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INTERNAL R IT YSECURITY
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N A L Complete Course PDF

TE R
IN
BY NAMAN MITTAL
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Naman Mittal
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Mentor & Coach for UPSC

N A M
INTERNAL SECURITY

Y B Y
U RITCreator of First ever Unacademy’s Articulate

SEC C.A. Magazine

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Former MGP Head (Q & A) @ ForumIAS

RN Worked with several Delhi based reputed CSE

IN TE Institutes in Various Capacities


Vast experience of Teaching/Mentoring for
UPSC CSE
Qualified LIC ADO 2015
Step 6 Step 7

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HOW TO Understand
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NAXALISMRIT Y IN INDIA
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INTRODUCTION

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The term “Naxalites” comes from Naxalbari, a small

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village in West Bengal where a section of the
Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) led by

AN M
Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Jangal Santhal
initiated a violent uprising in 1967.

N A M
Maoism is a form of communism developed by Mao

Y
Tse Tung. It is a doctrine to capture State power

IT Y B through a combination of armed insurgency, mass


mobilization and strategic alliances.

C U R The Maoists also use propaganda and disinformation

SE against State institutions as other components of their

AL
insurgency doctrine. Mao called this process, the

N
‘Protracted Peoples War’, where the emphasis is on

TE R
‘military line’ to capture power.

IN When the Naxal uprising began in 1967, the Indian


government looked at it as a law and order
problem. It did not analyse the causes of the
movement and the extent of mobilization of people.
TRACING IDEOLOGICAL ESTABLISHMENT
The creation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in 1925 consolidated the presence of communist ideology in the country.

The political context at the time proved to be favourable for the CPI.
• Peasant revolts against imperialist landowners has continuously occurred.

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• Withdrawal of Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement, disenchanted several revolutionaries.
• The success of the October Revolution in Russia.

AN M
While in its initial stages, the CPI remained secure in the idea of a Marxist inspired mass revolution but eventually it got

M
drifted towards the emergence of more radical communist parties.

Y N
Telangana Movement (1946-51)
A
It sought to;

IT Y B
• Liberate the peasantry from the dominance of oppressive landlords

R
• Organise the peasantry to lead it into revolution against the State

C U
• Redistribute the land amongst the landless

SE
AL
CPI formally withdrew the movement in 1951. Telangana insurgency led to the CPI promoting guerrilla warfare as a tactic.

RN
TE
Birth of CPI (M)

IN
The schism between the CPI and the CPI-M was brought about by the tensions between the two communist giants of the
time - the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.

In the 1960s, the Soviets advocated for democratic methods and diplomatic relations to spread communism, which lead the
Chinese to label the Soviets as revisionists who had abandoned the revolutionary flame.

While the older members of CPI stood by the USSR, the younger generation (which still advocated for violent revolution)
sided with the Chinese as it considered the older members traitors to the cause for having abandoned the Telangana uprising.
TRACING IDEOLOGICAL ESTABLISHMENT

Birth of CPI-ML & CPI-Maoists

• Indo China War

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• Indo Pak War
• West Bengal State Elections & victory of the CPI-M’s coalition

AN M
In 1969, Charu Mazumdar officially split from the CPI-M by forming the Communist Party of India- Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML).

M
In 1971, government commenced Operation Steeplechase and sent the army and members of the Central Reserve Police

Y N A
Force (CRPF) into West Bengal and ultimately crushed the Naxalite movement.

IT B
Naxalism resurfaced in the 1990s, during the liberalization of the Indian economy, when splintered Naxalite groups began

Y
dialogues and negotiations to recycle the original movement, only this time in a more structured fashion.

C U R
The merger of the People’s War Group and Maoist Communist Center in 2004 resulted in the creation of the Communist

SE
Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), and an upsurge in Left

AL
Wing Extremism (LWE) related violence which led Dr. Manhoman Singh, the former Prime Minister of India, to declare that

N
Naxalism was “the single biggest security challenge ever faced by our country”, in 2006.

TE R CPI-Maoists, was declared a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act in 2009.

IN
REASONS BEHIND EMERGENCE OF LWE

GOVERNANCE DEFICIT INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIT

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Poor implementation of land Inadequate Social Infrastructure
reforms – Health, Education,

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Weak Justice delivery system –
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Sanitation & Water Supply

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Inaccessible, Unaffordable,

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Inefficient Productive

Y
Unavailable and often Delayed Infrastructure –

IT Y B Roads, Electricity, Housing,

C U R
Inappropriate Rehabilitation & Irrigation etc..

SE Compensation Mechanisms

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Delayed Rural Infrastructure

RN Development

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Ineffective delivery of essential

IN
services and rights
Lopsided Infrastructure
Absence of community Development leading to
participation in decision making Wide Socio – Economic
Excessive use of force Disparities
(Failure of Trickle-Down Theory)
REASONS BEHIND EMERGENCE OF LWE

EXPLOITATIVE DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY


Large scale displacement of

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Tribals owing to Alienation & Oppression of
developmental related
activities. Like dams and
AN M
Dalits by Upper Caste
Adivasis by Outsiders

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reservoirs.

N
Y BY Distinctiveness of Tribal or

T
Unsustainable deforestation

I
Adivasi People

C U R
rendering tribal helpless

SE Large Dependency of rural

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Disruption of Tribal – Forests masses on natural resources

RN Relationship

IN TE Rent Seeking Behaviour of


Concentration of Key resources
in hands of few. Like Land.
Bureaucrats/Authorities

High illiteracy, poverty and


Encroachment of unemployment
Individual/Community Lands
SUBSTANTIATION
• India has one of the highest development-induced displacements in the world. Studies show that a total
of about 60 million people were displaced between 1947 and 2000.

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• It is found that in some of the projects like Bodhghat dam project in Madhya Pradesh, Icha, Chandil
and Koelkaro in Bihar, Mahi Bajaj Sagar in Rajasthan, Inchampalli in Andhra Pradesh and

M
Maharashtra etc the percentage of tribal displacement was more than 70 percent.

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which were tribals.
AN
The Narmada Valley Development Project affected as many as 25 million people, majority of

BY N
As shown by the 1971 census, nearly 60% of the population was landless, the lion’s share of land being

Y
owned by the richest 4%.

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Rural development became a priority for the government only in the initial years 70’s - IRDP, ICDS, Area

SEC
Development Programmes, TRYSEM, Garibi Hatao Andolan, Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY), Rural Landless

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Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP).

RN • According to the World Bank, rural development is “a strategy to improve the economic and social

TE
life of a specific group of people, the rural poor including small and marginal farmers, tenants and

IN
the landless”.

• Literacy rates in India during 1961 and 1971 were about 28% and 34% respectively.

• All the regions in which the Naxal movement took hold are ones with alarming levels of poverty. In
Telangana, in the districts of Karimnagar, Adilabad and Warangal poverty was 95.8% while in the rest of
the state it was between 50 and 60 per cent.

• The 1961 census estimated that 82 percent of the tenancies in the country were insecure.
OBJECTIVES OF MAOISM OR NAXALISM

Around the time of its creation, the CPI-Maoists published a document titled, ‘Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution (STIR)’.

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This document clearly outlines guidelines of political and military strategies to achieve the immediate aim of the group - the New
Democratic Revolution (NDR).

AN M
• The NDR, in line with Mazumdar’s formulation of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thoughts, aims to overthrow “imperialism,

M
feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism only through the Protracted People’s War”.

Y N A
• The ultimate aim, and second phase of the revolution following the NDR, is installing communism in the country.

T Y B
• Both these aims are formulated along the central task of the revolution, which is the seizure of power through protracted

I
R
armed struggle.

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In 1968, All India Coordination Committee of Communists Revolutionaries (AICCCR) declared five ideological objectives;

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1. Protracted people’s war

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2. Adoption of Guerrilla Warfare Tactics

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3. Rural revolutionary base areas

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4. Encircling cities

IN
5. Abstaining parliamentary elections

In a nutshell, the CPI (Maoist), the main LWE outfit in India, aims to overthrow the existing democratic state structure with violence
as their primary weapon, and mass mobilization and strategic united fronts as complementary components and plans to usher in
So-called ‘New Democratic Revolution’ in India.

The CPI (Maoist) philosophy of armed insurgency to overthrow the Government is unacceptable under the Indian Constitution and
the founding principles of the Indian State.
STRATEGY OF MAOISTS

Both the political and military strategy of the CPI-Maoists are centred on civilian masses.

L
Political Strategy

• The political strategy is to exploit the existing class inequalities in India to the Maoists’ advantage.
ITTA
AN M
• Hence, Maoists mobilize socially and economically marginalized populations, such as the Adivasis.

A M
• Doctrine of the Maoists: “The people are the eyes and ears of the army; they feed and keep our soldiers, It is

N
Y
they who help the army in sabotage and in battle. The people are the water and our army the fish”.

IT
Military Strategy
Y B
C U R
• The military strategy aims to create revolutionary ‘base areas’ in the countryside where the State has

SE
little reach and cannot enforce the rule of law.

RN AL • The weakness of the State in such areas, combined with the support of alienated Adivasis, allow the

TE
Maoists to sustain their operations.

IN
• The STIR describes that Maoist forces should operate in small, decentralised units and gather intelligence
before conducting swift ambushes. As such, they have become highly mobile and flexible.

• Some examples of such ambushes include the May 2009 attacks in the jungles of Maharashtra that killed 16
police officers and the April 2010 ambush of police reinforcement troops in Chhattisgarh.
• In one of the most recent attacks, in 2019 in Gadchiroli, the Maoists allegedly torched 27 vehicles belonging
to a construction company and ten hours later detonated an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that killed
15 members of the Quick Response Team (QRT) that was sent for reinforcements.
STRATEGY OF MAOISTS
This is a typical Maoist tactic; launching an attack in order to ambush reinforcement troops. This not only undermines
State authorities in the eyes of the local population, because they are perceived as unable to defend themselves

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against Maoists, but it also discourages police officers from operating effectively for fear of ambushes.

ITTA
The Maoist insurgency doctrine glorifies violence as the primary means to overwhelm the existing socio-economic and

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political structures. The Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), the armed wing of CPI (Maoist), has been created

AN
with this purpose in mind.

N A M
In the first stage of the insurgency, the PLGA resorts to guerrilla warfare, which primarily aims at creating a vacuum
at the grass-roots level of the existing governance structures.

Y BY
After creating a political and governance vacuum, they coerce the local population to join the movement.

U RIT
A strident propaganda is carried out against the inadequacies of the existing state structure. In areas under Maoist

EC
domination, the absence of governance becomes a self- fulfilling prophecy.

AL S
In the meanwhile, many Front Organisations are created to facilitate mass-mobilisation in semi-urban and urban

RN
areas through ostensibly democratic means

IN TE Front Organizations

They are the off-shoots of the parent Maoist party, which professes a separate existence to escape legal liability.
• They carry out propaganda/disinformation for the party, recruit ‘professional revolutionaries’ for the
underground movement, raise funds for the insurgency, assist the cadres in legal matters and also provide
safe houses and shelters to underground cadres.

• The functionaries of Front Organizations provide intellectual veneer to the inherent violence in the Maoist
ideology.
• The Front Organisations skilfully use state structures and legal processes to further the Maoist agenda and
weaken the enforcement regime.

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ITT
• In other words, they sanitize the bloodletting, and attempt to make the Maoist world-view palatable to urban
audiences and the media.

• The Front organizations exist in 20 States of India.

AN M
A M
In States like Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the Maoists have formed ‘Bal Dastas’ comprising young children.

N
The idea is to brain-wash and indoctrinate young children to Maoist ideology.

Urban Naxals

Y BY

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The Strategies and Tactics of Indian Revolution in 2004 and ‘Urban Perspective: Our Works in Urban Areas in

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2007’ spelled out strategies and tactics to spread into urban areas and create an elaborate network of

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underground and over-ground support for the armed movement.

RN

AL
CPI (Maoist) give immense importance to its ‘urban movement’ not just for the leadership, but for providing

TE
supplies, technologies, expertise, information and logistic support by overground activists.

IN • It is the task of the party in the urban areas to mobilise and organise the proletariat in performing its crucial
leadership role.
Deriving observations from ‘STIR’
• The nature of the Maoist’s ideology translates into using guerrilla tactics against the State.

A L
Maoists wish to use people as “eyes and ears”, this implies that if the Maoists are not able to mobilize them, their

ITT
operations would end.



AN M
This explains why civilians are currently caught in a tug of war between the Maoists and the Indian government.

N A M
Between 1980 and 2015, the Naxalite insurgency caused 20,012 casualties; of these, 4,761 are Naxalites,
3,105 are members of the security forces, and 12,146 are civilians.

Y BY
Moreover, a report published by the Indian Home Ministry in 2019 demonstrated that, since 2010, an

U RIT
average of 417 civilians have been killed annually in approximately 1,200 incidents of violence perpetrated
by Maoists.


SEC
Individuals are often branded as police informers by Maoists, and are executed for supposedly conspiring

AL
with the State. Out of the 109 civilian casualties in Naxalite-related incidents in 2018, 61 were executed.

RN
IN TE
SOURCES OF FUNDING & LINKS WITH ORGANISED CRIMES
Funds aim to cater to three main economic needs: war expenditures, propaganda and the people.

As outlined in the document ‘Our Financial Policy’ adopted at the CPI-Maoists’ 9th Unity Congress in 2007, the sources of funding
come from membership fees and contributions, extortion and confiscation of wealth and income of the enemy and

A L
ITT
‘revolutionary taxes’.

AN M
Maoists have established an elaborate and strict tax collection system. Evidence suggests that some businesses operating in
Maoist areas pay a tax in order to avoid attacks.

LINKS WITH ORGANISED CRIMES

N A M
Y BY
Recently, some reports have also emerged linking Naxalites to organised crime.

U RIT
In 2018, Indian police seized crude heroin equivalent to 700 million Rupees from Naxal areas. Following the crackdown of

C
cross-border drug cartels along the Afghan-Pakistan trafficking route, Naxalites had seized the opportunity to merge into the

SE
drug trafficking network.

RN

AL
Jharkhand, a major hub for illegal opium cultivation is one of the Indian states heavily affected by the Maoist insurgency and

TE
the Maoists have been using opium cultivation as a source of revenue since 2007.

IN
• In order to root out this method of funding and counter the incentive to work with Maoists, the Jharkhand State
government, which destroys thousands of poppy fields each year, has started to promote the cultivation of profitable
medicinal plants.

• Naxalites are also profiting from harvesting and trafficking cannabis from Orissa, parts of which are under Maoist control, to
other parts of the country and the region. Cannabis is one of the most used drugs in South Asia.

• Stratfor report mentions that the Indian government accused United Liberated Front of Assam (ULFA) of working with the
Naxalites to smuggle drugs and counterfeit money along the Indian-Bangladeshi border, in exchange for weapons and
explosives from the ISI.
ROLE OF EXTERNAL STATE

• Establishment of an ISI-Naxalite link is one that has consistently troubled the Indian authorities.

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• In 2010, the Bengaluru police stumbled across plans to arrange a meeting between D-Company men and

A
Naxalite leaders.

ITT
• The D-Company has ties to the Pakistani spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and a Naxalite-D-

M
Company partnership could be encouraged by the ISI in order to prolong the insurgency, hence engaging in

AN
yet another proxy war.
• Nearly 500 Maoists have allegedly undergone training with the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),

A M
a banned organisation with ties to the ISI, in 2008.

N
• In 2010, members of the notorious ISI-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) reportedly met with Naxalite leaders.

Y BY
ISI has traditionally kept a keen interest in subversive movements in India, and the Naxalites are in need of external

IT
support, such an alliance could lead to an escalation of LWE in India.

U R
EC
• The CPI (Maoist) have close fraternal ties with many North-East insurgent groups, especially the RPF/PLA of

S
Manipur. Most of these outfits have linkages with external forces inimical to India.

RN

AL
It is also believed that the Maoists in India had links to the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-Maoists).

TE
Indian Maoists have been able to procure arms from China through the Nepalese Maoists.

IN • Moreover, the CPI-Maoist is a member of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of
South Asia (CCOMPOSA), an umbrella organisation that serves as a discussion platform for Maoist parties in the
subcontinent, and it is believed to have mainly provided moral support in the past.
STATUS OF SPREAD OF LWE
• The States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana,
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala are considered LWE affected, although in

L
varying degrees.

ITTA
The geographical spread of LWE violence has been shrinking considerably. In 2018, LWE violence was

M
reported from 251 PSs in 60 districts spread across 8 States as compared to 330 PSs in 76 districts

AN
spread over 10 States in 2013.

M
• The arc of violence has been considerably restricted with just 30 districts accounting 89% of

A
the LWE violence.

BY N
Last five years have seen a significant decline in LWE violence. There has been an overall 26.7%

R T Y
reduction in violent incidents and 39.5% reduction in LWE related deaths since end-2013.

I
C U
• Chhattisgarh remains the most affected State followed by Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha and

SE
Maharashtra. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand together accounted for 71.7% of the violent incidents and

AL
81.7% of deaths.

RN
TE
The CPI(Maoist) are making forays into Southern States of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and

IN
planning to link up the Western Ghats to the Eastern Ghats through these states. The CPI(Maoist) are
planning to expand their area of activities and carve out a base for themselves in the tri-junction of
Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Maoists are also attempting to make inroads into Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, and their success in
doing so can have long-term strategic implications.
RED CORRDIOR

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GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH
The Government’s approach is to deal with Left Wing Extremism in a holistic manner, to achieve this, a National
Policy and Action Plan has been put in place that adopts a multipronged strategy in the areas of security,

L
development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities, improvement in governance and public

A
perception management.

M ITT
An integrated approach aimed at the relatively more affected areas would reap results, with this in view, a detailed

AN
analysis of the spread and trends in respect of Left Wing Extremist violence has been made and 90 districts in
eleven States have been taken up for special attention with regard to planning, implementation and monitoring

A M
various interventions.

N
BY
Left Wing Extremism Division was created in 2006, to effectively address the Left Wing Extremist insurgency in a

Y
holistic manner. The LWE Division implements security related schemes aimed at capacity building in the LWE

U RIT
affected States. The Division also monitors the LWE situation and counter-measures being taken by the affected
States.

SECThe Union Home Minister, the Home Secretary & the Special Secretary/Additional Secretary and a Review Group

AL
chaired by the Cabinet Secretary review the LWE situation on a regular basis.

RN
TE
'Police' and 'Public Order' being State subjects, action on maintenance of law and order, lies primarily in the domain

IN
of the State Governments.

The Central Government closely monitors the situation and supplements and coordinates their efforts in several
ways.
The underlying philosophy is to enhance the capacity of the State Governments to tackle the Maoist menace in a
concerted manner.

The significant features of the policy are zero tolerance towards violence coupled with a big push to developmental
activities so that benefits of development reached the poor and vulnerable in the affected.
MEASURES TAKEN
HARD POWER MEASURES
SAMADHAN – It stands for Smart leadership, Strengthening and re-organizing of Multi-Agency

L
Aggressive strategy, Motivation and training, Centre to enable it to function on 24x7 basis
Actionable intelligence, Dashboard Based KPIs (key
performance indicators) and KRAs (key result
ITTA
Special Infrastructure Scheme for funds to the
areas), Harnessing technology, Action plan for
each theater, and No access to financing.

AN M
States of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and
Odisha to raise Special Task Force to combat LWE.

A M
Police Modernization Scheme The objective of the

N
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has

Y
scheme is to gradually reduce the dependence of been amended to strengthen the punitive

B
the State Governments on the Army and the measures.

IT Y
Central Armed Police Forces to control internal

R
security and law and order situations by equipping Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme:

SEC U
the State Police Forces adequately and
strengthening their training infrastructure.
Under this the central Govt. reimburses security
related expenditure to the LWE affected state

AL
Governments.

N
Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV) to reduce number

TE R
of casualties due to use of IED by the Naxalites. LWE Mobile Tower Project: To improve mobile
Augmenting the strength of Central Armed Police connectivity in the LWE areas, the Government

IN
Forces. has approved installation of mobile towers in LWE
affected States.
Scheme of Fortified Police stations: The Ministry
had sanctioned 400 police stations in 10 LWE Establishment of National Security Guard (NSG)
affected States. Of these 399 of PSs have been hubs at Chennai, Kolkata, Hyderabad and Mumbai.
completed.
At present, more than100 Bns of CAPFs and a
Sanctioning of new Specialized India Reserve number of CoBRA Teams are deployed in LWE
Battalions (SIRB). affected States.
MEASURES TAKEN

SOFT POWER MEASURES

A L
ITT
Civic Action Programme - To bridge the gaps Bharat Nirman, National Rural Health mission
between Security Forces and local people through (NRHM), Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), Integrated

M
personal interaction and bring the human face of Child Development Services (ICDS) and other

AN
SFs before the local population. income generating and social security schemes of

M
the Ministry of Rural Development, Agriculture,

A
Media Plan: Under the scheme activities like Tribal Panchayati Raj and Tribal affairs.

B N
Youth Exchange programmes organised by NYKS,

Y
radio jingles, documentaries, pamphlets etc. are Road Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I) for LWE affected

T Y
being conducted. areas: This Scheme is being implemented by

U RI
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) -
Ministry of Road Transport & Highways for
improving road connectivity in 34 LWE affected

EC
Offers tremendous opportunities for rural road

S
districts of 8 States.

AL
connectivity.
Aspirational District: Program focuses closely on

RN National Rural Employment Guarantee improving people’s ability to participate fully in

TE
Programme (NREGP) is being implemented in 330 the vibrant economy. Health & Nutrition,

IN
districts affected by Naxalism so as to universalize Education, Agriculture & Water Resources,
the demand-driven programme for wage- Financial Inclusion & Skill Development, and Basic
employment. Infrastructure are this programme’s core areas of
focus.
Special Central Assistance (SCA) for 30 most LWE
affected districts: : The main objective of the
Scheme is to fill the critical gaps in Public
infrastructure and Services, which are of
emergent nature.
LOOPHOLES IN THE PRESENT STRATEGY
GOVERNANCE

A L
Weak coordination between the States affected - Inability to Maintain Created Assets - This

ITT
States (both affected and non affected) restrict weakens the position of both the government and
their efforts to the defined political boundaries the security forces deployed as it hampers trust of
instead of walking extra mile for better synergy and
co-ordination.

AN M
locals, disrupts channels of communication etc.

M
Ineffective Democratic Decentralisation - Half

N A
Inefficient Delivery of Governance - Still, basic and

Y
essential services, justice delivery, community
hearted and weak ground implementation of
PESA, provisions of sixth & fifth schedule and even

B
participation among others remain elusive to most PRIs has definitely helped in not containing the

IT Y
of the naxal affected areas of our country.

R
problem.

SEC U
Trust Deficit - Locals especially in naxal affected
areas are still sceptical and insecure regarding the
Poor Forest Governance - Continuous weakening
of forest governance laws and related rights of

AL
intentions of the government and security forces. dwellers as evidenced through recent draft India

N
There engagement is imperative in dealing with forest Act and decision of eviction of forest

TE R naxal menace. dwellers by SC has made meaningful engagement


difficult & uncertain.

IN Unutilized potential of corporates, media and civil


society - To ensure effective reach of benefits to
the naxal affected areas it is essential to rope in all
sections of society. Media and Corporates though
can play a transformative role have not been
leveraged yet.
LOOPHOLES IN THE PRESENT STRATEGY
SECURITY

A L
Rise of Urban Naxalism - Ideological supporters in

ITT
Absence of Co-ordinated Proactive Vigilance - the urban areas and at key positions have not only
Weak coordination between central and state fuelled but also have helped naxalism in attaining
agencies results in development of security voids
captured subsequently by naxals.

AN M
an organised structure.

M
Inability to Curb Terror Financing - Any act of

N A
Passive Role of State Police Forces - State police

Y
forces have usually not been in the frontline
violence cannot be sustained without finance.
Demonetisation though attempted failed to check

B
despite of them being well acquainted with the it comprehensively.

IT Y
terrain, local community etc.

R
Inadequate Technological Interventions - Use of

SEC U
Role of External States - Role of neighbours and
even terrorist organisations has been established
drones, mini UAVs, ground sensors, smart guns
and artificial intelligence have not been

AL
through several reports in fuelling naxalism in India aggressively deployed in naxal areas.

N
through supply of finances and arms by leveraging

TE R porous and poorly managed border areas. Standard Operating Procedures - All major naxal
attacks have been possible owing to failure of

IN Weak Local Intelligence Gathering - Weakest link in effective implementation of SoPs. In the recent
our strategy so far has been timely collection of
intelligence and its efficient dissemination.
attack in Dantewada (C.G), it was emerged that
the troops did not follow SoPs.

Ill Conceived Decisions - The unceasing


requisitioning of paramilitary forces for the
elections in West Bengal weakened the security
grid around Maharashtra’s Maoist heartland that
led to Gadchiroli attack.
CASE STUDIES

BEST PRACTICES

L
Pota Cabins is an innovative educational initiative When the Maoists decided to deepen their roots
for building schools with impermanent materials
like bamboo and plywood in Chhattisgarh. The
ITTA
into Gariaband, the State government notified this
division as a new district, which gave a fillip to

M
initiative has helped reduce the number of out-of- development work. Many new police stations and

AN
school children and improve enrolment and security camps were set up to prevent any major

M
retention of children since its introduction in 2011. Maoist attack.

Y N A
Chhattisgarh police have experience in tackling An educational hub and a livelihood centre in

B
Maoists in Bastar, they are now coordinating with Dantewada district sprang up. Seeing its success,

T Y
the bordering States to strengthen intelligence and the government has now opened up livelihood

RI
ground presence. Such coordinated proactive

U
centres, known as Livelihood Colleges, in all the

C
policing will dampen the Maoists’ plans. districts.

SE
AL
The government has enhanced the support price of Odisha's surrender-&-rehab policy - Under this,
the state provides up to Rs 2,50,000 cash, an

N
minor forest produce like imli (tamarind).

R
additional Rs 35,000 for surrendered weapon, a

TE
All India Radio stations in the three southern small piece land, a grant to build a home, money

IN
districts of Bastar will now broadcast regional for education and significantly, a Rs 25,000
programmes to increase entertainment options. incentive for marriage.

Andhra Pradesh has formed the Greyhounds which “Bastariya Warriors” The immediate advantage of
are said to be one of the most effective police force such a battalion is that its personnel will be
to combat the Naxal problem. equipped with the linguistic skills and local
knowledge needed to effectively operate in the
area. It bolsters the state’s image in the eyes of
the locals.
CONCLUSION
WHAT TO DO?

L
• Upgradation and Modernisation of Security Forces

ITTA
• Implementation & Assessment of Flagship Schemes in a Targeted Manner
• Extensions of PESA, Sixth Schedule to these areas for meaningful decentralisation and

M
participation.

AN
• Ensure effective ground implementation of Fifth Schedule & FRA.

A M
In May 2006, the Planning Commission appointed an expert committee headed by D

N
Bandopadhyay, to study development issues and address the causes of 'Discontent, Unrest and

BY
Extremism. It’s recommendations should be implemented in an uniform manner across the

Y
naxal affected areas.

U RIT
The LWE theatre has witnessed a consistent decline in violence and considerable shrinkage in

SEC
geographical spread in the last 5 years.

AL
The process of development has been set back by decades in many parts of the country under

RN Left Wing Extremists influence. This needs to be recognised by the civil society and the media

TE
to build pressure on the Left Wing Extremists to eschew violence.

IN Further, an ideology based on violence and annihilation is doomed to fail in a democracy which
offers legitimate forums of grievance redressal.
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
MILITANCY
RIT Y IN J&K
SEC U
N A L
TE R
IN
BACKGROUND

• Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) has been affected by terrorist


and secessionist violence, sponsored and supported
from across the border, for more than two and half
A L
ITT
decades.

AN M
• Since the advent of militancy in J&K (in 1990), 14024

A M
Civilians and 5273 Security Force (SF) personnel have

N
Y
lost their lives (upto 31.03.2019).

IT Y B
• The ongoing militancy in the State of Jammu and

C U R Kashmir is intrinsically linked with infiltration of

SE terrorists from across the border both from the

AL
“International Border” as well as the “Line of Control” in

RN J&K.

IN TE • Jammu is dominated by Hindus rities (Poonch, Rajouri,


and Doda; the other three districts, which have very
large Hindu majorities, are Jammu, Kathua, and
Udhampur). Kashmir’s six districts (Kupwara, Baramulla,
Srinagar, Budgam, Pulwama, and Anantnag) all have
Muslim majorities in excess of 90 per cent.
BACKGROUND
• Under the partition plan provided by the Indian Independence Act, Kashmir was free to
accede to either India or Pakistan.

A L
• The maharaja (local ruler), Hari Singh, initially wanted Kashmir to become independent -

ITT
but in October 1947 chose to join India, in return for its help against an invasion of
tribesmen from Pakistan.

AN M
A M
• In July 1949, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to establish a ceasefire line as

N
recommended by the UN and the region became divided.

Y BY
U RIT
• Sheikh Abdullah’s removal from power and imprisonment in 1953, was a major blow to the
legitimacy of Indian rule in Kashmir.

SEC
AL
• Through mere Presidential Orders, India has almost nullified the effect of J&K’s special

RN status. By the 1954 order, almost the entire Constitution was extended to J&K including most

TE
Constitutional amendments.

IN • After 1982, the Centre, actively destabilised Kashmir by forcing Farooq Abdullah, who had
succeeded his father, to relinquish power.

• The repression and rigging of 1987 elections proved to many Kashmiris that the freedoms
promised to them under the Indian constitution would be violated, not defended.
COMPONENTS OF MILITANCY IN KASHMIR

Foreign Elements: Most of these terrorists are citizens of Pakistan who have been recruited and

L
trained by their respective outfits.

ITTA
• The foreign cadre of terror outfits, such as JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), come under this
category.

AN M
A M
• These fighters cross the LoC to enter the Indian side of J&K. Security forces have labelled

N
Y
them as Foreign Terrorists (FTs).

IT Y B
R
Local Militants: The local elements include the local Kashmiri youth who are recruited by various

SEC U
militant groups active in J&K. This aspect of the militancy is homegrown, localised and closely
connected with the local population on the ground.

RN AL
IN TE
TRENDS IN MILITANCY
Aggressive Phase of Militancy

L
In the militancy of the 1990s, Kashmiri youth crossed the LoC for training in various

ITTA
camps located in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir and other provinces of Pakistan.

