merits ensued.
ARTICLE 11 – JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO OLARBE Y
BALIHANGO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The accused who shows by clear and convincing evidence that the death of the
victim arose from the need for self-preservation in the face of the victim's
deadly unlawful aggression, and there was a reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the same, is entitled to acquittal on the ground of
self-defense in the absence of any indication of his having provoked such
unlawful aggression.
In self-defense and defense of stranger, the circumstances as the accused
perceived them at the time of the incident, not as others perceived them, should
be the bases for determining the merits of the plea.
The Case
For the killing of the late Romeo Arca, accused Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango
(Olarbe) was charged with and convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 27, in Santa Cruz, Laguna through the judgment rendered on
August 13, 2014 in Criminal Case No. SC-12274.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on March 22,
2016.2
Antecedents
The information charged Olarbe with murder, viz.:
That on or about May 7, 2006 at about 12:00 o'clock midnight, at Sitio Pananim,
Municipality of Luisiana, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery and with the use of a rifle (airgun) converted to
caliber .22 and a bolo, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot and hack one ROMEO ARCA with the said weapons, thereby inflicting
upon him gunshot wound and hacking wounds on the different parts of his body
which resulted to (sic) his instantaneous death, to the damage and. prejudice of
his surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The CA recounted the factual and procedural background of the case in its
assailed decision thusly:
Arraigned, OLARBE initially pled not guilty to the crime charged. Upon re-
arraignment, OLARBE pleaded guilty but subsequently withdrew his plea of
guilt and manifested for the presentation of his defense. Thereafter, trial on the
The prosecution's diegesis of the case is synthesized as follows:
On 8 May 2006 at around 12:30 o'clock midnight, OLARBE voluntarily
surrendered to police officers SPO2 Vivencio Aliazas, PO3 Ricardo Cruz and PO1
William Cortez at the Police Station of Luisiana, Laguna. OLARBE informed them
that he happened to have killed Romeo Arca (Arca) in Sitio Pananim, Luisiana,
Laguna. Forthwith, OLARBE was booked, arrested and detained at the police
station. Thereafter, the police officers proceeded to the crime scene and found
the lifeless body of Arca with several wounds and the bolo used by OLARBE in
killing him. The Death Certificate revealed that Arca's antecedent cause of death
was gunshot wounds and his immediate cause of death was hacked wounds.
For his part, OLARBE invoked self-defense and avowed -
On the fateful incident, he and his wife Juliet were sleeping in their house
in Barangay San Antonio, Sitio Pananim, Luisiana, Laguna. Suddenly they were
awakened by the sound of a gunshot and shouting from Arca who appeared to
be drunk. Arca was holding a rifle (an airgun converted to a calibre .22) and
shouted "mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapatayin ko kayo." Then, Arca forcibly
entered their house and aimed the gun at them. OLARBE immediately grabbed
the gun from him and they grappled for its possession. OLARBE managed to
wrest the gun away from Arca. In a jiff, OLARBE shot Arca causing the latter to
lean sideward ("napahilig"). Nevertheless, Arca managed to get his bolo from his
waist and continued to attack them. OLARBE grabbed the bolo and in their
struggle for its possession, they reached the outer portion of the house. OLARBE
was able to wrestle the bolo and instantly, he hacked Arca. After the killing
incident, OLARBE voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities.4
Judgment of the RTC
Rejecting Olarbe's pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the RTC
pronounced him guilty of murder as charged. It observed that the initial
unlawful aggression by Arca had ceased when Olarbe shot him in the head and
caused him to "lean sideward." It disbelieved Olarbe's insistence that Arca had
still been able to grab his bolo and assault Olarbe's common-law spouse
therewith for being implausible considering that Arca had by then been hit in
the head. It held that Olarbe's testimony that he had wrested the bolo from Arca
after grappling for its control, and had then hacked him with it was improbable
and pot in accord with the natural order of things because. the injury in the head
had already weakened and subdued Arca; and that the killing was treacherous
because Olarbe had hacked the then unarmed and weakened victim.
The dispositive portion of the judgment of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds that herein accused was unable to prove the
justifying circumstance of self-defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing SO ORDERED.6
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part and Hence, this appeal.
further, he employed treachery when he killed the victim Romeo Arca. Thus,
this Court finds the accused Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango GUILTY of "Murder". The accused and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) have separately
manifested that they would no longer be filing supplemental briefs in this
On the other hand, finding that herein accused voluntarily surrendered to the appeal; and prayed that their respective briefs filed in the CA should be
police authorities of the Mrn1icipal Police Station of Luisiana, Laguna considered.7
immediately after killing Romeo Arca, he is entitled to the said mitigating Issue
circumstance. The accused Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango is thereby hereby
sentenced to the minimum penalty of imprisonment for the crime of murder, In his appellant's brief filed in the CA, Olarbe submitted that it was erroneous to
which is a period of TWENTY (20) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY TO RECLUSION reject his pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger because he had killed
PERPETUA. Arca to save himself and his common-law wife from the latter's unlawful
aggression; that his use of the victim's gun and bolo to repel or stop the unlawful
The accused Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango is also hereby ordered to pay to the aggression was necessary and reasonable; and that the killing was consequently
heirs of Romeo Arca the following: legally justified.

Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00; The OSG countered that it was Olarbe who had mounted the unlawful
aggression against Arca; and that the latter had been defenseless when Olarbe
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00; hacked him to death.
Ruling of the Court
Actual damages in the following amounts - P1,000.00 as expenses for church
services from the Iglesia Filipina Independiente; the amount of P1,200.00 for The appeal has merit.
expenses incurred in Jeralyn's Flower Shop; the amount of P20,000.00 paid to
Mancenido Funeral Service; fees paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Luisiana in An accused who pleads any justifying circumstance in Article 11 of the Revised
the amount of P150.00; and, the amount of P15,000.00 paid for the burial lot; Penal Code admits to the commission of acts that show the commission of a
and, crime. It thus becomes his burden to prove the justifying circumstance with
clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, his conviction for the crime charged
Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. follows.8

SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Olarbe because the factual findings
of the RTC were consistent with the evidence on record and accorded with
human experience; and because treachery had attended the killing. The fallo of
the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Judgment dated 13 August
2014 of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Santa Cruz, Laguna,
Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. SC-12274, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant Rodolfo Olarbe is ORDERED to pay
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. He is further ORDERED to pay
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity, moral,
exemplary and temperate damages awarded from the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
In order for Olarbe to exonerate himself on the ground of self-defense under
Article 11, paragraph 1,9 of the Revised Penal Code, he must establish the
following facts, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.
Olarbe also invoked defense of stranger under Article 11, paragraph 3,10 of
the Revised Penal Code because Arca was likewise attacking his common-law
spouse. Defense of stranger requires clear and convincing evidence to prove the
following, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced
by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.11
The indispensable requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that
the victim must have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or • Lacerated wound on the left lower quadrant;
the stranger. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused is not entitled to • Lacerated wound on the occipital area
the justifying circumstance.12 The essence of the unlawful aggression • Two (2) hacking wounds posterior of neck; and
indispensable in self-defense or defense of stranger has been fully discussed • Hacking wound on lumbar area.14
in People v. Nugas,13 thus: Only Olarbe's account of the incident existed in the records, but instead of giving
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the weight to the account, the RTC and the CA rejected his pleas of self-defense and
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can defense of stranger based on their common holding that Arca had been
be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of weakened from being hit on the head; and concluded that consequently Arca
unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression could not have charged with his bolo.
from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary The CA's rejection of Olarbe's pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger was
threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three unwarranted.
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, To start with, there was no credible showing that the shot to the head had
imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. rendered Arca too weak to draw the bolo and to carry on with his aggression in
the manner described by Olarbe. The conclusion of the RTC and the CA thereon
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; was obviously speculative. Secondly, the State did not demonstrate that the shot
and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression from the airgun converted to .22 caliber fired at close range sufficed to disable
means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that Arca from further attacking with his bolo. Without such demonstration, the RTC
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent and the CA clearly indulged in pure speculation. Thirdly, nothing in the record
unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of indicated Arca's physical condition at the time of the incident How could the CA
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be then reliably conclude that he could not have mounted the bolo assault? And,
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a lastly, to rule out any further aggression by Arca with his bolo after the shot in
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion the he,ad was again speculative. On the other hand, our substantial judicial
as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening experience instructs that an armed person boldly seeking to assault others - like
attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver Arca - would have enough adrenaline to enable him to persist on his assault
was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a despite sustaining a wound that might otherwise be disabling.
pot.
Let us now revisit the events of that fateful night of May 7, 2006. Arca, armed To us, Olarbe's account of what did happen on that fateful night was highly
with the rifle (described as an airgun converted into a caliber .22) and the bolo, plausible. At the minimum, the details and sequence of the events therein
we to the house of Olarbe towards midnight. The latter and his household re described conformed to human experience and the natural course of things.
already slumbering, but were roused from bed because Arca fired his gun and Armed with both the gun and the bolo, Acra not only disturbed Olarbe's peace
was loudly shouting, Mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapatayin ko kayo. Thereafter, but physically invaded the sanctity of latter's home at midnight. Given that the
Arca forcibly entered Olarbe's house. Olarbe managed to the gun of Arca, and aggression by Arca was unprovoked on the part of Olarbe, and with no other
they struggled for control of it. Upon wresting the gun from Arca, Olarbe fired at person disputing the latter's account, we should easily see and understand why
him, causing him to totter. But Arca next took out the bolo from his waist and Olarbe would feel that his and his common law spouse's lives had been put in
charged at Olarbe's common-law spouse. This forced Olarbe to fight for extreme peril.
possession of the bolo, and upon seizing the bolo, he hacked Arca with it.
In addition, Olarbe's conduct following the killing of Arca - of voluntarily
Arca's death was certified to have been due to the gunshot on the head and surrendering himself to the police authorities immediately after the killing (i.e.,
hacking wounds. The CA noted the following injuries, aside from the gunshot at around 12:30 o'clock in the early morning of May 8, 2006), and reporting his
wound in the head, namely: participation in the killing of Arca to the police authorities - bolstered his pleas
• Lacerated wound on the forehead; of having acted in legitimate self-defense and legitimate defense of his common-
• Lacerated wound, front rib area; law spouse. Such conduct manifested innocence.
• Lacerated wound on the left upper quadrant;
To disbelieve Olarbe's account is to give primacy to surmise and speculation.
That is not how courts of law whose bounden and sworn duty is to dispense
justice should sit in judgment in a criminal trial. Judges should assiduously sift
the records, carefully analyze the evidence, and reach conclusions that are
natural and reasonable.
Did Olarbe clearly and convincingly establish the justifying circumstances
invoked?
We find that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression
against Olarbe and his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he
forcibly barged into the house and brandished his gun until he assaulted
Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. Such armed assault was not a mere
threatening act. Olarbe was justified in believing his and his common-law
spouse's lives to be in extreme danger from Arca who had just fired his gun in
anger outside their home and whose threats to kill could not be considered idle
in the light of his having forced himself upon their home. The imminent threat to
life was positively strong enough to induce Olarbe to act promptly to repel the
unlawful and unprovoked aggression. For Olarbe to hesitate to act as he had
done would have cost him his own life. Arca's being dispossessed of his gun did
not terminate the aggression, for, although he had been hit on the head, he
quickly reached for the bolo and turned his assault towards Olarbe's common-
law spouse. Olarbe was again forced to struggle for control of the bolo. The
swiftness of the action heightened Olarbe's sense that the danger to their lives
was present and imminent.
