G.R. No.
156685 July 27, 2004 Captain Salvo and his men set up a plan to entrap the petitioner. Hian Hian Yu Sy
NAZARIO N. MARIFOSQUE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Crime charged: Direct Bribery
Sandiganbayan: Convicted
SC: Affirmed conviction
It ruled that First, petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So
Pong or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. When he was arrested and
interrogated, he made no attempt to present his asset to explain and justify his
receipt of the reward money. Instead, he accepted his arrest and investigation with
an air of resignation, which is characteristic of a culprit who is caught red-handed.
Second, petitioner’s solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery
incident betrays an intention not altogether altruistic. As shown in the testimony of
prosecution witness Hian Hian Yu Sy, petitioner met with Yu So Pong for no apparent
reason than to demand money. There was no mention of any attempt by him to
investigate, much less encourage the victims to file charges against the malefactors.
Third, the conduct of the petitioner during the recovery of the stolen articles leaves
much to be desired. He did not apprehend Edgardo Arnaldo or invite him for
investigation although the cylinder tanks were found in his possession. His flimsy
excuse that the latter promised to deliver additional cylinder tanks is unworthy of
credence considering that, as a police officer with years of experience, he should
have known that the proper action, under the circumstances, was to at least invite
him to the police precinct for investigation. Curiously, the prime suspect Edgardo
Arnaldo turned out to be the brother of petitioner’s police asset who, we recall,
directed the police officers to the location of the stashed articles.
FACTS:
On October 13, 1990, Sy and her husband went to the office of Captain Salvo Chief of
the Intelligence and Operating Division stationed at the Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) to report the robbery of Shellane tanks at the gasoline station of her father, Yu
So Pong, and the alleged extortion attempt by petitioner, Police Sergeant Narciso
Marifosque, in exchange for the recovery of the lost items.
prepared the pay-off money in the amount of P4,800.00. The pay-off would be done
in Golden Grace Department Store owned by Yu So Pong. Captain Calvo and his men
arrived at the target area and strategically positioned themselves outside the Golden
Grace Department Store to await the arrival of the suspect. Shortly thereafter,
petitioner Marifosque arrived. He went inside the store and demanded the money
from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu So Pong. The latter handed to him the marked money
which was wrapped in a folded newspaper. When petitioner stepped out of the store,
Arsenio Sy gave the pre-arranged signal, and arrested the suspect.
He went inside the store and demanded the money from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu So
Pong. The latter handed to him the marked money, which was wrapped in a
newspaper. When petitioner stepped out of the store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-
arranged signal, whereupon the arresting operatives swooped down upon the
suspect and arrested him.
By way of defense, petitioner Marifosque testified that police asset came to his
house and reported that he witnessed a robbery at the gasoline station of Yu So Pong.
Petitioner went to the gasoline station of Yu So Pong and relayed to him the
information. Petitioner and Yu So Pong proceeded to the police station to report the
robbery to the desk officer who then dispatched petitioner and a certain Pat. Garcia
to conduct an investigation. As they were leaving the police station, the asset
approached petitioner asking if he could get P350.00 per cylinder tank as his
reward. Petitioner relayed the message to Yu So Pong, who said he was amenable
if that was the only way to get the stolen tanks. Based on information furnished by
the asset, the police investigators proceeded to the house of Edgardo Arnaldo
where they found the stolen gas tanks. The group loaded the gas tanks into the
vehicle. Meanwhile, Arnaldo arrived. Petitioner did not arrest him at that time
because he promised to lead them to the other stolen cylinder tanks. The group
returned to the police station where petitioner made a written report of the recovery
of the gas tanks.
Elmer Arnaldo testified that he worked as an asset of the Legazpi City police force
and occasionally received rewards from the police for any information of the criminal
activities. On October 13, 1990 he saw three individuals stealing gas cylinder tanks in
the nearby gasoline station. He later visited petitioner and reported to him the
robbery. Sometime thereafter, he dropped by the police station to discuss with
petitioner the reward of P350.00 per cylinder tank recovered. Petitioner gave him
1,000.00 and told him to return for the remainder. He and petitioner went to the
store of Yu So Pong to collect the balance of the reward money. Petitioner went
inside the store and Arnaldo, who was left outside, saw a woman giving him a folded
newspaper. Suddenly, armed men apprehended the petitioner, so he ran away.
Sandiganbayan: convicted petitioner of direct bribery.
Petitioner contends that he was not the one who asked for reward from private
complainant Yu So Pong but the asset; and that Hian Hian Yu Sy had no direct
knowledge of the alleged transaction, i.e., the demand for money in consideration of
the return/recovery of twenty-one Shellane gas tanks, between private complainant
Yu So Pong and the accused.
Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt because there was no competent evidence to prove that the amount was really
intended for him and not for his asset. He anchors his defense on the fact that: (1) he
merely relayed to Yu So Pong the asset’s request for a reward money; and (2) Yu So
Pong was agreeable to the request. He further contends that the act of receiving
money for the asset is not one of those punishable under the law as direct bribery.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of direct bribery.
RULING: YES.
First, petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So
Pong or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously
gave P1,000.00 to his asset, which purportedly represented a partial payment of the
reward money, was not corroborated by his asset. When he was arrested and
interrogated, he made no attempt to present his asset to explain and justify his
receipt of the reward money. Instead, he accepted his arrest and investigation with
an air of resignation, which is characteristic of a culprit who is caught red-handed.
The petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were
about to arrest him. This was a clear showing that he was well aware of the illegality
of his transaction. Had he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced
courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the violation of his
person, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. Instead, he meekly
submitted to the indignity of arrest and went along the eventual investigation with
the docility of a man at a loss for a satisfactory explanation.
Second, petitioner’s solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery
incident betrays an intention not altogether altruistic. On the contrary, it denotes a
corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. At
the time petitioner was notified by his asset of the robbery incident, he was no longer
on duty, having been assigned to the night shift the day before. He was too
overzealous to meet with Yu So Pong although the case was already assigned to
another police investigator. His justification that he wanted to encourage the victim
to pursue the case against the robbers rings hollow and untrue. It is clearly an
afterthought. As shown in the testimony of prosecution witness Hian Hian Yu Sy,
petitioner met with Yu So Pong for no apparent reason than to demand money. There
was no mention of any attempt by him to investigate, much less encourage the
victims to file charges against the malefactors. More telling is petitioner’s persistence
in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer
complaining about the P1,000.00 he supposedly received earlier. While petitioner
supposedly supports the "reward system," yet he denied that he previously gave
incentives to the assets for the recovery of stolen items.
Third, the conduct of the petitioner during the recovery of the stolen articles leaves
much to be desired. He did not apprehend Edgardo Arnaldo or invite him for
investigation although the cylinder tanks were found in his possession. His flimsy
excuse that the latter promised to deliver additional cylinder tanks is unworthy of
credence considering that, as a police officer with years of experience, he should
have known that the proper action, under the circumstances, was to at least invite
him to the police precinct for investigation. Curiously, the prime suspect Edgardo
Arnaldo turned out to be the brother of petitioner’s police asset who, we recall,
directed the police officers to the location of the stashed articles. This strange
coincidence may well indicate a conspiracy between the petitioner and the thieves
to steal from the victim and later cash in on the recovery of the lost items.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise;
(3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his
commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, which includes all persons "who, by direct
provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take
part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall
perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee,
agent or subordinate official or any rank or class." At the time of the incident,
petitioner was a police sergeant assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station. He
directly received the bribe money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy
in exchange for the recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not
constituting a crime within the meaning of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The
act of receiving money was connected with his duty as a police officer.
JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,* Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 142369-70 April 13, 2007 CORONA, J.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and Article 210 of RPC
RTC: Convicted
SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted
SC: Convicted
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioner Merencillo, group supervisor of the BIR Tagbiliran City demanded
₱20,000 from Private Complainant Cesar in exchange for the approval of the
application of the certificate authorizing registration (CAR) filed by one Lucit Estillore
on behalf of private complainant. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section
3(b) of RA 3019 and Article 210 of RPC. Petitioner argued that he was put twice in
jeopardy.
The SC ruled that clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither
identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common
elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form
part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a
gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or
present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019
is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law.
Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a)
performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does
not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act
which is his official duty to do.
FACTS:
Lucit Estillore went to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) office in
Tagbilaran City to ask for the computation of taxes due on the sale of real property
to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration
(CAR). At the BIR office, she was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes
who computed the documentary stamp tax (₱37,500) and capital gains tax
(₱125,000) due on the transaction. The computation was approved by petitioner in
his capacity as group supervisor. Estillore paid the taxes in the bank and returned to
apply for a CAR. Fuentes prepared the revenue audit reports and submitted them
together with the application for the CAR to petitioner for preliminary approval.
Fuentes advised Estillore that the CAR would be released after seven days.
At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, private complainant Maria Angeles
Ramasola Cesar (Cesar) received a call from Estillore. She was told that petitioner
wanted to see her "for some negotiation." She proceeded to petitioner’s office where
the latter demanded ₱20,000 in exchange for the approval of the CAR. Cesar replied
that she needed to confer with her two brothers who were her business associates.
The following day, Cesar received a call from petitioner who was following up his
demand. Later that day, Cesar received another call from petitioner who told her that
she could get the CAR after four or five days. Cesar was able to return to the BIR only
on September 20, 1995. When petitioner saw her, he repeated his demand for
₱20,000 although the CAR had in fact been signed by RDO Galahad Balagon the day
before, on September 19, 1995, and was therefore ready for release. On Cesar’s
inquiry, the releasing clerk, Susan Cabangon, informed Cesar that she (Cabangon)
was still waiting for petitioner’s go signal to release the document.
On September 22, 1995, Cesar visited RDO Balagon and complained about
petitioner’s refusal to release the CAR unless his demand was met. RDO Balagon
assured Cesar that he would look into her complaint. Subsequently, Cesar received a
call from petitioner informing her that she could get the CAR but reminded her of his
demand. He told her that he was willing to accept a lesser amount. It was at this point
that Cesar decided to report the matter to the authorities. The following day, Sr.
Supt. Baraguer referred Cesar’s complaint to the chief of police of Tagbilaran City
who coordinated with Cesar for the entrapment of petitioner. Cesar was instructed
to prepare two bundles of bogus money by putting a one-hundred peso bill on each
side of each of the two bundles to make it appear that the two bundles amounted to
₱10,000 each or a total of ₱20,000.
On the appointed day, Cesar called petitioner and pleaded for the release of
the CAR as well as for the reduction of petitioner’s demand. Petitioner cautiously told
Cesar not to talk about the matter on the phone and asked her to see him instead.
Cesar went to petitioner’s office. The members of the PNP entrapment team were
already in petitioner’s office posing as civilians. On seeing Cesar, petitioner handed
the CAR to her and, as she was signing the acknowledgment for the release of the
CAR, he informed her that he was going down to the second floor. Cesar took this as
a cue for her to follow. As petitioner left his office, he held the door open for Cesar
to follow. On reaching the third floor lobby, petitioner uttered "Here only." Cesar
handed the envelope containing the two bundles of marked money to petitioner
who, upon receiving it, asked "Why is this thick?" Before Cesar could answer, a
member of the PNP entrapment team photographed petitioner holding the
envelope. Petitioner panicked, hid the envelope behind his back and turned towards
the window at the back of the BIR building. On seeing that the window was closed,
he turned around towards the open window facing the street. He threw the envelope
towards the window but it hit the ceiling instead, bounced and fell to the first floor
of the BIR building. The PNP entrapment team then introduced themselves to
petitioner and invited him to go with them to their headquarters.
Argument of Accused:
During the trial, petitioner’s evidence consisted of nothing more than a
general denial of the charges against him. He claimed that he never asked for money
and that the allegations of demand for money existed only in Cesar’s mind after she
was told that there was a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be
paid. He was surprised when policemen suddenly arrested him as soon as Cesar
handed him a white envelope the contents of which he suspected to be money.
RTC:
RTC found petitioner guilty as charged.
SANDIGANBAYAN:
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred for affirming the RTC decision
and disregarding the accused’s evidence.
(2) Whether or not the accused was placed twice in jeopardy when he was
prosecuted for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and for direct
bribery.
RULING:
Petition is without merit.
Petitioner Was Not Placed In Double Jeopardy
Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following [acts] shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a
felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either
concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal
Code. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or
successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code. The
rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with
the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one
offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other, as provided in
Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged necessarily includes
that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and
punished under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion
between the two offenses.
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share
percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;
(3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other
person;
 (4) the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or G.R. Nos. 147578-85 January 28, 2008
transaction with the government and
(5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUAN S.
connection with a contract or transaction has the right to intervene. ARMAMENTO, respondents.

On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements: x------------------------------------------x
(1) the offender is a public officer;
G.R. Nos. 147598-605 January 28, 2008
(2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another;
ROLANDO D. NAGAL, petitioner, vs. JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, private respondent
(3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the
public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of and THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, public respondent.
the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must
be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to DECISION
do and
(4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
connected with the performance of his official duties.
EMERGENCY RECIT (FACTS): Balderama and Nagal, petitioners, are members of the
Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor team, known as the “flying squad” created by the LTO to investigate on the
necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the complaints against taxi drivers in the NAIA. It was alleged that these taxi drivers were
essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those discriminating passengers and would transport them on a contract basis.
enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, Consequently, the team flagged down for inspection an SJ taxi owned by Armamento
share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA (respondent). However, the results showed contrary to the report of the team.
3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in
direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited The respondent, feeling aggrieved, filed a complaint for complaint for bribery and
only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other
CRIME CHARGED: The Office of the ombudsman filed nine (9) informations for
hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a
violations of Art. 210 of the RPC (DIRECT BRIBERY) and Section 3 (3) of R.A. No.
crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c)
3019.
agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same
SANDIGANBAYAN: The Sandiganbayan found petitioners and Lubrica guilty of direct
transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double
bribery in seven (7) of the nine (9) Informations. They were acquitted in Criminal
jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses
Cases Nos. 20671 and 20673 for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt
charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a
beyond reasonable doubt. Likewise, they were also convicted of were also convicted
second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.
in Criminal Case No. 20678 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999 decision of the
Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. SC: GUILTY OF DIRECT BRIBERY AND SEC. 3 (E) R.A. NO. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly
established that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as "protection money"
from respondent on several dates. As against the prosecution’s evidence, all that the
accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of defenses.
Likewise, settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before
this Court are binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come
under the established exceptions. This Court rules that this case does not fall under
such exceptions.
FACTS: Rolando L. Balderama and Rolando D. Nagal (petitioners) were employed
with the Land Transportation Commission (LTO) assigned to the Field Enforcement
Division, Law Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento (respondent) operates a taxi
business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units.
Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
discriminate against passengers and would transport them to their destinations only
on a "contract" basis, the LTO created a team to look into the veracity of the
complaints. Petitioners in these cases were members of the team, popularly known
as "Flying Squad," together with Cipriano L. Lubrica and Cresencio de Jesus.
The team flagged down for inspection an "SJ Taxi" owned by respondent. The team
impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon
inspection and testing by the LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that
contrary to the report of the team, the meter waiting time mechanism of the vehicle
was not defective and was functioning normally. The vehicle was released to
respondent.
Respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioners as well as
Lubrica and de Jesus. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO
officers had been collecting "protection money" from him. They went to his office
and proposed they would not apprehend his drivers and impound his vehicles for
violations of LTO rules, provided he gives them the amount of P400.00 every 15th and
30th day of the month. On the same day, he started giving them P300.00 and from
then on, every 15th and 30th day of the month until June 15, 1992. Thereafter, he
failed to give them the agreed amount because his business was not doing well.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan nine (9) Informations
for violations of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code3 against petitioners and the
other members of the team, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 20669-20677. They
were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
On March 5, 1999, accused de Jesus died. The cases against him were dismissed. The
hearing proceeded against petitioners and Lubrica.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners and Lubrica guilty of direct bribery in seven
(7) of the nine (9) Informations. They were acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 20671
and 20673 for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Petitioners and Lubrica were also convicted in Criminal Case No. 20678 for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Petitioners and Lubrica filed separate motions for reconsideration arguing that they
were not yet grouped as a team on February 15, 1992, hence, there could be no
conspiracy. While the motion was pending resolution, both petitioners filed separate
motions for new trial based on an affidavit dated December 22, 2000 executed by
respondent recanting his previous testimony and pointing to Lubrica and de Jesus as
the only culprits.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration and the motions for new
trial.
Both petitioners filed with this Court separate petitions for review on certiorari, both
arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred: (1) in finding that they are guilty of the
offenses charged; (2) in holding that petitioners and their co-accused acted in
conspiracy; and (3) in disregarding the recantation made by respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the guilt of the accused, now petitioners, in these cases has been
proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: YES.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
contains the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he
received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that
such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of
some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something
which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer.4
The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly
established that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as "protection
money" from respondent on several dates. As against the prosecution’s evidence,
all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of defenses.
Anent Criminal Case No. 20678, to hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a
private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public officer
commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in
relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any
party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence The
Sandiganbayan found that petitioners and Lubrica participated directly in the
malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of respondent, causing him
undue injury.6
Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court
are binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the
established exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. We found none
of these exceptions in the present cases.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision of the Sandiganbayan
dated November 17, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20669, 20670, 20672, 20674, 20675,
20676, 20677 and 20678 is AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006
FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x--------------------------------x
G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Crime Charged: Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas,
Francisco SB. Acejas III and Jose P. Victoriano were charged of Direct Bribery under
Article 220.
Sandiganbayan convicted all but Victoriano. It ruled that the elements of direct
bribery and conspiracy are present. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;
Perlas negotiated and dealt with the complainants; and Acejas accepted the payoff
and gave it to Perlas
Resolution: Conanan was aquitted. According to the Sandiganbayan, presence during
one of the meetings did not conclusively show his participation as a co-conspirator.
SC: Affirmed conviction
Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime.
Allegedly, he was merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required
him to investigate Takao Aoyagi. The passport was supposed to have been
voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to appear at the BID office, but he returned it
upon the instruction of his superior.
The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It
was he who had taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi. On various dates, he met with
Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi, and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the
passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on the payoff, during which he
directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas.
Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao
Aoyagi or his representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during
the meetings held outside the BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and
Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it was not a standard operating
procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations.It can readily be
inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some
time despite the absence of any legal purpose.
FACTS:
Accused Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir
Hernandez went to the house of Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon- to serve a
mission order issued against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told
Takao Aoyagi, through his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were complaints against him
in Japan and that he was suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and
an overstaying alien. To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed
his passport to Hernandez who issued an undertaking which Aoyagi signed. The
undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi promised to appear in an investigation at the
BID on Dec 20,1993 and that as a guarantee for his appearance, he was entrusting
his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez acknowledged receipt of the passport.
Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito ‘Dick’ Perlas and informed him about
the taking of her husband’s passport by Hernandez. Perlas introduced the Aoyagis to
Atty. Lucenario, his brother-in-law. They discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario
told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID on December 20, 1993.
As advised Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the BID. Instead, Atty. Rufino M.
Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with the BID an Entry of Appearance. Atty.
Margate requested for copies of any complaint-affidavit against Takao Aoyagi and
asked what the ground was for the confiscation of Aoyagi’s passport.
Hernandez prepared a Progress Report which was submitted to Ponciano M. Ortiz,
the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz recommended that
Takao Aoyagi, who was reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed under
custodial investigation.
The Aoyagis then met accused Atty. Francisco Acejas III who was then accompanied
by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it would be he who would handle their
case. A Contract for Legal Services was entered into by Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas,
who represented the Lucenario Law Firm.
Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to the Domestic Airport as the latter
were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty. Acejas P40,000.00,
P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for filing/docket
fee. The Aoyagis were able to leave only in the afternoon as the morning flight was
postponed.
While attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi informed her
brother, Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr., about her husband’s passport. Jun Pelingon
talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio in Davao and told the latter of Takao
Aoyagi’s problem with the BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling card and told
Pelingon to call him up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and Mrs.
Aoyagi flew back to Manila.
On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic
Conanan and Akira Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard. On
January 8, 1994, Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati
on January 8, 1994 with Jun Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Hernandez attending.
On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return
of Takao Aoyagi’s passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter
referred him to an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. An entrapment operation was
arranged.
On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at
the Coffee Shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar
and Somera arrested Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter
picked up the brown envelope containing marked money representing the amount
being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas, Acejas and Victoriano were brought to the
NBI Headquarters.
Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas it was averred that Acejas and Perlas
met Pelingon at the Aristrocrat Restaurant. Acejas informed Pelingon that he that he
would file a P1 million lawsuit against the BID agents who confiscated the passport
of Takao Aoyagi. Acejas showed Pelingon several papers, which allegedly were in
connection with the intended lawsuit. However, when Hernandez and Conanan
arrived at the Aristocrat Restaurant, Acejas never mentioned to the BID agents the
P1 million lawsuit. [Acejas] just hid the papers he earlier showed to Pelingon inside
his [Acejas’] bag. Acejas was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao Aoyagi
pay the amount of P1 million in exchange for the help he would extend to him (Takao)
in securing a permanent visa in the Philippines. Acejas, who was Aoyagi’s lawyer, did
nothing.
Acejas, Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez met at the Hotel Nikko. Thereat, Hernandez
informed the group that certain government officials and even the press were after
Takao Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can make a partial payment of
P300,000.00. Pelingon however, assured the group that Takao Aoyagi would pay in
full the amount of P1 million so as not to set another meeting date. Acejas kept quiet
throughout the negotiations.
Acejas was present during the entrapment that took place at the Diamond Hotel.
Hernandez handed the passport to Acejas, who handed it then to Perlas and
thereafter to Takao Aoyagi. After Takao Aoyagi went over his confiscated passport,
Bethel Grace handed to Hernandez the envelope containing the supposed P1 million.
Hernandez refused and motioned that Acejas be the one to receive it. Acejas willingly
got the envelope and placed it beside him and Perlas.
In the petition of Acejas he adds when Acejas tried to hand-over the Japanese
passport to the Japanese across the table, the Japanese was motioning and wanted
to get the passport under the table. He found this very strange, still Acejas did not
give it under the table and instead passed it on to Mr. Dick Perlas who was seated at
his right. And so, it was Mr. Dick Perlas who took the passport from Acejas and finally
handed it over to Mr. Aoyagi. Still, thereafter, ‘when the japanese passport was
received, Bethel Grace Aoyagi and [Acejas] were talking and she said since the
Japanese passport had been recovered, they are now willing to pay the
Php.25,000.00 balance of the acceptance fee.’ Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a
brown envelope but she wanted]Mr. Hernandez to receive it while Mr. Hernandez
was still around standing. But Mr. Hernandez did not receive it. Since, the payment
is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown envelope. Not long after, Acejas
saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano, who was ‘signaling something’ as if there
was a sense of urgency. Acejas immediately stood up and left hurriedly. When
[Acejas] approached Mr. Victoriano, he ‘said that the car which Acejas parked in front
of the Diamond Hotel gate, somebody took the car’. Acejas ‘went out and checked
and realized that it was valet parking so it was the parking attendant who took the
car and transferred the car to the parking area’. Acejas requested ‘Mr. Victoriano to
get the envelope and the coat’, at the table. When Acejas went out, Acejas already
looked for the parking attendant to get the car. When the car arrived, [Acejas] just
saw from the doors of the Diamond Hotel Mr. Jose Victoriano and Mr. Dick Perlas
coming out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI agents." They then ‘were
taken to the NBI’, except the accused Vladimir Hernandez."
The Sandiganbayan convicted all but Victoriano. It ruled that the elements of direct
bribery and conspiracy are present. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;
Perlas negotiated and dealt with the complainants; and Acejas accepted the payoff
and gave it to Perlas. In a resolution, Conanan was aquitted. . According to the
Sandiganbayan, Conanan was not shown to be present during the meetings on
January 8 and 12, 1994.29 His presence during one of those meetings, on January 5,
1994, did not conclusively show his participation as a co-conspirator.
ISSUE: WON the elements of direct bribery and conspiracy are present.
RULING: YES.
The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer
1)agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present;
2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute
a crime; or
3) abstains from the performance of official duties.
Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained
the following elements:
1) the offender was a public officer,
2) who received the gifts or presents personally or through another,
3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and
4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.33
Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime.
Allegedly, he was merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required
him to investigate Takao Aoyagi. The passport was supposed to have been
voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to appear at the BID office, but he returned it
upon the instruction of his superior.
The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It
was he who had taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi. On various dates, he met with
Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi, and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the
passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on the payoff, during which he
directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas.
Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao
Aoyagi or his representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during
the meetings held outside the BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and
Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it was not a standard operating
procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations.It can readily be
inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some
time despite the absence of any legal purpose.
Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanan’s acquittal. While the
testimony of Pelingon was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy, there
was an abundance of evidence showing Hernandez’s involvement.
Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the
prosecution’s version that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the
passport. According to him, he kept giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the
passport, with threats to file a court case.
Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was
prevented by Spouses Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against
Hernandez might have just been a charade and was in fact belied by Pelingon’s
testimony regarding the January 5, 1994. Acejas failed to justify why he received the
payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his contention that the envelope
represented the balance of his firm’s legal fees. That it was given to Hernandez
immediately after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the money was a consideration for the return. Moreover, Acejas should have kept
the amount if he believed it to be his. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan’s
pronouncement that If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance
of the acceptance fee, how come he passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown
envelope to Perlas only proves that the same did not contain the balance of the
acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept and retained it. Moreover, the three
prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope was being given to
Hernandez who refused to accept the same. This further shows that the brown
envelope was not for the balance of the acceptance fee because, if it were, why was
it given to Hernandez.
As a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other people. His
presence at Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was justified.
This fact, however, does not support his innocence
Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew of
the payoff, but did nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly
indicated that he was to get a share. Thus, he received the money purporting to be
the payoff, even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts
revealed that he was a conspirator.
The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethicswhen confronted by public officers
who extort money. Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities. If
the extortion is directed at the client, they must advise the client not to perform any
illegal act. Moreover, they must report it to the authorities, without having to violate
the attorney-client privilege. Naturally, they must not participate in the illegal act.
In sum, the elements of direct bribery were proved.
First, there is no question that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID
Agent Hernandez extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the
passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a visa. Petitioner Acejas was his
co-conspirator.
Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the
group and then gave to Perlas.
Third, the money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that
did not constitute a crime.
Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the
exercise of official duties.
For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable
as principals. The evidence shows that the parties conspired to extort money from
Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not commit the same
act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in
accomplishing a criminal design. The act of one is the act of all.
CANDELARIA DE MESA MANGULABNAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 236848, June 08, 2020 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
CRIME CHARGED: Direct Bribery under Article 210 of RPC
SB: Convicted
SC: Convicted
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Private complainant Alberto Guinto (Guinto) filed an election protest against
Dario Manalastas (Manalastas) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, where Rodrigo R. Flores was Presiding Judge
(Judge Flores) and Mangulabnan worked as a Court Interpreter. On several occasions,
Judge Flores allegedly visited Guinto in the latter's workplace and asked for several
monetary favors. Despite receiving these favors, Judge Flores decided the case in
favor of Manalastas.
SC ruled that all the elements constituting Direct Bribery have been
sufficiently established considering that: (a) Mangulabnan and Judge Flores were
indisputably public officers, being the Court Interpreter and Presiding Judge,
respectively, of the MTCC of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga at the time of the
offense; (b) she acted as Judge Flores' middleman in committing the crime,
specifically by receiving Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from Manalastas and
delivering it to Judge Flores; (c) the amount was given in exchange for the rendition
of a judgment favorable to Manalastas, as may be inferred from Mangulabnan's own
admission that Judge Flores ordered the release of the decision only after receiving
the Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); and (d) the rendition of judgment relates
to the functions of Judge Flores.
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1997, private complainant Alberto Guinto (Guinto) filed
an election protest against Dario Manalastas (Manalastas) before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, where Rodrigo R.
Flores was Presiding Judge (Judge Flores) and Mangulabnan worked as a Court
Interpreter. On several occasions, Judge Flores allegedly visited Guinto in the latter's
workplace and asked for several monetary favors. Despite receiving these favors,
Judge Flores decided the case in favor of Manalastas. Guinto then filed complaints
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging Judge Flores for his
failure to decide the election protest within the required period, and against
Mangulabnan for releasing an unauthorized copy of the decision.
These administrative complaints were referred to Executive Judge Adelaida
Ala-Medina (Judge Medina). In her report, Judge Medina revealed that while the
election protest case was pending before the MTCC, Judge Flores borrowed Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from Manalastas, which Mangulabnan received as
middleman in favor of Judge Flores. Hence, Judge Medina recommended
Mangulabnan's dismissal from service for her participation as conduit in the
commission of the crime.
In a Resolution, the Court adopted Judge Medina's findings, suspended
Mangulabnan for one (1) year. Thereafter, the OMB found that the allegations make
out a case for Direct Bribery; hence, the Information was filed.
During the proceedings before the SB, the prosecution did not present any
witnesses, and instead presented the documents culled from the administrative case,
the due execution of which was stipulated on by the parties.
Mangulabnan filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, which
the SB denied. Thereafter, Mangulabnan filed an Ex-Parte Manifestati on waiving her
right to present evidence.
Accused’s Argument:
Mangulabnan principally argued that the prosecution failed to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt considering its heavy reliance on the evidence
adduced during the administrative proceedings, without presenting a single witness
to identify the same or to be cross--examined. She argued that administrative
accountability cannot amount to a finding of guilt in a criminal case.
The SB Ruling
In a Decision, the SB found Mangulabnan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Direct Bribery. The SB noted Mangulabnan's admission in open court in a separate
civil case for injunction filed by Manalastas, which formed part of the administrative
case's records, that she indeed received money from the latter and delivered it to
Judge Flores, thus proving their conspiracy in committing the crime. Moreover, it
found that the prosecution had established all the elements constituting Direct
Bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that: (a) Judge Flores
and Mangulabnan were both public officers, being the Presiding Judge and Court
Interpreter, respectively, of the MTCC of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch
2 at the time of the commission of the offense; (b) Mangulabnan acted as a conduit
of Judge Flores when she received Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from
Manalastas, and delivered the same to Judge Flores; (c) the amount was in
consideration of the rendition of judgment in the pending election protest in favor of
Manalastas; and (d) that the rendition of judgment relates to the function of Flores
as Presiding Judge. Considering the concurrence of all the elements, and that
Mangulabnan was a co-conspirator of Judge Flores, the SB found the prosecution's
evidence sufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SB correctly convicted Mangulabnan of the crime of
Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states:
ARTICLE 210. Direct Bribery. - Any public officer who shall agree to perform
an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of this
official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received
by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
not less than three times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty
corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been
committed.
xxxx
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding Paragraphs, the culprit
shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
As may be gleaned from above, the elements of the crime charged are as
follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he accepts an offer or promise or
receives a gift or present by himself or through another; (c) such offer or promise be
accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing
some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute
a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and (d) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.