AN M
In the early stages of militancy, terror training camps mushroomed along the LoC.

M
Later, new camps emerged in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan and
Rawalpindi.

Y N A
Y B
The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was amongst the first few outfits to

IT
R
recruit and train Kashmiri youth in a rebellion against the Indian state. JKLF, stood

S C U
for the independence of J&K from both India and Pakistan.

E
RN AL In the earlier phase of militancy, indigenous groups jostled for space and

TE
dominance. The intragroup clashes intensified after 1992 and weakened many of

IN
the terror groups.

• HM, LeT and JeM are the only groups that have survived since the 1990s.
• HM is the only indigenous group of Kashmir-based militants to have
survived the test of time. Even today, all of its recruits are local Kashmiris.
TRENDS IN MILITANCY

Regressive Phase of Militancy

A L
ITT
• The most significant shift in the patterns of militancy started in the early
2000s, when local Kashmiri youth became disenchanted with the idea of
militancy.

AN M
A M
• The popular sentiment in the Valley had started to favour democratic

N
Y
means of resolving the Kashmir conflict, and in 2002, J&K witnessed

IT Y B
its most successful elections in history.

C U R
• Until 2008, the situation remained stable, and the number of local

SE militants killed in the encounters has gotten much lower than the number

AL
of foreign terrorists.

RN
IN TE • By government-specified standards, 2012 can be considered the year when
the Valley returned to normalcy. Data from the Ministry of Home Affairs of
India shows that by 2012, the number of incidents was down to 220,
marking a drastic shift in J&K.
TRENDS IN MILITANCY

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
TRENDS IN MILITANCY
Renewed Phase of Militancy
Localisation of Militancy;

L
• The militant outfits release photos (usually selfies) of new recruits posing with
a weapon to declare the inductions.

ITTA
M
• In 2013, around the time the first pictures of Burhan Wani started appearing

AN
on Facebook.

M
• Through these pictures, the idea of militancy gained popularity in Kashmir.

N A
• As a result, the new militancy became highly localised.

Y
B
• In 2018, for the first time in 18 years, more local militants were killed in

RIT Y
encounters than were foreign militants.

S C U
Growing synergy between the local and foreign elements of militant groups.
E
AL
• Demographic profiles of local militants killed in encounters in J&K, from

N
January 2017 to June 2019, reveal that nearly 43 percent of the local youth

TE R were recruited by the LeT and JeM, and another 45 percent joined HM.

IN Geographical spread of militancy has also changed;


• While in the past, militant groups were mostly active in the northern parts of
Kashmir (bordering the LoC)
• New militancy has found its geographical and ideological ecosystem in South
Kashmir.
RENEWED PHASE OF MILITANCY

Use of Social Media - Social media has proven to be the most effective weapon of
the new militancy.

A
• The process of recruitment and its announcement got linked to pictures
L
militants.
M ITT
posted on social media. Social media now drives the recruitment of local

A M AN
• New content is published frequently through encrypted platforms such as

Y N
Telegram and WhatsApp.

B
IT Y
• The new militants use this content to spread the call of jihad and inspire the

R
SEC U youth to join their ranks.

AL
• In December 2015, LeT launched its cyber cell, taking inspiration from ISIS.

RN The intent was to propagate the group’s ideology and propaganda.

IN TE • In April 2017, Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) issued multiple advertisements


announcing social media workshops.

• Social media is used not only to garner public support, create a narrative for
gun culture and to glamorise militancy amongst the local populace, but also
to expose the weakness of the state. It has changed the meaning of
“battlefield victory.”
RENEWED PHASE OF MILITANCY

Mob’s Cordon-breaking techniques

• In 2018, Khudwani village of Kulgam district in South Kashmir


A L
‘cordon and search’ operation.
M ITT
witnessed thousands of protestors forcing the army to withdraw a

A M AN
• Reports have surfaced of mobs not only disrupting counter-terror

Y N
operations but also facilitating the escape of militants.

B
IT Y
Organised Funerals
R
SEC U • Another form of public support comes in the form of the organised

AL
funerals. The local populations perceive large funerals as a symbol of

RN victory for the militants.

IN TE • A study done by the J&K Police found that militant funerals were
fertile grounds for new recruitments.

• Social Media has made crowd mobilisation much more dangerous.


The security forces are burdened with not only engaging in active
combat but also having to protect the law-and-order situation.
RENEWED PHASE OF MILITANCY
Changed Ideology

L
• The first phase of the militancy was primarily led by the JKLF. It was an

ITTA
ethno-nationalist group that took the path of jihad to overthrow India’s

M
rule.

M AN
• In the second phase of militancy, more and more pro-Pakistan groups

A
N
were formed. The ideology of militancy shifted from being pro-

BY
independence and became pro-Pakistan.

Y
U RIT
• In the present phase, the rhetoric of militant groups openly condemned

SEC and criticised Pakistan, seeking instead to establish Islamic rule in J&K or

AL
establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Kashmir.

RN
TE
• The emergence of groups such as AGH and ISJK has significantly changed

IN
the ideological contours of the militancy in Kashmir. In February 2016, the
Islamic State for the first time announced its plans to establish its
foothold in Kashmir.

In the new phase of militancy, the process of recruitment for locals became much
easier. While the heavy presence of armed forces along with the fencing has made
exfiltration nearly impossible, recruits no longer need to cross the LoC.
RENEWED PHASE OF MILITANCY

The Resistance Front (TRF)

A
• Under pressure from the FATF, Pakistan has come up with a new and novel
L
M ITT
way to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir. The idea of creating TRF was
conceived and immediately implemented post-August 2019, reorganisation
of Jammu & Kashmir and Abrogation of Article 370.

A M AN
Y N
• TRF group is an “online project”. “Pakistan wants to project Kashmiri

B
Y
terrorism as a resistance movement by Kashmiris.

U RIT
• TRF is presently a front for the LeT and Hizbul Mujahideen but is poised to

SEC cater for the other terror organisations also.

RN AL • Attacks carried out by the Pakistan backed Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are being

IN TE pinned on the newly formed “seasonal” group in the Kashmir Valley in order
to escape international scrutiny.
RENEWED PHASE OF MILITANCY
Over ground workers (OGWs)

L
These workers are omnipresent in all walks of life. They could be sympathisers, belong to

ITTA
families of killed militants, teachers, religious teachers, separatists, members of larger
networks.

AN M
As a sense of alienation increases the support for the grey population (separatists &

A M
OGWs) increases, who in turn are able to influence the perception of people more adversely.

N
Y
• Primarily involved in logistics support and intelligence gathering.

Y B
• Capable of carrying out small scale strikes while retaining the capability to mix rapidly

IT
R
with the population.

SEC U
• A significant tool for strategic communication and recruitment by their handlers in J&K. It
is a well-know

RN AL • Though these workers look benign in the face of it, they are the most dangerous to
society as well as the security forces.

IN TE OGWs are easy to identify as these can be caught in the act during a counter
terror operation or by intelligence agencies tracking cyber funding and physical currency as
funds for terror.

Need to jointly map the OGWs, terrorists and anti-national elements through a multi-agency
effort.
RENEWED PHASE OF MILITANCY

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
MAJOR REASONS OF UNREST & EMERGENCE OF MILITANCY
• Demography & Unfavourable Socio-Economic Indicators - Already, in 1981, more than half the
State population was less than 19 years of age, with a literacy rate well below the national norm
(and even lower among Muslims and especially Muslim women).
A L
ITT
• The age structure of the population indicates a high dependency ratio both in the 1971 and

M
1981census.

M AN
• Erosion of Special Status & Trust - Through mere Presidential Orders, India has almost nullified

A
N
the effect of J&K’s special status. By the 1954 order, almost the entire Constitution was extended

BY
to J&K including most Constitutional amendments.

Y
U RIT
• The rigging of the assembly election in 1987 created a political vacuum which eventually sparked

EC
insurgency. The people of the State lost trust in the system and practice of democracy, felt

S
AL
alienated, and remained disenchanted with the electoral process for many years.

RN
TE
• Excessive use of force - While the political expression of Kashmir has become less violent, relying

IN
on mass demonstrations on the street, the security responses continue to be driven by a counter-
insurgency approach.
• The grant of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) to Indian Armed Force has many
allegations of human right violation in Kashmir.
• Fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, arrest without warrant, enter
and search premises without warrant, stop, search and seize any vehicle.
MAJOR REASONS OF UNREST & EMERGENCE OF MILITANCY
• Failure of Political Consensus - The coming together of the BJP and the PDP, which was
seen as an effort to bridge the divide between the two regions essentially between the
Hindu and the Muslim populations failed.
A L
M
• The BJP–PDP alliance pushed South Kashmir, which had overwhelmingly voted for
ITT
AN
the PDP, towards a radical path.

M
• The Central government was in favour of following a hardline approach, while PDP

N A
wanted to follow a “support approach” of dialogue and reconciliation to deal.

Y
T Y B
• Synergy between Local & Foreign Groups - HM and Pakistani groups such as LeT and JeM
I
U R
have made the militancy in Kashmir more resilient and much stealthier.

C
SE
AL
• India has continued to respond in a traditional manner - Challenges posed in the cyber

N
domain have not been tackled with effective counter campaigns.

TE R
IN
• Fading of Definitional Difference between Terrorists & Militant - States do get into
negotiated settlements with “militants”, but rarely with “terrorists”. At present, virtually
everyone who opposes its policies in Jammu and Kashmir is a terrorist.

• Issues of rehabilitation and De-radicalisation - While there has been some success in
weaning youth off militancy and mainstreaming them, the government does not yet have
a clear policy to address the issues of rehabilitation and de-radicalisation.
GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH
The Government of India has adopted a multi-pronged approach. The endeavour of the
Government has been to:

L
• Proactively take suitable measures by all the SFs to safeguard the borders from cross-border
A
ITT
terrorism and to contain militancy.

M
• Cross border infiltration, which, in interalia, includes strengthening of the border

AN
infrastructure.

M
• Multi-tiered and multimodal deployment along the international Border / Line of
Control.

Y N A
B
• Improved technological surveillance, weapons and equipment for Security Forces.

T Y
• Improved intelligence and operational coordination.

RI
EC U
• To ensure that the democratic process is sustained and primacy of civil administration is

S
AL
restored to effectively tackle the socio-economic problems facing the people on account of

N
the effects of prolonged militancy.

TE R
IN
• To ensure a sustained peace process and to provide adequate opportunities to all sections of
people who eschew violence to effectively represent their view points and to redress their
genuine grievances.

• The Government has also encouraged policies to mainstream the youth, including providing
employment opportunities to wean them away from militancy.
MEASURES TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT
• Prime Minister Development Package for J&K- 2015 Prime Minister announced a package of
₹80,068 crore towards Special Assistance to J&K for development of 63 Infrastructure Projects

L
concerning various sectors.

ITTA
• Special Industry Initiative ‘UDAAN’ - It was based on the recommendations of the Expert

AN M
Group constituted under the chairmanship of Dr. C. Rangarajan.
• The Scheme has been implemented and monitored by National Skill Development

A M
Corporation (NSDC) in Public Private Partnership (PPP) mode.
N
Y BY
• The Scheme aimed at enhancing the skills and employability of unemployed youths of
J&K who are graduate, post graduates or three year engineering diploma holders.

U RIT
C
• Himayat Yojana is now doing wonders in J&K and as of now 12000 candidates have been

SE
trained under it and 7801 are under training now

RN AL
TE
• Employment to Kashmiri Migrants - The Government of India had approved 3000 State

IN
Government jobs under the Prime Minister’s Relief Package-2008, another package was
approved in 2015 for providing additional 3000 State Government jobs.
• According to the 2011 Census, the population of Jammu and Kashmir is 1.25 crore and
more than 70 percent of the population is below the age of 35 years.

• Women Empowerment - Government has sanctioned an amount of ₹ 5.09 crore to Self


Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) for setting up of Resource Centre (Shehzar) at
Kupwara, Ganderbal and Leh for training women.
MEASURES TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT
• Relief and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Migrants - Due to onset of militancy in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in the early 1990s, most of the Kashmiri Pandit families along

A
with some Sikh and Muslim families migrated from the Kashmir Valley to Jammu, Delhi
L
and other parts of the country.

M ITT
A M AN
• Relief/Compensation for Border Population affected by Cross Border Firing/Ceasefire
Violations - In order to mitigate the hardships being faced by the people living on IB/LoC

Y N
due to Cross Border Firing/Ceasefire violations.

B
Y
• Construction of 14,460 bunkers in the five border districts.

U RIT
• Reimbursement of expenditure to compensate losses to houses, agriculture etc
• The limit of 3 milch animals for claiming compensation for the losses suffered has

SECbeen removed and the amount of compensation has been enhanced.

RN AL
• Cross LoC Travel - A weekly bus service on Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route and thereafter

TE
on Poonch-Rawalakot route was started in 2005-06 for Confidence Building Measures

IN (CBMs).

• Bharat Darshan/Watan Ko Jano Programme - The main objective of the program is to


give exposure to the youth of J&K about the social and cultural diversity of India so
that they feel socially, culturally and emotionally integrated with rest of the country.
MEASURES TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT
• Cross LoC Trade between J&K and PoK - Cross LoC Trade between J&K and PoK in respect of 21
agreed items on zero duty basis started on Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot routes in
2008.
A L
and Chakan-da-Bagh, Poonch for safe and smooth Cross LoC Trade.
M ITT
• Trade Facilitation Centres (TFC) have been established in two checkpoints i.e. Salamabad, Uri

A M AN
• Cross LoC trade between India and PoK has been suspended in 2019 till a stricter regime is put
in place to ensure that only bonafide trade takes place for the benefit of the people of J&K.

BY N
Y
• The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 – It reorganised the state of Jammu and Kashmir
into:

U RIT
• Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir with a legislature & Union Territory of Ladakh without a

SEC
legislature.

AL
• Union Territories will be administered by the President, through an administrator appointed by

RN him known as the Lieutenant Governor.

TE
• The Legislative Assembly may make laws for any part of the Union Territory of Jammu and

IN Kashmir related to any matters specified in the State List of the Constitution, except “Police”
and “Public Order”.
• Further, Parliament will have the power to make laws in relation to any matter for the Union
Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
• Internet Shutdown - There is a possibility that the internet shutdown will lead to a decline in
recruitments as the militant groups. However, an internet shutdown is only a stopgap and
unsustainable in the long run.
MEASURES TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT
• Developmental Push – Stuck up hydropower projects of the UT of J&K; Pakaldul Hydroelectric
Power Project , Ratle Hydroelectric Power Project, Kiru Hydroelectric Power Project, Shahpur Kandi

L
Project, Uj multipurpose project which were stuck up for years have been cleared.

ITTA
• Highest bridge in the world is being constructed on Chenab in J&K which is an architectural
marvel.
• Banihal-Katra project has been expedited by the govt.

AN M
• The Chenani -Sudhmahadev road project in Jammu and Kashmir’s Udhampur is boosting local
economy.
N A M
Y BY
• Strategically crucial 14.5-km Zojila tunnel, connecting Srinagar to Leh with an all-weather road,
has finally taken off.

U RIT
C
• Creation of Block Development Fund on the pattern of Constituency Development Fund. By creating

SE
the Block Development Fund, 25 lakh rupees each shall be placed at the disposal of the Block

RN AL
Development Council (BDC) Chairpersons who could utilize the funds for local block developmental

TE
works. The works could be identified by the BDC Chairpersons as per the local priorities.

IN • J&K Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission was also established to examine the
social and educational backwardness of various backward classes of people besides Schedule Castes
and Scheduled Tribes of the region.

• In order to provide an impetus to tourism, the Ministry of Tourism, under its schemes of Swadesh
Darshan and PRASAD, provides financial assistance to State Governments / UT Administrations,
including J&K and Ladakh, for development of tourism infrastructure.
VAJPAYEE’S KASHMIR POLICY
Vajpayee’s approach to the problem of Kashmir was pragmatic and practical. His slogan of
Kashmiriyat, Insaniyat, Jamhooriyat (inclusivity culture of Kashmir, humanitarianism and

A L
democracy) created a window for peace and an opportunity to evolve a lasting political

ITT
solution of the Kashmir issue.

AN M
The bold move to conduct elections in 1996 broke the spine of insurgency and

A M
subsequently, Vajpayee’s unwavering commitment to Jamhooriyat in the election of 2002

N
ushered a wave of confidence through the widespread participation of the people.

Y BY
U RIT
• Channels of communication were opened with separatists at the highest level. It
weakened the insurgency thus outmanoeuvring the Pakistan army’s plan in Kashmir.

SEC
• It was a symbolic gesture which provided an opportunity to the moderate factions and

AL
even to the dreaded militant outfit, Hizbul Mujahideen, to enter into talks with the

RN government of India for peace negotiations.

TE
• It was instrumental in young Kashmiris realising the futility of the gun and effectively

IN rejecting it.

While analysing Vajpayee’s Kashmir policy, it is important to note that he sought hard
power for India and retaliated to every provocation that came from Pakistan. But, at the
same time, he had the vision and the courage to attempt to solve one of the most complex
problems of the subcontinent, and that too through peaceful means.
WAYFORWARD
• Recently, Chief of Army Staff mooted the idea of establishing a new Directorate General
of Information Warfare (DGWI). It is indeed the need of the hour to have a dedicated wing of

L
experts who can communicate with their target audience with precision and speed.

ITTA
M
• Use of Frontier Technologies especially AI, Big Data & IoT for Face Recognition to curb prevalence

AN
of stone pelting, OGWs and mob led disruptions.

N A M
• There is also an urgent need to undertake an impact assessment study of the schemes

BY
implemented by the government on the socio-economic conditions of the people.

Y
RIT
• Efforts are needed for the development of infrastructure, generation of employment and

U
SEC
alleviation of poverty in rural areas to bring about the desired socio-economic development of

AL
Jammu and Kashmir.

RN
TE
• The handloom and handicraft industry, the state’s oldest traditional cottage industry, has special

IN
socio-economic significance.
• Jammu holds the domain in Basholi painting, calico painting, phoolkari
• Kashmir specializes in carpets, shawl, wood carving, papier mache, chainstitch, crewel
• Ladakh’s areas of expertise covers wood carving and painting, clay moulding, pashmina
weaving, carpet, and Thanka painting.
WAYFORWARD

• The horticulture sector occupies an important position in the farming system of Jammu
and Kashmir. The state has three agro-climatic conditions: sub-tropical, temperate and cold

A
arid. Each agro-climatic region has its own potential to grow specific fruits.
L
M ITT
• Kashmiri Kesar has been given the geo indicator tag and this shows that the trade of the
region is acquiring global dimensions.

A M AN
Y N
• The IT industry, though not well developed in the state, has tremendous potential for

B
growth. For developing IT, the knowledge-based industry, a large pool of educated and

IT Y
skilled youth in the state provides the required manpower.

R
SEC U
• Good governance requires accountability by public officials along with transparency in

AL
regard to decisions and actions taken by various authorities. People’s participation is

RN necessary to make the system more accountable and transparent.

IN TE • There is a need to rationalize the scheme of providing free education at all the levels in the
state and to reconsider the decision of providing free education at the university level.

• Sector-specific strategies should be adopted to promote industries in Jammu and Kashmir


keeping in mind the climate, accessibility, raw material availability, human resources and
consumption pattern.
WAYFORWARD
• Difference between militancy and terrorism needs to be given due attention.

L
• It is imperative that the government tackle the problem of public support for militancy.

ITTA
• Valley has witnessed a political vacuum since 2019, In the absence of any political activity, there
is likely to be an increase in public support for militant groups.

AN M
N A M
• Changing contours of militancy in Kashmir demand a redefinition of policies and responses that
go beyond traditional approaches.

BY
• The Kashmir conflict is a mixture of domains comprising of conflict psychology, information

Y
U RIT
campaigns, finances, social media, perception management, political manoeuvring,
diplomacy etc. Military is just a subset of it.

SEC
AL
• As a state with unique features and a strategic location, the speedy development of Jammu and

N
Kashmir needs an integrated approach. The top priority of the government should be to create a

TE R secure environment by improving the law and order situation.

IN • A sound policy should be devised to exploit the potential in the sectors of strength. The
development of potential sectors such as horticulture, handloom and handicrafts, biotechnology,
tourism and information technology will have strong inter-linkages with the rest of the sectors.

• In a nutshell, sound policy and good governance can lead Jammu and Kashmir to a faster
development path.
A L
M ITT
A AN
M
BY N
NAGA R INSURGENCY
IT Y
SEC U
N A L
TE R
IN
BACKGROUND
The North Eastern Region comprises of eight States viz. Arunachal Pradesh,
Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura.

A L
ITT
This region is culturally and ethnically diverse having more than 200 ethnic

M
groups which have distinct languages, dialects and sociocultural identities.

M AN
Almost all of its borders of about 5,484 Kilometers is international border

A
N
along Bangladesh (1880 kms), Myanmar (1,643 kms), China (1,346 kms),

BY
Bhutan (516 kms) and Nepal (99 kms).

Y
RIT
The security situation in the North Eastern States has improved substantially

U
SECsince 2013.

AL
• The year 2018 witnessed the lowest number of insurgency incidents and

N
civilian deaths since 1997.

TE R • There was a 25% reduction in the number of civilians and Security Forces

IN
personnel deaths in 2018.

While there is almost no insurgency in Tripura and Mizoram, there has been a
marked improvement in security situation in other States of the region.
In 2018, insurgency related violence declined by 48% in Meghalaya, 40% in
Arunachal Pradesh, 16% in Assam and 24% in Manipur compared to 2017.
There has been increase in insurgency incidents in Nagaland in 2018.
BACKGROUND

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
RISE OF NAGA SUB-NATIONALISM
• Nagas had been living in relative isolation for centuries. The British annexed Assam in
1826, and in 1881, the Naga Hills became part of British India.

A L
ITT
• The British followed a policy of "least interference" in the internal affairs of the Nagas.
• It gave due regard to the continuance of the tribal village administration, land system,

AN M
customary laws, social customs and communal institutions.

A M
• British declared the Naga territory as a "backward area".
N
Y BY
• It aimed at administering it "in a simpler and more personal manner than those of
the more civilised and longer settled tribes".

RIT
• Little importance was given to the improvement of means of communication and

U
C
natural resources.

SE
RN AL• In 1873, British India, promulgated the Bengal-Eastern Frontier Regulation.

TE
• It brought into force what came to be known as the 'Inner Line'.

IN
• Under these regulations, the people from the plains were prevented from entering
the Naga areas while an exception was made in the case of Christian missionaries.
• This saved the Nagas from exploitation by outsiders and sudden disruption of Naga
culture, but it went a long way in isolating the Nagas from the national mainstream.

• English language and Christianity brought a gradual change in the outlook of these people,
and infused a sense of nationality in them.
RISE OF NAGA SUB-NATIONALISM
• In 1918, a few government officials and leading Naga chiefs formed an organisation known as the
"Naga Club" at Kohima. Threefold objectives;
• For promoting the interests of the Nagas
A L
ITT
• A common platform for leaders of different tribes of Nagas

M
• An effective political forum for the Naga tribes

M AN
• Simon Commission visited Naga Hills in 1929 - A strong delegation representing different tribes

A
BY N
of Nagas submitted a memorandum demanding that their hills be excluded from the proposed
reform scheme and kept under direct British rule.

RIT Y
U
• As a result, under the Government of India Act, 1935 Naga Hills were excluded from the

SEC
reform scheme.

AL
• Declared as an "Excluded Area", they continued to be administered by the Government of

N
Assam.

TE R
IN
• The World Wars too had a tremendous impact on the Nagas.
• During World War I the Naga members of the Labour Corps brought money and dresses.
• World War II was fought in Nagaland itself. Nagas were introduced to modern guerilla
fighting which was natural to them.
• The dumps of arms and ammunition left by the retreating Japanese Army provided ready
material to be used against the security forces later.
• The War brought a greater degree of unity among the Nagas.
RISE OF NAGA SUB-NATIONALISM
• After the war, the Naga Hills Tribal Council was formed in April 1945 to help in the
relief and rehabilitation work. It was converted into Naga National Council (NNC) in
April, 1946.
A L
ITT
• For the first time, the term "national" was used in the Naga phraseology,

M
indicating the intensity of Naga feelings.

AN
• In the beginning, the political objective of the Naga National Council was

N A M
solidarity of all Nagas, with local autonomy and adequate safeguards for the
interest of the Nagas.

Y BY
IT
• Return of Angami Zapu Phizo from Burma greatly helped the undercurrents of Naga

C U R
politics to come to the surface within a year in the form of N.N.C.'s June 1947

E
declaration that the Naga Hills would cease to be a part of India with the departure of

AL S the British.

RN
TE
• On August 14th on the eve of the Independence of India, some Nagas under the

IN
leadership of Phizo declared their own independence.
• Pandit Nehru termed the Nagas' demand for independence as 'absurd’.

The declaration by itself marked the beginning of a new chapter of confrontation and
conflict, of armed insurrection by a section of the Nagas and the counter-offensive
launched by the Indian security forces.
INSURGENCY BEGINS

• In 1947, Assam Governor Akbar Hydari signed the Nine-Point Agreement with the moderates
in the NNC but the main leaders of the movement like Phizo were not taken into confidence

L
and hence Phizo rejected it outrightly.

ITTA
M
• The assumption of direct leadership of the Naga National Council in December 1950 by Phizo,

AN
resulted in referendum of May 1951, boycott of General Elections of 1952, establishment of

M
a parallel government in 1956 which eventually led to socio-political unrest in Nagaland.

Y N A
• Different Acts, including the Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955, AFSPA, 1958 were imposed to

Y B
enable the armed forces personnel to carry out their difficult task.

IT
U R
• The intensity of the armed movement lessened with the signing of the 16-Point Agreement
C
SE between the Centre and a group of the people’s representatives in 1960, leading to

AL
Nagaland’s statehood in 1963.

RN
TE
• In 1964, a Peace Mission was formed for an agreement on suspension of operations with the

IN NNC, but it was abandoned in 1967 after six rounds of talks.

• The Indian government viewed the Naga problem seriously, and declared the N.N.C., Federal
Government of Nagaland and its army "unlawful associations" under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 on August 31, 1972.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
• The Government of India was exerting extreme pressure on the N.N.C. leaders and ultimately it
led to the signing of what is known as the "Shillong Accord" with moderate section of the N.N.C.

L
leaders.

ITTA
• Radical section of NNC led by Muivah, Issak and Khaplang, rejected the pact and formed the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland in January 1980.

AN M
A M
• NSCN, soon developed and turned out to be the most powerful underground organisations in

N
Y
the Northeastern region having close ties with the Myanmarese insurgent organisation, Kachen

Y B
Independent Army (KIA).

IT
C U R
• Differences surfaced within the outfit and it split into the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (K) in 1988.

SE
RN AL
• In 1997, the NSCN (IM) had discussions with New Delhi for peace talks and a ceasefire
agreement was signed.

IN TE • The NSCN (K) followed suit four years later in 2001 but NSCN (K) unilaterally abrogated the
ceasefire in 2015.

• The Indian government set up the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CFMG) in 2001 to speak to Naga
nationalist organisations and Indian forces to ensure that ceasefire ground rules between the
two parties were not broken.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

• The Government of India signed a Peace framework agreement with the NSCN (IM) On 3

A L
August 2015. The government refused to divulge any details regarding the agreement in

ITT
public.

AN M
• In 2018 The Hindu published a report revealing details of the government’s statement to a

N A M
Parliamentary panel regarding the framework agreement.
• Recognition of the uniqueness of the Naga history by the Government of India

BY
• Some special arrangements will have to be made for the Nagas

Y
IT
• Article 371A of the Constitution makes it clear that they are special and a special status

C U R has been accorded to them. A similar kind of status, with some local variation, and

E
some change to the Nagas in the neighbouring states can be explored.

AL S
N
• In August 2017 another armed umbrella outfit Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs)

TE R joined the peace talks with the Centre. This agreement ostensibly made the peace process

IN
inclusive.
• But it created suspicion about Delhi exploiting divisions within the Nagas on tribal and
geopolitical lines.

• Many important insurgent and civil society groups are excluded from the peace talks. Two
rival insurgent groups – NSCN (U) and NSCN (K) – are outside the negotiations.
GREATER NAGALIM
• The purported objective of the National Socialist Council of
Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) is the establishment of

L
a Nagalim (Greater Nagaland), consisting of all the Naga-inhabited

ITTA
areas of neighbouring Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and

M
some portions Myanmar, which it considers to be the rightful

AN
homeland of the Nagas.

N A M
• The proposed Nagalim spreads over approximately 1,20,000 sq.

BY
km. in contrast to the present State of Nagaland that has an area of

Y
T
16,527 sq. km.

U RI
SEC • The stand of the Assam government is clear that it will not

AL
allow any change to the state’s geography.

N
• Civil society groups in Manipur have been apprehensive -

TE R Three major groups, UCM, AMUCO and CCSK vowed to not to

IN
allow the Framework Agreement to affect the territorial
integrity of the state.
• The sentiment in Arunachal is similar – According to All
Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union (AAPSU) there can be no
question of inclusion of any portion of Arunachal Pradesh in
the NSCN(IM)’s Greater Nagalim.
GREATER NAGALIM
• Other two key demands include: A separate flag and a separate constitution for the
Nagas.

L
• The NSCN (IM) is insistent that talks can only continue if the Indian state agrees
to a separate Naga flag and constitution.

ITTA
AN M
• The latest demand of NSCN (IM) includes to remove Nagaland Governor R.N. Ravi as

M
the Centre’s interlocutor.

Y N A
B
• NSCN-IM has also demanded the involvement of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the

RIT Y
talks for faster determination of their demands, insisting that the negotiations be held
in a “third country”

SEC U
AL
• The talks have hit a roadblock with the NSCN(I-M) adopting an aggressive posture as

N
it is increasingly getting isolated with a number of other Naga groups taking centre

TE R stage and pushing for culmination of the peace process.

IN • The Indian government’s shift in tone, and arresting NSCN (IM) members under the
UAPA, is a significant step back in the peace process. Especially, as the NSCN (IM) is
treated as a representative of the Naga people in the process.

• There is an increase in violent incidents and kidnapping/ abduction cases in 2018-


2020 in the State.
CONCLUSION

• While the talks are ongoing between the top levels of the government and the
NSCN (I-M), other Naga groups have come out openly in favour of the peace
deal.
A L
M ITT
• Government cannot afford to be seen as favouring one or the other faction

AN
otherwise piecemeal peace/dialogue will not bring a satisfactory political
solution.

