even after this
treaty, the United States continued to fall behind the Japanese and
would have continued to do so had Japan not become the first open
violator of the collective security systems put in place after World
War I. The Japanese Army would cause a change in U.S. attitudes that
caused the Americans to build ships again.33
After the fury of the outburst against the London Naval Treaty
in 1930, Japan stood deeply divided and in the throes of the world-
wide Depression. Right-wing extremists found sympathetic ears
for their messages of imperial expansion and strident nationalism.
A Lieutenant-Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro organized the reactionary
Cherry Society (Sakura-kai) after the Hamaguchi cuts and London
Treaty ratification. This group was committed to establishing a
Bakufu-type government dominated by the military (preferably the
army). Both the army and the navy were internally divided into bitter
opposing factions and in opposition to each other over lean defense
budgets. Their only common ground seemed to be agreement on the
continued exploitation of China. The Kwantung Army (KTA), which
guarded Japanese interests along the Manchurian railroad, had
already been disciplined once in 1928 by Prime Minister Tanaka for
attempting to expand its prerogatives in Manchuria and North China.
In 1928, Lieutenant-Colonel Ishiwara Kanji reported as its operations
officer. Ishiwara’s vision of the future aligned with the Control faction,
and he strongly believed that Manchuria’s rich resources in coal and
iron should be under complete Japanese control for the future wars
with China and the Soviet Union. However, Ishiwara differed from
other Japanese officers in believing that the West, led by the United
States, was the ultimate enemy, and so he espoused a slow cautious
policy of conquest, retrenchment, and development to take Japan
steadily toward autarky and hegemony in Asia. He saw these as the
essential precursors for the final showdown with the United States.
His focus on the United States was almost entirely of a religious
nature, and his lack of curiosity about the United States lay in stark
contrast to naval officers such as Yamamoto Isoruku, who had lived
in the United States and seen its vast resources and wealth. Ishiwara
dismissed critics of his lack of interest about America saying, “. . . the
only occasion on which I plan to visit the United States is when I arrive
there as chief of the Japanese forces of occupation.”34
In 1929, Ishiwara had his planning section of the KTA do the neces-
sary staff work for railway timetables and routes to rapidly occupy
Manchuria. He then took them, dressed as civilians, on a “staff ride”
on the projected rail lines around Manchuria, ostensibly as tourists,
collecting intelligence and checking actual timetables against his plan.
In this manner, he had the plan ready to execute should he gain appro-
val from his commander to invade and neutralize the forces of Zhang
Zoulin’s son, who governed Manchuria for the Nationalists.35 The
opportunity to execute this plan occurred the following year. Engi-
neering an explosion near the Japanese garrison at Mukden along the
railroad and blaming it on the Chinese, Ishiwara convinced his new
commanding officer, General Honjo Shigeru, to aggressively execute
his plan without consulting Tokyo—the most infamous use of geko-
kujo/field initiative in Japanese military history. Ishiwara and his
plotters had also convinced the commander of the Korean Army to
send reinforcements if the need arose. Using a force slightly larger
than a division, Ishiwara exercised operational command and then
instigated and flew along with the brutal bombing raid against the
Manchurian city of Jinchou (Chinchou), despite the express orders of
both the prime minister and the emperor not to attack the city. The
Chinese commander Zhang Xueliang, following the orders of Chiang
Kai-shek to preserve his forces, did not offer serious resistance and
abandoned Manchuria, crossing over into North China. By early
1932, the Japanese had added Manchuria to their empire, renaming it
Manchukuo and installing the last Qing emperor Pu Yi as a puppet.36
While Ishiwara and the KTA conquered Manchuria, senior army
officers discovered a plot by Hashimoto and his Cherry Blossom reac-
tionaries to seize the government and install General Araki as prime
minister in October 1931. These generals had Hashimoto and his con-
spirators arrested in the so-called October Incident, but the light pun-
ishments for the perpetrators encouraged rather than discouraged
gekokujo. Meanwhile, the government faced the dilemma of either
renouncing the army’s no less insubordinate operations in Manchuria
or underwriting them. Upon the advice of army leaders, who argued
that pulling back would undermine army morale, the government and
the emperor reluctantly approved the conquest. The international
impact had serious consequences. The League of Nations condemned
Japan for her aggressive actions and demanded she withdraw her
forces from Manchuria. In response, her delegation walked out, and
she withdrew from the League in 1933. On the American front, Secre-
tary of State Henry Stimson declared that the United States would not
recognize Manchukuo, and most of the rest of the world followed suit.
The election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) in 1932 brought
a new spirit regarding naval construction, and American politicians
began to take concrete steps to build up American naval power.
Roosevelt gained passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act that
gave $240 million to the Navy for construction as a means of provid-
ing much needed jobs during the Depression. In 1934, stimulated by
Japanese aggression and withdrawal from the League, the U.S.
Congress passed the first Vinson-Trammel naval construction bill,
which committed the United States to building up to its treaty limits
over the next 10 years. Japan responded by giving the required two
years notification of her withdrawal from the treaty system. These
events ushered in a new naval arms race in the Pacific.37
In China, the consequences of the conquest of Manchuria led to fur-
ther conflict. In early 1932, the Chinese—in reaction to Manchuria—
imposed a boycott on Japanese goods, and there were anti-Japanese
demonstrations and riots, especially in Shanghai. The Japanese Army
secretly fomented an incident that caused the Chinese to attack
Japanese “civilians,” and the Japanese Navy responded to pleas from
the large local Japanese community for protection, deploying its naval
infantry against Chinese rioters and troops. The navy found itself
completely outclassed against the veteran GMD troops and had to call
in the army for help. The army sent in its 9th Division, which the
Chinese also manhandled. The Chinese bloodily repelled the unimagi-
native IJA frontal assaults against their entrenchments. Eventually,
the IJA had to deploy an entire expeditionary force under General
Shirakawa Yoshinori, a Control faction general and protégé of Tanaka.
Shirakawa had orders to end the faltering campaign soon and to
restrict his operations accordingly. He landed north of the city, out-
flanked the defenders, and quickly ejected them from the city in
March. By May 1932, a cease-fire had been signed with the Chinese.
The Japanese incurred about 3,000 casualties and the Chinese about
four times as many, but the operations had been plagued by poor
decisions and incompetence, and they worsened relations with China

and the international community. During the operations, Japanese
naval aircraft flying from the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho had been
used in an offensive role for the first time. In the north the IJA, again
acting on its own initiative to relieve the pressure on Shanghai, over-
ran the North China province of Jehol, where it established another
buffer zone. This action brought Japanese and Chinese troops into
uneasy contact and low level combat along the Great Wall and at the
key Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing.38
Two incidents coming out of the First Shanghai Incident highlight
the development of the “pseudo-Bushido” ethos of the Japanese
military in the 1930s. The first incident involved orders to Japanese
troops to storm a strong Chinese position regardless of casualties.
Three Japanese soldiers converted themselves into what today are
called human-delivered improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and then
blew themselves up in the assault. They were celebrated as national
heroes for their suicidal sacrifice and the corresponding message that
suicide was a suitable tactic for imperial soldiers. In another incident,
a Japanese officer and his unit were surrounded, and he wisely surren-
dered to avoid further losses. When he was repatriated to Japan, he
was brought up on charges of violating instructions to Japanese troops
to “fight to the last” and hounded until he committed suicide. This
incident also reinforced the new norms of “no surrender” later codi-
fied in the Senjin kun (Code of Battlefield Conduct) and of committing
suicide instead of surrendering. Japan’s military had created a
modern culture of death that had little to do with the ancient bushido
code and instead celebrated the ethos that the only proper place for
the warriors of the emperor to die was on the battlefield.39
Shortly after the messy resolution of the Shanghai Incident, there
was another coup attempt by Japanese militarists. Eleven young naval
officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi on May 15, 1932,
as a part of an attempt to seize the emperor and conduct a “Showa
Restoration.” Tsuyoshi had supported the acquisition of Manchuria
and opposed the London Naval Treaty, but he had outraged the young
officers and ultra nationalists by negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek to
end the Shanghai Incident. Although the coup failed and the conspir-
ators were arrested, it was another step along the road toward milita-
rism during the period. Unlike during the 1920s, the economic
situation in Japan was bad enough that more average Japanese sup-
ported these violent outbursts—and felt pride in easy conquests such
as Manchuria. This incident also served to educate the reactionaries

about the need to use significant military force to seize power in addi-
tion to assassination. The war minister at the time, General Araki, was
encouraged to resign due to his strong criticism of party-style
government. Araki ignored these calls and continued to establish reg-
ulations and institutions that supported the growing militarism in the
army. In July 1933, he encouraged the establishment of sword foundry
near the Yasukuni Shrine and began churning out swords for the new
samurai. In 1934, he changed the uniform regulation to require com-
pany grade officers to wear these new swords—modeled from the
swords of the Kamakura Bakufu. Many of the “samurai” swords treas-
ured by Americans in World War II would be these twentieth-century
imitations of the real thing.40
After the establishment of the Manchukuo regime, Ishiwara and his
successors continued a policy that created buffer zones between the
areas the IJA controlled and those territories held by the Chinese,
and later Soviets. The old problem of how much buffer is enough
highlights the process that led to war in 1937.41 North China seemed
an ideal location to establish a buffer area. This was because the area
had been in a constant state of war for much of the period since the
Qing Dynasty had collapsed. World War I–style battles between war-
lord armies had taken place there in the 1920s followed soon thereafter
by Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition from 1926 to 1928. It was
the nominal unification of China under Chiang and his military oper-
ations against the warlord Zhang Zoulin that caused Japan’s aggres-
sion against Manchuria in the first place. With the zone around
Beijing still warlord-controlled, the area’s rugged terrain (encompass-
ing the eastern end of the Great Wall) was ideal for Japanese ambi-
tions. The IJA tried to influence events by supporting “local
governments” in opposition to Chiang. Agreements made with local
Mongolian and North Chinese warlords in June 1935 by the IJA effec-
tively excluded the GMD from these areas. The Nationalists were
unwilling to accept this state of affairs, and a period of tense negotia-
tions ensued. These efforts ran afoul of the militarists, who “squashed”
a cabinet proposal for Chiang to obtain these provinces in exchange for
recognition of Manchukuo.42 At the same time, on the navy front, any
hope for further naval limitation ended when Yamamoto Isoruku pulled
the navy’s delegation out of the second London Naval Conference in
1936 due to the British and the Americans rejecting Japan’s demand for
naval parity.43
In China, negotiations with Chiang officially ended on the New

Year (1936), and the Imperial General Staff proposed a policy of “wait
and see,” hoping that Chiang would accept a modus vivendi and
agree to align with Japan. These hopes were underpinned by Chiang’s
anticommunism and his having finally expelled the Chinese Commu-
nists from their sanctuaries in the south. The IJA sincerely desired a
united front against the Soviets but underestimated Chiang’s tenacity
vis-à-vis occupied Chinese territory. The IJA also continued to use
methods that had worked well with the warlords in the past: bribery,
infiltration of the GMD with pro-Japanese agents, and propaganda
touting economic improvements in Manchukuo with benevolent
Japanese assistance. To these ends, Japan established the Committee
on the Current Situation, which was composed of members from the
Foreign, Naval, War, and Finance Ministries—including active duty
army and navy officers. The immediate effect on the ground in North
China was the removal of control of Japanese troops there from the
Kwantung Army (KTA) and the creation of a new North China Army
(NCA) under the command of General Tashiro Kanichiro. However,
this unit’s standing guidance was to avoid conflict and let time work
to achieve Japanese goals. The committee also adopted a “Mongolia
for Mongolians” policy that would eventually lead to undeclared
war with the Soviet Union in 1939.44
While these events took place in North China, the bickering
between Japanese factions broke out into the most serious rebellion
against the modern Japanese state since that of Saigo Takimori in the
Meiji era. As seen, serious differences had broken out between the
two IJA factions in the first half of the 1930s. In 1935, after General
Mazaki Jinzaburo was forced from his position by a closed session of
the Supreme War Council, an allied faction of the Imperial Way
known as the “young officers” decided to try and seize power and
force the emperor to install Mazaki as prime minister. In the mean-
time, one of their members assassinated General Nagata Tetsuzan,
the leader of the Control faction, with a samurai sword. It was during
the January 1936 trial of this officer that his young co-conspirators
decided to press ahead with an armed coup. Over two dozen junior
officers and about 1,400 of their troops launched the coup on Febru-
ary 26. Most of the troops were from the 1st Division, which was
slated to deploy to Manchuria in the near future. They planned to
assassinate key leaders, including the prime minister, three former
prime ministers, two admirals, and others they deemed “disloyal.”45
The government in Tokyo was frozen for several days after these
troops seized a few government buildings. They murdered the leader
of the navy’s Treaty faction, Admiral Saito, the army inspector general,
and the brother-in-law of the prime minister while seriously wound-
ing Admiral Suzuki. Most of these victims’ “crimes” had been support
for the London Naval Treaty or their role in the dismissal of Mazaki.
The shocked young emperor called out loyal troops and ordered the
rebellious troops back to their barracks. This they did peacefully four
days after the revolt started. Because of the strict Japanese regulations
that directed them to obey the orders of officers, the enlisted troops
and their NCOs were only lightly disciplined. The officers were not
so fortunate, and 13 of them as well as four civilian extremists were
court-martialed and shot. Nagata’s murderer, too, was retried and
shot. Mazaki was also court martialed but acquitted. Order had been
restored by the decisiveness of the emperor and the loyalty of the bulk
of the army—a process that would recur again at an even more critical
juncture nine years later in August 1945.46
The collapse of the Young Officer ’s Revolt (also known as the
February 26 Incident) saw the end of the Imperial Way faction’s
attempt to dominate the army. But its impact went beyond simply
one faction in the IJA winning out over another. The activities of these
ultranationalists and militarists in the 1930s had polarized Japanese
society and moved it to the right while at the same time pushing
the entire military (both army and navy) into more extreme positions
on a variety of issues, especially China. The navy’s Treaty faction, a
major target of the militarists, clearly lost more ground to the officers
of the Fleet faction, although the navy lost influence overall in the
development of policy to the army.
* * *
The 1936 military coup attempt followed the pattern of the “nobility of
failure” theme that has run throughout Japanese history. However, it
differed in one important aspect—it succeeded in putting the Japanese
Army in overall control of Japan’s foreign policy, especially with
regard to China. The tradition of field initiative had become a solid
part of this equation—so much so that policy was driven as much
from the “bottom up” as it was by the Control faction from the “top
down.” It was this bottom-up process that finally provided the tipping
point for a general war in Asia between Japan and the various
bickering Chinese factions—nationalists, communists, and warlords.

In addition, a proxy financial and economic conflict with the United
States slowly increased in intensity.
As for the Japanese Navy, war in China tilted the balance to the
army in national policy. Once troops become engaged in major combat
operations on the continent, lost blood and treasure had a way of
making all other considerations secondary. Remember, too, that for
Japanese officers of the Control faction, the subjugation and incorpora-
tion of China into Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
was not the end but rather the means for the final confrontation with
the real threat—Stalin’s regime in the Soviet Union. Factionalism
and interservice rivalry were the overriding themes after the
Russo-Japanese War. Meanwhile, in China, all remained quiet at the
Marco Polo Bridge that separated Japanese and Chinese troops.
Chapter 8
The Greater East Asian War
The outbreak of what Japanese histories call the Greater East Asian
War should have surprised no one who had been watching events in
the 1930s. Japan’s militarist and navalist cliques aligned themselves
with right-wing politicians to advance expansionist and parochial
programs, which—in the end—all had the effect of propelling Japan
toward a general Asian war. The diplomats and politicians of the
would-be liberal international order had watched Japan’s growing
involvement in China with dismay since Japan’s conquest of Manchu-
ria in 1931. As events in Europe and Africa spiraled out of control,
postwar assumptions about collective security began to unravel.
Liberal European colonial powers—Great Britain, France, and the
Netherlands—turned their focus on local events: the Spanish Civil
War (1935–1939), the Rape of Ethiopia (1936), Hitler’s aggressions that
led to the Munich Crisis (1938), and the Rome-Berlin Anti-Comintern
Pact (1937).
Inside Japan, moderates found themselves assassinated, margin-
alized, and increasingly irrelevant in the face of a form of extreme eth-
nocentric nationalism that took hold throughout the Japanese polity.
After another army-engineered “incident” in 1937, Japan became
involved in open conflict in China against Chiang Kai-shek’s national-
ists and communist forces under Mao Zedong. Caught in the middle
of all of this was the Treaty faction of the navy, which was placed in
the impossible position of arguing against policies that also had the
perverse effect of justifying high naval expenditures. In the end they
compromised, too, maintaining a narrow loyalty to the institution
while the state became hostage to an extreme vision of the future. This
vision entertained war with the greatest powers on earth—the Soviet
Union, China, the United States, and Great Britain.1 Over it reined
the Showa emperor, Hirohito, grim-faced and appearing in uniform
as the chief warlord of his empire. Hirohito remains an enigma—was
he all-powerful, a puppet of the militarists, or something in between?
His only mechanism to influence events was his silence or displeasure
with his various governments. These governments never figured out a
means to discipline the services or reverse the course of events. And so
Hirohito sat on his ancient throne, Fujiwara blood in his veins, passive
as total war engulfed his nation and the Kokutai.2
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
On July 7, 1937, Nationalist Chinese soldiers and Japanese troops of

the NCA exchanged gunfire at the key Marco Polo Bridge some
30 miles north of Peking. These shots, under confused circumstances,
may not have been heard throughout the world, but they were
throughout Asia. They ushered in World War II, or rather they ended
the long truce of Versailles. However, because the principals were both
minor allies (on the winning side) of the Great War, historians can be
forgiven their tardiness in recognizing this as the real starting point
for renewed global war.3 To understand why it all happened here,
we must once again return to IJA policies in North China. Recall that
the official policy was not proactive, but rather “wait and see.” By
1937, Japanese officers in the Kwantung Army (KTA) concluded that
the resources of North China “were not essential” to their long-range
goals. In fact, they felt development in North China would retard
growth in Manchuria. Accordingly, they recommended that the lead-
ership of the NCA issue strict instructions to their troops to avoid
“incidents” with the GMD troops. The Japanese were almost to the
point where they were willing to exchange their North China buffer
zone for a Sino-Japanese friendship treaty that included Chiang’s rec-
ognition of Manchukuo. After the Young Officers’ Revolt, the Japanese
General Staff had been reorganized. Chief of operations General
Ishiwara Kanji finalized a new policy of integrated military, political,
The Greater East Asian War 195
and economic synchronization. Ishiwara believed the real enemy was

the Soviet Union and wanted to avoid war with the Chinese National-
ists now that Manchuria was in hand. Nonetheless, the sustained Jap-
anese policy of intervening and meddling in Chinese affairs now
yielded a harvest of violence against the backdrop of what was prob-
ably an accident rather than a conspiracy.4
The Japanese officer responsible for the Marco Polo outpost, Colonel
Matsui, reported the occurrence of a brief skirmish to his Nationalist
counterpart General Chin Teh-chin around midnight on July 7, 1937,
and requested permission to cross the lines to search for a missing sol-
dier. From this mild beginning, the crisis escalated. The Chinese general
countered by proposing a joint investigation while issuing orders to his
subordinates to resist any Japanese search for their missing soldier. Evi-
dently, the orders from the Japanese higher headquarters to avoid inci-
dents had not made it to the battalion level, and troops from the 28th
Regiment came looking their missing man. They were repulsed by the
Chinese troops, and the situation deteriorated from there. At this point,
Major Ichiki Kiyonao of the 28th Regiment used a loophole in his verbal
orders and assaulted the Chinese position at Wanping on July 9. While
the situation in the field degenerated, the higher-ups conferred politely
in Peking.5 Before long, all efforts to control the situation had been over-
come by events in the field because of one bellicose major from the 28th
Regiment exercising “field initiative.” The Nationalists deployed four
divisions into North China in reaction, which was a violation of a 1935
agreement. Before long, the IJA was committed to a policy of reaction
and reprisal. In Japan, with events spinning out of control, Ishiwara
reluctantly ordered the mobilization of three divisions.6
Japan’s task appeared formidable, as Chiang had over 176 divi-
sions. Also, the Nationalists and Communists now formed a united
anti-Japanese front. The conflict led these uneasy allies to practice a
form of resistance known as compound warfare, with Chiang and
the Nationalists battling the IJA in conventional battles, and Mao’s
forces employing guerilla warfare in the Japanese rear and behind
the lines.7 Only 33 of Chiang’s division were trained by Germany,
and they were dispersed over the entire country. The remainder were
of uneven quality and sometimes insubordinate, answering to their
generals/warlords and not to Chiang. Occasionally, the Communists
would mass and administer a sharp check to the Japanese forces in
their sector (the northwest), as when the Communist 115th Division
defeated a Japanese force at Pingzingguan in September 1937.8
Japanese arms, close to their base of operations in Manchuria, at

first succeeded brilliantly. Japan had complete control of the sea with
the IJN as well as air superiority. In these operations, the navy’s bomb-
ers were often employed as the interdiction and strategic bombing
force of choice. On the ground, the NCA quickly overran Beijing and
Tianjin. At this point, a split occurred inside Japan over how to pro-
ceed now that the ostensible problem had been solved by the occupa-
tion of North China’s five provinces. One group inside the War
Ministry wanted to negotiate, but the General Staff advocated a more
hawkish approach. The deliberate decision was made not to declare
war in order to avoid international repercussions related to trade,
and the policy became that of an undeclared war controlled by milita-
rists at home with generals executing “disciplined initiative” in the
field. Command and control of the armies in the field became so tenu-
ous that in November 1937, the Imperial General Headquarters
(IGHQ) was finally established, but it did not include the prime minis-
ter and civilian ministers.9
The IJA’s greatest weakness—logistics—came to the fore in China
once it began to operate away from the sea and its bases. The wisdom
in the Nationalist Army soon spread that one need fight the Japanese
for only 10 days and after that, they would run out of supplies.10 The
IJA could accomplish much in those “10 days,” but its ability to con-
solidate gains would be limited to the cities (which it had to garrison)
and the maintenance of the rail lines to connect its urban conquests
with each other. The NCA became the North China Area Army
(NCAA) and was reorganized into the First and Second Armies. It
advanced south along two rail lines toward the lower Yangtze River
valley and the Shanghai-Nanjing area. Chiang Kai-shek responded
by opening a second front in Shanghai, attacking the lightly armed
Japanese naval troops that had been stationed there since the troubles
of 1932. The 3rd Fleet began evacuating Japanese citizens from Shang-
hai in August. Chiang hoped this would force the Japanese to ease the
pressure in their southern advance. This move precipitated one of the
largest battles in Asia during the entire war.11
IGHQ had ignored the emperor’s advice to send two divisions to
the hard-pressed naval forces in the city. However, IGHQ soon
reversed course and decided that the capture of Shanghai might be
an ideal way to end the war via a decisive battle. Chiang also decided
to make his stand at Shanghai and fed 70 GMD divisions into the fight
to defend the city. Most of the fighting did not take place inside the
city because both sides wanted to avoid antagonizing the Western

presence there. Instead, it took place in a World War I–style conflict
northwest of the city. Initially, the Japanese sent too few troops and it
seemed the battle of attrition, a forerunner of Stalingrad five years
later, would become a Chinese victory. The Japanese then pulled out
all the stops, bringing General Matsui Iwane from retirement to com-
mand the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. Mastui’s tactics mirrored
those of General Nogi at Port Arthur, and the assault stalled with
heavy Japanese casualties. The Japanese “doubled-down” and con-
ducted an uncontested amphibious landing south of Shanghai with
the 10th Army to try and encircle Chiang’s almost 1 million troops.
But Chiang pulled his men out of the trap. The cost was immense—
almost a quarter of a million troops became casualties (75 percent of
them Chinese), and the shock stunned the Japanese people. The back-
lash against the army in Japan at these casualties caused protests and
suicides, and the police had to be called out in Tokyo to deal with
mobs angry at the army. However, these sunk costs in blood only
hardened the attitude of the IJA—which saw itself engaged in a war
of retribution and conquest.12
The army’s most significant accomplishment at Shanghai became
apparent soon after. Chiang’s best divisions had been wrecked, and
he now began a fighting retreat up the Yangtze in a campaign of sheer
survival, banking that the Japanese would outrun their supply lines.
The Japanese pressed to the capital at Nanjing, hoping that a rapid
pursuit would quickly capture the city and bring Chiang to the table
to end the conflict. By December, the 10th Army, which was the fresh-
est formation, arrived at the city—burning, looting, and living off the
country during its rapid advance. The makings of a catastrophe were
present, with indiscipline widespread during the campaign. Added
to this was the Chinese Army’s stubborn resistance and the strain of
constant combat. After three days of a confused defense, Chiang with-
drew toward Wuhan, another couple hundred miles upriver. Japanese
naval air forces sank the U.S. gunboat Panay, causing American casu-
alties during the general chaos. Japanese forces sacked the city in an
orgy of violence not seen since the Taiping Rebellion. Rape, murder,
prisoner executions, arson—every crime imaginable was committed
and although accounts of the toll vary, it was certainly in the hundreds
of thousands. The IJA also normalized its policy of “no quarter” for
GMD prisoners who resisted longer than the IJA thought reasonable.
The Rape of Nanking only hardened the hearts of Japan’s adversaries
and pushed Japan to the fore in international opinion as a pariah

nation—yet no collective action was taken against her.13
With the fall of Nanjing, Japan’s militarists moved another step away
from democracy in Japan, passing a universal conscription law to mobi-
lize the nation and taking the Diet completely out of decision making in
military affairs. Although Japan was not ruled by a dictator (Tojo Hideki
never had the authority of a Hitler or Stalin), she was now ruled by an
alliance between cliques of militarists, navalists, and civilian extremist
groups. Sun Tzu wrote that “. . . there has never been a protracted war
from which a country has benefited,” and this truism applied equally
to both the GMD and Japan. The “China Incident” had indeed become
a protracted war—one of survival for the Chinese and for autarky and
“honor” for the Japanese. Worse, Japan’s moves increased her reliance
on the United States as her need for food and raw material exports sky-
rocketed and inflation set in at home. The year of 1938 dawned, at least
in the minds of Japan’s leaders, as the year for victory. It would be, but
only for tactical victories and no end to the war. Chiang’s strategy was
now to simply outlast the Japanese. Mao quipped to an American
observer that China was too big to conquer. Battles still occurred, how-
ever, and in the end the Japanese won only to find they had enough re-
sources to secure a city and the connecting rail line, and nothing more.
Japanese armies captured Xuchou in North China in May 1938, destroy-
ing a nationalist army in the process. Along the coast, they leapfrogged
down toward Canton (Gungzhou), capturing that key southern city in
October and then seizing Hainan Island, which controlled access to
northern Indochina through the Gulf of Tonkin.14
Along the Yangtze, General Doihara Kenji advanced toward
Wuhan, achieving some success until his operations were suspended
due to manmade flooding by Chiang and a threat to the Japanese rear
in Korea by the Soviet Union. Incidents along the Soviet-Japanese bor-
der in Korea had increased to regimental-size actions, causing IGHQ
to halt the drive on Wuhan. The Soviets increased their forces in the
Far East to almost 500,000 troops with plentiful artillery, armor, and
over 3,000 airplanes. This modern force had been created by the
recently purged Marshal M. N. Tukachevsky and although Stalin con-
tinued his brutal purge of the Soviet officer corps, some of his most tal-
ented generals managed to escape, or rather avoid, political murder
by being actively engaged in the Far East. One of these was General
G. K. Zhukov, one of the greatest heroes of World War II. Similarly,
the KTA now numbered over 200,000 troops. The Japanese knew of
the Soviet purges, and the Soviets had backed down on one occasion.
These things probably contributed the KTA/IJA miscalculation of the
threat from the Soviet Union. The Soviets struck at Changkuofeng in
July 1938 along the border, occupying the high ground. Despite being
ordered not to attack, a Japanese local commander exercised that “[un]
disciplined initiative” that caused so many woes. The Soviets coun-
tered with an all-out mechanized and air attack, pummeling units of
the Korean Army. Chastened, the Japanese and Soviets signed an
armistice in August in Moscow.15
Meanwhile, operations resumed against Wuhan, with Chiang
scuttling further up the river to Chungking in Sichuan (Szechuan) Prov-
ince. Wuhan fell to Doihara and his men in December. During this cam-
paign, the Japanese first employed poison gas, although they were
careful to disguise its use with euphemistic language. The capture of
Wuhan was good enough for Prince Konoye, who declared victory. He
also announced the end of the American “Open Door” in China and
Japan’s leadership of the fight against imperialism and colonialism in
Asia. He also articulated, for the first time, Japan’s intent to establish
the Dai To-A Kyoeken (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere), Japan’s
highly militarized Asian version of the American Monroe Doctrine.
Japan’s leadership meant her “partners” would provide Japan all neces-
sary resources to maintain the “new order” against the West. Japan’s
bluster helped saved Chiang as the U.S. Congress now voted for substan-
tial aid to the GMD and instituted a heightened program of domestic
armaments, especially for the U.S. Navy and Army Air Force. U.S. efforts
also included the eventual “loan” of officers such as Claire Chennault to
help establish a Chinese air force to fight the Japanese, who had air supe-
riority over every battlefield with their nimble fighters.16
The success of Konoye’s efforts was best illustrated by his resigna-
tion in January 1939 when he could not resolve his differences with the
army. The Japanese Army had culminated in China, managing to cap-
ture Nanchang in March 1939 but unable to capture Mao’s home city
of Changsha. The war settled into a stalemate—Japan’s version of the
later U.S. “quagmire” in Vietnam—except on a far more vast and hope-
less scale. Meanwhile, things went from bad to worse with the Soviets.
Interpreting Soviet willingness to cease operations in August as weak-
ness, the KTA pushed forces forward on the Manchurian-Mongolian
frontier in the spring of 1939 near the village of Nomonhan in pursuit
of Soviet proxy Mongolian forces. Again the ill-starred 28th Infantry
Regiment, which had precipitated things two years earlier in North
China, made another disastrous appearance. The Soviets reacted with