In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the courts should not
demand that the accused conduct himself with the poise of a person not under
imminent threat of fatal harm. He had no time to reflect and to reason out his
responses. He had to be quick, and his responses should be commensurate to
the imminent harm. This is the only way to judge him, for the law of nature - the
foundation of the privilege to use all reasonable means to repel an aggression
that endangers one's own life and the lives of others - did not require him to use
unerring judgment when he had the reasonable grounds to believe himself in
apparent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury. 15 The test is
whether his subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the danger
was reasonable or not,16 and the reasonableness of his belief must be viewed
from his standpoint at the time he acted.17 The right of a person to take life in
self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief
and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the
circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of circumstances as
they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might
entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to
kill.18
The remaining elements of the justifying circumstances were likewise
established.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression
does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted
cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make
comparisons that can easily be made in the calmness of reason. The law
requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In each particular case, it is
necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in
accordance with the rules of rational logic. The accused may be given the benefit
of any reasonable doubt as to whether or not he employed rational means to
repel the aggression.19
In determining the reasonable necessity of the means employed, the courts may
also look .at and consider the number of wounds inflicted. A large number of
wounds inflicted on the victim can indicate a determined effort on the part of
the accused to kill the victim and may belie the reasonableness of the means
adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor. 20 Here, however,
although Arca sustained several wounds, the majority of the wounds were
lacerations whose nature and extent were not explained. The lack of
explanations has denied us the means to fairly adjudge the reasonableness of
the means adopted by Olarbe to prevent or repel Arca's unlawful aggression.
Accordingly, to rule out reasonable necessity of the means adopted by Olarbe
solely on the basis of the number of wounds would be unfair to him. In any
event, we have to mention that the rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad in
its application, but is dependent upon the established circumstances of each
particular case.
The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the
time nor the sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the
weapon to be used. For, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act
upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon
this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in law
for the consequences.21 Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, not
material commensurability, viz.:
It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply
material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the
law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the
principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person
attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend
upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such
injury.22 [Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Lastly, the absence of any showing that Olarbe had provoked Arca, or that he
had been induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive has been equally TO: Director General Ronald Dela Rosa
palpable. We deem to be established, therefore, that the third elements of the       BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS
justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of stranger were present.       1770 Muntinlupa City

With Olarbe being entitled to the justifying circumstances of self-defense and GREETINGS:
defense of a stranger, his acquittal follows.
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court on July 23, 2018 promulgated a Decision in the
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated above-entitled case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
on March 22, 2016 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07112; ACQUITS accused RODOLFO "WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
OLARBE y BALIHANGO on the grounds of SELF-DEFENSE and DEFENSE OF A on March 22, 2016 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07112; ACQUITS accused RODOLFO
STRANGER; DECLARES him NOT CIVILLY LIABLE to the heirs of the late OLARBE y. BALIHANGO on the grounds of SELF-DEFENSE and DEFENSE OF A
Romeo Arca; and DIRECTS his IMMEDIATE RELEASE FROM STRANGER; DECLARES him NOT CIVILLY LIABLE to the heirs of the late
CONFINEMENT unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause. Romeo Area; and DIRECTS his IMMEDIATE RELEASE FROM
CONFINEMENT unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause.
Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Director, Bureau of Corrections, in
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Director, Bureau of Corrections, in
Corrections is DIRECTED TO REPORT the action taken to this Court within five Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
days from receipt of this decision. Corrections is DIRECTED TO REPORT the action taken to this Court within five
days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED."
Velasco, Jr., Leonen, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 171284               June 29, 2015

August 7, 2018 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
Sirs / Mesdames: BERSAMIN, J.:
The accused is guilty only of homicide in a prosecution for murder where the
Please take notice that on July 23, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was record does not substantiate the attendance of treachery. But he may not
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which benefit from the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense if
was received by this Office on August 7, 2018 at 1:28 p.m. there was no unlawful aggression from the victim. The Case
Alfredo Dulin y Narag appeals the decision promulgated on August 26,
Very truly yours, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification his
conviction for the murder of Francisco Batulan rendered on December 29, 1997
(SGD)
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.2 In
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN convicting him, the RTC had appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense, and had then sentenced him to "suffer the penalty of
  Division Clerk of Court reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17
years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years." On appeal, the CA prescribed
reclusion perpetua.
Antecedents
The information filed on January7, 1991 averred as follows:
ORDER OF RELEASE
That on or about August 22, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province
of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
Alfredo Dulin y Narag alias Freddie, armed with a sharp blade(d) instrument,
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Francisco
Batulan, inflicting upon him several stab wounds on the different parts of his
body which caused his death.
Contrary to law.3
During the trial, the Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (a) Dr.
Nelson Macaraniag, (b) Alexander Tamayao, (c) Romulo Cabalza and (d) Estelita
Batulan. Their version follows. Tamayao was on Tamayao Street in Atulayan
Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990
when a young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the
house of Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed.
Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his
own house, and there he saw Dulinstabbing Batulan who was already prostrate
face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching
the ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and
thrusting the knife at the latter with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran
towards Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife who was
his aunt, about the incident. He went home afterwards.
Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin,
and of seeing them fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two
occasions: He will soon have his day and I will kill him.4
Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening
of August 22, 1990 when he heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was
facing his house. It was Carolina, Danao’s daughter, screaming for help. He thus
sought out a fellow barangay tanod. On his return to the scene, he found
Batulanat the door of Danao’s house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed
instrument, about 6-7 inches long. Fearing for his safety, he rushed to the
Barangay Hall to seek the assistance of Edwin Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to
bring Batulan to the Provincial Hospital in Carig, Tuguegarao.5
Estelita recalled that Tamayao went to her house around 10:00 o’clock in the
evening of August 22, 1990 to inform her that Dulin had stabbed her husband in
Danao’s house. She rushed to Danao’s house but fainted on the way. Upon
regaining consciousness, she learned that her husband had been rushed to the
hospital. On her way to the hospital, she met Barangay Captain Loreto Meman,
who told her: Finally, Freddie Dulin killed your husband as he vowed to do. At
the hospital, she was told that her husband had sustained two wounds in the
back and several stab wounds in the front, and was being attended to at the
hospital’s intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.
Estelita said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake and
repeated what he had said to her about Dulin. But when she later on sought out
Barangay Captain Meman to ask him to confirm what he had told her about
Dulin’s vowing to kill her husband, Barangay Captain Meman’s response was:
I’m sorry I cannot go and declare what I have stated because I am afraid of
FREDDIE and he will kill all those persons who will testify in their favor.6
Estelita mentioned of the heated discussion between her husband and his
nephew, Seong Bancud, in front of Danao’s house in April 1990. On that
occasion, Dulin wielded a knife with which he tried to stab her husband. Dulin
was pacified only when she went to the aid of her husband, but she then heard
Dulin saying: You will soon have your day, I will kill you.7
Batulan was attended to at the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital on August 22,
1990 by Dr. Macaraniag, who said that the victim was in a state of shock from
his 12 stab wounds. Dr. Macaraniag was part of the three teams that conducted
the surgery on Batulan. He issued the Medico-Legal Certificate8 attesting that
Batulan died on August 24, 1990 at 12:15 a.m.; and that Batulan had sustained
several injuries, as follows:
Multiple stab wounds #12
(1) Lacerated wound, sternum, 1 cm.
(2) Lacerated wound, 4th ICS, 2 cm. MCL
(3) Lacerated wound, 1 cm. post axillary line
(4) Lacerated wound, 3 x 2 cm. 3 cm below scapula
(5) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect, left hand
(6) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, left hand
(7) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, about 3 cm. from elbow, left
(8) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. middle third, left forearm
(9) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. posterior aspect left forearm 4 cm. from left wrist
(10) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect of left foot
(11) Lacerated wound, 4 cm. lateral aspect, left thigh
(12) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. scapular area.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x.9
Dr. Macaraniag stated the cause of death to be "Hypovolemic shock secondary to
Massive Hemothorax secondary to Multiple stab wounds." 10 He clarified in court
that there were clerical errors in the preparation of the Medico-Legal Certificate
because his handwritten records indicated that Batulan had sustained stab
instead of lacerated wounds. He surmised that one of the clerks could have
misread his handwriting in the process of transcription.11
Estelita declared that her late husband had earned a living from buying pigs,
deriving a monthly income of ₱8,000.00; that their marriage bore only one
child; that she spent more or less ₱6,500.00 for Batulan’s hospitalization,
including his medicines, and ₱36,000.00 for Batulan’s 10-day wake, his burial
attire and his coffin; that during the wake she butchered one cow worth
₱6,800.00 and six pigsworth ₱15,000.00; that his death caused her and her
family so much pain; and that she and her family expended a total of
₱70,000.00, plus the ₱20,000.00 for the counsel’s services in bringing the
criminal charge against Dulin.12
In his defense, Dulin testified thatin the evening of August 22, 1990, he was in
his house in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with Doming Narag, Imelda
Danao, Jun Danao, Carolina Dulin and Caridad Narag; that Nicanor Annariao and
Raymund Soriano arrived at his house to see the fighting cocks being sold by
Alberto Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto was not yet around, arriving only at
about 8:00 o’clock in the evening to talk with Raymund and Nicanor about the
price of the fighting cocks; that after their transaction, Alberto served Nicanor
and Raymund food, and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao thereafter accompanied
Raymund and Nicanor to the highway to get a tricycle ride, but on their way,
they passed Angel Bancud who called out to him: that he (Dulin) asked the
others to go ahead, and he would just catch up with them; that as he (Dulin)
approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother, stabbed him on
the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained to Batulan:
Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you;
that he (Dulin) ran to the upper level of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by
Batulan who stabbed him again several times; that they grappled for the
weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin)
stabbed Batulan with the weapon, and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak,
eventually falling to the ground; and that he (Dulin) regained consciousness
only the next day at the hospital.
Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but
interjected that the barangay captain would summon him to bring Batulan
home each time the latter got drunk at night.
Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, authenticated the hospital records showing that Dulin
had also been injured.13 Judgment of the RTC
On December 29, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of
murder,14 to wit: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Alfredo Dulin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
and appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense and no aggravating circumstance, this Court hereby lowers the penalty
of said crime by two degrees and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17
years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount of
₱36,000.00 and moral damages for ₱40,000.00.