N A M
BY
• A lasting solution lies in more autonomy to the state, genuine economic

Y
U RIT
development, accelerated infrastructural development, new trade routes, less
Central funds and a little bit of pressure on militant groups to accept the peace

SEC proposal.

RN AL • Resolution of the Indo-Naga conflict will not only bring to an end one of the

TE
longest political movements in the entire region but also defuse what has come

IN to be known as the mother of all insurgencies.


A L
M ITT
M A N
INSURGENCY IN N NORTH
A
Y BY
REAST
IT
SE C U
(EXCEPT NAGALAND)
N A L
T E R
IN
ASSAM’s INSURGENCY

• Assam is the gateway to north east India and


comprises of riverine plains, interspersed with

A L
ITT
low hills, reserve forest and and rivers.

AN M
• It is bounded by Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland,
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura.

N A M
Y
• It shares borders with Bangladesh (263Km) and

IT Y B
Bhutan (262 Km).

C U R • The main demographic pattern is composed of

SE Assamese (Hindus and Muslims), Bodos and

AL
others including Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and

RN Jains besides the tribals.

IN TE
ASSAM’s INSURGENCY
• After Independence unrestricted migration from outside continued. During the partition of
India and emergence of Bangladesh, Bengali Hindus & Muslims migrated from East Pakistan.

L
These people outnumbered the natives in many areas and soon became a majority.
• Consequences of large Scale Illegal Migration -
• People of Assam reduced to a minority in their home state
ITTA
• Cultural survival jeopardised

AN M
M
• Political control will be weakened

Y N A
• Employment opportunities undermined
• This became the root cause for the inception of insurgency in the state. This came to be

Y B
called the anti foreigners agitation or the foreigners issue calling for deportation of all

IT
R
foreigners.

SEC U
• A number of groups emerged who were asking for greater autonomy and statehood. These
groups were All Assam Students Union (AASU), All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP),

RN AL All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).

TE
• It was after the assembly elections in 1978, that things became bad when it was revealed

IN
that the Muslims had got 26 seats out of 126 assembly, with the help of the foreigner‘s
votes.
• In 1980, `Assam Disturbed Area Act‘ and AFSPA was enforced. Violence continued
intermittently till 1985.
• The Assam Accord was signed in 1985. Under the accord, all those who came to Assam after
25 March 1971 were to be detected and deported.
• The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) demanded secession from the union and
ASSAM’s INSURGENCY
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

L
• The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was formed in 1979. It felt betrayed by the

ITTA
government after the signing of the Assam accord and thereafter launched their militant
struggle against the government.

AN M
M
• They started negotiations with other more experienced militant groups in the region like the

Y N A
NSCN (IM), Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Burma, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan
and the Liberation of Tamil Tiger Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.

IT Y B
R
• The state of Assam was declared disturbed‘ in 1990 and `Operation Bajrang‘ was launched. Due

C U
to pressure of the security forces, ULFA agreed to a truce in March 1991.

SE
RN AL
• Renewed violence led to launching of `Operation Rhino‘ in September 1991. The organization

TE
spurted their terrorizing acts by threatening the assets of the state such as the oil refineries and

IN
tea estates.

• By 1996, these actions led to the change in the popular sentiments of the people against the
ULFA. The government took advantage of this and started concerted attacks on the cadres.

• The ULFA chairman Arbinda Rajkhowa and the commander-in chief Paresh Baruah went into
hiding in Bangladesh.
ASSAM’s INSURGENCY
• The group became keen to talks with the government of India and in 2001.
• ULFA Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa is involved in talks with the government as ULFA (Pro Talks).

L
Rajkhowa formally announced ceasefire on 12 July 2011.

ITTA
• The commander-in-chief of the ULFA (anti talks), Paresh Baruah has started making all out
efforts to revitalise the outfit.

AN M
• Around 120 to 130 members of the ULFA are in Myanmar. ULFA (Independent) has set up bases

M
in Myanmar.

Y N A
• They are being supported by the People‘s Liberation Army and the NSCN – K to carry out
violence and other criminal activities like extortion in Assam.

IT Y B
R
Role of External State

SEC U
Foreign secretary of the ULFA‘s pro talks faction in an interview to the Times of India revealed that;
• ULFA militants were trained in Pakistan in small arms and rifles.

RN AL • Bangladesh agencies provided logistics and support.

TE
• ULFA has fought along with the Kachin Independent Army (Myanmar).

IN
• As their the financial situation improved, weapons were bought from China indirectly.
• The outfit moved to Bangladesh after the Bhutan army had evicted them in 2003 with
`Operation All Clear‘.
• Most alarming for the security as well as the intelligence agencies is that aided and abetted
by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Islamic militancy is on the rise and it is much more
fundamentalist. A large number of youth belonging to these outfits have visited Pakistan for
arms training under Harkat- ul- Mujahideen and Laskar-e-Taiba.
ASSAM’s INSURGENCY
THE BODOS

A L
• Bodos form the major tribal group in Assam residing in the plains and

ITT
constitute a sizable proportion of the Assam populace.

AN M
• Muslims had started migrating into Assam in the late 19th century and

N A M
carried on after the partition of India and emergence of Bangladesh.

BY
• There have been clashes between the Bodos and the Muslims on a number

Y
IT
of occasions.

C U R
E
• Taking cue from the AASU and militant and ethnic political organizations, the

AL S Bodos adopted the path of bandhs and likewise violent agitation activities

N
to make their demands be heard.

TE R
IN
• They were disillusioned by the Assam accord as their interests were not
protected by the AASU.
ASSAM’s INSURGENCY
• The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) came into existence in 1986, led by Rajan
Daimary and the demand of the Bodos changed from autonomy to separate state/country.

A L
ITT
• First Bodo Accord was signed in 1993, to end long movement for a separate State. This accord led

M
to the creation of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC), but the experiment failed as its

AN
territory could not be demarcated.

N A M
• The All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) denounced the accord in 1996 and revived the statehood

BY
movement, alleging that the accord failed to fulfil the aspirations of the Bodo people.

Y
U RIT
• Second Bodo Accord, created Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in 2003, a self-governing body

EC
for the Bodo Areas in Assam with some more financial and other powers.

S
AL
• The area under the jurisdiction of BTC, was called the Bodo Territorial Autonomous District

N
(BTAD).

TE R • Bodo agitation for a separate Bodoland comprising the Bodo dominated areas was

IN
contained to an extent.
• This finally paved the way for the formation of BTC comprising the districts of Kokrajhar,
Chirang, Baksa and Udalgiri.
• The NDFB, however, rejected the second accord and continued its insurgent activities for a
“sovereign Bodoland”.
• Also, denial of assent by the Governor to laws passed by the BTC was one of the key reasons
for the ABSU rejecting the 2003 accord and reviving the statehood demand.
ASSAM’s INSURGENCY
• NDFB, continued with its movement and were indulging in violence and demanding sovereignty
of Bodo area in Assam.

A L
ITT
• In 2011, Anti talks faction of the NDFB led by its Chairman Ranjan Diamary announced a

M
unilateral ceasefire to find a political solution. Since its formation in 1986, the NDFB has split into

AN
four factions. All the factions gradually joined the peace process seeking a separate State.

N A M
• In January 2020, A tripartite accord for final settlement of demands in Bodoland was signed in

BY
New Delhi. The NDFB signed the agreement and the representatives of All Bodo Students’ Union

Y
IT
(ABSU) also signed the tripartite agreement.

C U R
• BTAD will be renamed as Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR)

E
• The number of seats in BTAD will be increased from 40 to 60.

AL S • More legislative, executive, and financial powers to the BTC.

N
• Government of Assam “will notify Bodo language in Devanagri script as the associate

TE R official language in the state.”

IN
• Government of India to expedite the process of granting hills tribe status to Bodos
living in hills areas.
• Autonomous Welfare Council for the Bodo people living outside BTAD areas.
• Special Development Package of Rs. 1500 Crore would be given by the Centre to
undertake specific projects for the development of Bodo areas.
ASSAM’s INSURGENCY
• The objection of non-Bodo groups to the new accord is based on the argument that Bodos, who
account for less than one-third of the population in the BTR, have been given the political power

A L
to rule over other communities, which together account for two-thirds of the population.

M ITT
• Bodo leaders, however, claim that Bodos were the majority in the region but their percentage

AN
declined owing to encroachment of the tribal belt and blocks that form part of the BTR by

N A M
migrant population and, therefore, there should be constitutional safeguards to protect their
identity, language and culture.

Y BY
U RIT
SEC
RN AL
IN TE
MEGHALAYA’s INSURGENCY
• The influx of foreign Nationals from Bangladesh and Nepal and outsiders has
created an anti outsider feeling particularly amongst the youth and is the main cause
of anti establishment sentiment amongst them.
A L
M ITT
• The north east insurgents have found Meghalaya, particularly Shillong a convenient

AN
hideout for rest and recoup.

N A M
• Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) is now playing an important role for the Garos

BY
for separate Garoland.
Y
U RIT
• The State of Meghalaya has been witnessing Garo militancy since 2010-11.

SEC
AL
• The major militant outfits presently active in the State are Garo National Liberation

RN Army (GNLA), a Garo militant group and Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council

TE
(HNLC), a Khasi militant group.

IN • There was significant improvement in security situation in the State in the year
2018. The State witnessed more than 48% decline in the number of violent incidents
in 2018.
MIZORAM’s INSURGENCY
• In 1959-1960, there was a famine and it resulted in forming of Mizo National Famine
Front (MNFF) to provide relief to the people.

A L
ITT
• In 1960, the people were not satisfied with the measures taken by the Assam

AN M
Government and thus MNFF was converted into Mizo National Front (MNF) with an
aim, to unify all Mizos under a single administration and to achieve freedom. They

A M
also feared the immigration of refugees from East Pakistan.

N
BY
• The Mizo National Army (MNA) was formed and underwent training in East
Y
U RIT
Pakistan. The central government did not accept the demand for independence.

SEC • In 1976, the situation was under control and talks commenced between the

AL
government and the MNF under Laldenga.

RN
TE
• The security forces had to be launched to regain control of the situation. Thereafter

IN in 1986, the MNF laid down their arms and the personnel were rehabilitated.
Mizoram gained its statehood on 20th February 1987.
TRIPURA’s INSURGENCY
• The predominantly tribal population of the state was diluted by the influx of large
number of migrants who migrated from the then east Pakistan and the demographic
balance had been upset to the extent.
A L
M ITT
• The tribals who had become minority were not satisfied with the actions of the

AN
government with being given recognition under the seventh schedule of the

A M
constitution thus resorting to violence.

N
BY
• In 1989 and 1990, National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger
Y
U IT
Force (ATTF) were raised respectively, which still exist.

R
SEC • There have been differences between the NLFT and the ATTF, due to which they have

AL
been operating independently.

RN
TE
• Because of the counter insurgency operations in the state, the top leadership and

IN their cadres were based in Bangladesh.

• However, with the change in government in 2008, there have been problems for the
groups as Bangladesh has assured India that the territory of Bangladesh will not be
allowed to launch attacks in India and also no camps will be allowed. This gave an
impetus towards the end of insurgency in the state.
MANIPUR’s INSURGENCY
• The State of Manipur is an insurgency ridden State affected by activities of Meitei,
Naga, Kuki, Zomi, Hmar and Muslim UG outfits.

A L
ITT
• The State of Manipur remained the most violent State accounting for about 50% of the
total incidents in the region in 2018.

AN M
• The insurgent groups in Manipur are People‘s Liberation Army (PLA), United National

A M
Liberation Front (UNLF), Kuki National Organisation (KNO), Kangleipak Communist

N
Y
Party (KCP), & People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK).

IT Y B
R
• Major demands include a separate and independent homeland & are opposed to

SEC U demand of NSCN (IM) of Greater Nagalim.

RN AL • The Kukis have laid stress on Kuki homeland by forming the Sadar hills revenue district
as their political watch tower.

IN TE • The Zomis are demanding their own homeland which was affecting the Kukiland
homeland. They have been influenced by NSCN for Greater Nagalim.

• The Meitei want to ensure that the identity of the Manipuri nationalism is maintained.

• The Pangals (Manipuri Muslims) have taken up arms ostensibly for their own protection.
They are aligning themselves with the Rohingas in Myanmar.
ARUNACHAL PRADESH’s INSURGENCY
• The State of Arunachal Pradesh does not have any
active indigenous insurgent group.

A L
ITT
• The State is affected by spill-over militant activities

AN M
of Naga insurgents from Nagaland-based UG
factions of National Socialist Council of Nagaland

N A M
[NSCN] as also activities of Assam-based ULFA.

Y BY • Cadres of NDFB and ULFA frequent the State in the

U RIT areas bordering Assam and Myanmar for shelter


and transit.

SEC
AL
• The National Liberation Council of Taniland (NLCT)

RN was active along the Assam – Arunachal Pradesh

TE
border, and is demanding Taniland. The group is

IN defunct now.

• In the year 2018, security situation in Arunachal


Pradesh improved substantially with decline in
insurgency incidents by 40%.
IMPACT OF THE INSURGENCY

• Internal displacement of the population from within the states


• Fear psychosis and a great sense of insecurity due to cases of Killing,

A L
ITT
kidnapping, threat and extortion.
• An atmosphere of fear and trepidation has prevented national as well as

AN M
international tourists from choosing the region as their destination
• System of administration of criminal justice has been derailed

A M
• Nexus between the politicians and the insurgents has made elections a

N
Y
farce

IT Y B
• Education of children is frequently disrupted.
• Large portions of the development funds are siphoned by the insurgents

C U R
and some other agencies.

SE • Business and enterprises have failed because of frequent extortions by the

AL
insurgents.

RN • Large amount of food and other consumer items are siphoned by the

IN TE insurgents and the poor suffer.


• People‘s sense of alienation due to deprivation in the economic and social
fields.
• Except Assam, the north east is an industrial desert.
• Support from the neighbouring countries to the insurgent groups is a
serious security threat to the region.
GOVERNMENT’s APPROACH
Central Government has been pursuing a policy for talks/negotiation with such groups
which abjure violence. As a result, a number of outfits have come forward for talks with

A L
the Government and have entered into Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements

ITT
and some of them have signed Memorandum of Settlements (MoS) and dissolved
themselves.

AN M
N A M
Government is engaged in peace talks with various insurgent groups of NE States. R.N.
Ravi, GoI’s Interlocutor is holding peace talks with Naga insurgent groups and for peace

BY
talks with other insurgent groups of NE States (except Nagaland), A.B. Mathur has been

Y
U IT
appointed as GoI’s Interlocutor.

R
SEC The Law & Order is a State subject. However, the Central Government is supplementing

AL
efforts of the State Governments for curbing the illegal and unlawful activities of

RN militant/insurgent groups of North Eastern States through various measures.

IN TE Banning the Unlawful Associations operating in NE Region under UAPA. Declaring


specific areas/ states as ‘disturbed areas’ for the purpose of AFSPA and issuing
notifications for Unified Command Structure.

The implementation of the agreed Ground Rules of insurgent outfits is periodically


reviewed by Joint Monitoring Groups comprising representatives of the Government of
India, State Governments, Security Forces and the outfits concerned.
MEASURES TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT

• Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces. CAPFs and 18 CoBRA teams are deployed in

L
the North Eastern States for Internal Security and Counter Insurgency Operations.

ITTA
• Reimbursement of security related expenditure to the State Governments under SRE

M
Scheme

AN
• Central assistance to the State Governments for modernization of State Police Forces

M
• Sanction of India Reserve Battalions, assisting the State Governments for augmenting and

N A
upgrading their police forces.

Y
B
• Scheme for Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation of Militants in North East - The Ministry of

RIT Y
Home Affairs has been implementing this scheme to wean away the misguided youth and
hardcore militants.

EC U
• Civic Action Programme - There is a constant need to deploy Army and other Central

S
AL
Paramilitary Forces in the region to combat insurgency. In order to take the local populace

N
in confidence and boost the image of armed forces among the common people.

TE R • Advertisement and Publicity - Ministry of Home Affairs implements a scheme of

IN
Advertisement and Publicity in North Eastern States with a view to highlight the activities
being undertaken by the Government for peace in the region and also with a view to
convey that “Peace pays”.
• Nehru Yuvak Kendra Sangathan (NYKS), telecasting of various programmes on
Doordarshan and AIR, financial assistance to various organizations for organizing functions
on NE themes.
MEASURES TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT

• NITI Forum for North East - Focussed attention for development of NER

A L
ITT
• North Eastern Council (NEC) – The North Eastern Council is the nodal agency for the
economic and social development of the North Eastern Region. It is a statutory body

M
with Governors and Chief Ministers of all the eight North Eastern States as its Member.

AN
A M
• North East Industrial Development Scheme (NEIDS) - The newly introduced scheme

N
Y
shall promote industrialization in the States of the North Eastern Region and will boost

Y B
employment and income generation.

IT
U R
• Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways is implementing the Special Accelerated Road
C
SE Development programme for North East (SARDPE- NE) under Bharatmala Pariyojana.

RN AL • “National Bamboo Mission” to supplement farm income and contribute towards

IN TE resilience to climate change as well as availabilty of quality raw material requirements of


industries.
• Establishment of Bamboo Industrial Park (BIP) at Manderdisa, NC Hills, Assam
under Dima Hasao Autonomous Territorial Council (DHATC) package

• Sikkim on India’s air link map through inauguration of Pakyong Airport.


MEASURES TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT

• Digital North East Vision 2022 released to transform lives of people of the
north east and enhance the ease of living.

A L
ITT
• As part of the Digital North East Vision 2022, a cloud hub for North East
will be set up in Guwahati.

taken up in use of digital technologies.


AN M
• Capacity building for 50 thousand state government employees will be

A M
• It also assured to provide mobile connectivity in all uncovered villages in

N
Y
the North East.

IT Y B
• Prime Minister launched development projects worth Rs. 750 crore in

C U R
Manipur - National Sports University, 1,000 Anganwadi Centres and several

SE other important development projects.

RN AL • Indradhanush Gas Grid - North East Gas Pipeline Grid covering all eight

IN TE States g Clean and Green NE with use of cleaner fuel, boost to Industrial
Growth with clean environment.
MEASURES TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT

• Improving Connectivity
• New train ‘Arunachal Express’ between Naharlagun in Arunachal
Pradesh and Anand Vihar Terminal
A L
M ITT
• Greenfield Hollongi Airport Capital Connectivity to Arunachal Pradesh
• Belonia-Sabroom line in Tripura - easy access to Southern Tripura and
Chattogram Port in Bangladesh

A M AN
• 4 Laning of Imphal-Moreh – Pkg – Connectivity for India Myanmar -

Y N
Thailand Trilateral Highway

B
IT Y
• Inland Waterways – Connectivity with Kolkata/Haldia Ports Bulk cargo and

R
SEC U container movement from Kolkata and Haldia Ports to Pandu (Guwahati)
Terminal via IndoBangladesh Protocol (IBP) Route

RN AL • Launch of new scheme Krishi Udaan in Union Budget 2020-21 for

TE
agrihorticultural product which covers North East including tribal

IN destinations.

• Tourism development at Tawang with provision of sewage and water


treatment plant at Tawang District in Arunachal Pradesh under NESIDS
WAYFORWARD

• Continued Efforts By Civil Society notwithstanding the progress in peace talks,


efforts by the civil society for rapprochement with the insurgent organisations

A L
ITT
must continue.

AN M
• Military Operations against Select Insurgent Groups should continue against
those insurgent groups who have not shown inclination towards any peace

A M
talks, like NSCN (K), NDFB (S), ULFA, etc.

N
Y BY
• Sanctity of Indo-Myanmar International Border (IB) must be strengthened to

IT
preclude insurgents from crossing the border at will.

U R
SEC
• Multi Tiered Deployment can be achieved by increasing the deployment of

AL
Assam Rifles (AR) along the Indo-Myanmar border in the first tier, IA in the

RN second tier and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in the third tier.

IN TE • Enhancing Connectivity: Comprehensive geographical connectivity is key to the


development of NorthEast states. For this transit arrangement to connect to
Indian mainland through Bangladesh and India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral
highway should be completed. This highway is expected to boost trade and
commerce in the ASEAN–India Free Trade Area, as well as with the rest of
Southeast Asia.
WAYFORWARD
• Standing Committee on Home Affairs recommended that the Ministry prepare a
generous rehabilitation-cum-settlement scheme for the insurgent outfits, who will

A L
surrender as a part of the agreement. This will avoid emergence of any rebel

ITT
groups.

AN M
• Monitoring Spread of Radical Islam. GoI must keep on monitoring the situation in

N A M
NEI to prevent spread of Islamic radicalism by initiating appropriate socio-economic
development measures including education.

Y BY
U RIT
• Geographical compulsion of Bangladesh. Two- thirds of Bangladesh is a low- lying
delta prone to flooding. One way to counter the problem is to legalise immigration

SEC
on work permit system that would ensure that the Bangladeshis return home after a

AL
fixed period.

RN
TE
• Insurgency is defeated when the population is won over and its cause does not

IN appeal to the people any more. The most important thing is to mobilise local public
opinion against the insurgency.
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
TERRORISM
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in human experience. Violence has been used
throughout human history by those who chose to oppose states, kings, and princes. This
sort of violence can be differentiated from what is termed as terrorism.

A L
ITT
• Global Terrorism Index define terrorism as ‘the threatened or actual use of illegal force

goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.’


AN M
and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social

A M
• UN described terrorism as any act "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to

N
civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or

BY
compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing

Y
U RIT
any act.”
• Indian National Security Guard Act, 1986, defines a 'Terrorist' as: "Terrorist means any

SEC
person who with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike

AL
terror in the people or any section of the people, does any act or thing by using bomb,

RN dynamite or other explosive substance or inflammable substances or firearms or other

TE
lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other substances (whether biological or

IN otherwise) of a hazardous nature, in such a manner as to cause or as is likely to cause,


death or injuries to any person or persons or damage to or destruction of property, or
disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of community."

Common themes on terrorism involve premeditation terrorist acts which are motivated
by some political or social agenda, terrorists generally target non-combatants or civilians
and are generally sub-national or clandestine groups.
CAUSES OF TERRORISM
The causes of terrorism appear to be varied. There does not appear to be one lone factor
that leads people to engage in acts of terror. Scholars have categorized motivations for
terrorism to include psychological, ideological, and strategic.

A L
ITT
•Psychological Perspective Those who engage in terrorism may do so for purely personal

more than hate or the desire for power.


AN M
reasons, based on their own psychological state of mind. Their motivation may be nothing

N A M
Y
•Ideological Perspective - Ideology is defined as the beliefs, values, and/or principles by

IT B
which a group identifies its particular aims and goals. Ideology may encompass religion or
Y
political philosophies and programs.

C U R
• Irish Republican Army (IRA) - The IRA is motivated by a political program to oust

SE the United Kingdom from Ireland and unite Ireland under one flag.

AL
• LTTE sought to establish a separate state for their people.

RN
TE
•Strategic Perspective - Terrorism is sometimes seen as a logical extension of the failure of

IN politics. When people seek redress of their grievances through government, but fail to win
government’s attention to their plight, they may resort to violence.
• In South Africa, the African National Congress only turned to the use of terrorism
after political avenues were explored and failed.
• States may use terrorists in the pursuit of their own strategic interests. States may
sponsor terrorist groups, especially when the objectives of the state and the
terrorist group are similar.
TYPES OF TERRORISM
• Establishment Terrorism or State Sponsored Terrorism - Employed by governments
or more often by factions within governments against that government’s citizens,

A
against factions within the government, or against foreign governments or groups.
L
ITT
This type of terrorism is very common but difficult to identify, mainly because the
state’s support is always clandestine.

AN M
• The violent police states of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and Saddam

N A M
Hussein in Iraq.
• The Soviet Union and its allies allegedly engaged in widespread support of

BY
international terrorism during the Cold War; in the 1980s the United States

Y
IT
supported rebel groups in Africa that allegedly engaged in acts of terrorism.

C U R
• Pakistan’s ISI facilitating terrorism on Indian soil through LeT, JeM, JuD, HuM

E
etc.

AL S
N
• Non - State Terrorism - Used by non state actors having no direct links with any

TE R government(s) or organisation thereof often against government,

IN
factions/organisations of state, security forces & agencies, civilians to achieve social,
religious or political goals.
• Left wing extremism
• Insurgency in North East
• Militancy in Jammu & Kashmir
• Khalistan Movement
• LTTE
TYPES OF TERRORISM
• International or Cross Border Terrorism - When a terrorist from one country goes to
the soil of another country and operates in utter disregard of international borders,

L
it is known as "international terrorism" or "cross-border terrorism". (Examples - LeT,

A
ITT
JeM, Al-qaeda, ISIS, etc.)

AN M
• Domestic or Homegrown Terrorism - Domestic terrorism or homegrown terrorism is

M
a form of terrorism in which victims "within a country are targeted by a perpetrator

N A
with the same citizenship" as the victims. (Examples - NSCN(IM)(K), ULFA(I), PLA,

Y
B
HM, CPI-M, etc.)

RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
EVOLVED FORMs OF TERRORISM
Cyber Terrorism / Online Radicalisation

• Since the late 1980s, the Internet has proven to be a highly dynamic means of communication,

A L
ITT
reaching an ever-growing audience worldwide.
• Internet technology makes it easy for an individual to communicate with relative anonymity,

AN M
quickly and effectively across borders, to an almost limitless audience.
• International and domestic violent extremists have developed an extensive presence on the

A M
Internet through encrypted messaging platforms and online images, videos, and publications.

N
Y
• Incitement, Radicalisation & Recruitment –

Y B
• One of the primary uses of the Internet by terrorists is for the dissemination of

IT
R
propaganda.

SEC U
• It facilitates the groups’ ability to radicalize and recruit individuals who are receptive to
extremist messaging.

AL
• Financing - Terrorist organizations and supporters may also use the Internet to finance acts of

RN terrorism.

IN TE • Planning - Many criminal justice practitioners have indicated that almost every case of
terrorism prosecuted involved the use of Internet technology.
• Training - Terrorist organizations have increasingly turned to the Internet as an alternative
training ground for terrorists. For example, Inspire is an online magazine allegedly published by
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula with the stated objective of enabling Muslims to train for
jihad at home.
• Cyberattacks - A cyberattack generally refers to the deliberate exploitation of computer
networks as a means to launch an attack.
EVOLVED FORMs OF TERRORISM
Lone Wolf Terror Attacks

L
A lone actor, lone-actor terrorist, or lone wolf is someone who prepares and commits violent acts

ITTA
alone, outside of any command structure and without material assistance from any group. They may
be influenced or motivated by the ideology and beliefs of an external group and may act in support of
such a group.

AN M
A M
• The Internet and social media have been integral in galvanising lone wolves by validating their

N
Y
ambitions and providing tactical and logistical support in conducting attacks.

IT Y B
R
• The Internet provides lone wolves with a community of like-minded individuals that validate

SEC U
grounds for inciting violence as well as enabling “a conversation between disconnected, scattered
people which was not possible before.

RN AL
• The Internet also provides lone wolves with the anonymity to communicate without filters and

IN TE freely express their extremist views online without fear of backlash.

• Terrorist threats have evolved from large-group conspiracies toward lone-offender attacks. These
individuals often radicalize online and mobilize to violence quickly.
EVOLVED FORMs OF TERRORISM

• Without a clear group affiliation or guidance, lone offenders are challenging to


identify, investigate, and disrupt.

A L
M ITT
• With strict rules regarding holding firearms, India may be less susceptible to
lone wolf shootings, but as witnessed with the case of the Jamia shooter, the

A M
present security challenges to India. AN
illegal channels of accessing firearms, especially those made locally, still

BY N
Y
• Acts of violence in the name of nationalism present unique security and policy

U RIT
implications for India that are only exacerbated by the wave of fake news
enabled by social media.

SEC
AL
It is imperative that lone wolf terror threats irrespective of their ideological affiliations

RN are better understood and dealt with to strengthen and more importantly, diversify,

TE
India’s counterterrorism capabilities and understanding of new, developing threats

IN coming from the intersection of technology, nationalism and counter-terrorism.

• Special Cell of Delhi Police arrested an ISIS operative in 2020, who was planning
lone wolf attack in Delhi.
EVOLVED FORMs OF TERRORISM

Sleeper Cell Terrorism

A L
• A terrorist cell whose members work under cover in an area until sent into action.

M ITT
• The National Investigation Agency (NIA) busted a sleeper module of the
proscribed Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) in Karnataka in 2019.

A M AN
• They had expanded activities not only in coastal and interior Karnataka but all
along the coastal regions of the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.

Y N
• According to the NIA, these terrorists were involved in the October 2, 2014

B
Y
bomb blasts at Burdwan in West Bengal.

U RIT
• MHA had stated that the group also intended to establish permanent bases
within 10 kilometres of the India-Bangladesh border in the eastern states of

SEC Tripura, Assam and West Bengal.

RN AL• Mob Disruptions, Front Organisations & Overground Workers (OGWs) - Already

TE
Explained in Previous sessions.

IN
PREVENTION STRUCTURE

• A number of intelligence, military, and police organizations within the Indian


government contribute to counterterrorism efforts. These include state-run police

L
forces, special security forces to guard airports and other high-profile targets, and

A
ITT
paramilitary forces that patrol the borders and assist the police when necessary.

AN M
• The army usually participates in counterterrorism operations as a last resort, though

M
in Jammu and Kashmir they play a more consistent role.

Y N A
B
• India has several intelligence agencies that monitor terrorist activities. The Research

RIT Y
and Analysis Wing (RAW) is the external intelligence agency and the Intelligence
Bureau (IB), a division of the Home Affairs Ministry, collects intelligence inside India.

SEC U
AL
• Joint Intelligence Committee analyzes intelligence data from RAW and IB as well as

N
from a handful of military intelligence agencies, which usually provide tactical

TE R information gathered while carrying out counterterrorist operations.

IN • India lacks a coherent strategic response to terrorism; there is no doctrine and most
of our responses are situation based.
UAPA ACT

• UAPA was developed as an anti-terrorism law to prevent such unlawful activities


association and maintain the sovereignty and integrity of India. Throughout the years it

A L
has been amended for effective application and to serve the primary intent of the act.