overwhelming force against a small Japanese reconnaissance foray.
General Zhukov had over 100,000 troops; 1,000 tanks and armored cars;
hundreds of artillery pieces; and hundreds of aircraft at his disposal. The
Japanese reconnaissance element was nearly annihilated, and when a
reinforced 23rd Division was sent to “teach the Russians a lesson” in
July, it was sent reeling backward. A stalemate ensued, with the two
sides pounding each other with artillery, and then Zhukov conducted a
double envelopment that destroyed the 23rd Division. Eighty percent
of the 28th Infantry Regiment was lost, and the pitiful remnants were
sent to join the one remaining battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Ichiki,
who was now assigned to the navy. The Soviets had won a great victory,
and, as Edward Drea notes:
The Nomonhan disaster was all the more traumatic because the
army had employed its premier doctrine, tactics, and equipment
that it specially designed to produce a lightning victory. Instead
everything from nighttime bayonet assaults to vaunted spiritual
power had failed. Rather than admit . . . disaster, the high com-
mand blamed the troops . . .
Prisoners who returned to the IJA were mistreated and their officers
encouraged to commit suicide—more evidence of false bushido.
Worse, the Germans—Japan’s anti-Comintern partners—signed a
nonaggression accord with the Soviets.17
The grinding and brutal China War continued. In 1940, Mao felt con-
fident enough to launch the “100 Regiments” offensive against Japanese
forces in North China. Initially he was successful, but the Japanese
responded and restored the situation, though they did have to reassess
their passive strategy. The next year, they responded with a brutal
counterinsurgency campaign known in China as the Three Alls Cam-
paign, standing for “kill all, burn all, loot all.” Mao’s military cadres were
decimated, and he retreated into the guerilla warfare that would charac-
terize his operations for much of the remainder of the war. Meanwhile,
back in Tokyo, the Control faction had to completely rethink its strategy
of going north against the Soviets versus the navy’s plan to go south.18
WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES
As Mao had predicted, Japan found China simply too big to conquer.
When Japanese aircraft attacked the U.S. Navy gunboat Panay in the
Yangtze River, war was averted only after the Japanese apologized
and sent conciliatory officers from the Naval Ministry to return the
bodies of dead U.S. servicemen. In 1939, the United States took action
by terminating its long-standing Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
with Japan, the first in a series of moves made as tensions between
the two countries increased.19 The militarist elements in Japan saw
Germany and Italy winning in Europe and pushed for an alliance with
those countries. Germany and Japan had already signed the Anti-
Comintern Pact in 1936 that pledged neutrality if one or the other
became engaged with the Soviets. However, by 1939, both parties
wanted something more robust. Germany had signed the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union in August 1939 just before
Germany invaded Poland. This move undermined some Japanese
support to join the Axis. German victory in the summer of 1940, with
Great Britain barely hanging on, strengthened the hand of those in
favor of a Tripartite alliance, which seemed the best way to leverage
the United States.20
Despite the clear momentum in Japan for the Axis, the Treaty fac-
tion in the Naval Ministry—including admirals Inoue, Yoshida, and
Yamamoto—firmly opposed the alliance. However, the army and the
navy faction led by chief of the Naval General Staff Admiral Nagano
Osami supported the alliance as a way to neutralize the Americans
using a German threat in the Atlantic. Japan formally joined the Axis
in September 1940, with the Germans hoping the pact would reduce
U.S. assistance to Great Britain. It was also intended to give both the
Americans and the Soviets “pause” in extending aid to Chiang and
the GMD.21
This move backfired, and the United States responded with further
economic and financial sanctions. The Americans and the British insti-
tuted a policy of more support for the Nationalist Chinese using loans
and pushing material into China via the Burma Road through the
Himalayas (see Map 8.1). The Japanese countered by moving into
northern Indochina at the “invitation” of the new Vichy French
government in order to cut off U.S. aid to Chiang. The United States
responded by expanding its embargo to include scrap metal and
establishing the Atlantic Fleet with Admiral Ernest King as its com-
mander. FDR also ordered the Pacific Fleet to remain permanently at
Pearl Harbor after the end of its annual fleet exercise instead of
returning to its bases in California. Now committed to a possible
two-ocean war, the U.S. Congress passed the 1940 Navy Act that
Map 8.1 The Pacific Theater
promised an almost entirely new huge fleet of American warships,

including 20 new aircraft carriers, by 1943.22 Japan was now in a naval
arms race with the United States it knew it could not win. Her leaders
were seeing their strategies to stabilize the situation backfire, but it
only seemed to harden their resolve. At this point, they replaced
their ambassador in Washington with the moderate admiral Nomura
Kichisaburo. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Nomura negotiated
constantly from that point on, but the Japanese government ignored
Nomura’s advice.23
Results of the alliance vis-à-vis China were no less disappointing.
The United States approved an additional aid package in Novem-
ber 1940 of $100 million for the Nationalists. Worse, the United States
adopted the “Europe-First strategy,” which had immense implications
for China with the approval of Lend-Lease to the British in March 1941.
T. V. Soong, the Chinese minister in Washington, obtained promises
under Lend-Lease provisions to get enough equipment for a large
modern air force and 30 army divisions, as well as help in improving
the roads necessary to bring this equipment into China. Additionally,
in anticipation of all of this, the United States began a program of
improvements to its Pacific bases and way stations so that it could
move bomber aircraft to China and the Philippines from which to
bomb Japanese bases and territory—including the world’s most
advanced long-range bomber, the B-17 Flying Fortress. Prince Konoye,
working with Foreign Minister Matsuoka, decided to reinstitute the
strategy of “hold north, go south” (hokushu nanshin). After finding
out about the upcoming German invasion of the Soviet Union,
Matsuoka negotiated the a secret nonaggression pact with the Soviets
to secure Japan’s northern flank, and he convinced the army to free
up 15 divisions for the conquest of the Southern Resource Area. While
Japan’s economic situation worsened, she bullied the Vichy French
into accepting 50,000 Japanese troops into southern Indochina, thus
obtaining the key base at Cam Ranh Bay from which to project power
south and west.24 This caused the United States, Great Britain, and the
Netherlands to cut off all Japan’s access to fuel oil leases and strategic
metals on July 26, 1941, as well as implement a comprehensive freeze
of all her financial assets.25
The lack of military progress in China and the failure of his policy to
deter the United States resulted in the collapse of Prince Konoye’s
“unity government” and his replacement as prime minister by the
militarist General Tojo. Admiral Yamamoto, who had opposed the
alliance with Germany, was reassigned from his post as vice naval
minister to command the Combined Fleet due to worries over assassi-
nation threats.26 Yamamoto reluctantly planned for war against the
United States and conceived of the idea of a surprise air and miniature
submarine attack on the U.S. fleet, an attack possible only now that the
U.S. fleet was in Hawaii. His brilliant air operations planner Com-
mander Genda Minoru believed that all six large aircraft carriers
should be used as one striking force. After working through the tech-
nical problems related to launching torpedo attacks in shallow Pearl
Harbor, the six big carriers of Dai Ichi Kido Butai (the First Mobile
Strike Force), probably the finest naval aviation force in the world at
that time, departed from their anchorage at Takan Bay in the Kurile
Islands under the command of Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi in late
November 1941 for a stealthy North Pacific transit. Unbeknownst to
the U.S. Navy, Kido Butai was something new in warfare—a mobile
naval air striking force with an operational capability not seen before
in history. Kido Butai’s air groups were almost entirely veterans of
combat in China since 1937, and its deck crews were at the peak of
perfection in getting their planes airborne.27
On November 27, Admiral Husband Kimmel, commander of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet, received a “war warning” based on decryption of
the Japan’s secret diplomatic code (Magic). Kimmel convened a meet-
ing of his major commanders about preparations for war. The outcome
of this meeting was a heightened alert status for the forces in Pearl
Harbor and a decision to send two aircraft carriers out to reinforce
the garrisons on Wake and Midway Islands.28
Back in Washington, DC, on December 6, the initial excitement of
the war warning seemed to have dulled everyone’s senses. Because
of a series of miscues, most of the key strategic decision makers in
Washington went to bed that night without having been informed that
the Japanese were sending their diplomatic entourage instructions
that constituted a diplomatic break just short of war and that a critical
final section of the message had yet to be decrypted. Meanwhile,
Nagumo’s carriers steamed eastward in complete radio silence. 29
Roosevelt, aware that the situation was tense, had decided to leave
the initiative for peace or war with the Japanese. At the end of a mid-
day budget meeting, Roosevelt remarked to his budget director that
“we might be at war with Japan although no one knew.”30
In Malaya, December 7 had already arrived. British commanders
were fighting a losing battle trying to prepare for the storm they
suspected would break upon them. Up until December 5, the British

ground commander, Lieutenant General Arthur E. Percival, had been
unable to get the colonial government to agree on a redeployment of
troops to try and pre-empt any Japanese invasion by occupying the
excellent harbor of Singora (which the Japanese planned to seize).
Also that day, a PBY Catalina flying boat of American make took off
from Kota Bahru in Malaya to search for reported Japanese convoys
that had last been sited steaming west from Thailand toward the Kra
Peninsula connecting Thailand with Malaya to the south. These con-
voys turned out to be General Yamishita Toymi’s 25th Army, whose
objectives were Malaya and Singapore.31
Before sunrise on December 8, Tokyo time, the Japanese launched
their coordinated attacks at Singora and Kota Bharu in Malaysia.
About an hour later, the first wave of Kido Butai’s air groups arrived
over Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Several hours later, Japanese aircraft from
Formosa, Mitsubishi bombers, struck at Clark Field and Cavite Naval
Base in the Philippines. Never before in the history of warfare had any
nation launched such a finely synchronized attack on land, air, and sea
over such a broad geographic area and in so short a period of time.
The Pacific phase of the Greater East Asian War had begun.32
The United States expected attacks on the Philippines, Guam,
Wake, and the resource-rich British and Dutch colonial possessions.
All of these occurred on December 7–8, 1941, or shortly thereafter,
but not foreseen was Yamamoto’s bold attack on Hawaii. Militarily,
the Pearl Harbor attack was nothing more than a spectacular and suc-
cessful raid. However, had it never occurred, the United States would
still have gone to war because of attacks on U.S. possessions in the
Pacific. 33 Nagumo’s aircraft caught the Pacific Fleet completely
unaware. In addition to sinking or damaging all eight of the battle-
ships present, the Japanese—more importantly—crippled the U.S.
army, marine, and naval land-based air forces. Over 3,200 military
and civilian casualties were incurred. Once sober minds evaluated
the damage, it was realized that the critical repair facilities and fuel
depots surrounding Pearl Harbor were virtually untouched. Even so,
the results of Pearl Harbor were materially insignificant as far as the
Japanese conquest of the Southern Resource Area was concerned
because the U.S. fleet had little chance of reaching U.S. possessions in
the western Pacific in time to prevent the loss of key bases once hostil-
ities broke out.34 Once the reality of war set in, the U.S. Navy did what
it had planned to do all along—methodically island-hop across the
Pacific. More importantly, Pearl Harbor served not as a morale-

destroying defeat, but rather as a rallying cry that motivated
Americans and hardened their hearts. When this combined with the
modern variant of bushido, the Pacific War developed into one of the
most merciless conflicts in history.35
Japan’s attacks against U.S. forces in the Philippines had to wait on
the daylight, too. Air power was a daytime weapon at this stage of
World War II, and most of the Japanese aircraft in Indochina and For-
mosa (Taiwan) that would strike the Philippine naval and air bases
had to wait for sunrise and the fog to clear. Through a series of mis-
cues, as well as underestimation of the enemy, the Japanese bombers
and fighters found General Douglas MacArthur’s B-17 bombers on
the ground refueling. At one stroke, the Japanese eliminated half of
MacArthur’s air force and the majority of his bombers. With air supe-
riority achieved by their initial strike, the Japanese returned on
December 9 to pound Cavite. The small U.S. Asiatic Fleet suffered
few losses because its commander had already moved most of his
major units to the south. Nonetheless, the attack damaged the shore
facilities and destroyed the U.S. reserve of torpedoes. It also sank a
submarine and minesweeper. The defense of the northern Philippines
was now the responsibility of the combined U.S. Army and indige-
nous Filipino forces. They would be virtually without naval or air sup-
port in their quixotic mission against an enemy that had command of
both the air and the sea.36
Japanese strikes continued relentlessly at other locations through-
out Southeast Asia and Micronesia. Poorly defended Guam in the
Marianas fell on December 10. Only at the tiny Wake Island Atoll in
the middle of the Pacific did the navy and marine defenders give the
Japanese juggernaut its first temporary setback. Here the Japanese
were guilty of underestimating their enemy and overestimating their
own capability. A Japanese amphibious assault on December 11 was
bloodily repulsed by Wake’s defenders, with the loss of several
Japanese warships. Unfortunately, the relief force was fatally delayed
in its departure from Pearl Harbor and was over 425 miles away from
Wake when the gallant defenders surrendered to another Japanese
assault two weeks later.37
Meanwhile, events in the Philippines went from bad to worse.
Without the ability to interdict Japanese invasion forces, by land or
sea, it was only a matter of time before the Japanese 14th Army com-
manded by General Homma Masaharu successfully established itself
on Luzon in late December. With the U.S. air force destroyed,

and most of the small naval forces being evacuated to the south,
MacArthur held a very poor hand of cards. Accordingly, he modified
his original plan to defend Luzon on a broad front. Instead of oppos-
ing Homma’s landings on the beaches at the Lingayen Gulf (where
the attack was expected), MacArthur decided to challenge the
Japanese in the broad plain south of Lingayen.38
December 22, 1941, dawned on the largest Japanese amphibious
operation to date as over 50,000 troops landed at Lingayen. After the
first contact with the well-coordinated air-sea-ground Japanese
assault, MacArthur ditched his modified plan and decided to pull
back into a fortified lines of defense on the peninsula of Bataan located
between Subic and Manila Bays. Here he hoped to defend until
relieved by the navy’s Pacific Fleet. Any hope of executing this course
of action had gone up in the pall of smoke rising over Pearl Harbor on
December 7. Nevertheless, MacArthur had little choice other than to
try and hold out, or at the very least tie down Japanese forces and pre-
vent their use elsewhere. Fortunately for the Americans, Homma was
more interested in capturing Manila than destroying his opponent,
and the withdrawal into Bataan was accomplished smoothly. How-
ever, Bataan was simply not prepared for the 80,000 troops (including
20,000 Americans) who retreated there. Large stockpiles of food did
exist, but they were scattered across Luzon and in the confusion of
the retreat, most of these supplies fell to the Japanese. After only one
week in their new defenses, the U.S. forces were already on half
rations.39
The fight now settled into a siege, with disease and hunger
afflicting both the Japanese and U.S. forces. Meanwhile, FDR and
General George Marshall ordered MacArthur to escape through the
loose Japanese blockade and go to Australia. leaving General Jonathan
Wainwright in command. MacArthur delayed his departure until
March 11, when he finally boarded a PT boat with his family and
staff for a 600-mile run to an airfield on Mindanao. Upon his arrival in
Australia, he announced, “I shall return.” In the meantime. the horrors
in Bataan continued to their inevitable conclusion. In April, General
Edward King, with Wainwright’s concurrence, ordered his famished
and disease-ridden troops—some 70,000 Americans and Filipinos—to
surrender. The Japanese had expected to capture supplies along with
these troops and in a horror of logistics and maltreatment marched their
emaciated prisoners some 60 miles to a processing camp with over
10,000 dying en route in an event now known as the Bataan Death

March. Most of the dead were Filipino. Wainwright and a forlorn hope
of 14,000 held on into May on the Island of Corregidor at the mouth of
Manila Bay. In the final analysis, these heroic sacrifices achieved very
little—the stubborn defense of Bataan and Corregidor did not prevent,
nor even slow, the Japanese conquest of Malaya, Burma, and the Dutch
East Indies.40
As all of this was unfolding, the Allies agreed to establish the Ameri-
can, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) Command under British
field marshal Sir Archibald Wavell to try and halt the Japanese advance
to the south. Wavell’s naval commander was U.S. Admiral Thomas
Hart. The principal weapons in Hart’s inventory were his three cruisers,
29 submarines, and 14 destroyers—and the torpedoes did not work.41
Hart’s command also included small surface forces from the Dutch,
British, and Australians. However, these were woefully inadequate com-
pared to the firepower available to Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet. They
received their baptism of fire when the Japanese invaded the island of
Borneo in late January. During the first major surface action of the war,
U.S. destroyers slipped in among Japanese transports at Balikpapan at
night, sinking four of them. They would probably have sunk even more
if not for their defective torpedoes. However, for the Japanese air-
sea-land juggernaut, this was simply a “speed bump.”42
Hong Kong had fallen in December after an unexpectedly tough
British defense that caused the Japanese to go on a murderous ram-
page. The event that doomed the Dutch East Indies (today Malaysia
and Indonesia) was the fall of Britain’s “Gibraltar of the Far East”—
Singapore. General Yamashita was assured command of the air and
sea after veteran Japanese aviators sank the battleship Prince of Wales
and battle cruiser Repulse on December 10, 1941, in a shocking defeat
for the Royal Navy.43 In a brilliant campaign, which had begun on
the first day of the war, Yamashita’s 25th Army conducted a blitzkrieg
against the British in Malaya, advancing almost 12 miles a day. In per-
haps the greatest victory for the Japanese in the Pacific War, the British
were pushed out of the Malay Peninsula into Singapore. Worse, they
were unable to repel an assault against the vulnerable rear of the
island bastion by Japanese troops assaulting across the Strait of Johore.
General Percival surrendered over 130,000 soldiers and other person-
nel on February 15, 1942. Many of those captured, both civilians and
troops, would die of disease, famine, and neglect while building the
infamous Thai-Burma railroad for the Japanese along with thousands

of other slave laborers from captured colonies.44
Shortly after the fall of Singapore, Wavell advised the American-
British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) that protecting the remaining
Indies was hopeless and that the Allies needed to focus all their re-
sources on the defense of Australia and Burma. He subsequently
turned over defense of the Indies to the Dutch, and their remaining
forces were put under the command of the Dutch Admiral C. E. L.
Helfrich.45 In late February during a day-night battle in the Java Sea,
the Japanese smashed what little Allied sea power remained. The
two major survivors, the cruisers Houston and HMAS Perth, perished
in the Sunda Strait as they withdrew to the south. On March 9, the
Dutch East Indies surrendered. The Japanese now had nothing to
impede their advance to the shores of Australia.46
Japanese operations, along diverging axes, reflected the poverty of
Japanese strategy. Even though victorious everywhere, IGHQ found
itself torn as to which way to go. They could go east, west, or south-
west—but they could not realistically advance in all three directions
at once. Their chief problem resided in the fact that they had provoked
a limited naval war with the two greatest naval powers in the world.
As Stalin tied down the main forces of their German ally in Russia,
and as the Chinese tied down the bulk of the IJA in China, the Japa-
nese Navy desperately sought a Mahanian means to victory—the
destruction of the U.S. fleet. The subsequent misfortunes of Imperial
Japan can be traced to this unaccomplished task. Japan’s unique style
of consensus and compromise decision making resulted in a series of
orders that went in three directions simultaneously with Japan’s most
powerful tool at hand—Kido Butai.47
Reflecting this indecisiveness, Nagumo’s carriers, along with
land-based bombers from new bases in the Indies, conducted a pun-
ishing air attack on Darwin, Australia, on February 17.48 Nagumo then
reversed course and proceeded into the Indian Ocean in late March
and April to ravage British naval forces and merchant traffic there.
He pounded British bases in India and Ceylon, sank a small British
carrier and two cruisers, and sent over 100,000 tons of merchant ton-
nage to the bottom. Japanese submarines added to these totals during
Japan’s most successful, and as it turns out only, major assault
on Allied sea lines of communication. However, despite forcing the
Royal Navy out of the area for the first time in 150 years, Nagumo
accomplished no major strategic task; the Americans continued to

remain a dangerous presence in their “rear.”49
Moving southeast from their new bases in the Indies and from Truk
in the Caroline Islands, other Japanese naval, air, and ground forces
captured the excellent harbor at Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago
and begun to turn it into an impregnable fortress. Elsewhere, they
occupied the British Gilbert Islands (including Tarawa) and parts of
the northern Solomon Islands, and they established themselves along
the northern shores of New Guinea. These operations paid far more
handsome dividends and at much less cost than those further west.50
Japan’s efforts in the China-Burma-India (CBI) region were no less
successful. After the fall of Singapore and the dissolution of ABDA,
the defense of Burma fell back to the India Command. The British
colony of Burma had one overriding purpose—to protect India. To
lose India was to lose the war in British eyes. The Americans also
wanted to defend Burma to protect the Burma Road to southern China
through which American Lend-Lease aid flowed to the Nationalists.
The Americans also cherished the dream of establishing long-range
air bases in southern China from which to bomb Japan proper. How-
ever, before Singapore had even fallen, the Japanese 15th Army under
General Iida Shojiro began its offensive into Burma on January 20,
1941. Iida captured Rangoon, the port terminus of Chiang’s lifeline,
in March. Roosevelt sent General Joseph Stillwell as his personal
representative to Chiang’s government to coordinate with the British
for operations against the Japanese. Initially, the British resisted
Chinese aid, but the pace of Japanese operations caused them to
relent. Chiang sent his best divisions to help protect his lines of com-
munication through Burma. However, the divided command struc-
ture, poor of British leadership, and Japanese domination in the air
and at sea resulted in catastrophe. Although Stillwell was nominally
in command, he found it difficult to control his Chinese subordinates.
By May 1942, the British, Stillwell, and the Chinese had been run
out of Burma. In Stillwell’s words, “. . . we got a hell of a beating.”
However, the Japanese, just like the Germans later that year, had cul-
minated—they could neither retreat nor advance. General William
Slim, the new British commander, noted that despite defeat, his army
was still “recognizable as fighting units.”51 Further north, Japanese
victory was tarnished by General Anami’s capture and then violent
expulsion from the city of Changsha by Chiang’s forces in Janu-
ary 1942. 52 At the end of their wild run, the Japanese had indeed
achieved incredible results. But these results were empty. Their geo-
graphic objectives had been accomplished, but their strategic objec-
tives—the destruction of the U.S. fleet and initiation of diplomatic
negotiations to end the war—had not been attained.
In the words of Admiral Ernest King, the U.S. chief of naval opera-
tions, “The Defensive Offensive Phase” of the war had begun.53 For
the Japanese admirals and generals, it began a period of unmitigated
disasters as their offensives in Southeast Asia, New Guinea, and the
northern Pacific ran out of steam. Not long after the fall of the Dutch
East Indies, the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) oversaw the
implementation of a new—and divided—command structure for the
Pacific. This decision was driven as much by service rivalries as it
was by logic. MacArthur was put in charge of a Southwest Pacific the-
ater (SWAPA), Admiral Chester Nimitz (Kimmel’s replacement as com-
mander of the Pacific Fleet) commanded the Pacific theater (CINCPOA),
and the same messy arrangement of divided command remained in
place in the CBI. The dividing line between the two Pacific theaters ran
right along the line of the next axis for Japanese offensive operations,
through New Guinea and down the Solomon Island chain. Nimitz had
already begun to conduct limited strikes against the Japanese in this
region. In this he was very much aided by the cryptography unit at Pearl
Harbor under the supervision of Lieutenant Commander Joe Rochefort.
These raids emphasized to Yamamoto that the U.S. Navy was still very
much “a fleet in being.”54 Nimitz was guided by the principle of “calcu-
lated risk” where he would risk his key forces, aircraft carriers, and bat-
tleships only if the probabilities were high that the enemy would sustain
more damage than he would.55
This principle was emphasized in the most dramatic fashion in
mid-April when the Americans launched an air raid on Tokyo using
B-25 medium bombers flying from the carrier Hornet and escorted by
the Enterprise under the command of Admiral Halsey. Lieutenant
Colonel “Jimmy” Doolittle commanded the raid and after being
detected short of the launch point by Japanese picket ships, his raid
launched early on the morning of April 18 while he was 650 miles
from Tokyo. Although the raid caused little physical damage, it pro-
vided a huge boost to U.S. morale—both civilian and military. For
the Japanese military leadership, the dishonor associated with the
bombing led to the assignment of hundreds of veteran Japanese avia-
tors back to Japan to defend the homeland. These pilots and aircraft
would be sorely missed in the coming year.56
The Imperial Naval General Staff had proposed that the next step in
the Pacific War should be to sever Australia’s lines of communications
with the United States. Some officers proposed that Australia itself be
invaded, but the army leadership vetoed this plan, claiming that they
simply did not have enough troops to secure an area so large. As for
Yamamoto, he was convinced that the Americans could be brought
to the bargaining table only by destroying the U.S. fleet. He advocated
an invasion of Hawaii as a suitable objective that would bring the
remainder of the American fleet to battle, but both the Army and the
Navy General Staffs opposed this plan, and he countered by propos-
ing to seize the American base at Midway, at the western end of the
Hawaiian chain. When Doolittle’s aircraft dropped bombs near the
sacred palace in Tokyo, threatening the life of the emperor, all resis-
tance to Yamamoto’s plan to seize Midway evaporated. Approval of
this plan did not cancel existing plans to continue the advance in the
southwest. Naval planners also saddled the Combined Fleet with the
mission of seizing the western-most islands in the Aleutians chain, in
part because Doolittle’s raid had exposed the open flank in the
northern Pacific. All of this led to a fatal watering down of the striking
forces Yamamoto would have available for what he saw as the main
effort at Midway.57
Japanese operations in the southwest Pacific came first. The open-
ing phase involved a two-pronged assault with two objectives: the
seizure of the island of Tulagi in the southern Solomons and the cap-
ture of Port Moresby on the southeastern tip of New Guinea on the
Coral Sea. With New Guinea and the southern Solomons in their
possession, the Japanese would push into the Coral Sea and sever
Australia’s lifeline to the United States across the South Pacific.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, Nimitz’s codebreakers informed him
of the Japanese outline and objectives. Nimitz already had one carrier
force operating in the area and immediately dispatched another to join
it.58 In a confused series of engagements during the first week of May,
elements of the U.S., Australian, and Japanese navies clashed in the
Coral Sea. It was the first naval battle in which neither side’s ships
saw each other. The Americans lost the carrier Lexington, a valuable
oiler, and a destroyer. They also suffered damage to the carrier
Yorktown. The Japanese lost the light carrier Shoho, and the veteran
Pearl Harbor carrier Shokaku was badly damaged. Large numbers of
Japanese pilots were also lost. Admiral Inoue (who had opposed the
Axis alliance and who was the commander in Rabaul) made the
critical decision to turn the Port Moresby invasion force around and
try another day. However, that day would never come. The Japanese
believed they had sunk two or three of the American carriers. In real-
ity, the Americans, due to the incredible efforts of the sailors aboard
Yorktown and the dockworkers at Pearl Harbor, had three big aircraft
carriers available to ambush Yamamoto’s fleet when it came to attack
Midway. Coral Sea had reduced the forces available for Yamamoto’s
main effort. In addition to the loss of Shoho, the two other big carriers
and their air groups at Coral Sea were unavailable for the Midway
operation. Yamamoto also diluted his available naval air striking
power by agreeing to the Aleutian operation, which subtracted the
air groups of two medium carriers. The results of the Coral Sea were
twofold: it stopped the Japanese advance in the south and compro-
mised the operation at Midway’s chances for success.59
Yamamoto, and Admiral Nagano of the Naval General Staff, both
believed that the weight of the Combined Fleet, especially its battle-
ships, must prevail. U.S. code breakers had broken enough of the
Japanese code to know that Yamamoto’s objective was Midway.
Nimitz deployed all of his remaining carriers to a position northeast
of Midway to ambush the Japanese.60 In a stunning defeat lasting
June 3–5, the Americans sank all four of Nagumo’s carriers while losing
only the Yorktown and a destroyer to a submarine. Kido Butai had been
effectively annihilated, and the Japanese would never be able to recon-
stitute it.61 Upon the fleet’s return to Japan, the IJN leaders decided not
to tell the Japanese people of the disaster and even withheld its extent
from the Japanese Army. This deception was to exacerbate the defeat
because the loss of dozens of experienced naval aviators as well as the
hundreds of veteran carrier deck crew did not lead to new or urgent pro-
grams to replace them for the war of attrition that the conflict in Pacific
had now become. As for the northern forces attacking the Aleutians,
they had accomplished their mission and captured the desolate islands
of Attu and Kiska. Yet even this minor victory was pyrrhic because they
soon found that these islands were virtually useless as bases.62 As for
Yamamoto, he matches our theme of the tragic failure. The man who
wanted to avoid war with the United States but supported policies in
China and elsewhere that would lead to it. The man who wanted to
serve his emperor and nation but would become the unwitting agent
that led to the occupation and humiliation of Japan. The man who
wanted a big navy but when asked to use it could think of no better
usage than to fling it recklessly across the Pacific—twice.
WAR OF ATTRITION
Midway had opened up new opportunities for U.S. commanders itch-