After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the SB
correctly convicted Mangulabnan for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code as the co-conspirator of Judge Flores. Firstly, the conspiracy between the
two accused has been duly proven by the findings of Judge Medina and by
Mangulabnan's own admission. When conspiracy is established, the responsibility of
the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable
regardless of the extent of their respective participations.
Secondly, the elements constituting Direct Bribery have been sufficiently
established considering that: (a) Mangulabnan and Judge Flores were indisputably
public officers, being the Court Interpreter and Presiding Judge, respectively, of the
MTCC of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga at the time of the offense; (b) she acted
as Judge Flores' middleman in committing the crime, specifically by receiving Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from Manalastas and delivering it to Judge Flores; (c)
the amount was given in exchange for the rendition of a judgment favorable to
Manalastas, as may be inferred from Mangulabnan's own admission that Judge
Flores ordered the release of the decision only after receiving the Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00); and (d) the rendition of judgment relates to the functions of
Judge Flores.
While the SB's findings appear to have been sourced from the documentary
evidence submitted and the admissions made in the related administrative and civil
cases, the due execution of these documentary evidence has been stipulated upon
by the parties, thus dispensing with the presentation of further witnesses. Given that
these evidence formed part of the records of the case, they may be properly
considered by the SB in its own independent determination of Mangulabnan's guilt,
which it did in this case. Although it is true that the quantum of evidence for
administrative and civil cases differ greatly from those of criminal cases, the evidence
adduced in the former may result in a criminal conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 6, 2017
and the Resolution dated January 15, 2018 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
SB-11-CRM-0228 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Candelaria De Mesa Mangulabnan is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the in
determinate penalty of imprisonment for a period of four (4) years, two (2) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and a fine in the amount of Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), with special temporary disqualification from holding
public office. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155574 November 20, 2006
TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
EMERGENCY RECIT (FACTS): Various information were filed with the Sandiganbayan
against Timoteo Garcia, Gilbert Nabo and Nery Tagupa for violation of Sec 3(b) RA
3019 on 14 Aug 1997. The information alleged that on 9-10 Jan 1993, in Cagayan de
Oro, the accused, being public officers of LTO, conspired with each other to borrow
a specific car from Oro Asian Automotive Corp. (the Company), which is engaged in
the business of vehicle assembly and dealership. The other 56 information are
similarly worded except for the dates and types of vehicles.
On 22 Aug 1997, Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the accused. On
17 Aug 1998, when arraigned, petitioner and Tagupa pleaded not guilty, while Nabo
remained at large.
Evidence of Prosecution:
Estanislao Yungao, employed as a drier and liaison officer of the Company, had
to officially report to the LTO all the engine and chassis numbers prior to the assembly
of any motor vehicle. The Company had to secure a Conduct Permit for the road
testing of vehicles assembled. After road testing, vehicles had to be registered with
the LTO. Garcia, as the Director of LTO CDO, was the approving authority. By reason
thereof, Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his office to tell him to inform
either Aurora or Alonzo Chiong, the owners of the Company, the he would borrow a
vehicle in visiting his farm because he could not use the assigned government vehicle
for his own use during weekends in going to his farm. When Yungao could not be
contacted, Garcia would personally call the Company and talk to the owners to
borrow the vehicle. Although there was a Regulation Officer before whom the
request is to be presented, Yungao was often told to go straight up to the office of
Garcia. Yungao testitfied that the names and signatures of the persons who actually
received the vehicles were reflected on the faces of the delivery receipts but did not
recognize the signatures because Yungao was not present when the vehicles were
taken.
Ma Lourdes Miranda was present when Yungao testified. The parties agreed to
enter into stipulations prior to her presentation that Miranda was the mother of a
child Jane, who was run over and killed in a vehicular accident; that the driver was
Nabo; that Miranda discovered the vehicle and numerous delivery receipts in the files
of the Company; that such led to the institution of the subject criminal cases against
accused.
Aurora Chiong, the VP and Gen Manager of the Company, recounted that Garcia
had a farm and would borrow a vehicle from the Company on a weekly basis by asking
her directly or through Yungao. Each time Garcia would borrow, the Company would
issue a delivery receipt which would usually be sign by Chiong. On several occasions,
Chiong had seen Nabo affixing his signature on the delivery receipt before taking out
the vehicles. She also testified that Garcia would return the vehicle in the after of
the same day and that there was only once when Garcia returned the car the day
after – when the car met an accident involving the death of Jane, the daughter or
Miranda. It was clarified that the cars borrowed by Garcia were all company service
cars and not newly assembled vehicles.
Garcia’s defense:
He testified that he was the Reg Dir of LTO and denied borrowing any motor
vehicle from the Company arguing that his signatures never appeared in the
Delivery Receipts submitted by prosecution. He added that he warned his
subordinates against the borrowing of vehicles from their friends but they merely
turned a deaf ear. Lastly, his driver Nabo had, on several occasions, driven motor
vehicles and visited him at his farm, and that he rode with him in going home
without allegedly knowing that the vehicles driven by Nabo were merely borrowed
from Nabo’s friends.
On 6 May 2002, Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner on 56 counts of violation
of Sec 3(b) RA 3019, Tagupa was acquitted for lack of evidence, while the cases of
Nabo, who remained at large, were archived.
CRIME CHARGED: Fifty-seven (57) Informations for violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019. In a resolution dated 3 July 1998, the withdrawal of the
information in Criminal Case No. 24078 was granted.
SANDIGANBAYAN: the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting
petitioner (GARCIA) of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. Accused Tagupa was acquitted, while the cases against
accused Nabo, who remained at large, were archived.
SC: PETITIONER IS ACQUITTED.
(1) NOT GUILTY OF R.A. NO. 3019: We agree with petitioner that the prosecution
miserably failed to prove the existence of the fourth element. It is very clear from
Section 3(b) that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present, share, percentage,
or benefit must be in connection with "a contract or transaction" wherein the public
officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. In the case at bar, the
prosecution did not specify what transactions the Company had with the LTO that
petitioner intervened in when he allegedly borrowed the vehicles from the Company.
What is required is that the transaction involved should at least be described with
particularity and proven. To establish the existence of the fourth element, the
relation of the fact of requesting and/or receiving, and that of the transaction
involved must be clearly shown.
2. NOT GUILTY OF DIRECT BRIBERY: There is utter lack of evidence adduced by the
prosecution showing that petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting
direct bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about
petitioner asking for something in exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to
perform, an act in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-
President and General Manager of the Company, testified that the Company
complied with all the requirements of the LTO without asking for any intervention
from petitioner or from anybody else from said office. From the evidence on record,
petitioner cannot likewise be convicted of Direct Bribery.
3. NOT GUILTY OF INDIRECT BRIBERY: The prosecution was not able to show with
moral certainty that petitioner truly borrowed and received the vehicles subject
matter of the 56 informations.. The prosecution relies heavily on the delivery
receipts. This Court finds that delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that
petitioner received the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear
therein. f the petitioner is uncertain, there ca
FACTS: Fifty-seven (57) Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019,
In a resolution dated 3 July 1998, the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case
No. 24078 was granted.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION:
ESTANISLAO BARRETE YUNGAO (hereinafter, "Yungao") declared that he was
employed as the driver and liaison officer of the Oro Asian Automotive Center
Corporation (hereinafter, "the Company"), an establishment engaged in the
assembly of motor vehicles. As such, Yungao had to officially report to the Land
Transportation Office ("LTO") of Cagayan de Oro City all the engine and chassis
numbers prior to the assembly of any motor vehicle. In the process, the Company
had to secure from the LTO a Conduct Permit after a motor vehicle has been
completely assembled, for purposes of carrying out the necessary road testing of the
vehicle concerned. Accused Garcia, in his capacity as the Director of the LTO of
Cagayan de Oro City, during all times relevant to the instant cases, was the approving
authority on the aforesaid reportorial requirements and the signatory of the said
Conduct Permits.
In the process, accused Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his office to tell
him to inform either Aurora or Alonzo Chiong, the owners of the Company, that he
(accused Garcia) would borrow a motor vehicle for purposes of visiting his farm.
When Yungao could not be contacted, accused Garcia would personally call up the
Company and talk to the owners thereof to borrow the vehicle. Accused Garcia
confided to Yungao that he could not utilize the assigned government vehicle for his
own personal use during Saturdays and Sundays. It was for this reason that he had to
borrow vehicles from the Chiongs to enable him to visit his farm.
Yungao maintained that accused Garcia had been regularly borrowing motor vehicles
from the Chiongs. Accused Garcia would always ask his representative to take the
Company’s vehicle on a Saturday morning. However, Yungao never reported for work
on Saturdays; thus, he was not the one who actually released the borrowed motor
vehicles to the representative of accused Garcia. Nonetheless, Yungao would be
aware of the fact that accused Garcia borrowed the vehicles requested because, for
every such instance, a corresponding delivery receipt is issued, which is placed on top
of his table for him to place in the Company’s record files on the following working
day.
On cross-examination, Yungao testified that accused Garcia would always make his
request to borrow the Company’s motor vehicle verbally and on a Friday. However,
Yungao admitted that he was not very familiar with the signature of accused Garcia,
and that the latter’s signature did not appear in any of the delivery receipts.
During all these years, Yungao could only recall one (1) instance when accused Garcia
failed to approve the Company’s request, and this was a request for an extension of
the usual "5-day road test" period granted to the Company. Nonetheless, the
Company found the said disapproval to be acceptable and proper.
On questions propounded by the Court, Yungao testified that the names and
signatures of the persons who actually received the Company’s vehicles were
reflected on the faces of the delivery receipts. However, Yungao does not recognize
the signatures appearing on the said delivery receipts, including those purportedly of
accused Tagupa, because Yungao was not present when the vehicles were taken.
AURORA J. CHIONG (hereinafter, "Chiong") declared that she is the Vice-President
and General Manager of the Company, a business establishment engaged in the
assembly of motor vehicles. In 1993, accused Garcia was the Regional Director of the
LTO in Cagayan de Oro City. He was the officer who approves the needed Conduction
Permit of newly assembled motor vehicles. He was also the LTO officer who approves
and signs the Company’s annual LTO Accreditation Certificate.
Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and that he would need a vehicle
to transport water thereto. For this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow
from the Company a motor vehicle, either by asking from Chiong directly through
telephone calls or through Yungao, her Liaison Officer. Everytime accused Garcia
would borrow a motor vehicle, the Company would issue a delivery receipt for such
purpose, which has to be signed by the person whom accused Garcia would send to
pick up the motor vehicle. Chiong was usually the company officer who signed the
delivery receipt for the release of the borrowed motor vehicle to the representative
of accused Garcia. When she was not in office, she would authorize her personnel to
place [their] initials on top of her name. On several occasions, Chiong had seen
accused Nabo affixing his signature on the delivery receipt before taking out the
borrowed motor vehicles. Chiong was very sure that the driver who picked up the
motor vehicle from the Company was the personnel of accused Garcia because the
latter would always call her up first before sending his representative to get a vehicle.
On questions propounded by the Court, Chiong testified that there was only one
instance when accused Garcia returned the motor vehicle on the day after, and this
was the time when the said vehicle had figured in a vehicular accident which resulted
in the death of a certain Jane, the daughter of Miranda. Chiong was not the
complainant in the said vehicular accident case because she could not afford to
offend or antagonize accused Garcia, and she had always considered the lending of
motor vehicles to accused Garcia as a public relation thing.
Chiong clarified that the subject motor vehicles occasionally borrowed by accused
Garcia were all company service cars and not newly assembled vehicles.
For the defense, petitioner took the witness stand, while accused Tagupa did not
present any evidence:
Petitioner downright denied borrowing any motor vehicle from the Company arguing
that his signatures never appeared in the Delivery Receipts 12 submitted by the
prosecution.13 He admitted, though, that the Company has been continually
transacting business with his office properly and officially, and has not, even for a
single instance, violated any rules with respect to assembly of motor vehicles, and
that there was no reason for the owners of the Company to harbor any ill-feelings
against him. He added that employees of the LTO are used to borrowing vehicles
from their friends and that this practice has been going on prior to his being Regional
Director. He claimed he repeatedly warned his subordinates about the illegality of
the same but they merely turned a deaf ear.16 Lastly, he said his driver, accused Nabo,
had, on several occasions, driven motor vehicles and visited him at his farm, and that
he rode with him in going home without allegedly knowing that the vehicles driven
by Nabo were merely borrowed from his (Nabo) friends.17
On 6 May 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting
petitioner of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended. Accused Tagupa was acquitted, while the cases against accused Nabo,
who remained at large, were archived. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
ISSUES:
(1) WON accused Garcida guilty of R.A. No. 3019. (NO)
(2) WON accused Garcia guilty of direct bribery. (NO)
(3) WON accused Garcia guilty of indirect bribery. (NO)
RULING:
(1) To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b)20 of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, the prosecution has the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the
offender is a public officer; (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share a
percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) in
connection with a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the
public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.21
Petitioner maintains that not all the elements of Section 3(b) have been established
by the prosecution. Petitioner focuses primarily on the fourth element. He argues
that the prosecution failed to show the specific transactions of the Company with
the LTO of Cagayan de Oro that petitioner approved and/or intervened in so that
he could borrow from, or be lent by, the Company a vehicle. Inasmuch as he was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) for
allegedly borrowing the Company’s vehicle fifty-six times, the Sandiganbayan, he
stresses, should have at least pointed out what these transactions were. This,
petitioner claims, the Sandiganbayan failed to show with certainty in its decision.
Petitioner adds that the prosecution did not even attempt to introduce evidence to
show what contract or transaction was pending before the LTO over which
petitioner had the right to intervene being the Regional Director when, at the
period stated in all the fifty-six informations, he borrowed a vehicle.
We agree with petitioner that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the
existence of the fourth element. It is very clear from Section 3(b) that the requesting
or receiving of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit must be in connection
with "a contract or transaction" wherein the public officer in his official capacity has
to intervene under the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not specify what
transactions the Company had with the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he
allegedly borrowed the vehicles from the Company. It is insufficient that petitioner
admitted that the Company has continually transacted with his office. What is
required is that the transaction involved should at least be described with
particularity and proven. To establish the existence of the fourth element, the
relation of the fact of requesting and/or receiving, and that of the transaction
involved must be clearly shown. This, the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution’s
allegation that the Company regularly transacts with petitioner’s LTO Office for the
registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers,
as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer’s report, and other similar transactions,
will not suffice
(2) NO.
The next question to be resolved is: Can petitioner be convicted of any other crime
(i.e., Direct Bribery or Indirect Bribery) charged in the informations?
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 21023 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he
received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that
such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of
some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise
of his functions as a public officer.24
Thus, the acts constituting direct bribery are: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by
performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present an act constituting
a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties; (2) by accepting a
gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to refrain, or
by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in consideration
of any gift or promise.