M ITT
• The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019 amended the Unlawful

AN
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

N A M
• Under the Act, the central government may designate an organisation as a terrorist

BY
organisation if it:

Y
IT
• Commits or participates in acts of terrorism

C U R
• Prepares for terrorism

E
• Promotes terrorism

AL S • Is otherwise involved in terrorism

RN
TE
• The new Act additionally empowers the government to designate individuals as

IN
terrorists on the same grounds.

• Investigation by NIA: Under the Act, investigation of cases may be conducted by


officers of the rank of Deputy Superintendent or Assistant Commissioner of Police or
above.
• The new act additionally empowers the officers of the NIA, of the rank of
Inspector or above, to investigate cases.
UAPA ACT

• Seizure of property by NIA - Under the Act, if the investigation is conducted by an


officer of the National Investigation Agency (NIA), the approval of the Director General

L
of NIA would be required for seizure of such property.

ITTA
M
• Previously, approval of the Director General of Police (State) was required.

M AN
• Schedule of treaties: The Act defines terrorist acts to include acts committed within

A
N
the scope of any of the treaties listed in a schedule to the Act.

Y BY
T
• The Schedule lists nine treaties, including the Convention for the Suppression of

RI
Terrorist Bombings (1997), and the Convention against Taking of Hostages

U
SEC (1979).

RN AL • The new act adds another treaty to the list. This is the International Convention

TE
for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005).

IN
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA)
India has been the victim of large scale terrorism sponsored from across the borders.
There have been innumerable incidents of terrorist attacks, not only in the militancy and

L
insurgency affected areas and areas affected by Left Wing Extremism, but also in the

ITTA
form of terrorist attacks and bomb blasts, etc., in various parts of the hinterland and
major cities, etc.

AN M
A large number of such incidents are found to have complex inter-State and international

A M
linkages, and possible connection with organised crimes.
N
Y BY
Several experts and Committees, including the Administrative Reforms commission in its

RIT
Report, had made recommendations for establishing such an Agency.

U
SEC
The Government proposed to enact a legislation to make provisions for establishment of a

RN ALNational Investigation Agency with provisions for taking up specific cases under specific

TE
Acts for investigation. At present NIA is functioning as the Central Counter Terrorism Law

IN
Enforcement Agency in India.

NIA has registered and investigated 315 cases as on date i.e. 05.02.2020. After
submission of charge sheets, 60 cases have been finally or partially decided in trial. Of
these, 54 cases have ended in conviction giving NIA an enviable conviction percentage of
90%.
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA)
The Act makes the National Investigation Agency the only truly federal agency in the country,
along the lines of the FBI in the United States, more powerful than the CBI.

L
• It gives the NIA powers to take suo motu cognisance of terror activities in any part of India

ITTA
and register a case, to enter any state without permission from the state government, and to
investigate and arrest people.

AN M
Scheduled offences: The schedule to the Act specifies a list of offences which are to be

A M
investigated and prosecuted by the NIA.

N
Y
• These include offences under Acts such as the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, and the

Y B
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967.

IT
R
• The amendment act of 2019 allowed the NIA to investigate the following offences, in

SEC Uaddition: (i) human trafficking, (ii) offences related to counterfeit currency or bank notes,
(iii) manufacture or sale of prohibited arms, (iv) cyber-terrorism, and (v) offences under

RN AL the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

IN TE Jurisdiction of the NIA: The officers of the NIA have the same powers as other police officers in
relation to investigation of offences specified in the schedule, across India.
• The amendment act of 2019 stated that in addition, officers of the NIA will have the
power to investigate scheduled offences committed outside India, subject to
international treaties and domestic laws of other countries.
• The central government may direct the NIA to investigate such cases, as if the offence has
been committed in India. The Special Court in New Delhi will have jurisdiction over
these cases.
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA)

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA)
Special Courts: The Act allows the central government to constitute Special Courts for the trial of
scheduled offences.

L
• The amendment act of 2019 amended this to state that the central government may

ITTA
designate Sessions Courts as Special Courts for the trial of scheduled offences.

AN M
• The central government is required to consult the Chief Justice of the High Court under
which the Sessions Court is functioning, before designating it as a Special Court.

N A M
Y
• When more than one Special Court has been designated for any area, the senior-most

Y B
judge will distribute cases among the courts.

IT
C U R
Further, state governments may also designate Sessions Courts as Special Courts for the trial of

SE
scheduled offences.

RN AL
IN TE
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA)

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT, 1958

The Act came into force in the context of increasing violence in the Northeastern States
decades ago, which the State governments found difficult to control. The Armed Forces
(Special Powers) Bill was passed in 1958.

A L
M ITT
• It is effective in the whole of Nagaland, Assam, Manipur (excluding seven assembly

AN
constituencies of Imphal), parts of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.

N A M
• AFSPA gives armed forces the power to maintain public order in “disturbed areas”.

BY
• A disturbed area is one which is declared by notification under Section 3 of the

Y
T
AFSPA.

U RI
SEC • An area can be disturbed due to differences or disputes between members of

AL
different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities.

RN
TE
• The Central Government, or the Governor of the State or administrator of the Union

IN
Territory can declare the whole or part of the State or Union Territory as a disturbed
area.

• Once declared ‘disturbed’, the region has to maintain status quo for a minimum of
three months.
ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT, 1958

• They have the authority to prohibit a gathering of five or more persons in an area.

L
• They can use force or even open fire after giving due warning if they feel a person is in

A
ITT
contravention of the law.

AN M
• If reasonable suspicion exists, the army can also arrest a person without a warrant; enter

M
or search a premises without a warrant; and ban the possession of firearms.

Y N A
B
• Under Section 7 of AFSPA no legal proceedings can be instituted against any armed forces

T Y
personnel without the sanction of the Centre.

RI
SEC U• The Supreme Court in 2012 ruled that under the AFSPA, or the Armed Forces (J&K)

AL
Special Powers Act, sanction is mandatory. But, the need to seek sanction would

N
only arise at the time of cognizance of the offence.

TE R
IN
• Cognizance is the stage when the prosecution begins.

• Sanction is therefore not required during investigation.


PREVENTIVE DETENTION LAWS
• Under Section 151 of The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) preventive
detention is action taken on grounds of suspicion that some wrong actions may
be done by the person concerned.
A L
ITT
• Maintenance of public order
• Security of state
• Security of India and foreign matters
AN M
A M
• Maintenance of supplies and essential services and defence

N
BY
• A police officer can arrest an individual without orders from a Magistrate and

Y
U RIT
without any warrant if he gets any information that such an individual can
commit any offense.

SEC
AL
• Article 22 of the Indian Constitution provides protection against arrest and

RN detention in certain cases.

IN TE • Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (PSA), National Security Act of 1980.
NATGRID Project
• NATGRID (National Intelligence Grid) has been conceived through governmental
notification to develop cutting edge technology to enhance India’s counter terror
capabilities. It will come into operation by the end of 2020.
A L
M ITT
• NATGRID is the integrated intelligence grid connecting databases of core security

AN
agencies of the Government of India.

N A M
• This project will be a connecting database of all security agencies of the Government of

BY
India which will collect comprehensive and detailed patterns of intelligence that can be

Y
IT
readily accessed by intelligence agencies from anywhere through authorised

U R
personnel.

C
SE
RN AL
IN TE
MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC)

• MAC is a nodal establishment for sharing intelligence inputs among


various agencies, at present operating at national and state levels.

A L
ITT
• Government is planning now to expand it to districts level now.

AN M
• MAC had also launched National Memory Bank (NMB) integrated with

A M
Threat Management System (TMS) on MACSMAC-State SB network, in

N
2012.

Y BY
U RIT • NMB can be defined as a Classified Electronic Library on CT
information and is designed as a repository of data related to CT

SEC matters, accessible to all stakeholders nationwide.

RN AL • MHA launched in 2020, Crime Multi Agency Centre (Cri-MAC) for sharing

TE
of information on heinous crime and other issues related to inter-state

IN coordination.
COMBATING TERROR FINANCING
• Combating Financing of Terrorism Cell (CFT Cell) in the Ministry of Home Affairs deals with the
policy matters on combating Terrorist Financing and Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN).

A L
• A FICN Co-ordination Centre (FCORD) is functioning in the Ministry of Home Affairs to share the

ITT
intelligence / information amongst the different security agencies of Centre / States to counter

AN M
the menace of circulation of Fake Indian Currency Notes within the Country.
• A Terror Funding and Fake Currency (TFFC) Cell is functioning under the National Investigation
Agency (NIA).

N A M
• Training programmes are regularly conducted for the State Police personnel on issues relating

BY
to combating terrorist financing.

Y
U RIT
• India is a Member of Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an Inter-Governmental Body, which
makes recommendations relating to Combating of Financing of Terrorism, Money Laundering,

S
etc.
EC
AL
• A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to prevent and counter smuggling and circulation of

RN fake currency notes was signed in 2015 between India and Bangladesh.

TE
• Security at the international borders has been strengthened by using new surveillance

IN technology, deploying additional manpower for round the clock surveillance.


• During the Informal BRICS Meeting, on the margins of G20 Osaka Summit (28-29 June, 2019),
India along with other BRICS members underlined their resolve to make the international
financial system entirely hostile to terrorist financing.
• Strengthening of the provisions in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 to combat
terror financing.
WHY LESS INDIANS HAVE JOINED ISIS?

It is interesting to note that out of India’s population of over 172.2 million Muslims
(constituting 14% of the Indian population), less than a 100 migrants are thought to have left for

A L
the ISIS territories. ISIS and AQIS have been trying to recruit members from India but have

ITT
consistently faced a muted response.

AN M
• Much less than that of the European Union (EU), from where between 3,922 and
4,294 foreign fighters joined the ranks of the ISIS Caliphate by 2016.

A M
• India’s unique syncretic traditions that have fostered an extraordinarily pluralistic culture.

N
• India was born a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-denominational society that embraces

BY
that diversity.

Y
U RIT
• Indian Muslims mainly follow Sufism, a peaceful sect of Islam, which inhibits them from
joining its more fundamentalist and militant antithesis, namely Salafi-Wahhabism.

SEC • Sufi teachers played a central role in the interaction emphasizing social ethics, social

AL
equality and tolerance. This was faith of most Indians, Hindus and Muslims, for 500

RN years.

TE
• Indian migration to the former ISIS-held territories in Syria and Iraq did not happen in large

IN numbers due to logistical problems. (Too expensive & Too treacherous)


• The passport ownership rate in India stood at 5% in 2017, with Muslims.
• Idea of creating an Islamic state is something Indian Muslims have already dealt with and
suffered the consequences of, with many families splitting up.
• Heterogeneity is major reason why Indian Muslims do not participate in conflicts as each
group has local contexts, aspirations and challenges.
• Effective role of Security & Intelligence agencies
INTERNATIONAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES & ORGANISATIONS

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INTERNATIONAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES

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RECENT MEASURES & BEST PRACTICES

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WAYFORWARD

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INDIA’S COASTAL A M AN
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SECURITY
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IN TE
INTRODUCTION

India’s coasts have always been vulnerable to anti-national


activities. Numerous cases of the smuggling of goods, gold,

A L
narcotics, explosives, arms and ammunition as well as the

ITT
infiltration of terrorists into the country through these

M
coasts have been reported over the years.

AN
A M
India has a coastline of 7,516.6 km. bordering the mainland

N
and the islands with Bay of Bengal in the East, the Indian

BY
Ocean on the South and the Arabian Sea on the West.
Y
U RIT
There are nine States viz. Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa,

SEC Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and

AL
West Bengal and four Union Territories viz. Daman & Diu,

RN Lakshadweep, Puducherry and Andaman & Nicobar Islands

TE
situated on the coast.

IN
SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE COAST
• The physical proximity of India’s coasts to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and
Gulf countries adds to its vulnerability. India has been facing cross-border
terrorism for decades.

A L
ITT
• Places such as Dubai have become a source and destination for smuggled and

AN M
trafficked items, dhows plying from Dubai to Mumbai and Gujarat. They got
involved in smuggling heroin, hashish, precursor chemicals, gold and luxury

A M
items, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. This illegal practice continues even
today.
N
Y BY
• No security agency maintains a database about the owner, crew and

U RIT movement of dhows.

SEC • Over the years, with the increased focus, security along the land borders has

AL
been sufficiently tightened. On the other hand, security over the ocean domain

RN with the sea routes remaining poorly guarded.

IN TE • The eastern Indian seaboard has been increasingly witnessing a steady increase
in illegal migration from Bangladesh.

• The Indian coasts also have a number of strategic installations, numerous big
and small towns which makes Indian Coasts high value targets for the terrorists.

• Unsettled maritime boundaries pose serious security challenges.


DEVELOPING CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

Maritime Security
• It encompasses a host of issues relating to
the sea under the broad constructs of
A L
ITT
national sovereignty, economic

M
development, human security and

AN
preservation of the marine environment.

Coastal Security
N A M
B
• It is a subset of maritime security, and

Y Y
IT
represents the ability of a State to preserve

U R
its national security interests in its coastal

C
E
zone against all maritime threats not only in

AL S
times of peace but also conflict.

RN
IN TE
COASTAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK OF INDIA
• The Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard and State Marine Police, act
as a three tiered cover, along with other agencies such as Customs
and Port Trusts.

A L
ITT
• In 2009, Indian Navy was designated as the agency

and coastal security.


AN M
responsible for overall maritime security, including offshore

N A M • The Naval Commanders-in-Chiefs at Mumbai, Kochi,

Y
Visakhapatnam and Port Blair were designated as Cs-in-C

IT Y B Coastal Defence.

C U R • The Indian Coast Guard was designated as the agency responsible

SE for coastal security in territorial waters, including waters to be

AL
patrolled by the State Marine Police.

RN
TE
• Coastal Police Stations were created in every coastal state and U.T.

IN to secure the sea borders, and with the jurisdiction up to 12nm


from the baseline.

• The State Coastal Police Forces work closely with ICG under the
hub and spoke concept, the hub being ICG station and the spokes
being the coastal police stations.
COASTAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK OF INDIA
• The National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) is
a national-level forum and an apex review mechanism for maritime and coastal security,
in which all concerned ministries and government agencies are represented. (Chaired

A L
ITT
by Cabinet Secy.)
• Committees have also been established at State and District level.

AN M
• At the operational level, Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) of the Navy and Indian
Coast Guard have been set up.

N A M
Y
• Steering Committees for Review of coastal security (SCRCS) - This operates at the

Y B
national level, under the Chairpersonship of the Secretary (Border Management), MHA,

IT
R
wherein all coastal States/UTs are members.

SEC U
• Coastal Security Committee - This is set up at the level of coastal state and coastal

RN AL district, under the Chairmanship of Chief Secretary and District Magistrate respectively,
for further decentralisation and effective coordination at the local level.

IN TE • Standard Operating Procedures - SOPs are aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the
Coastal Security mechanism.

• Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) - The Department of Border Management (MHA) has
been implementing CSS in phases since 2005 with the objective of strengthening
infrastructure of the Police Force of Coastal States/UTs for patrolling and surveillance of
coastal areas, particularly shallow waters close to the coast.
MEASURES TAKEN
• Since ‘26/11’ the Government has taken a number of measures to
strengthen coastal, offshore and maritime security. Broadly, these measures
include

A L
ITT
• Capacity augmentation of maritime security agencies for surveillance
and patrol of the nation’s maritime zones

AN M
• Enhanced technical surveillance of coastal and offshore areas
• Establishment of mechanisms for inter-agency coordination

A M
• Increased regulation of activities in the maritime zones

N
Y
• Integration of the fishing and coastal communities

IT Y B
R
• Electronic surveillance mechanism has been augmented by provisioning of

SEC U
an electronic / radar chain called Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN)
consisting of Chain of Static Sensors which assist in developing Maritime

RN AL Domain Awareness (MDA) through interconnecting 51 Indian Navy and


Indian Coast Guard stations.

IN TE • Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) radars in ports facilitate


surveillance of port areas.

• State-wise Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for coordination among


various agencies on coastal security issues have been formulated.
MEASURES TAKEN
• Real-time information sharing through the National Command Control
Communication and Intelligence (NC3I) Network; greater intelligence and
operational coordination were made the focus areas.

A L
ITT
• The sectoral security initiatives in fisheries, offshore, ports and shipping

M
AN
sectors were also adopted.

A M
• Coastal Security Exercises are being conducted regularly by Indian Navy and

N
Y
Indian Coast Guard to assess the effectiveness of existing mechanisms and

Y B
to address gaps.

IT
C U R• Exercise SEA VIGIL aims to comprehensively and holistically validate the

SE efficacy of the measures taken since '26/11'.

RN AL • The exercise entails both seaward and shore-based monitoring.


• It is a build up towards the major theatre level tri-service exercise

IN TE TROPEX [Theatre-level Readiness Operational Exercise] which Indian


Navy conducts every two years.
• Multi agency exercises such as Sagar Kavach have helped improve
coordination.
OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT’S MEASURES
• Community Interaction Programmes (CIP) ICG has been undertaking CIPs for
the fishermen to bring in awareness about safety issues at sea.
• The CIPs are also conducted to sensitize the fishing community on the

A
prevailing security situation and develop them to be the “Eyes and
L
ITT
Ears” for intelligence gathering.

AN M
• Fishermen Biometric ID Cards are issued to the Fishermen by the

A M
Department of Animal Husbandry Dairying & Fisheries. Biometric enrolment

N
Y
in respect of 99% fishermen have been completed.

IT Y B
• Tracking of Vessels/Boats - All vessels above 20 metres length are

C U R
mandatorily required to be fitted with Automatic Identification System (AIS)

SE equipment.

AL
• ISRO has been requested to provide 500 transponders each to the

RN sensitive coastal States.

TE
• Registration of sea-going vessels and identification of persons on

IN board have been made compulsory

• Security of Non-major Ports - There are 227 non-major ports in Coastal


States. A ‘Compendium of Guidelines’ containing a broad spectrum of basic
security requirements which are needed at minor ports to address various
security concerns was circulated in 2016.
OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT’S MEASURES
• Security of Single Point Mooring - MHA has evolved a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
for security of SPMs, which has been circulated to all Coastal States/UTs for compliance.

A L
• Coastal Mapping: Coastal mapping is a process of putting information on the map which

ITT
includes vital details and location of Coastal Police Stations.

AN M
• Notification of Coastal Police Stations - Ministry of Home Affairs has notified 10 Coastal

A M
Police Stations in Coastal States/UTs to deal with crimes committed in International waters.

N
BY
• National Academy of Coastal Policing (NACP) - The Government of India has approved the
Y
IT
setting up of NACP in Dwarka, in the State of Gujarat.

U R
SEC
• Development of Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) –

AL
• The ICPs are envisaged to to enable smooth cross border movement of individuals,

RN vehicles and goods under an integrated complex.

TE
• It has set up Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) at the existing Land Customs Stations.

IN • Training of Policemen deployed in coastal police stations is imparted by Indian Coast


Guard.

• Marine Police Training Institute (MPTI) - The Government of India has decided to set up
one each MPTI on the East Coast and the West Coast in order to impart training to Marine
Police Personnel.
EXISTING LOOPHOLES
• Multi-level structure - There are approximately 15 agencies involved in various facets of
coastal security.
• Involvement of states and the Centre leads to inadequate utilisation of resources.

A L
• The Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2017) noted that there was lack of

ITT
coordination between 3 key security agencies.

responsible in case any untoward incident.


AN M
• Three-tier structure has made it difficult to hold any organisation solely

A M
• NCSMCS is at best an ad hoc arrangement.

N
• Proposal to set up an apex coastal authority remains frozen. Parliament has not

BY
established yet National Maritime Authority (NMA).

Y
U RIT
• State governments continue to be indifferent to needs of coastal security, and the

SEC state-police still reluctant to shoulder responsibility.

AL
• Low numbers of marine police stations

RN • Underutilisation of patrol boats for coastal tasks

TE
• Absence of shore-based infrastructure

IN • Manpower shortages
• Unspent funds
• Detection of small boats are being increasingly used by the non-state actors
• Unregulated fishing further complicates identification of friendly or foe.
• Identification of personnel manning boats is equally difficult in the absence of
suitable identity cards.
• Only boats over 20 m in length are eligible for the AIS.
EXISTING LOOPHOLES
• Less emphasis on non-traditional challenges
• Narcotics trafficking incidents have witnessed an uptick, the most prominent
incident being the seizure of the M.V. Henry in August 2017.
• Drug traffickers are turning old harbours like Tuticorin into a hub of
A L
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contraband and illicit trade.

AN M
• Critical ‘gaps’ persist, at Indian ports, where authorities are yet to install fool-proof

A M
security measures.

N
Y
• According to an Intelligence Bureau audit in 2016, out of 227 minor ports in

IT Y B
India, 187 had little or no security at all.
• More than six years after the home ministry cleared the setting up of radiation

C U R detection equipment in 16 of the major ports in 2011, two of these ports have

SE yet to receive the equipment.

RN AL • Security of oil infrastructure - While most of India’s crude oil imports are through

TE
certain identified ports and Single Point Moorings (SPMs), there is no integrated

IN strategy for their protection.


• Coast Guard Act 1978 places the responsibility for protection of artificial
islands and offshore terminals within the ICG’s functional ambit.
• But CG officers say the task of protecting SPMs 15 nautical miles from the
shoreline must be performed by the CISF. The latter claims they lack required
assets and trained personnel to discharge the function.
RECOMMENDATIONS & WAYFORWARD
• Surveillance and interagency coordination
• Expediting the installation of coastal radar chains and AIS stations and
ensuring broad access to information.

A L
• Address the problems of coordination arising out of the interactions of

ITT
multiple agencies (with overlapping jurisdictions) and delayed responses.

AN M
• The Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2017) recommended that the
Director General, Indian Coast Guard, should be the nodal authority for

A M
coordinating operations related to coastal security.

N
BY
• Leveraging Technology
Y
U RIT
• Deployment of a satellite constellation for coastal surveillance.
• Induction of hovercraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as part of the

SEC CSS.

AL
• Deployment of frontier technologies.

RN
IN TE • Stronger involvement of coastal police
• Instead of setting up a coastal border security force with no legal powers, the
authorities must move to strengthen and better integrate the coastal police
into the littoral security architecture.
RECOMMENDATIONS & WAYFORWARD
• Strengthening of the Coast Guard
• Designate ICG as a single organisation for coastal security.
• Ambiguities from the Coast Guard Act need to be removed.

A L
• Ensure all security agencies are clear about the roles and responsibilities they

ITT
are expected to perform.

• A legislative framework
AN M
A M
• Statutory duties of various stakeholders need to be clearly outlined.

N
Y
• Setting up of Central Marine Police Force to standardise equipment and

IT B
seamlessly integrate all the realms of costal security.
Y
• National Commercial Maritime Security Policy Document, to articulate its

C U R strategic vision for maritime security.

SE • National Strategy for Commercial Maritime Security for efficient, coordinated,

AL
and effective action for protection of the port and shipping infrastructure.

RN • Enactment of the Coastal Security Bill which has been pending since 2013 and

TE
Anti-Maritime Piracy Bill, 2019.

IN • Increased interaction with other countries so as to adopt and customise the best
practices being followed by them.

There is a need to review the framework of maritime governance to improve


coordination and to remove the wholly "artificial" divide between what is a security
requirement and what is a development requirement.
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CYBER RITSECURITY
Y
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IN TE
INTRODUCTION
What is cyberspace?

It is a global domain within the information

A L
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environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology

AN M
infrastructures, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer

A M
systems, and embedded processors and

N
Y
controllers.

IT Y B
C U R What is cybersecurity?

SE
AL
The IT Act, 2000 defines “cyber-security” as the

RN protection given to devices and information

IN TE stored therein from “unauthorised access, use,


disclosure, disruption, modification or
destruction.”

Cyber Security is protecting our cyberspace


(critical infrastructure) from attack, damage,
misuse and economic espionage.
NEED OF CYBERSECURITY
• Cybersecurity is very much needed today when India is moving towards a cashless
society, digitization and investing heavily in critical infrastructure & other e-services.

L
• Digital India Programme
• Aadhar Programme

ITTA
M
• Bharat Net or NOFN Programme

AN
• DigiLocker, DBT, MOOCs, etc.

N A M
• In this era of Corona, when most of the work is going on online transactions and

BY
cashless, taking cybersecurity seriously is paramount in India. Cyber security attacks and

Y
breaches in the country may have jumped by as much as 500% since the lockdown was

RIT
first announced in March.

U
SEC
AL
• Increased Risks due to;

N
• Interconnectedness of Sectors

TE R • Proliferation of exposure points

IN
• Concentration of Assets

• The border stand-off has further increased worries about enhanced cyber attacks from
China and its close allies.

• Evolved form of terrorism and extremisms are actively relying upon cyber platforms for
mobilisation of finances, radicalisation, recruitments, and planning.
NEED OF CYBERSECURITY

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IN TE
CYBERSECURITY : FACTS & FIGURES
• India is now second only to China in terms of internet users, according to a
report by Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI).
• NITI Aayog Report indicates close to 730 million internet users in India with 75%

A L
ITT
new users coming from rural areas who also consume data in regional
languages.

AN M
• Today India ranks among the top 10 spam sending countries of the world. It is
also among the top 5 countries affected by cybercrime worldwide.
MAJOR CYBER ATTACKS IN INDIA
N A M
Y BY
• In 2010, India was the third worst-affected country by computer worm Stuxnet.

U RIT
• Debit card hack, 2016 - About 3.2 million debit cards were compromised
resulting in a loss of Rs 1.3 crore.

SEC • ATM system hack, 2018 -Canara Bank ATM servers were rigged and almost Rs 20

AL
lakh wiped off from various accounts.

RN • Aadhaar software hack, 2018 - Data of nearly 1.1 billion Indian Aadhaar card

IN TE holders was compromised.


• In 2019, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) confirmed the breach by
the malware.
• In 2019, WhatsApp was used to spy on journalists and human rights activists in
India. The surveillance was carried out using a spyware tool called Pegasus, which
has been developed by an Israeli firm, the NSO Group.
• The most commonly targeted sectors in India are critical infrastructure followed
by banking, defence and manufacturing.
CYBERSECURITY : FACTS & FIGURES

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BY N
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IN TE
CYBER THREATS/ATTACKS
• Cyber Crime: Seeking commercial gain from hacking banks & financial institutions
as well a phishing scams & computer ransomware.

A L
ITT
• Cyber Terrorism: Mission to penetrate & attack critical assets, and national

M
infrastructure for aims relating to political power & ‘branding’.

M AN
• Cyber Espionage: Using malware to penetrate both corporate & military data

A
N
servers in order to obtain plans and intelligence.

Y BY
• Cyber Hacktivism: Groups such as ‘Anonymous’ with political agendas that hack

RIT
sites & servers to virally communicate the ‘message’ for specific campaigns.

U
SEC
AL
• Cyber Bullying is a form of harassment or bullying inflicted through the use of

N
electronic or communication devices such as computer, mobile phone, laptop, etc.

TE R
IN
CYBER THREATS/ATTACKS

• Cyber Grooming is a practice where someone builds an emotional bond with

L
children through social media or messaging platforms with an objective of gaining
their trust for sexually abusing or exploiting them.

ITTA
AN M
• Cyber Phishing is a method of social engineering used to trick people into

M
divulging sensitive or confidential information, often via email.

Y N A
B
• Ransomware attack is a form of malware that encrypts victims’ information and

RIT Y
demands payment in return for the decryption key.

SEC U
• Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a network attack in which an unauthorized

AL
person gains access to a network and stays there undetected for a long period of

N
time.

TE R • In most cases, APTs are state sponsored which makes them extremely well

IN
financed, organised and resourced.
• 38% of Advance Persistent Threat Vectors like APT40, APT3, APT10 and APT17
have been reported to be developed and deployed by China for espionage,
stealing of data and IP.
• Pakistan too has deployed APT 36 targeting Indian entities.
CYBER ATTACK TOOLS
• Social engineering is used to deceive and manipulate victims in order to obtain
information or gain access to their computer. This is achieved by tricking users into

L
clicking malicious links or by physically gaining access to a computer through
deception.

ITTA
AN M
• Malware is a broad term used to describe any file or program that is intended to

M
harm or disrupt a computer.

N A
• Ransomware is a form of malware that encrypts victims’ information and

Y
B
demands payment in return for the decryption key.

RI Y
• Spyware is a form of malware used to illicitly monitor a user’s computer
Tactivity and harvest personal information.

SEC U • Trojan is a type of malware that disguises itself as legitimate software but

AL
performs malicious activity when executed.

N
• Virus is a piece of malicious code that is installed without the user’s

TE R knowledge. Viruses can replicate and spread to other computers by attaching

IN
themselves to other computer files.

• Formjacking is the process of inserting malicious JavaScript code into online


payment forms in order to harvest customers’ card details.
CYBER ATTACK TOOLS
• DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks attempt to disrupt normal web
traffic and take targeted websites offline by flooding systems, servers or networks

L
with more requests than they can handle, causing them to crash.

ITTA
M
• DNS (domain name system) poisoning attacks compromise DNS to redirect traffic

AN
to malicious sites. Affected sites are not ‘hacked’ themselves.

N A M
• SQL (Structured Query Language) injection occurs when an attacker inserts

BY
malicious code into a server that uses SQL. Successful SQL attacks will force a

Y
T
server to provide access to or modify data.

U RI
SEC• MITM (man-in-the-middle) attack occurs when a criminal hacker inserts

AL
themselves between a device and a server to intercept communications that can

N
then be read and/or altered.

TE R
IN
• Botnets are large networks of compromised computers, whose processing power
is used without the user’s knowledge to carry out criminal activity.
• IoT is rolling out more and more sensor-packed, internet connected devices,
but the Internet of Things remains a major weak point for defenses. These
devices lack basic security features, and can give attackers easy access. This
in turn is giving rise to botnets.
CYBER ATTACK TOOLS

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IN TE
CYBER THREATS & SECURITY EVOLUTION

A L
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A M AN
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IN TE
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF CYBERSECURITY
• Cyber and Information Security Division, MHA: This division under the MHA is
tasked with handling the matters related to cyber security and cyber-crimes.

A L
ITT
• National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) created
under Information Technology Act, 2000 in 2014. It is designated as the National

AN M
Nodal Agency in respect of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection.

N A M
• National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC) under National Security Council

BY
Secretariat (NSCS) coordinates with different agencies at the national level for

Y
cyber security matters. It is nodal agency for cyber security.