ing to go on the offensive—General MacArthur and Admiral King.
King, alarmed by the Japanese seizure of Rabaul, broached the idea
of a counteroffensive through the Solomon Islands to capture it even
before Midway. Similarly MacArthur, sensing the tide had turned,
made a counterproposal to use his command to seize Rabaul in a
three-week operation. The final outcome was a compromise that
established the war’s offensive pattern for the rest of 1942 and most
of 1943. Nimitz would execute the first phase by seizing the Japanese
bases at Tulagi and, in a last minute decision, Guadalcanal in the
southern Solomon Islands. It was here that the slowing Japanese offen-
sive to the southeast would meet a brand new American offensive
driving northwest from Australia and French Polynesia. MacArthur,
too, intended to go on the offensive, advancing along the northern
coast of New Guinea at the same time as naval and marine forces
advanced in the Solomons. The final phase, under MacArthur’s over-
all command, would involve the capture of Rabaul.63
The Japanese struck first. After capturing Buna in New Guinea on
July 21, the Japanese advanced over rugged Owen-Stanley Range in
New Guinea to try and seize Port Moresby by the land route with only
a regimental-sized force. They advanced along the Kokoda Trail,
which was believed to be unable to support major offensive opera-
tions. MacArthur found himself on the defensive. At the same time,
Australians and a small contingent of U.S. combat engineers defeated
a supporting Japanese amphibious assault at Milne Bay on July 25.
King, meanwhile, exercising his command prerogative, launched
naval and marine forces against Japanese positions at Tulagi and
Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. It was one of the most important deci-
sions of the Pacific War. Guadalcanal was invaded only because the
Japanese were building an airfield there.64
Guadalcanal proved to be a microcosm for the entire Pacific
theater—a campaign of amphibious assaults and fierce naval, air,
and jungle battles. The marines seized Tulagi after a short, stiff fight.
On Guadalcanal, they simply waded ashore as the Japanese construc-
tion workers ran off into the jungle. Upon landing, they found a pesti-
lential, monsoon-swept, hellhole. The airfield and abandoned
Japanese bulldozers were secured, and the marines began to establish
security perimeters, finish the airfield, and hunker down for the
Japanese counterattack. The 11th (Navy) Air Fleet in Rabaul had just
the range to get its medium bombers to Guadalcanal. But once there,
they had little time to deliver their attacks and did so without land-
based fighter coverage. Japanese carrier aviation was so reduced after
Midway that it could provide only temporary air coverage before
it had to withdraw to refuel its few carriers in safer waters. The
American carriers were under the same constraints and vulnerable to
Japanese submarines and land-based aircraft. The Japanese counterat-
tacked immediately from air and sea, winning the lopsided night vic-
tory of Savo Island on August 8–9, 1942. However, the Japanese
commander missed a golden opportunity to sink U.S. transport and
supply shipping, which slipped away the next day and left the
marines to their own devices.65
The Japanese continued to make critical errors. Underestimating
the marines, they landed the bad-luck Ichiki Detachment (one battal-
ion) in an attempt to recapture the airstrip, now named Henderson
Field. On August 21, Ichiki’s troops were wiped out in one night at
the Battle of the Ilu River. Additional Japanese reinforcements were
turned back on August 24 thanks to the timely return of the U.S. Navy.
Over the course of the next six months, there were six more major
naval battles and at least nine land battles—with attritional air combat
occurring daily. After a series of naval battles in November, the U.S.
Army and Marine forces resumed their offensive to push the Japanese
off the island for good. By the time the campaign ended in early 1943,
IJN land-based aviation was as decimated as its carrier counterparts.
The Japanese lost 24,000 men to death alone; however, they salvaged
some of their troops from the defeat with a seaborne evacuation under
the noses of the Americans. American losses were no less severe, but
they could afford these losses while the Japanese could not.66
The strategic repercussions of Guadalcanal were immense—the
Japanese China Expeditionary Army, preparing to seize the GMD
capital at Chunking, had to cancel its offensive as IGHQ diverted lim-
ited reinforcements and supplies south to attempt to regain the initia-
tive. In Tokyo, Tojo and other generals engaged in screaming matches
at meetings, and a fistfight broke out between two of his subordinates.
The Japanese abandoned their efforts in the Solomons and chose to
make New Guinea the focus of their efforts to defeat the Allies.
Guadalcanal had diverted resources from New Guinea in the critical
period after the Japanese culminated along the crest of the Owen
Stanley Range.67 The Allied counteroffensive operated under the same
harsh conditions that plagued their antagonists. By November

the Australians, with American support, had captured Kokoda.
MacArthur now focused his efforts on the capture of the two key towns
on the northern coast—Buna and Gona. While fierce fighting raged
on Guadalcanal, MacArthur’s Aussies and Yanks met stiff opposition,
especially at Buna. Fortunately, the Australians captured Gona
on December 9, 1942, and were able to assist the American effort, and
Buna fell in early January 1943. The Japanese garrison had died vir-
tually to the last man. One bastion remained, at Sanananda, but the
Japanese logistics situation had become intolerable and on January 13,
1943, the IJA troops who could still move withdrew further north to
Lae and Salamaua.68
Far to the north, a deadly sideshow played itself out. The Americans
tried with naval forces to cut supply lines to the Japanese-occupied
islands of Kiska and Attu. In March 1943, a larger force of warships
under Vice Admiral Hosagaya fought an indecisive engagement near
the Komodorski Islands in the north Pacific with Admiral Charles
McMorris. By May, the Americans landed on Attu amidst ice, snow,
and fog. After a bloody slog, another American division commander
was relieved, and the island was not secured for two weeks. The
Japanese defenders led by Colonel Yamasaki Yasuyo had pulled into
the interior and died fighting to the last man—a chilling preview of
things to come. As at Guadalcanal, the Japanese successfully withdrew
their garrison from Kiska. Yamasaki’s suicidal tactics “electrified” the
leaders and population of Japan, giving them hope that Attu guyokusai
(transcendent spirit) might indeed give them victory.69
As the battles in the southwest Pacific wound down, Allied leaders
met in Casablanca, and an arrangement was born that has become
known as the dual advance. The Japanese would have to defend
against major offensives from both the southwest and central Pacific
at the same time, and broad pressure would be applied against
Japanese defenses. The first phase of this dual advance became more
generally known as island hopping because once Americans realized
that they need not take every island, they began “hopping” past
many of Japan’s most formidable strongholds. In the southwest, two
mutually supporting offensives to take Rabaul were launched.
One involved Admiral Halsey advancing up the Solomons while
MacArthur advanced with American-Australian forces along the
north shore of New Guinea. Eventually, the two offensives would
converge on the island of New Britain, where the huge fortress of

Rabaul was located.70
In the southwest, the Japanese learned that once the Americans had
seized an airfield or anchorage and established a secure perimeter,
they could fight from a superior defensive posture against the ill-
supplied Japanese ground forces. Anticipating another round of
Allied offensives, IGHQ began moving reinforcements from other the-
aters to New Guinea. In early March 1943, MacArthur’s air forces,
including B-25 medium bombers, annihilated a convoy carrying the
Japanese 51st Division in the Bismarck Sea. IGHQ overreacted to this
battle by never attempting another major convoy again, routing most
of the reinforcements through western New Guinea. This placed an
even bigger strain on the inadequate Japanese supply lines.71
That spring, Yamamoto launched an air counteroffensive (I-Go)
against Allied bases and shipping in an attempt to recapture the initia-
tive. Using precious carrier pilots, he gained little as a result and lost
about as many planes and pilots as the Allies. Worse, he lost his own
life when U.S. code breakers detected his movement plans and used
deadly P-38 fighters to ambush the bombers transporting him and
his staff. Although Yamamoto’s strategic and operational acumen
have been overstated, his loss was a real blow to the IJN’s morale.72
That summer, MacArthur and Halsey advanced simultaneously;
MacArthur along the coast of New Guinea and Halsey against the Jap-
anese airfield at Munda on New Georgia Island. The Japanese grand
strategy shifted to a defense on all fronts to confront these offensives
in the south. To deal with manpower shortages, IGHQ conscripted
over 170,000 Koreans, assigning them to labor and POW guard units.73
The Japanese 18th Army in New Guinea had been attempting to seize
the Australian airfield at Wau, but MacArthur’s attack relieved the
pressure, bypassing their defenses. Halsey’s force, on the other hand,
came under fierce attack by Japanese land, air, and naval forces. None-
theless, by the end of August, the U.S. Army had had secured Munda.
Throughout these operations, a number of fierce naval battles occurred,
but the IJN found itself facing improved Navy tactics and crews who
gave as good as they got. Halsey advanced up the Solomons methodi-
cally, being careful to go no further than his air support would allow
and chewing up Japanese air forces in the process.74
MacArthur’s offensive relentlessly ground north toward the Huon
Peninsula of New Guinea that pushed toward Rabaul from the west.
Like Halsey, he neutralized Japanese airpower in the area. Lae and

Salamaua fell, in part due to the first operational airborne assault of
the campaign that seized a nearby air base. The Americans advanced
their timetable, realizing that they might not need to actually capture
the Rabaul with its 80,000 Japanese troops, but instead neutralize it
with air and sea power, leaving its defenders cut off and isolated.75
Japan’s grip on command of the air was slipping fast. Allied aircraft
plagued the skies over Rabaul as new more deadly U.S. fighters and
tactics challenged the hegemony of the Zero. Halsey bypassed the
Japanese garrison on Kolombangara and seized the key island of
Bougainville and its airfields in November 1943 in one of the most
well-executed operations of the war. Instead of occupying the entire
island, the Americans established their airfields and then set up
a defensive perimeter around them, defying the Japanese to attack.
Halsey not only distracted the Japanese from MacArthur’s upcoming
operations, but fighters from the captured bases on Bougainville
escorted bombers in attacks against Rabaul. A punishing sequence
of air and sea battles erupted around Rabaul and the Northern
Solomons. These battles established American command of the sea
and air around Bougainville.76 American long and medium-range
bombers now cratered airfields and attacked the anchorages with
impunity.
By March 1944, fighters were flying from airfields on New Britain;
however, Rabaul had already been isolated by that time. Allied aircraft
punished Rabaul throughout these operations and in late February,
Imperial Japanese Headquarters decided to leave only ground forces to
defend it. By April, Rabaul’s airfields were neither usable nor defensible.
The Allies, secure in their defensive positions, simply left the consider-
able Japanese ground forces to their own devices. MacArthur continued
his spectacular advance toward bases in western New Guinea from
which he could launch an invasion of the Philippines. In April 1944,
MacArthur’s Sixth Army conducted three simultaneous amphibious
operations, again aided by airborne forces behind the main Japanese
18th Army front. He captured the key anchorage and airfields at Hollan-
dia and cut the 18th Army off from the Second Area Army in western
New Guinea. The 18th Army was now as isolated and irrelevant as the
defenders at Rabaul—although the Australians would have to watch
them while MacArthur moved north to the Philippines.77
While the Japanese gaze remained fixed on the southwest Pacific, a
new offensive exploded in the central Pacific in late 1943. Situated on
the flank of this advance were the Gilbert Islands, which had been
seized at the beginning of the war. The Americans felt it imperative
to neutralize them prior to driving against the Marshall Islands on
the axis of advance toward the western Pacific and Philippines. The
campaign opened with an assault against the Tarawa Atoll on Novem-
ber 20. It was a bloody opening to the campaign, and the Japanese gar-
rison inflicted almost 3,000 casualties on the U.S. Marines, again dying
almost to the last man. Tarawa was a slaughter that shocked the
American public—but everyone learned from this tragedy.78
The American amphibious juggernaut next struck Kwajalein in
the Marshall Islands, selecting its objectives based on existing
Japanese airfields or suitability to build such. Japanese Micronesia
was defended by the 31st Army, but it was scattered and the real
defense was in the hands of the navy. However, most of the available
naval forces had been siphoned to deal with the offensives ongoing
in the southwest Pacific. In January 1944, U.S. forces landed on the
islands of Roi and Namur, and on the main island of Kwajalein. Air
support was provided mostly by the new fast carrier task forces of
Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance’s Fifth Fleet. The IJN, with no mean-
ingful naval air power, barely contested these operations. For the cost
of about 800 American lives, Spruance secured a major anchorage
and operating base in the central Pacific. Admiral Nimitz moved the
American timetable forward and seized the important but lightly
defended Eniwetok Atoll some 300 miles further west later in Febru-
ary. Air support came entirely from Spruance’s fast carriers. The
Japanese had no counter as they slowly tried to rebuild their carrier
forces after the punishing carrier battles of 1942 and 1943. Spruance
pushed Admiral Marc Mitscher ’s fast carriers west to attack the
Japanese 4th Fleet at Truk in the Carolines. The result was a Pearl
Harbor in reverse—especially March 30–31. Almost 200,0000 tons of
shipping tonnage was sunk and 270 enemy aircraft destroyed. Truk,
like Rabaul, had been neutralized, and the Americans decided there
was no need to capture it. Air power, particularly carrier air power,
had made possible bypassing the Japanese “pillars of Hercules” in
the Pacific—Rabual and Truk.79
Only in the CBI theater did the Japanese maintain their hold on the
initiative. The Allies began construction on a new road from Ledo in
British Assam to connect with portions of the Burma Road not taken
by Japan as they continued to fly supplies to Chiang over the “Hump”
of the Himalayas. IGHQ decided to take the offensive in the spring of
1944 against India to cut the Ledo road, drive the British from Assam,
and starve Chiang for supplies. The Japanese had just finished the
infamous Thai-Burma railroad in December 1943, which had been
built to enable offensive operations, but logistics were still a great
weakness. The 15th Army, commanded by General Mutaguchi Renya,
was also hampered by bickering between Mutaguchi and his three
divisional commanders. By now, Allied superiority in men, material,
experience, and air power had reached decisive levels. General
William Slim, in a masterful campaign, defeated Mutaguchi’s forces
at Aykab, Imphal, and Kohima that spring. On the Japanese flank in
North Burma, Stillwell’s Sino-American forces threatened Mitkyina
in late May and took it on August 3, 1944. The Japanese Army’s horrid
logistics systems collapsed, and the 15th Army literally fell apart in
the greatest disaster to overtake the IJA so far during the war. Starv-
ing, many of Mutaguchi’s troops resorted to cannibalism to stay
alive.80
By early 1944, Japan was on the horns of a strategic dilemma, and
only in China did her military efforts meet with success. Meanwhile,
Japan’s island empire, seized at little cost, was now being recaptured
at great cost—to Japan. By mid-1943, the Americans had fixed the
problems with their torpedoes, and the Pacific Submarine Command
under Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood conducted history’s only
successful submarine campaign. By early 1944, more than 3 million
tons of Japanese shipping had been sunk. By the end of the war, U.S.
submarines had sunk over 5 million tons of enemy shipping. The
Japanese were now without a merchant marine to supply their far-
flung empire.81
MacArthur continued to make astonishing progress. By late May,
his forces had seized terrain for bomber bases that could reach the
southern Philippines at Biak. While the U.S. Navy distracted the
Japanese in the central Pacific, MacArthur opportunistically seized
the remainder of his objectives at the western end of New Guinea.
The American seizure of the island of Morotai in September put
MacArthur’s forces 300 miles south of Mindanao in the Philippines.82
While MacArthur conducted a “triphibious” blitzkrieg up New
Guinea, disaster visited the Japanese Navy in the Philippine Sea. The
Japanese had been attempting to rebuild their carrier force to chal-
lenge the U.S. Navy. Operation A-GO, the defense of the Marianas,
was to provide the ideal opportunity to turn the tables on the overcon-
fident Americans. Spruance and the Fifth Fleet arrived with a
juggernaut of their own to take the critical Mariana Islands, which

would put the new B-29 American bombers within range of the
Japanese Home Islands. Over two days of aerial combat, which
became known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot, U.S. carrier pilots and
anti-aircraft guns destroyed Japanese carrier aviation. Additionally,
American submarines and aviators sank three more Japanese carriers.
Ashore the fighting was fierce, especially at Saipan, where 30,000
Japanese inflicted 14,000 American casualties. The Japanese garrison
and civilians died virtually to the last man, woman, and child with
horrified American soldiers watching as Japanese mothers tossed
their babies off a “suicide cliff.” The disaster visited upon Japanese
arms in the Marianas was so severe that the Tojo government resigned
in disgrace.83
The Japanese Army and Navy had no intention of quitting the
fight.84 In fact, that summer in China, the Japanese conducted a pun-
ishing series of offensives against the Nationalists—the Ichi-go Offen-
sive. Their purpose was to capture air bases in China that were being
used by the new B-29 bombers of the Fourteenth Air Force, which
began a strategic bombing campaign against Japan. Rapid movement
of Chinese and American troops from Burma managed to save Chiang
from complete collapse, but the air bases were lost and Changsha finally
captured. Japan simply did not have enough troops to complete the con-
quest. The Americans responded by moving the B-29s to the newly cap-
tured Marianas, where they could continue to bomb Japan from newly
captured airstrips in Saipan and Tinian. Ichi-go—Japan’s largest land
operation of the war—continued until February 1945, but in the end it
only brought further misery to the long-suffering Chinese and no peace
for the Japanese.85
Throughout the spring and summer of 1944, the Allied strategic
councils were divided on which step to take next. After much bicker-
ing and fighting between Admiral King and MacArthur, FDR person-
ally gave the direction to invade the Philippines. The thought was that
the invasion of the Philippines might end the war because its capture
by the Americans would sever the Japanese Home Islands from their
critical oil and other strategic resources in the Indies. A precursor to
the invasion involved seizing key islands in the Palaus and the atoll
as well as anchorage at Ulithi. In early September, Admiral Halsey
sailed with 15 fast aircraft carriers and escorts for a series of pre-
invasion raids. The Americans had gone beyond the original Kido
Butai construct by a factor of four. Halsey’s carriers savaged airfields
in the Philippines and the Western Carolines. He reported light air

defenses and recommended that the timetable for the Philippine inva-
sion be moved up to October and that several other invasions—such
as at Peleliu—be cancelled. Invasions of Mindanao and Yap were
cancelled, but Morotai and Peleliu went as scheduled.
Peleliu (appropriately named STALEMATE) turned out to be a
charnel house. The new Japanese strategy was geared toward bleed-
ing the Americans to convince the U.S. home front to ask its
government to abandon its unconditional surrender position and
negotiate a la the Russo-Japanese War. At Peleliu the skillful defend-
ers, veterans from Manchuria, achieved a nearly one-to-one ratio of
American to Japanese casualties during a two-month nightmare bat-
tle, and the U.S. Army had to be called in to relieve the shattered 1st
Marine Division.86 Halsey sortied from newly seized anchorage at
Ulithi in early October to pound Formosa and the Ryukyus prior the
Philippine invasion. IGHQ mistakenly believed that an invasion of
Formosa was underway and activated the Sho (victory) plan for the
defense of Formosa, releasing carefully husbanded aircraft for its
defense. During a series of air battles, recently trained Japanese pilots
exaggerated their success so much that the leadership concluded they
had won a great victory. What had actually happened was that the
Americans shot down Japan’s precious reserve of trained carrier
pilots.87
The U.S. forces that sailed toward Leyte Gulf constituted the most
powerful assemblage of ships in history. Lieutenant General Walter
Krueger commanded the Sixth Army (200,000 troops) embarked and
escorted by the 738 ships of Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s Seventh
Fleet. Kinkaid was supported by Halsey’s Third Fleet, which included
17 aircraft carriers, six new battleships, and over 80 cruisers and
destroyers. Halsey, under Nimitz, had orders to destroy the Japanese
Fleet if it appeared—but which fleet? Halsey thought it should be the
carrier fleet.88
On October 20, Krueger ’s forces landed on Leyte, stunning the
Japanese—who believed they had defeated the Americans. The
emperor cancelled the plan to make the main fight in Luzon and
ordered the army and the navy to concentrate on Leyte—to make it
the great decisive battle for both the IJA and the IJN. It was, but they
lost. The IJN’s Sho plan for the Philippines involved three forces that
would converge on the U.S. transport and amphibious ships in Leyte
Gulf. The Southern and Center Forces were composed of Japan’s still
powerful surface fleet, while the Northern Force consisted of the

pitiful remains of Japan’s carriers and served as a decoy to lure the
American main carrier force to the north. On October 23, Halsey’s car-
riers decimated the weak Japanese land-based air forces while subma-
rines and aircraft slowly whittled down the strength of the Center
Force under Admiral Kurita Takeo. Kurita turned away after U.S.
Navy aircraft sank the super battleship Musashi. On the night of
October 24–25, PT boats, destroyers, cruisers, and the old battleships
raised from Pearl Harbor destroyed the Southern Force under
Admiral Nishimura Shoji. Meanwhile, Halsey detected the carriers
and took the bait, leaving the Leyte invasion beach unguarded.89
Kurita turned around and sailed through the San Bernardino Strait
at night and collided on the morning of October 25 with the American
covering force of destroyers and escort carriers. Then the real miracle
of the Pacific War occurred. The U.S. Navy’s “third string” aggres-
sively attacked Kurita’s potent force. Kurita, baffled by suicidal
destroyer torpedo attacks and harassment by fighters and torpedo
planes, came to believe he was up against Halsey. The Japanese admi-
ral broke off the action and turned away within sight of Leyte Gulf.
The American covering force lost three gallant escorts and one small
carrier. Ironically, a small kamikaze squadron, the first deliberate unit
created for this purpose in the war, attacked Kinkaid’s escort carriers
and managed to sink as many ships as Kurita had. Meanwhile, Halsey
savaged the decoy force and sank several of the empty carriers, but he
missed his chance to destroy the rest of Kurita’s surface ships. How-
ever, it mattered little. After Leyte, the Japanese Navy was a spent
force.90
Ashore on Leyte, the fight bogged down. General Yamashita, the
“Tiger of Malaya,” moved troops in to reinforce those already defend-
ing Leyte. Weather, too, helped the Japanese cause with three
typhoons, constant rain, and an earthquake that all made American
operations more difficult, especially air support. The Japanese fought
on despite being cut off and on December 15, MacArthur declared vic-
tory, although resistance continued on Leyte into April. General
Krueger and the Sixth Army next invaded Luzon in January 1945 at
the same location the Japanese had landed three years earlier. Manila
was destroyed in a fierce urban battle, and Yamashita retired to the
interior of the island. MacArthur spent the rest of the war liberating
the Philippines. Yamashita did not surrender until after the atomic
bombs were dropped.91
Returning to Burma, General Slim’s counteroffensive drove south

in the wake of the 15th Army’s disaster. The Japanese Ichigo offensive
had slowed the Allied advance in Burma as Chiang moved divisions
north to help with the crisis. By the spring of 1945, the Japanese aban-
doned Rangoon, and a British amphibious operation liberated the
undefended city that May.92
ARMAGEDDON
With the destruction of the Japanese fleet and the fall of the
Philippines imminent, America and her allies were now poised to begin
the final destruction of Japan. The Japanese adopted the Ketsu-go and
Ten-go (Okinawa) defense plans that relied on attrition and kamikaze
tactics to bleed the Americans into agreeing to a peace rather than
invade Japan. The final great battles of the Pacific War—Iwo Jima and
Okinawa—reflect this grim strategy. The capture of these islands was
considered absolutely essential to enable an invasion of the Home
Islands. Iwo Jima, a sulfurous, volcanic rock 600 miles south of Japan,
had airfields from which Japanese fighters could attack B-29s along with
radar and radio facilities to send to the main islands warnings of
impending raids. Okinawa, on the other hand, would serve as the prin-
cipal staging base for the invasion of Kyushu (Olympic).93
Spruance was given the task of capturing Iwo. Marines landed on
February 16, 1945. Despite an extensive air assault and a powerful
naval bombardment, General Kuribayashi Tadamichi’s 21,000 soldiers
sold their lives dearly, burrowing into caves and then emerging from
their subterranean sanctuaries to kill marines. The Japanese died
nearly to the last man and inflicted over 28,000 casualties on the
Americans in the bloodiest month in U.S. Marine Corps history.94
Okinawa was Iwo Jima on a larger scale with the added terror weapon
of mass kamikaze attacks originating from Japan and Formosa.
General Simon B. Buckner Jr. commanded the Tenth Army with over
half a million men. During the course of the two-month campaign,
the Japanese sank 21 U.S. ships, seriously damaged 66, and inflicted
more than 10,000 casualties—the highest naval losses of the Pacific
War after Guadalcanal. Ashore, the butcher bill was no less sobering
and was a reflection of the horrors of total war. In addition to the anni-
hilation of the 100,000-man Japanese garrison, the civilian population
lost at least 80,000 killed. American casualties numbered almost
70,000 killed, wounded, and missing, including General Buckner, who