Without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.15
Decision of the CA
In his appeal, Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of
murder, considering the RTC’s appreciation of incomplete self-defense as a
privileged mitigating circumstance; and that even if self-defense should be
unavailing, he could be found guilty only of homicide because it was the victim
who had first attacked by stabbing him, and that the multiple wounds inflicted
on the victim did not mean that he had not been justified in killing the victim. He
argued that the penalty imposed on him was incorrect considering the absence
of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the modification
of the civil liability, decreeing:
The Court agrees with the OSG representing the State that the penalty requires
modification. The Court a quo committed error in the imposition of the proper
penalty. The crime committed by appellant in the case at bench is murder
qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating and no mitigating
circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Where no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the medium
period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed
by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification of the penalty and awards of damages. Appellant ALFREDO DULIN
y NARAG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
award of ₱36,000 actual damages is DELETED. Appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of Francisco Batulan ₱20,000 as temperate damages and ₱50,000 by way
of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.16
On January 12, 2006, the CA denied Dulin’s motion for reconsideration.17
Issues
In this appeal, Dulin submits the following issues for our review and
consideration, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE
ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
SELF-DEFENSE AS A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IN THE EVENT
THAT THE APPRECIATION OF A COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE IS UNAVAILING.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THE KILLING OF
FRANCISCO.18
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
I.
There was no self-defense
The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The
burden of proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by
clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following elements of self-
defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.19 The most important of all the elements is unlawful
aggression,20 which is the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a
justifying circumstance. Unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
should not be appreciated, for the two other essential elements of self-defense
would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to
prevent or repel.
Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is
aptly described in People v. Nugas,21 as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can
be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful
aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal
safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or
imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of
three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least,
imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression;
and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression
means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent
unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion
as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening
attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver
was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a
pot.
Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of
self-defense in his favor because all its elements had been present in the
commission of the crime.
In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had
initiated the attack against Dulin the unlawful aggression from Batulan
effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from the latter. The CA
thus found and held in its assailed decision:
Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to
take possession of the weapon and ran towards the second level of the house of
Vicente Danao, away from FRANCISCO. At that point, the unlawful aggression
against him effectively ceased. When
FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for possession of the weapon,
appellant now became the armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of trying to
wrest the weapon cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. At that
moment, appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to his
life and limb from FRANCISCO.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that FRANCISCO could no longer be
considered as unlawful aggressor. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore,
appellant’s theory that he was merely defending himself when he killed
FRANCISCO is unavailing. A fortiori, there would be no
basis for the second requisite of self-defense.22
We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor
against Dulin, ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him
of the weapon. Even if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the latter going
inside the house of Danao, where they again grappled for control of the weapon,
the grappling for the weapon did not amount to aggression from Batulan for it
was still Dulin who held control of the weapon at that point. Whatever Dulin did
thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation
against Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the
accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing
when the accused injured the aggressor. 23 As such, there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.
Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did
not cease because the latter followed him into Danao’s house with the singular
purpose of ending his life; and that there was no gap in the aggression initiated
by Batulan.24
The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed
Batulan and then running away from him. With the aggression by Batulan
having thereby ceased, he did not anymore pose any imminent threat against
Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression when Dulin fatally
stabbed him.
It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating
Batulan to have sustained twelve stab wounds25 confirmed the cessation of the
attack by Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by the
accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not
defending himself.26
II.
Incomplete self-defense was not proved
Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law. For this purpose, the accused must prove
the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense, but unlawful
aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present. Either or both of
the other requisites may be absent, namely: reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, or the lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.27
Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted
incomplete self-defense, and must be appreciatedas a privileged mitigating
circumstance.28
Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove
the elements of incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing that the
victim had committed unlawful aggression against him. With Batulan’s
aggression having already ceased from the moment that Dulin divested Batulan
of the weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-defense. Moreover, as
borne out by his stabbing of Batulan several times, Dulin did not act in order to
defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to inflict injury on Batulan.
III.
The RTC and CA erred in appreciating
the attendance of treachery
Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the
circumstances listed Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.1âwphi1 Treachery,
which was alleged in the information, is one such qualifying circumstance.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.29 Two
conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one,
the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the
criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. 30 Treachery, whenever
alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the
killing and raises it to the category of murder.31
Based on the established facts, Dulinand Batulan grappled for control of the
weapon Batulan had initially wielded against Dulin, who divested Batulan of it
and ran with it into the house of Danao, with Batulan in immediate pursuit. They
continued tograpple for the weapon inside the house of Danao, and it was at
that point when Dulin stabbed Batulan several times. Under the circumstances,
treachery should not be appreciated in the killing of Batulan because the
stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise due to his having been
sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending assault,32 and being thus afforded
the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to recover control of the
weapon from Dulin. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without
warning, or is done in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape,
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.33 The mode of attack
must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.
Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for which is
reclusion temporal.34 There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
the penalty is imposed in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, eight months and
one day to 17 years and four months). The indeterminate sentence of Dulin is,
therefore, eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14
years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with full credit of his
preventive imprisonment, if any.
Anent the civil liability, the CA ordered the accused to pay to the heirs of Batulan
₱20,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. We
modify the awards, and grant to the heirs of Batulan ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages. Indeed, the current judicial policy sets the civil indemnity for death
caused by a crime at ₱50,000.00. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled
to moral damages of ₱50,000.00. The civil indemnity and moral damages are
allowed even without allegation and proof, it being a certainty that the victim’s
heirs were entitled thereto as a matter of law. Temperate damages of
₱25,000.00 should further be granted to the heirs of the victim for they were
presumed to have spent for his interment. It would be unjust to deny them this
amount for the reason that they were not able to establish the actual
expenditure for his interment with certainty.35
In line with recent jurisprudence,36 interest of 6% per annum shall be charged
on all the items of the civil liability fixed and imposed herein, computed from
the date of the finality of this decision until the items of the civil liability shall be
fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the judgment promulgated on August 26,
2005 by finding ALFREDO DULIN YNARAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate sentence of EIGHT
YEARS AND ONE DAY OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS,
EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, with full credit of
his preventive imprisonment; ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of Francisco
Batulan ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each item
reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189405               November 19, 2014
SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in
behalf of his deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L.
GONZALES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its August 19, 2009
Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information 3 dated
March 2, 2005, which alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
with intent to kill and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one JEFFREY
WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious and moral gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the
afternoon, petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th
Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner
was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the deceased
victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the
eye witness Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer
terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from
the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s
head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner
holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued
thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said
gun. Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4)
times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the
forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled
the office.
The defense recounted a different version of the facts.
Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon,
more or less, petitioner, together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the
workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of
Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City, to fetch the latter so that their
family could spend time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day. Before
entering the Robinson’s Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular
security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty manning
the main entrance of said building and no firearm was found in his possession.
He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.
Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning
the entrance once again frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his
possession; hence, he was allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The
security guard also pointed to him the direction towards his wife’s table.
However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain
man and asked the latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person
whom petitioner had talked towas the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually
introducing himself as the husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo
hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The
response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng
asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from
Jeffrey who he was. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey
suddenly picked up something in his chair which happened to be a gun and
pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. The gun,
however, did not fire.
Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the
possession of the gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3)
more times. Again, the gun did not fire.
Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to
avoid any further confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately
blocked petitioner’s path and shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then,
Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed and was about to smash the
same on petitioner’s head.
Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun.
While in the act of parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable
force and contact that his parrying hand had made with the fire extinguisher
and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the
latter to fall on the floor and die.
Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded
towards the elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout,
"Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he was not able to answer.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their
two (2) young children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an
illicit relationship when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated January
30, 2005, sent by his friend.
During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pretrial conference was
conducted on even date and trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of
Marie Antonette Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez)
and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales (Gonzales), respectively. The prosecution
likewise formally offered several pieces of documentary evidence to support its
claim.
For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother,
Simeon Sander Dela Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena)
and Managbanag, who was recalled to the witness stand as witness for the
defense.
On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch 147,
rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y
Gloria Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of
Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus moral
damages in the amount of ₱1 Million, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private
respondent, through the private prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11,
2007 insofar as the sentence rendered against petitioner is concerned and the
civil damages awarded.
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the latter denied their appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision with modification on the civil liability of petitioner.
The decretal portion of the Decision7 reads: WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147 dated 26
February 2007 finding accused-appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(4) the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.
(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Raised are the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
SELF-DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE,
ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS
DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED
DURING THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE
ACT OF DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED VICTIM.
3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT
TRANSPIRED.9
There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim,
Jeffrey. What is leftfor determination by this Court is whether the elements of
self-defenseexist to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lackof sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.10 In other words,
there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the
life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.11
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal
liability, it is well settled thatwhen he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent
upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in
defense of himself.12 The burden of proving that the killing was justified and that
he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13 As such, he must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution
for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the
accused himself has admitted the killing.14
Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely
wanting. Hence, his petition must be denied.
First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that
unlawful aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely
threatening and intimidating action.15 There is aggression, only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life.16 The peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. 17 In the case at
bar, other than petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to
show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions or
initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun
from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may
have caused petitioner to fear for his life.
Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation
transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of
that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by
wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it,
there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner
had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to
do so, thus:
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the
gun.1avvphi1 Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From
that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire
extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused
had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression
with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased
when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled
that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to
kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense
is committed (Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has
no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased
(PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).
Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his
(accused’s) headbut he parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful
as nothing in the records is or would be corroborative of it.In contrast, the two
(2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not impeached, both gave the
impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from the
accused who was then already in possession of the gun.18
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who
resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor.19 To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his
purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in
peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-
defense on the part of the offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the
call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and
fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had
already ceased.
More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show
that if there was unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same rather
emanated from petitioner, thus: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Atty. Mariano:
Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?
A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the
moment and I was standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached
Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of the head of Jeff.
Q: And then what happened?
A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of
the gun.
Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?
A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.
Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey
warded off the gun, they started to struggle, what happened after that, if any?
A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried
to get hold of the fire extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey
fell down.
Q: And who was holding the gun?
A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSS-
EXAMINATION: Atty. Agoot:
Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from
the other side? Atty. Mariano:
Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.
Atty. Agoot:
I am on cross examination, your Honor.
COURT
You didn’t not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point
the gun at the back of Jeff and he did not come from my side so that means…
COURT
No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?
A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.
Atty. Agoot
He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?
A: Yes, Sir.
(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21
Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled
a gun from his chair and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate
competent evidence. Pitted against the testimony of prosecution witnesses,
Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses probative value. We
have, on more thanone occasion, ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be
justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence but also extremely doubtful in itself.22
In addition, other than petitioner’s testimony, there is dearth of evidence
showing that the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued
when he blocked the path of petitioner while the latter tried to run away to
avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of the
RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash
the big fire extinguisher on petitioner’s head. Alternatively, the prosecution
witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself
from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a deadly weapon. An
excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced
the person who was holding the gun already?
Witness:
A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this.
COURT
For the record.
Atty. Mariano:
Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire
extinguisher upright with his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his left
hand below the fire extinguisher.
Witness:
The left hand would support the weight basically.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping
of that person who was in possession of the gun?
Witness
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?
Witness
A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire
extinguisher at thattime. And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.
Atty. Agoot
Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi
pumutok" Do you affirmand confirm this statement?
Witness
A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point
the gun at Jeffrey and Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire
extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same time.
Atty. Agoot
Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without
firing?
Witness
A: Three (3) times, sir.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?
Witness
A: They were still pushing each other at that time.
Atty. Agoot
Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person…
Witness
A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was
pointing the gun at him.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire
extinguisher?
Witness
A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly
saw what was going on at that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated
04 September 2006, pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23
Petitioner’s contention that Jeffrey’s unlawful aggression was continuous and
imminent is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant
case, the severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted
and, therefore, cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent
laws and jurisprudence.