U RIT
C
• Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) is the national nodal

SE
AL
agency for responding to computer security incidents as and when they occur.

N
CERT-In functions under the aegis of MeitY.

TE R
IN
• National Technical Research Organisation reports to the Prime Minister’s Office
(PMO) and the National Security Advisor (NSA) has the same “norms of conduct”
as the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing. (The
Intelligence Organisations (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1985)
• The NTRO was created after the 1999 Kargil conflict as a dedicated technical
intelligence agency.
• It has the right to lawfully intercept and monitor communications externally.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF CYBERSECURITY

• National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) to generate necessary situational


awareness of existing and potential cyber security threats and enable timely

L
information sharing for proactive, preventive and protective actions by
individual entities.

ITTA
M
• Its mandate also includes scanning internet traffic and communication

AN
metadata coming into the country to detect real-time cyber threats.

N A M
• Defence Cyber Agency: The agency has been established to address the issues

BY
pertaining to military cyber security and cyber warfare. It is governed by the

Y
T
Defence Intelligence Agency under the MoD.

U RI
SEC
• Computer Emergency Response Team in Financial Sector (Cert-Fin) will act as

AL
an umbrella Cert for the financial sector and report to Cert-In.

N
• It is recommended to be an independent body, under Companies Act,

TE R 2013, with a governing board.

IN
• It has also been recommended that each financial-sector regulator will
have a separate entity that will provide information in real time to Cert-
Fin.
• Cert-Fin will report to the National Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection Centre (NCIIPC).
POLICY FRAMEWORK OF CYBERSECURITY
Information Technology Act, 2000

• IT Act is the primary law in India dealing with cybercrime and electronic

A L
ITT
commerce. It also defines cyber crimes and prescribes penalties for them.

to electronic records and digital signatures.


AN M
• It provides a legal framework for electronic governance by giving recognition

N A M
Y
• The Information Technology Act of India states that when a cyber crime has

IT Y B
been committed, it has a global jurisdiction and a complaint can be filed at
any cyber cell.

C U R
SE• Section 70A provides protection to Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) by

AL
prescribing punishment.

RN
IN TE • It was amended in 2008 to introduce Section 66A which penalized sending
"offensive messages and Section 69, which gave authorities the power of
"interception or monitoring or decryption of any information through any
computer resource".
POLICY FRAMEWORK OF CYBERSECURITY
National Cyber Security Policy, 2013
The objective of this policy in broad terms is to create a secure cyberspace
ecosystem and strengthen the regulatory framework.

A L
• Designation of the NCIIPC as the nodal agency to undertake measures to
secure the country’s CII.
M ITT
A M AN
• Cyber Swachhta Kendra initiative under the CERT-In to combat and analyse
any malicious infections/attacks that damage computer systems.

Y N
• Development of multilateral relationships in the area of cyber security. In

B
Y
2016, India partnered with the US for coordinating best practices in relation to

U RIT
cyber security and exchanging information in real time about malicious
cyberattacks, among other things.

SEC
• Setting up of the National Cyber Coordination Centre (“NCCC”) to create

AL
situational awareness about cyber security threats and enable timely

RN information sharing for preventive action by individual entities.

IN TE • Creating a workforce of 500,000 professionals trained in cyber security in the


next 5 years was also envisaged in the policy through skill development and
training.
• The policy planned to promote and launch a comprehensive national
awareness programme on security of cyberspace.
POLICY FRAMEWORK OF CYBERSECURITY
• The B.N. Srikrishna Committee submitted a data protection framework for
India along with a Draft Personal Data Protection Bill. Personal Data

L
Protection Bill, 2019 was introduced in Parliament. The Bill has been referred
to a Joint Parliamentary Committee for detailed examination.

ITTA
AN M
• RBI Meena Hemchandra Expert Panel on Information Technology and Cyber

M
Security: The RBI has instructed banks to mandate cyber security

N A
preparedness for addressing all cyber risks at their end as well.

Y
Y B
• National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence by Niti Aayog: NITI Aayog provided

IT
R
over 30 policy recommendations to invest in scientific research, by

SEC U
encouraging re-skilling and training, accelerating the adoption of AI across the

AL
value chain, and promoting ethics, privacy, and security in AI.

RN
IN TE
MEASURES TAKEN
• Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) is an initiative of the Ministry of
Home Affairs (MHA) to combat cyber crime in the country, in a coordinated
and effective manner. It acts as a nodal point in the fight against cybercrime.

A L
ITT
• National Cybercrime Threat Analytics Unit (TAU)
• National Cybercrime Reporting
• Platform for Joint Cybercrime Investigation Team

AN M
• National Cybercrime Forensic Laboratory (NCFL) Ecosystem

A M
• National Cybercrime Training Centre (NCTC)

N
Y
• Cybercrime Ecosystem Management Unit

Y B
• National Cyber Crime Research and Innovation Centre

IT
U R
• National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal - Facilitate reporting of all types of
C
SEcyber crime incidents with special focus on cyber crime against women and

AL
children. Automated routing to concerned State/UT for appropriate action in

RN accordance with law.

IN TE • Cyber Coordination Centre (CyCord) portal was launched in 2018 as a one-


stop platform for sharing all cyber related matters amongst Law Enforcement
Agencies (LEAs), government organizations and other stakeholders.

• Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) - Every government organisation is


headed by a CISO, who can identify and document the security requirements
that arise with each technical innovation.
MEASURES TAKEN

• Government approved a ‘Framework for enhancing security in cyberspace’


for cyber security in the Indian cyberspace, with the National Security Council

L
Secretariat as nodal agency.

ITTA
M
• Cyber Swachhta Kendra (Botnet Cleaning and Malware Analysis Centre) has

AN
been launched for providing detection of malicious programmes and free

M
tools to remove such programmes.

Y N A
B
• Cyber-Crime Prevention against Women & Children’ Scheme: Implemented

RIT Y
by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the scheme aims to prevent and reduce cyber
crimes against women and children.

SEC U
AL
• TechSagar: The National Cyber Security Coordinator’s office in partnership

N
with Data Security Council (DSCI) of India launched TechSagar –a consolidated

TE R and comprehensive repository of India’s cyber tech capabilities.

IN • Twitter Handle - "@CyberDost" - To sensitize millions of social media users


having their accounts on Twitter on prevention and protection against
cybercrimes, a Twitter handle "@CyberDost” has been created.

• Cyber Surakshit Bharat is the first public-private partnership of its kind and
will leverage the expertise of the IT industry in cybersecurity.
MEASURES TAKEN

• Cyberdome Project - It is a technological


research and development Centre of Kerala

A L
Police Department. It envisages as a high tech

ITT
public-private partnership Centre of

M
collaboration for different stakeholders in the

AN
domain of cyber security and handling of

N A M
cyber crimes, in a proactive manner.

Y BY• Formulation of Crisis Management Plan for

IT
countering cyber attacks and cyber terrorism.

C U R
E
• India has voted in favour of a cybercrime

AL S resolution ‘Countering the use of information

N
and communications technologies for

TE R criminal purposes’ to develop a UN

IN
convention on cybercrime.
LOOPHOLES
• Multiplicity of institutions - Also, highlighted by the Standing Committee on
IT. There are 36 bodies under different Union ministries. Each of these bodies

L
has its own reporting structure and response protocol on managing
cybersecurity.

ITTA
AN M
• Inadequate Legal Provisions - No changes have been made in the IT Act in
almost 9 years. In February 2020, MeitY announced that it will revamp the IT

A M
Act with a stronger focus on framework for cyber security.
N
Y BY
• Surveillance and privacy - In 2018, the MHA passed an order under the

RIT
Interception Rules which authorized 10 security and intelligence agencies to

U
C
intercept/monitor/decrypt any information transmitted, generated, received

SEor stored on any computer resource.

RN AL • Srikrishna Committee report mentioned that the review committee has

TE
a task of reviewing 15,000-18,000 interception orders in every meeting.

IN
• This unrealistic target poses a threat to safety and security of personal
data of individuals.
• The committee noted that surveillance should not be carried out without
a degree of transparency that can pass the Puttaswamy test of necessity,
proportionality and due process.
LOOPHOLES

• Absence of a Central Cyber Leadership - At present there is neither a Joint


Working Group on Cyber Security nor is the Government considering any

L
proposal regarding setting up of an autonomous body on cyber security.

ITTA
M
• Limited Cyber-Awareness - In the case of the WhatsApp breach, Cert did

AN
inform about software upgrade; it is only when the issue came to light that

M
people paid heed to their circular and advisory. COVID- 19 Pandemic theme

N A
based attacks are also increasing.

Y
T Y B
• Weak Self-Reliance - Most equipment and technology for setting up Cyber

I
C U R
Security infrastructure in India are currently procured from global sources.

E
These systems are vulnerable to cyber threats just like any other connected

AL S system.

RN
TE
• Lack of Skilled Manpower - There is a lack of skilled people in Indian military

IN
forces, central police organizations, law enforcement agencies to understand
technical aspects related to various software and hardware required in this
field. Country currently needs at least three million cybersecurity
professionals.
LOOPHOLES

• Absence of Exhaustive Legal Framework - As Cyberlaw is growing, so are the


new forms and manifestations of cyber crimes. The offences defines in the IT

L
Act are by no means exhaustive.

ITTA
M
• Shortage of cutting-edge technology-savvy professionals such as artificial

AN
intelligence, blockchain technology, machine learning, data analytics, cloud

M
computing, and the Internet of Things.

Y N A
B
• Inadequate links & collaboration among academia, industry and R&D.

RIT Y
• Use of the dark web has brought in unique challenges for law enforcement

SEC U
agencies in India owing to anonymity that it affords and has raised questions

AL
on the loopholes in the laws.

RN
TE
• Emerging disruptive and frontier technologies have opened plethora of new

IN
challenges to Indian law enforcement agencies.
WAYFORWARD

• Centralised agency to deal with all the cases of cybercrimes. Standing


committee on IT in 2014 recommended the establishment of a national

A L
protection centre to protect the cyberspace of the country. MHA should be

ITT
the nodal agency for handling cyberterrorism.

AN M
• Localisation of Servers - Government should take all steps to ensure that as

A M
far as possible, the servers should be hosted locally.

N
BY
• National Cyber Security Strategy (“NCSS”) 2020 should be soon published to

Y
IT
address the issues pertaining to cyber threats and data vulnerabilities.

U R
SEC
• PPP Model - JWG recommended putting in place a permanent mechanism for

AL
a Public Private Partnership (“PPP”) on cyber security to strengthen the

RN cybersecurity posture of the state.

IN TE • Information Security Policy and Practices - Security Audit Adhering to


international standards applicable for all govt. websites, applications before
hosting and publishing.

• State Computer Emergency Response Team - Establishment of the State CERT


to operate in conjunction ICERT and coordinate with NCIIPC
WAYFORWARD

• Capacity Building and Awareness - Cybersecurity Capacity building and


training for professional, extending ISEA program, introducing curricula
academia and organizing conferences.
A L
M ITT
• AI and machine learning can boost cyber defenses - Because the battle with

AN
cyber criminals moves so quickly, machine learning models that can predict

A M
and accurately identify attacks swiftly could be a real boon for InfoSec

N
professionals.

Y BY
U RIT
• Developing a common language As more organizations and cybersecurity
experts come together to develop a common language, our collective

SECdefenses grow stronger.

RN AL • The National Security Council and NCC should be strengthened to bring

TE
much-needed synergy between various institutions and to work a coordinated

IN approach to cybersecurity for cybersecurity.

• Central universities, private universities, industry associations, industrial


training institutes, and other educational institutions should incorporate
courses in cybersecurity.
A L
M ITT
M A N
THE PERSONAL Y N A
DATA
IT Y B
C U R
PROTECTION BILL
L SE
RN A
IN T E
INTRODUCTION

The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 is the country's first attempt to

L
protect individual rights by regulating the collection, movement and

ITTA
processing of data that is personal, or which can identify the individual.

AN M
A M
• Data is any collection of information that is stored in a way so
N
BY
computers can easily read them.
Y
U RIT
SEC
• Data can be broadly classified into two types: personal and non-

RN AL personal data.

IN TE • Data protection refers to policies and procedures seeking to


minimise intrusion into the privacy of an individual caused by
collection and usage of their personal data.
KEY DEFINITIONS

• Data principal - It is an individual whose personal data is being

L
processed.

ITTA
• Data Fiduciary - It is the entity or individual who decides the means and
purposes of data processing.
AN M
A M
• Data Processor - While the fiduciary controls how and why data is
N
BY
processed, the processing itself may be by a third party, the data
Y
U RIT
processor. This distinction is important to delineate responsibility, as

SEC
data moves from entity to entity.

RN AL • For example, in the US, Facebook (the data controller) fell into

IN TE controversy for the actions of the data processor Cambridge


Analytica.
• Data Flows - The physical attributes of data, where data is stored, where
it is sent, where it is turned into something useful are called data flows.
NEED & EVOLUTION

• In 2017, the Supreme Court held that privacy is a fundamental

L
right, flowing from the right to life and personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution.
ITTA

AN M
The Court also observed that privacy of personal data and facts

A M
is an essential aspect of the right to privacy.
N
Y BY

U RIT
In July 2017, a Committee of Experts, chaired by Justice B. N.

SEC Srikrishna was set up to examine various issues related to data

RN AL protection in India.

IN TE • PDP Bill is based on the recommendations of the report of the


Expert Committee and the suggestions received from various
stakeholders.
NEED & EVOLUTION

• Future’s economy and law enforcement will be predicated on the

L
regulation of data.

ITTA
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) is the extensive process

AN M
that Indian authorities have to follow in order to receive

A M
information for law enforcement purposes.
N
Y BY

U RIT
Address the issues of National or Data sovereignty. The size of data in

SEC 2022 is to be about 40 times more than that of 2020.

RN AL
IN TE • EU has also come out with General Data Protection Regulation
(EU GDPR) in 2018.
EXISTING FRAMEWORK

• Currently, the usage and transfer of personal data of citizens is regulated

L
by the Information Technology (IT) Rules, 2011, under the IT Act, 2000.

ITTA
AN M
• The rules hold the companies using the data liable for compensating the

A M
individual, in case of any negligence in maintaining security standards
N
BY
while dealing with the data.
Y
U RIT
SEC ISSUES IN EXISTING POLICY

RN AL • Definition of sensitive personal data under the rules is narrow

IN TE • Some of the provisions can be overridden by a contract.

• IT Act applies only to companies, not to the government.


FUNCTIONS OF PDP BILL

• The Bill regulates personal data related to individuals, and the

L
processing, collection and storage of such data.

ITTA
AN M
• The Bill governs the processing of personal data by both the government

A M
and companies incorporated in India.
N
Y BY
U RIT
• The Bill also governs foreign companies, if they deal with personal data

SEC of individuals in India.

RN AL
IN TE
KEY PROVISIONS

• Personal data pertains to characteristics, traits or attributes of identity,

L
which can be used to identify an individual. PDP Bill trifurcates personal
data.
ITTA
AN M
A M
• All personal data — Data from which an individual can be identified.
N
BY
• The draft had said all fiduciaries must store a copy of all
Y
U RIT personal data in India.

SEC • The PDP Bill removes this stipulation, only requiring individual

RN AL consent for data transfer abroad.

IN TE
KEY PROVISIONS

• Sensitive personal data (SPD), which the Bill defines as financial,

L
health, sexual orientation, biometric, genetic, transgender status,
caste, religious belief, and more.
ITTA
AN M
• It is to be stored only in India. It can be processed abroad only

A M
under certain conditions including approval of a Data Protection
N
BY
Agency (DPA).
Y
U RIT
SEC
• Critical personal data - The government at any time can deem

RN AL something critical, and has given examples as military or national

IN TE security data.
• It must be stored and processed in India.
KEY PROVISIONS

• Non-personal data includes aggregated data through which individuals

L
cannot be identified.

ITT
PDP Bill mandates fiduciaries to give the government any non- A
personal data when demanded.
AN M
N A M

BY
Rights of Data Principal
Y
U

RIT
To seek confirmation on whether their personal data has been

SEC processed, seeking correction, completion or erasure of their data.

RN AL • To seek transfer of data to other fiduciaries, and restricting

IN TE continuing disclosure of their personal data, if it is no longer


necessary or if consent is withdrawn.
• Any processing of personal data can be done only on the basis of
consent given by the data principal.
KEY PROVISIONS

• Obligations of Data Fiduciaries

A L
ITT
• Processing should be subject to certain purpose, collection and
M
A M AN
storage limitations. For instance, personal data can be

BY N
processed only for specific, clear and lawful purposes.

RIT Y
SEC U
• All data fiduciaries must undertake certain transparency and

AL
accountability measures such as implementing security

RN
TE
safeguards and instituting grievance redressal mechanisms to

IN address complaints of individuals.


KEY PROVISIONS

• Certain fiduciaries would be notified as significant data fiduciaries

L
(social media intermediaries).

ITTA
AN M
• They must undertake additional accountability measures

N A M
such as conducting a data protection impact assessment.

Y BY
U RIT • To develop their own user verification mechanism. It will

SEC
AL
decrease the anonymity of users and “prevent trolling”.

RN
IN TE
KEY PROVISIONS
• Risk of non-compliance with PDPB: There are two tier of penalties and
compensations:

A L
M ITT
AN
• Failure of the data fiduciary to fulfil its obligations for data protection

A M
may be punishable with a penalty which may extent to Rs.5 crores or 2%
N
BY
of its total worldwide turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is
Y
RI
higher.
U T
SEC
RN AL• Processing data in violation of the provisions of the PDPB is punishable

IN TE with a fine of Rs.15 crores or 4% of the annual turnover of the data


fiduciary, whichever is higher.
KEY PROVISIONS
• Data Protection Authority - It will be composed of members with expertise
in fields such as data protection and information technology.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Any individual, who is not satisfied with the grievance redressal by the

A M
data fiduciary can file a complaint to the Authority.
N

BY
Orders of the Authority can be appealed to an Appellate Tribunal.
Y

U RIT
Appeals from the Tribunal will go to the Supreme Court.

SEC
RN AL• It will oversee assessments and audits and definition making. Each company

IN TE will have a Data Protection Officer (DPO) who will liaison with the DPA for
auditing, grievance redressal, recording maintenance and more.
KEY PROVISIONS
• Exemptions

A L
ITT
• Central government can exempt any of its agencies in the interest of

AN M
security of state, public order, sovereignty and integrity of India, and

A M
friendly relations with foreign states.
N
Y BY
RIT
• Processing of personal data is also exempted from provisions of the Bill
U
SEC for certain other purposes such as prevention, investigation, or

RN AL prosecution of any offence, or research and journalistic purposes.

IN TE • Personal data of individuals can be processed without their consent in


certain circumstances such as, if required by the State for providing benefits
to the individual, legal proceedings, & to respond to a medical emergency.
LIMITATIONS
• Data localization

A L
ITT
• Even if the data is stored in the country, the encryption keys may still be
out of reach of national agencies.
AN M
N A M
BY
• Domino effect of protectionist policy will lead to other countries following
Y
U RIT
suit.

SEC
RN AL • It may backfire on India’s own young startups that are attempting global

IN TE growth, or on larger firms that process foreign data in India, such as Tata
Consulting Services and Wipro.
LIMITATIONS
• Processing of personal data in the interests of the security of the state - It is a
potential introduction of an “Orwellian State” and also a ‘Surveillance State’.

A L
ITT
• Just like, there is a doctrine of a reasonable restriction on fundamental

AN M
rights, there shall be a reasonable restriction on the powers of authority

A M
to work under such exemptions.
N
Y BY

RIT
Regulatory structure not sufficiently independent -
U
SEC • Central government will have power to appoint members of the data

RN AL protection authority and will also be able to remove members of the

IN TE authority for reasons specified in the law.


• The bill does contain a two-year cooling off period. But India has such a
small pool of experts that fit recruitment eligibility descriptions.
• That conflict of interests will likely be established between the regulator
and data fiduciaries being regulated.
WAYFORWARD
• The committee’s draft had recommendations that need to be incorporated;
• Significant keywords that are expected to be in the Bill. “Purpose

A L
ITT
limitation” and “Collection limitation” limit the collection of data to what

AN M
is needed for “clear, specific, and lawful” purposes or for reasons that the

A M
data principal would “reasonably expect”.
N
Y BY
RIT
• Certain Rights granted to the individuals including the right to data
U
SEC portability and the right to be forgotten (allows an individual to remove

RN AL consent for data collection and disclosure) .

IN TE • It stipulated that data access exceptions be authorised by a separate law


and data be collected only if it is “necessary for, and proportionate to”
the government’s interests.
WAYFORWARD
• A more principle-based holistic approach may thus be needed with regard to
personal and non-personal data, because of the difficulties in distinguishing

A L
ITT
between the two.

AN M
A M
• It is important to not only provide robust checks and balances for accessing
N
BY
the data, but also for lawmakers and citizens to know the principles behind
Y
RIT
them while formulating the law.
U
SEC
RN AL• Data protection regulation is at a nascent stage around the world. Just as India

IN TE is seen as a global leader in the design of its “digital infrastructure”, it has an


opportunity to be a global leader in data protection, especially for developing
countries facing similar challenges and opportunities. To make this happen,
the DPA must prove itself able to safeguard the consumer while also creating
space for Start Up India to thrive.
A L
ROLE OF MEDIA AND SOCIAL M ITT
M A N
NETWORKING SITES
Y N A IN
INTERNALIT Y B
SECURITY
C U R
A SE
L CHALLENGES
T E RN
IN
INTRODUCTION
• According to World Bank, 41% of India’s population is online, and it’s one
of the world’s largest social media markets. Due to developing

A L
ITT
infrastructure, many rural areas are about to go digital.

AN M
M
• India has more Facebook users than any other country. YouTube’s Indian

N A
audience has grown 85% in 2019 and WhatsApp reached 400 million users.

Y
Y B
The subcontinent is now the largest market for all three networks.

IT
C U R
SE
• The average Indian online user’s monthly data usage is 8 GB.

RN AL
IN TE • The report, by Microsoft, found 64 per cent of Indians had encountered
fake news, compared to the global average of 57 per cent.

• India at UN; Increased presence of people online and on social media has
been targeted by terrorists.
ROLE OF MEDIA & SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES (COMMON)

News stories FAKE NEWS DEEPFAKES HATE NEWS


that are false, News

A L
ITT
fabricated, Xenophobia that attacks or
uses
M
with
Communal Tensions (Riots)

AN
no verifiable pejorative or

M
facts, sources Regional Tensions (Mass exodus) discriminatory
or quotes.
Y N A
Fragmentation of Society language

IT Y B
Adverse Influence on Mob & its Behaviour

C U R
E
Mob Disruptions

AL S Mob Violence

RN
TE
Mob Lynching

IN Adverse Influence on Individual & their


Behaviour
Lone Wolf Terror Attacks
Increased Violence & Aggression
ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES IN INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

• Social Engineering & Cyber Phishing (Financial frauds)

L
• Cyber Bullying & Cyber Grooming (Bois Locker Room Scandal)
• Cyber Espionage (Pegasus)
ITTA

AN M
Cyber Terrorism (Branding, Incitement, Radicalisation Recruitment,

A M
Training, Finances, Planning, Execution)
N

BY
Spread of Extremism & its Ideology (LWE, Militancy, Insurgency)
Y
U

RITDeep Fakes

SEC
RN AL
IN TE
REASONS

MEDIA & INTERMEDIARIES SPECIFIC

L
• Deteriorating media ethics and their professional conduct.
• Social Media intermediaries remain to be non-cooperative and
ITTA
AN M
reluctant in introducing filters, third party fact checkers , strict

A M
actions & AI technology.
N
Y BY
U RIT
USER SPECIFIC

SEC Users are unaware of the importance they should give to the

AL

RN disclosure of their personal information.

IN TE • Users do not know about privacy settings required to manage


those threats.
• Online literacy remains to be elusive among online users.
REASONS
STATE SPECIFIC
• Lack of understanding by policy makers in addressing issues

A L
ITT
• Inadequate investment in technology by organizations to deal with
cyber-threats.

AN M

N A M
Implementation issues like negligible conversion of complaints on

Y BY
NCCRP into FIRs.

U RIT
More emphasis being laid on response rather on predictive &

SEC preventive technologies.

RN AL
IN TE OTHERS
• Anonymity issue encourages impunity and reduces deterrence effect.
• Owing to the technological complexity associated with cybercrimes,
evidence collection and investigation are very complex.
• Increased use of dark web
MEASURES
Draft Information Technology [Intermediaries Guidelines (Amendment) Rules] 2018
• The Rules require each intermediary to publish terms of use to prohibit the user

A L
ITT
from hosting certain content, including content that is grossly harmful or obscene.

AN M
Any intermediary must, on receipt of a court order or on being notified by the

A M
government, remove access to unlawful content.

N

BY
Intermediaries must, within 72 hours, provide assistance to any government agency.

Y

RIT
They must enable tracing of the originator of the information on their platform.

U

SEC
Intermediaries must deploy technology-based automated tools to identify and

RN ALremove public access to unlawful information.

IN TE • Intermediaries with more than fifty lakh users must incorporate a company in
India.
MEASURES
• Cyberdome Project
• Cyber Crime Prevention against Women and Children (CCPWC)

A L
ITT
• Twitter handle @Cyberdost
• National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCCRP)

AN M
M
• ‘Social Media Lab’ of Mumbai police to monitor the happenings on

Y N A
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.

IT Y B
BIG FM has launched the campaign ‘Dilli Ke Dhaakad... Kehte Hai...Online

C U R
E
Reh Par Fine Reh’, in partnership with the Delhi Police to raise awareness on

AL S how to stay cautious and safe online.

RN
TE
• Telangana police have launched CybHer to spread awareness about cyber

IN grooming and teach girls a trick or two to combat such attacks.


• "KID GLOVE" - A Kerala Police initiative to create Cyber Security awareness
among Children, Teachers & Parents.
• cOcOn to discuss, showcase and spread awareness on the hi-tech crimes.
WAYFORWARD
• Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (PDP) enactment is essential, as
it will require social media platforms to tighten their protection

A L
ITT
policies.

AN M

A M
Deterrence effect needs to be ensured through efficient

N
BY
investigations & prosecutions.

Y
U RIT
S

EC Media should be made more accountable through meaningful but

RN AL flexible regulations by revisiting self regulatory structure, media

IN TE ethics & TRP rationalisation.

• There is need to have an independent association and a law to


check the spread of fake/hate news along with an Independent
Regulatory Body for Social Media related regulations.
WAYFORWARD
• Capacity building of Cyber Agencies in India especially state cyber
cells is an immediate requirement.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Social media analysis generated intelligence should be prioritised

A M
as predictive tools for Indian Cyber Agencies.

N
Y BY

RIT
Voluntary measures like Global Internet Forum to Counter

U
SEC Terrorism (GIFCT) must showcase proactive participation and

RN AL accountability of SMI.

IN TE • International convergences like ‘Christchurch Call Initiative’ should


further be attempted to bring all stakeholders together for a
collective action.
WAYFORWARD

• European Union proposed a plan where social media platforms would be

L
required to file monthly reports on their efforts towards combating fake
news.
ITTA
AN M

N A M
In 2018, Singapore proposed stringent regulation to combat fake news and

Y
advertising on social media and internet. The new law would bring in

IT Y B
greater transparency and accountability in the flow of content

C U R
SE
RN AL
IN TE
A L
M ITT
M A N
MONEY LAUNDERING Y N A &
IT Y B
IT’S
C R
PREVENTION
U
L S E
RN A
IN T E
MONEY LAUNDERING
FATF - Money laundering is the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise
their illegal origin. It enables the criminal to enjoy these profits without
jeopardising their source.
A L
M ITT
AN
PMLA - ‘Money laundering' is a criminal offence and extends to any property

A M
derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal

N
BY
activity relating to a scheduled offence.

Y
U RIT
SECMoney laundering is the illegal process of making large amounts of money

AL
generated by a criminal activity, such as drug trafficking or terrorist funding,

RN
TE
appear to have come from a legitimate source. The money from the criminal

IN activity is considered dirty, and the process "launders" it to make it look clean.

According to UNODC, the estimated amount of money laundered globally in


one year is 2 - 5% of global GDP, or $800 billion - $2 trillion in current US
dollars.
BLACK MONEY
Black Money - Black money is a term used in common parlance to refer to
money that is not fully legitimate in the hands of the owner. This could be for

A L
ITT
two possible reasons.

AN M
• The first is that the money may have been generated through illegitimate
activities not permissible under the law, like crime, drug trade, terrorism,

N A M
and corruption, all of which are punishable under the legal framework of

Y B
the state.Y
U RIT
• The second and perhaps more likely reason is that the wealth may have

SECbeen generated and accumulated by failing to pay the dues to the public

RN AL exchequer in one form or another.

IN TE According to the Standing Committee’s report, the sectors that see the highest
incidence of black money include real estate, mining, pharmaceuticals, pan
masala, the gutkha and tobacco industry, bullion and commodity markets,
the film industry, and educational institutes.
HAWALA TRANSACTIONS
Hawala is an informal method of
transferring money without any physical

A L
ITT
money actually moving. Interpol's

M
definition of hawala is "money transfer

AN
M
without money movement."

Y N A
IT Y B Hawala is used today as an

C U R alternative remittance channel that

SE exists outside of traditional banking

RN AL systems. Transactions between hawala

IN TE brokers are made without promissory


notes because the system is heavily
based on trust and the balancing of
hawala brokers' books.
PROCESS OF MONEY LAUNDERING
Placement - launderer introduces illegal profits into the financial system. This
might be done by breaking up large amounts of cash into less conspicuous

A L
ITT
smaller sums that are then deposited directly into a bank account, or by

M
purchasing a series of monetary instruments (cheques, money orders, etc.)

AN
M
that are then collected and deposited into accounts at another location.

Y N A
Y B
Layering - launderer engages in a series of conversions or movements of the

IT
C U R
funds to distance them from their source. The funds might be channelled

SE through the purchase and sales of investment instruments, or the launderer

RN AL might simply wire the funds through a series of accounts at various banks

IN TE across the globe.