was killed during the last days of the campaign.95
Okinawa was another defeat for the Japanese, but the hardliners,
mostly in the army, were not inclined to surrender, despite U.S. fire-
bombing that had destroyed most of Japan’s major cities. Army lead-
ers believed that another bloodbath would convince the Americans
to back down from their harsh surrender terms. American casualty
estimates for the Kyushu operation and subsequent invasion of the
Tokyo area on the island of Honshu amounted to over 720,000 “dead
and evacuated wounded” according to preinvasion studies. Two other
factors came into play to end the war. As preparations for the invasion
of Japan proceeded apace, two atomic weapons produced by the
secret Manhattan Project were shipped to a special B-29 unit located
on Tinian. The other factor was the entry of the Soviet Union into the
contest.96
On August 6, 1945, a B-29 piloted by Colonel Paul Tibbits dropped
the first atomic bomb on the port city of Hiroshima, killing tens of
thousands instantly, with the toll quickly climbing to 80,000 from
residual blast and radiation deaths. On August 9, the Red Army
invaded Manchuria, unleashing its form of blitzkrieg on the weak-
ened KTA. Over the next few weeks, mechanized Soviet armies over-
ran the Japanese puppet state as Japanese forces retreated south to
prepared defenses near the border with Korea. Hours after the Soviets
attacked, a second bomb obliterated Nagasaki, and 35,000 more
Japanese were incinerated. The Japanese Army realized its strategy
for defending Kyushu was hopeless if the Americans could vaporize
its defenses. At the last moment, radical elements of the Japanese
Guards Division in Tokyo attempted to prevent the emperor from
broadcasting the surrender over the radio. Loyal troops suppressed
this coup and on August 15, Hirohito asked his people to “endure
the unendurable.” On September 2, General MacArthur received the
surrender of the Japanese dignitaries on behalf of the Allied powers
aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The final bill in lives
and property damage will never be known, but the deaths due to the
Greater East Asian War probably exceeded 25 million (more than
two thirds civilians).97
Chapter 9
After the Samurai
Japan humbled. Her cities ruined, her people chastened. Had the
samurai spirit, pseudo-bushido or not, really been tamed? The Allies,
embodied by the cult of personality built around Douglas MacArthur,
the new “viceroy” of the U.S. occupation of Japan, tried to legislate the
end of Japanese military history. The story of the American attempt to
put the samurai genie back in the bottle brings to mind the words of
Immanuel Kant, “out of timber so crooked as that from which man is
made nothing entirely straight can be built.”1 Tokugawa Ieyasu put
the samurai genie in the bottle by disarming and attained “peace”
for over 200 years. The Americans still have another 130 years to go.
A short anecdote might help.
During my 23 years in the U.S. Navy, I spent over eight years in
western Pacific assignments, mostly in Japan. Years later, I had a con-
versation with an older American gentleman after a lecture I had
given to a local community group about security issues in the Pacific.
He was not a veteran of World War II but certainly someone who
had been alive when Pearl Harbor occurred. He asked, “Do you mean
to tell me that the Japs have a navy again?” “Why yes, and it is prob-
ably one of the four or five most capable navies in the Pacific, if not
in the world,” I answered. “How the hell did we let ’em do that?” he
responded with some heat. How indeed? This chapter will try to
explain that, and much more. The samurai spirit, its modern bushido
variant, or any national ethos, cannot simply be legislated out of exis-

tence. Wherever military institutions exist, culture and deep-seated,
long-running tendencies will out. Such is the case of the self-defense
forces the United States eventually came to allow Japan to possess.
Japan’s military was reborn sooner rather than later and in direct
relation to the emergence of the uncertain postwar world dominated
by two major powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. As
mutual suspicion turned into the mutual antipathy of the Cold War,
so too did Japan’s geostrategic position in northeast Asia begin to
appear all the more important to an emerging idea of containing
global communism. Japan’s brief fling as the “Sweden of the Pacific”
did not last long. The price for political independence, the treaty
signed in 1952 that officially ended the occupation of Japan (although
not for the Rykukus), equated to partnership, albeit a junior partner-
ship, in the great game of containing the communist forces that
seemed to grow in influence and danger with every new develop-
ment. That story dominates Japan’s military history after Septem-
ber 1945 until 1991, when the Soviet Union officially ceased to be.
* * *
At noon August 15, 1945, radios crackled in Japan and the alien voice
of the Showa emperor Hirohito came forth—a voice that most Japa-
nese had never heard. Famous photographs of the event show many
Japanese kneeling in reverence before their radios as the “Son of
Heaven” asked them to “endure the unendurable” and surrender
their sacred soil to the triumphant Americans. A week earlier, the first
atomic bombs had dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. In John Dower’s account, some Japanese could not even
understand Hirohito’s thin, reedy voice speaking its highly formal
court dialect of Japanese. But they did understand enough to know
that they had lost. The Yamato race and its fearsome samurai tradition
had been defeated by the gaijin (barbarians/foreigners) from the East.2
Millions of Japanese soldiers, airmen, and sailors remained under
arms across the vast expanses of the Pacific and Asia. From bypassed
lonely island outposts, where they starved, to the once-mighty Kwan-
tung Army fighting for its life in Manchuria against the might of the
Red Army, to the as yet undefeated armies in China, Indochina, and
the Dutch East Indies, the problem of how to disarm these immense
forces, or even get them to surrender, remained.3 What happened in
After the Samurai 229
the next several months equates to a succession of miracles. Asia stood

on the brink of a general peace, but catastrophic famine and disease
would continue if the fighting did not end. Why did the fanatical
Imperial Army do what many of them had sworn they would never
do—surrender? The simple answer is that the Japanese military
obeyed its supreme warlord—although it was touch and go, especially
in China and Indochina. Members of the imperial family had to be
sent to get the Japanese military commanders in mainland Asia to
accept the reality of defeat.4
Not all Japanese surrendered. Many soldiers retreated into caves
and jungles and continued to resist, or more often simply survive, in
places like Guam and the Philippines. Their commitment to obedience
was overcome only by the advance of civilization and discovery, or a
belated conviction that the war must be over. Some of them certainly
died—in small groups or alone—of disease, suicide, and starvation
and their remains will probably never be found. One of the most
bizarre incidents occurred, fittingly, on Peleliu in 1947 when an officer
and 32 men attacked the small marine garrison (which included
women and children) with grenades and small arms. Reinforcements
were called in, and a Japanese admiral brought in to coax the officer
to surrender with his men, his sword, and the battle flag.5
All across Asia, the hated conquerors adopted new roles as an
unwelcome, but often necessary, presence. As the colonial powers
returned to their possessions, these Japanese troops often found them-
selves being used by their former enemies to maintain law and order.
Examples included Shanghai, which the Japanese continued to police
into the fall of 1945. The precise analogy would be the Soviets having
the surrendered German Sixth Army police Stalingrad in 1943. As the
U.S. Marines arrived at Tianjin in north China, they found themselves
protecting their former enemies—who had surrendered in an orderly
fashion—from their erstwhile allies, the nationalist Chinese. In other
areas, the GMD and the Japanese made common cause against the
Chinese Communists under Mao. In short, the war in China had not
ended; its character had simply changed to that of a civil war with
an unwanted and defeated army along with many Japanese civilians
stuck in the middle.6
Elsewhere in Asia, Japanese troops also kept the peace until the
colonial powers could return. Only in Malaysia were the European
rulers welcomed back with any degree of enthusiasm.7 In Vietnam,
the strapped Allied commander resorted to using Japanese troops to
patrol the streets of Saigon to maintain order. The Japanese incurred

over 100 casualties while fighting for the Allies against insurgents
around the city by the end of October 1945. In another case, the Viet-
minh convinced Japanese soldiers to desert and join their war of
independence against the British and the returning French. Many of
these Japanese, especially the officers and NCOs, provided valuable
training to the Vietminh. In Korea, polite relations between the arriv-
ing Americans and the Japanese antagonized the locals. General
Courtney Hodges was so strapped for resources that he retained the
existing Japanese government to run things until the Americans could
get a working military government in place.8 Actions like these had
long-term negative consequences during the Cold War.
In Indonesia, the situation was extremely complex, with the Japa-
nese Army accommodating both sides as they maintained order until
the first small contingents of British troops arrived to help the Dutch
reoccupy their colony. In the end, the Japanese Army stayed much
longer than it wanted to, fighting on in many small engagements as
it attempted to maintain order, with some Japanese deserting (usually
those married to locals) to the independence forces and others fighting
alongside the British and the Dutch. 9 The Japanese military had
returned to its samurai origins as policemen, specialists in military tac-
tics, or armed keepers of the peace—for whoever was in charge.
Concurrently, the U.S. military arrived in Japan in all its majesty.
MacArthur had landed by airplane at Atsugi on August 30, 1945. Sev-
eral days later, on September 2, he oversaw the unconditional surren-
der of Japan aboard the battleship USS Missouri, which was lying at
anchor in Tokyo Bay.10 According to Dower, “In 1853, a modest fleet
of four vessels . . . arrived to force the country open. In 1945, a huge,
glistening armada came back to close it.”11 MacArthur, the supreme
commander for the allied powers (SCAP) and his occupation
government immediately went to work to address Japan’s biggest
problem—militarism. Although not quite on the same scale as in
Europe, war crimes tribunals began, and a strategic bombing survey
of the Far East soon discovered the vast destruction done to Japan’s
infrastructure by the U.S. submarine offensive and Lemay’s bomb-
ing. 12 Japan was on the verge of starvation and as in Europe, the
Americans found that quick action was needed to avoid a humanitar-
ian disaster. MacArthur’s two most important actions occurred in the
first two years of occupation. First, on the advice of Brigadier General
Bonner Fellers, he retained Hirohito as emperor, albeit with much
reduced powers.13 At one stroke, he solved a myriad of potential prob-

lems and created a constitutional monarchy the Meiji oligarchs could
have scarcely imagined. He then had his lawyers and government
experts give Japan a liberal democratic constitution. The most impor-
tant element of the new constitution was Article 9, which is often
known as the no war clause:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.14 [emphasis added]
Article 9 led to a sustained U.S. commitment to provide for Japan’s
security and gave birth to the Yoshida Doctrine, named after Japan’s
first postwar prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru. “The Yoshida Doctrine
became the mainstream policy of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP]
—a party not even formed until almost a year after Yoshida’s resigna-
tion.” This doctrine, in addition to acknowledging the U.S. role in
underwriting Japan’s defense, also stipulated that Japan would use
primarily economic power to influence its destiny. Finally, it commit-
ted Japan to the maintenance of only lightly armed forces for domestic
policing. 15 All three elements were interlinked, but the doctrine
became the pillar of Japan’s economic recovery and its long reluctance
to employ any power, military or otherwise, outside of Japan or to
build so-called offensive weapons such as bombers and aircraft car-
riers. It later included Japan’s promise to never build or employ
nuclear weapons, nor to allow them on her soil.16
MacArthur’s programs for the ideological and industrial demilita-
rization of Japan as well as the war crimes process intersected when
he used the former Japanese Imperial Officer School (Japan’s West
Point) to house the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMTFE). By 1948, when the verdicts were finally executed, including
death sentences, most observers agreed that the proceedings were a
sham. The consequences of the IMTFE for history have been unfortu-
nate because of the ongoing problem of Japanese national war guilt.
Unlike in Germany, divided and prostrate with her warlord (Hitler)
dead and his henchmen hunted and (mostly) punished, the issue of
war guilt never really achieved acceptance inside Japan. Years later,
Japanese prime ministers would make obligatory trips to the “sacred”
Yasukuni Shrine, where the names of some of the “war criminals” are
listed. In addition, Japanese public education whitewashed Japan’s
culpability in the instigation of the catastrophic Greater East Asian
War, and the apologists for Japan inside Japan (such as the Ministry
of Education) were vindicated by Japanese courts, and they curtailed
and censored Japanese historian Ienaga Saburo’s attempts for a more
honest account of that history.17 These processes proceeded apace,
and the Japanese political elites in power under MacArthur’s benevo-
lent pro-consulship, especially Yoshida, made strenuous efforts to
limit any hint of militarism. In some cases, valuable scientific and
industrial equipment that could have been used in efforts for recovery
was destroyed.18 Events soon outpaced the realistic goals of Mr. Yosh-
ida as well as American visions for a peaceful, productive Japan with
large markets for American goods.
The turning point was 1949, when what George Kennan had presci-
ently warned of came to pass—the Soviet Union indeed intended to
expand on her considerable gains from World War II and remained
as committed as ever to the program of worldwide revolution under
the malevolent leadership of Joseph Stalin.19 The situation in Berlin
had worsened and by 1949, the first battle of the Cold War—the Berlin
Airlift—occurred. At the same time, the tide of worldwide revolu-
tion was aided by the victory of the Chinese Communists under Mao
Zedong over the Nationalists and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang retreated
to Taiwan, where both the relatively unscathed Japanese infrastruc-
ture and population—weakened by war and overawed by his mili-
tary—provided him sanctuary. It seemed that Asia’s next war would
occur along the Taiwan Strait, probably with a Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) invasion. However, events soon proved everyone wrong.
Also shortly after World War II, in Southeast Asia, post colonial wars
and revolutions proceeded without pause.20
It was during this difficult time that the newly organized U.S.
National Security Council (NSC) devised its strategy vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union and the forces of communism. Entitled NSC-68, the strat-
egy advocated both military and political containment of
communism. Japan was squarely inside the defensive scheme envi-
sioned by this strategy, but Korea was not. NSC-68 might never have
been adopted by the United States had the Korean War not occurred.
It meant beefing up the NATO alliance in Europe, defending Japan
militarily if necessary, and increasing U.S. defense expenditures in a

time of fiscal austerity. However, the fall of China and the Berlin Airlift
undermined faith in the existing strategy of massive nuclear retalia-
tion with air power. Too, the Soviets successfully tested their own
atomic bomb, which further diminished the deterrent value of the
U.S. nuclear arsenal.21
With the North Koran invasion of the South in June 1950, the U.S.
Army in Japan switched from cushy occupation duty to a desperate
war in Korea. Yoshida was forced to decide Japan’s role. Would he
allow Japan to be used as the springboard for U.S. military operations?
If he did, he would be divesting the country of its only organized mili-
tary forces for defense. He decided to go ahead and not challenge the
Americans, who after all had still not signed a peace treaty with Japan
and were still in occupation. The ramifications of this decision,
though, meant that Japan needed to provide a capability for her own
security, even if that security was mostly for domestic purposes. The
result was the establishment in July of the National Police Reserve
(NPR), which was a national police organization along the lines of
the Carabinieri in Italy. Yoshida authorized a force of 75,000 men,
and over 380,000 applied by the August 13 deadline, an indication of
chronic unemployment as well as a lingering martial spirit. This force
was under the direct control of Yoshida, making him a postwar sho-
gun of sorts. Similar to the first samurai, the purpose of this force
focused on “. . . civil unrest, public violence, and the like.” Its first
armaments, though, were modest and consisted of small arms and riot
control gear.22
From these humble beginnings sprang Japan’s Self Defense Forces
(SDF). Allied fortunes in Korea waxed and then waned with the Chi-
nese Communists’ entry into the war in late 1950. With U.S. military
resources strained by the Cold War and the hot Korean War, the Tru-
man administration pressed the Japanese to do more in their own
defense and brought an end to the period of disarmament. A formal
basing agreement that served as a precursor to today’s Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) was negotiated with the Yoshida government.
Because of this bargain, Yoshida avoided U.S. demands for a larger
security establishment but did agree to expand the NPR to 100,000
troops. Japan also negotiated with the free nations of the world at
San Francisco for a final peace treaty that came into effect in 1952,
and she reluctantly renamed the NPR the Security Force. The Security
Force included 40 light tanks, 18 small frigates for a maritime
self-defense force (MSDF), and 40 small reconnaissance aircraft. These

modest forces eventually became the three main services of Japan in
the modern era after an act of the Diet in 1954: the Ground Self
Defense Force (GSDF), the MSDF, and the Air Self-Defense Force
(ASDF). Yoshida obtained U.S. agreement not to deploy these forces
outside of Japanese sovereign territory. The equipment was all sup-
plied by the United States.23
The San Francisco peace treaty of September 1951 (which became
effective in 1952) formalized Japan’s Cold War role as an independent
power providing military bases for the United States in exchange for a
modest self-defense force. Just as NATO served as the regional system
for security in Europe, the so-called San Francisco System came to
symbolize the United States’ security structure in northeast Asia. At
the very center of this system lay the U.S. bases in Japan and the Ryu-
kyus (which was under the U.S. military government until 1972),
which served as a militarized island chain to contain Far East variants
of communism. Unfortunately, the treaty left unsettled many
territorial disputes in the region. Foremost among these were disputes
with Korea over islands in the Sea of Japan, with China and Taiwan
over the Senakaku Islands in the East China Sea, and with Russia over
the southernmost of the Kurile Islands.24 In 1954, the Japanese Diet
officially established the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) from the
pre-existing security force. The term self-defense was chosen rather
than the Japanese words for navy, army, or air force to emphasize
the alignment of this institution with Article 9 of the constitution.
The forces expanded again to twice the size of the original “police”
force envisioned by Yoshida—150,000 ground forces. There were an
additional 15,800 personnel in the JMSDF (i.e., the navy) and 6,287 in
the JASDF (i.e., the air force). A joint staff was also established with
20 military personnel and a civilian secretariat with over 10,000 civil-
ian employees. By 1960, the budget to support this force had grown
to $0.5 billion, almost $100 million more than Australia, another U.S.
ally, spent on defense at the time.25
Japan’s expansion of these forces, especially its ground forces,
engendered significant opposition from the political left in Japan, par-
ticularly the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese Socialist
Party (JSP). A series of disturbances in the late 1950s, which were rem-
iniscent of Tokugawa peasant protests, underscores this opposition.
These protests boiled over in 1960 during riots that surrounded the
revision of the Mutual Security Treaty by the Kishi Nobusuke
government. In January 1960, Kishi and President Dwight Eisenhower

signed the revised treaty, which was meant to decrease Japan’s reli-
ance on the United States for defense, but it required passage by the
Diet. A coalition, including some in the LDP as well as some violent
communist splinter groups, opposed passage of the treaty (nicknamed
Anpo). As the treaty was debated in the Diet, strikes and riots
occurred, including in downtown Tokyo. Diet opposition members
walked out and then the Treaty was approved. The author’s parents
(stationed in nearby Atsugi) were caught up in the violence but in an
interesting tactic, the rioters were preceded by agents who informed
bystanders to please go inside the stores and buildings until the mob
had passed! However, the reaction by the more conservative middle
class was not so easily constrained. A 22-year-old female student
was killed by a right-wing student and the U.S. president’s press sec-
retary’s vehicle was attacked. Eisenhower canceled his visit to Japan,
and Prime Minister Kishi resigned. In a bizarre coda—with an act
reminiscent of the assassination of the Meiji oligarch Osumi—a right-
wing student assassinated the leader of the JSP, Asanuma Inejiro, with
a samurai sword on national TV, as if to emphasize that the Japanese
left was right after all about the resurgence of militaristic bushido.26
These events most affected the GSDF and the way it was regarded by
the Japanese.
The 1960s brought a new factor into the Cold War dynamic of
Japan’s security—the Vietnam War. While U.S. allies Australia and
Korea sent combat forces to fight communism in Vietnam, the Japa-
nese relied upon the Yoshida Doctrine as modified by Sato Eisaku to
keep them out of the conflict who served as finance minister and later
as head of government in the late 1950s and 1960s. This modification
prevented the dispatch of any forces for use in collective security out-
side of Japan proper. Sato also formally enacted Japan’s “no nukes”
policy and outlawed the export of Japanese armaments. It was also
during the 1960s that Japan adopted the policy of spending no more
than 1 percent of gross national product (GNP) on defense. This
would prove a bonus when Japan’s economy expanded to become
the second largest in the world by the 1970s, giving Japanese politi-
cians a win-win situation. Japanese politicians could say they did not
spend large amounts of GNP on defense as compared to their partner,
the United States, while at the same time, having an ever-larger GNP
provided considerable flexibility in building and fielding the latest in
modern armaments. Because of Japan’s constraints and agreements
on armaments, her policy of not exporting armaments now applied to

the import of armaments, such as hardware from the United States.
This led her to build her own arms industry and ensured it always
had a domestic customer. It would also lead her to gain the leases to
build U.S.-designed systems such as the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft
and AEGIS radar system—which are massive technology transfers—
on a scale that no ally other than Great Britain would receive.27
In 1970, Japanese self-confidence as a result of the Yoshida Doctrine
was reflected in her first ever “white paper” entitled the “Defense of
Japan”:
We will face a greater need to cope with serious problems arising
both internally and internationally as a consequence of our eco-
nomic growth. Therefore, we must now stop being imitators,
and we must stop following in the wake of others; we must move
on toward our own aims of our own choosing.28
At the U.S. Army Command and Staff College majors learn the con-
cept of the DIME—diplomatic, information, military, and economic
sources of national power. From this perspective, it seems clear that
for Japan, the economic source of power held primacy. Based on an
analysis of Japan’s defense expenditures, behind this economic power
lay a considerable amount of military power that Japan found rela-
tively untied to any overseas commitments to collective security. In
some sense, Japan had become the Sweden of the Far East, except with
a much larger pot of GNP from which to buy weapons for “self-
defense.” Japan, compared to all other nations in the world, ranked
twelfth in defense spending (1970)—around $1.5 billion. The SDF
“possessed 400 main battle tanks, 450 combat aircraft, and 28 [princi-
pal] surface combatants.” For tanks and surface combatants, these
numbers nearly doubled in the next decade.29 Japanese leaders had
replicated the Meiji slogan of “rich country, strong army,” except the
strength applied to the entire military, and increasingly to its naval
forces. Japan’s wealth now vastly exceeded that of her Meiji predeces-
sor under a national mythos that officially eschewed a large standing
army.30
As the United States disengaged from Vietnam, the new adminis-
trations in Washington struggled with a strategic realignment vis-à-
vis the Soviet Union. The 1973 Yom Kippur War had shown the United
States that its force structure in the wake of the Vietnam catastrophe
was badly in need of an overhaul. As the United States looked to
reanimate her NATO alliance, so too did she turn to Japan to help
share the burden of containing the Soviet Union. This had the result
of giving Japan more, not less, of a say in her military relationship
with the United States. Japan was no longer the junior partner in the
San Francisco System.31
From the Japanese perspective, as reflected in a 1976 white paper,
the enemies looked very familiar—China and Russia (the Soviet
Union). The nexus for this influence continued to be identified, as it
had since the third century, as the Korean Peninsula, which the white
paper called “. . . the area most important to Japan’s peace and secu-
rity.”32 Another disturbing development was the increasing mention
of Japan’s criminal behavior in World War II (and her perceived failure
to atone for it) by Asia’s communist leaders who were drumming up
nationalist fervor via anti-Japanese rhetoric. In particular, China under
Deng Xiaoping and North Korea under Kim Il-Sung used Japan as a
foil. Of the two, the North Koreans proved the most hostile in the near
term, although China and Japan began to regard each other as eco-
nomic competitors, even while trade between the two countries sky-
rocketed and came to dominate the East Asian economic landscape.33
Tensions with Soviet Union remained high, and relations between
the two countries sank to their lowest point in September 1983 when
a Soviet SU-15 FLAGON air interceptor from an air base on Sakhalin
Island shot down Korean Airlines flight KAL-007 over the Tatar Strait
north of the Sea of Japan. Many Japanese nationals were aboard, and
the incident had the unintended result of pushing the Japanese and
South Korean governments together from their normal state of uneasy
alliance. The U.S. military used its bases in Japan to support salvage
operations that were attempting to locate KAL-007’s black box flight
recorder in the constricted waters of the northern Sea of Japan that
bordered both Japan and the Soviet Union.34
As the Cold War heated up, the Reagan administration imple-
mented a new aggressive Maritime Strategy across the globe in 1984.
Included in this strategy were courses of action intended to challenge
the Soviets on their Asian flank in both the Sea of Japan and the remote
frigid Sea of Okhotsk. The principal power projection bases would, of
course, be those secure locations in Japan protected by the now con-
siderable Self-Defense Forces of Japan. U.S. efforts at animating the
strategy came to a head in 1985 when the United States deployed large
three aircraft carrier battle group in the seas around Okinawa and then
proceeded north to continue with a two-carrier battle group
demonstration of power in the Soviets’ backyard in the Sea of Japan

just south of the huge Soviet complex of bases around Vladivostok.35
The North Koreans began to focus more of their rhetoric—and
eventually, deadly activities—upon the “imperialist lackeys” of the
United States. Their primary target was South Korea, though they
did also use kidnapped Japanese nationals to achieve their ends. Their
goal was to have the abductees teach North Korean agents to pass as
Japanese and then conduct terrorist attacks and “dirty tricks” against
the government of South Korea and its nationals. In this manner, the
totalitarian regime in Pyongyang hoped to undermine U.S. allies in
the region by further increasing Japanese-Korean animosities that lin-
gered from World War II. The entire scheme was exposed in 1987
when one of these North Korean agents provocateur was captured
and divulged the entire two-decade-long scheme. However, it was
only in 2002 that the son of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, finally admitted
North Korea’s duplicity in this international criminal activity against
Japan. Japan’s fears vis-à-vis North Korea had been earlier reflected
in her 1982 defense white paper.36
During this same period, the JSDF kept pace with events. By 1980,
Japanese expenditures on “defensive” forces came to a whopping
$8.96 billion—an amount that was on a par with France and Germany,
two nations that were heavily mobilized and invested in doing their
part to support the rejuvenated NATO alliance. Japanese attitudes,
remarkably, were also changing about the enshrined principal of the
revised Yoshida Doctrine involving the ban on nuclear weapons. First,
the Japanese people had come to rely heavily on civilian nuclear
power, a fact that had to some extent desensitized them to the more
controversial issue of nuclear weapons. In 1968, opinion polls in Japan
showed that over 50 percent of the population “expected Japan to
acquire [nuclear weapons] by the 1980s.” This does not indicate, how-
ever, that these same people favored the acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons. Although the acquisition of nuclear weapons did not happen,
the sheer number of Japanese nuclear reactors indicated that Japan
could easily and rapidly develop an atomic bomb from the nuclear
fuel that was providing her citizens with electricity.37
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro reflected Japan’s new attitude of
power from 1982 to 1987. He represented a type of neonationalist fig-
ure that Japan had not seen in power since World War II but who
had a clear precursor in Prime Minister Kishi. It was during this era
that the issue of the Japanese attitude of denial about their war guilt
reared its ugly head, although court challenges over Japanese primary
and secondary education had been going on for some time. By the
mid-1980s, Japanese public opinion polls showed that over half of
the Japanese polled indicated that they saw themselves as “superior
to Westerners.” This was in great part due to Japan’s remarkable eco-
nomic performance and characterization as an economic superpower
second only to the United States. Although Japan had committed itself
to keeping its defense expenditures under 1 percent of GNP, this was
not a legally mandated ceiling and by the late 1980s, Japan for the first
time exceeded this limit. Earlier in the 1980s, Japan had broadened the
commitment of the MSDF “to defense of sea lines out to 1,000 nautical
miles from Japan.” This made perfect sense given that Japan’s eco-
nomic viability rested almost entirely on its ability to import U.S. and
Persian Gulf oil and to ensure the flow of its manufactured items as
exports throughout the globe, especially automobiles. Accordingly,
the MSDF focused its resources and training on the critical skill of anti-
submarine warfare (ASW)—this time with Soviet submarines as the
adversary. This critical area had been grossly neglected by Japan in
World War II, a mistake she never intended to make again. Japan’s
rebuilt fleet made ASW its number one priority. The United States
was more than willing to share intelligence, technology, and tactical
methods with the MSDF to battle their common enemy. It was at this
time that Naksone made his famous statement that Japan would
become America’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” an image of startling
power given Japan’s humbling by aircraft carriers at Midway. Adding
power to this image, the United States forward staged the aircraft car-
rier USS Midway at Yokosuka Naval Station across the harbor from
Admiral Togo’s flagship Mikasa until after the end of the Persian Gulf
War in 1991. At the same time, Japan quietly allowed U.S. nuclear-
powered fast attack submarines to operate out of Sasebo in Kyushu,
although these submarines were not formally based in Japan in accor-
dance with the San Francisco Treaty (they almost certainly carried
nuclear weapons, as did the Midway).38
By the end of the Cold War, the JSDF consisted of over 250,000 sol-
diers, sailors, and airmen. Her navy was second only to the U.S. Navy
as the premier antisubmarine force in the western Pacific and included
sophisticated diesel-electric submarines. Her air forces included ASW
squadrons flying sophisticated P-3 aircraft and by 1991, she had built
her own EP-3 electronic warfare and reconnaissance aircraft that was
almost as sophisticated as its U.S. counterparts. Her ASDF included
indigenous and foreign state-of-the-art fighters such as the Mitsubishi