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the
deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably
commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to
avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed
to repel Homer's punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person
invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means
of attack and the defense. Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched
him and was trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant)
stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing
Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body was
unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-
appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite
was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC,
thus:
The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the
gun. The gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate
to repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that
the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a
rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs.
Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).
It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as
against the victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is
not a deadly weapon. Under the circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was
unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an imagined impending
attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute
unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA
628). It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must
be confronted by a real threat on his lifeand limb; and the peril sought to be
avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA
695).26
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should
have just run, despite any obstruction, considering that he was already in
possession of the gun. He could have also immediately sought help from the
people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor where the
shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the
authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident
or a cry of self-preservation. Yet, petitioner never did any of that.
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling
and hassling with Jeffrey, and inthe end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not
only once, but four times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention
to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:
Moreover, the Prosecution’s eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that
while there was prior struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless
accused who was holding the gun at the time of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p.
30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness Managbanag even
alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire
extinguisher, and the accused were pushing each other, accused pointed the gun
at the victim. She heard three (3) clicks and on the 4th , the gun fired (TSN, p. 12,
October 10, 2005). Under the circumstances, it cannot be safely said that the
gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The discharge of the gun which
led to the victim’s death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or
struggle for the possession of the gun.27
The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot
accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a
misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the
onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively, his intent to hurt
(or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the
pastthat the nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly
considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense.28 Thus,
petitioner’s contention that an accident simultaneously occurred while hewas in
the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There could
nothave been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound
on his head, a vital part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind
resolved to end the life of the victim.
Besides, petitioner’s failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on
the part of Jeffrey and to surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim
militates against his claim of self-defense.29
In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element
of self-defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine
qua nonfor upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense. 30 If there is
nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no
basis.31 Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioner’s argument that a
privileged mitigating circumstance of selfdefense is applicable in this case,
because unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other,
there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter.32
Anent petitioner’s argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as
suppression of evidence the prosecution’s alleged deliberate omission to
present the testimonies of the security guards-on-duty at the time of the
shooting incident, the same fails to persuade. We concur with the decision of the
CA on this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in
self-defense, shifted to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his
open admission of responsibility for the killing.
The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the
disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. The defense did not proffer
proof that the prosecution prevented the security guards from testifying. There
is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of
suppression of evidence.
The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the
opinion that their [the security guards] testimonies were vital and material to
the case of the defense. It could have compelled the security guards on duty to
appear before the court. xxx.33
It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense
is essentially a question of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to
determine the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of
its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses
while testifying.35 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA and
the RTC failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and
substance that would have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that petitioner did not act in
self-defense.36
In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that since the
incident transpired in Jeffrey’s office, and the witnesses presented by the
prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey, the witnesses are expected to
testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed out by
respondent, there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to
falsely testify against petitioner.37 The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey
does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or
fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere purpose of implicating petitioner
with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.
All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of
the RTC and the CA that the elements of homicide are present in the instant case
as amply shown by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, and they
constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or doubt.
Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
use of an unlicensed firearm, we deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal
of the Information will show that the use of unlicensed firearm was expressly
alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This allegation was further proved during trial by
the presentation of the Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Division, dated November 11, 2005, certifying that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, per verification from
the records of the said Division. Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1866, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance, to wit:
xxxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
x x x x.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being an aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the
penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum period.38 Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.
As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of
earning capacity in favor ofprivate respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA
in so far as they are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we
find the grant of exemplary damages in the present case in order, since the
presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has
been established.39 Based on current jurisprudence, the award of exemplary
damages for homicide is ₱30,000.00.40
Finally, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest
of six percent (6%) per annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil
indemnity and damages for loss of earning capacity shall be imposed, computed
from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19,
2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding
petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum, as the maximum penalty;
(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:
a. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d. the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;
f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an
interest of six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of finality of
this Decision until full payment thereof; and
g. the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 238120, February 12, 2020
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RICO DELA
PEÑA,* ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
INTING, J.:
Treachery attends the killing where the accused attacks the victim while the latter
is asleep and unable to defend himself. Absolutely, a sleeping victim is not in a
position to defend himself, take flight or otherwise avoid the assault, thus ensuring
that the crime is successfully executed without any risk to the attacker. 1
The Court is now asked to decide on Appeal2 the Decision3 dated October 30,
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02163, which affirmed
the Judgment4 dated October 28, 2015 ofBranch 45, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Bais City, in Criminal Case No. 11-94-MY, finding Rico Dela Peñ a (accused-
appellant) guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The case arose from an Information5 charging accused-appellant with the crime
of Murder committed as follows:
That on or about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of December 14, 2006 , at
Barangay Samak, Mabinay, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without any just motive, with treachery, and with
intent to kill his brother in law, OLIPIO GOMEZ AMAHIT, assault, attack, and
stab said Olipio Gomez Amahit with a "pinuti", thereby inflicting upon him
multiple stab wounds on his body, which directly caused the death of said Olipio
Gomez Amahit, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, and aggravated by relationship under Article 15 of
the RPC, the accused being the brother in law of the victim.6
The antecedents as culled from the CA Decision and records of the case are
summarized as follows:
Ernie D. Amahit (Ernie), son of the victim Olipio G. Amahit (Olipio), testified that
in the afternoon of December 14, 2006, he went to their nipa hut after tending
to their carabaos. When he was a few meters away, he saw accused-appellant
enter the nipa hut where his father was sleeping. Olipio was lying face down
when accused-appellant stabbed him at the back with a bolo locally known
as "pinuti." He heard his father shout for help while he watched accused-
appellant stab the former several times. Accused-appellant then threatened to
kill Ernie prompting him to run towards home to tell his mother about the
incident.7
For his part, accused-appellant alleged that at around 5:30 p.m. of December 14,
2006, while he was walking on the road on his way home, Olipio called and
motioned him to come near him. Olipio then told accused-appellant about the
banana plants that were uprooted. Accused appellant inquired as to the reason
for Olipio's action, but the latter simply told him not to get angry otherwise he
would kill him. When accused-appellant answered "no," Olipio pulled out
his bolo and thrust it towards him. They wrestied for the bolo and when
accused-appellant got hold of it, he stabbed Olipio. He narrated that Olipio was
first hit in the stomach but when they continued to grapple with each other, he
continued to stab the latter. Thereafter, accused-appellant went to the house of
his cousin.8
On October 28, 2015, the RTC rendered a Judgment9 finding accused-appellant
guilty of Murder. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having ably proven the
guilt of accused RICO DE LA PEÑ A for the crime of MURDER beyond reasonable
doubt, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory
penalties of the law, and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
P20,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
SO PROMULGATED IN OPEN COURT this 28th day of October, 2015 at Bais City,
Philippines.10
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Ernie who actually saw appellant
stab his father with a pinuti several times at his back while the latter was
sleeping lying face down on the floor. According to the RTC, it is an act of
treachery to the highest form when one attacks a person who was sleeping. It
gives no chance to the victim to defend himself thereby ensuring the evil motive
of killing the victim.11
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction by the RTC:
WHEREFORE, the 28 October 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 45, Bais City in Criminal Case No. 11-94-MY finding accused-appellant
RICO DE LA PEÑ A, guilty of Murder is AFFIRMED. With respect to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed upon him, accused-appellant shall be ineligible
for parole pursuant to RA No. 9346. The accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate
damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate
of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
With costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA concluded that the physical evidence presented including the location of
the stab wounds contradict accused-appellant's claim that Olipio was the
unlawful aggressor. The depth and seriousness of the wounds suffered by the
victim prove that the stabbing blows were not inflicted by accused-appellant as
a matter of defense but more to be taken as acts of aggression towards Olipio.13
Hence, this appeal.
After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the
parties, the Court finds that the CA committed no error in concluding that
accused-appellant is indeed guilty of the crime of Murder. The issues and
matters before the Court are the same issues raised in the CA, there being no
supplemental briefs filed. They were sufficiently addressed and correctly ruled
upon by the CA.
First, it has been held that when the issue involves matters like credibility of
witnesses, the calibration of their testimonies as well as the assessment of the
probative weight thereof, findings of the trial court and its conclusions anchored
on said findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so
because the trial court has the unique opportunity to closely monitor the
demeanor of witnesses during the trial and is in the best position to discern
whether they are telling the truth.14 There being no showing that the RTC
misconstrued or misapprehended any relevant fact in this case, the Court gives
full respect to its findings and conclusion, which were sustained on appeal by
the CA, supporting accused-appellant's conviction for Murder.
Second, credence is accorded to the testimony of Ernie, who positively identified
accused-appellant as the one who stabbed his father. The alleged inconsistency
between Ernie's affidavit and his testimony in open court does not affect his
credibility as it does not detract from the fact that he saw and identified
accused-appellant as the assailant of his father. Verily, a sworn statement or an
affidavit does not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of
the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. 15
Third, by invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, accused-appellant
thus admits committing the acts constituting the crime for which he was
charged and the burden of proof is on him to establish, by clear and convincing
proof, that (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.16
 Q: Where was he sleeping?
The prosecution's material witness, Ernie, clearly described how accused-
appellant stabbed his father to death. He recalled: A: Inside the nipa hut.
PROS.
YBANEZ: And, what was the position of your father while he was
Q:
sleeping?
xxxx
A: He was lying face down.
While approaching the said nipa hut was there any unusual
Q: xxxx
incident that you observe or witness?

A: Yes. Can you recall how many times this Rico Dela Peña
Q:
stabbed your father?
Q: What is that unusual incident?
A: Many times.
A: He stabbed my father.
xxxx
When you say he stabbed your father, who stabbed your
Q: And, what weapon did Rico Dela Peñ a use in stabbing your
father? Q:
father?
A: Referring to Rico.
A: A long bolo locally known as "pinuti".
Q: May we know the family name of this Rico?
The first time that your father was stabbed by Rico [,] what
Q:
A: Dela Peña. happened to your father?

Q: Is he inside this courtroom? A: My father shouted.

A: Yes. Q: And, can you remember what was the shout of your father?

Q: Can you please point to him. A: He shouted for help.

(Witness pointing to a person who when asked of his name And, what did you do after seeing that your father was
A: Q:
answered Rico Dela Peñ a). stabbed by Rico?

How far were you when you see this Rico Dela Peñ a stabbed A: I was just watching.
Q:
you. father?
You said a while ago that your father was stabbed by Rico
Q:
A: Just near. many times. After that what happened if any?

xxxx A: He said that he will include us.

And, when this Rico Dela Peña stabbed your father where Q: After hearing this, what did you do?
Q:
was your father situated and what was he doing?
A: We ran away.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
A: My father was asleep during that time.
This narration was corroborated by the result of the Post-Mortem
Examination18 showing that Olipio sustained several wounds on his back, to wit:
 >
Location
Right upper chest.
Along anterior axillary
line or three inches
below the nipple.
Findings
Five inches long, diagonal anterior ribs open to
four inches long, heart and other internal organs
can be seen through the wound.