Integration – funds re-enter the legitimate economy. The launderer might


choose to invest the funds into real estate, luxury assets, or business ventures.
PROCESS OF MONEY LAUNDERING

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
IMPACT OF MONEY LAUNDERING

SECURITY ECONOMY SOCIETY

A L
ITT
Fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, Inexplicable changes in money demand Damages the integrity of the
illegal arms dealers, and others to Prudential risks to bank soundness

AN M
entire society

M
operate and expand their criminal Contamination effects on legal financial

A
Undermines democracy and the
enterprises
Y N
transactions

B
rule of the law

RIT Y
Increased volatility of international

SEC U capital flows and exchange rates

AL
Rewards corruption and crime

RN
IN TE
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Enforcement Directorate
Enforcement Directorate
• The ED was established in 1956 to administer the provisions of the Foreign

A L
ITT
Exchange Regulation Act 1973 (FERA). However, FERA was repealed and

M
replaced with the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (FEMA) which

AN
M
came into force with effect from 1 June 2000.

N A
• The ED has a pan-Indian character with field offices spread over various
Y
IT Y B
states and regions.

C U R
• It enforces the provisions of FEMA, aimed at promoting the development

SE
AL
and maintenance of India's foreign exchange market and providing for

RN action against persons/entities involved in international hawala

IN TE transactions.
• ED also administers the PMLA. It has been entrusted with the investigation
and prosecution of money-laundering offences and
attachment/confiscation of the proceeds of crime under the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act 2002 (PMLA).
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Financial Intelligence Unit

A L
ITT
• The FIU-IND was established in 2004 for coordinating and strengthening

AN M
efforts for national and international intelligence by investigation and
enforcement agencies in combating money laundering and terrorist

N
financing.
A M
Y BY
U RIT
• FIU-IND is the national agency responsible for receiving, processing,

SEC analysing, and disseminating information relating to suspect financial

RN AL transactions.

IN TE • It is an independent body reporting to the Economic Intelligence Council


headed by the Finance Minister. For administrative purposes, the FIU-IND is
under the control of the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance.
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Economic Intelligence Council (EIC)

A L
ITT
• It came into existence in 2003, and is chaired by the Finance Minister and

AN M
comprises senior functionaries of various ministries and intelligence
agencies, including the Governor of the RBI and the Chairman of SEBI.

N A M
Y BY
• The EIC meets at least once a year to discuss and take decisions regarding

U RIT
trends in economic offences and strategies on intelligence sharing,

SEC coordination, etc.

RN AL
IN TE • The implementation of decisions taken by the EIC is monitored by the
Working Group on Intelligence Apparatus, set up for this purpose within
the EIC.
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Central Board of Excise and Customs

A L
ITT
• CBEC is a part of the Department of Revenue under the Ministry of
Finance, Government of India.

AN M
N A M
• It deals with the tasks of formulation of policy concerning levy and

Y BY
collection of customs and central excise duties, prevention of smuggling,

U RIT
and administration of matters relating to customs, central excise and

SEC narcotics to the extent under the CBEC's purview.

RN AL
IN TE • The Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence (DGCEI) is the apex
intelligence organization functioning under the CBEC. It is entrusted with
the responsibility of detecting cases of evasion of central excise and service
tax.
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI)

A L
ITT
• Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) also functions under the CBEC.

AN M
• It is entrusted with the responsibility of collection of data and information

N A M
and its analysis, collation, interpretation and dissemination on matters

Y BY
relating to violations of customs laws and, to a lesser extent, anti-narcotics

U RIT
law.

SEC
RN AL • It maintains close liaison with the World Customs Organisation, Brussels,

IN TE the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office at Tokyo, INTERPOL, and foreign


customs administrations.
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Central Economic Intelligence Bureau

A L
ITT
• The CEIB functioning under the Ministry of Finance is responsible for

AN M
coordination, intelligence sharing, and investigations at national as well as
regional levels amongst various law enforcement agencies.

N A M
Y BY
• It has been assigned the responsibility of acting as the 'think tank' on issues

U RIT
relating to economic offences.

SEC
RN AL • It coordinates with the National Security Council Secretariat on matters

IN TE having a bearing on national and economic security.

• CEIB maintains constant interaction with its Customs Overseas Investigation


Network (COIN) offices to share intelligence and information on suspected
import / export transactions.
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Narcotics Control Bureau
• NCB functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs, established in 1986.

A L
M ITT
• Its functions include coordination of actions by various offices, state

A M AN
governments, and other authorities under the Narcotics Drugs and

BY N
Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act 1985, Customs Act, Drugs and

Y
Cosmetics Act.

U RIT
SEC• It is assigned the task of counter measures against illicit drugs traffic under

RN AL the various international conventions and protocols.

IN TE • The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) monitors India's implementation of


the United Nations Drug Control Conventions and also interacts with the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) in Vienna and the competent
authorities of other countries.
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

• Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee on Combating Financing of

L
Terrorism and Prevention of Money Laundering (IMCC) has been set up in

ITTA
2002 to ensure effective coordination between all competent authorities

AN M
and strengthen India's national capacity for implementing AML/CFT
measures.

N A M
Y BY
IT
• National Investigation Agency (NIA) is a specialised and dedicated

U R
SEC investigating agency set up under the National Investigation Agency Act to

AL
investigate and prosecute scheduled offences, in particular offences under

RN
TE
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, including Financing of Terrorism.

IN
PREVENTION – INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

CBI and Police Authorities

L
• CBI, functioning under the Department of Personnel, Ministry of Personnel,
Pension and Public Grievances, Government of India, is the premier
ITTA
investigating police agency in India.

AN M
A M
• It handles a broad category of criminal cases including cases of corruption

N
BY
and fraud committed by public servants, economic crimes, and other

Y
U IT
specific crimes involving terrorism, bomb blasts, sensational homicides,

R
SEC kidnappings and the underworld.

AL
• The CBI plays an important role in international cooperation relating to

RN
TE
mutual legal assistance and extradition matters.

IN • State Police Agencies: Under the Constitution of India, police and public
order are state (provincial) subjects. Every State/Union Territory has its own
police force, which performs not only normal policing duties but also has
specialised units to combat economic offences.
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002
• Objective - It is an act to prevent money-laundering and to provide for

A L
ITT
confiscation of property derived from, or involved in, money-laundering

M
and to punish those who commit the offence of money laundering.

AN
N A M
• Party - Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly

Y BY
assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or

U RIT
activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment,

SEC possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted

RN AL property shall be guilty of offence of money laundering (Section 3).

IN TE • Proceeds of crime means any property derived or obtained, directly or


indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a
scheduled offence. The offences listed in the Schedule to the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 are scheduled offences.
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
• Scheduled Offence is called Predicate Offence and the occurrence of the
same is a prerequisite for initiating investigation into the offence of money

A L
ITT
laundering.

AN M
• Predicate Offences are investigated by agencies such as Police,
Customs, SEBI, NCB and CBI, etc. under their respective Acts.

N A M
Y BY
• Investigation - As per Sections 48 & 49 of the PMLA, the officers of the

U RIT
Directorate of Enforcement have been given powers to investigate cases of

SEC Money Laundering.

RN AL
IN TE • Powers - Attachment of property under Section 5, seizure/ freezing of
property and records under Section 17 or Section 18.
• Persons found guilty of an offence of Money Laundering are
punishable with imprisonment and shall also be liable to fine.
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
• Special Courts - Scheduled offences and the offence of money laundering
are proposed to be tried together by a special court constituted by the PML

A L
ITT
Act, having jurisdiction over the area in which the offence has been
committed.

AN M
N A M
• Presumption of Guilt - In the case of a person charged with the offence of

Y BY
money-laundering under section 3, the Authority or Court shall, unless the

U RIT
contrary is proved, presume that such proceeds of crime are involved in

SEC money-laundering.

RN AL
IN TE
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
KEY MODIFICATIONS IN PMLA THROUGH 2019 AMENDMENT ACT

A L
ITT
• Broadening the existing powers of the ED under the PMLA provisions,

an arrest.
AN M
there is no pre-condition to seek warrants from the Court for making

N A M
Y BY
• Expanding the ambit of the "proceeds of crime". The scope now

U RIT includes properties and assets created, derived, or obtained through

SEC any criminal activity related to the scheduled offence, even if it is not

RN AL under the PMLA.

IN TE • Making the offence of money laundering a continuous offence. A


person shall now be considered guilty of the offence of money
laundering for as long as the said person is enjoying the "proceeds of
crime".
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
• Exclude the period of stay granted by a Court from the 180-day limit
for the validity of provisional attachment orders and also to provide a

A L
ITT
further period of not more than 30 days to take care of delays in
communication of judicial orders.

AN M
N A M
• Give 90 more days to the ED to file charge sheets, after confirmation

Y BY
of attachment orders by the adjudicating authority. The existing

U RIT provision does not allow even a single day after the orders are

SEC confirmed.

RN AL
IN TE • Empowering the Special Court to restore confiscated assets to the
rightful claimants even during the trial.
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
• Introducing greater and more nuanced reporting obligations for the
reporting entities, who will now have to do a detailed authentication

A L
ITT
with regard to transactions

AN M
• Making it mandatory for the ED to share relevant details with other

N A M
agencies in order to ensure effective information sharing in

Y BY
compliance with the Financial Action Task Force ("FATF")

U RIT Recommendations.

SEC
RN AL
IN TE
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The Conservation Of Foreign Exchange And Prevention Of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA)

A L
M ITT
• An Act to provide for preventive detention in certain cases for the

A M AN
purposes of conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange and

BY N
prevention of smuggling activities and for matters connected

Y
therewith.

U RIT
SEC The Smugglers And Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of

RN AL property Act 1976), Act

IN TE • To provide for the forfeiture of illegally acquired properties of


smugglers and foreign exchange manipulators and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

A L
ITT
• An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to

AN M
make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of
operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

N A M
Y BY
• To provide forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic

U RIT in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

SEC
RN AL
IN TE
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016
• Benami transaction is any transaction which is made in the name of one person

A L
ITT
which can be fictitious or who may be not aware of this transaction and the

property.
AN M
consideration is paid by the other person who is the real beneficiary of the

N A M
Y BY
• The main purpose behind this act is to nab those people with undisclosed

U RIT
income by prohibiting the benami transactions and to prevent tax evasion in

SEC
the country.

RN AL
IN TE • Under section 53(2), Whoever is found guilty of the offence of benami
transaction shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to seven years and shall
also be liable to fine which may extend to twenty-five per cent. of the fair market
value of the property.
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of
Tax Act, 2015

A L
ITT
The Government enacted a comprehensive and a more stringent new law, It

AN M
has included the offence of willful attempt to evade tax etc. in relation to
undisclosed foreign income/assets as a Scheduled Offence under the

N A M
Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA).

Y BY
U RIT
DTAA, TIEAs, MAC & AEOI

SEC • The Government of India has entered into Double Taxation Avoidance

RN AL Agreements (DTAAs), Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) and

IN TE Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax


Matters (MAC) with over 130 countries including tax havens.
• These agreements allow exchange of information between countries for
tax purposes including information pertaining to money laundering and
funding.
PREVENTION – LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

• India has been a leading force in the efforts to forge a multi-lateral regime

A L
ITT
for proactive sharing of Financial Information known as Automatic

M
Exchange of Information (AEOI) which will greatly assist the global efforts
to combat tax evasion.

A M AN
BY N
• The AEOI based on Common Reporting Standard (CRS) has

RIT Y commenced from 2017 enabling India to receive financial account

SEC U information of Indian residents in other countries.

RN AL
IN TE • India has also entered into an information sharing agreement with the
USA under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) of USA.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Financial Action Task Force
• FATF on Money Laundering was established by the G-7 Summit in Paris in

A L
ITT
1989 to develop a coordinated international response.

M
• One of the first tasks of the FATF was to develop Recommendations, which

AN
M
set out the measures that national governments should take to implement

N A
effective anti-money laundering programmes.

Y
IT Y B
C U R
United Nations Convention Against Corruption

SE
RN AL • It has mechanisms for freezing, seizure, and confiscation of the proceeds

IN TE of crime and cooperate in criminal matters by extradition and mutual legal


assistance.
• It can help prevent perpetrators of corruption from illegally transferring
their wealth abroad and will be an important tool for tackling this menace.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

A L
ITT
• To take measures against smuggling of migrants by land, sea, and air as

M
well as manufacturing and trafficking of firearms and ammunition.

AN
N A M
• It helps India get international cooperation under a wide range of mutual

Y BY
legal assistance clauses, even with countries with which it has no mutual

U RIT
legal assistance treaties.

SEC
RN AL
IN TE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances

A L
M
• To promote cooperation among the parties in narcotic drugs and ITT
M AN
psychotropic substances having an international dimension.

A
BY N
• It calls for criminalisation of money laundering, the freezing, seizure and

RIT Y
confiscation of the proceeds of crime, and international cooperation.

SEC UInternational Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the

RN AL Prevention and Repression of Customs Offences (Nairobi Convention)

IN TE • Indian Customs is represented in matters relating to international


cooperation in enforcement by the Department of Revenue Intelligence.
• This arrangement helps in dealing with customs offences which can have
direct linkages with the generation of black money.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

A L
ITT
• It requires each state party to take appropriate measures, in accordance

M
with its domestic legal principles, for the detection and freezing, seizure,

AN
M
or forfeiture of any funds.

Y N A
Y B
• The offences referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable

IT
C U R offences between state parties under existing extradition treaties and

SE under the Convention itself.

RN AL
IN TE Egmont Group
• It is a group of FIUs for international cooperation and free exchange of
information.

• FIU-IND was admitted as a member of the group in 2007.


WAYFORWARD
• Creating Public Awareness and Public Support
• Need to Fine-tune Relevant Laws and Regulations

A L
ITT
• Enhancing the Accountability of Auditors

AN
• Protection to Whistleblowers and Witnesses
M
A M
• Limit the scope of the right to financial privacy
N
BY
• Integrate frontier technologies with the financial system and
Y
RIT
the law enforcement agencies
U
SEC
• Strengthen ‘Prevention’ component of money laundering

RN AL strategy

IN TE • Upgradation of IT capability and networking


• Provide effective deterrence against habitual tax evasion &
money launderers.
• Need to Join International Efforts and Use International
Platforms
WAYFORWARD
• India must enact strict compliance programs for the financial industry that
make it more difficult to launder money.

A L
M ITT
• The placement stage of the money laundering process is the most vulnerable

M AN
to detection. Improve capabilities of bank employees through effective training

A
BY N
programmes to identify the characteristics of money laundering transactions.

RIT Y
U
• Money laundering requires meaningful engagements & cooperation for global

SEC
convergence.

RN AL • Disrupt financial networks

IN TE • Effective Curbing of Structuring through Tax Havens


• Technological deployment to trace proceeds of crime
• International Taxation and Transfer Pricing
• Single set of high quality, global accounting standards
• Agreement between Countries for Revenue Sharing
A L
M ITT
LINKAGES OF A AN
M
BY N
ORGANISED
RIT Y CRIME
EC
WITH
S U TERRORISM
N A L
TE R
IN
DEFINITION

According to UNODC Organized crime is a continuing criminal

A L
ITT
enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that

activities for criminal purposes.


AN M
are often in great public demand. They seek to exploit legitimate

N A M
Y BY
Its continuing existence is maintained through corruption of public

U RIT
officials and the use of intimidation, threats or force to protect its

SEC operations.

RN AL
IN TE The most obvious distinction between organized crime and other
forms of criminal conduct is that it is "organized." In general terms,
it does not include random, unplanned, individual criminal acts.
TYPES
Crimes such as drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, money
laundering, firearms trafficking, illegal gambling, extortion, counterfeit goods,

A L
ITT
wildlife and cultural property smuggling, and cyber crime are keystones within
TOC enterprises.

AN M
N A M
• Trafficking in cultural property is becoming an important source for the

Y BY
T
laundering of the proceeds of crime, and has been recently identified as a

U RI
possible source of financing for terrorist groups.

SEC
RN AL • Organ Trafficking - Desperate situations of both recipients and donors

IN TE create an avenue ready for exploitation. Also, organized crime syndicates


are involved in trafficking people for the purpose of organ removal and the
organs themselves.
TYPES
• Wildlife and forest crime refers to the taking, trading (supplying, selling
or trafficking), importing, exporting, processing, possessing, obtaining

A L
ITT
and consumption of wild fauna and flora, including timber and other

M
forest products, in contravention of national or international law.

AN
M
• It is particularly acute in developing countries as under-resourced

N A
Governments often lack the capacity to regulate the exploitation of
Y
IT Y B
their natural assets.

C U R
SE
AL
• Identity-related information about individuals is used e.g. for banking,

RN shopping, travelling and collecting social assistance. Increasingly, such

IN TE information also includes biometric information.


• It can be abused to launder money, to commit fraud and to enable
illicit activities for organized crime purposes, including acts of
corruption, human trafficking, migrant smuggling and even
terrorism.
CHALLENGES

• They have become more complex, creative, transnational and


diversified.

A L
ITT
• They are interconnected and global

AN M
• They take place on both physical and virtual levels

A M
• Traditional, territorial-based criminal groups have been partially
N
BY
replaced by smaller and more flexible networks.
Y
RIT
• People can fall victim to organized crime in an increasing number
U
SECof ways, in an increasing number of places.

RN AL • Emerging Crimes - The United Nations Convention on

IN TE Transnational Organized Crime identified cybercrime, identity-


related crimes, trafficking in cultural property, environmental
crime, piracy, organ trafficking, and fraudulent medicine as new
and emerging crimes of concern.
WAYFORWARD
• Identification of criminal networks - Identify major
figures engaged in serious transnational crime, the

A L
ITT
associated criminal networks and their key activities.

M
• Illegal trafficking and illicit markets - Combat the criminal

AN
M
networks involved in all forms of illegal trafficking and

N A
identify and address new trends and illicit markets.
Y
IT Y B
• Enabling crimes and criminal convergence - Identify links

C U R between seemingly unrelated types of crimes and how

SE
AL
one crime can be used to support another, and assist

RN police in preventing such enabling crimes from leading to

IN TE greater criminal activity.


• Illicit flows of money and assets - Disrupt the profits of
organized criminal networks by tracing and preventing the
movement of criminal assets, as well as freezing and
confiscating them.
LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM & ORGANIZED CRIME
Terrorism is another form of "organized" criminal behaviour, but it is distinct
from organized crime. In general terms, terrorism involves crimes committed

A L
ITT
with the objective of achieving political or social objectives.

AN M
M
Organized crime, on the other hand, always seeks to obtain a financial or other

N A
material benefit, whereas power and control can be secondary motives.
Y
T Y B
Organized crime can involve violence and coercion, but the objective in

I
C U R
organized crime remains profit.

SE
RN AL The differences between them rest on means and ends. Terrorism is driven

IN TE purely by political objectives conversely, economic objectives are the


operational determinants of organized crime. In most developed countries,
organized crime thrives with little or no terrorist activities, and in most
developing countries, terrorism exists along with varying levels of organized
criminal activity.
LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM & ORGANIZED CRIME
• Organized criminal groups, may adopt terrorist tactics of indiscriminate
violence and large-scale public intimidation to further criminal

A L
ITT
objectives or fulfil special operational aims.

AN M
M
• Organized criminal groups and terrorist organizations may build alliances

N A
with each other. The nature of these alliances varies broadly and can
Y
IT Y B
include one-off, short-term, and long-term relationships.

C U R
SE
AL
• With time, criminal and terrorist groups may develop a capacity to

RN engage in both criminal and terrorist activities, thus forming entities

IN TE that display the characteristics of both groups.

These linkages are complex, fluid and continually evolving.


LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM & ORGANIZED CRIME

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM & ORGANIZED CRIME
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
UNODC 2017, figures point to the fact that the annual value of the trade in

A L
ITT
illicit drugs is estimated to be between $426 and $652 billion.

M
• UNODC, 2018 reports estimate that approximately 86% of the world's

AN
M
opium cultivation takes place in Afghanistan and that a very large part

N A
of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is in regions now under the
Y
IT Y B
control of the Taliban.

C U R
• The Taliban's association with the opium economy indicates a

SE
AL
correlation between the trade in illicit drugs as a criminal activity and

RN terrorism.

IN TE • In 2017, Boko Haram was reported to be facilitating heroin and cocaine


smuggling across West Africa.
• AQIM is involved in drug trafficking and profiting from taxing organized
criminal groups trafficking drugs from South America to Europe across
territory it controls in Sahel region.
LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM & ORGANIZED CRIME
Terrorism and Trafficking in Weapons

A L
ITT
• Terrorists are increasingly using automatic weapons to perpetrate

M
attacks and there is a growing concern that organized criminal groups

AN
M
are supplying terrorists with weapons

Y N A
T Y B
• Tunisian authorities have seized arms and ammunition caches trafficked

I
C U R from Libya by organized commercial smugglers and financed by terrorist

SE
AL
groups linked to Al-Qaida. (UNSC, 2014)

RN
IN TE • Information from the investigations into the Paris attacks of 2015
suggests that some of the attackers might have actively participated in
criminal networks, instead of just being their clients.
LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM & ORGANIZED CRIME
Terrorism and Trafficking in Cultural Property

A L
ITT
• Terrorist groups seem to have increasingly taken up trafficking in illicit

M
antiquities and cultural property to fund their operations, support

AN
M
recruits and acquire weapons.

Y N A
T Y B
• Looting occurs, most often in an area where conflict exists or that is

I
C U R economically depressed.

SE
RN AL • By destroying symbolic representations of culture, terrorist groups

IN TE effectively undermine the nationalism and attack the morale of local


population through a type of "cultural cleansing"
LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM & ORGANIZED CRIME
Terrorism and Trafficking in persons

A L
ITT
• Trafficking for sexual exploitation and for forced labour are the most
prominently detected forms.

AN M
M
• Victims are trafficked to be used as beggars, for forced or sham marriages,

N A
benefit fraud, production of pornography or for organ removal.
Y
T Y B
• Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has drawn attention to a growing nexus

I
C U R between terrorism and trafficking in persons. Terrorist groups engage in the

SE
AL
trafficking of persons for three primary reasons: funding, fear, and

RN recruitment.

IN TE • Boko Haram (Nigeria) and Al-Shabaab (Somalia) have been documented


trafficking children into soldier/fighter roles, as well as using them to carry
out suicide bombings.
• Yazidis - mostly women and children - were enslaved and transported to ISIS
for institutional use of rape (sexual slavery), selling them in the markets.
LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM & ORGANIZED CRIME

Exploitation of Natural Resources and Terrorism

A L
ITT
• ISIL is thought to be the richest terrorist group, with a turnover of roughly

M
AN
$2 billion in 2015, a substantial proportion of which was derived from oil

A M
trafficking.

N
Y BY
U IT
• The connection between Al-Shabaab and sugar smuggling came to the fore
R
SEC in Kenya in 2014.

RN AL
TE
• In 2011, the UNSC Monitoring Group estimated 9-11 million sacks of

IN charcoal were exported from Somalia, generating annual revenues for Al-
Shabaab in excess of $25 million.
LINKAGES IN INDIA

• In the Northeast, extortion is the fundamental basis for funding all

L
forms of terrorism. In addition to this, kidnapping has been used
extensively for spreading terror and raising funds.
ITTA
AN M
A M
• Human trafficking, drug trafficking and gun running are some of the

N
BY
other criminal activities that have been common in these areas.

Y
U RIT
SEC • There are a number of insurgent groups which over a period of

AL
time have morphed into crime syndicates.

RN
IN TE • In India’s northeast, almost all the militant groups run a parallel
government or have their areas of influence.
LINKAGES IN INDIA
• In J&K, counterfeit currency has been a major source of funding
terrorism.

A L
M ITT
• Enormous funds that are mobilized in Pakistan and other Muslim

M AN
countries, especially in the Gulf, are channelled through various

A
BY N
organizations in Pakistan to Kashmir.

R T Y
• Money laundering plays a significant role.

I
U
• Hawala transactions take place swiftly and effectively in Kashmir.

SEC
AL
Besides, it is also believed that the ISI uses drug money to fund

RN militant activities in Kashmir.

IN TE • In LWE, extortion is yet again a common phenomenon. They have also


indulged in robberies of banks to fund their movement. There have also
been reports of cuts being enforced on drug yielding crops in the
region.
A L
M ITT
VARIOUS SECURITY M A N
Y N A
FORCES AND IT Y B
AGENCIES
C U R
AND
L SE THEIR MANDATE
RN A
IN TE
INTRODUCTION

Under the Constitution, police and public order are state subjects. However, the Ministry of Home Affairs

L
(MHA) assists state governments by providing them support of the Central Armed Police Forces.

ITTA
ARMED FORCES
• Indian Navy
AN M
A M
• Indian Air Force

N
Y
• Indian Army

IT Y B
C U R
SE
RN AL
IN TE
INTRODUCTION
There are five Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and one Central
Paramilitary Force (CPMF) under the Ministry of Home Affairs

A L
ITT
namely;

AN M
1.
A M
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)
N
2.
BY
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)
Y
3.
U RIT
Border Security Force (BSF)

SEC
4. Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)

RN AL 5. Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB)

IN TE 6.
7.
Assam Rifles (AR)
National Security Guard (NSG)

Out of these, AR, BSF, ITBP and SSB are the ‘Border Guarding
Forces’.
INTRODUCTION
MANDATE

A L
ITT
• Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) are deployed to aid the State

AN M
Governments and Union Territories in maintaining public order

A M
on their request.
N
BY
• These Forces have been playing a key role in the overall
Y
RIT
management of the internal security situation in the Country.
U
SEC
• They have also assisted in the conduct of free, fair and peaceful

RN AL General/Assembly Elections, as well as law and order duties

IN TE during local Municipal Elections.


• CAPFs also continued to assist the North-Eastern States, the LWE
affected States and Jammu & Kashmir in combating terrorism
and militancy.
ASSAM RIFLES (AR)
• Fondly known as “Friends of the North East People”, the Assam
Rifles was raised as “Cachar Levy” in 1835 and is the oldest

A L
ITT
ParaMilitary Force in the country.

deployed in the North East.


AN M
• It has its Headquarters at Shillong and the Force is completely

N A M
• Tasked with Counter Insurgency role and for guarding the Indo-

Y BY
Myanmar Border, spread over 1,643 kilometer.

U RIT
• Also AR is involved in Flood Relief Operations & Civic Action

SEC Programme (CAP) in North East.

RN AL • AR is contributing to the International peace & harmony by

IN TE performing well in the UNPKO in Haiti as a Formed Police Unit


since 2010.
• It is the highest awarded and decorated Para Military Force of the
Republic of India.
• It has a sanctioned strength of over 63,000 personnel.
ASSAM RIFLES (AR)
It is the only paramilitary force with a dual control structure. While the
administrative control of the force is with the MHA, its operational control is

A L
ITT
with the Indian Army, which is under the MoD.

AN M
The Delhi High Court has granted 12 weeks to the Union government to

N A M
decide on whether to scrap or retain the dual control structure for Assam
Rifles.
Y BY
U RIT
SEC
• MHA has argued that all the border guarding forces are under the

RN AL operational control of the ministry and so Assam Rifles coming under MHA

IN TE will give border guarding a comprehensive and integrated approach.

• Army is of the opinion that the Assam Rifles has worked well in
coordination with the Army and frees up the armed forces from many of
its responsibilities to focus on its core strengths.
BORDER SECURITY FORCE (BSF)
• Border Security Force was raised in 1965 after Indo-Pak War.
• The sanctioned strength of BSF as on 31.03.2019 is 2,63,905.

A L
ITT
• The Force Headquarter is in New Delhi.

AN M
• Its operational responsibility is spread over 6,386.36 km of
International Border with Pakistan and Bangladesh.

N A M
• It is also deployed on the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K under the

Y BYoperational control of the Army.

U RIT • It is also deployed to fight against Militancy/Left Wing Extremism.

SEC • The Border Security Force has one Formed Police Unit deployed

RN AL with United Nations Stabilizations Mission in Democratic Republic

IN TE of Congo since 2005.


• BSF Mt. Everest Expedition Team successfully scaled Mt. Everest in
2018 and got the rare distinction of becoming the first team in the
world whose all climbers successfully reached the summit without
any loss/injury.
BORDER SECURITY FORCE (BSF)
• BSF is "INDIA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENCE".

A L
ITT
• BSF has been defending Sir Creak in Arabian Sea and

AN M
Sundarban delta in the Bay of Bengal with its state of art

A M
fleet of Water Crafts.

N
Y BY
U RIT • BSF has instrumental role in helping state administration in

SEC maintain Law and Order and conduct of peaceful election.

RN AL
IN TE • It is containing naxals/insurgents menace from spreading in
the Naxals infected states and bringing peace.

• BSF has been crusading against natural calamity to save


precious human lives as and when warranted.
INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE FORCE (ITBP)
• ITBP was raised in the wake of Chinese aggression in 1962 with a
modest strength of 04 Battalions for reorganizing the frontier

A L
ITT
intelligence and security set up along the Indo-Tibetan border.

AN M
• Originally conceptualized as an integrated “guerrilla cum-
intelligence cum-fighting Force” self contained in supplies,

N A M
communication and intelligence collection.

Y BY • It has evolved with passage of time into a conventional border

U RIT guarding Force. Today, ITBP guards 3,488 kms of Indo-China Border.

SEC • It is manning at altitudes ranging from 9,000 feet to 18,750 feet in

RN AL the Western, Middle and Eastern Sector of the Indo-China Border

IN TE from Karakoram Pass in Ladakh to Jachep La in Arunachal Pradesh.


• ITBP Battalions are deployed in Maoist affected areas of
Chhattisgarh.
• The force operates with a total sanctioned strength of 90,000
personnel.
INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE FORCE (ITBP)
• The Holy Kailash Manasarovar Yatra is planned via two routes i.e.
Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand and NathuLa in Sikkim. ITBP provided

A L
ITT
medical, communication and security cover to the yatris.

AN M
M
• ITBP is providing security to Embassy of India (EOI), Kabul and 04

Y N A
other Consulates at Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-eSharif in

IT Y B Afghanistan.

C U R
SE
AL
• Presently 12th Congo Contingent comprising a total 140 ITBP

RN officials is deployed at Kisangani in Democratic Republic of Congo.

IN TE • Also it is involved in Disaster Management & related activities, Civic


Action Programme (for winning the hearts and minds of population
of border villages)
SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB)
• The Special Service Bureau which was precursor to the present Sashastra
Seema Bal was set up in early 1963 in the wake of India-China conflict of

A L
ITT
1962.

M
• To build up the morale and capability of the border population against

AN
M
threats of subversion, infiltration and sabotage from across the border.