F-1 and the US F-16. The Mitsubishis were later modified to be attack
versions, which allowed them to ostensibly perform maritime strike
missions to contribute to the new mission to defend Japanese “sea
lines” of communications.39
AFTER THE COLD WAR
One might imagine that the end of the Cold War, then, marked the end
of the military history of Japan. The short answer as to why tensions
have kept Japan armed to the teeth lie across the short Tsushima Strait
in mainland Asia—longstanding animosities with North Korea flared
up in the 1990s. This kept Japan on her guard until another specter
reared its head in the early twenty-first century—resurgent China,
now an economic and military presence vying with Japan to be the
dominant East Asian economy. As so often occurs in history, the pass-
ing of the Cold War was simply a transition to another period with
both new and old challenges. Before long, nonstate entities, the
“always-there” problem of Korea, and the emerging colossus of China
came to the fore to keep Japan’s Self-Defense Forces well armed and
ready.
First, we must discuss North Korea. The northern half of the “her-
mit kingdom” remains Japan’s greatest challenge. In the early 1990s,
just prior to the death of the long-reigning Kim Il-Sung, the North
Koreans began a provocative series of ballistic missile tests over the
Sea of Japan in the direction of Japan using their latest intermediate
range missile, the Nodong-1. These tests caused great anxiety in Japan
and were one of many factors, including the North Koreans’ anti-
Japanese rhetoric, underwriting strong Japanese defense budgets in
the 1990s as well as Japan’s successful effort to acquire U.S. theater
antiballistic missile (ABM) technology. Another key North Korean
program was its arms exports industry that provided weapons to
nations hostile to the United States (and by association Japan) such
as Iran.40
These events may have presaged one means for Kim Il-Sung’s son,
Kim Jong-Il, to take strong control when his father died in 1994. How-
ever, the younger Kim’s first actions seemed calculated to mollify both
U.S. and Japanese concerns about a North Korean program to marry
nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles. In 1994, Kim signed the
“Agreed Framework” negotiated by former president Jimmy Carter in

which Kim promised to forgo nuclear weapons development and
instead invest in peaceful nuclear power in exchange for light water
nuclear power technology. Kim also cultivated relations with South
Korea, a signal that he intended to unite the Koreas to some degree
on the basis of joint animosity toward a rich, arrogant Japan (as he por-
trayed them). Not without cause, Kim and his counterparts in South
Korea portrayed the Japanese as still unrepentant over their criminal
rule in the early twentieth century, especially the notorious program
of Korean comfort women used by the Japanese Army during World
War II. In 1998, Kim launched a Taepodong-1 missile whose flight path
went over Japan, which significantly increased tensions. Most impor-
tantly, in 2000, Kim met publicly with South Korean prime minister
Kim Dae-jung in an apparent milestone in the easing of tensions
between the two Koreas. But the clear target of this meeting was
Japan. Evidently, the 1998 missile launch was of no concern to South
Korea’s leader.41
In the meantime, other than within the JSDF, can we see any other
indicators that reflect modern variants of the samurai, or bakufu, in
liberal democratic Japan? Perhaps the best case to be made for the
presence of modern versions of these institutions may be found in
the work of historian Chalmers Johnson, who claimed that Japan used
her Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI) as an “economic general
staff.” Additionally, the work of Johnson and others has emphasized
Japan’s incorporation of the vestiges of the samurai culture into her
Zaibatsu corporate culture—a patriarchal and male-dominated hier-
archy. The author’s own experience in the early 1990s in Japan sup-
ports a view that Japanese cultural norms are not so much new as
they are modernized older roles—with very strong ties to both the ser-
vice aspects of samurai bushido and its emphasis on interpersonal ties
and collective action on behalf of a superior. These superiors are now
captains of industry and Japan’s more powerful and accepted political
elites—they often frequent the same social circles.42
AFTER 9-11
The year 2000 might have been seminal in the military history of
Japan. Some observers claimed that the time appeared ripe to perhaps
undo the San Francisco System, and by extension the Yoshida
Doctrine, via the mechanism of a regional peace conference focused on

resolving Japan’s outstanding territorial disputes with China, Russia,
and the Koreas. But 2000 was also the year that the two Kims of North
and South Korea met.43 Worse was to come. September 11, 2001, saw
the coordinated Al Qaeda attacks on the United States and ushered
in the end of a period of strategic uncertainty for the world’s only
superpower. Hopes for an era of extended global peace went up in
the smoke of 9-11, which provided the occasion for Japan to take its
initial concrete steps away from the Yoshida Doctrine—although
she had belatedly deployed some minesweepers in 1991 to help clear
the Persian Gulf. At the same time, North Korea continued to provide
Japan’s neonationalists grounds for maintaining a strong SDF. The
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and ongoing provocation
from Korea served as the two lines of policy development that kept
Japan from cutting back on defense. They contributed to an ever big-
ger Japanese defense budget and ushered in a new era of Japanese
political leadership that was more ready to shape and expand Japan’s
ongoing contributions to global security as well as maintain a more
sympathetic regional public image.
After 9-11, the United States wanted a new relationship with Japan
that leveraged tangible military power to support the so-called Global
War on Terror (GWOT). After the Gulf War of 1991, Japan was heavily
criticized for not providing even indirect military assistance to the
United States and its allies when they liberated Kuwait—especially
because the restoration of stability to the region directly impacted
Japan’s interests and her oil lifeblood. Japan attempted to ameliorate
this negative image by wielding her most potent weapon, economic
power, and provided substantial help to the United States to pay for
the war (reputedly some $13 billion). However, this measure was
met in the United States with some discontent and was seen as a sign
that Japan was willing to spend treasure, but not blood, in her own
defense.44 The United States under the second President Bush and
his neoconservative advisors determined that this time, Japan would
do more than “pay off” the United States to protect its oil coming from
the Persian Gulf.45
Japan responded quickly to the U.S. request for mutual defense
against terrorism by passing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law on October 29, 2001. Especially pertinent to subsequent activities
by the JSD was this language:
The contents of materials and services that the Self-Defense

Forces provide are supply, transportation, repair and mainte-
nance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport
services, and base support. (Nonetheless, the Self-Defense Forces
shall not undertake the supply of weapons and ammunitions and shall
not supply fuel or conduct maintenance on aircraft preparing to take
off on military sorties, or undertake the land transportation of
weapons and ammunitions in foreign territories.)46 [emphasis
added]
Pursuant to this law, Japan agreed to deploy a battalion-sized element
to Iraq as part of the Japan Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group
(JIRSG). The deployments lasted until 2006, when the deteriorating
security situation saw the last Japanese ground forces withdrawn
from Iraq, although no losses had occurred despite intermittent shell-
ing of the Japanese by the insurgents. The final Japanese C-130 aircraft
providing logistics support to the coalition in Iraq departed in 2008.
Similarly, marine fuel oil was provided via MSDF oilers. However,
when it was learned that some of this fuel had gone to the aircraft car-
rier USS Kitty Hawk, which conducted strike missions from the Persian
Gulf, oiler support was ended in 2007. However, the measure did not
much hurt the United States because the Japanese simply restricted
themselves to providing oil to U.S. Navy warships in the Pacific, with
the United States picking up the fueling further west. So Japan helped
and is still helping today, albeit much further east.47
Against the backdrop of new precedents for all three of its services,
the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine continues to trouble Japan’s relations
with its Asian neighbors, especially both Koreas and China. Japanese
politicians are careful to characterize that they visit as “private indi-
viduals,” but every visit since 1985 has caused considerable angst
among Japan’s neighbors, especially the annual visits by Japanese
prime minister Koizumi Junichiro from 2001 to 2006 (this was the
same prime minister who was so aggressive in pushing Japan beyond
the limits of the Yoshida Doctrine). Koizumi’s last visit came after the
most recent North Korean test of a long-range ballistic missile, the
Taepodong-2 version, along with five other missiles. It was this launch
that increased U.S. transfers of the latest ballistic missile radar systems
and software for Japanese AEGIS destroyers. The AEGIS SPY radars
on Japanese ships can now track these sorts of missiles. Not long after,
the North Koreans announced they had successfully tested a nuclear
weapon, and they made the same claim three years later. The most
recent state-level Yasukuni visit was by Prime Minister Abe, although
he was no longer in office when he made the visit. China responded
that “[Our] position on this issue has been clear-cut and consistent:
we urge the Japanese side to . . . reflect upon history and strictly abide
by its solemn statements and pledges regarding historical issues, and
face the international community in a responsible manner.” Nonethe-
less, it is unlikely, especially with tensions between China and Japan
as high as ever over the Senkaku Islands, that Japan’s politicians will
decrease this activity.48
A final area of current Japanese military activity concerns the anti-
piracy efforts of various nations in the Indian Ocean. The attacks of
Somali pirates in and around the Horn of Africa since the implosion
of Somalia two decades ago have been a source of constant tension
and no considerable expense to shipping companies and their mar-
kets. Japan, by recognizing and extending its right to defend its “sea
lines,” justifies its antipiracy patrols as an extension of that right.
Japan recently completed JIMEX 12 in 2012 with the Indian Navy,
focusing on humanitarian operations from the sea as well as counter
piracy. Earlier, she had leased and improved her first overseas base
in Djibouti (East Africa) near the nexus of the piracy problem. (The
United States also maintains a base in Djibouti.) The exercise with
India included two Japanese destroyers and three Indian Navy ves-
sels. India, not surprisingly, is also a nation with a history of adversity
with China. It is no accident that India and Japan are combining their
naval power, and the clear target of their signals is China.49
* * *
By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Japan had
deployed its air, land, and sea forces for the first time outside its self-
defense areas of interest to help in the GWOT and more recent prob-
lems such as maritime piracy. Closer to home, unresolved ghosts of
the past, as well as newer and more dangerous threats from North
Korea, continue to haunt Japan. Japan now has a type of ship known
as a helicopter destroyer that looks like light aircraft carriers rather
than sleek destroyers and bears the names of famous imperial
Japanese warships of days gone by—Hyuga and Ise (World War II bat-
tleships). Making matters worse, as of the writing of this book, is the
re-emergence of an intense Chinese nationalism that seems to focus
on the area where Japan has most to lose—the seas and island chains
of the Asian rim. Interestingly, a Co-Prosperity Sphere under Chinese
tutelage seems to be the goal of Beijing’s nationalist-corporate elites.
The severity of the situation has been most forcefully demonstrated
by Japanese-Chinese confrontation over the Senkaku Islands. Japan
responded to Chinese actions when her Diet passing legislation to
buy the Senkakus from a third party and by this means establish a firm
legal claim to the islands under international law. China’s response
has been provocative and strident, and she is joined by Taiwan in
rejecting Japan’s claims.50 Too, China has now displaced Japan as the
world’s second largest economy (the United States remains first),
reflecting how the competition between these two ancient nations
has moved into the global economic sphere.
Japan has the third most capable navy in the Pacific after the United
States and China. As for nuclear weapons, the Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant catastrophe diminished the Japanese population’s taste
for nuclear power, even though no one was killed in the disaster as a
direct result of the reactor meltdowns. Correspondingly, the impetus
for Japan to take more than paperwork steps toward the design and
production of a bomb is probably an area that politicians will avoid
in the foreseeable future.51 Nonetheless, the future is here. China and
Japan gaze across Korea and the East China Sea at each other, in com-
petition economically and militarily through the medium of naval and
air power. China is a nuclear power, as is North Korea. The idea of a
nuclear-armed samurai is not as remote as one might think.
Japan’s ancient institutions that revolve around the management of
violence are more present today than at any time since 1945. Given the
ghosts of the past—from the Battle of Paekchon to Pyongyang in 1592
—the story of Japan’s military history is unlikely to end anytime soon.
And more recently there is Russia, the Bear, with the cold Pacific lap-
ping her eastern shores, either looking on for gain—or more often
these days being eyed covetously by her neighbors because of her rich
resources. Conflict in northeast Asia will remain a specter for years to
come, and Japan will remain a part of that equation. Japan’s new
samurai cannot retire to a Tokugawa kabuki dance just yet.
Notes
Preface
1. Mark Edward Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China (New York: State
University of New York Press, 1990), 1–5.
Selected Chronology
1. Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History (Trowbridge, UK:

Japan Library, 1996), xviii; Karl Friday, Japan Emerging: Premodern History to
1850 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2012), 109–110, 201–202, 309–310; Ivan Morris,
The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan (New York: Holt,
Rheinhart and Winston, 1975), xvii.
Chapter 1
1. Turnbull, The Samurai, 4–6.

2. Gari Ledyard, “Galloping along with the Horseriders: Looking for the
Founders of Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies, 1, no. 2 (Spring 1975), 217–
254; Turnbull, The Samurai 1–5. See also William George Ashton, Nihongi:
Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A.D. 697 (1896) (http://archive
.org/details/nihongichronicl00astogoog, accessed 8/25/2012).
248 Notes
3. Turnbull, The Samurai, 5–6; William Wayne Farris, Heavenly Warriors: The
Evolution of Japan’s Military (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1996), 13–14.
4. Farris, Heavenly Warriors, 11.
5. The term center of gravity comes from Carl von Clausewitz, On War,
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 595–596.
6. Farris, Heavenly Warriors, 13–14.
7. Ivan Morris, Nobility of Failure, 1–2.
8. Morris, Nobility of Failure, xiii, xxi, Chapter 1. See also Chronicles of Japan
(Nihon Shoki), http://nihonshoki.wikidot.com/scroll-7-keiko-seimu (accessed
October 5, 2012), hereafter Nihon Shoki (scroll name).
9. Morris, Nobility of Failure, 2, 12–13; Nihon Shoki (Scroll 7); Turnbull, 9.
10. Farris, xvi, 399n1; Turnbull, 9.
11. Turnbull., 17, 33–35.
12. Nihon Shoki (Scroll 5).
13. Ledyard, “Galloping along with the Horseriders: Looking for the
Founders of Japan,” 217–218. The Japanese adopted the Chinese term for
emperor (tenno) during the seventh century AD.
14. Farris, 13–16.
15. Ibid., 22–23.
16. Nihon Shoki (Scroll 9). The actual name of the first subjugated Korean
kingdom was Silla.
17. Turnbull, 10; Nihon Shoki (Scroll 10).
18. Farris, 13–17.
19. George Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1958), 49–50, 63–64.
20. Turnbull, 10–11.
21. Farris, 17–22. See also Nihon Shoki (Scroll 19).
22. Nihon Shoki (Scroll 19).
23. Nihon Shoki (Scroll 19); Sansom, 47. See also Farris, 18–24.
24. Farris, 23–24; Nihon Shoki (Scroll 22). “Local servants of the Court” is a
translation of kuni no miyatsuko.
25. Ibid., 27–32
26. Nihon Shoki (Scrolls 24 and 25); Farris, 34.
27. Farris, 34–35; David A. Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300–900 (New
York: Routledge, 2002), 195–199; Nihon Shoki (Scroll 25).
28. Farris, 35–37; Nihon Shoki (Scroll 25).
29. Farris, 35–37; Nihon Shoki (Scroll 25).
30. Graff, 199; Farris, 38–39; Nihon Shoki (Scroll 27).
31. Nihon Shoki (Scroll 27); Farris, 38–40; Graff, 199–201.
32. Farris, 38–40.
33. Karl F. Friday, Hired Swords: The Rise of Private Warrior Power in Early
Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 12; Farris, 41–45; Nihon
Shoki (Scrolls 27 and 28).
Notes 249
34. Sun Tzu (Sunzi), The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1963), 63; Farris, 45–46; Nihon Shoki (Scroll 29).
35. Farris, 46–47.
36. Nihon Shoki (Scrolls 28 and 29); Turnbull 10–15.
37. Turnbull 15–16.
38. Friday, Hired Swords, 1–7, 11–17.
39. Friday, 17–32, 40–43.
40. Farris, 49–57, 60.
41. Ibid., 60–65.
42. Farris, 57–60.
43. Farris, 70, lists this as “Junior 5th rank lower grade.”
44. Ibid., 70–72; Friday, 62–64.
45. Farris, 72–75; Turnbull, 15–16.
46. Turnbull, 15–16; Farris, 75–76. See also Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the
Samurai (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 47–48.
47. Graff, 148–150.
48. Graff, 160–161. See also Frank Kierman and John K. Fairbank, Chinese
Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 1–10;
Hans Van de Ven, ed., Warfare in Chinese History (Boston: Brill Academic,
2000), 4–11; Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 246–247.
49. Karl Friday, Samurai, Warfare, and the State in Early Medieval Japan (New
York: Routledge, 2003), 34–35.
Chapter 2
1. Friday, 69–98.
2. Friday, 88–98.
3. The term Bakufu refers to the tent camp of a shogun in the field. Also,
shogun (lower case) refers refer to a general and Shogun (upper case) refers
to a Seii Taishogun (great general who quells the Barbarians) and eventually
to the permanent military dictator of the Bakufu or shogunate.
4. Carl Von Clausewitz, “Two Letters on Strategy,” ed. and trans. by Peter
Paret and Daniel Moran (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute
Press Reprint, 1984), 21.
5. Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334, 139, 142.
6. See especially Sansom, Chapter 11, as well as Morris, 41–42 and Turn-
bull, 17.
7. Turnbull, 18; Sansom, 104–105, 151; Farris, 82–83.
8. Sansom, 142–143, 146; Friday, Hired Swords, 4–7.
9. Sansom., 148–152.
10. A tax farmer is someone contracted by the tax collection authorities to
collect taxes for them, a private middle-man. In the Bible these people were
known as publicans. They were allowed to collect over and above the regular
tax rates to support themselves and all with the sanction of the state.
250 Notes
11. Friday, Hired Swords, 70–72.

12. Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 15–16, 42–48.
13. Farris, 85.
14. Ibid., 81–86.
15. The latest definitions and tactics for counterinsurgency can be found in
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Head-
quarters, Department of the Army, 2006).
16. Sansom, 139–144; Farris, 81–82; Morris, xvi.
17. Farris, 90–91.
18. Farris, 90–92.
19. Sansom, 105–106; Farris, 92–93.
20. Sansom, 106; Farris, 94–95.
21. Sansom, 106; Farris, 52–53, 95–96.
22. Sansom, 106; Farris 96.
23. Farris, 95; Sansom, 106–107.
24. Farris, 57–60.
25. Ibid., 101–103.
26. Farris, 113–115; Sansom, 139–141.
27. Farris, 113–116.
28. Sansom, 154–159.
29. Farris, 121–122.
30. Farris, 120–131; Sansom, 145; Friday, 74–75.
31. Karl Friday, The First Samurai: The Life and Legend of the Warrior Rebel
Taira Masakado (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).
32. Sansom, 242; Farris, 129–130.
33. Sansom, 236–240; Friday, Hired Swords, 88–99.
34. Friday, Chapter 3, passim; and Friday, First Samurai, Chapter 1.
35. Friday, 88.
36. Sansom, 242.
37. Farris, 131–132; Sansom, 244–245; Friday, Hired Swords, 98–100.
38. Farris, 132, relies heavily on The Tale of Masakado, an account of the
rebellion written ca. 1000.
39. Farris, 132–136.
40. Farris, 133–137; Karl F. Friday, “Bushido or Bull? A Medieval Historian’s
Perspective on the Imperial Army and the Japanese Warrior Tradition,” History
Teacher, 27, no. 3 (May 1994): 346.
41. Karl F. Friday, Samurai, Warfare, and the State, 24–25.
42. Farris, 137.
43. Ibid., 138–139.
44. Ibid., 138–140.
45. Ibid.,141–142.
46. Sansom, 145; Farris, 142–144. See also Friday, Hired Swords, Chapter 3.
47. Farris, 146.
48. Farris, 146–147; Sansom, 246.
49. Friday, First Samurai, 1–5.
Notes 251
50. Friday, First Samurai, 1n1.

51. Farris, 146–150.
52. Sansom, 147–148.
53. Friday, Samurai, Warfare, and the State, 23–25.
54. Sansom, 165–166; Morris, xvi.
55. Farris. 138–140.
56. Farris, 163–177.
57. Friday, Hired Swords, 83–84; Farris, 163–176.
58. Friday, 83–85; Farris, 177–179.
59. Friday, Hired Swords, 84.
60. Friday, 76; Farris, 179–180.
61. Sansom, 174–175.
62. Sansom, 247; Farris, 192.
63. Sansom, 247–249; Farris, 193–198.
64. Sansom, 247–249; Farris, 193–198.
65. Helen Craig McCullough, ed. and trans. “A Tale of Mutsu,” in Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies, 25 (1964–1965), 180, 188.
66. Sansom, 249–251; Farris, 225.
67. McCullough, 191–194; Sansom, 249–251.
68. Sansom, 251–252; McCullough, 181n7.
69. Sansom., 252–253.
70. Farris, 238.
71. Ibid., 230–238.
72. Farris, 238–240; Sansom, 197.
73. Sansom, 141, 196.
74. Ethan Segal, “The Shoen System,” in Friday, Japan Emerging, 170–177:
Farris, 249–251; Sansom, 199.
75. Sansom 198–201.
76. Sansom, 254–255.
77. Ibid., 206–211.
78. Farris, 265–268: Sansom, 211, 255–256.
79. Farris, 267–268; Sansom, 256.
80. Sansom, 257–258.
82. Sansom, 258–260, 274–275; Friday, Japan Emerging, 110.
83. Andrew Edmond Goble, “The Kamakura Bakufu shogunate and the Begin-
nings of Warrior Power,” in Friday, Japan Emerging, 190–191; Sansom, 275–286.
84. Sansom, 275–288; Goble, 189.
Chapter 3
1. Ledyard, 217–254.
3. Goble, 191; Turnbull, 41–43.
252 Notes
5. See Morris, 68–69.
6. Goble, 191–192.
7. Ibid., 192–195.
9. Turnbull, 49–52; Morris, 71; Noble, 192. For the exact Sun Tzu quotation,
see Griffith, 77.
10. Sansom, 289–292.
11. Sansom, 291–293; Morris, 74; Turnbull, 52–54.
12. Sansom, 293; Turnbull, 54–57.
14. Morris, 74; Sansom, 294–295; Turnbull, 57–59, 62.
15. Farris, 294–296; Sansom, 295–297; Turnbull, 62–62.
16. Morris, 71–74; Turnbull, 60–61.
17. Cited in Morris, 74.
18. Sansom, 297–299; Morris, 76; Turnbull, 64–68.
19. Farris, 296; Turnbull, 68. These “ships” were really small galley-type
vessels.
20. Farris, 296; Goble, 192–193.
21. Farris, 296; Turnbull, 69–70.
22. Turnbull, 70–73; Farris, 296–297; Morris, 76–77; Sansom, 301–305.
23. Sansom, 314.
24. Sansom, 314–317; Morris, 79–87.
25. Morris, 87–105; Sansom, 318–331.
26. Sansom, 327–334, 371.
27. Ibid., 332–334, 347–349, 370–375.
28. Morris, xvii; Sansom, 62–66.
29. Morris, 101.
30. Farris, 320–325; Sansom, 358, 382.
31. Farris, 328–329; Peter Lorge, “Water Forces and Naval Operations,” in
David A. Graff and Robin Higham, eds., A Military History of China (Boulder,
CO: Westview, 2002), 88–89.
32. Lorge, 88–89; Thomas C. Conlan, “Medieval Warfare,” in Friday, Japan
Emerging, 246; Farris, 328–335.
33. Cited in Farris, 331.
34. Lorge, 89; Conlan, 246–247; Farris, 331.
35. Farris, 331–332; Lorge, 89; Conlan 246.
36. Farris, 332–333; Conlan, 246–247; Lorge 88–89; Sansom, 447–450.
37. Sansom, 450–453.
38. Morris, 108.
39. William M. Bodiford, “Medieval Religion,” in Friday, ed., Emerging
Japan, 228–229; Morris, 108–111.
40. Morris, 107–111; Sansom, 466–467.
41. Morris, 113–117.
42. From Morris, 118.
Notes 253
43. Ibid., 118–119.

44. Ibid., 119–123.
45. Ibid., 124–125.
46. Morris, 127–130; Conlan, 248.
47. Morris, 129–133, 474.
48. Conlan, 248; Morris, xvii, 135.
49. Conlan, 248–249; Morris, 135.
50. From Pierre F. Souyri, trans. Kathe Roth, The World Turned Upside
Down: Medieval Japanese Society (New York: Columbian University Press,
1998), 162.
51. Morris, xvii; Turnbull, 106–107.
Chapter 4
1. Geoffrey Parker, The Cambridge History of Warfare (Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 2005), 6–7.
2. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military
Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7–8.
3. Ibid., 11–13.
4. Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003), 73–76, 83–89.
5. H. Paul Varley, The Onin War: History of Its Origins and Background with a
Selective Translation of the Chronicle of Onin (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1966), 3–5.
6. Ethan Segal, “The Medieval Economy,” in Friday, Japan Emerging,
291–294.
7. Friday, Japan Emerging, 202.
8. Segal, “The Medieval Economy,” 289–298; Stephen Turnbull, Sengoku:
War in Japan, 1467–1615 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), 7–10.
9. Conlan, 249; Varley, 86–87.
10. Varley, 87–88; Macgregor Knox, “The French Revolution and After,” in
Knox and Murray, Dynamics of Military Revolution, 65–66.
11. Varley, 90–93.
12. Varley, 93–97.
13. Friday, 202.
14. Varley, 96–108.
15. Cited in Varley, 127.
16. Varley, 127–130.
17. Varley, 131–132.
18. Turnbull, War in Japan, 20–25.
19. Trans. Chronicle of Onin in Varley, 163.
20. Chronicle of Onin in Varley, 172.
21. Conlan, 249.
22. Morris, 117–119.
254 Notes
23. Clausewitz, On War, 592–593.

24. Varley, 131–133.
25. Ibid., 133–135.
26. Friday, 201–202.
27. Varley, 204–205.
28. Turnbull, 30–31; Conlan, 231.
30. Ibid., 32–34.
31. Lee Butler, “The Sixteenth-Century Reunification,” in Friday, Japan
Emerging, 315; Turnbull, 33–34. For Caesar at Alesia, see Plutarch, The Fall of
the Roman Republic (London: Penguin Classics, 1972), 370–371.
32. Conlan, 250–251
33. Turnbull, 35.
34. Ibid., 35–36.
35. Chase, Firearms, 30–33, 177.
36. Ibid., 178.
37. Chase, 178–179; Friday, 202.
38. Chase, 178–180; Butler, 312.
40. Conlan, 251; Chase 180.
41. Cited in Chase, 180.
42. Chase, 180–181; Turnbull, 42.
43. Chase, 180–181; Turnbull, 43.
44. Chase, 181; Butler, 312–313.
45. Cited in Butler, 312.
46. Chase, 181; Turnbull 43–44.
47. Butler, 313; Turnbull, Samurai Warfare, 138–139; Chase, 181.
48. Turnbull, Samurai Warfare, 139–141; Chase, 181.
49. Turnbull, Samurai Warfare, 141; Butler, 181–182; Turnbull, War in Japan, 44.
50. Cited in Turnbull, Samurai Warfare, 141–142.
51. Butler, 313; Chase, 182; Turnbull, 142.
52. Turnbull, Samurai Warfare, 144–145; Turnbull, Warfare in Japan, 48–49.
53. Chase, 182; Turnbull, Samurai Warfare, 144–145.
54. Chase, 182; Conlan, 252.
56. Butler, 313; Chase 182–183.
57. Butler, 314; Turnbull, War in Japan, 52.
58. Butler, 314.
59. Ibid., 311–318.
60. See Murray and Knox, 6–13.
Chapter 5
1. Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai, 7–8.

Notes 255
2. Denis Gainty, “The New Warriors,” in Friday, Japan Emerging, 344; and
Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan (Berkley, CA: University of California
Press, 1993), xxv-xxix.
3. Butler, 315–316.
4. Gainty, 344.
5. Chase, 183; Turnbull, 52.
6. Chase, 183; Turnbull, War in Japan, 52–54; Butler, 314.
9. Chase, 183; Turnbull, 64.
10. Chase, 183; Turnbull, 64–66.
11. Cited in Butler, 315; Chase, 183.
12. Butler, 314–316; Chase, 183–184.
14. Gainty, 344–345.
15. Butler, 314–317; Chase, 183–186.
16. Butler, 314.
17. Kenneth M. Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Tech-
nology Employed during the Sino-Japanese-Korean War, 1592–1598,” Journal
of Military History, 69, no. 1 (January 2005): 11–41, 11–12n1.
18. Chase, 186; Kenneth Swope, “Turning the Tide: The Strategic and
Psychological Significance of the Liberation of Pyongyang in 1593,” War and
Society, 21, no. 2 (October 2003): 1–26; Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret
Weapons,” 11n1; Butler, 317.
19. Swope, “Turning the Tide,” 1–7. For a discussion of compound
warfare, see Thomas Huber, ed., Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2002), 1–10.
20. Chase, 186; Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons,” 22.
22. Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons,” 28.
23. Cited in Turnbull, Samurai Warfare, 200.
24. Swope, “Turning the Tide,” 7.
25. Turnbull, 200–201.
26. Swope, “Turning the Tide,” 8–9.
27. Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons,” 30–34; Julian S. Corbett,
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
reprint, 1988), 234.
28. Chase, 187; Turnbull, 203–209.
29. Swope, “Turning the Tide,” 11–14.
30. Swope, “Turning the Tide,’ 14–15.
31. Swope, 15–17.
32. Swope, “Turning the Tide,” 16–20; Chase, 187–188.
33. Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons,” 36–38.
34. Chase, 187–188; Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons,” 36–38.
256 Notes
36. Chase, 190–191; Swope, 39.