In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the
prosecution showing that petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting
direct bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about
petitioner asking for something in exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to
perform, an act in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-
President and General Manager of the Company, testified that the Company
complied with all the requirements of the LTO without asking for any intervention
from petitioner or from anybody else from said office. From the evidence on record,
petitioner cannot likewise be convicted of Direct Bribery.
(3) NO.
Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him
by reason of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article
21127 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have
accepted the gift or material consideration. In the case at bar, was the prosecution
able to show that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the Company?
The alleged borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered
as the gift in contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner borrowed a vehicle
from the Company for 56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery
receipts28 allegedly signed by petitioner’s representative whom the latter would send
to pick up the vehicle.
The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly
borrowed and received the vehicles subject matter of the 56 informations. The
prosecution claims that petitioner received the vehicles via his representatives to
whom the vehicles were released. The prosecution relies heavily on the delivery
receipts. We, however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that
petitioner received the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear
therein. In addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner’s
representatives who picked up the vehicles. The acquittal of one of the accused (Nery
Tagupa) who allegedly received the vehicles from the Company further strengthens
this argument. If the identity of the person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on
behalf of the petitioner is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was
petitioner who received the vehicles in the end.
WHEREFORE, all the above considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 24042 to 24077 and 24079 to 24098 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For insufficiency of evidence, the petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the informations. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 174764-65
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Crime Charged: Two informations charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with
corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section
4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
Sandiganbayan: Denied Motion to Quash of Disini
SC: Affirmed denial

It ruled that the crime has not yet prescribed. The crime of corruption of public officials
charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal
Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted." Under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery), if the gift was
accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the
value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the period
of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini
is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a)
of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall
prescribe in 15 years.
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his
right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running
of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance"
doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute
of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute
of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action."

The prescriptive period did not begin to run from 1974, the time when the contracts
for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Considering
further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality
of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the
unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in
relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with
a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
In the first criminal information, it was averred that the accused feloniously offered,
promised and gave gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused
DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in
Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock
in The Energy Corporation, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction
Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the
mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and
in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in
fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and committing
the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and
presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse,
the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct the
Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
In the second criminal information, the accused as a close personal friend and golfing
partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-
Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and
family physicianof the Marcos family, took advtange of such close personal relation
received the total amount of 1M dollars from Burns and Roe and 17 Million dollars
from Westinghouse for the contract in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan that the accused
secured with Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural
design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and
receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and
Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled
by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted
kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing
and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention
of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.
Accused Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the
prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.
Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s
favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then entered a plea
of not guilty to both informations.
The Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to quash.
Disini moved for the but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion through
the second assailed resolution.
ISSUE:
1. WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the criminal cases
2. WON the action has already prescribed
3. WON the information did not conform to the prescribed form.
RULING:
1. YES. Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the offenses
charged
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
states that in case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints
in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation
of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to
refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG
would not be an impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being
established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction,
specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini and President
Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and
Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project
(PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal
Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary. With Criminal Case No.28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had
the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG
with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled
by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover
ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249 applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A.
No. 8249:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or
higher;
 "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a
of this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher
are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative
intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the
ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene
the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to
and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan
properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
despite Disini’s being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his
being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission
of the offenses charged.
2. No. The informations have not yet prescribed.
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is
punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed
upon the officer corrupted." Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code (direct bribery), if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of
the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the
act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods
and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription for this specie of corruption
of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a)
of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall
prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10
years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, however, that the longer prescriptive
period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer
period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused.
With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in
order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that
prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime
is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,"
does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this
rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of
action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action."
The prescriptive period did not begin to run from 1974, the time when the contracts
for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the
criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved
and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh
impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of
the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly
publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions
in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation,
resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute
Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts,
which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution
having been regularly done in the course of official functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the
discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
The criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary
investigation. In accordance with Article 91 of theRevised Penal Code and the ruling
in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of
prescription.
3.
NO. The informations were sufficient in form and substance
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers
specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila,
Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President
Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as President, committed the
offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered,
promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural
design of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the
contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason
of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal
Code are:
 1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a
public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a
public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for
direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated
that:
(1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public
officer; and
(2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the
award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his
position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under
circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer
to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable
for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos
received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in direct
bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being
liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public
official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present,
gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close
personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application,
request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense,
considering that:
(1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses,
had close personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a
public official;
(2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and
received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse,
the entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in
connection with the PNPPP;
(3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal
relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-62439 October 23, 1984 GUERRERO, J.
CRIME CHARGED: Corruption of Public Official
RTC: Convicted
CA: Convicted
SC: Acquitted
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioner, a foreigner was an applicant for probation in the
Probation Office of Angeles City. Appellant came to the office looking for Probation
Officer Danilo Ocampo and since the latter was out at the time, appellant gave him a
closed envelope bearing the name of Ocampo for delivery to the latter; that two days
later, he gave the envelope to Ocampo who opened the same in his presence; that
the envelope contained some official papers connected with appellant's application
for probation and attached thereto was a hundred peso bill.
The SC ruled that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for
probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear
cut And since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with
probation rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was
befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses
for whatever documentation was needed further to complete and thus hasten his
probation application, was understandably innocent and not criminal.
FACTS:
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mr. Ricardo Manalo, Mrs.
Primitiva Francisco and Mr. Danilo Ocampo. Upon the other hand, the defense placed
on the witness stand appellant himself and his counsel Atty. Reynaldo Suarez.
Ricardo Manalo, Clerk at the Probation Office of Angeles City, declared that
he started working at the Probation Office since May 2, 1978 and came to know
appellant because the latter had gone to said office in connection with his application
for probation; appellant came to the office looking for Probation Officer Danilo
Ocampo and since the latter was out at the time, appellant gave him a closed
envelope bearing the name of Ocampo for delivery to the latter; that two days later,
he gave the envelope to Ocampo who opened the same in his presence; that the
envelope contained some official papers connected with appellant's application for
probation and attached thereto was a hundred peso bill; that Ocampo then
remarked: 'This is something bad that the opening of the envelope was done on
December 19, 1979.
Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the Angeles City
Probation Office, declared that she knows appellant because the latter was one of
the applicants for probation in 1979 and she was the one assigned to investigate
appellant's case; she requested him to submit certain pertinent documents required
by their office, such as barangay, police and court clearances, residence certificate,
etc.; that she prepared appellant's post-sentence Investigation Report that she first
saw appellant on December 7, 1979, when she interviewed him on his social and
personal history and his version of the offense, among others; that she gave the list
of documents which are to be submitted to the office; that the second time she saw
appellant was on December 21, 1979 but appellant was out at the time and when
she saw that he was in his car that broke down in front of the Pampaguena she tried
to can him but the car left as she was about to reach the place. Mrs. Francisco further
declared that at the time she saw appellant on December 21, 1979, the latter was
asking person to leave for Baguio City but she told him to talk with Probation Officer,
Mr. Ocampo, anent the matter; that she then prepared a draft of the Post-Sentence
Investigation report and thereafter had a conference with Ocampo who told him not
to delete the bribery incident from the report; that it was first from Manalo and later
from Ocampo that she became aware of the bribery or more accurately corruption
of a public official committed by appellant.
The third prosecution witness was complaint himself Danilo Ocampo, who
declared that he has been the Probation Officer of an Angeles City, since 1977 and
that his employees thereat were Ricardo Manalo, Primitiva Francisco and Ramon de
Leon; that at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of December 19, 1979, he received a
closed letter envelope from his clerk. Manalo, at the Probation Office at Merlan
Building, Angeles City, Manalo informing him that the same came from appellant;
that he opened the envelope on the presence of Manalo and found that the same
contained xerox copies of the passport and visa of appellant and inserted with said
documents was a hundred peso bill; that the envelope given him by Manalo was
addressed to him Mr. Danilo Ocampo, Probation Officer, in handwritten for that he
could not, however, produce said envelope the same having been misplaced that he
kept the one hundred peso bill as the same was an evidence against appellant; that
when he met Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, appellant's counsel at the Angeles City Court on
January 14, 1980, he told the latter about the envelope received from appellant
containing the passport, visa and the one hundred peso bill inserted with said
documents and intimated to the lawyer that the client should not have inserted said
one hundred peso bill. Ocampo further declared that the Post-Sentence Investigation
Report was prepared by Mrs. Francisco who conducted the investigation; that the
first time he saw appellant was on December 10, 1979, when the latter was seeking
permission to go to Baguio City and being a foreigner, he required him to submit to
his office copies of the latter's passport and visa; that the second time he met
appellant was in March, 1980, when the hearing of appellant's application for
probation was conducted at Branch I of the Angeles City Court; that he never required
appellant to give money, so that when he saw the one hundred peso bill in the
envelope handed him by Manalo, he was very much surprised; that he intended to
confront appellant but was unable to do so but was able to inform Atty. Suarez,
appellant's lawyer, about the matter when he met him at the City Court; that at the
time the envelope containing the documents and money was handed to him on,
December 19, 1979, the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was not yet finished and
that the same was submitted to the City Court by Mrs. Francisco on February 5, 1980;
that the fact that appellant enclosed a one hundred peso bill in the envelope was
mentioned in said report. Finally, Ocampo declared that he approved the Post-
Sentence Investigation Report recommending the granting of appellant's application
for probation, notwithstanding the bribery or corruption incident mentioned in said
report, because appellant's act was not yet a disqualification under the law, as he
was still presumed innocent until he is found guilty by the court.
Argument of Defense:
The evidence for the defense is that the one hundred peso bill the accused-
appellant placed in the envelope delivered to the Probation Officer was allegedly
intended to take care of the expenses in the xerox copying or reproduction of
documents that may be needed by the Probation Office.
TRIAL COURT:
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the said information
and, after trial, the City Court in its decision found the petitioner guilty of the crime
of corruption of a public official.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT:
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals (now In termediate
Appellate Court) and subsequently, the appellate court affirmed the same in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be held guilty for corruption of public
officials
RULING:
NO.
Art. 212. Corruption of Public Officials. — The same penalties
imposed upon the officer corrupted, except those of disqualification
and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have
made the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents as
described in the preceding articles.
The preceding Articles of the Revised Penal Code are Articles 210 and 211
which define and penalize the offenses of direct bribery and indirect bribery, and
they provide as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 210. Direct Bribery. — Any public officer who will agree to
perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or
through the mediation of another, shag suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not
less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such
value, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed
upon, ff the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the
officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided
 in the preceding paragraph, and if said shall not have been
accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the
gift and not more than twice such value, If the object for which the
gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain
from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall
suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not less than the value of the gift and not more
than three times such value.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs,
the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary
disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be
made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim
commissioners, experts, or any other persons performing public
duties.
Art. 211. Indirect Bribery. — The penalties of arresto mayor,
suspension in its minimum and medium periods, and public censure
shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts
offered to him by reason of his office.
It is well to note and distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery. In both
crimes, the public officer receives gift. While in direct bribery, there is an agreement
between the public officer and the giver of the gift or present, in indirect bribery,
usually no such agreement exist. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or
performs an act or refrains from doing something, because of the gift or promise in
indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer should do any particular act or
even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to him by
reason of his office.
In the case at bar, We find that the Information against the petitioner
charged that the accused "did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the sum of
one hundred (P100.00) pesos in a paper bill with serial No. BC530309, under
circumstances that would make the said City Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo,
liable for bribery. The trial court found the accused guilty of the offense of Corruption
of a Public Official as charged in the Information and pursuant to Article 212, in
relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is erroneous. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the
crime of Corruption of Public Official as consummated offense for it is clear from the
evidence of the prosecution as recited in both decisions of the trial and appellate
courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did not accept the one hundred peso
bill. Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public official.
Attempted corruption of a public official is punished with destierro and is
cognizable by inferior courts. Be that as it may, the crucial point is whether the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the one hundred peso bill
was given to bribe and corrupt the City Probation Officer or that it will be used to
defray expenses in xeroxing or copying of whatever documents needed by the
Probation Office in connection with petitioner's application for probation then
pending in said office.
The evidence on record disclose that the petitioner was required by the Assistant
Probation Officer, Primitive Francisco, to submit in connection with his probation
application the Court Information ( complaint) Court decision, Custody Status
(recognizance or bail bond), clearances from the Police, the Court, Barangay
Certificate, I.D. pictures (3 copies), residence certificate, and told to report once a
week on Mondays. Aside from these documents, the Probation Officer required of
the petitioner on December 10, 1979 when the latter was asking permission to go to
Baguio to submit to the office a copy of his visa and passport. Mrs. Francisco to
testified that the petitioner was asking permission from her to leave for Baguio. And
according to the petitioner, "during all the time he was applying for probation, he
made more or less 12 visits in the office as he was directed to report every Monday
at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. He reported for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks and there
were times that he went there unscheduled for conference and clarification of the
various re. requirements he needed. During all the time he went there, he met
Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo himself. Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo
interviewed him He submitted all the requirements to the Probation Officer; at times,
he submitted them directly to Mrs. Francisco, and at other times to Mr. Manalo, and
also to Mr. Ocampo. Other than those listed in the list given by Mrs. Francisco, he
was required to submit xerox copy of his passport, his visa and his pictures. He
explained that he gave the requirements to the person who was interviewing him,
primarily Mrs. Francisco, of the documents needed. Later, he submitted to the office
xerox copy of the original He likewise submitted his two passports, and later xerox
copy of his passports. When Mrs. Francisco was asking for the original, which
documents are in the possession of his lawyer at his office, he had to return to get
the originals."
 From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing
petitioner's application for probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not
precise, explicit and clear cut And since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite
unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that
petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and advancing
the expenses for whatever documentation was needed further to complete and thus
hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent and not criminal.
In fine, the facts and circumstances on record amply justify and support the
claim of the defense as against the conjectures, speculation and supposition recited
in the decision of the trial court and quoted with approval in the appealed decision
under review. The Government's own evidence as indicated in the Post-Sentence
Investigation Report that the giving of the one hundred pesos ( P100.00) was done in
good faith, is vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent. There being no criminal
intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal
of the crime charged. We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is not that moral certainty required
to convict him. Even the complainant himself, the Probation Officer, filed the
complaint only on the suggestion of the presiding judge of the Angeles City Court
during the hearing on petitioner's application for probation, the complaint having
been filed in the City Fiscal's Office on June 10, 1980 after a lapse and delay of six (6)
months.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED. The accused petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
HENRY T. GO, Petitioner, vs. THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
EMERGENCY RECIT (FACTS): Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner
Henry Go, Chairman and President of PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section
3(g) of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in
relation to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the government with Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).
Petitioner Go contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that
he was not a public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA
3019. He further assert that conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is
chargeable only with the offense under Sec3(e).
CRIME CHARGED: Information dated January 13, 2005 charging Vicente C. Rivera, as
then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and President of PIATCO, with
violation of Section 3(g) 4 of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act
SANDIGANBAYAN: The Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying
Rivera’s Motion for Judicial Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause
and Motion to Dismiss and petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash More particularly, the
allegations that accused Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner
Go, entered into the ARCA with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which agreement was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, are constitutive of the
elements of the offense charged as defined under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
SC: Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a
public officer does not necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section 3(g) of RA
3019. Petitioner Go’s simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he
cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, goes against the letter
and spirit of the avowed policy of RA 3019 as embodied in Section 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with
the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which
may lead thereto.
As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, 15
the Court had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both
public officers and private persons.
The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is
a public officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons
who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in
the commission of the offense thereunder.