N A
• It became a border guarding Force in 2001 under the Ministry of Home Affairs

Y
IT Y B
and was rechristened as “Sashastra Seema Bal” with an amended charter of

C U R duties.

SE
AL
• It has been given the border guarding responsibilities along the Indo-Nepal

RN covering a stretch of 1751 km and Indo-Bhutan borders covering 699 km.

IN TE • It is also performing duty related to Internal Security and Counter Insurgency


Operations. It has deployed its personnel in insurgency affected States of
Jammu & Kashmir and LWE (Left Wing Extremism) affected areas of
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar.
• Presently the Force has a posted strength of 79441 personnel.
CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE (CISF)
• Raised in the year 1969, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) is providing
security cover to 345 units including 61 domestic and international airports

A L
ITT
and fire protection cover to 102 Industrial Undertakings.

M
• The specialized task of airport security was assigned to CISF in the year

AN
M
2000 in the wake of hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 to

N A
Kandahar.

Y
T Y B
• With globalization and liberalization of the economy, CISF is no longer a PSU

I
C U R centric organization. Instead, it has become a premier multi-skilled security

SE
AL
agency of the country.

RN • It is mandated to provide security to major critical infrastructure

IN TE installations of the country in diverse regions including terrorist and naxal


affected areas and important Private Sector Units.
• After the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008, the mandate of the force has
been broadened to provide direct security cover to private sector also.
• The current strength of the CISF is about 1.8 lakh personnel.
CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE (CISF)
• CISF has also been mandated to provide protection to the VIP protectees of
various categories across the country. The VIP Security wing of CISF is called the

A L
ITT
Special Security Group (SSG).

M
• CISF is one of the largest Fire Protection Service providers in the country. It

AN
M
provides fire protection and fire safety coverage to 102 Public Sector

N A
Undertakings.

Y

IT Y B
The CISF Act was amended to enable the Force to provide security, on

C U R payment basis, to private/ joint venture industrial undertakings, which are vital

SE for the security and economy of the country.

RN AL • A contingent of the CISF has been deployed at the United Nations Mission for

IN TE Justice Support in Haiti since 2008.


• The contingent was assigned with the prestigious task to provide security
support to Haitian National Police (HNP).
• It has been conducting various humanitarian projects like Blood Donation
Camps, Medical Camps, etc.
CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF)
• Initially raised as the ‘Crown Representative Police’ in 1939 at Neemuch, Madhya
Pradesh, the Force was rechristened as Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) after

A L
ITT
Independence.

AN M
M
• The Force is presently handling a wide range of duties covering law and order,

N A
counter insurgency, anti-militancy and anti-naxal operations.

Y
IT Y B
U R
• The Force plays a key role in assisting the State Governments and UT Administrations

C
SEin maintaining public order and countering subversive activities of Naxalites/

RN AL militant groups/ Insurgents.

IN TE • The Force also has Mahila Battalion, Mahila contingent and 242 Mahila personnel in
various ranks are also deployed in Bastariya Battalion meant for fighting naxalism.

• The strength of the Force is 3,24,824 as on 31.03.2019.


CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF)
Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA)

A L
ITT
• CoBRA- Commando Battalion for Resolute Action, is a specialized force which has been

M
raised to fight Maoists and insurgents in Left Wing Extremism affected areas.

AN
M
• Also known as Jungle Warriors, they are selected amongst the CRPF’s personnel based

N A
on age and other physical attributes.

Y
IT Y B
U R
• CoBRA Battalions were raised between 2008-11, they have been trained, equipped and

C
SE
deployed in LWE affected States of Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand, Madhya

RN AL Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh as well as Assam & Meghalaya.

IN TE • It is one of the elite Commando units in the country trained to survive, fight and win in
the jungles.
• A CoBRA School for specialized training in Jungle Warfare & Tactics has also been in
operation and providing exclusive training to the force personnel.
CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF)
Rapid Action Force (RAF)

A L
ITT
• In 1991, few Battalions of CRPF were reorganized and converted into
Rapid Action Force (RAF).

AN M
N A M
• The personnel in RAF are trained and equipped to be an effective strike

Y BY
T
Force in communal riots and similar situations.

U RI
SEC
AL
• These Battalions are located at 10 communally sensitive locations across

RN the country to facilitate quick response in case of any such incident.

IN TE • The RAF are deployed on the request of State Governments for Law and
order duties and maintenance of peace during various festivals and
communal riots, etc. on short-term basis.
NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG)
• The National Security Guard was raised in 1984 to combat terrorism.

A L
ITT
• This Strike Force is a unique amalgam of selected personnel from the

M
Army, the Central Armed Police Forces and State Police Forces.

AN
N A M
• After the 26.11.2008 terror attack in Mumbai, four regional Hubs

Y BY
T
(Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad and Kolkata) were established to reduce

U RI the response matrix and to ensure Pan-India footprint.

SEC
AL
• In 2016, the fifth Hub came into existence in Gandhinagar

RN (Gujarat).

IN TE • As a Federal Contingency Force, NSG has to its credit several successful


counter-terrorist operations.
• It has acquired an enviable reputation of ‘Best Amongst Best’ by
virtue of its high standards of training and operational efficiency.
NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG)
• For its dedication, valour and surgical operational capabilities,
Commandos of this Special Force have earned the moniker ‘Black Cats’.

A L
M ITT
• The National Security Guard Commandos are trained for high-risk tasks

M AN
like counter-terrorism, counter-hijack and bomb disposal operations.

A
BY N
R T Y
• They are also assigned the task of providing ‘close protection’ to

I
U
designated protectees.

SEC
RN AL • NSG Task Forces (TFs) are deployed for Immediate Back Up Security

IN TE Operations (IBUS) operations as part of security arrangements during the


events of national importance, including Republic Day and Independence
Day celebrations, to thwart any terror strike.
NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG)
• Operation BLACK QUARRY & Render Safe Procedure (RSP) – Under
Operation Black Quarry, NSG Bomb Disposal Teams carried out the Anti

A L
ITT
Sabotage Checks at important venues, attended by VVIPs and places of

M
importance where national & international summits are conducted.

AN
N A M
• RSP was also carried out at the locations during the events of national

Y BY
T
importance which are visited by VVIPs including the President, Prime

U RI Minister and visiting foreign delegates.

SEC
RN AL • Mobilisation Exercise (Hovercraft Training) – Hovercraft training was

IN TE undertaken by NSG with Indian Coast Guard. The Exercise was aimed at
familiarization of NSG Commandos with the Hovercraft and to improve
synergy with Indian Coast Guard.
NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG)
• Single City Multiple Target Counter Terrorist (Ex Chakravyuh) – The aim
of the exercise is to practice the response matrix and establish effective

A L
ITT
coordination between all stakeholders within Delhi & NCR to counter any
act of terrorism.

AN M
N A M
• NSG members have become an intrinsic part of Joint Working Groups on

Y BY
T
CT which are undertaken with friendly countries to build synergy, joint-

U RI manship, assist in capacity building amongst like minded countries to

SEC
AL
counter the menace of Terrorism.

RN
IN TE
SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE (SFF)
• The SFF was raised by the Intelligence Bureau in the immediate aftermath of
the 1962 China-India war.

A L
ITT
• The covert outfit recruited Tibetan exiles (now it has a mixture of Tibetans and

M
Gorkhas) and was initially named Establishment 22. Subsequently renamed SSF.

AN
M
• SFF units, also known as Vikas battalions, come under the direct purview of the

N A
Cabinet Secretariat, and are operationally involved with the Army.
Y
T Y B
• SFF personnel are elite forces known to be trained in high-altitude warfare and

I
C U R
are excellent mountain warriors. The original task as envisaged was

SE
AL
clandestine operations behind the lines in Tibet.

RN • SFF has played an important role in multiple military operations like 1971 India-

IN TE Pakistan war, 1984 Operation Blue Star, capture of Siachen Glacier in 1984 and
also in the 1999 Kargil battle but it has largely functioned under the shadows.
• In the operation, which was codenamed ‘Eagle’, they infiltrated into
Bangladesh for guerrilla campaigns. They also prevented Pakistani troops from
escaping into Myanmar.
INDIA RESERVE BATTALIONS (IRB) IN STATES
• A scheme for raising of India Reserve Battalions (IR Bns) in States was
introduced in 1971 with a view;

A L
ITT
• To strengthen the capabilities of the States
• To reduce their dependence upon CAPFs

AN M
M
• To deal with various types of law & order and internal security situations

N A
• Till date, 185 IR Bns have been sanctioned and 144 have been raised by the
Y
T Y B
States. 75% of the amount to be reimbursed to the States as Grant-inAid by

I
C U Rthe Government of India and 25% of the amount to be borne by the States

SE
AL
as their share.

RN • Land for the battalions is to be provided by the State Government free of

IN TE cost.
• A scheme of Specialized India Reserve Battalion (SIRB) with Engineering
component was approved by the Government in 2011 with the aim that the
SIRB will execute small development works like village, road, schools, Primary
Health Center, rural water supply etc in LWE States.
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN CAPFS
• The Committee on Empowerment of Women has given
recommendations on the subject ‘Women in Paramilitary Forces’.

A L
ITT
• Re-orienting the training programmes to include topics like
gender sensitization & combat training.

AN M
M
• Reorientation of syllabi; assigning operational duties to more and

Y N A
more women are being taken to bring the women police officers

IT Y B into the mainstream of policing.

C U R • All CAPFs are strictly following the guidelines of the Supreme

SE
AL
Court of India in this regard and have set up the Complaints

RN Committees.

IN TE • All CAPFs have already included the NGOs in the Complaint


Committees to enquire into complaint of sexual harassment.
• The disciplinary cases involving sexual harassment in
Paramilitary forces are being monitored through periodic
returns and meetings taken by senior officers.
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN CAPFS
• The programme on Gender Sensitization and its implications in
Government services has already been conducted by all the

A L
ITT
CAPFs to educate its personnel of various ranks.

M
• Separate toilets for women employees have already been set

AN
M
up by all the Forces at static locations/premises on need basis.

Y N A• In other areas, where appropriate locations are not

IT Y B available, toilet facilities are made available to them by

C U R pitching of small tents with commode for the use of

SE
AL
women employees.

RN • ‘Creches’ and ‘Day Care Centres’ have been provided for by the

IN TE CAPFs to women employees on need basis and separate


budgetary allocation on a regular basis have been provided.
• Considering the increased demand of women police in tackling
law & order situation, the government has approved the raising
of 2 Mahila battalions instead of 2 male Battalions in CRPF.
CHALLENGES
• As of January 2017, the sanctioned strength of the seven CAPFs was
10,78,514 personnel. However, 15% of these posts (1,58,591 posts)

A L
ITT
were lying vacant.

AN M
M
• According to the Estimates Committee of Parliament, the number of

N A
deployment of CAPFs battalions has increased from 91 in 2012-13 to

Y
Y B
119 in 2016-17.

IT
C U R
SE
• The Committee has noted that there has been heavy dependence by

RN AL states on central police forces even for day-to-day law and order

IN TE issues.
• This is likely to affect anti-insurgency and border-guarding
operations of the Forces, as well as curtail their time for training.
• The continuous deployment also leaves less time for rest and
recuperation.
CHALLENGES
• The Estimates Committee has pointed out that most of the expenditure
of the CAPFs was on salaries.

A L
M ITT
• The Committee observed that top positions in CAPFs are occupied by

M AN
IPS officers. This has a demoralizing effect on the officers of the CAPFs,

A
BY N
and impacts the effectiveness of the forces.

RIT Y
• The Committee recommended that top positions should be filled

U
from the respective cadre of the CAPF.

SEC
RN AL • The Committee noted that during the 12th Five Year Plan, as against the

IN TE target of 24,206 houses for CAPFs, only 11,884 houses were constructed
till March 31, 2016 (49%).
CHALLENGES
• Committee noted that there is a need to improve the intelligence
gathering mechanism, which should be strengthened and modernized

A L
ITT
within the shortest possible timeframe.

M
• It recommended that agencies involved in intelligence gathering

AN
M
should be given autonomy in the recruitment of their personnel.

Y N A
IT Y B
U R
• The Standing Committee on Home Affairs in the year 2017 had

C
SE expressed concern over the working conditions of personnel of the

RN AL border guarding forces.

IN TE • They had to work 16-18 hours a day, with little time for rest or
sleep.
• The personnel were also not satisfied with medical facilities that
had been provided at border locations.
CHALLENGES
• Committee noted that a number of personnel among the CAPFs have
committed suicide.

A L
ITT
• It recommended that workshops on stress management should

M
regularly be undertaken, and yoga and meditation be made part of

AN
M
the daily exercise for CAPF personnel.

Y N A
Y B
• The Standing Committee observed that personnel of the CAPFs have not

IT
C U R
been treated at par with the Armed Forces, in terms of pay and

SE allowances.

RN AL • The demand for Paramilitary Service Pay, similar to Military

IN TE Service Pay, had not been agreed to by the Seventh Central Pay
Commission.
• Hard-area allowance for personnel of the border guarding forces
was much lower as compared to members of the Armed Forces.
DEVELOPMENTS

• The Union Home Ministry has constituted two special committees to

L
specifically deal with issues and approvals related to the Central Armed
Police Forces (CAPFs).
ITTA
AN M
• First committee will be headed by the Home Secretary and will

N A M
deal with issues that are to be decided between the Ministry of

Y
Home Affairs (MHA) and these forces.

IT Y B
• Second will be headed by the Secretary (Border Management) and

C U R will only deal with procurement matters.

SE
RN AL
TE
• According to the MHA’s directions, these committees are special and

IN hence “routine matters” will not be taken up in their meetings.

• The committees, will also take up sharing of best practices among each
other and review decisions till successful resolution is found.
DEVELOPMENTS

The Report of the Task Force under the Chairmanship of Madhav Godbole

L
(2001);

ITTA
AN M
• Recommended border-guarding force should not be distracted from its

N A M
principal task and deployed for other internal security duties.

Y BY
IT
• Recommended the establishment of a marine police force, the

U R
C
strengthening of the Indian Coast Guard and setting up of an apex

SE
AL
institution for coordinating various maritime issues.

RN
IN TE Bringing uniformity and cohesiveness in border guarding by assigning the
responsibility of border security to a single force.
A L
M ITT
M A N
BORDER MANAGEMENT Y N A
IT Y B
C IN
U R INDIA
L SE
RN A
IN T E
INTRODUCTION

Border management involves facilitating the legitimate cross-


border flow of people and trade while concurrently preventing

A L
ITT
the entry of persons or goods that pose a threat to the country or
its population.

AN M
N A M
Y
• India has 15,106 km of land border and a coastline of 7,516 km

IT Y B
including island territories.

C U R
SE
AL
• All states, except Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,

RN Delhi and Haryana, have an international border or a coastline.

IN TE • The Department of Border Management was created in the


Ministry of Home Affairs in 2004 to devote focussed attention
to the issues relating to the management of the international
land & coastal borders.
INTRODUCTION

The various border security threats are broadly classified under the
following categories:

A L
ITT
• Infiltration and exfiltration of armed militants
• Non-state actors

AN M
M
• Narcotics and armed smugglers

Y N A
• Illegal migrations & Human Trafficking

T Y B
• Separatist movements aided by external powers
I
C U R
• Establishment of madrassas, which must be watched for any potential

SE
AL
security hazards

RN • Export of fundamentalist terrorism

IN TE • Smuggling of counterfeit Indian currency

Border management has become a major challenge in the post-


globalisation world. The traditional approach to border management
emphasising on security has become inadequate.
STRATEGY OF BORDER MANAGEMENT

The approach as employed by the government towards managing the


borders has four important elements -

A L
ITT
• Guarding & Regulation
• Development of border areas

AN M
M
• Constituting bilateral institutional mechanisms for resolving disputes

Y N A
• Ironing out conflicts with neighbours

IT Y B
C U R
Approach and practices of border management vary from one border to

SE
AL
another, based on the security perceptions and relationship with the

RN neighbouring country.

IN TE
STRATEGY OF BORDER MANAGEMENT

To create infrastructure in the border areas of the country.


• Construction of the fence, floodlighting, Border Out Posts and building

A L
ITT
roads, development of Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) and measures to
strengthen Coastal Security.

AN M
M
• Various developmental works in the border areas have been undertaken

Y N A
by the Department under the Border Area Development Programme

IT Y B
(BADP) as part of a comprehensive approach to the border management.

C U R
SE
AL
Deployment of forces along the borders is based on the principle of ‘One

RN border, One Border – Guarding Force’ (BGF).

IN TE • Indian army is guarding land borders along the LOC on Pakistan border
along with BSF and Line of Actual Control (LAC) on China border along
with ITBP.
• Indian Navy is responsible for overall maritime security which includes
coastal and offshore security.
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CIBMS)

• The Government of India has taken an initiative to cover the area where
physical fence is not feasible with non-physical barriers in the form of

A L
ITT
Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS).

AN M
M
• CIBMS includes integration of manpower, sensors, networks, intelligence

Y N A
and Command & Control Solutions to improve situational awareness.

IT Y B
C U R
• The purpose of the CIBMS is to eventually replace manual

SE
AL
surveillance/patrolling of the international borders by electronic

RN surveillance and organising the BSF personnel into quick reaction teams

IN TE to enhance their detection and interception capabilities.

• The trigger for implementing the CIBMS was the Pathankot terrorist
attack (2016).
COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CIBMS)

It has three main components:

A L
ITT
• New high-tech surveillance devices such as sensors, detectors, cameras,

AN M
ground-based radar systems, micro-aerostats, lasers as well as existing

M
equipment for round-the-clock surveillance of the international border

Y N A
T Y B
• An efficient and dedicated communication network including fibre optic
I
C U R cables and satellite communication for transmitting data gathered by

SE
AL
these diverse high-tech surveillance and detection devices

RN
IN TE • A command and control centre to which the data will be transmitted in
order to apprise the senior commanders about the happenings on the
ground and thus providing a composite picture of the international
border.
COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CIBMS)

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CIBMS)

LIMITATIONS OF CIBMS

A L
ITT
• In the case of India, the operation and maintenance of the existing
sophisticated equipment remain a problem.

AN M
N A M
Y
• At present, many of the high-tech surveillance devices are not optimally

IT Y B
utilised owing to the absence of the required technical expertise.

C U R
SE
AL
• Exorbitant cost of the electronic devices and the lack of easy availability

RN of spare parts act as a deterrent against their use.

IN TE • The assessment of SBInet programme of USA & American Shield


Initiative brought out a number of lacunae with high technology systems.
It revealed that the system suffered numerous technical glitches.
BORDER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (BADP)

• Border Area Development Programme was initiated in 1986–87 as a


Centrally Sponsored Scheme by the Department of Border Management,

A L
ITT
Ministry of Home Affairs.

AN M
M
• Initially, the program was implemented in the western Border States, with

Y N A
an emphasis on the development of infrastructure to facilitate the

IT Y B
deployment of the BSF.

C U R
SE
AL
• Later, the geographical and functional scope of the programme was

RN widened to include eastern and northern sectors of India’s borders and as

IN TE well as socio-economic aspects.

• BADP is implemented through the State Governments as a part of a


comprehensive approach to border management.
BORDER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (BADP)

• The aim of BADP is to meet special developmental needs and well being of
the people living near the international borders and to provide essential

A L
ITT
infrastructure through convergence of the Central/State/BADP/Local
schemes through participatory approach.

AN M
N A M
Y
• The programme covers all the villages which are located within 0-10 km

T Y B
distance of the International Border.
I
C U R
SE
AL
• The works/ projects undertaken under the BADP relate to construction of

RN roads, bridges, safe drinking water supply, health, agriculture and allied

IN TE activities, social sector activities etc.


INDO-PAKISTAN BORDER
• India shares 3323 km of its land border with Pakistan. This border runs
along the States of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and J&K.

A L
M ITT
• The Indo-Pakistan border runs through diverse terrain including deserts,

A M AN
marshes, plains, snow-clad mountains, and winds its way through

BY N
villages, houses and agricultural lands. This makes the border extremely

Y
porous.

U RIT
C
• Porosity of this border has facilitated various illegal activities such as

SE
AL
smuggling, drugs and arms trafficking, and infiltration.

RN
TE
• Heroin and fake Indian currency are the two predominant items

IN smuggled along this border.


• Money laundering is also quite rampant along the border. A large-
scale money laundering network is flourishing in Punjab.
• Sir Creek area, due to its peculiar terrain, provides scope for illegal
fishing.
INDO-PAKISTAN BORDER

The India–Pakistan border is categorised under three different heads.

A L
ITT
• International boundary also known as the Radcliffe Line. It is 2,308-

AN M
km long and stretches from Gujarat to parts of the Jammu district in

M
Jammu and Kashmir.

Y N A
IT Y B
• Line of Control (LoC), which is 740 km long and runs from parts of

C U R Jammu to parts of Leh. It is a ceasefire line which came into existence

SE
AL
after the 1948 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan. It was

RN delineated in the Simla Agreement (July 1972) whereby both sides

IN TE agreed not to alter it unilaterally.

• Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), which divides the current


position of Indian and Pakistani troops in the Siachen region. It is 110
km long and extends from NJ 9842 to Indira Col in the north.
INDO-PAKISTAN BORDER

• Border Out Posts (BOPs) - Presently, 656 BOPs already held by


BSF along the IPB. A proposal for construction of Composite

A L
ITT
BOPs along the Indo-Pakistan border has been sanctioned.

AN M
• These Composite BOPs will provide the entire necessary

M
infrastructure for the accommodation, logistic support and

Y N A
the combat functions of the BSF troops deployed on the

IT Y B Indo-Pakistan borders.

C U R
SE
AL
• In order to curb the attempt of infiltration and cross-border

RN crimes along the Indo-Pakistan Border, the Government has

IN TE sanctioned 2043.76 km of floodlights and 2063.066 km fence


along the International Border.

• Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System


(CIBMS) along Indo-Pakistan Border.
INDO-BANGLADESH BORDER

• The Indian side of the Indo-Bangladesh Border passes through West


Bengal (2216.7 km), Assam (263 km), Meghalaya (443 km), Tripura (856

A L
ITT
km) and Mizoram (318 km).

AN M
M
• The entire stretch consists of plains, riverine belts, hills & jungles. The

Y N A
area is heavily populated and is cultivated right upto the border.

IT Y B
C U R • The Indo-Bangladesh Border is marked by a high degree of porosity and

SE
AL
the checking of illegal cross border activities and illegal migration from

RN Bangladesh into India have been major challenges.

IN TE • India-Bangladesh border, is prone to transnational crimes like human


trafficking, smuggling of contraband substances, counterfeit money,
arms, cattle etc.
INDO-BANGLADESH BORDER

• Although India and Bangladesh officially trade goods worth $7 billion,


illegal trade between the two countries is estimated to be double the

A L
ITT
figure.

AN M
M
• Incidents like the Burdwan (West Bengal) blast in October 2014 have

Y N A
revealed the presence in the country of a deep-rooted network of

IT Y B
Bangladeshi militant organisations such as the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen

C U R Bangladesh (JMB).

SE
RN AL
IN TE
INDO-BANGLADESH BORDER

• Establishment of border-haats is reflective of the intention of the


authorities to experiment with alternatives pathways for managing the

A L
ITT
India and Bangladesh border.

AN M
M
• In 2015, under their Land Border Agreement, India and Bangladesh

Y N A
exchanged 162 enclaves, ending one of the world’s oldest border

IT Y B
disputes.

C U R
SE
AL
• India and Bangladesh have both signed a border management plan that

RN envisions joint patrols and information-sharing.

IN TE • Border Out Posts (BOPs) are the main workstation of the BSF along the
borders. These are self - contained defence out-posts with a specified
area of responsibility.
INDO-BANGLADESH BORDER
• The Government of India had sanctioned the construction of border fencing with floodlights in two phases.

A L
• There have been some problems in the construction of fencing in certain stretches on this border due to riverine/low lying
areas, habitations, pending land acquisition cases and protests by the border population.
M ITT
A M AN
N
• The Government of India has taken an initiative to cover the area where physical fence is not feasible with non-physical

BY
barriers in the form of Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS).
Y
U RIT
SEC
• In order to have better communication and operational mobility of BSF in border areas, border roads have been constructed.

RN AL
IN TE
INDO-MYANMAR BORDER

• India shares a 1643 km long border with Myanmar. The States of Arunachal
Pradesh (520 km), Nagaland (215 km), Manipur (398 km) and Mizoram (510

A L
ITT
km) have a common border with Myanmar.

AN M
M
• The Assam Rifles is guarding the Indo-Myanmar Border. Out of 1643 km,

Y N A
demarcation of 1472 km has been completed.

IT Y B
C U R
• There is a Joint Boundary Working Group (JBWG) between India and

SE
AL
Myanmar to examine/discuss all boundary related issues in a comprehensive

RN manner.

IN TE • The construction of the border fence by Myanmar has led to resentment


among the people on both sides of the Indo-Myanmar border.
• The people living in the Eastern districts of Nagaland and in the areas of
NSAZ in Myanmar have close family ties and engage in cultural and
economic exchanges.
INDO-MYANMAR BORDER

• A Free Movement Regime (FMR) exists between India and Myanmar.


• Under the FMR, every member of the hill tribes, who is either a citizen of India

A L
ITT
or a citizen of Myanmar and who is resident of any area within 16 km on either

AN M
side of IndoMyanmar Border (IMB) can cross the IMB on production of a border

M
pass with one year validity.

Y N A
• Citizens of Myanmar can move into the area in India which is within 16 km from

IT Y B
India-Myanmar Border and can stay up to two weeks per visit.

C U R
SE
AL
• Insurgent groups have benefited from the open border in terms of carrying out

RN illegal activities including launching strikes against Indian security forces and

IN TE returning to their safe havens in Myanmar.


• China has also been reportedly aiding some of these groups.
• Indian insurgent groups in the region are also known to collaborate with
Myanmarese insurgent groups like Kachin Independent Army (KIA), among
others.
INDO-MYANMAR BORDER

Being highly porous, poorly guarded and located along a


remote, underdeveloped, insurgency-prone region and

A L
ITT
proximate to one of the world's largest opium producing

AN M
areas, the India–Myanmar border is vulnerable to the

M
activities of insurgents and drugs and arms traffickers as well

Y N A
as criminals.

IT Y B
C U R
SE
RN AL
IN TE
INDO-NEPAL BORDER

• India and Nepal share an open border of 1,751 km. Sashastra


Seema Bal (SSB) has been deployed as the Border Guarding

A L
ITT
Force (BGF) on this border.

AN M
M
• The main challenges are to check misuse of open border by the

Y N A
terrorists and criminals.

IT Y B
• Open border is under growing threat of criminal enterprises

C U R which use it for human trafficking, mainly of women and

SE
AL
children, narcotics trade, and the transport of fake

RN currency.

IN TE • There are also issues of radicalism in the Terai region.

• Pakistan-based militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba are


also known to carry out terrorist attacks in India using Nepal and
Bangladesh as transit countries.
INDO-NEPAL BORDER

• Governments of India and Nepal have decided to constitute an institutionalised

L
mechanism in the form of Home Secretary-level talks and Joint Working Group to

ITTA
facilitate bilateral dialogue on matters of mutual concern regarding border
management.

AN M
N A M
Y
• In addition, there is a mechanism of Border District Coordination Committees at the

IT Y B
level of district officials of the two countries.

C U R
SE
AL
• In order to meet operational requirements SSB, the Government has approved

RN construction and up-gradation of 1,377 km of strategic roads along the border.

IN TE • Being a landlocked country, Nepal depends on India for connectivity to the rest of
the world. Any disruption at the border creates significant socioeconomic impacts for
Nepal. Ensuring the smooth movement of goods and vehicles at the border is both
a necessity and a challenge.
INDO-BHUTAN BORDER

• Bhutan is another landlocked country that shares an open


border with India.

A L
M ITT
AN
• To improve the security environment along the Indo-Bhutan

M
border measuring 699 km, Sashatra Seema Bal (SSB) has been

Y N A
deployed as the Border Guarding Force.

IT Y B
C U R
• Insurgents from neighbouring Indian states often sneak into

SE
AL
Bhutan for sanctuary.

RN • Although Bhutan succeeded in flushing them out of its

IN TE territory in a major operation in 2003, fears are persistent


about criminal and militant activity.
INDO-BHUTAN BORDER

• Migration is another issue in Bhutan-India border management.


• As areas bordering Bhutan are largely underdeveloped, many

A L
ITT
Indians work as manual labour in construction sites in Bhutan,

AN M
where they manage to earn more decent wages.

M
• This migration has provoked concerns of altering demographics

Y N A
in both countries.

IT Y B
• Migrants and infiltrators are also accused of deforestation,

C U R poaching, and wildlife smuggling.

SE
RN AL • A bilateral mechanism in the shape of a Secretary level India-Bhutan

IN TE Group on Border Management and Security exists for assessing


threat perceptions of the two countries.

• The Government of India has approved construction of 313 km.


border road.
INDIA-CHINA BORDER

• Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), is the border guarding force for this
border.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Apart from Sikkim, the entire border stands un-demarcated leading

M
to severe and long lasting border issues with China.

Y N A
T Y B
• Ministry of Home Affairs has undertaken the construction of roads
I
C U R
along the Indo-China border in the States of Jammu & Kashmir,

SE
AL
Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

RN
IN TE • Infrastructure development on the Indian side is far off from what
the Chinese has achieved, hindering development of a sustainable
security system.
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
CONCERNS

• Border-guarding forces are often short on resources and ill-equipped


for modern border management and mastery.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Intelligence gathering is imperfect, as are intelligence sharing and

M
intelligence coordination.

Y N A
T Y B
• Indian borders continue to be guarded by security forces that report
I
C U R
to different ministries in the Centre, making the border management

SE
AL
task arduous and leading to duplication of efforts by the security

RN forces.

IN TE • CIBMS lacks resources and required skill sets for its efficient rollout.
COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

The Report of the Task Force under the Chairmanship of Madhav


Godbole, presented in 2001, is the first comprehensive document on

A L
ITT
border management, and it provided various suggestions for improving
border management and security.

AN M
N A M
Y
• Borders could not be effectively managed because of certain inherent

IT Y B
problems such as their disputed status, artificiality and porosity.