38. Turnbull, Samurai Warfare, 224–232.
39. Turnbull, 225–230.
40. Conlan, 252–253; Turnbull, 230–236.
41. Conlan, 253.
42. Totman, Early Modern Japan, 52; Friday, Japan Emerging, 310.
43. Totman, 52–53; Chase; 193.
44. Totman, 52–53; Chase; 193.
45. Philip Brown, “The Political Order,” in Japan Emerging, 322–323, 330;
Gainty, 347; Chase, 193–195.
46. See Ikegami, passim, especially 329–346; Friday, Hired Swords, passim;
Farris, 297, 307–310.
47. Miyamoto Musashi, The Book of Five Rings, trans Ashikaga Yoshiharu,
ed. Rosemary Brant (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2003), 1–21.
48. Morris, The Nobility of Failure, 143–153; James Clavell, Shogun (New
York: Dell, 1975).
49. Morris, 152–159.
50. Morris, 159–166.
51. Ibid., 143, 159–174.
52. Michael Laver, “A Whole New World (Order): Early Modern Japanese
Foreign Relations, 1550–1850,” in Friday, Japan Emerging, 333–338.
53. Brown, 321–322, 331.
54. Laver, 340–341.
55. United States Naval Heritage and History Command government
website. http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/teach/pearl/kanagawa/
friends4.htm (accessed May 8, 2013); http://www.history.navy.mil/library/
special/perry_openjapan1.htm (accessed May 8, 2013).
56. Laver, 340.
57. Edward Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army (Lawrence, KS: University of
Kansas Press, 2010), 1.
58. Drea, 1–2; Totman, 543–544.
59. Drea, 3–4.
60. Totman, 543–545; Drea, 4–10. Boshin stands for Dragon, the Chinese
zodiac character for the year 1868.
61. Totman, 345; Drea 7–9.
62. Drea, 10–11.
63. Drea, 11–15; Totman, 345.
64. Totman, 345.
65. Drea, 17–19.
66. Drea, 20–31; Totman, 545, 550; Ernst L. Presseisen, Before Aggression:
Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1965), passim. For the Meiji Constitution, see http://history.hanover.edu/
texts/1889con.html (accessed May 10, 2013).
67. Drea, 19–20.
Notes 257
68. Ibid., 35–39.

69. Ibid., 39–41.
70. Ibid., 41–45.
Chapter 6
1. Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War,
1890–1914 (New York: Ballantine, 1996); Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China:
From War to Peace, 1894–1972 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975), 89.
2. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 61–70; Peattie and Evan, Kaigun, 7–8.
3. Drea, 72–75.
4. Peattie and Evans, 7–8, 15–20, 532.
5. Ibid., 20–25, 524–525. The term fleet-in-being comes from Sir Julian
Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1988, reprint), 234.
6. Richard S. Horowitz, “Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850–
1911,” in David A. Graff and Robin Higham, eds., A Military History of China
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), 153–159.
7. Drea, 74–75.
8. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 222; Peattie and Evans, 41.
9. Drea, 79–83.
10. Philo N. McGiffin, “The Battle of the Yalu: Personal Recollections by
the Commander of the Chinese Ironclad ‘Chen Yuen’,” Century: A Popular
Quarterly Volume, 50, no. 4 (August 1895): 585–605; A. T. Mahan, “The Battle
of the Yalu: An Interview with the Time,” London, September 25, 1894, in Let-
ters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Vol. 3 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1975), 583–585.
11. McGiffen, 587, 595.
12. McGiffin, 595–597.
13. Ibid., 597–605.
14. Mahan, 584–585; Drea, 83.
15. Drea, 83–85.
16. Ibid., 85–87.
17. Ibid., 88–90.
18. Drea, 90; Spence, 223.
19. Drea, 90–93.
20. Drea, 92–93; Peattie and Evans, 53; Spence, 230–231.
21. Drea, 98–99.
22. Peattie and Evans, 57–66; Drea, 98–100; Holger Herwig, “The battle-
fleet revolution, 1885–1914” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 114–131.
23. Drea, 100–101.
24. Peattie and Evans, 13, 66–68.
25. Ibid., 79–83.
26. Ibid., 83–85.
258 Notes
27. Ibid., 70–85.

28. Bruce W. Menning, “Neither Mahan nor Moltke: Strategy in the Russo-
Japanese War,” in John Steinberg, Bruce Menning, David Schimmelpenninck
Van Der Oye, David Wolff, and Shinji Yokote, eds., The Russo-Japanese War in
Global Perspective: World War Zero (Boston: Brill, 2005), 129–130.
29. Drea, 101–102.
30. Menning, 132–137. See also Perti Luntinen and Bruce W. Menning,
“The Russian Navy at War” in John Steinberg et al., eds.,The Russo-Japanese
War in Global Perspective, 230–231.
31. Drea, 104.
32. Drea, 102; Peattie and Evan, 85–86; Luntinen and Menning, 232–233.
33. Peattie and Evans, 94–99; Drea, 102.
34. Luntinen and Menning, 230–234; Drea, 102–103.
35. Drea, 102; Luntinen and Menning, 234–235.
36. Luntinen and Menning, 236–237; Constantine Pleshakov, The Tsar’s
Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima (New York: Basic Books,
2002), 91.
37. Drea, 103–104; Luntinen and Menning, 237.
38. Peattie and Evans, 102; Luntinen and Menning, 238–239; Drea, 107.
39. Drea, 104–105.
40. Luntinen and Menning, 237–239, 243; Drea, 105–107.
41. Peattie and Evans, 102–105; Luntinen and Menning, 241–242.
42. Drea, 105–108.
43. Drea, 107–108, 117–118; Luntinen and Menning, 242–244; Peattie and
Evans, 110.
44. Peattie and Evans, 110–111; Luntinen and Menning, 244; Steinberg,
Menning, Van Der Oye, Wolff, and Yokote, eds The Russo-Japanese War in
Global Perspective: World War Zero, introduction, passim.
45. Drea, 108–109.
46. Ibid., 109.
47. Pleshakov, passim; Peattie and Evans, 110–114; Luntinen and
Menning, 248.
48. Pleshakov, 247–258; Peattie and Evans, 114–115.
49. Luntinen and Menning, 255.
50. Peattie and Evans, 116–124; Luntinen and Menning, 255–257; A. T.
Mahan, “Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan
Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 32, no. 118 (June 1906): passim.
51. Drea, 109–110.
52. Friday, “Bushido or Bull?” 339–349; Drea, 119–124; Ivan Morris, The
Nobility of Failure, 479.
Chapter 7
1. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 271–278.

Notes 259
2. Drea, 125–127. For the Great Program, see Norman Stone, The Eastern
Front, 1914–1917, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin Global, 2004), Chapter 1, passim.
3. Drea, 125–126.
4. Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and
the United States (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 42–48; Henry J.
Hendrix, Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2009), 155–163; Drea, 127; Peattie and Evans, 152–154; and Nicholas
A. Lambert, “Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence,
1904–1909,” The Journal of Military History 59 (October 1995), 639–660.
5. Drea, 128–129.
6. James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and
Foreign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966),
30–38; Drea, 130–131.
7. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 10–14; Drea, 130–131.
8. Sadao Asada, “The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Imperial
Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921–1927,” Naval War College Review,
46, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 87–88.
9. Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1994), 66, 70–72, 88–100; Peattie and Evans, 163–167.
10. Peattie and Evans, 167; Drea, 137; Alan R. Millett, “Assault from the
Sea” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in
the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 51–54,
64–65.
11. Peattie and Evans, 168–169; Drea, 137.
12. See Jerry W. Jones, “The Naval Battle of Paris,” Naval War College
Review, 62, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 77–89; Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern
China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 444–445.
13. Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram (New York: Bantam, 1971),
139–141; National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Record
Group 38, Formerly Classified Correspondence of the Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI), 1913–1924, Box 66.
14. Drea, 137–138; Spence, 285–319.
15. James B. Crowley, “Japanese Army Factionalism in the Early 1930’s,”
Journal of Asian Studies, 21, no. 3 (May, 1962): 309–310; Ronald H. Spector, Eagle
against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Vintage, 1985), 35;
Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Secu-
rity, 1919–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 18.
16. Andrew Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations
Doctrine, 1860–1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2003), 208–210.
17. Birtle, 209–210, 218–219; Drea, 141–143.
18. Birtle, 219–221; Drea143.
19. Birtle, 220–226; Drea, 143–145.
20. Birtle, 220–226.
21. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 56–57; Asada, “The Revolt against
the Washington Treaty,” 82–83; Tuchman, Zimmerman Telegram, 141–150.
260 Notes
22. Drea, 137–141; Peattie and Evans, 191–194, 526.

23. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 56–58; John T. Kuehn, “The U.S.
Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitation, 1922–1937,” Journal of Mili-
tary History, 74, no. 4 (October 2010): 1138–1141.
24. Asada, “Revolt against the Washington Treaty,” 85–86.
25. Kuehn, Agents of Innovation, 25–29.
26. Asada, “Revolt against the Washington Treaty,” 85–89.
27. Kuehn, Agents of Innovation, 25–29.
28. Asada, 86–90.
29. Asada, 88.
30. Ibid., 86–92.
31. Kuehn, “The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitation,
1922–1937,” 1147–1149; see also U.S. Department of State, Office of the Histo-
rian, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/Kellogg (accessed
March 12, 2012); Drea, 165.
32. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York:
Harper Collins, 2000), 4 and passim.
33. Kuehn, “The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitation,
1922–1937,” 1152–1154; Asada, 93–94.
34. Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 27–36, 52, 71, 80; Drea, 166–167.
35. Peattie, 101–107; Drea, 166; Peattie and Evans, 297.
36. Peattie, 118–133; Drea, 167–169.
37. Drea, 167–171, 182; Peattie and Evans, 297; Kuehn, “The U.S. Navy
General Board and Arms Limitation,” 1157–1159.
38. Drea, 171–174; Peattie and Evans, 296; Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: The
Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2001), 50–51.
39. Drea, 172–174; Friday, “Bushido or Bull,” 346–348.
40. Drea, 174–176. Showa ironically means “Bright Peace or Harmony.”
41. James B. Crowley, “A Reconsideration of the Marco Polo Bridge Inci-
dent,” Journal of Asian Studies, 22, no. 3 (May 1963): 277–291.
42. Crowley, 278.
43. Peattie and Evans, 296–298.
44. Crowley, 278–279.
45. Drea, 177–179; Morris, xix–xx.
46. Drea, 179–181; Peattie and Evans, 532, 534.
Chapter 8
1. H. P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies

to April 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 57–66; Sadao
Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United
States (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 296.
Notes 261
2. Edward Drea, “Chasing a Decisive Victory,” in In the Service of the

Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska,
1998), 211–215.
3. Crowley, “A Reconsideration of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident,” 277.
4. Ibid., 280.
5. Idib., 281–283.
6. Ibid., 283–284.
7. Thomas M. Huber, ed., Compound Warfare: That Final Knot (Fort Leaven-
worth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2002), 1–7; Murray and Millet, 158.
8. Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Sec-
ond World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 158;
Edward J. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945 (Lawrence:
Kansas University Press, 2009), 196.
9. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 191–193.
10. Conversation with author Richard Frank in January 2012.
11. Drea, 194–195.
12. Drea, 195–196; Murray and Millett, 159.
13. Drea, 196–197; Murray and Millett, 160. See also historian Iris Chang’s
website, www.irischang.net (accessed February 2, 2013).
14. Sun Tzu (Sunzi), The Art of War, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1963), 73; Murray and Millett, 161.
15. Drea, 201–203.
16. Murray and Millett, 161–163; Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confron-
tation with the West, 62; Drea, 202–203.
17. Edward Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939 (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1981), 86–90.
18. Drea, 204–205; Murray and Millett, 160–164; Friday, “Bushido or Bull?”
339–349.
19. For U.S. aid to Nationalist China, see John D. Plating, The Hump: Amer-
ica’s Strategy for Keeping China in World War II (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2011); Edward S. Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy (Annapolis
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 1–2, 78–79.
20. Murray and Millet, 14, 157, 164–165.
21. Murray and Millet, 164–165.
22. Miller, 241–243. Asada, page 247, lists the key admirals opposed to the
Tripartite Pact and to war. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The Ameri-
can War with Japan (New York: Vintage, 1985), 68–69; H. P. Willmott, Empires in
the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1982), 72–75.
23. Juha Saunavaara, “Naval Officer and Diplomat with Pro-American
Views: Reappraising the Career of Nomura Kichisaburo,” on H-Net, http://
www.h-net.org/reviews/ (accessed February 2, 2013).
24. Glenn M. Williford, Racing the Sunrise: Reinforcing America’s Pacific Out-
posts, 1941–1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 27–34; Plating,
The Hump, 14–31; Murray and Millett, 166.
262 Notes
25. Miller, 1–2.

26. Spector, 64–69; Asada, 225–226.
27. Jonathan B. Parshall and J. Michael Wenger, “Pearl Harbor’s Over-
looked Answer,” Naval History (December 2011), 16–21; Peattie, Sunburst,
122–128.
28. John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at
Coral Sea Midway, and Guadalcanal (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2006), 6–7; John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American
Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1995), 163–169.
29. Ladislas Farago, The Broken Seal: “Operation Magic” and the Secret Road
to Pearl Harbor (New York: Random House, 1976), 329–353; Prados, 163–169.
30. Farrago, 343–353; Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: Strategy and
Command; The First Two Years (Washington, DC: Center of Military History,
1962), 120–121; Prados, 167.
31. Willmott, 104–106, 164–169, 220–232; John Burton, Fortnight of Infamy:
The Collapse of Allied Airpower West of Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2006), 86–87.
32. Jonathan Parshall, “A Grim December,” Naval History (December 2011),
22–28.
33. Parshall, “A Grim December,” 22–28; Willmott, 142–143.
34. Alan D. Zimm, Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions (Philadelphia: Case-
mate, 2011), 372–373; Parshall and Michael Wenger; Parshall, “A Grim
December,” 23; Willmott, 134–136.
35. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1991), 1–8. See John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the
Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986).
36. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, DC: Center of
Military History, 1952), 79–85; Willmott, 146–149.
37. Lundstrom, 28–47; Gregory Urwin, Victory in Defeat: The Wake Island
Defenders in Captivity, 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2010), 1–21.
38. Spector, 73–75; Morton, 156–157.
39. Drea, 223–224; Willmott, 202–203; Spector, 109–111. See also Morton,
128–127, 150, 155–157.
40. Spector, 111–119; 134–139; Willmott, 396–397. See also Morton, parts IV
and V, passim; Drea, 224; Dower, 51–52.
41. Steven B. Shepard, “American, British, Dutch, and Australian Coali-
tion: Unsuccessful Band of Brothers,” unpublished Master ’s Thesis (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 5.
42. Shepard, 59; Spector, 132.
43. Peattie, Sunburst, 168–170.
44. Drea, 223; Willmott, 218–220.
45. Shepard, 59–62.
46. Shepard, 65–68; Spector, 134.
Notes 263
47. Willmott, 435–437. See also Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shat-
tered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, 2005), 33–38.
48. Shepard, 16, 62; Willmott, 303–304.
49. Willmott, 440–446; David Hobbs, The British Pacific Fleet: The Royal
Navy’s Most Powerful Strike Force (Barnsley, UK: Seaforth, 2011), 14–15.
50. Spector, 150; Willmott, 142–143; John Miller Jr., Cartwheel: The Reduction
of Rabaul (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1959), 1–3.
51. Willmott, 398–434; Spector 328–332; Drea, 225; Field Marshal Viscount
William Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Casselll, 1956), 109–110. See Plating,
The Hump, 8–9 for a discussion on the strategy of air power in China.
52. Drea, 224.
53. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Navy at War, 1941–1945: Official
Reports to the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Department,
1946), 39.
54. Spector, 149–151; King, 44–45; Elliot Carlson, Joe Rochefort’s War: The
Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 239–243.
55. King, 34.
56. Parshall and Tully, 42–43; Willmott, 447–449; King, 45.
57. Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, 37, 43–44. See also Asada, From
Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 256, 275–277.
58. Carlson, 270–273, 286–288; Lundstrom, 126–129.
59. Parshall and Tully, 63–64. For the most up-to-date and accurate
account of the battle, see Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 133,
141–183, 222; Peattie, Sunburst, 206.
60. Parshall and Tully, 51–59, 90, 95–96, 296–298; Carlson, 334–340,
348–349; Lundstrom, 218–229, 235–236.
61. Parshall and Tully, 106, 113, 114–282; Lundstrom, 235–262.
62. Jonathan Parshall, “Ignoring the Lessons of Defeat,” Naval History 21,
no. 3 (June 2007): 32–37; Spector, 178–179.
63. Spector, 184–187. See also Lundstrom, 308–314.
64. Samuel Milner, The United States Army in World War II: The War in the
Pacific; Victory in Papua (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1957),
53–54. Drea, 228–229; Spector, 188–190; John T. Kuehn with D. M. Giangreco,
Eyewitness Pacific Theater (New York: Sterling, 2008), 95–96.
65. Lundstrom, 333–403; Drea, 228; Captain Toshikazu Omhae, “The Battle
of Savo Island,” ed. Roger Pineau, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 83,
no. 12 (December 1956): 1263–1278; Richard Frank, Guadalcanal (New York:
Random House, 1990).
66. Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw Jr., History of U.S.
Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal (Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 274–359; Spector, 199–214;
Frank, Guadalcanal, 598–618.
67. Drea, 229–230.
264 Notes
68. Samuel Milner, 72–100, 125–202, 324–325, 369–377; Spector, 214–217.

69. Spector, 178–182; Drea, 231.
70. David Rigby, Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), Chapter 3 passim. See also John
Miller Jr., The United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific; Cart-
wheel, The Reduction of Rabaul (Washington, DC: Center of Military History
1959), 3–8; Spector, 220–223.
71. Miller, 39–41. See also Drea, 230.
72. Prados, 448–486; Spector, 227–230; Zimm, 1–10.
73. Drea, 231–233.
74. Miller, 15, 49–59, 97–158; King, 63–65; Spector, 238–239; Trent Hone,
“ ‘Give Them Hell!’: The US Navy’s Night Combat Doctrine and the Cam-
paign for Guadalcanal,” War and History, 13, no. 1 (2009): 197–198.
75. Spector, 240–242; Miller, 189–217.
76. David C. Fuquea, “Bougainville: The Amphibious Assault Enters
Maturity,” Naval War College Review (Winter 1997), 104–121; King, 67–68;
Hone, 198–199; Spector, 239–245, 283–284; Prados, 508–515.
77. Douglas T. Kane and Henry I. Shaw Jr., History of U.S. Marine Corps:
Operations in World War II; Isolation of Rabaul (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1989, first published 1963), 297–306, 453–454;
Spector, 246–248; Miller, 294, 302–312; Prados, 519–520; Drea, 238–239.
78. Benis M Frank and Henry I. Shaw, “Amphibious Doctrine in World
War II,” in Victory and Occupation: History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations
in World War II, Vol. 5 (Quantico, VA: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps,
1968), 658–676; Jerold E. Brown, “Amphibious Operations: Tarawa; The Test-
ing of an Amphibious Doctrine,” in Roger J. Spiller, ed., Combined Arms in Bat-
tle since 1939 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College Press, 1992), 19–26; Jon T. Hoffman, “The Legacy and Lessons of
Tarawa,” Marine Corps Gazette, 77 (November 1993): 63–67.
79. King, 72–74; Prados, 531–539; Spector, 267–273; Drea, 233–235.
80. Slim, 275, 280–281; Drea, 237–239; Plating, 164–183.
81. King, 76–77, 201–203; Joel Ira Holwitt, “Execute against Japan”: The U.S.
Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (College Station: Texas
A&M University Press, 2009), 181–184; Spector, 483–486.
82. King, 104–106; Ed Drea, Defending the Driniumor: Covering Force Opera-
tions in New Guinea, 1944, Leavenworth Paper No. 9 (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 1984), ix–31, 135–142; Spector, 279–283,
285–294.
83. King, 109–112; H. P. Willmott, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet
Action (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 13–18, 35; Gary J.
Bjorge, “Hard Fighting in Saipan’s Death Valley: The 27th Infantry Division’s
Experience in a Harsh Environment of Combat,” unpublished monograph
used in H200, Military Innovation in Peace and War (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 393–421; Drea, Japan’s
Imperial Army, 239–240.
Notes 265
84. Edward Drea, “Chasing a Decisive Victory: Emperor Hirohito and

Japan’s War with the West,” in In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the
Imperial Japanese Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 208–210.
85. Plating, 183–201; Spector, 365–379.
86. Willmott, 25–31; Bobby C. Blair and John Peter DeCioccio, Victory at
Peleliu: The 81st Infantry Division’s Pacific Campaign (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2011); George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, History
of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Western Pacific Operations
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 51–254.
87. Willmott, 31–33, 58–74; Prados, 604–612; Drea, 242–243.
88. Drea, 242–243.
89. Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, 196–197; Willmott, 74–135; Anthony
P. Tully, Battle of Surigao Strait (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
90. Willmott, Chapter 6; Drea, 196–197. See also Spector, 426–442.
91. Spector, 511–530; Willmott, Chapter 7, passim.
92. Slim, 506–507.
93. D. M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of
Japan, 1945–1947 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), passim but
especially Chapters 5–8 and 14; Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, 198–215;
Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 245–246.
94. Donald L. Miller, D-Days in the Pacific (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005),
Chapters 7 and 8. See also Michael C. Howard, “Operation DETACHMENT: The
Corps’ Supreme Test at Iwo Jima,” Marine Corps Gazette, 790 (February 1995): 58–65.
95. Thomas M. Huber, Japan’s Battle of Okinawa: April–June 1945, Leaven-
worth Paper No. 18 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,
1990). See also Robin L. Rielly, Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships: Okinawa,
1945 (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2008).
96. Giangreco, Chapters 1, 15–17, and Appendix A; Drea, In the Service of
the Emperor, Chapters 10 and 11; Spector, 503–506.
97. Giangreco, 194–204; Casualty estimates come from various sources:
Murray and Millett, 554–558; Dower, War without Mercy, implies tens of mil-
lions in his opening chapter; Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 251–262.
Chapter 9
1. Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of

Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), xi.
2. Dower, 33–35.
3. Dower, 48–49.
4. Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the
Battle for Postwar Asia (New York: Random House, 2007), 22–23.
5. The last confirmed Japanese holdout turned himself in on the Philip-
pine island of Mindoro in 1980, see http://www.wanpela.com/holdouts/
list.html (accessed 10/27/2012).
266 Notes
6. Spector, 39, 41, 66–72.

7. Ibid., 77.
8. Ibid., 128–129, 152–153.
9. Ibid., 167–200.
10. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964),
270–271.
11. Dower, 19.
12. Ernest J. King and John T. Kuehn, “Operational Requirements for Short
Summary of World War II Submarine Ops,” Submarine Review (Spring 2011),
113–124.
13. Dower, 48, 280–283. See also Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of
Modern Japan (New York: Harper Collins, 2000), 4. Dower makes the argu-
ment that U.S. general Bonner Fellers is responsible for the retention of Hiro-
hito as emperor.
14. The Constitution of Japan, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution
_and_government_of_japan/ constitution_e.html (accessed October 27, 2012).
15. David Hunter-Chester, “A Sword Well-Made: Renouncing, Rearming,
Reimagining and Recreating an Army; The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force,
19451995,” published dissertation, University of Kansas, 2012, 79–80, 173.
16. David R. Grambo, “Japanese Military Developments: Expressed
Threats versus Programs and Policies,” unpublished masters thesis (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000),
10, 13.
17. Dower, Chapter 15. For recent uproars over Japanese political figures
and Yasukuni as well as the Ienaga controversy, see http://articles.cnn.com/
keyword/yasukuni-shrine (accessed November 3, 2012); Kathleen Woods
Masalski, “Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies,” Japan
Digest (November 2001), published in Bloomington, Indiana.
18. Dower, 78–79.
19. George Kennan (as Mr. )X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign
Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566–582.
20. Jonathan M. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 161–163.
21. Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 24, no. 4 (December 1980), 563–592; John Lewis Gaddis
and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,” International
Security, 4 (Spring 1980): 164–176.
22. Grambo, 8–10.
23. Hara Kimie, “50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace
Treaty and Japan’s Territorial Problems,” Pacific Affairs, 74, no. 3 (Fall 2001):
361–382; Grambo, 10–12. See also Kawano Katsutoshi. “Japan’s Military Role:
Alliance Recommendations for the Twenty-First Century,” in Naval War
College Review (Newport RI: NWC Press, 1998), 9.
24. Hara, 361–363; Kawano, 9.
25. Grambo, 12.
Notes 267
26. Hunter-Chester, 9–10, 184–185, 206–209; author interview with Cap-

tain John L. Kuehn, MC, USNR (retired) January 10, 2012. Anpo is short for
Nichibei Anzen Hosho Joyaku (Mutual Defense Treaty).
27. Grambo, 13; Norman Friedman, World Naval Weapons Systems
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), vi.
28. The Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1970), 2–3. Here-
after simply DOJ, year, edition.
29. Grambo, 15.
30. Hunter-Chester, 1.
31. Paul H. Hebert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy
and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Paper No. 16 (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1988), 25–59; Grambo,
15–16.
32. DOJ, 1976, 10.
33. “Key Moments in the Rule of Kim Jong-Il,” http://www.npr.org/2011/
12/19/143956544/key-moments-in-the-rule-of-kim-jong-il (accessed Novem-
ber 20, 2012); “China and Japan, Moving Apart,” http://www.economist
.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/02/growth_0 (accessed November 26, 2012).
34. Author ’s personal papers, including fitness reports and flight log
books.
35. Norman Friedman, The US Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1988); author’s personal papers as listed above in note 34.
36. DOJ, 1982, 41.
37. Grambo,16. See also “Nuclear Power in Japan,” at http://www.world
-nuclear.org/info/inf79.html (accessed September 11, 2013).
38. See note 19, this chapter; Grambo, 17–20.
39. Grambo, 19–20; Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval
Weapons Systems.
40. Grambo, 49–50.
41. “Key Moments in the Rule of Kim Jong-Il,” http://www.npr.org/2011/
12/19/143956544/key-moments-in-the-rule-of-kim-jong-il (accessed Novem-
ber 20, 2012). For the comfort women issue, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/oct/18/forced-prostitution-wartime-japan-korea (accessed
November 22, 2012).
42. Chalmers Johnston, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Indus-
trial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), intro-
duction passim.
43. Hara, 361–363, 381–382. See also Grambo, 42–45. For the territory dis-
pute between South Korea and Japan, see Asahi newspaper article at http://
ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201211220013 (accessed
November 26, 2011).
44. Grambo, 23–24.
45. A full discussion of the neoconservative movement can be found in
Len Colodny and Tom Shachtman, The Forty Years War: The Rise and Fall of
the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama (New York: Harper Collins, 2009).
268 Notes
46. See http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/