Two inches long, vertical, deep and penetrating.
fell and rolled on the ground which caused the wounds at the back.19
Assuming that Olipio was the aggressor, it is nevertheless apparent that at the
time he was killed, the danger to accused-appellant had already ceased. Notably,
even after taking full control of the bolo, he attacked the victim several times
and stabbed him to death. Settled is the rule that when the unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former
aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.20
Both the RTC and the CA properly ruled that treachery qualified the killing to
murder.

Anterior side of the In People v. Clariño,21 the Court discussed that the lower court correctly
Cutting up to subcutaneous tissue.
right forearm. appreciated the circumstance of treachery since the victim was asleep at the
time of the assault.22 Accordingly, the essence of treachery is the sudden and
Five inches long with one inch abrasion tail, unexpected attack by an aggressor of an unsuspecting victim, depriving the
widely gasping, width about two inches, posterior latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby insuring its commission
Below right scapula
ribs open to two inches long, deep and without risk to the aggressor.23
penetrating.
Similarly, in People v. Caritativo,24 accused-appellant was found guilty of the
Above left iliac crest crime of murder for the death of Expidito Mariano. In affirming the conviction of
Four inches long, vertical, deep, large intestine
along posterior axillary accused-appellant, the Court stressed that treachery attended the killing of the
partly herniated.
line. victim as the latter was attacked while he was asleep. A sleeping victim is not in
a position to defend himself, take flight or avoid the assault, thus ensuri ng that
V-shaped wound on the
the crime is successfully executed without any risk to the latter.
posterior side of left Cutting tissue up to muscles.
thumb.
In this case, Ernie categorically stated that his father was sleeping inside
One inch below the nipa hut when accused-appellant stabbed him using a "pinuti". Olipio was
Four inches long, deep reaching muscles. lying on his stomach, with his face down, and it was in that position that he was
shoulder blade.
killed by accused-appellant. Under such circumstance, there is no doubt that he
Along right posterior was not in a position to put up any form of defense against his assailant. 25
One inch long, superficial.
axillary line.
Lastly, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
Posterior side of Right Horizontal, two inches long, reaching muscles and Information is sufficient if it contains the full name of the accused, the
forearm. tendon. designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date,
¾ inch long diagonal, cutting up to subcutaneous as well as the place of the offense. To the Court's mind, the Information herein
Posterior side of hand.
tissue. complied with these conditions since the qualifying circumstance of "treachery"
was specifically alleged in the Information. In fact, it bears emphasis that
The nature, character, location and extent of these wounds belie accused- accused-appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully
appellant's claim that Olipio attacked him with a bolo; and it was in self-defense apprised of the nature of the charges against him due to the insufficiency of the
that after wrestling the bolo from the victim, accused-appellant used it against Information.
the latter. The appearances of the wounds on the victim's heart, his internal
organs and large intestine contradict accused-appellant's defense that he had In People v. Galido,26 it was held that the failure to allege the element of force
only hit Olipio twice in the stomach and that after the second blow, both of them and intimidation in an information for rape is not a fatal omission that would
deprive the accused of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of made by the CA already conform to the latest jurisprudence on the
accusation against him. While the information failed to allege this element, the matter. People v. Jugueta holds:32
complaint stated the ultimate facts which constitute the offense. Since the In summary:
complaint forms part of the records and is furnished the accused, the latter may
still suitably prepare his defense and answer the criminal charges hurled I. For those crimes like Murder, Panicide, Serious intentional Mutilation.
against him.27 Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:
Furthermore, in People v. Candaza (Candaza),28 the Court declared that an
information which lacks the essential allegations may still sustain a conviction if 1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion
the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency perpetua because of RA 9346:
was cured by competent evidence presented therein. 29 Section 9 of Rule 117 of a. Civil indemnity        - P100,000.00
the same Rules reads: b. Moral damages         - P100,000.00
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any Thus, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), but reduced to reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages that
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. should be awarded will each be P100,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for
exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an
example.33 In the present case, other than treachery which was used to qualify
More recently, in People v. Solar (Solar),30 the Court found that the accused- the killing, the special aggravating circumstance of relationship was specifically
appellant has waived his right to question the defects in the Information filed alleged in the information and the accused-appellant did not deny that he is the
against him. It observed that the accused-appellant did not question the victim's brother-in-law, a relative by affinity within the second civil degree.
supposed insufficiency of the Information through either a motion to quash or
motion for bill of particulars. He also voluntarily entered his plea during the WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
arraignment and proceeded with the trial. As such, he is deemed to have waived October 30, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02163 finding
any of the waivable defects in the Information, including the supposed lack of accused-appellant Rico Dela Peñ a guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
particularity in the description of the attendant circumstances. Simply put, the of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
accused-appellant is deemed to have understood the acts imputed against him
by the Information and the appellate court erred in modifying his conviction in SO ORDERED.
the way that it did when he had effectively waived the right to question his
conviction on that ground.
------------------------ MIRANDA v. PEOPLE (NAULIT ARTICLE 3)------------------
In accused-appellant's case, the defense not only failed to question the
sufficiency of the Information at any time during the pendency of the case G.R. No. 158057             September 24, 2004
before the RTC, it even allowed the prosecution to present competent evidence, NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, petitioner,
proving the elements of treachery in the commission of the offense. At this vs.
point, as in Candaza and Solar, herein accused-appellant is deemed to have PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
waived any objections against the sufficiency of the Information. 31 DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
As to the penalty imposed, the RTC and CA were both correct in imposing the This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with the accessory penalty provided by G.R. CR No. 23742 affirming on appeal, the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
law, instead of death considering that the latter penalty has been suspended by (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82, in Criminal Case No. OD-861,
Republic Act No. (RA) 9346. As to the award of damages, the modifications convicting the petitioner of homicide.
In an Information filed in the RTC of Romblon, the petitioner was charged with
homicide allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1995, at around 9:30 o’clock in the
evening, in Barangay Libertad, municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bolo, one RICKY F. GUARTE, which
causes (sic) his untimely death.
Contrary to law.3
In due course, the prosecution adduced evidence against the petitioner which
was synthesized by the appellate court as follows:
On September 16, 1995, appellant went to a black-smith who made the design
of his bolo. When he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the
afternoon (TSN, September 4, 1998, p. 2), appellant saw the group of Lani
Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte drinking gin at the house
of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents. Appellant’s house is
about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte. Appellant
requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise. Thereupon,
appellant proceeded inside his house and went to sleep (ibid., p. 3). Around 9:00
p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s brother arrived at the Guarte house and
asked for any left-over food (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 3). Eliza prepared dinner
for him and after Gerardo finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky
(TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 5). Gerardo’s home is about twelve (12) meters away
from the Guarte home (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 11). Minutes later, Ricky
came back and together with Lani, Rex and Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte
house. They had not laid down for long when they heard stones being hurled at
the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times (TSN, August 5,
1998, pp. 2-3). Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw
appellant stoning their house. Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to
appellant’s house. Ricky asked appellant, his uncle, why he was stoning their
house. Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his
(appellant’s) house (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 6; August 5, 1998, pp. 4-5) and,
without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo (TSN, August 5,
1998, p. 8). Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was
stabbed, shouted for help (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 13). Lani heard Eliza’s cry
for help and immediately rushed outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on
the ground and supporting his body with his hands. Lani helped Ricky stand up
and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who stabbed him and Ricky
replied that it was appellant who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez arrived at
the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and
taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital (TSN, January 19, 1998, pp. 4-6).
At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Noralie Fetalvero operated on Ricky
that very night. Ricky had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive
blood loss, he died while being operated on (TSN, November 24, 1997, pp. 2, 6-
7). Dr. Fetalvero issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing the injuries
sustained by Ricky, thus:
Stab wound, left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration measuring 6
cms. long, irregular-edged at 8th ICS, left penetrating (operative findings):
(1) abdominal cavity perforating the stomach (thru & thru) and the left lobe of
the liver
(2) thoracic cavity thru the left dome of the diaphragm perforating the lower
lobe of the left lung.
…
(Exhibit C)
The Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Fetalvero stated the cause of Ricky’s death
as:
CAUSES OF DEATH:
Immediate cause : a. Cardiorespiratory Arrest
Antecedent cause : b. Hypovolemic shock
Underlying cause : c. Multiple thoraco-abdominal
injury 2º to stab wound
(Exhibit B)4
The Evidence of the Petitioner
The petitioner adduced evidence that at around 5:00 p.m. on September 16,
1995, he was on his way home at Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon. He saw his
nephew, Ricky Guarte, and the latter’s friends, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez, and
Lani Famero, about five meters away from his house, having a drinking spree.
He ordered them not to make loud noises, and they obliged. He then went to his
house, locked the door with a nail, and went to sleep. However, he was
awakened at around 9:30 p.m. by loud noises coming from Ricky and his three
companions. He peeped through the window grills of his house and admonished
them not to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was then already inebriated, was
incensed; he pulled out a balisong, pushed the door, and threatened to stab the
petitioner. The petitioner pushed their sala set against the door to block the
entry of Ricky, but the latter continued to push the door open with his hands
and body. The petitioner ran to the upper portion of their house and got his
bolo.5 He returned to the door and pushed it with all his might using his left
hand. He then pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand, towards Ricky. The
bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and the latter lost his balance and
fell to the floor. The petitioner, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain
at 11:00 a.m. on September 17, 1995.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, NOE TOLEDO is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and is meted the indeterminate penalty of from six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.
Accused is condemned to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil liability to the
heirs of the victim.6
The trial court did not give credence and probative weight to the testimony of
the petitioner that his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
On appeal in the CA, the petitioner raised the following issue in his brief as
appellant:
WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE CRIMINALLY HELD LIABLE
FOR THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF RICKY GUARTE7
Invoking Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner
claimed that he stabbed the victim by accident; hence, he is exempt from
criminal liability for the death of the victim.
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with modifications.
The CA also denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. The
appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed to prove that he acted in self-
defense.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that
the CA erred in not finding that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the
victim by accident and prays that he be acquitted of the crime charged.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide based on the evidence on record.
The petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error when it
affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting him of homicide, on its finding that
he failed to prove that he acted in complete self-defense when the victim was hit
by his bolo. The petitioner insists that he acted in complete self-defense when
his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to
prove self-defense with clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of
the CA affirming, on appeal, the decision of the RTC is correct.
The contention of the petitioner has no merit.
The petitioner testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He asserted in
the RTC and in the CA that he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of
the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
In his brief in the CA, the petitioner argued that:
In the case at bar, with all due respect, contrary to the findings of the lower
court, it is our humble submission that the death of Ricky Guarte was merely a
sad and unwanted result of an accident without fault or intention of causing it
on the part of accused-appellant. We submit, there were clear and indubitable
factual indicators overlooked by the lower court, bolstering the theory of the
defense on accidental death.8
However, the petitioner changed gear, so to speak, and now alleges that he
acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim. As such, he contends, he is not
criminally liable under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
The petitioner avers that he was able to prove the essential elements of
complete self-defense, thus:
A close scrutiny of the records of the case would show that the petitioner acted
in self-defense.
The essential requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) reasonable scrutiny of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself (People vs. Silvano, 350 SCRA 650)9
However, the petitioner also claims that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of
the victim.