The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is
applicable to the present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is
in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices
act or which may lead thereto.
It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of
the former First Lady’s conviction was based on the fact that it was later held that
she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not a public officer.
However, this acquittal should also be taken in conjunction with the fact that the
public officer with whom she had supposedly conspired, her co-accused Dans, had
earlier been acquitted. In other words, the element that the accused is a public
officer, was totally wanting in the former First Lady’s case because Dans, the public
officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in committing Section 3(g) of RA
3019, had already been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could not be
convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.
FACTS: On May 5, 2003, this Court rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),1 declaring as null and void the 1997
Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA),
and the Supplemental Contracts entered into between the Government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO.
By the aforementioned contracts (collectively known as the PIATCO contracts), the
Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 6957 as
amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).
The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, was
not a qualified bidder as it failed to meet the financial capability requirement under
the BOT Law. Moreover, the PIATCO contracts were declared null and void for being
contrary to public policy.
Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman by Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco, Corporate Secretary of Asia’s Emerging
Dragon Corporation (AEDC), charging several persons in connection with the NAIA
IPT III project. The AEDC was the original proponent thereof which, however, lost to
PIATCO when it failed to match the latter’s bid price.
After conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan the Information dated January 13, 2005 charging
Vicente C. Rivera, as then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and
President of PIATCO, with violation of Section 3(g) 4 of RA 3019, also known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
On May 26, 2005, Rivera filed a Motion for Judicial Determination (or Re-
Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss. The Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner Go a period of ten (10) days within which to file a comment thereon.
On June 20, 2005, petitioner Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash. Petitioner
Go maintained that apart from the bare allegations contained in Pesayco’s affidavit-
complaint, there was no supporting evidence for the finding of the existence of
probable cause against him and Rivera. Petitioner Go further alleged that he could
not be charged under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not a public officer and
neither is he capacitated to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government. At least one of the important elements of the crime under Section 3(g)
of RA 3019 is not allegedly present in his case.
On December 6, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying
Rivera’s Motion for Judicial Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause
and Motion to Dismiss and petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that, contrary to the prosecution’s submission, it could still
entertain petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash even after his arraignment considering
that it was based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash holding
that, contrary to his claim, the allegations in the Information actually make out the
offense charged. More particularly, the allegations that accused Rivera, as DOTC
Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner Go, entered into the ARCA with petitioner
Go/PIATCO, which agreement was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government, are constitutive of the elements of the offense charged as defined
under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
The Sandiganbayan explained that petitioner Go’s contentions that he is not a
public officer, he did not conspire with Rivera in the execution of the ARCA and, in
any case, the said agreement cannot be said to be manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, could not be properly considered for the
purpose of quashing the Information on the ground relied upon by him.
Petitioner Go filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but it was denied. Petitioner
Go now seeks recourse to the Court.
ISSUE: WON the Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ruling that Section 3(g) does not
embrace a private person within its proviso. (NO)
PETITIONER GO’s contention: Petitioner Go contends that Section 3(g) of RA 3019,
by its text, cannot be extended or even enlarged by implication or intendment to
bring within its limited scope private persons. The said provision of law allegedly
punishes only public officers as it penalizes the act of "entering, on behalf of the
government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby." As a private person, he could not allegedly enter into a contract
"on behalf of the government," there being no showing of any agency relations or
special authority for him to act for and on behalf of the government.
He also cites Marcos v. Sandiganbayan 9 where the Court acquitted then First Lady
Imelda R. Marcos of the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as it found
that she did not sign the subject Lease Agreement, entered into between the Light
Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) and Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc.
(PGHFI), as a public officer, but in her capacity as Chairman of the PGHFI, a private
entity. As such, the Court held that the first element of the offense charged, i.e.,
that the accused is a public officer, was wanting.
By parity of reasoning, according to petitioner Go, the first essential element of the
crime penalized under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is that the offender must be a public
officer. Since he is not a public officer, one of the essential elements of the offense is
lacking; hence, there is no other recourse but to quash the Information.
Petitioner Go posits that had it been the intention of the lawmakers to penalize
private persons who supposedly "conspired" with public officers in violation of
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of RA 3019, it could have easily used the conjunctive "and,"
not "or," between the terms "public officer" and "private person" in Section 9
thereof.
Petitioner Go takes exception to the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement that even as
a private individual he is not excluded from the coverage of Section 3(g) of RA 3019
because he is not being accused singly but as someone who conspired with a public
officer in violating the said law. According to petitioner Go, this proposition applies
only to Section 3(e)12 of RA 3019, the elements of which include that "the accused
are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them." 13 He
stresses that, unlike Section 3(e) of RA 3019, Section 3(g) thereof penalizes only
public officers as the operative phrase in the latter provision is "on behalf of the
government."
RULING: NO. The petition is bereft of merit.
For clarity, Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is quoted below anew:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
As earlier mentioned, the elements of this offense are as follows:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.14
Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a public
officer does not necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Petitioner Go’s simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be
charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit
of the avowed policy of RA 3019 as embodied in Section 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government,
in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute
graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, 15
the Court had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both
public officers and private persons.
Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers
and private persons with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application
extends to both public officers and private persons.
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one
month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion
to his salary and other lawful income.
The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is
a public officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons
who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in
the commission of the offense thereunder.
The case of Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan is instructive. Singian illustrates that private
persons, like petitioner Go, when conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and,
if found guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Another case, Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, may likewise be applied to this case by
analogy.
Despite the first element mentioned above, the Court affirmed the conviction of
Garcia, a private individual, as well as that of Domingo, who was then a municipal
mayor, for violation of Section 3(h) of RA 3019. In so holding, the Court established
that Domingo and Garcia acted in conspiracy with one another in the commission of
the offense. Domingo thus also serves to debunk petitioner Go’s theory that where
an offense has as one of its elements that the accused is a public officer, it
necessarily excludes private persons from the scope of such offense.
The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is
applicable to the present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is
in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices
act or which may lead thereto.
Reliance by petitioner Go on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan 20 is not quite appropriate.
Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the subject lease agreement
as a private person, not as a public officer. As such, the first element, i.e., that the
accused is a public officer was wanting.
Petitioner Go, however, failed to put the Court’s ruling in Marcos in its proper factual
backdrop. The acquittal of the former First Lady should be taken in the context of the
Court’s Decision dated January 29, 1998, in Dans, Jr. v. People, 21 which the former
First Lady sought to reconsider and, finding merit in her motion, gave rise to the
Court’s Resolution in Marcos. In Dans, the Information filed against the former First
Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of Transportation and Communications, for
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, alleged that they were both public officers and,
conspiring with each other, entered into the subject lease agreement covering the
LRTA property with the PGHFI, a private entity, under terms and conditions
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Lady’s conviction for
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 but acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the
said offense. As stated earlier, upon the former First Lady’s motion for
reconsideration, the Court reversed her conviction in its Resolution in Marcos.
It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of
the former First Lady’s conviction was based on the fact that it was later held that
she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not a public officer.
However, this acquittal should also be taken in conjunction with the fact that the
public officer with whom she had supposedly conspired, her co-accused Dans, had
earlier been acquitted. In other words, the element that the accused is a public
officer, was totally wanting in the former First Lady’s case because Dans, the public
officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in committing Section 3(g) of RA
3019, had already been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could not be
convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.
In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first
element in his case because he is not being charged alone but in conspiracy with
Rivera, undoubtedly a public officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC Secretary.
The case against both of them is still pending before the Sandiganbayan. The facts
attendant in petitioner Go’s case are, therefore, not exactly on all fours as those of
the former First Lady’s case as to warrant the application of the Marcos ruling in his
case.
Following these truisms, the specific acts of petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracy
with Rivera in violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as well as the details on how petitioner
Go had taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy need not
be set forth in the Information as these are evidentiary matters and, as such, are to
be shown and proved during the trial on the merits. Indeed, it bears stressing that
"[t]o establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the
acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when
taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the
proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once
established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of participation of each of them, for in contemplation of the law the act of
one is the act of all.
In this connection, for purposes of the Information, it is sufficient that the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are complied with.
As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the
Information, if admitted hypothetically, establish all the elements of Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 vis-à-vis petitioner Go.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions
dated December 6, 2005 and March 24, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 28092 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. Nos. 236308-09, February 17, 2020 ]
EFREN M. CANLAS, PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.
Crime Charged: Two Informations were filed against petitioner, along with public
officers named therein, before the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.
Sandiganbayan: Denied Motion to Quash
SC: Affirmed denial of Motion to Quash
The SC ruled that the well-settled rule is that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for
the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, in consonance with the avowed
policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
Facts:
Two Informations were filed against petitioner, along with public officers named
therein, before the Sandiganbayan. The Informations charged him and his co-accused,
former Mayor Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., among others, with violations of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 in relation to the construction of the Makati City
Hall Parking Building.
For the first information, it was alleged that that the accused former Makati City Mayor
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr. and the other accused public officers of Makati City
mentioned therein, in the performance of their official and/or administrative functions,
conspired with petitioner, a private individual and the representative of Hilmarc's
Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), in giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, and
preference to Hilmarc's, and causing undue injury to the Government by awarding
Hilmarc's the contract for the Phase IV construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building amounting to P649,275,681.73, through simulated public bidding.
The second information is similarly worded as to petitioner's participation, except that
it involved the Phase V construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building
amounting to P141,649,366.00.13
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Information for the first information and another
Motion to Quash Information for the second information.
He argued that the facts alleged in the Informations which charged him with the
offense of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 did not constitute the charged offense
for the following reasons:
(1) RA 3019 explicitly applies only to public officers; however, the Informations
alleged that he is a private individual; and
(2) the Informations did not allege that he induced or caused any public officer to
commit a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 to render him liable under Section
415 thereof.16
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash
Petitioner maintains that while the prosecution alleged that the accused public officers
acted in conspiracy with him, conspiracy does not make him a public officer.
Petitioner further argues that there is not a single case in which a private person was
held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 under Section 4(b) of the
law. Thus, he prays for a reversal, or at least a clarification, of the ruling in several
cases decided by the Court to the effect that private individuals may be held liable
under Section 3 of RA 3019 if they act in conspiracy with public officers.
Issue: WON the motion to quash should be granted.
Ruling: No.
The well-settled rule is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the
anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
In PCGG v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court reiterated the well-settled elements
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as follows:
(i) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions, or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public
officers;
(ii) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence;
and
(iii) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.

The Court, in various cases, had the occasion to affirm the indictment and/or
conviction of a private individual, acting in conspiracy with public officers, for
violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 particularly paragraph (e) thereof.
Thus, in Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, while the issue therein was whether
a private individual may be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the
Court discussed and relied on Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) (Singian, Jr.) to rule in the affirmative.
In Singian, Jr. , Gregorio Singian, Jr., therein petitioner, a private individual
who was then the Executive Vice President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI), was
charged together with some officers of the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
with violation of both paragraphs (e) and (g), Section 3 of RA 3019 in
connection with the loan accommodations extended by PNB to ISI which
were characterized as behest loans.
The Court ruled that the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when they respectively found probable cause
against Singian, Jr. for violation of both paragraphs (e) and (g), Section 3 of
RA 3019.41
Further, in Uyboco vs. People, the Court discussed the criminal liability of Edelbert
C. Uyboco (Uyboco), a private individual who acted in conspiracy with his co-accused
public officer in the procurement of overpriced dump trucks. The Court affirmed his
conviction by the Sandiganbayan under Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Similarly, in PCGG v. Navarra-Gutierrez, et al., the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance filed an Affidavit-Complaint against private respondents who were
former officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping Corporation (Galleon),
together with the public respondents who were former officers/directors of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of
RA 3019 in connection with the loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon from
DBP which possessed the characteristics of behest loans.46 Reversing the Office of
the Ombudsman's ruling, the Court ruled that there was probable cause to indict the
private respondents and the public respondents for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of
RA 3019/
Hence, based on this cases, the argument of the accused that a private individual cannot
be held liable for violation of RA 3019 does not lie.
Given the foregoing pronouncements, the petition, together with the prayer therein that
the case be referred to the Court En Banc and that a TRO be issued, should be denied.
LIBRADO M. CABRERA AND FE M. CABRERA, PETITIONERS, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. Nos. 191611-14, July 29, 2019 REYES, J. JR., J.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
SB: Librado and Fe Convicted; Leonor Acquitted
SC: Affirmed Conviction
EMERGENCY RECIT:
FACTS:
Petitioners Librado M. Cabrera (Librado) and Fe M. Cabrera (Fe) together with
accused Luther H. Leonor (Leonor), as public officers, were charged in four separate
Informations with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In Criminal Case No. 27555, Librado and Leonor, in their capacity as then
Municipal Mayor and Municipal Councilor, respectively, of Taal, Batangas, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, made several
direct purchases of medicines from Diamond Laboratories, Inc. (DLI), a corporation
owned by the relatives by consanguinity of Librado. The purchases were made
without the benefit of public bidding or canvass giving DLI unwanted benefit and
depriving the Municipality of Taal the opportunity to avail of a better price of the
same quality of supplies. The total costs of the purchases amounted to P503,920.35.
Leonor, despite being the Municipal Councilor, acted as the authorized
representative of DLI as he was the one who received all payments due and signed
all pertinent documents of the transactions.
In Criminal Case No. 27556, Librado, then Mayor of the Municipality of Taal,
Batangas, taking advantage of his official position, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, caused undue injury. to the
Municipality of Taal, gave unwarranted benefit to himself by reimbursing, collecting
and appropriating the total amount of P27,651.83 representing the expenses he
incurred during his unauthorized and illegal travels to Manila.
In Criminal Case No. 27557, Fe and Leonor, in their capacity as then
Municipal Mayor and Municipal Councilor, respectively, of Taal, Batangas through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, made several
direct purchases of medicines from DLI, a corporation owned by the relatives by
consanguinity of Fe's husband, Librado. The purchases were made without the
benefit of public bidding or canvass giving DLI unwanted benefit and depriving the
Municipality of Taal the opportunity to avail of a better price of the same quality of
supplies. The total costs of the purchases amounted to P1,042,902.46. Leonor,
despite being the Municipal Councilor, acted as the authorized representative of DLI
as he was the one who received all payments due and signed all pertinent documents
of the transactions.
In Criminal Case No. 27558, Fe, then Mayor of the Municipality of Taal,
Batangas, taking advantage of her official position through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, caused undue injury to the
Municipality of Taal, to the government as a whole and to public interest, at the same
time, gave unwarranted benefit to herself by reimbursing, collecting and
appropriating the total amount of P170,987.66 representing the expenses she
incurred during her unauthorized and illegal travels to Manila.
Defense argument:
Librado and Fe claimed that the purchases of medicines in question were
covered by the exceptions allowing certain purchases without public bidding. These
purchases conform with the exceptions pertaining to emergency purchases that were
made directly from manufacturers or exclusive distributor of Philippine-
manufactured drugs. Leonor, on the other hand, explained that his participation in
these transactions was only by virtue of the request of DLI, his former employer, with
respect to the collection of payments. Leonor clarified that he had no financial or
material interest in these transactions and neither was his office charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or concessions. As to the charge of illegal
reimbursements of travel expenses, Librado and Fe claimed that these were not
questionable considering that they were supported with bills and receipts and
certifications attesting that their travels were absolutely necessary. Moreover, they
claimed that they secured the verbal permission of the governor before every travel
and although late, they were able to secure a written permission from the governor
after the travels.