1029terohougaiyou_e.html (accessed November 23, 2012).
47. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7789580.stm (accessed
November 23, 2012).
48. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19986895 (accessed 11/
23/2012); see also John Chan, “Japan: Koizumi’s Provocative Visit to the Yasu-
kuni Shrine,” http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/aug2006/japa-a24.shtml
(accessed 11/22/2012); and http://www.npr.org/2011/12/19/143956544/
key-moments-in-the-rule-of-kim-jong-il (accessed 11/22/2012).
49. Eric Wertheim, “Combat Fleets,” in United States Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings (September 2012), 90; see also Wertheim in Proceedings (March 2011),
62–63.
50. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19754353 (accessed
November 23, 2012). See also Wertheim, Proceedings (March 2011), 62–63.
51. http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/ (accessed November 23, 2012).
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Index
Aaron Ward, USS. See photo essay Akechi Mitsuhide, 109, 113
ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Akiyama Saneyuki, 155
and Australian) Command, 208 Alekseev, E. I., 158
Abe clan, 49–50 Aleutian Islands, 213
Abe no Hirafu, 12, 28 Alliances, 95
Abe Sadato, 49–51 Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff
Abe Yoritoki, 49–50, 244 (CCS), 209, 211
ABM (Antiballistic missile Amakusa Shiro, 133–34
technology), 240 Amateratsu. See Sun Goddess
Afghanistan, 29 Amateratsu
Agrarian class, 116 American, British, Dutch, and
“Agreed Framework,” 241 Australian (ABDA) Command, 208
Air battles: Australia, 209–10; Amphibious attacks, 159, 197, 206–7,
Bismarck Sea, 217; China, 221; 214–15, 218–19
Guadalcanal, battle of, 214–15; Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty, 154,
I-Go counteroffensive, 217; Iwo 173, 181
Jima, battle of, 224; Korea, 199; Antiballistic missile technology
Marshall Islands, 219; Peleliu, 222; (ABM), 240
Philippines, 206–8; raid on Tokyo, Anti-Comintern Pact, 201
211. See also Kido Butai; Pearl Anti-Japanese rhetoric, 237, 240
Harbor attack Anti-piracy efforts, 244
Air counteroffensive (I-Go), 217 Anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 239
Air Self Defense Force (ASDF), 234 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Aizu, 142 Law, 242–43
Akasaka, siege of, 82–83, 95 Antoku, Emperor, 72
282 Index
Araki Sadao, 184, 186, 189 Beheading of enemies, 39, 42–43, 51,
Archaeology of Japan, evidence of 64, 74, 102
war in, 5 Benkai, 70, 74
Armaments, import and export of, Berlin Airlift, 232–33
235–36 Bismarck Archipelago, 210
Armor, 9, 33–34 Boer War, 153
Arson, 94–95, 102, 109 Bohdisattva, doctrine of, 8
Article 9, of Japanese constitution, 231 Bolsheviks, 176
Art of War (Sunzi), 15 Book of Five Rings (Musashi), 132
Asai clan, 103–4 Boshin War, 139, 142
Asai Nagamasa, 104 Bougainville, 218
Asakura clan, 103–4 Bow and arrow weapons, 5, 9, 33,
Asanuma Inejiro, 235 94–95. See also photo essay
ASDF (Air Self Defense Force), 234 Boxer Protocol, 154
Ashigara Pass, 66 Boxer Rebellion, 152–67
Ashigaru. See Mercenary warriors British Gilbert Islands, 210
Ashikaga Bakufu, 81–85, 89, 92 Buckner, Simon B., Jr., 224–25
Ashikaga Masashige, 85 Buddhism: conversion to, 16;
Ashikaga Shogun, 81, 85–86, 87–88, influence of priesthood, 16–17;
99, 107 introduction of in Japan, 8, 22;
Ashikaga Tadatsuna, 63–64 as virtual state religion, 10; Zen,
Ashikaga Takauji, 84–86 75–76, 81
Ashikaga Yoshiaki, 103–4 Buffer zones, 189
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, 89, 92 Buke Shohatto. See Laws for Military
Ashikaga Yoshiteru, 99 Households (Buke Shohatto)
ASW (Anti-submarine warfare), 239 Buna, battle of, 215
Asymmetric warfare, 29–31 Burma, 209, 210, 224
Atomic bomb, 225 Burma Road, 201, 210, 219
Attrition, war of, 214–24 Bush, George W., 242
Australia, 209, 212, 215–16 Bushidan. See Warrior bands
Austro-Hungarian Empire, 173 Bushido: battle of the Uji and, 64;
Autarky, 175–76 Buddhism and, 75; definitions
Awa Province, 47–48 of, 56; loyalty and, 117; recreation
of, 167; resurgence of, 235, 241;
B-17 Flying Fortress, 203, 206 self-defense forces and, 227–28.
B-29 bombers, 221 See also “Pseudo-Bushido” ethos
Bakufu, definition of, 249n3 Byodo-In Monastery, 63
Bakufu period, 61
Bakufu system, 29, 76, 77–78, C3 (Command, control, and
111, 112 communications system), 155
Balance of power strategy, 153–54 Cannon revolution, 130
Ballistic missile tests, 240 Cannons: arrival of, 94; in Battle of
Baltic Fleet, 160 Sekigahara, 129; Hideyoshi and,
Bando Fujiwara, 26, 43 114; introduction of in Japan,
Bataan Death March, 207–8 98; invasion of Korea, 123–24;
Index 283
in Japanese navy, 137; Ming Song Dynasty, 77; Sui Dynasty, 11;
armies, 118; Nobunaga and, 105; Tang Dynasty, 11–14; Three Alls
seaborne, 99, 108 Campaign, 200; Yuan Dynasty, 77
Carter, Jimmy, 241 China-Burma-India (CBI) region,
Casablanca conference, 216 210, 211, 219–20
Cavalry, transition to, 15 China Incident. See Marco Polo
CBI (China-Burma-India) region, Bridge incident
210, 211, 219–20 Chinese Navy, 149–51, 152
CCS (Allied Combined Chiefs of Chinese Revolution of 1911, 169, 175
Staff), 209, 211 Chin Teh-chin, 195
Census of the population, 17 Choshu clan, 137–40
Center Force, 223 Choson, Kingdom of, 89
Chase, Kenneth, 126–27 Christianity, 101, 130, 132–33
Chennault, Claire, 199 The Chronicle of Onin, 92–94
Chen Yuen (Chinese battleship), The Chronicles of Japan (Nihon Shoki),
149–50 6, 7, 12, 68
Cherry Society (Sakura-kai), 185, 186 Chungju, Battle of, 120
Chiang Kai-shek: Inukai Tsuyoshi Civilian-military split, 18, 170,
and, 188–89; Marco Polo Bridge 171, 181
incident, 195–97, 198–99; open Civil wars, 14–21, 139. See also
conflict with, 193; retreat to Revolts/rebellions
Taiwan, 232; Tanaka Giichi and, Clausewitz, Carl von, 11, 26, 154
183–84; World War II, 210, 219–20, Clavell, James, 57, 132
221; Zhang Xueliang and, 186 Cloister government, 54
China: alliance with Korea, 118–26; Cloud Cluster Sword, 4, 5
anti-Japanese rhetoric, 237; Boxer Code breakers, U.S., 212, 213, 217
Rebellion, 153; defeat of Chiang Code of Battlefield Conduct
Kai-shek, 232–33; gentlemen (Senjin kun), 188
class, 131; Ichi-go Offensive, Code of the warrior, 56
221; imperial government, Cold War, 232–38, 240–41
adoption of, 10–11, 12; influence Colonization of the northeast, 33
on Japanese military tradition, Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS),
15; Japanese relations with, 175; 209, 211
in Japanese strategic planning, Combined Fleet, 155, 208, 212, 213
176, 180; legal system of, adoption Combined Fleet Battle Plan, 155
of, 16–17; Marco Polo Bridge Comfort women, 241
incident, 194–98; Ming Dynasty, Command, control, and
80, 89, 118–26; Nomonhan, battle communications system (C3), 155
of, 199–200; Paekchon, Battle Committee on the Current Situation,
of, 14; Qing Dynasty, 135, 190
137, 147, 153, 169; reaction to Confucian model, 131
Japanese takeover of Manchuria, Conscription: after the Rape of
187–88; resurgence of, 240, Nanking, 198; of Koreans during
244–45; Senkuku Islands, 245; World War II, 217; under Meiji
Sino-Japanese War, 146, 147–52; government, 146; Meiji
284 Index
Restoration, 141; Mongol Treaty, 154, 173, 181; Four Power

invasions, 79 Pact, 182; London Naval Treaty,
Constable daimyo, 87–88, 89–90, 96. 184–85, 188, 189; Mutual Security
See also Daimyo Treaty, 234–35; Naval Treaty,
Constitution, 231 182–83; negotiations with Chiang
Constitutional monarchy, 231 Kai-shek, 189–90; Treaty of
Control Group (Tosei-ha), 176, 180, Commerce and Navigation, 201;
185, 190 Treaty of Kanagawa, 136; Treaty
Coral Sea, battle of, 212–13 of Shimonoseki, 152, 154; Wash-
Council of State, 40 ington Naval Conference, 174–83;
Counterinsurgency, 31–33 Washington Naval Treaty, 179, 185
Coup attempts: after the Shanghai Diplomatic, information, military
Incident, 188; Fujiwara Kamatari, and economic sources of national
10–12; Fujiwara Nakamaro, 20; power (DIME), 236
in Korea, 152; Yoshitomo and Doihara Kenji, 198
Fujiwara, 57; Young Officer’s Doolittle, Jimmy, 211
Revolt, 190–91 Dowager empresses, 35
Crossbows, 18, 34 Dower, John, 225, 230
“Cross the T” naval maneuver, Drea, Edward, 200
155–56, 166 Drums, 12
Cryptography, 204, 211, 212, 213 Dual advance, 216
Czech Legion, 177, 178 Dutch East Indies, 208, 209
Dutch/Netherlands, 134–35, 137, 209
Daimyo: Christianity and, 132; in
Laws for Military Households, Early Nine Years War, 49–50
130–31; provincial-wars daimyo, Economic sanctions, 203
96, 101; under Tokugawa Bakufu, Edo (Tokyo), 116, 130, 140
134–35; Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 18th Army, 218
policies toward, 117 Eight-eight fleet plan, 171, 173,
Dai To-A Kyoeken. See Greater East 179, 180
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Eisai, 75
Dannoura, battle of, 65, 72–73 Eisenhower, Dwight, 235
Darwin, attack on, 209 Emishi people, 27, 28–35
Death poems, 63, 64 Emperor’s Army, structure of, 17–18
“Defense of Japan” white paper, Enryaku-ji, 105
236–37 Enterprise (carrier), 211
Defense spending, 235–36, 238, 239 European primogeniture, 35
Demilitarization, 230–32 “Europe-First strategy,” 203
Deng Xiaoping, 237 Explosive mines, 114
Dewa Province, 31–32, 35
DIME (diplomatic, information, Farris, William, 10, 21
military and economic sources of February 26 Incident, 190–91
national power), 236 Fellers, Bonner, 230–31
Ding Ju Chang, 149–51 Feudalism, 52
Diplomacy: Anglo-Japanese Naval Field initiative. See Gekokujo
Index 285
15th Army, 220 Fujiwara no Michinaga, 44, 47, 53–54

Fifth Fleet, 219, 220–21 Fujiwara no Motonaga, 47
Fighter jets, 240 Fujiwara no Motosune, 35
Firearms, 108, 114, 129, 131. See also Fujiwara Regency, 26–28, 44, 49, 51,
Gunpowder weapons 53–54
Fire God, 2–3 Fujiwara Sumitomo, 41–43
1st Marine Division, 222 Fujiwara Tadahira, 39, 41
First Army, 156, 159, 160, 162 Fujiwara Tadamichi, 56
First Fleet, 155 Fujiwara Tamenori, 40–41
First Mobile Strike Force, 204 Fujiwara Yasuhira, 74
First Shanghai Incident, 188–89 Fujiwara Yorimichi, 53
Fisher, John “Jacky,” 147, 171 Fujiwara Yorinaga, 55–56
Five Guards, 18 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
Flags, 12 catastrophe, 245
“Flaming ox attack,” 120 Fukuwara, 70
Fleet faction of Imperial Navy, 183, Fushimi castle, 127
185, 191
Foreign policy, naval concerns vs. Gaijin warriors. See photo essay
army concerns in, 175 Gekokujo: Hideyoshi and, 113, 116;
Former Nine Years War, 49–50 Honjo Shigeru and, 186; Marco
Formosa, 222 Polo Bridge incident, 195; modern
Fort Akita, 34, 51 form of, 172; as a problem in IJA,
Fort Monofu, 30 151–52; recurrence of, 141, 143;
Fort Taga, 31 suppression of, 112
Four Power Pact, 182 Genda Minoru, 204
Fourteenth Air Force, 221 Genghis Khan, 76
Fourth Army, 157, 162 Genpei War, 55, 61, 62–73
France, 138, 182 Geography of Japan, 1–2, 4–5, 23
Friday, Karl, 28 German Shandong, 175
Fujiwara clan: daughters of, 17; Germany, 174, 201, 232
hereditary regents, 29; hold Gifu castle, 103
on power in Kyoto, 34–35; Gilbert Islands, 219
introduction to, 8–9; key positions, Globalization, in late 19th-century, 145
55–56; rise of, 20–21; smallpox Global War on Terror (GWOT),
epidemic, 19; Toyotomi Hideyoshi 242–44
and, 118; warrior bands, 26. See GMD (Guomindang), 184
also Bando Fujiwara Gneisenau (cruiser), 173
Fujiwara Hidehira, 70, 74 Go-Daigo, Emperor, 81–82, 83–84, 85
Fujiwara Kamatari, 8, 10 Gods, 2–4, 7
Fujiwara Kiyohira, 51 Golden Hall, 47
Fujiwara no Ason Hirotsugu, 19 Golden Temple, 89
Fujiwara no Ason Nakamaro, 20–21 Gona, battle of, 215
Fujiwara Nobuyori, 57 Go-Reizei, Emperor, 53
Fujiwara no Hidesato, 42 Goryo, battle of, 94
Fujiwara no Kunikaze, 43 Goryo Shrine, 93
286 Index
Go-Sanjo, Emperor, 53–54 Handheld firearms, 98

Go-Shirakawa, Emperor, 56, 58, 62, Hansan Island, Battle of, 122
67–69, 71, 73–74 Hara, battle of, 134
Go-Toba, Emperor, 76–77 Hara Kei, 177–79, 180, 181
Graves, William, 177–78 Hara-kiri, 63
Great Britain: alliance with Japan, Harding, Warren, 181
153–54; Four Power Pact, 182; Harquebus, 100, 105
reaction to Russian Revolution of Hart, Thomas, 208
1917, 176–77; Shimonoseki Strait Hashiba Hideyoshi, 112–13. See also
and, 138; support for Nationalist Toyotomi Hideyoshi
Chinese, 201; World War I, 173; Hashimoto Kingoro, 185, 186
World War II, 204–5, 208–10 Hatakeyama clan, 89–91
Great Buddha of Kamakura, 76 Hatakeyama Kunikiyo, 89
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Hatakeyama Masanaga, 89–93
Sphere, 192, 199 Hatakeyama Yoshinari, 89–93
Greater East Asian War: atomic Heavenly Warrior Emperor, 16
bomb, 224–25; introduction to, Heian period, 44
193–94; outbreak of, 194–200; war Heian procession. See photo essay
of attrition, 214–24; war with the Heiji insurrection, 55–58
United States, 200–213. See also Helfrich, C. E. L., 209
World War II Hill 203, 163
“Great man history,” 21 Hirohito, Emperor, 184–85, 194, 225,
Great Reforms, 16 228, 230–31
Ground Self Defense Force Hiroshima, 225
(GSDF), 234 Hodges, Courtney, 230
Guadalcanal, battle of, 214–16 Hogen insurrection, 55–58
Guam, 180, 206 Hojo clan, 96–99, 116
Guerilla war, 82, 123, 125, 177–78, 200 Hojoji Monastery, 54
Gun foundries, 100, 103 Hojo Regency, 76
Gunji shizoku (military aristocrats), 10 Hojo Soun, 96–97
Gunpowder weapons, 94, 98, Hojo Tokimune, 80
100–101, 108. See also Cannons; Hojo Ujimasa, 98
Firearms Hojo Ujinao, 98–99
Gunsmith guild, 100 Hojo Ujitsuna, 97
Guomindang (GMD), 184 Hojo Ujiyasu, 97
GWOT (Global War on Terror), Hojo Yoshitoki, 75, 76
242–44 Hokkaido, 4, 140
“Hold north, go south” strategy, 203
Hachiman, the War God, 7 Homma Masaharu, 206–7
Hakata Bay, 79–80 Honda Tadakatsu, 127
Hakodate fortress, 140 Honda Tadatsugu, 104
Halsey, William, 211, 216–18, 221–23 Hong Kong, 208
Hamaguchi Osachi, 185 Honjo Shigeru, 186
Hamamatsu castle, 106 Honnoji temple, 109
Handheld edged weapons, 94–95 Honorable suicide, 64
Index 287
“Honorific individualism,” 131 Imperial institution: decentralization

Honshu, 4, 27, 140 of, 27–28, 34–35; Oda Nobunaga
Hornet (carrier), 211 and, 109
Horses: development of use in war, Imperial Japanese Army (IJA):
9; introduction of, 7–8, 22; in Chiang Kai-shek and, 190;
Masakado’s rebellion, 39; warrior Chinese reaction to Japanese
bands and, 26 takeover of Manchuria, 187–88;
Hosho (carrier), 188 division with navy, 152–53, 161,
Hosokawa clan, 90–93 167, 170; factions within, 170;
Hosokawa daimyo, 99 fathers of, 141; intervention
Hosokawa Katsumoto, 91–93, 95 in Siberia, 177–79; Marco Polo
Houston (cruiser), 209 Bridge incident, 194–98; policies
Hughes, C. E., 181 in North China, 194–95; Saigo
Hull, Cordell, 203 Takamori revolt, 142–43;
Sino-Japanese War, 148–49, 151;
Ichi-go Offensive, 221, 224 strategic planning, 156–57,
Ichiki Detachment, 214 175–76; use of to maintain law
Ichiki Kiyonao, 195 and order after WWII, 229–30;
Ichinotani, 70 Young Officer’s Revolt, 190–91
IEDs (Improvised explosive Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN):
devices), 188 buildup of, 154; Chinese reaction
Ienaga Saburo, 232 to Japanese takeover of
IGHQ. See Imperial General Manchuria, 187–88; development
Headquarters (IGHQ) of, 146–47, 154–55; division with
I-Go (Air counteroffensive), 217 army, 152–53, 161, 167, 170;
IGS (Imperial General Staff), 178, 190 implementation of Naval Treaty,
Iida Shojiro, 210 182–83; measured against U.S.
IJA. See Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Navy, 170–71; Sino-Japanese War,
IJN. See Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) 149–51; strategic planning,
Iki, 77, 79 155–56, 179–83; World War II,
Ikko-ikki movement, 103, 105–8 204–13, 215–16, 219, 220–22
Ilu River, Battle of the, 214 Imperial regent, 118
Imagawa clan, 97, 101–2 Imperial restoration, 11
Imagawa Yoshimoto, 101 Imperial Way (Kodo-ha), 176, 184,
Imari Gulf, 80 190–91
Imperial Defense policy, 183 Improvised explosive devices
Imperial General Headquarters (IEDs), 188
(IGHQ): civilian-military divide IMTFE (International Military
in, 158, 196; on Mukden, 165; stra- Tribunal for the Far East), 232–33
tegic planning, 162; in World War India Command, 210
II, 209, 217, 219–20, 222; Yamagata Individual vs. group tactics, 77–78
and, 151–52 Indochina, 201, 203
Imperial General Staff (IGS), Indonesia, 208, 230
178, 190 Infantry: in early Japanese armies, 7;
Imperial guards, 46 firearms and, 101–2; Masakado
288 Index
and, 38–39; officers, 18; peasants Japanese Tea Box covering. See
service in, 17; role of, 38–39; photo essay
transition from to cavalry, 15, 26. Japan Iraq Reconstruction and
See also Imperial Japanese Army Support Group (JIRSG), 243
(IJA); Universal conscription Jesuits, 101, 132
Infrastructure, 117 Jimmu, 4
Insei. See Retired emperors Jingo, Queen, 7
In system, 54, 55–56, 58, 75 Jinshin Civil War, 14–15
International Military Tribunal for JIRSG (Japan Iraq Reconstruction
the Far East (IMTFE), 232–33 and Support Group), 243
Inukai Tsuyoshi, 188 Jito, Empress, 17
Iron Age, 7 Johnson, Chalmers, 241
Irregular warfare, 29–31. See also Jokyu War, 76, 78
Guerilla war JSDF (Japanese Self-Defense Force),
Ise Soun, 96 234, 238–40
Ishida Mitsunari, 127–29 JSP (Japanese Sociality Party), 234
Ishiwara Kanji, 176, 181–82, 185–86, Junnin, Emperor, 20–21
189, 194–95 Jurakutei palace, 117
Island hopping, 216
Island of Corregidor, 208 Kaga (carrier), 188. See also
Isolation of Japan, 111–12 photo essay
Itaitsu River, battle of, 19 Kamakura: fall of, 81–85; Hojo Soun
Itakura Shigemasa, 133–34 and, 96–97; ruggedness of, 66;
Ito Hirobumi, 138, 152 samurai government in, 75, 77, 80;
Ito Yuko, 147, 149–50 seizure of by Ashikaga Takauji, 84
Itsukushima (cruiser), 146 Kamakura Bakufu, 61, 73–80, 189
Iwakura, siege of, 102 Kamakura shogunate, 75–77
Iwato-hime, 5 Kamikaze (divine wind), and
Iwo Jima, battle of, 224–25 Mongol invasion, 80
Izanagi, 3 Kamikaze attacks, 224. See also
Izanami, 3 photo essay
Izawa, 32 Kammu, Emperor, 31–32, 36, 41
Izu Province, 97 Kammu Heishi, 36. See also Taira clan
Kant, Immanuel, 227
Japanese China Expeditionary Kanto-bushi, 27
Army, 214 Kanto Plain, 4, 9, 25, 33, 35, 46, 97–99
Japanese Communist Party, 234 Kato Kanji, 182–83
Japanese Fleet Air Force. See also Kato Kiyomasa, 117, 119–20, 122,
photo essay 127, 128
Japanese Guards Division, 225 Kato Tomosaburo, 155, 179–83.
Japanese Imperial Officer See also photo essay
School, 232 Katsura Taro, 158, 162
Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF), Kawamura Sumiyoshi, 142
234, 238–40 Kawanakajima, battles of, 99
Japanese Sociality Party (JSP), 234 Kazusa Province, 36, 47–48
Index 289
Keiko, King, 5 with Japan, 9–10; invasion of, 7–8,

Kellogg-Briand Pact, 183–84 118–27; Japanese foreign policy in,
Kemmu Revolt, 81–85 11, 22, 79, 80; natural resources, 7;
Kendo fighting, 132 as part of Japanese empire, 175;
Kennan, George, 232 Russo-Japanese War, 157; Sino-
Ketsu-go defense plan, 224 Japanese War, 149–52; Tang
Kido Butai, 204–5, 209, 213. See also Dynasty and, 12–14
photo essay Korean Airlines flight KAL-007, 237
Kigoshi Yasustuna, 172 Korean War, 232–33
Kim Dae-jung, 241 Koromo, battle on the, 32
Kim Il-Sung, 237, 240 Kotoku, Emperor, 11
Kim Jong-Il, 238, 240–41 Krueger, Walter, 222
Kimmei, King, 9 KTA (Kwantung Army), 184,
Kimmel, Husband, 204 185–86, 190, 194, 198–99, 228
Kinai Plain, 4 Kublai Khan, 77
King, Edward, 207 Kumamoto, 142–43
King, Ernest, 201, 211, 214, 221 Kuribayashi Tadamichi, 224
Kinkaid, Thomas, 222–23 Kurikara Pass, 68
Kishi Nobusuke, 234–35 Kurita Takeo, 223
Kishin system, 16, 17 Kuroda Kiyotaka, 142
Kiso Yoshinaka, 65. See also Kuroda Nagamasa, 120
Minamoto Yoshinaka Kuroki Tamemoto, 162
Kitty Hawk, USS, 243 Kuropatkin, A. N., 161, 162, 164–65
Kiyohara Mitsuyori, 50–51 Kusunoki Masashige, 81–84
Kobayakawa Hideaki, 127, 128 Kusunoki Shichiro, 83
Kodama Gentaro, 156, 164, 165, 170 Kwantung Army (KTA), 184,
Kodo-ha (Imperial Way), 176, 184, 185–86, 190, 194, 198–99, 228
190–91 Kyoto: Ashikaga Bakufu and, 92;
Koguryo, Kingdom of, 8, 9, 11, 12 court moved to, 58; Fujiwara
Koizumi Junichiro, 243 Regency in, 26–27; Oda Nobunaga
Koken, Empress, 20–21 and, 103; Onin War, 89–95;
Kokoda, 215 samurai government in, 75, 77, 80;
Kokutai, 4 seizure of by Ashikaga Takauji,
Kolchak, Alexander, 177–78 84–85; warring states period, 87
Komei, Emperor, 136, 137, 139 Kyushu, 4, 77–79, 81, 115–17, 132–33
Komiyo, Emperor, 85
Komodorski Islands, 216 Lamellar armor, 9, 34
Kongo class battle cruisers, 173 Landless vassals, 132
Konishi Yukinaga, 119–24, 127, Land reforms, 16, 53–54
128, 132 Later Three Years War, 51–53
Konodai, battle of, 97 Laws for Military Households
Konoe, Emperor, 55–56 (Buke Shohatto), 130–31
Konoye, Prince, 199, 203 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party),
Korea: as buffer zone, 79–80, 118, 231, 235
146, 148–49, 154; early interactions League of Nations, 183, 187
290 Index
League to Demonstrate Maps: ancient Korea, 13; battles in

Righteousness (Shogitai), 140 the reunification of Japan, 115;
Legal system, Chinese, 16–17 Battles of the Sengoku, 90; eastern
Legitimacy, 109 Japan and Tohoku campaigns,
Legitimacy, icons of, 103 30; Genpei War, 63; geographic
Lend-Lease program, 203, 210 areas of Japan, 2; Kanto Plain,
Lenin, V. I., 176 37; Masakado’s rebellion, 37;
Lexington (carrier), 212 Meiji Restoration and Satsuma
Leyte Gulf, 222–23 Rebellion, 137; Mongol invasions,
Liaodong Peninsula, 154, 157, 78; Nagashino, Battle of, 107;
159, 161 Pacific Theater of World War II,
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 202; provinces of Japan, 3;
231, 235 Sekigahara, Battle of, 129;
Liberty Memorial, 174 Sino-Japanese War, 148; war in
Li Hongzhang, 147 Korea, 1592–1598, 121
Lingayen, 207 Marco Polo Bridge incident, 194–98
Li Rubo, 124 Marianas Islands, 180, 221
Li Rusong, 123–25, 126 Marianas Turkey Shoot, 221
Liu Rengui, 12 Maritime self-defense force (MSDF),
“L” naval maneuver, 155 233–34, 239
Lockwood, Charles A., 220 Maritime Strategy (U.S.), 237–38
Logistics, 118–19 Marriage as a means to influence, 38
London Naval Treaty, 184–85, 188, 189 Marshall, George, 207
Loyalty, 117 Marshall Islands, 219
Luzon, 223 Matsudaira Nobotsuna, 134
Matsui Iwane, 195, 197
MacArthur, Douglas: in charge of Matsushima (cruiser), 146
Southwest Pacific theater, 211; Mazaki Jinzaburo, 190–91
occupation of Japan, 227, 230–31; McGiffen, Philo, 150
in the Philippines, 206–7; McMorris, Charles, 216
surrender of Japan, 225; war of Meeting engagement, 42
attrition, 214–18, 220–21, 223 Meiji, Emperor, 159, 167, 172, 184
Mahan, A. T., 155, 156 Meiji government, 145, 146–47
Makarov, S. O., 157, 159–60 Meiji Restoration: battles, 135–40;
Malaya, 204–5, 208 overview of, 111–12; reforms,
Malaysia, 205, 208, 229–30 140–42; Westernization, 141–42
Manchukuo. See Manchuria Mercenary warriors, 95
Manchuria: in Japanese strategic Meritocracy, military, 33, 113
planning, 157, 175, 176, 185; Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 174
Japanese takeover of, 186–87; Midway, Battle of, 212–13
Mukden, 162; Russia in, 154; Midway, USS, 239
Soviet invasion of, 225 Mii-dera Monastery, 62, 64
Manhattan Project, 225 Militarism: demilitarization, 230–32;
Manila, 223 road to, 188–89; Taisho Crisis,
Mao Zedong, 193, 195, 198, 200, 232 171–72
Index 291
Militarization of Japan, 10–14 Missouri, USS, 225, 230. See also