It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is
tried and decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal. The case will be reviewed and decided on that
theory and not approached and resolved from a different point of view. To
permit a party to change his theory on appeal will be unfair to the adverse
party.10
The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense
which he adopted in the trial court and foisted in the CA – by claiming that he
stabbed and killed the victim in complete self-defense. The petitioner relied on
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial and appellate
courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he killed the
victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified
under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo
accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time
because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. 11 There is no such
defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily
implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused
has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts.
The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master
of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and
ends where it ends.12 Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, Q Where was he hit by the bolo you were carrying?
however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is A In the stomach.17
deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil …
liabilities.13 On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Q And since you were at the left side of the door, your right hand was at the
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, center part of the door, correct?
freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the A No, Sir.
accused.14 The basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Q Where was your right hand?
Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either A Holding a bolo.
an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no Q Where, in what part of the door?
criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which A Right side.
constitute free will or voluntariness of the act.15 An accident is a fortuitous Q When Ricky Guarte was pushing the door, the door was not opened?
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through A It was opened.
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or Q It was opened because you opened the door, correct?
unexpected by the person to whom it happens.16 A No, Sir.
Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, Q Now, why was it opened?
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the A Because he was pushing it.
accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. Such Q With his left hand?
affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial and appellate A With his both hands and body.
courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by Q Now, when he fell down because, according to you, he losses (sic) his balance,
accident without fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the left side of the body was the first to fell (sic) down, correct?
the accused to prove such affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength A Yes, Sir.
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. If the Q You are sure of your answer now Mr. Toledo?
accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted. A Yes, Sir.
The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without Q Now, and while holding that bolo, you are doing that in [an] upward position,
fault or intention on his part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove correct?
with clear and convincing evidence, the essential requisites for the exempting A No, Sir, pointing the door.
circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4, viz: Q Yes, you are pointing the tip of your bolo to the door upward, correct?
1. A person is performing a lawful act; A No, Sir, steady pointing to the door.
2. With due care; Q Now, when the door was opened, your bolo did not hit any part of that door,
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; correct?
4. Without fault or intention of causing it. A "Ginaiwas ko ang sunrang," meaning I was able to get away from hitting any
To prove his affirmative defense, the petitioner relied solely on his testimony, part of the door.
thus: Q The question Mr. Toledo is simple, while the door was opened and while you
Q What happened next when Ricky Guarte was able to push through the door were pointing directly your bolo at the door, not any part of the door hit the
and you ran away? bolo (sic), correct?
A When Ricky Guarte was able to push the door, that is the time I go (sic) ATTY. FORMILLEZA:
downstairs and got my bolo and at that time the body of Ricky Guarte was at the It was a valid answer, it did not hit any part of the door.
entrance of the door and accidentally the bolo reached him. COURT:
Q Where did you get the bolo? Answer.
A I got the bolo in the post or wall of our house. A No, Sir.
Q Was Ricky Guarte hit the first time you boloed him? PROS. FRADEJAS continuing:
A Not hacking but accidentally. Q You were only about five inches away from your door while pushing it,
Q What do you mean by accidentally? correct?
A Because when Ricky Guarte pushed the door and unbalance himself (sic) the A Yes, Sir.
bolo which I was carrying hit him accidentally.
Q Now, when the door was pushed already by Ricky Guarte, not any part of your
body hit the door, correct?
A No, Sir.18
The petitioner also testified that the victim was armed with a balisong and
threatened to kill him as the said victim pushed, with his body and hands, the
fragile door of his house:
Q Where were you when you saw Ricky went out?
A I was at the door.
Q Did Ricky proceed to the door where you were?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did he do, if any?
A He drew his fan knife or balisong and asked me what do you like, I will stab
you?
Q What did you do?
A I told him I have not done you anything wrong, I am only scolding you or
telling you not to make noise.
Q What, if any, did Ricky Guarte do to you?
A He pushed the door.
Q Whose door did he push?
A My own door.
Q Where were you when he pushed the door?
A Inside our house.19
We find the testimony of the petitioner incredible and barren of probative
weight.
First. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle
between him and the victim would have caused the door to fall on the
petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to adduce real evidence that the door
of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any physical
injuries,20 considering that he was only five inches away from the door.
Second. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the victim must
have fallen on top of the door. It is incredible that the bolo of the petitioner
could have hit the stomach of the victim. The claim of the petitioner that he
managed to step aside and avoid being crushed by the door belies his claim that
the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
Third. When he surrendered to the barangay captain and to the policemen, he
failed to relate to them that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim:
Q Now, that very night when you said Ricky Guarte was accidentally hit by your
bolo, you did not surrender to the police, correct?
A I surrendered to the barangay captain at one o’clock in Panique, in the
afternoon.
Q Now, you only surrendered to the police when a certain person advised you to
surrender, correct?
A On my own volition, I surrendered to the barangay captain.
Q You did not narrate the incident to the barangay captain whom you have
surrendered, correct?
A No, Sir.
Q When you were brought to the municipal jail, you did not also narrate to the
police what happened, correct?
A No, Sir.
Q You just remained silent thinking of an excuse that happened that evening of
September 16, 1995, correct?
A No, Sir.21
Fourth. There is no evidence that the petitioner surrendered either the bolo that
accidentally hit the victim or the balisong held by the deceased to the barangay
captain or the police authorities. Such failure of the petitioner negates his claim
that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim and that he acted in self-
defense.22
Fifth. To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential
elements thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner; (3) employment by
him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete.23 Unlawful aggression presupposes
an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.24 We agree with the ruling of the
CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete:
The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the
part of Ricky. While it was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of
appellant’s house which would give a semblance of verity to appellant’s version
of the incident, such view, however, is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at
appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask
appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no weapon to attack
appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Ricky’s
arrival at appellant’s doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any
manner did he manifest any aggressive act that may have imperiled appellant’s
well-being. Ricky’s want of any weapon when he arrived at appellant’s doorstep
is supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court, and that
weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky.
Thus, appellant’s version of the events does not support a finding of unlawful
aggression. In People vs. Pletado, the Supreme Court held:
"xxx (F) or aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden,
[un]expected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening
or intimidating attitude (People vs. Pasco, Jr., supra, People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA
149 [1989]) and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real
aggression (Pacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 716 [1983]). Unlawful
aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself or of a relative sought to be defended and not an
imagined threat."
Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to
appellant’s life necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. For
unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-
defense must fail.
Further, appellant’s plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent
evidence. The plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is
not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself
extremely doubtful.25
Sixth. With the failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense, the inescapable
conclusion is that he is guilty of homicide as found by the trial court and the CA.
He cannot even invoke Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.26
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135981             January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on
a novel theory -- the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly
constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to
complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no
immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time
she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant
constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her
psychological resistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysis" she
suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating
factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the
hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to
vindicate her life and her unborn child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from
BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now
apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has already
served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the
pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision 1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No.
5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored
by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the
accused with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and
another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral
damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate
husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided
herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head,
resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels
on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal
vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding
of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment on March 3, 1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of
parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version
of the facts in this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in
Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at
Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with
them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban
Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their
two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after
receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading
home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching his. When they arrived at
the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look
for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it,
waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did
not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas'
rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied
'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared
uninhabited and was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and
neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig
because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise
asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who
unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a
bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her
two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her
children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters
behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the
same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant
did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul
odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went
there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the
inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate
padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the
kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it.
Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was
coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed
covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his
head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of
Ben about his son's misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of
Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned
at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at
the Genosas' rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr.
Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the
bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with
a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3
Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two
(2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe
measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half
(1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one
end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had
to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination
was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health
officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that
Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings
quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She
concluded that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary
to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital
[bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet
might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arañ o,
appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte
but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the
Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her to sleep in
their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging
her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children
who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction,
Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the
television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to
appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got
hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because
she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben
allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a
drawer holding her by the neck, and told her 'You might as well be killed so
nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a
gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-
inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben
with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then
'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and
his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting
him. She supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He
did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983.
Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City,
obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was
working, at the time of her husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers
in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and
Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were
neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree
cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was
persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness
developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together
with Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic
and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember
when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic
quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict
injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a
kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with
blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having
asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning,
Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from
Ben's forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled
after Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben
and Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.'
She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were
'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a
table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994,
when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye
was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband went to
Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already
transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered
as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995
'After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They
stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank
beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque
and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while
talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and
the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao
numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can
place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the
Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one
'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the
root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying 'I will
never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.'
Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every
Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was
stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her and that Ben
would always take her back after she would leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time
that they had been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right
forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her
and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her
parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and
would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would
seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These
doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports.
Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at
least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic,
testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas,
testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and
Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw
the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did
not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the
same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe
Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of
November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located
beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then
Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic
Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter
the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing
that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this
was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were
living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs.
Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years.
He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben
would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went
to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be
pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that while Ben was alive 'he
used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he
will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which
means 'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben
'would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I
noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a
knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been
injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified
that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and
asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several
taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic
home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house 'because she
might be battered by her husband.' When they got to the Genosa house at about
7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husband was already there and
was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his staggering walking
and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them
quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to
by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic
had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her
husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was
awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple 'were
very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.' She
said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get
in he got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window grill
and he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On
cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic's house on November 15,
1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees
at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also
received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989
until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted
upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the
PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing
and considered him an expert witness.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic
on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.'
The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries
reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not
say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it
is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of
the patient, 'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas
resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his
office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the
Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to
return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed 'that
they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each
other.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it
was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal
Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the
baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at
least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive
towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that
he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing
their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next
day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented
herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias
'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just
wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San
Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away;
that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once';
that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours
after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards the
drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence.
This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of
Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such
was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers
and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She
merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the
police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some
police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket,
lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a
brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving
the skeletal area of the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based
on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify
as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa
charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with
treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a
hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22
and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May
1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial
date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc
City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of
the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and,
under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for
Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and
permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20
January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G.
Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she
submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by
the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death;
allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband;
and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony
of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun,
then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the
description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings,
Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly
granted Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the
trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion
on the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice,
and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together
with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any,
submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before
the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews
were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20)
years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle
University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at
the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and was the
counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in
Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical
[Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the
past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a
member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the
International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the
Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling]
Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy,
recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of
families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the
Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a
book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and
Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert
on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence,
and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years
and discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital
conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and
also sexual abuse.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very
low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken
homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very
low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it
comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry.
They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are
involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.'
The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-
pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often
how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of aggression
in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the
violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the
belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the
children.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave
the house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back
triggering 'physical violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital
relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic, are
not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the
abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even would cause
hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered
woman because 'inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at
times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she
sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still
has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even
consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the
time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed
away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of
the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry
Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years.
Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial
Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After
that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his
retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General.