SB Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision finding Librado and Fe guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Leonor was
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUES:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (4th DIVISION) COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR OF
LAW IN EQUATING LACK OF PUBLIC BIDDING TO GIVING UNWARRANTED
BENEFIT TO DIAMOND LABORATORIES, INC. (DLI).6
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (4th DIVISION) COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR OF
LAW IN RULING THAT THE PERMISSION REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 96(B) OF
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE MUST BE IN WRITING NOTWITHSTANDING
THE EN BANC DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN "CABRERA ET[.] AL[.]
VS[.] MARCELO"7
3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (4th DIVISION) COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR OF
LAW IN RULING THAT THE REIMBURSEMENT OF PETITIONERS' TRAVEL
EXPENSES RESULTED IN UNDUE INJURY ON THE GOVERNMENT DESPITE THE
PERMISSION GRANTED THEREFOR BY FORMER GOVERNOR MANDANAS.
RULING:
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
SEC. 3 Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan,9 the Court laid down the essential elements of the
crime, viz.:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
 The first element need not be explained. In this case, there is no doubt that
petitioners are public officers of Taal, Batangas, during the material time and date of
the commission of the alleged violation. Librado was the mayor from January 30,
1998 to June 30, 1998 and his wife, Fe, was the incumbent Mayor from July 28, 1998
to July 6, 1999.
The second element provides the modalities by which a violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed. It must be stressed that these three modes,
namely "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence"
are not separate offenses, and proof of the existence of any of these three in
connection with the prohibited acts committed, is sufficient to convict. As explained
by this Court:
There is "manifest partiality" when there is clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith"
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.
The third element refers to two (2) separate acts that qualify as a violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. An accused may be charged with the commission of
either or both. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies
as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The first punishable act is that the accused is said to have caused undue
injury to the government or any party when the latter sustains actual loss or damage,
which must exist as a fact and cannot be based on speculations or conjectures. The
loss or damage need not be proven with actual certainty. However, there must be
"some reasonable basis by which the court, can measure it." Aside from this, the loss
or damage must be substantial. It must be "more than necessary, excessive, improper
or illegal"
The second punishable act is that the accused is said to have given
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to a private party. Proof of the
extent or quantum of damage is not thus essential.15 It is sufficient that the accused
has given "unjustified favor or benefit to another."
In the instant case, Librado's and Fe's violation of the aforesaid Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 basically hinges on two delictual acts, namely: (1) the awarding of
procurement contract (for the purchase of medicines) to a private person (DLI)
without the benefit of competitive public bidding as provided under the LGC, as
referred to in Criminal Cases Nos. 27555 and 27557, and (2) by making illegal
reimbursements of amounts representing the expenses for their unauthorized
travels to Manila, as referred to in Criminal Cases Nos. 27556 and 27558.
Criminal Cases Nos. 27555 and 27557
Petitioners first act constituting violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is the
alleged procurement of supplies without the benefit of public bidding. As a matter of
policy, procurement or "acquisition of supplies or property by local government units
shall be made through competitive public bidding." Thus, Section 356 of the LGC of
1991 on procurement of supplies, provides:
SEC. 356. General Rule in Procurement or Disposal. — Except as otherwise
provided herein, acquisition of supplies by local government units shall be
through competitive public bidding. x x x.
Whereas, Section 366 of the LGC, by way of exception, provides:
SEC. 366. Procurement Without Public Bidding. – Procurement of supplies
may be made without the benefit of public bidding under any of the following
modes:
(a) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(b) Emergency purchase;
(c) Negotiated purchase;
(d) Direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusive distributors; and
(e) Purchase from other government entities.
The rationale behind the requirement of a public bidding, as a mode of
awarding government contracts, is to ensure that the people get maximum benefits
and quality services from the contracts. It promotes transparency in government
transactions and accountability of public officers as it minimizes occasions for
corruption and temptations to abuse of discretion on the part of government
authorities in awarding contracts.For these reasons, important public policy
considerations demand the strict observance of procedural rules relating to the
bidding process.

Petitioners admit that they have dispensed with the requirement of public
bidding. They justify non-compliance with the bidding process by claiming that the
purchases were emergency purchases as certified to by the Head of the Municipal
Health Office, and that the purchases were all directly from the manufacturer or
exclusive distributor of Philippine-manufactured drugs.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that these justifications are not sufficient
to forego the conduct of public bidding. Indeed, it is incumbent upon a party who
invokes coverage under the exception, to a general rule to prove fulfillment of the
requisites thereof. In this case, petitioners fail to adduce evidence that their
purchases of the medicines fall under the exceptions.
As ruled by the Sandiganbayan, certain legal requirements as provided in
the IRR of the LGC of 1991,22 must be observed in order for a purchase/procurement
of supplies to be categorized as (a) emergency purchase; and (b) direct purchase from
duly licensed manufacturer. Article 437 of the IRR of the LGC of 1991, reads:
ART. 437. Procurement Without Public Bidding. – The procurement of
supplies may be made without the benefit of public bidding under any of the
following modes:
(b) Emergency Purchase —
(1) In cases of emergency where the need for the supplies is exceptionally
urgent or absolutely indispensable and only to prevent imminent danger to,
or loss of, life or property, LGUs may, through the local chief executive
concerned, make emergency purchases or place repair orders, regardless of
amount, without public bidding. Delivery of purchase orders or utilization of
repair orders pursuant to this Article shall be made within ten (10) days after
placement thereof. Immediately after the emergency purchase or repair
order is made, the head of office or department making the emergency
purchase or repair order shall draw a regular requisition to cover the same
which shall contain the following:
(i) Complete description of the supplies acquired or work done or to
be performed;
(ii) By whom furnished or executed;
(iii) Date of placing the order and date and time of delivery or execution;
(iv) Unit price and total contract price;
(v) Brief and concise explanation of the circumstances why procurement
was of such urgency that the same could not be done through regular course
without involving danger to, or loss of, life or property;
(vi) Certification of the provincial general services officer, city general
services officer, municipal treasurer, or barangay treasurer, as the case may
be, to the effect that the price paid or contracted for was the lowest at the
time of procurement; and
(vii) Certification of the local budget officer as to the existence of
appropriations for the purpose, of the local accountant as to the obligation
of the amount involved, and of the local treasurer as to availability of funds.
(2) The goods or services procured in case of emergency must be utilized or
availed of within fifteen (15) days from the date of delivery or availability.
(3) Without prejudice to criminal prosecution under applicable laws, the
local chief executive or the head of office making the procurement shall be
administratively liable for any violation of the provisions on emergency
purchase and shall be a ground for suspension or dismissal from service.
(d) Procurement from Duly Licensed Manufacturers — Procurement of
supplies or property may be made directly from duly licensed manufacturers
in cases of supplies of Philippine manufacture or origin. The manufacturer
must be able to present proof showing that it is a duly licensed manufacturer
of the desired product.
None of the above-mentioned prescribed procedures are complied with by
petitioners. Going into the details, the Court observes the following:
A. As to petitioners' claim that the purchases were emergency
purchases. - While Fe was able to show the Purchase Request23
dated August 25, 1998, issued by the Head of the Municipal
Health Office, Dr. Adolfo Magistrado, the request was
incomplete in details. There was likewise no Certification that
at the time of the procurement, the price contracted for, was
the lowest and that there was availability of funds as required
by the IRR. No such purchase request was presented by
Librado.
 B. As to petitioners' claim that they made direct purchase from
DLI as it is a duly licensed manufacturer of medicines in the
Philippines, such barren allegation is not sufficient. We cannot
accept hook, line and sinker, the ruling of the Ombudsman that
DLI is a duly licensed manufacturer of medicines. Courts,
generally, do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented
in other proceedings.24 There must be proof establishing that
DLI is indeed a duly licensed manufacturer of medicines in the
Philippines.
Neither did petitioners show that they conducted a canvass of
prices in order to obtain the lowest of prices of the known
manufacturers for the same quality of medicines needed.
Petitioners conveniently skipped the requirement of canvass
before making the purchases. Section 370 of the LGC imposes
a duty that a canvass of the known manufacturers first be
conducted before the purchase is made, so as to ensure that
the local government would spend the lowest possible price
for such purchase.25 Since petitioners are claiming exemption
to the requirement of public bidding, the burden of proof lies
upon them to show that there is no qualified manufacturer but
DLI which could offer the best possible price for the
government.
For failure to comply with the procedure, petitioners' case does not qualify under the
exceptions provided by law. Thus, petitioners should have conducted a competitive
public bidding on the procurement of the medicines for the municipality in order to
avoid suspicions of irregularity. Petitioners, as mayors, should have acted in a
circumspect manner to observe the law in order to promote transparency in the
handling of government funds. As things stand, there was no public bidding that was
conducted.
As can be read from the Information, petitioners are charged of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the second punishable act which is giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to a private party, through manifest
partiality, bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. Indeed, the choice of DLI as the
grantee of the medicines, in the absence of public bidding, shows that petitioners
gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in favor of DLI. The words
"unwarranted," "advantage" and "preference" were defined by the court in this wise:
"[Unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a
more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind;
benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher
evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.
In the instant case, there is no sufficient justification or adequate reasons
why DLI was favorably chosen. DLI was awarded the procurement contract without
the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the government.
And the only way to ascertain the best possible price advantageous to the
government is through competitive public bidding. Indeed, public bidding is the
accepted method for arriving at a fair and reasonable price and it ensures that
overpricing and favoritism, and other anomalous practices are eliminated or
minimized.31 To circumvent this requirement outside the valid exceptions, is
evidence of bad faith.
It was established in this case and admitted by petitioners, that DLI is a
corporation whose stockholders, directors and officers are the relatives of Librado.
Petitioners' refusal to conduct public bidding and to award the contract to the
winning bidder, smack of favoritism and bias in favor of DLI. Indeed, nothing
demonstrates manifest partiality more than the awarding of procurement contract
to second degree relatives, either by consanguinity or affinity, without the benefit of
competitive public bidding. By choosing DLI without public bidding, petitioners
evidently give unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in favor of private
persons, through manifest partiality.
Criminal Cases Nos. 27556 and 27558
Petitioners' second act constituting violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
is the alleged illegal reimbursements made by petitioners of the amount representing
their expenses for their alleged unauthorized travels. Two acts are involved here: the
unauthorized travels and the illegal reimbursements.
Pertinent provision of the LGC of 199 provides:
SEC. 96. Permission to Leave Station. — (a) Provincial, city, municipal, and
barangay appointive officials going on official travel shall apply and secure
written permission from their respective local chief executives before
departure. The application shall specify the reasons for such travel, and the
permission shall be given or withheld based on considerations of public
interest, financial capability of the local government unit concerned and
 urgency of the travel. Should the local chief executive concerned fail to act
upon such application within four (4) working days from receipt thereof, it
shall be deemed approved.
(b) Mayors of component cities and municipalities shall secure the
permission of the governor concerned for any travel outside the province.
(c) Local government officials traveling abroad shall notify their respective
sanggunian: Provided, That when the period of travel extends to more than
three (3) months, during periods of emergency or crisis or when the travel
involves the use of public funds, permission from the Office of the President
shall be secured.
(d) Field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in provinces, cities,
and municipalities shall not leave their official stations without giving prior
written notice to the local chief executive concerned. Such notice shall state
the duration of travel and the name of the officer whom he shall designate
to act for and in his behalf during his absence. (Underscoring supplied).
Paragraph (a) speaks of the term "permission" as one that is "written" and
secured "before departure." While the words "written" and "before departure" are
not repeated in paragraph (b) of the aforesaid provision, we take into consideration
the general rule of statutory construction that a word used in a statute in a given
sense is presumed to be used in the same sense throughout the law.34 While this rule
is not, by some authorities, regarded as so rigid and peremptory as some other of the
rules of construction, nevertheless it is particularly applicable in the case at bar,
where in the statute the words appear so near to each other physically, and
particularly where the word has a technical meaning and that meaning has been
defined in the statute.35
Petitioners raised the defense that the unauthorized travels were
subsequently ratified. They claimed that they were able to subsequently obtain the
permission/approval of the Governor such that, the unauthorized travels become
authorized. True enough, the Governor issued a Certification to the effect that he
gave his subsequent approval to petitioners' previous travel. The Governor even
confirmed, in no uncertain terms, that he indeed gave his permission to petitioners
for the travels which they made. However, the subsequent approval given by the
governor did not save the day for the petitioners. As the anti-graft court observed.
We cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for brushing aside the Governor's
permissions which were not timely obtained. True, things got complicated when
petitioners sought reimbursements of the travel expenses which they advanced from
their personal funds. It is worthy to note that petitioners, as claimants seeking
reimbursements, are also the ones approving the disbursement vouchers, in their
capacity as the Chief Executives of the Municipality of Taal during their respective
terms. This is the mandate of Article 454 (k) of the IRR 37 of the LGC of 1991, that
approval of the disbursement vouchers shall be made by the local chief executive
himself, thus:
(k) Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers — No money shall be
disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of
appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local
accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies
to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be
certified to and approved by the head of the office or department who has
administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety, and
legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving
regularly recurring administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or
permanent employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph
services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as the GSIS, SSS,
LBP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the DBM and
others, approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive
himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed. (Underscoring
supplied)
The foregoing provision also laid down the requirements needed to disburse
local funds,38 to wit: (a) certification from local budget officer as to the existence of
appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose; (b) that the local
accountant has obligated said appropriation; (c) certification from the local treasurer
as to the availability of funds for the purpose; (d) that the vouchers and payrolls shall
be certified to and approved by the head of the office or department who has
administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety, and legality of
the claim involved; and lastly, (e) the approval of the local chief executive of the
disbursement voucher.
As established, at the time the disbursement voucher was approved by
petitioners, there was yet no sufficient basis that would justify the reimbursement of
travel expenses. The validity, propriety and legality of the claimed travel expense can
be justified if the travel itself is with the written permission/approval of the Governor
as mandated by the LGC of 1991. At that moment when petitioners were claiming
reimbursements, the required permissions of the Governor for petitioners' travels to
Manila were yet to be obtained and despite that, petitioners still proceeded to
approve the disbursement vouchers. This was the reason why a special audit was
conducted in December 1999, as the reimbursements made were questionable. 39
Even the local accountant noted beside her signature as to the absence of the
required travel order.40 Evidently, there was circumvention of the rules and the
procedure in claiming reimbursements. Given that the travels made by petitioners
were unauthorized at the time of reimbursements, then there was no legal obligation
on the part of the municipality to disburse the said claimed travel expenses to the
benefit of petitioners.
It bears to stress that mere unauthorized travel does not automatically
equate to violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. There must be proof that the said
unauthorized travel caused undue injury to the government or that it amounts to
giving unwarranted benefit or advantage to a private person or to oneself for that
matter. The act of petitioners in approving the disbursement vouchers without
compliance with the disbursement procedures (i.e., necessary supporting
documents, written permission of the government authorizing their travel)
constitute bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence in observing the law, causing
undue injury to the Municipality of Taal. The Municipality of Taal was effectively
deprived of the amounts of P27,651.83 and P170,987.66 which petitioners Librado
and Fe respectively reimbursed for themselves. Indeed, there is no greater proof of
undue injury to the government when public funds are used for an unjustified
expense.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 175457 July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
EMERGENCY RECIT (FACTS): The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty.
David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into
the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No.