Military, rebirth of, 228, 232–34 photo essay
Military anarchy following Onin MITI (Ministry of Industry and
War, 96–100 Trade), 241
Military aristocrats (gunji shizoku), 10 Mitscher, Marc, 219
Military dictatorship: Ashikaga Miura, 65
Bakufu, rise of, 81–85; conclusion, Miyako no musha, 37–38, 43–46
85–86; Genpei War, 62–73; Miyoshi clan, 99
introduction to, 61–62; Kamakura, Mizuki, 78–79
fall of, 81–85; Kamakura Bakufu Mochihito, Prince, 62, 64–65
and Mongolian invasions, 73–80 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 201
Military experts, 14–15 Moltke, Helmut von, 156, 162
Military institutions, 26–27, 45–46. Mommu, Emperor, 16
See also specific institutions Monarchical instutution,
Milne Bay, 214 development of, 6–7
Minamoto clan: Genpei War, 62–73; Monarchs, as warriors, 4
loyalty to, 55; roots of, 36; support “Mongolia for Mongolians”
for the crown, 43; Taira clan and, 26, policy, 190
27, 44–55; Taira Kiyomori and, 58 Mongolian invasions, 61, 73–80
Minamoto Mamoru, 38–39 Monks, weapons of, 57–58. See also
Minamoto Noriyori, 69–73 Warrior-monks
Minamoto no Tsunemoto, 36 Mori clan, 99, 105, 108, 113, 127
Minamoto-Taira War. See Morinaga, Prince, 82
Genpei War Mounted archers, 19–20, 22–23, 33,
Minamoto Tameyoshi, 56 39, 83, 87
Minamoto Tsunemoto, 40, 41–42, 43 Mount Hiei, 104, 105
Minamoto Yorimasa, 62, 64–65 MSDF (Maritime self-defense force),
Minamoto Yorinobu, 48–49 233–34, 239
Minamoto Yoritomo, 59, 61–62, Musashi (battleship), 223
64–71, 73–76, 88, 102, 111 Musashi Province, 36, 97
Minamoto Yoriyoshi, 49–51 Musashi swordsman, 132
Minamoto Yoshiie, 49–53, 54–55 Musha. See Miyako no musha
Minamoto Yoshimitsu, 51 Musketeers, 109–10, 114, 119, 126
Minamoto Yoshinaka, 66–69, 120 Mutaguchi Renya, 220
Minamoto Yoshitomo, 56–58 Mutsuhito, 140
Minamoto Yoshitsune, 6, 61, 69–74, 76 Mutsu Province, 29–31, 49, 51, 74
Minamoto Yukiie, 66–67, 68–69, Mutual Security Treaty, 234–35
73–74 Myongnyang, Battle of, 126
Minato River, battle at, 85 Mythology, 2–4, 5–6, 7
Ming Dynasty, 80, 89, 118–26
Ministry of Industry and Trade Nagano Osami, 201, 213
(MITI), 241 Nagasaki, 225
Mino Province, 35, 103 Nagashino, Battle of, 107–8
Mirror of the East (Azumi Kagami), Nagata Tetsuzan, 190, 191
76–77 Nagumo Chuichi, 204–5, 209–10
292 Index
Naka, Prince, 11–12 Nijo, Emperor, 57

Nakahara Narimichi, 48 Nimitz, Chester, 211, 212, 213,
Nakasone Yasuhiro, 238–39 214, 219
Nanking, Rape of, 197–98 Nine-Power Pact, 182
Napoleon, 157 Nineteenth-century to early
National Industrial Recovery Act 20th-century: Boxer Rebellion,
(NIRA), 187 152–67; introduction to, 145–47;
National Police Reserve (NPR), 233 Russo-Japanese War, 152–67;
National Security Council (NSC), Sino-Japanese War, 147–52
232–33 Ningxia Mutiny, 120, 123
National war guilt, 232–33, 238–39 Ninigi, 4
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty NIRA (National Industrial Recovery
Organization), 29, 234 Act), 187
Naval arms limitation conference Nishimura Shoji, 223
(1921), 181–82 Nitta Yoshisada, 84–85
Naval arms race, 179–81, 187, 203 Nobel Peace Prize, 170
Naval battles: Battle of Nobility of failure, 132, 167, 191, 213
Myongnyang, 126; Genpei War, Nobi Plain, 4
71–72; invasion of Korea, 12–14, Nogi Maresuku, 151, 157, 162–64, 167
118–19, 122–23; Korean invasion, Nomonhan, battle of, 199–200
122–23, 125–26; Meiji Restoration, Nomoto, battle of, 38
140; Mongolian invasions, 80; Nomura Kichisaburo, 182, 203
Nobunaga and, 108; Russo- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Japanese War, 158–61, 163–66; (NATO), 29, 234
Shimonoseki Strait, 137–38; Sino- North China Area Army
Japanese War, 149–51; World War (NCAA), 196
I, 173–74; World War II, 204–13, North China Army (NCA), 190, 196
215–16, 219, 220–23. See also Northeast, pacification of, 28–35
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) North Korea, 237–38, 240–41, 242,
Naval Staff College, 147 243–44
Naval Treaty, 182–83 Noryang Straits, battle of, 126
Navy Act of 1916 (U.S.), 179 “No surrender” ethos, 188
Navy Act of 1940 (U.S.), 201, 203 NPR (National Police Reserve), 233
NCA (North China Army), 190, 196 NSC (National Security Council),
NCAA (North China Area Army), 196 232–33
Nebogatov, N. I., 166 NSC-68, 232–33
Negoro monastery, 105 Nuclear power, 238, 245
Negoro temple, 100, 115 Nuclear weapons ban, 238
Nelson, Horatio, 155
Netherlands, 134–35, 137, 209 Oama, Prince, 14–15
Neutrality, 177 Occupation of Japan, 227–28, 230–31
New Georgia Island, 217 October Incident, 186
New Guinea, 210, 212, 214, October Revolution, 176
216–18, 220 Oda clan, 113
Nicholas II, Tsar, 157, 162 Oda Nobunaga, 98, 101–9, 113, 117
Index 293
Odawara, siege of, 98–99 Peloponnesian War, 95

Odawara castle, 96 Percival, Arthur E., 205, 208–9
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 175 Perry, Matthew C., 80, 135–36.
Ojin, King, 7 See also photo essay
Okehazama, Battle of, 102 Persian Gulf War, 242
Okinawa, Battle of, 224–25 Perth, HMAS, 209
Okiyo, Prince, 40–41, 42, 45 Petropavlovsk (flagship), 159
Okuma Shigenobu, 171 Philippines, 180, 205–7, 221–23
Oku Yaasutaka, 161–62 Philippine Sea, 220–21
Omi Province, 104 Pikes, 97, 101, 109, 114, 128, 129
Omura Yasujiro, 139–41 Piracy, 41, 43, 244
ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence), 175 Poison gas, 199
Onin War, 45, 88, 89–95 Political parties, 171–72
Onin War, period of military Politics, and military institutions,
anarchy following, 96–100 26–27
Ono Azumabito, 19, 29 Port Arthur, 150–51, 154, 157–59,
Ono no Yoshifuru, 43 160, 162, 163–65
Open Door policy, 175 Port Moresby, 212–14
Operation A-GO, 220–21 Portuguese, 130, 132, 134
Opium Wars, 135, 137 Posse metaphor for imperial warrior
Osaka, 104–5 bands, 45
Osaka castle, 127 POWs (Prisoners of war), 173
Otani Kikuzo, 177 Prince of Wales (battleship), 208
Otomo, Prince, 15 Prisoners of war (POWs), 173, 177
Otomo clan, 99, 115–16 Provincial-wars daimyo, 96, 101
Owari peasant petition, 45–47 Provisional misrule, 44–45, 46–47
Owari Province, 35, 101–2, 113 “Pseudo-Bushido” ethos, 188, 200,
Owen-Stanley Range, 214 206, 227
Oyama Iwao, 146, 151–52, 162–65 Public education, and national war
guilt, 232, 239
Pacific Submarine Command, 220 Pume, Prince, 10
Pacific Theater of World War II Pu Yi, 186
(map), 202 Pyonghang, siege of, 120–25
Paekche, Kingdom of, 9, 11, 12–13
Paekchon, Battle of, 13–14 Qingdao, 173, 175
Palace coups, 10–11 Qing Dynasty, 135, 137, 147, 153, 169
Panay (gunboat), 197, 200–201
Parker, Geoffrey, 87 Rabaul, 214, 216–18
Pearl Harbor attack, 204–6 Rangoon, 210, 224
Peasant revolt over rice Rape of Nanking, 197–98
speculation, 86 Reizei the Later. See Go-Reizei,
Peasants: disarmament of, 116; in Emperor
Heian period, 46–47; Shimbara Religion, and war, 10
Revolt, 132–33 Repulse (cruiser), 208
Peleliu, 222, 229 Resources, control of, 175–76
294 Index
“Respect Virtue: Reform 148; probes from, 135. See also

Government,” 142 Russo-Japanese War; Soviet Union
Retired emperors, 44, 53–55, 58, 76 Russian Civil War, 175
Reunification of Japan, 101, 109 Russian Pacific Squadron, 158–60
Revision of Imperial Defense, Russian Revolution of 1917, 176
179–80 Russo-Japanese War: Battle of
Revolts/rebellions: Ashikaga Tsushima, 165–66; causes of, 154;
Takauji, 84–85; conscription and, cultural impact, 167; land battles,
141; Early Nine Years War, 49–50; 159–65; naval battles, 158–61,
Fujiwara no Ason Hirotsugu, 163–66; peace negotiations,
19–20; Fujiwara Sumitomo, 41–43; 166–67; strategic planning,
Fujiwara Yorinaga, 56; Go-Daigo, 155–57, 162
Emperor, 81–85; Hogen and Heiji
insurrections, 55–58; Kusunoki Saga castle, 142
Masashige, 81–84; Later Three Sagami Province, 97
Years War, 51–53; in Mutsu Saigo Takamori, 6, 139–43
province, 29–32; Owari peasant Saigo Tsugumichi, 146–47, 154
petition, 45–47; peasant revolt Saionji Kinmochi, 172, 184
over rice speculation, 86; Saigo Saipan, 221
Takamori, 142; Satsuma Rebellion, Saito clan, 103
137–39, 142; Shimbara Revolt, Sakai, gun foundries in, 100, 103
132–34; Taira no Masakado, 35–43; Sakamoto Toshiatsu, 154–55
Taira no Tadutsune, 45; under Sakanoue no Tamuramaro, 32–33
Tokagawa, 131 Sakimori frontier guards, 18
Revolutions in military affairs Samurai, emergence of: conclusion,
(RMAs), 87–88. See also Sengoku 58–59; first political leader, 55;
military revolution Hogen and Heiji insurrections,
“Right of supreme command,” 171 55–58; introduction to, 25–28;
Rikken Seiyukai (Friends of Kanto-bushi in development of,
Constitutional Government), 27; pacification of the northeast,
171–72 774–812, 28–35; path to, 14–21;
Ritual suicide, 167 role of during Tokugawa shoguns
RMAs (Revolutions in military period, 112; Taira and Minamoto,
affairs), 87–88. See also Sengoku 44–55; Taira no Masakado, 35–43;
military revolution Zen Buddhism and, 75–76
Rochefort, Joe, 211 Samurai, taming of: Hideyoshi,
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 187, 201, 204, 112–17; introduction to, 111–12;
207, 210, 221 Korean invasion, 118–27;
Roosevelt, Theodore, 166, 170–71 maintenance of, 130–35; Meiji
Royal Navy, 208, 209 Restoration, 135–43; Satsuma
Rozhestvensky, Z. P., 160, Rebellion, 135–43; at Sekigahara,
164–66 127–30; Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s
Russia: Great Program, 170; policies toward, 116–17
intervention in, 174–83; in Samurai helmet. See photo essay
Japanese strategic planning, San Bernardino Strait, 223
Index 295
Sanemoto, Shogun, 76 Shizugatake, battle of, 114

San Francisco System, 234, 241–42 Sho (victory) plan, 222–23
Sanjo the Later. See Go-Sanjo, Shogun (Clavell), 57, 132
Emperor Shogunate, 61
Sato Eisaku, 235 Shoguns: definitions of, 249n3;
Sato Kozo, 174 development of, 6–7, 22–23;
Satomi Yoshihiro, 98 succession of, 75, 89–92; during
Satsuma clan, 137–40 Tang Dynasty, 12
Satsuma Rebellion, 135–43 Shoho (carrier), 212–13
Scharnhorst (cruiser), 173 Shokaku (carrier), 212
SDF (Self Defense Forces), 233 Shomu, Emperor, 8, 20
Second Army, 156–57, 161–62 Shotoku, Emperor, 20
Second Fleet, 155 “Showa Restoration,” 188
Second Pacific Squadron, 160, 165 Siberia, 177–79
Security Force, 233–34 Silla, Kingdom of, 10, 11, 12, 34
Seii taishogun, 74, 107, 130, 249n3 Silver Temple, 89
Seiwa, Emperor, 36 Singapore, 208
Seiwa Genji, 36, 48. See also Sin Ip, 120
Minamoto clan Sino-Japanese War, 146, 147–52
Sekigahara, 127–30 Sixth Army, 222
Self Defense Forces (SDF), 233 Skrydlov, N. I., 161, 163
Sengoku military revolution, 90, Slim, William, 210, 220, 224
100–110 Smallpox epidemic, 19
Sengoku period, 94 SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement),
Senjin kun (Code of Battlefield 233–34
Conduct), 188 Soga clan, 8, 10–11
Senkuku Islands, 245 Soga Umako, 8
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Solomon Islands, 210, 212, 214, 216
241–44 Song Dynasty, 77
Sevastopol (battleship), 164 Sonjo, King, 120
Seventh Fleet, 222 Soong, T. V., 203
Shanghai, battle at, 196–97 South Korea, 238, 241
Shanghai Expeditionary Army, 197 Soviet Union: Cold War, 232–33;
Shiba clan, 92 incidents along Soviet-Japanese
Shiba Yoshikado, 92 border in Korea, 198–99; invasion
Shiba Yoshitoshi, 92–93 of Manchuria, 225; in Japanese
Shikoku, 4, 115 strategic planning, 176, 180;
Shimazu clan, 115–16 relations with Germany, 201;
Shimazu Yoshihiro, 128 relations with Japan, 237; shoot
Shimbara Revolt, 132–34 down of Korean Airlines flight,
Shimonoseki Strait, 137 237. See also Russia
Shimosa Province, 47, 97–98 So Yoshitoshi, 119, 124
Shintoism, 8 Spiritual leadership, 27–28
Shirakawa, Emperor, 54–55 Spruance, Raymond, 219, 220–21,
Shirakawa Yoshinori, 187 224
296 Index
Stalin, Joseph, 198, 209, 232 Taira Kiyomori, 55, 56–59, 62, 64,
Stark, O. V., 158–59 65–67
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Taira Koremori, 66, 68, 70
233–34 Taira Kunika, 38
Steamships, 136, 137 Taira Munemori, 72
Stillwell, Joseph, 210, 220 Taira Naokata, 49
Stimson, Henry, 187 Taira no Kiyomori, 55
Stone fortifications, 94 Taira no Masakado, 35–43
Strategic planning: autarky, 175–76; Taira no Naokata, 48
factions in, 185–86; geographic Taira no Tadamori, 55
objectives vs. strategic objectives, Taira no Tadatsune, 45, 47–49
211; naval planning, 155–57, Taira Sadamori, 38, 40, 42, 43
181–83; Revision of Imperial Taira Shigehira, 69, 71
Defense, 179–80; Russo-Japanese Taira Tadamori, 71
War, 162; U.S. and, 203 Taira Takamochi, 36, 38
Strict neutrality, 177 Taira Tomomori, 69, 71–72
Strikes and riots over treaty Taira Yoshikane, 38–40
revision, 234–35 Taira Yoshimomochi, 36–37
Submarine warfare, 174 Taisho Crisis, 171–73
Sugura Province, 66 Taisho democracy, 183–91
Suicide attacks, 188 Taiwan, 152
Sui Dynasty, 11 Takamochi, Prince, 36
Sujin, King, 5, 6 Takasugi Shinsaku, 138–39
Sun Goddess Amateratsu, 2–4, 72 Takeazki Suenaga, 79–80
Sun Tzu. See Sunzi Takeda clan, 97–98, 99, 106–8
Sunzi, 15, 66, 198 Takeda Katsuyori, 107–8
Supreme War Council, 190 Takeda Shingen, 98, 99, 106–7
Surrender of Japan, 225, 228–29, 230 The Tale of Genji, 44
Sutoku, Emperor, 56 Tale of Masakado, 42
Suvorov (ship), 166 Tamura Iyozo, 154
Swope, Kenneth, 122 Tamura Maro. See Sakanoue no
“Sword hunts,” 116 Tamuramaro
Swords, samurai, 34, 189, 190 Tamuramaro clan, 35
Tanaka Giichi, 176, 178, 179–80,
Tachibana clan, 19 183–84
Taiho Code, 16, 18, 20 Tang Dynasty, 11–14
Taiho conscript army, 29, 33–34 Tarawa, 210, 219
Taika Reform Edict, 12 Tashiro Kanichiro, 190
Taira Ascendency, 28, 44, 54–55 Tax farmer, 249n10
Taira clan: Genpei War, 62–73; Telegraph technology, 155
infighting, 38; material Ten-go (Okinawa) defense plan, 224
advantages, 55–56; Minamoto Tenji, Emperor, 14–15
clan and, 26, 27, 44–55; overthrow Tenmu, Emperor, 15–16, 17
of, 61; roots of, 35–36; support for Terauchi Masatake, 162, 170, 171–72,
the crown, 43 176, 178
Index 297
Thai-Burma railroad, 209, 220 True Pure Land Sect, 103

Third Army, 157, 161–62 Truk, attack on, 219
Third Fleet, 155, 158, 222 Tsesarevich (battleship), 163
Thirty Years’ War, 95 Tsushima, 77, 79
Three Alls Campaign, 200 Tsushima, Battle of, 165–66
Tibbits, Paul, 225 Tsushima Strait, 158
Ting Yuen (Chinese battleship), Tukachevsky, M. N., 198
149–50 Tulagi, 212, 214
Togo Heihachiro, 155, 158–61, Turtle boats, 122. See also
163–66, 167, 182 photo essay
Tohoku campaigns, 30 28th Infantry Regiment, 199–200
Tohuku region, 27, 28, 49 25th Army, 205, 208
Tojo Hideki, 176, 198, 203–4, 214, 221 “Twenty-One Demands,” 175
Tokugawa Bakufu, 134–35, 140 Typhoons, 80
Tokugawa clan, 115
Tokugawa Ieyasu: attainment of Uehara Yusaku, 172
peace, 227; Hideyoshi and, Uesugi clan, 97–98, 99, 127
113–14; Hojo domains and, 116, Uesugi Kenshin, 98, 99
117; Hojo Ujinao and, 99; Uji River, battle of the, 62–64, 76
introduction to, 102–4; Laws for Ukino, Battle of, 102
Military Households, 130–31; Ukita Hideie, 127
policy against Christianity, 132; as Ulsan, siege of, 126
regent, 127–29; as seii taishogun, United States: asymmetric warfare
130; Takeda clan and, 106–7 and, 29; in Japanese strategic
Tokugawa Shogun (Iemitsu), 133–34 planning, 180, 185–86; Perry’s
Tokugawa shoguns, 92, 95, 111–12 mission, 136; reaction to Russian
Tokugawa Yoshinobu, 139 Revolution of 1917, 176–78;
Tokyo, 140, 211. See also Edo (Tokyo) support for Nationalist Chinese,
Tomiko, Lady, 92–93 201, 203, 210; war scare with Japan,
Tosei-ha (Control Group), 176, 180, 175, 180; World War I casualties,
185, 190 174; World War II, 200–213
Toyotomi Hideyori, 127, 130 Universal conscription, 17–18, 33, 198
Toyotomi Hideyoshi: death of, U.S. Army, 222, 233
126–27; Kanto Plain, 98–99; U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 206
Korean invasion, 118–27; Oda U.S. code breakers, 212, 213, 217
Nobunaga and, 104, 108–9; rule of, U.S. Marine Corps, 224–25, 229
111; unification of Japan, 112–17 U.S. Navy: buildup of, 187;
Trans-Siberian Railroad, 148, 154, compared to rebuilt Japanese
156, 177 Navy, 239; expansion of U.S.
Treaty faction of Imperial Navy, bases, 180; naval battles, 204–13,
182–83, 191, 201 215–16, 219–23
Treaty of Commerce and U.S. Pacific Fleet, 204–5, 211
Navigation, 201
Treaty of Kanagawa, 136 Vietminh, 230
Treaty of Shimonoseki, 152, 154 Vietnam, 229–30
298 Index
Vietnam War, 235 220–23; outbreak of, 194–200;

Village burning, 31, 38, 42 Pacific Theater map, 202; war of
Vinson-Trammel naval construction attrition, 214–24
bill, 187
Violence, role of in founding of Yamagata Aritomo: concerns
Japan, 21–22 over Russia, 148; as father of
Vitgeft, V. K., 160, 161–62 Imperial Japanese Army, 141;
Vladivostock, 177 Russo-Japanese War, 165;
Von Spee, Graf, 173 Satsuma Rebellion, 138–39,
142–43; Sino-Japanese War, 149,
Wainwright, Jonathan, 207–8 151–52; strategic planning, 162,
Wake Island Atoll, 206 176; Taisho Crisis, 171, 172;
Wandering tragic hero vision for use of military force,
archetype, 5–6 146, 170
Wanli, Emperor, 120 Yamamoto Gombei: air
War, and religion, 10 counteroffensive, 217; as father of
War crimes tribunals, 230, 232–33 Imperial Japanese Navy, 147; as
War guilt, 232–33, 238–39 prime minister, 172; strategic
Warlord emperors, 14–21 planning, 155, 203–4, 211–13
Warring states: conclusion, 109–10; Yamamoto Isoruko, 186, 189
introduction to, 87–88; Oda Yamana clan, 90–93
Nobunaga, influence of, 100–109; Yamana Sozen, 91–93, 95
Onin War, 89–95; Sengoku Yamasaki Yasuyo, 216
military revolution, 100–109 Yamashita Tomoyuki, 208, 223
Warrior bands (bushi), 25–28, 46, 49 Yamato, 5–6
Warrior-monks, 57–58, 62, 64, 70, Yamato, Prince, 22
103–4, 105 Yamato period, 6–9
Washington Naval Conference, Yamato Province, 19
174–83. See also photo essay Yamishita Toymi, 205
Washington Naval Treaty, 179, 185 Yashima, battle at, 71–72
Wavell, Archibald, 208–9 Yasukuni Shrine, 232, 243–44
Weapons: Kotoku’s seizure of, Yellow Sea, Battle of the, 163
11–12, 19; transformation of, Yi Sunsin, 122–23, 125
33–34. See also Bow and arrow Yokosuka Naval Station, 239
weapons; Cannons; Crossbows; Yokoyama castle, 104
Firearms; Gunpowder weapons Yom Kippur War, 235
Weapons range, 123–24 Yorimasa, Shogun, 92
Wild West (American), compared to Yorktown (carrier), 212–13
Kanto region, 25–26 Yoshida Doctrine, 231, 235–36, 238,
Wilson, Woodrow, 176, 179 241–42
Women, in Japanese history, 21 Yoshida Shigeru, 231–32, 233–34
World War I, 169, 173–74 Yoshimasa, Shogun, 89, 99
World War II: Japan and the U.S., Yoshimitsu, Shogun, 86, 89
200–213; land battles, 214–25; Young Officer’s Revolt, 190–91
naval battles, 204–13, 215–16, 219, Yuan Dynasty, 77
Index 299
Yusa Kunisuke, 91 Zhang Xueliang, 186

Yusoke Matsuoka, 203 Zhang Zoulin (Chang Tso-Lin), 184,
186, 189
Zaibatsu corporate culture, 241 Zhukov, G. K., 198, 200
Zen Buddhism, 75–76, 81 Zimmerman Telegram, 179
Zeng Guofan, 147 Zu Chengxun, 121
About the Author
JOHN T. KUEHN is the General William Stofft Professor of Mili-
tary History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col-
lege, and has served on the faculty there since July 2000. He
retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004 as a commander after 23 years
of service. He is also the author of Agents of Innovation (2008)
and co-authored Eyewitness Pacific Theater (2008) with D. M.
Giangreco, as well as numerous articles and editorials. In Octo-
ber 2009, he lectured the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic
Studies Group in Newport, Rhode Island, and was recently
awarded a Moncado Prize from the Society for Military History
for “The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitation:
1922–1937.” He is also an adjunct professor for the Naval War
College Fleet Seminar Program and with the MA in Military
History (MMH) and MA in History Programs at Norwich Uni-
versity. He earned the MMH Faculty Member of the Year Award
in 2010–2011.

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Chapter 9 After the Samurai 227

5.1 The Battle of Sekigahara, 1600 129

My first memories are of Japan. My father had convinced the U.S.

my inclinations than me or anyone else. In the background of the pho-

between Daimyo (“great name”) lords in medieval Japan, the Meiji

individuals began to go almost exclusively by their clan or family

Particular thanks go to David Graff for his invaluable suggestions

ca. 660 BC Accession of first emperor, Jimmu, now celebrated as a

From the Sun Goddess

Map 1.1 Geographic Areas of Japan

us. The picture that seems to emerge centers on individuals rather

Map 1.2 Provinces of Japan

Once Amateratsu “inherited the Earth” she proceeded to send her

families that surrounded the throne and sometimes controlled it. It

the horse more seriously as a weapon of war. Around 400 AD the

overthrow), the Fujiwaras are a type of powerful family one sees

THE NARA PERIOD (710–793) AND THE MILITARIZATION OF JAPAN

reforms whereby the Japanese polity adopted Chinese forms of imperial

military measures went hand-in-hand with the Taika Reform Edict

Map 1.3 Ancient Korea

modern-day Kunsan. The Tang fleet had to be driven off, so the

attack, the Tang forces maintained “strict” discipline and formation, as

THE WARLORD EMPERORS, CIVIL WARS, AND

policy of being ready to repel an invasion from Korea or (more likely)

hundred to over a thousand from some of the more populous prov-

bands of retainers, often mounted, belonging to court nobles and mag-

army to challenge the empress. He failed. The pattern was adhered to

Japan’s unique geographic circumstances caused her to depart from

The Wild East: Emergence

English-speaking audiences will be familiar with the concept of the

And so it was by this mechanism that politics influenced the develop-

THE PACIFICATION OF THE NORTHEAST, 774–812

Before proceeding more directly to the lengthy process whereby the

Map 2.1 Eastern Japan and the Tohoku Campaigns

in favor of forces more suited to a protracted war of counterinsur-

protégé of Tamuramaro, succeeded in finally pacifying the northeast

with Fujiwara no Motosune becoming the first Fujiwara regent (kam-

TAIRA NO MASAKADO: THE FIRST SAMURAI?31

Into this stewpot of dictatorship, lawlessness, decaying institutions,

Map 2.2 The Kanto Plain Region: Masakado’s Rebellion

third. This plethora of male members of a military clan resulted in

defenses, a line of large implanted shields, and captured 80 prisoners.

surprise attack on Masakado’s forces at Iwai in Shimosa. Masakado

Sumitomo suspended his operations as a result. The court also

TAIRA AND MINAMOTO

long-suffering peasants—who often had no advocate to plead their

The final imperial component, last seen during Sumitomo’s threats

Also, because of the pardon, no doubt engineered by Yorinobu, Tadat-

(“cowardice”) in the seating arrangements for his men. Too, during

his private war, the court promoted him. It eventually welcomed

semiretirement near the capital, as the most honored warrior in the

THE HOGEN AND HEIJI INSURRECTIONS

An event known as the Hogen Insurrection served as occasion for

ignored it, but one in particular would not—Minamoto Yoritomo, eld-

Military Dictatorship: From the

THE GENPEI WAR

In the summer of 1180, the imperial prince Mochihito anonymously

Map 3.1 The Genpei War

hands of his enemies.4 As Mochihito fled toward Nara, the pursuing

retainers moved their camp to the modest fishing village of Kama-

the Taira troops promptly started to starve in their winter cantonments