He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also
a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City
Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of
Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the
Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented
twice in international congresses. He also authored 'The Mental Health of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000', which was likewise published
internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of
Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on
an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the
mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord
enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate
degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo
had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified
in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes
abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days,
the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse,
battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the
woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is
not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if
the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is
stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic
stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the
'anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming
brutality, trauma.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the
beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at
that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her
emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become
hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is
damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's
illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As
to the batterer, he normally 'internalizes what is around him within the
environment.' And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is
aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong façade 'but in it
there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the
precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing
of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just
come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to
defend themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any
weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x
because that abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons
when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other
recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he
conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the
psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the
time she killed her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-
experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically
that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just
come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when
the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he
interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x
x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or
the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence
to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was
in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless
when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe
at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that
this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the
cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists
and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her
spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the
case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial
reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part
appellant's Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman
syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional
evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of
Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo
Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along
with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the
lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the
records of the case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's
consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa
were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with
a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced
from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler,
a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben
Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of
Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and
her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save
the life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional
elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in
this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death."13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant
acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery
attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not
collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this
Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his
discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the
case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion,
reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or
modify the trial court's disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly
dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note
that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the
testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the
basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the
testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this
Court, may not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily
conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence
presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously
hasty" manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on
November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held
for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of
trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the
case with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn
him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case
should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with
his constitutional obligation.15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and
appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their
marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between
the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a
marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of
appellant's deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to
Marivic.17 The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover,
during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of
her marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that
(1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission
was in fact made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the
marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made
through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's
death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal
consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution,
"[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband
and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back
of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not
immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death."
Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of
the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that
Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to
us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of "battered
woman syndrome," for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her
theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing
jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that
led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellant's children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor,
in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are
necessary to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court
nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as
witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to
testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of
Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are
indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any
reversible error as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances has
little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-
defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing
the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in
criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third
person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered
woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been
recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least,
incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is
afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and
controlled over a period of time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her
to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for
the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-
called "cycle of violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal
or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually
tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by
simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself
to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish,
however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory" and passive
behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first
place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are
not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each
partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and
despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon
withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the
more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute
battering incident.29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this
incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no
control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as
unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it.
The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that
resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible
pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent
passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is
almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful
experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very
savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are
likely to get hurt.30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the
one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his
partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it,
begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other
hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this
"good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible
for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or
seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains
with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as
a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that
she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered
woman's psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and
forgiveness," each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be
separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning
without the other.31
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented
several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as
follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was
cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was
abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested
to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he
pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after
that I go to him and he said 'sorry'.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive
behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx   xxx   xxx
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted
on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the
occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel
me." 32
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos
Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery
in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the
chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the
record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid
and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and
contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician:
Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the
attending physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the
patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something
rough substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension
breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, and I think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she
there is tenderness pain. had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor? Q For what?
xxx   xxx   xxx A Tension headache.
Q Were you able to talk with the patient? Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
A Yes, sir. hypertension?
Q What did she tell you? A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment.
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. She does not response when the medication was given to her, because tension
And she told me that it was done to her by her husband. headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa? Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in
A Yes, sir. nature?
xxx   xxx   xxx A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the
ATTY. TABUCANON: family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So,
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
in the month of November, 1995 when this incident happened? Q You mean problem in her household?
A As per record, yes. A Probably.
Q What was the date? Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A It was on November 6, 1995. A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically? hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
A Yes, sir. Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the of the accused?
patient pregnant? A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
A Yes, sir. Q Is this considered hypertension?
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she? A Yes, sir, severe.
A Eight (8) months pregnant. Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy? of blood pressure?
A Yes, sir. A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in
her pregnancy or for some other findings? Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that
pregnancy. the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.35
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined? Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by
A Yes, sir. Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would
Q For how many days? come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she
A One day. was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy …
Q Where? and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into
A At PHILPHOS Hospital. Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a
xxx   xxx   xxx chair, scaring them with a knife.
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this
able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home,
pregnant. where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her,
What is this all about? Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel
hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three
other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail
the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him,
showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the
evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after
office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached
Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second
child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I was
anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son
arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me
at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that
he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she
resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arañ o, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her
because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else
did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was
just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to
avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed
because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said
to him, 'why did you switch off the light when the children were there.' At that
time I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He
was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen
and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were
scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying
that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the
bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for
packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in
her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag
me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but
he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx   xxx   xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert
witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had
met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based
on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as
follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in
layman's term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she
was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to
emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very
meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the
family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas,
drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very
angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience
a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused
her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not
his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed
because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it
was happening day in and day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but
wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown
below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you
talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant information did
you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most
important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during
her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already
knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the
facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider
them as substantial.
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband
they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that
were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in
Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that
room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered,
it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this
matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is
your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it
was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I
also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety
reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time and that is why it
happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test,
what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The
purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she
someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I
can trust. That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo,
testified on his Psychiatric Report,42 which was based on his interview and
examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years
of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine,
normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was
also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time
Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his
family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and
emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic
claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got
drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected
that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve
years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated
relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain.
Further quoting from the Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close
relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was
happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and
more severe. x x x."43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's
mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman,
her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot
rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is
evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court
has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of
battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary.
"How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The
average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this
kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could
she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We
would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect?
Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction
of the average person confronted with the so-called 'battered wife syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be
drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of
a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be
consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a
similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on
domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the
United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered
woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist
explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered
woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests,
making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape." 46 In her
years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the point
of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered
woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and
self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they
usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated
the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and
even sexually abusive to them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does
not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from
the latter's belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to
keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the
only hope for her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated
"probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases
of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would
sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons "may
believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the
development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's
ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma.
Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
have a predictable positive effect."52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of
Pennsylvania, found that "even if a person has control over a situation, but
believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation
with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the
cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He
referred to this phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a
situation turn out to be less important than the individual's set of beliefs or
perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave
the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing
they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for
the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing
her, and that there is no escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from
pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a shelter is
available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a
means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be
found and hurt even more.57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support
such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence"
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the
tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail
the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in
at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to
acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor
abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from
developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of
the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her
mother's or father's house;58 that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her
spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that
she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely,
how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their
relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences
and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential
characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the
defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by
her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were
culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they
failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had
related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying
circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records
lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered
woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must
still be considered in the context of self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that
crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the
time of the offense60 -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her
batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to
self-defense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised
Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. 63 It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger
thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. 64 In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.
She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had
ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat
on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's
bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability
that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the
imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the
brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic
battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to
await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on
the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.66 Considering
such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant
self-defense.67 In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense --
complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of
Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other
modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to
evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal
liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it
wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the
parties.69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in
her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as
follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering
Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative]
provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced
at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can
only be ended by an act of violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect
of "repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious
maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the
battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the
severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the
prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional
stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support available
to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of
severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic
stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually
the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the
individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful
stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the
woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the
anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual
will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse,
restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any
prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six
(6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the
book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the
repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become
normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness
clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x
affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
appellant resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke down her
psychological resistance and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis," and
"difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were
analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power
without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a
resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating
factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when
a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked
by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites
should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity.78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful
aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to
kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a
gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time.
The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and
violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and
her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her
reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional
and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were
about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where
Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her
normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony80 that with "neurotic
anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or]
trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although
she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing
the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks
"of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the control of a
person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced
during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal
equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is,
the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will
power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent
aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred
when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an
attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such
perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to
oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.81 In order
to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as
indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences,
or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. 82 Because of
the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as
the killing itself.83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances
merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed
with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to
exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution
failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads
us to the events surrounding his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did
he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in
her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag
me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but
he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxx   xxx   xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed
him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood
pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood
pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness
at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took
pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure
and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There
is no showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the
shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded
by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and
to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that
might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing, though, that the
present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking
her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might
make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to
her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-
spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order
to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of
the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article
64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are
to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other
modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the
offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty
shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor --
and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion
temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper
to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years
and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has
already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released
from detention on parole.91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was
neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis-à -vis the given set of facts
in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-
day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions
are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the
proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to
take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand
the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically
abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the
solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in
such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only
work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or
invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in
its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising
from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized
at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must
have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to
the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of
self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of
these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her
penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE  her from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice Santiago
in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide, our esteemed colleague
Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban found that there was no factual basis to
conclude that Marivic was suffering from "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS)
at the time she took the life of her husband. With due respect, I register my
dissent.
The novel theory of "Battered Woman Syndrome" is recognized in foreign
jurisprudence as a form of self-defense. It operates upon the premise that a
woman who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time
develops a fearful state of mind. Living in constant danger of harm or death, she
knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will escalate over
time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her
alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously
threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not
unlikely that she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive
possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is
seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would
have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less
fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.1
As exhaustively discussed in the ponencia, the "Battered Woman Syndrome" has
three phases, to wit: (1) the tension-building phase, where minor batterings in
the form of verbal or slight physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman tries to
pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply
staying out of his way; (2) the acute battering incident phase which is
characterized by brutality, destructiveness and sometimes, death. The battered
woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him and that resistance
would only exacerbate her condition; and (3) the tranquil period, where the
couple experience a compound relief and the batterer may show a tender and
nurturing behavior towards his partner.
Contrary to the findings in the ponencia, the defense was able to establish the
occurrence on more than one occasion of the "tension-building phase" of the
cycle. The various testimonies of appellant's witnesses clearly reveal that she
knew exactly when she would once again be subjected to acute battery. Her
cousin, Ecel Arano, testified that she often asked the latter to sleep in her house
as she was afraid every time her husband came home drunk. Clearly, whenever
appellant requested for Arano's company, she was experiencing a tension-
building phase. The barangay captain, Panfilo Tero, also testified that appellant
sought his help two months before she killed her husband, again demonstrating
that she was in the tension-building phase and was attempting to prevent
another incident of acute battery. Appellant presented evidence to prove that
the tension-building phase would occur whenever her husband would go out
looking for other women, would lose at cockfights or would come home drunk.
She often tried to ignore her husband's attitude or, as testified to by some
witnesses for the prosecution, even shouted back, fought off or even injured her
husband during the tension-building phase, if only to prevent the onset of acute
battery.
Appellant was able to perfectly describe the tension-building phase of the cycle
immediately prior to the death of her husband, i.e., when she knew or felt that
she was going to be killed by the deceased. She could not possibly have testified
with clarity as to prior tension-building phases in the cycle as she had never
tried to kill her husband before this time.
It was shown by the testimonies of appellant and even witnesses for the
prosecution that appellant would seek shelter in her mother's or her father's
house after an acute battering incident, after which would begin the process of
begging for forgiveness, promises of change in behavior and return to the
conjugal home, only for the same cycle to begin all over again.
To require appellant to prove the state of mind of the deceased, as seems to be
required in the ponencia,  would mean that no person would ever be able to
prove self-defense in a battered woman case. Appellant could not possibly prove
whether the deceased felt provoked into battering by any act or omission of
appellant. She cannot possibly prove that she felt herself to be the sole support
of the deceased's emotional stability and well-being. Nevertheless, appellant felt
trapped and helpless in the relationship as, in the end, she resorted to killing her
husband as no one could or did help her, whether out of fear or insensitivity,
during the violent marriage she endured.