10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of
petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.
Petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that
Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person
and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to
petitioners, Adalim’s sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous
prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998
to 2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed
the transfer of Adalim’s detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial
jail as the primary reason for taking personal custody of Adalim.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at
home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting
the legality of Mayor Adalim’s arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking
him for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White
who informed him that he was under the governor, in the latter’s capacity as a
provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the
governor’s order to relinquish custody of Adalim. Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr.
described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and undermanned.
CRIME CHARGED:
(1) The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal
charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) 7 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019. The new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the
Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case against
petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
petitioners.
(2) Nonetheless, in an Information, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together
with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano.
(3) Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum,
recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the
amendment of the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from
Jail under Article 15611 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the
remaining accused (petitioner AMBIL and APELADO).
SANDIGANBAYAN: the Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty of violating Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
SC: Both petitioners are guilty of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
All the elements were established.
First element: that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions; As to the first element, there is no question that
petitioners are public officers discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over
them lay with the Sandiganbayan.
Second element: that he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; In this case, we find that petitioners displayed
manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor
Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s
contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of
his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar. Pursuant to Section 28 of the
Local Government Code in connection with Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 6975
on the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, it is the provincial government and
not the governor alone which has authority to exercise control and supervision over
provincial jails.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in
Section 1737 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the
neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to
accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been
superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention
by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less
the governor.
Third element: that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. As mentioned in order to hold a person
liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act
constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative
or judicial functions.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this
case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the
last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses,
permits or other concessions" and he is not such government officer or employee.
Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but
to a public officer.
However, as regards his first contention, the Supreme Court already settled in
Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is
"charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions."
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Evidently, Mayor
Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving
by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party.
Despite the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits, this case will
not be taken the ambit of said law.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than
"private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference for a reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise
meaning in legal parlance46 as distinguished from "person" which, in general usage,
refers to a human being.4 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not
a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his
personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial
jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such
privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged
with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019, Adalim was a private party.
FACTS: The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, President
of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the
Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of
then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder,
from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for
violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new
President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the
IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against petitioners. 8
Nonetheless, in an Information,petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado,
Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3
Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the
complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information to include the
charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 156 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason,
however, that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon
his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to
petitioners, Adalim’s sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous
prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana
A. Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998
to 2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed
the transfer of Adalim’s detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial
jail as the primary reason for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the
latter would be in the company of inmates who were put away by his sister and
guards identified with his political opponents.15
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern
Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. According to Atty. White, she sought the
alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein petitioner
Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor’s safety. 16
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern
Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White’s account that he spotted inmates who served
as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial jail.
He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised clenched
fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil,
Jr.’s residence for almost three months before he posted bail after the charge against
him was downgraded to homicide.17
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at
home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting
the legality of Mayor Adalim’s arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking
him for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White
who informed him that he was under the governor, in the latter’s capacity as a
provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the
governor’s order to relinquish custody of Adalim. 18
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be
dilapidated and undermanned.
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the
assailed Decision20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have
conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable
quarters with access to television and other privileges that other detainees do not
enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is
admitted to bail.
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’ defense that Adalim’s transfer was
made to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally
verify any actual threat on Adalim’s life but relied simply on the advice of Adalim’s
lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and
nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been
used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s
failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of
the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Hence, the present petitions.
PETITONER AMBIL’S CONTENTION: Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to his case because the provision
contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a
public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner
avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public
officer. of duty or lawful exercise of duty.
PETITIONER APELADO, SR’s CONTENTION: Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other
hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and petitioner Ambil, Jr.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the orders of a superior
when he transferred the detention of Adalim.
ISSUE: WON petitioners Ambil Jr. and Apelado Sr. is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. (YES)
RULING: YES. The Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must
concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
FIRST ELEMENT
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers
discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the
Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with
violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606,27 as amended by R.A. No. 8249. The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No.
1606, as amended, read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
 Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads[;]
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding
to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification29 from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO
shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22.
Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in
the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with
Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper
court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them – the Sandiganbayan.
SECOND ELEMENT
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as
follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see
and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong;
a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes
of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as
other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."
In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad
faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house.
There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s contention that he is authorized to
transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer"
of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local
chief executives over the units of the Philippine National Police within their
jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine
National Police.—The extent of operational supervision and control of local
chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit, and jail
management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be
governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred
seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," and the rules and regulations
issued pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control
over all city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and
controlled by the provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall
be subsidized by the National Government for not more than three (3) years after
the effectivity of this Act.
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has
authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case,
neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by
law. On the contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
In the event that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
on how the act should be done, but always in conformity with the law.
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon
Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
support. Section 1731 provides:
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less
province shall be charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall the governor.
be his duty to administer the same in accordance with law and the
regulations prescribed for the government of provincial prisons. The Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer."
immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be committed to the care Said petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and
of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of jailer willful defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a former political party
shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may be filled in mate,41 betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that attended his
the manner in which classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the actions.
appointee shall be entitled to all the benefits and privileges of classified
employees, except that he shall hold office only during the term of office of THIRD ELEMENT
the appointing governor and until a successor in the office of the jailer is
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the
appointed and qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial governor
crime. As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section
shall, under the direction of the provincial board and at the expense of the
3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the offense consist of
province, supply proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though the
either (1) causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or (2) giving
provincial board may, in its discretion, let the contract for the feeding of the
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.)
discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
But again, nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor as the
PETITIONER’s defense: Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e),
"provincial jailer," or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take personal
R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him
custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision is that the provincial
allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply
governor’s duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative acts
grant of licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not such government
pertain only to those acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative
officer or employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not
policies and purposes already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved
to a private party but to a public officer.
upon it38 by the Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative powers,
the governor can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has
obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in
Sandiganbayan42 where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of
Section 173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the
the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is
neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to
"charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions."
accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been
Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada: Its reference to "any public
officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared
unlawful.
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution
for violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public
officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. 45
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A.
No. 3019 defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal from the government.
Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party,
does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners’
case beyond the ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than
"private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference for a reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise
meaning in legal parlance46 as distinguished from "person" which, in general usage,
refers to a human being.47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not
a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his
personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial
jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such
privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged
with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019, Adalim was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his
official, administrative or judicial functions. 48
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place
other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable
quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch
television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
representation of his lawyers that the mayor’s life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the
existence of any risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in
having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatan’s gesture of
raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same would still not
constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant Adalim’s detention outside the
provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail
which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while
the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have
exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More
importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on
his person to petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his transfer.
While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was
then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado,
Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and,
unarmed with a court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr.
This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1)52 of the
RPC.
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same
object, one performing one part of and another performing another so as to
complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although
apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness
of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.
Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful
cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail,
despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot
hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring a court order to
transfer a person under detention by legal process is elementary.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Trial on the merits ensued. Pajayon was the lone witness for the prosecution. She
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We narrated the State’s version of the facts as above stated.
find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond When it was the turn of the defense to present evidence, petitioner admitted that
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. indeed, no public bidding was conducted insofar as the purchases he was being
Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for accused of were concerned. When asked how the purchases were made, he
nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) answered that they were done through personal canvass. When prodded why
months. With costs against the petitioners. personal canvass was the method used, he retorted that no public bidding could be
conducted because all the dealers of the items were based in Manila. It was therefore
SO ORDERED. useless to invite bidders since nobody would bid anyway. The defense thereafter
rested its case and formally offered its exhibits.
G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403 March 9, 2010 The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged.
ROLANDO E. SISON, Petitioner,
vs. Issue:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 1.WON there is non-compliance with the requirements of Personal Canvass
Crime Charged:Petitioner were indicted before the Sandiganbayan in seven separate 2. WON there is a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
informations for seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019.
Sandiganbayan: Found petitioner guilty as charged Ruling:
SC: Affirmed conviction 1. Yes.
FACTS:
From July 1, 1992 to June30, 1995, petitioner Rolando E. Sison was the municipal RA 7160explicitly provides that, as a rule, "acquisitions of supplies by local
mayor of Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, while Rigoberto de Jesus was the municipal government units shall be through competitive bidding." By way of exception, no
treasurer. State auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which bidding is required in the following instances:
revealed that during petitioner’s incumbency, no public bidding was conducted for (1) personal canvass of responsible merchants;
the purchase of a: (2) emergency purchase;
1. Toyota Land Cruiser (3) negotiated purchase;
2. 119 bags of Fortune cement (4) direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusive distributors and
3. an electric generator set (5) purchase from other government entities.9
4. certain construction materials Since personal canvass (the method availed of by petitioner) is an exception to the
5. two Desert Dueler tires, and rule requiring public bidding, Section 367 of RA 7160 provides for limitations on the
6. a computer and its accessories. resort to this mode of procurement:
Pajayon also found out that there were irregularities in the documents supporting In relation thereto, Section 364 of RA 7160 mandates:
the acquisitions. Section 364. The Committee on Awards.—There shall be in every province, city or
Thus, on June 4, 1998, petitioner and de Jesus were indicted before the municipality a Committee on Awards to decide the winning bids and questions of
Sandiganbayan in seven separate Informations for seven counts of violation of awards on procurement and disposal of property.
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019. The Committee on Awards shall be composed of the local chief executive as
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the Informations. Accused de Jesus has remained chairman, the local treasurer, the local accountant, the local budget officer, the local
at large. general services officer, and the head of office or department for whose use the
supplies are being procured, as members. In case a head of office or department
would sit in a dual capacity a member of the sanggunian elected from among its
members shall sit as a member. The Committee on Awards at the barangay level
shall be the sangguniang barangay. No national official shall sit as member of the
Committee on Awards. (emphasis supplied)
Note that the law repeatedly uses the word "shall" to emphasize the mandatory
nature of its provisions.
Insofar as the purchase of the Toyota Land Cruiser is concerned, the Sandiganbayan
found that the personal canvass was effected solely by petitioner, without the
participation of the municipal accountant and petitioner’s co-accused de Jesus, the
municipal treasurer. Worse, there was no showing that that the award was decided
by the Committee on Awards. Only an abstract of canvass supported the award,
signed by petitioner and de Jesus, without the required signatures of the municipal
accountant and budget officer.
To reiterate, RA 7160 requires that where the head of the office or department
requesting the requisition sits in a dual capacity, the participation of a Sanggunian
member (elected from among the members of the Sanggunian) is necessary.
Petitioner clearly disregarded this requirement because, in all the purchases made,
he signed in a dual capacity—as chairman and member (representing the head of
office for whose use the supplies were being procured). That is strictly prohibited.
None of the regular members of the Committee on Awards may sit in a dual capacity.
Where any of the regular members is the requisitioning party, a special member from
the Sanggunian is required. The prohibition is meant to check or prevent conflict of
interest as well as to protect the use of the procurement process and the public funds
for irregular or unlawful purchases.
The same flaws attended the procurement of 119 bags of Fortune cement, electric
power generator set, various construction materials, two Desert Dueler tires and a
computer and its accessories.
With the kind of items purchased by petitioner, he also clearly spent more than
₱20,000—or beyond the threshold amount per month allowed by Section 367 of RA
7160 as far as purchases through personal canvass by fourth-class municipalities (like
Calintaan) are concerned.
2. Yes.
To be found guilty of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must concur:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official,
administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.17
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The only
question left is whether the third and fourth elements are likewise present. We hold
that they are.
The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e.,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof
of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section
3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.18
Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are."
"Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach
of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud."
"Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that
care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own
property."
In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that were
made under his watch. Petitioner’s admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de
Jesus to the suppliers already contained his signatures because he pre-signed these
forms only proved his utter disregard of the consequences of his actions. Petitioner
also admitted that he knew the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did
not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of his predecessors.
This was an admission of a mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality.
This is totally unacceptable, considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to
implement the law to the letter. As local chief executive, he should have been the
first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his constituency. Sadly,
however, he was the first to break it.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by RA 7160 on
personal canvass, no matter how strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law
is difficult but it is the law. These requirements are not empty words but were
specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the acquisition of government supplies,
especially since no public bidding is involved in personal canvass. Truly, the
requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a collegial body
assures the general public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions do not
occur. It also guarantees that no personal preference is given to any supplier and that
the government is given the best possible price for its procurements.1avvphi1
The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not
able to prove any undue injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it
should be noted that there are two ways by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be
violated—the first, by causing undue injury to any party, including the government,
or the second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may
be charged under either mode or both. The use of the disjunctive "or" connotes that
the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other words, the presence
of one would suffice for conviction.
Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also
charged with having given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private
suppliers. Under the second mode, damage is not required.
The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a
more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind;
benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher
evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.
In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has
given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official,
administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner did just that. The fact that he
repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves
that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning
suppliers. These suppliers were awarded the procurement contract without the
benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the government.
The private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent, were able to
profit from the transactions without showing proof that their prices were the most
beneficial to the government. For that, petitioner must now face the consequences
of his acts.
ROBERTO P. FUENTES, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
April 17, 2017 G.R. No. 186421* PERLAS-BERNABE,J.
CRIME CHARGED: Article 3 (e) of RA 3019
SB: Convicted
SC: Affirmed Conviction
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioner Fuentes, Mayor of Isabel refused to sign the Business Permit belonging to
Private Complainant due to rumors that it is engaged in illegal activities. Thereafter,
Triple A's operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease and Desist Order
after receiving Fuentes's unnumbered Memorandum alleging that Valenzuela was
involved in smuggling and drug trading
SC ruled that Fuentes is guilty under Article 3 (e) of RA 3019 Fuentes's acts
were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith. As can be
gleaned from the records, Fuentes himself testified that according to the rumors he
heard, all five (5) ship chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel were allegedly
involved in smuggling and drug trading. Yet, it was only Valenzuela's chandling
operations through Triple A that was refused issuance of a Business Permit, as
evidenced by Business Permits issued to two (2) other chandling services operators
in the said port, namely: S.E. De Guzman Ship Chandler and General Maritime
Services; and Golden Sea Kers Marine Services. Moreover, if Fuentes truly believed
that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug trading, then he
would not have issued Business Permits to the latter's other businesses as well.
However, and as aptly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, Fuentes issued a Business
Permit to Valenzuela's other business, Gemini Security, which provides security
services to vessels in the Port of Isabel. Under these questionable circumstances, the
Court is led to believe that Fuentes's refusal to issue a Business Permit to Valenzuela's
Triple A was indeed committed with manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor
of the other ship chandling operators in the Port of Isabel.
FACTS:
Private complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela (Valenzuela) is the sole
proprietor of Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services (Triple A), which
was operating in the Port of Isabel, Leyte since 1993 until 2001 through the Business
Permits issued by the Local Government Unit of Isabel (LGU) during the said period.
However, in 2002, Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A's Business
Permit, despite: (a) Valenzuela's payment of the renewal fees; (b) all the other
municipal officers of the LGU having signed the same, thereby signifying their
approval thereto; and (c) a Police Clearance certifying that Valenzuela had no
derogatory records in the municipality.
Thereafter, Triple A's operations were shut down when the BOC issued a
Cease and Desist Order after receiving Fuentes's unnumbered Memorandum
alleging that Valenzuela was involved in smuggling and drug trading. This caused the
BOC to require Valenzuela to secure a Business Permit from the LGU in order to
resume Triple A's operations. Valenzuela then wrote to Fuentes pleading that she be
issued a Business Permit, but the latter's security refused to receive the same.