C U R
SE
AL
• It identified multiple other problems including illegal migration,

RN smuggling, drugs trafficking, and trans-border movement of

IN TE insurgents.
COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Committee recommended that the government resolve pending


border disputes with the neighbouring countries, as they later

A L
ITT
become matters of national-security threat.

AN M
M
• To enforce accountability, the border-guarding force should not be

Y N A
distracted from its principal task and deployed for other internal

IT Y B
security duties.

C U R
SE
AL
• It recommended accelerated development of infrastructure along

RN the border, especially to wean the border population from illegal

IN TE activities.

• It also recommended the establishment of a marine police force, the


strengthening of the Indian Coast Guard and setting up of an apex
institution for coordinating various maritime issues.
COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

• Project Sampark, carved out of Project Beacon, on 1st January 1975,


covering south of Pir Panjal, parts of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab.

A L
ITT
Project Sampark has achieved 1200.72 m bridge targets in 2019-20

AN M
which is almost 40% of the entire B.R.O. achievements.

N A M
Y
• BharatMala - To improve connectivity particularly on economic

IT Y B
corridors, border areas and far flung areas with an aim of quicker

C U R movement of cargo and boosting exports.

SE
AL
• Connecting the cities and remote areas, which are situated in

RN the border regions, the project has kept provision for

IN TE constructing 2000kms roads that fall in the Border Road or


International Connectivity category.
COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

• BOLD-QIT (Border Electronically Dominated QRT Interception


Technique) - Project to install technical systems under the CIBMS,

A L
ITT
which enables BSF to equip Indo-Bangla borders with different kind of

AN M
sensors in unfenced riverine area of Brahmaputra and its tributaries.

M
• Data network generated by Microwave communication, OFC

Y N A
Cables, DMR Communication, day and night surveillance

IT Y B Cameras and intrusion detection system.

C U R
SE
AL
• Madhukar Gupta Committee, submitted its report to the

RN Government in 2016 to strengthen border protection on India-

IN TE Pakistan border and Indo-Bangladesh Border.


COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

• Adopt biometric and digital profiling of citizens who travel across the
region.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Set up smart fencing along borders.

N A M
Y
• Sensitise agencies along the borders about legal and illegal

IT Y B
movements.

C U R
SE
AL
• Install closed circuit televisions for better border monitoring.

RN
IN TE • Promote cooperation and exchange of information among officials
across the borders to tackle challenges of radicalism and extremism.

• Develop a shared understanding and work together to counter


terrorist and militant groups operating across the entire region.
COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

• Establish an integrated border security system to deal with drug


trafficking, human trafficking, movement of weapons, infiltration by

A L
ITT
terrorists and similar other violations.

AN M
M
• Strengthen coordination and integration among agencies for smooth

Y N A
functioning of the ICPs.

IT Y B
C U R• Improve the capacity of various agencies by training them to use

SE
AL
technologies as and when adopted.

RN
IN TE • Improve socio-economic conditions of the border populations.

• Bring uniformity and cohesiveness in border guarding by assigning


the responsibility of border security to a single force.
A L
M ITT
M A N
INDIA – CHINA Y N A
BORDER
IT Y B
C U R
STANDOFF
L SE
RN A
IN TE
INDIA-CHINA BORDER

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
INDIA-CHINA BORDER

A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
RIT Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
EXITSING MECHANISMS - CBMs

1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA) - India and China had
vowed to arrive at a “common understanding of the alignment of the Line of

A L
ITT
Actual Control in the India-China border areas”. The two sides also agreed to

AN M
speed up the process of clarification and confirmation of the LAC.

N A M
Y
1996 Agreement on “Confidence Building Measures” - Troops on both sides

T Y B
shall “exercise self-restraint” in case of a face-off situation and start “immediate
I
C U R
consultations” through diplomatic channels. The agreement, makes it clear that

SE
AL
“neither side shall open fire or conduct blast operations within 2 km of the Line

RN of Actual Control”.

IN TE This is what led to a practice, where troops on both sides, never brandished
weapons at each other and at most, indulged in a physical jostle.
EXITSING MECHANISMS - CBMs

2005 “Protocol on Confidence Building” - The agreement spelt out the standard
operating procedures on what would happen when patrols met each other on

A L
ITT
the territory that both countries claimed

AN M
The two sides have already held seven rounds of Corps Commanders level talks

M
to discuss the entire issue of transgressions in the Eastern Ladakh sector.

Y N A
IT Y B
C U R
2013, Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) - Both sides agreed “to

SE
AL
not follow or tail patrols” in areas where there is no clarity on the LAC.

RN
IN TE China’s track record on adhering to agreed CBMs and protocols on the LAC has
been poor in the past few years.

The two sides have already held eight rounds of Corps Commanders level talks
to discuss the entire issue of transgressions in the Eastern Ladakh sector.
COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

• Adopt biometric and digital profiling of citizens who travel across the
region.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Set up smart fencing along borders.

N A M
Y
• Sensitise agencies along the borders about legal and illegal

IT Y B
movements.

C U R
SE
AL
• Install closed circuit televisions for better border monitoring.

RN
IN TE • Promote cooperation and exchange of information among officials
across the borders to tackle challenges of radicalism and extremism.

• Develop a shared understanding and work together to counter


terrorist and militant groups operating across the entire region.
COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

• Establish an integrated border security system to deal with drug


trafficking, human trafficking, movement of weapons, infiltration by

A L
ITT
terrorists and similar other violations.

AN M
M
• Strengthen coordination and integration among agencies for smooth

Y N A
functioning of the ICPs.

IT Y B
C U R• Improve the capacity of various agencies by training them to use

SE
AL
technologies as and when adopted.

RN
IN TE • Improve socio-economic conditions of the border populations.

• Bring uniformity and cohesiveness in border guarding by assigning


the responsibility of border security to a single force.
A L
M ITT
M A N
DEFENCE REFORMS Y N A IN
IT Y B
C U R
INDIA
L SE
RN A
IN T E
NEED FOR REFORMS

• South Asia is the second-most unstable region in the world and is closely
vying with West Asia for the number one spot.

A L
M ITT
AN
• India faces the most complex threats and challenges spanning the full

M
spectrum of conflict from nuclear to sub-conventional.

Y N A
T Y B
• The key geo-strategic challenges in South Asia emanate from the ongoing
I
C U R
conflict in Afghanistan and the Af-Pak border, unresolved territorial

SE
AL
disputes between India and China, and India and Pakistan.

RN
IN TE • The rising tide of Extremism and the growing spectre of urban terrorism
have also contributed towards vitiating India’s security environment.
• 28% of the Ministry of Defence’s 2020-21 budget of ₹4,71,378 crores was
allocated to pensions, and another 28.6% of it went towards payment
salaries and allowances.
NEED FOR REFORMS

• India remained the world’s second largest arms importer during the
period 2015-19, with Russia being the largest supplier.

A L
M ITT
AN
• India 23rd among the world’s 25 largest arms exporters, with its

M
main clients being Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Mauritius.

Y N A
• Poor design capability in critical technologies, inadequate

IT Y B
investment in R&D and our inability to manufacture major sub-

C U R systems and components.

SE
AL
• India plans to spend $130 bn on military modernization in the next 5

RN years, as achieving self- reliance in defence production is a key target

IN TE for the Government of India.


• The Government has opened up the Defence industry for private
sector participation to provide impetus to indigenous manufacturing.
• Annual Turnover by Private sector in Defence and Aerospace sector
in 2018-19 is $2.4 bn. $1.53 billion comes from export business.
MAJOR LIMITATIONS

• The absence of a National Security Strategy (NSS)


• Complex structure of command, i.e. who will report to who.

A L
ITT
• Shortage of resources eg. Indian Air Force (IAF) has only 31 operational

AN M
squadrons against a modest sanctioned strength of 42.

M
• Inter-services competition - greater share of the defence budget and

Y
influence
N A
T Y B
• Poor civil-military relations
I
C U R
• Failure to commit funds for modernisation on a long-term basis

SE
AL
• Sub-optimal inter-service prioritisation

RN • Sub-optimal synergization of available combat resources

IN TE • Acquisition Process of new weapons and equipment is delayed and


tardy
• Disconnect in the interface between R&D, production agencies and
users
• DRDO projects continue to be delayed with consequent cost overruns
IMPORTANT COMMITTEES & RECOMMENDATIONS

• The only time a serious security review was undertaken in the recent
past was after the Kargil Conflict of 1999 when the Kargil Review

A L
ITT
Committee (KRC) headed by the late K. Subrahmanyam.

AN M
M
• GoM set up four task forces on intelligence reforms, internal security, to

Y N A
undertake in-depth analyses of various facets of national security

IT Y B
management.

C U R • Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus headed by G.C. Saxena

SE
AL
• Task Force on Internal Security headed by N.N. Vohra

RN • Task Force on Border Management headed by Dr Madhav Godbole

IN TE • Task Force on Management of Defence headed by Arun Singh


Naresh Chandra Committee (2012) - (Task Force on National Security)

• Ensure adequate military preparedness to deal with a militarily


assertive China.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Appoint a permanent Chairman of the present COSC, that is, another

M
four-star post in addition to the army, navy and air force chiefs of staff.

Y N A
IT Y B
• Creation of three new tri-service commands to better manage future

C U R challenges and vulnerabilities: Special Operations Command, Aerospace

SE
AL
Command and Cyber Command.

RN
IN TE • Establishment of a Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs to deliberate on
security issues having foreign policy implications.
Naresh Chandra Committee (2012) - (Task Force on National Security)

• Setting up of an Advanced Projects Agency on the lines of the Defence


Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to oversee defence R&D,

A L
ITT
the posting of additional armed forces officers to the MoD and the

AN M
Ministry of External Affairs and civilian IAS officers to the Services

M
Headquarters for better integration and coordination.

Y N A
IT Y B
• Increasing the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in defence

C U R joint ventures from 26 to 49 per cent which has been implemented

SE
RN AL
IN TE
D.B. Shekatkar Committee - (Enhancing combat capabilities and rebalancing defence expenditure)

• Optimization of Signals Establishments to include Radio Monitoring


Companies, Corps Air Support Signal Regiments and merger of Corps

A L
ITT
Operating and Engineering Signal Regiments.

AN M
M
• India’s defence budget should be in the range of 2.5 to 3 percent of the

Y N A
GDP.

IT Y B
C U R • Redeployment and restructuring of approximately 57,000 posts of

SE
AL
officers/JCOs/ORs and civilians.

RN
IN TE • Military Intelligence School at Pune be converted to a tri-service
intelligence training establishment.

• Establishment of a Joint Services War College for training for middle-


level officers.
D.B. Shekatkar Committee - (Enhancing combat capabilities and rebalancing defence expenditure)

• Restructuring of repair echelons in the Army to include Base


Workshops, Advance Base Workshops and Static / Station Workshops in

A L
ITT
the field Army.

AN M
M
• Redeployment of Ordnance echelons to include Vehicle Depots,

Y N A
Ordnance Depots and Central Ordnance Depots apart from streamlining

IT Y B inventory control mechanisms.

C U R
SE
AL
• Better utilization of Supply and Transportation echelons and Animal

RN Transport units.

IN TE • Closure of Military Farms and Army Postal Establishments in peace


locations.
D.B. Shekatkar Committee - (Enhancing combat capabilities and rebalancing defence expenditure)

• Enhancement in standards for recruitment of clerical staff and drivers in


the Army.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Improving the efficiency of the National Cadet Corps.

N A M
Y
• Creation of 3 integrated theatre commands — northern for the China

IT Y B border, western for the Pakistan border, and southern for the maritime

C U R role.

SE
RN AL
IN TE
MAJOR REFORMS TAKEN
CDS

L
• Appointment of Gen. Bipin Rawat as the first Chief of Defence Staff

ITTA
(CDS) on January 1, 2020, and the creation of the Department of
Military Affairs (DMA) in the Ministry of Defence.

AN M
• Rank of a four-star General with salary and benefits equivalent to a

A M
Service Chief.

N
Y BY
• The CDS will act as the principal military adviser to the defence minister

U RIT
on tri-Services issues

SEC • CDS will be a member of Defence Acquisition Council and Defence

RN AL Planning Committee

IN TE • The CDS is vested with the authority to provide directives to the three
chiefs.

• CDS has no military command over the other services and can only
advise the government on matters that concern all three services.
MAJOR REFORMS TAKEN
• CDS will wield control over issues governing promotions, travel,
appointments to key posts, and overseas assignments.

A L
ITT
• CDS is vested with the authority in prioritising inter-service

AN M
procurement decisions as Permanent Chairman-Chiefs of Staff

M
Committee.

Y N A
IT Y B
• As head of DMA, the CDS is now be answerable to Parliament.

C U R
SE
AL
• Function as the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command

RN Authority.

IN TE
MAJOR REFORMS TAKEN

AtmaNirbhar Abhiyan Package announced few important measures;


• Raising the sectoral cap of foreign direct investment (FDI) (automatic

A L
ITT
approval) from the existing 49% to 74%.

AN M
M
• Negative list for the import of defence equipment in India. A list of 101

Y N A
items for which the embargo on imports is planned to be progressively

IT Y B
implemented between 2020 and 2024.

C U R
SE
AL
• Separate capital budget for indigenous weapons procurement

RN • Corporatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and reforming the

IN TE defence procurement .
• Setting up of a ‘Project Management Unit’ and providing support to the
contract management purposes for timely procurement.
• New Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) - The new policy replaces
Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016.
MAJOR REFORMS TAKEN

Human rights cell

A L
ITT
• To assure people that the Army upholds the values of human rights and

AN M
does not shy away from investigating its own violations.

N A M
Y
• The cell will mark the first time that an Indian Police Service officer will

IT Y B
work with the MoD to help in coordination with the Ministry of Home

C U R Affairs, other agencies and the local police.

SE
RN AL • Earlier, the Army used to carry out its own internal probes, mostly at the

IN TE local level. The new cell will be the nodal point to examine any reports
of human rights violations reports.

• It is as yet unclear if the cell will have its own investigation team, or will
coordinate with local authorities for the probe.
MAJOR REFORMS TAKEN

Vigilance cell
• A separate vigilance cell under the Chief of Army Staff with tri-services

A L
ITT
representation.

AN M
M
• It will tackle a host of issues, including moral as well as financial.

Y N A
T Y B
• Vigilance issues until now were dealt with through multiple agencies at the
I
C U R local level and through the existing ‘discipline and vigilance cell’, but there

SE
AL
was no single point of interface.

RN
IN TE • New cell will have colonel-level officers from the Indian Air Force and the
Navy.

• The idea is to imbibe best practices and to have someone from outside the
system to look into an issue without any bias.
MAJOR REFORMS TAKEN

Restructuring plan

A L
ITT
• The idea is to make the 1.3 million-strong force leaner and meaner, as well
as to enhance its combat capabilities.

AN M
N A M
Y
• The aim of the reforms is to cut down the overall strength by about 1.5 lakh

IT Y B
personnel over the next 5-7 years.

C U R
SE
AL
• The process will not only free up additional resources for modernisation,

RN but will also cut down pension bills in the future.

IN TE • It aims for a better ratio of combat forces to overall forces. This will include
slashing non-operational flab, and downsizing the Army HQs through
merging or relocating different directorates and by creating integrated
battle groups.
WAYFORWARD

• Formulate a comprehensive NSS, inclusive of internal security, so that all


the stakeholders are aware of what is expected of them.

A L
M ITT
AN
• A fresh debate on giving command positions to women in the Army,

M
besides combat roles and permanent commission should take place.

Y N A
• SC (Babita Puniya case, 2020) held that female Naval officers have the

IT Y B
right to Permanent Commission (PC).

C U R
SE
AL
• The government must commit itself to supporting long-term defence plans

RN by making the dormant NSC a proactive policy formulation body for long-

IN TE term national security planning.

• Enhance defence budget to 3.0 per cent of the GDP for defence
modernisation and upgrade the military strategy against China to
deterrence.
WAYFORWARD

• Provide armed forces with a truly integrated Command, Control,


Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and

A L
ITT
Reconnaissance (C4I2SR) system suitable for modern network-centric warfare.

AN M
M
• The Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) also need to be modernised as they

Y N A
are facing increasingly potent threats while being equipped with obsolete

T Y
weapons.
I B
C U R
SE
AL
• Tour of Duty - A person would serve for three years, including his training

RN period, before being released from the Army to pursue work in the civil streets,

IN TE without any post-retirement benefits.

• The next logical step in the process of defence reforms is the formation of
Integrated Theatre Commands to synergise the capabilities and combat
potential of the three Services during war and peace.
INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMAND

An integrated theatre command envisages a unified command of the three


Services, under a single commander, for geographical theatres that are of

A L
ITT
security concern. The commander of such a force will be able to bear all

AN M
resources at his disposal from the IAF, the Army and the Navy with

M
seamless efficacy.

Y N A
IT Y B
C U R This is in contrast to the model of service-specific commands which India

SE
AL
currently has, wherein the Army, Air Force and Navy all have their own

RN commands all over the country. In case of war, each Service Chief is

IN TE expected to control the operations of his Service through individual


commands, while they operate jointly.
INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMAND

• The concept of an integrated theatre command was pioneered by the


United States military. In 1947, the US set up five geographic tri-service

A L
ITT
commands to cover the globe. It now has 11 unified commands.

AN M
M
• In 2016, China reorganised its military and Navy into five joint theatre

Y N A
commands – Eastern, Western, Northern, Southern and Central. Its

IT Y B Western Theatre Command oversees China's border with India.

C U R
SE
AL
• The current structure of the armed forces includes 17 different

RN commands, seven each belonging to the Army and the Air Force, and

IN TE three headed by the Navy. Though these commands are in the same
regions, they are not located together.
INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMAND

At present, India only has two tri-service commands.

A L
ITT
• Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), was created in 2001 and is led
by service chiefs on a rotational basis.

AN M
M
• Strategic Forces Command established in 2006 is a functional command

Y N A
(not overseeing a particular geographical location).

IT Y B
C U R India’s military is reported to be reorganized into five theatre commands by

SE
AL
2022.

RN • Northern Command along the border with China

IN TE • Western Command along the border with Pakistan


• Peninsular Command
• Air Defence Command
• Maritime Command
INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMAND - BENEFITS

• Reducing redundancies across the services by integrating manpower


within theatre commands

A L
M ITT
AN
• Redirecting a sizable portion toward maintenance and modernization of

M
equipment and capabilities.

Y N A
IT Y B
• Integrated approach toward procurement, sans capital acquisitions.

C U R
SE
AL
• Requirements of the military as a whole would be able to be

RN formulated.

IN TE • Ensure synergy among the tri-services

• Lead to systematic planning in the acquisition of resources, as it will end


piecemeal approach
INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMAND - BENEFITS

• Lead to significant cuts in the cost of maintenance and management of


assets

A L
M ITT
AN
• Facilitate easier maintenance and spares management

N A M
Y
• Jointly contracting specialized equipment for the tri-services.

IT Y B
C U R • Orders in bulk, will boost the domestic defence production sector and

SE
AL
will result in the military getting a better rate for their purchases.

RN
IN TE • Integration of logistics by the formation of a Joint Logistics Command

• Common contract management for the three services and Common


inventories for maintaining reserves
INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMAND - CONCERNS

• Might perpetuate the dominance of the army and give it greater

A L
ITT
operational control

AN M
M
• IAF feels that it doesn’t have enough resources like fighter squadrons,

Y N A
mid-air refuellers and AWACS to allocate them dedicatedly to different

IT Y B
theatre commanders.

C U R
SE
AL
• IAF - India is not geographically large enough to be divided into different

RN theatres, as resources from one theatre can easily be moved to another

IN TE theatre.

• To achieve a more efficient command and control configuration, it would


be vital to ensure that bureaucracy is kept to a minimum.
A L
M ITT
A M AN
BY N
SPACE RITSECURITY
Y
SEC U
RN AL
IN TE
INTRODUCTION

Several advancements made in the field of space technology over the last few decades have
significantly benefited mankind. Today, space technology is considered critical to human

A L
ITT
survival and progress.

AN M
M
• Space systems are increasingly being used in multiple fields, such as financial

Y N A
management, education, tele-medicine, scientific research and disaster management, to

T Y B
gather real time information and increase efficiency and connectivity.
I
C U R
SE
AL
• Currently, an estimated 2,666 satellites are in orbit. The US is the world leader with over

RN 1300 satellites in orbit, followed by China which has over 350 satellites. In contrast, India

IN TE ranks sixth in the world with 58 satellites to its credit.

• Dual use of the nature of space technology enables its utilisation for security purposes
too, for military support functions like reconnaissance, communication and navigation
have received global acceptability.
NEED FOR SPACE SECURITY

• Space is becoming an increasingly ‘congested, contested, and competitive’


medium.

A L
M ITT
AN
• Capabilities in space have the potential to influence the international balance of

M
power.

Y N A
T Y B
• The Security Framework of India is likely to increase its reliance on satellites for
I
C U R
the purpose of intelligence gathering, communication, navigation and operating

SE
AL
various weapon systems.

RN
IN TE • Space is an important for the passage of ballistic missiles and for operating
various military systems like missile defence systems, spy planes (orbital UAVs),
near-space systems, and anti-satellite weapons like Kinetic Kill Weapons, etc.
NEED FOR SPACE SECURITY

• The satellite operations could be hindered by space debris, ground or space


based jammers, cyber attacks and pre-programmed micro satellites .

A L
M ITT
AN
• Policies of some states do show signs of gradual militarisation and

M
weaponization of outer space and their actions appear to be exploiting the

Y N A
ambiguities in the existing space law regime.

IT Y B
C U R
• There also exists a possibility of deployment of space-based weapons, laser-

SE
AL
directed energy weapons, etc., either for targets in space or on the ground.

RN
IN TE • From the geostrategic prism, space is increasingly being viewed as a foreign
policy tool and a force multiplier, and simultaneously also as the fourth medium
of warfare.
NEED FOR SPACE SECURITY

In the last few years, countries have explored alternative options of making enemy

A L
satellites dysfunctional, options which do not involve direct destruction of the target
or creation of the debris. For example,

M ITT
A M AN
• Jam the communication from the satellites by interfering with its radio

BY N
signals.

RIT Y
SEC U• Close proximity anti-satellite technologies - Sending satellites that could

RN AL just approach a target close enough to deviate it from its selected orbit,

TE
without destroying it.

IN • Possible use of ground-based lasers to the sensors of the satellites and


make them at least partially blind so that they are unable to work efficiently.
INDIA’S ADHERENCE TO SPACE NORMS

• India believes in protecting space sustainability to allow peaceful uses of outer


space by all stakeholders.

A L
M ITT
AN
• India adheres to various multilateral conventions or guidelines that seek to

M
ensure continuous space access for all, on the one hand, and mitigate potential

Y N A
man-made or natural risks.

IT Y B
C U R
• The UN General Assembly (UNGA) had established a Committee on the Peaceful

SE
AL
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1959, and had proposed five treaties for

RN approval and ratification by the member states.

IN TE
INDIA’S ADHERENCE TO SPACE NORMS

India is committed to the observance of the following UN conventions/guidelines


that have broader global acceptability:

A L
M ITT
AN
• India adheres to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), 1968 Rescue Agreement,

M
1972 Liability Convention and 1974 Registration Convention.

Y N A
T Y B
• India is a signatory to the 1979 Moon Agreement but has not ratified it.
I
C U R
SE
AL
• India is a member of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee

RN (IADC) and adheres to the Debris Mitigation Guidelines of 2008.

IN TE • India actively participates in all discussions at the Conference on Disarmament


(CD).
INDIA’S ADHERENCE TO SPACE NORMS

• India was the co-sponsor of the UNGA resolution 68/29 on Prevention of an


Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).

A L
M ITT
AN
• India has agreed to the use of Transparency and Confidence Building

M
Mechanisms (TCBMs) to ensure space security.

Y N A
T Y B
• India is constructively debating the European Union (EU)-sponsored proposal for
I
C U R
creating an International Code of Conduct (ICoC) as an interim measure until a

SE
AL
legally binding space treaty mechanism is formulated.

RN
IN TE
OUTER SPACE TREATY (OST)
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

A L
M ITT
• The Outer Space Treaty came into force in 1967. It has 104 signatories. These include

A M AN
major space powers like the US, Russia, China, Japan and the European members of the

BY N
European Space Agency (ESA), as well as emerging space powers like Brazil and India.

RIT Y
U
• OST was the first binding legal instrument for the management and governance of outer

SECspace that came into force.

RN AL
IN TE • It prohibits nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons from being placed in or used from
Earth's orbit.

• The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was the
primary body in charge of negotiating the treaty.
OUTER SPACE TREATY (OST)

• There have been four more major treaties dealing with Outer Space that have
been signed since, namely:

A L
ITT
• The Rescue Agreement
• The Liability Convention

AN M
M
• The Registration Convention

Y N A
• The Moon Treaty

IT Y B
C U R
• OST remains as one of the primary documents governing the control of Outer

SE
AL
Space.

RN
IN TE • The other four agreements served to elaborate and further clarify the OST while
also providing legally enforceable measures regarding the violation of any of the
OST’s articles.
OUTER SPACE TREATY (OST)

• Issues that crop up include the vagueness of its lexicon, the lack of definition of
its terms and its inadequacy to envision and subsequently cope with concurrent

A L
ITT
challenges.

AN M
M
• Issues such as the privatization of space exploration, the dangers of excessive

Y N A
satellite debris, the utilization of satellite technology for unethical breaches of

T Y B
privacy, the emergence of Quantum Physics, Quantum Mechanics and Quantum
I
C U R
Computing; all pose tremendous challenges.

SE
RN AL • There is a need to rework the OST treaty and contemporize it to deal more

IN TE directly with issues of the current era.


SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIA

MISSION SHAKTI – Anti-satellite missile test (ASAT)

A L
ITT
• Anti-satellite missile test (ASAT) is the technological capability to

AN M
hit and destroy satellites in space through missiles launched

M
from the ground.

Y N A
IT Y B
• It can cripple enemy infrastructure, and bring it down on knees,

C U R without causing any threat to human lives.

SE
RN AL • According to the Ministry of External Affairs, the Indian test was

IN TE done in the lower atmosphere to ensure that there was no space


debris.
SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIA

• Test was carried out on a satellite placed in the low-earth orbit.


Most strategic satellites are placed in orbits that are 30,000 km

A L
ITT
from earth’s surface or even higher. DRDO scientists claim India

AN
has the technology to target these as well.
M
N A M
Y
• The first anti-satellite test (ASAT) was carried out by the US

IT Y B military way back in 1959. The then Soviet Union followed a year

C U R later. Thereafter, the two countries carried out a series of such

SE
AL
tests up till early 1980s. After that there was a lull, broken only

RN by the Chinese test in 2007.

IN TE • Other countries which could have the capability, like Israel, have
not shown an intention to test.
SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIA
Defence Space Agency (DSA) IndSpaceEx - A table-top war game with all the stakeholders
including its scientific establishment and the military.
• It comprises members of the three services (Army,
A L
Naval and Air Force).

M ITT
• It is meant to give a better understanding of the new and

A
• To help the country fight wars in outer space.
M AN
emerging space security challenges in outer space.

BY N
Y
• It will aid India in developing appropriate capabilities to

RIT
• It will gradually take over the space-related

U
protect its interests.

EC
capabilities of the three forces.

S
RN AL Defence Space Research Agency (DSRA)

IN TE • It has been entrusted with the task of creating space


warfare weapon systems and technologies.

• It would be working in close coordination with


the triservices integrated Defence staff officers.
SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIA

BOOST TO PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN SPACE ACTIVITIES

A L
ITT
• Level playing field provided to private companies in satellites, launches and
space-based services.

AN M
N A M
Y
• Predictable policy and regulatory environment to private players will be

T Y B
provided. Private sector allowed to use ISRO facilities and other relevant assets
I
C U R
to improve their capacities.

SE
RN AL • Future projects for planetary exploration, outer space travel etc shall also be

IN TE open for private sector.

• There will be liberal geo-spatial data policy for providing remote-sensing data to
tech-entrepreneurs.
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN

Develop an institutional structure to implement space security policy


• As the Indian space programme is civilian in nature, the existing institutional

A L
ITT
structure is meant to cater mainly for civilian requirements.

AN M
• To cater for strategic requirements, a National Authority for Space Security

M
(NASS) needs to be established under the defence ministry to oversee all aspects

Y N A
of space security.

IT Y B
C U R
Establish a Space Command

SE
AL
• A dedicated Space Command needs to be established for administering various

RN military-related aspects of satellite technology.

IN TE • This command would directly liaise with NASS for all policy matters and budget
requirements.
• There is also a need to develop Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR)
capacities in space to support network centric strategies.
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN

Enhance Space Situational Awareness Capabilities

A L
ITT
• For launching of satellites and ensuring that operational satellites do not suffer

AN M
damage from space debris, it is important to get timely warnings.

N A M
Y
• There is a need to develop a combination of an IR-microwave-radar network for

T Y B
gathering technical intelligence in space.
I
C U R
SE
AL
• There is also a need to put in place a Space Collision Warning System.

RN
IN TE • A separate space weather monitoring and forecasting capability needs to be
developed by engaging the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) and the
proposed Space Command.
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN

Legal Architecture

A L
ITT
• There is a need to update existing national laws and consider legislating new
space laws.

AN M
N A M
Y
• The development of such a legal regime should also cater to the need for

T Y B
international space treaty obligations.
I
C U R
SE
AL
• There is also a need to evolve guidelines to respond to any hostile activity in

RN outer space.

IN TE
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN

Strategic Technologies

A L
ITT
• Technological innovation needs to be encouraged and agencies like the Defence

AN M
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) should be actively engaged in

M
this regard.

Y N A
T Y B
• Private industry should be encouraged to undertake various technology
I
C U R
development and production projects.

SE
RN AL • Satellites in space and ground infrastructure could become vulnerable to cyber

IN TE attacks. Hence, a specific cyber security mechanism also needs to be put in


place.
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN

Counter-space Capabilities

A L
ITT
• India’s increasing military dependence on space would make space assets more

AN M
vulnerable to attacks by adversaries. India would have to develop effective

M
counter-space capabilities.

Y N A
T Y B
• This demands initiating a Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite (KE-ASAT) programme and
I
C U R
conducting a demonstrative test.

SE
RN AL • There is a need to develop methods for satellite jamming at various orbits.

IN TE • India should voluntarily commit to a No First Use (NFU) policy with regard to any
offensive action in space.
A L
M ITT
M A N
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