The "acute battering incident stage" was well demonstrated by the severe
beatings suffered by Marivic in the hands of the deceased as well as the threats
to kill her using a bolo or a cutter.2 The physical abuses occurred at least 3 times
a week in the 11 miserable years of their marriage,3 six incidents of which were
documented by the 1990-1995 medical records of Marivic. They included,
among others, hematoma, contusion, and pain on the breasts; multiple
contusions and trauma on the different parts of her body even during her
pregnancy in 1995.4 The tranquil period underwent by Marivic was shown by
the repeated "kiss and make-up" episodes of their relationship. On more than 5
occasions, Marivic ran to her parents' house after violent fights with the
deceased only to forgive the latter every time he would fetch her and promise to
change.5
All these recurring phases of cycle of violence, repentance and forgiveness
developed a trauma in the mind of Marivic making her believe that a
forthcoming attack from the deceased would cause her death. This state of mind
of Marivic was revealed in her testimony given way back in 1998, before she
was examined by experts on BWS. Unaware of the significance of her
declarations, she candidly narrated how she felt immediately before she killed
the deceased, thus -
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx       xxx       xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but
he could not open it because he did not have the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was pity on myself, then
the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
xxx       xxx       xxx6
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the room, I felt the same thing like what happened before I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure
has raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
xxx       xxx       xxx
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through him, I took pity
on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the
baby, so I got the gun and shot him.7
It must be stressed that the defense of "Battered Woman Syndrome" was not
raised by Marivic before the lower court but only here on automatic review.
This makes the foregoing testimony more worthy of great weight and credence
considering that the same could not have been cunningly given to suit or
conform to the profile of a battered woman.
Moreover, there was indeed basis for Marivic to fear death because of her
medical history. Dr. Dino Caing testified that he treated Marivic for hypertension
due to domestically related emotional stress on 23 separate occasions. The
latest one was on November 6, 1995 when she suffered from severe
hypertension and had a blood pressure of 180/120 on the 8 th month of her
pregnancy.8
Furthermore, Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist and an expert on
BWS who examined Marivic, assessed the effects of the repeated violence on the
latter as follows:
A What I remember ... was it was more than ten years that she was suffering
from emotional anguish. There were a lot of instance of abuses, ... emotional
abuse...verbal abuse and... physical abuse. The husband had very meager
income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The
husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even
womanizing, being involved in cockfighting and in going home very angry
which... triggered a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience of taunting
from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity,
the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she
was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she .. .[felt]
almost like living in purgatory or even in hell when it was happening day in and
day out.
xxx       xxx       xxx
Q And what was it that triggered ... that tragedy in your opinion?
A I think for several weeks, she was already having all those tensions, all those
anxieties, they were not enough, that the husband was even going to
cockfighting x x x
A She was angry with him, he was angry with her and I think he dragged her and
even spun her around. She tried to fight him so there was a lot of fight and when
she was able to escape, she went to another room and she locked herself with
the children. And when the husband was for a while very angry he calms down
then and then (sic). But I remember before that the husband was looking for the
gun and I think he was not able to open the cabinet because she had the key. So
during that time, I remember, that she was very much afraid of him, so when the
husband calmed down and he was asleep, all she was concerned was to end up
her misery, to save her child which she was carrying and to save her two
children. I believe that somehow she's not rational.9
xxx       xxx       xxx
PROS. TRUYA
Q Mrs. Witness, being an expert witness, giving more the facts and
circumstances on this case that the books you studied in the expertise in line
and in the 77 hour contact with appellant Mrs. Genosa, could you say that this is
not ordinary self-defense but a survival on her part?
A Yes, sir.
Q To what she did to her husband (sic)?
A Yes, sir this is not an ordinary self-defense, but this [is] a need to survive, a
need to survive with her two sons and [the] child she's bringing.
Q Had she not able to kill her husband, would she still be in the very short
moment with the victim (sic)?
A If she did not do that she believes that she will be the one who would be
killed.10
There is no doubt therefore that Marivic was afflicted with the "Battered
Woman Syndrome" and that it was an apprehension of death and the instinct to
defend her and her unborn child's life that drove her to kill her husband.
The ponente  further refused to sustain the self-defense proffered by Marivic
because there was allegedly no aggression or danger posed on her life by the
victim at the time she attacked the latter. Again, I beg to disagree.
Traditionally, in order that self-defense may be appreciated, the unlawful
aggression or the attack must be imminent and actually in existence. This
interpretation must, however, be re-evaluated vis-a-vis the recognized inherent
characteristic of the psyche of a person afflicted with the "Battered Woman
Syndrome." As previously discussed, women afflicted by this syndrome live in
constant fear for their life and thus respond in self-defense. Once BWS and an
impending danger based on the conduct of the deceased in previous battering
episodes are established, actual occurrence of an assault is no longer a
condition sine qua non before self defense may be upheld. Threatening behavior
or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. As stated in
the ponencia, to require the battered person to await an obvious deadly attack
before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by
installment.
In the case at bar, the cycle of violence perpetrated by the deceased, which
culminated in the physical assaults and an attempt to shoot Marivic when she
was 8 months pregnant, took the place of unlawful aggression, thus entitling her
to a complete self defense even if there was no actual employment of violence
by the deceased at the time of the killing. Marivic had every reason to believe
that the deceased would kill her that night not only because the latter was
verbally threatening to kill her while attempting to get a gun from the drawer,
but more importantly because the deceased wounded her on the wrist with a
bolo, and because of the deceased's previous conduct of threatening to cut her
throat with a cutter which he kept in his wallet. Quoted hereunder are the
relevant testimonies of Marivic -
A When I arrived home, he was already in his usual behavior.
xxx       xxx       xxx
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior. A He kicked my ass and then I screamed.12
xxx       xxx       xxx xxx       xxx       xxx
A He was nagging ... me at that time and I just ignore[d] him because I want to Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed A Outside perhaps to drink more.
because I just ignore[d] hi[s] provocation and he switch off the light and I said Q When he left what did you do...?
to him, "why did you switch off the light when the children were there." At that A I packed all his clothes.
time I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen A I wanted him to leave us.13
and g[o]t a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television. A I was frightened that my husband would hurt me, so I packed all his things
xxx       xxx       xxx then on the following day I will leave, I was afraid and I want to make sure I
A He switch[ed] off the light and the children were shouting because they were would deliver my baby safely.14
scared and he was already holding a bolo. xxx       xxx       xxx
Q How do you describe this bolo? A After a couple of hours, he went back again and got angry with me for packing
A 1 1/2 feet. his clothes, then he dragged me again outside of the bedroom holding my neck.
xxx       xxx       xxx ATTY. TABUCANON
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
that bolo? drag... you?
A He was about to attack me so I ran to the room. COURT INTERPRETER
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you? (The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly
A When I attempted] to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell [on] in her front neck)
the bedside.11 A And he dragged me towards the door backwards.
xxx       xxx       xxx ATTY. TABUCANON
COURT Q Where did he bring you?
To the witness A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept
xxx       xxx       xxx shouting at me that "you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag
Q The bolo that you said which Ben was holding at that time, [was] it a bolo or a me.
knife? Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Bolo. A Yes, sir.
Q Were you wounded or were there inflictions on your body when he was Q What is there in the drawer?
holding and trying to frighten you [with] that bolo? A I was aware that it was a gun.
A No, only here. xxx       xxx       xxx
COURT INTERPRETER Q What happened when you were brought to the drawer?
(The witness pointed to her wrist). A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but
COURT he could not open it because he did not have the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet
To the witness which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
Q You were demonstrating a motion, whirling, did your husband really whirl to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
you? he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
A Yes, your Honor. was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
Q How did he whirl you? room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was pity on myself, then
A Whirled around. the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
Q Just like spinning. PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
xxx       xxx       xxx xxx       xxx       xxx
Q Where did he whirl you, was it inside the bedroom or outside? Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
A In our bedroom. describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
Q Then after the whirling what happened? A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade? battered woman? Appellant was not a normal married woman. She can never be
A It's a cutter. in a state of natural equanimity as she was in a constant state of alertness and
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges? hypersensitivity to the next phase of acute battery. The esteemed ponente also
A Yes, because he once used it to me. correctly found that the appellant acted with diminished will-power. However,
Q How did he do it? he failed to go further. In the case of People v. Javier,17 it was held:
A He wanted to cut my throat. Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon
Q With the same blade? him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case,
A Yes sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.15 however, aside from the testimony of the accused that his mind went blank
RE-DIRECT BY ATTY. TABUCANON when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented
Q In other words, there were two (2) incidents, the first incident and then he left regarding his mental condition at the time of the killing. This Court can hardly
and then two (2) hours after he came back? rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions
A Yes, sir. and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-
Q And the whirling happened in the first incident? appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power
A Yes, sir. at the time of the killing.18
Q And the dragging with arms flexed in her neck and on that blade In the case at bar, appellant was allowed and did in fact present clear and
happened on the second incident (sic)? convincing evidence that she was a battered woman for 13-14 years and that
A Ye, sir. she suffered from the "Battered Woman Syndrome". Expert testimony was
xxx       xxx       xxx presented and admitted to this effect, such that the ponente ably discussed the
COURT causes and effects of the syndrome. To ignore the testimony and the evidence
To the witness thus presented is to make impossible the proof of mental state. Evidence as to
Q Why, what is that blade about? the mental state need not be also "beyond reasonable doubt."
A A cutter about 3 inches long. Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern of the batterer in
Q Who used that? previous violent episodes was sufficiently satisfied in the present case. This,
A Ben. juxtaposed to Marivic's affliction with BWS justified the killing of the deceased.
Q He used that on you? The danger posed or created in her mind by the latter's threats using bladed
A He scared me on that (sic). weapons, bred a state of fear, where under the circumstances, the natural
xxx       xxx       xxx response of the battered woman would be to defend herself even at the cost of
Q But he did not hit you with that? taking the life of the batterer.
A Yes, because I managed to run every time he scared (sic).16 The ponencia's acknowledgement of "Battered Woman Syndrome" as a valid
There are many things which cannot be proved by direct evidence. One of this is form of self-defense, is a noble recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for
state of mind. In the case at bar, there is more than sufficient physical evidence battered women who are trapped in a culture of silence, shame, and fear. This
presented by the appellant from which her mental state can be inferred. The would however be an empty victory if we deliberately close our eyes to the
prosecution did not object to the presentation of these physical and testimonial antecedents of this case. The facts are simple. Marivic was suffering from the
pieces of evidence, namely, the medical records of 23 instances of domestic "Battered Woman Syndrome" and was defending herself when she killed her
violence-related injuries and the testimonies of neighbors, cousins and even the husband. Her acquittal of the charge of parricide is therefore in order.
barangay captain. Indeed, no person would endure 23 reported instances of IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to ACQUIT Marivic Genosa.
beatings if she were planning to kill her spouse in the first place. The majority
need not worry that women around the country will mastermind the killings of
their husbands and then use this Decision to bolster their attempts to employ
the BWS defense.
Moreover, as found in the ponencia, appellant should be allowed the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. This, at the very least, supports a
finding that the acts of violence and battery committed by the deceased were
illegal and unlawful and were committed immediately before appellant could
recover her natural equanimity. But what is the natural equanimity of a