Valenzuela likewise obtained certifications and clearances from the Isabel Chief of
Police, Barangay Captain, NAPOLCOM, PNP and the Police Regional Office similarly
stating that she is of good moral character, a law-abiding citizen, and has not been
charged nor convicted of any crime as per verification from the records of the locality.
Despite the foregoing, no Business Permit was issued for Triple A, causing: (a) the
spoilage of its goods bought in early 2002 for M/V Ace Dragon as it was prohibited
from boarding the said goods to the vessel due to lack of Business Permit; and (b) the
suspension of its operations from 2002 to 2006. In 2007, a business permit was finally
issued in Triple A's favor.
Defense Argument:
Fuentes averred that as early as 1999, 2000, and 2001, he has been hearing
rumors that Valenzuela was engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug
trading, but he did not act on the same. However, in 2002, he received written
reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and Isabel Chief of Police
Tamse allegedly confirming the said rumors, which prompted him to hold the
approval of Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A, and to issue the unnumbered
Memorandum addressed to port officials and the BOC. Further, Fuentes presented
corroborative testimonies of other people, essentially: (a) refuting Valenzuela's claim
that Triple A was unable to resume operations due to lack of Business Permit; and (b)
accusing Valenzuela of pulling out her application for Business Permit from the
Mayor's Office, which precluded Fuentes from approving the same.
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
The Sandiganbayan found Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution had established all
the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, considering that: (a) Fuentes
was admittedly the Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time relevant to the case; (b) he
singled out Valenzuela's Triple A despite the fact that the rumors relative to the illegal
smuggling and drug-related activities covered all ship chandlers operating in the Port
of Isabel; (c) he still refused to approve Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A even
though she had already secured clearances not only from the other offices of the
LGU, but from the PNP itself, exculpating her from any illegal activities; and (d) as a
result of Fuentes's acts, Valenzuela was unable to operate her ship chandling
business through Triple A, thus, causing her undue injury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime
of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
RULING:
YES.
The petition is without merit.
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 states:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019 are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the Sandiganbayan
correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime charged. Anent the first element, it is
undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel,
Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of. As to the second element, it
is worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of commission of the crime,
namely, through "manifest partiality", "evident bad faith", and/or "gross negligence."
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the
other hand, "evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably
and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill
will or for ulterior purposes.
In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest
partiality, but also with bad faith. As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes
himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five (5) ship chandlers
operating in the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading.
Yet, it was only Valenzuela's chandling operations through Triple A that was refused
issuance of a Business Permit, as evidenced by Business Permits issued to two (2)
other chandling services operators in the said port, namely: S.E. De Guzman Ship
Chandler and General Maritime Services; and Golden Sea Kers Marine Services.
Moreover, if Fuentes truly believed that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal
smuggling and drug trading, then he would not have issued Business Permits to the
latter's other businesses as well. However, and as aptly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, Fuentes issued a Business Permit to Valenzuela's other business,
Gemini Security, which provides security services to vessels in the Port of Isabel.
Under these questionable circumstances, the Court is led to believe that Fuentes's
refusal to issue a Business Permit to Valenzuela's Triple A was indeed committed with
manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor of the other ship chandling
operators in the Port of Isabel.
As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's
prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to
Sections 1623 and 444 (b) (3) (iv)24 of the Local Government Code as an incident of
his power to issue the same, it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power
to suspend or revoke is premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein;
and (b) the power to refuse issuance is premised on non-compliance with the pre-
requisites for said issuance.
Here, it is clear that Valenzuela had complied with all the prerequisites for
the issuance of a Business Permit for Triple A, as her application already contained
the prior approval of the other concerned officials of the LGU. In fact, Valenzuela
even submitted numerous certifications issued by various law enforcement agencies
clearing her of any kind of participation from the alleged illegal smuggling and drug
trading activities in the Port of Isabel. Despite these, Fuentes still refused to issue a
Business Permit for Valenzuela's Triple A without affording her an opportunity to
controvert the rumors against her. Worse, he even issued the unnumbered
Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from conducting its ship chandling
operations without a Business Permit. Quite plainly, if Fuentes truly believed the
rumors that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal activities in the Port of Isabel,
then he should have already acted upon it in the years 1999, 2000, and 2001, or when
he allegedly first heard about them. However, Fuentes's belated action only in 2002
- which was done despite the clearances issued by various law enforcement agencies
exonerating Valenzuela from such activities - speaks of evident bad faith which
cannot be countenanced.
Anent the third and last element, suffice it to say that Fuentes's acts of
refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of
the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from engaging in
its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of
undue injury on the part of Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A's ship
chandling operations prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful
endeavor for the year 2002. To make things worse, Valenzuela was also not issued a
Business Permit for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as it was only in 2007 that
such permit was issued in Triple A's favor. Under prevailing case law, "[p]roof of the
extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the
benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and
the Resolution dated February 16, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No.
28342 are hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Roberto P. Fuentes is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, entitled the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with
perpetual disqualification from public office, and is ordered to pay private
complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela the amount of ₱300,000.00 as temperate
damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this
Decision until fully paid. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
EMERGENCY RECIT (FACTS): An Information filed against respondent is an offshoot
of this Court’s which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government.
Subsequent to the Decision, a certain Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among
those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President
of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order to show
cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public
official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an
accused in this case.
PETITIONER’S CONENTION: SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because
he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: Respondent contends that by reason of the death of
Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the Information and,
as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
CRIME CHARGED: The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While
there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding
probable cause
SANDIGANBAYAN: The SB granted the Motion to Quash and the Information filed
in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.
SC: Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A.
3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not
mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent.
The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public
officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting
bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his
person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing
motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS: The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's
Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified
the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent
to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A.
3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary
Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against
Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of
the resolution finding probable cause.
The SB issued an Order, to wit: The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from
today within which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private
person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already
acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with
a public officer.6
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground
that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent also contended that, independently of the deceased
Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority
as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019.
The SB SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go and it appearing that
Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-
conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in
court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the
Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed
and dismissed.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information. (YES)
RULING: YES. The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting
in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable
for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the
avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.12
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not
mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did
not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy
between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no
public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for
infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he
should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have
acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that
such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as
in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of
them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them
and they are jointly responsible therefor. 16 This means that everything said, written
or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common
purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes
no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of
trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction
of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone.
The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does
not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal
or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy,
one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed
against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion
to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g)
of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal
liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and
the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike,
which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a
public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such
public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of
conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial
court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion 24 as
well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise
indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the
same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side
Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the
present case. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to
quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person
of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919.
In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding
no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and
executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution
in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he
even filed a Motion for Consolidation 26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court
agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and
filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person.
The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions
seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.27
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion
for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show
cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves
a contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More
importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public
officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the
law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried
jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can
no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that
the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving
herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide
a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch
in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149175 October 25, 2005
JAIME H. DOMINGO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 149406
DIOSDADO T. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Crime Charged: In an Amended Information, Jaime H. Domingo and Diosdado T.
Garcia are charged of conspiracy for violating Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
Sandiganbayan: Convicted petitioners as charged
SC: Affirmed conviction.
It ruled that there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction.
The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the
Constitution or by law
Petitioner Domingo, in his official capacity as mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, violated
the aforestated provision via the first mode, that is, by intervening or taking part in
his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in the
transaction regarding the supply and delivery of mixed gravel and sand to the
constituent barangays.
The Sandiganbayan found that there was really no contract between D.T. Garcia
Construction and the Municipality of San Manuel, Isabela involving the delivery of
mixed gravel and sand and that accused Domingo wove an intricate web of lies, to
the extent of fabricating documents in order to cover up his business transaction with
his own municipality. The Court is also convinced that accused Diosdado T. Garcia
should be held liable as co-conspirator t
FACTS:
Petitioner Domingo, at the time the petition was filed, was serving his third term as
mayor of the Municipality of San Manuel, Isabela. He was elected to the post in 1992
but was unseated in November 1993 after his opponent, Reynaldo P. Abesamis, won
in his election protest. In 1995, however, Domingo ran again and won in the
mayoralty election.
Petitioner Garcia, on the other hand, is the proprietor of D.T. Garcia Construction
Supply, and, incidentally, is the godson of Domingo in marriage.
During Petitioner Domingo’s incumbency in 1993 and prior to his ouster in November
of the same year, a Multi-Purpose Pavement (MPP) project was undertaken on the
eighteen barangays of the municipality for the paving and repair of the barangay
roads. The allocated budget for the project was ₱520,000 to be charged against the
20% Economic Development Fund (EDF). Congressman Faustino Dy, Jr. donated a
total of 3,600 bags of cement for the project to be divided equally among the
eighteen barangays. The mixed gravel and sand was to be subsidized by the
municipality through its EDF, while the labor was to be provided by the constituent
barangays.
A special audit team was created by Commission on Audit (COA) to examine the
infrastructure and EDF expenditures of the municipality during the incumbency of
petitioner Domingo. During the audit, two checks, namely, PNB Check No. 901363-S
in the amount of ₱114,350 and PNB Check No. 901365-S in the amount of ₱20,000,
were discovered to have been issued by the municipality to Domingo. The
disbursement voucher for said checks, however, indicated that the claimant for the
sum of the two checks totaling ₱134,350 was D.T. Garcia Construction Supply for the
payment of the cost of gravel and sand delivered to the barangays. Another PNB
check, No. 901362, with a face value of ₱264,350 appeared to have been issued to
D.T. Garcia Construction Supply but was indorsed by Garcia himself to the
Municipality of San Manuel. Domingo handed said check to the municipal treasurer
who later encashed it to replenish the various cash items of the former. Apparently,
Domingo would occasionally advance the salaries of the municipal employees when
the same were not remitted to the municipality in time for payday. The municipal
treasurer, in turn, would reimburse Domingo when the funds become available.
The findings and recommendations of the audit team that were incorporated on the
audit report were:
1. There was no contract or agreement between the municipality and D.T. Garcia
Construction Supply;
2. Procurement of goods and services through public bidding was not properly
observed, in violation of Sections 356 to 365 of the Local Government Code of 1991
and Sections 430 to 436 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM
Vol. 1) as there was actually no public bidding undertaken;
3. Disbursement vouchers were not properly accomplished and not fully
documented, hence the regularity and appropriateness of the transaction could not
be validated;
4. The contractor had no performance bond;
5. Canvass papers were not properly accomplished;
6. The purchase order served to D.T. Garcia Construction Supply and the attached
canvass sheet differed in amount;
7. A certification, by Municipal Engineer Edwin A. Abarra who supervised the project,
revealed that dump trucks owned by Domingo were used to haul the 226.5
truckloads of mixed gravel and sand to the different barangays.
8. The purchase order, sales invoice, official receipt and the disbursement voucher
indicated that D.T. Garcia Construction Supply sold the gravel and sand to the
municipality but it was Domingo’s name that appeared as the payee of the checks,
namely, PNB Check No. 901363-S in the amount of ₱114,350 and PNB Check No.
901365-S in the amount of ₱ 20,000.
Based on the above findings, the audit team concluded that D.T. Garcia Construction
Supply was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover up his business transaction with
the municipality of San Manuel in connection with the 226.5 truckloads of mixed
gravel and sand in violation of Section 34 of R.A. 7160, Section 108 of P.D. 1445 and
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
Consequently, Domingo was charged with violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for having financial interest
in a business transaction involving the delivery of 226.5 truckloads of mixed gravel
and sand to the aforesaid barangays in San Manuel.
During the preliminary investigation, Garcia submitted an Affidavit and a Counter
Affidavitsupporting Domingo’s claim that the contract for the supply and delivery of
gravel and sand to the different barangays was between his firm, D.T. Garcia
Construction Supply and the municipality of San Manuel, and it was by his instance
that the checks in payment for the transaction were to be issued in the name of
Domingo to pay off the loan obtained by his mother, Anicia Garcia, from Domingo’s
wife, Consolacion Domingo.
Domingo filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. After the prosecution conducted a
reinvestigation, Garcia was impleaded as co-accused, along with Domingo, for
violating Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
In a minute resolution, the Sandiganbayan, admitted the Amended Information,
charging Jaime H. Domingo and Diosdado T. Garcia of conspiracy for violating Section
3(h) of R.A. 3019.
Domingo and Garcia plead not guilty. Prosecutor Olaguer filed a Motion to Discharge
Diosdado T. Garcia as a State Witness. Domingo opposed the aforesaid motion.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Marilyn P. Cortez, COA State Auditor II, and
Jose C. Lavadia, COA Technical Audit Specialist, who testified on the findings of the
special audit team relating to the infrastructure projects and the EDF disbursements
made by the municipality during the incumbency of Domingo as mayor of San Manuel
in 1993.
After the testimonial evidence of the COA officers was concluded, the Sandiganbayan
resolved to deny the Motion to Discharge Diosdado T. Garcia as a State witness in
view of the allegation of conspiracy between Domingo and Garcia in the Amended
Information.
During the trial, the prosecution posited that it was really Domingo who supplied and
delivered the gravel and sand to the eighteen barangays, and that he merely used
Garcia as a front, being aware that as municipal mayor, he is prohibited by law from
having any pecuniary interest or business involvement in any projects in his
municipality.
Domingo, on the other hand, contended that he had no participation in the supply of
gravel and sand to the different barangays of the municipality; that the two checks
issued in his name were intended for D.T. Garcia Construction Supply; that the
municipal treasurer issued said checks in his name in view of the written request
made by Garcia as Garcia’s mother, Anicia Garcia, was indebted to Consolacion
Domingo, his wife, in the amount of ₱300,000 as evidenced by a Promissory Note.
Garcia allegedly deemed it more convenient to have the checks issued in Domingo’s
name since, after all, he would have used the amount to pay Consolacion Domingo
for his mother’s indebtedness.
To prove the existence of the questioned transaction, Domingo presented a contract
purportedly showing the sales agreement between the municipality and D.T. Garcia
Construction Supply, dated May 10, 1993. He likewise presented the Certificate of
Emergency Purchase, to justify the absence of a public bidding for the supply and
delivery of mixed gravel and sand.
Garcia pointed out, however, that there was no existing contract between his
business entity, D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, and the municipality of San Manuel;
and, that despite the false allegations contained therein, he merely signed the
aforementioned Affidavit and Counter-affidavit prepared by Domingo and his lawyer
during the investigation in 1996 supporting Domingo’s defense upon the latter’s
assurance that the matter had already been settled by Congressman Faustino Dy, Jr.
His mother, Anicia Garcia, likewise denied any outstanding obligation to the wife of
Domingo.
In addition, Garcia claimed that the aforesaid contract, dated May 10, 1993, was
signed by his attorney-in-fact, E. Agustin, only in 1994. He was also asked to sign the
authorization letter, supposedly dated June 18, 1993, addressed to the municipal
treasurer requesting the latter to issue the checks in the name of Domingo.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners herein guilty of violating Section 3(h) of R.A.
No. 3019, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner are guilty of the said offense and conspired to commit the offense
RULING: YES
Under Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019, the person liable is any public officer who directly or
indirectly has financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction
in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows:
1) The accused is a public officer;
2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract
or transaction; 3) he either:
a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or
b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
There are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial
or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section
3(h) of R.A. 3019.
The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction.
The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the
Constitution or by law
Petitioner Domingo, in his official capacity as mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, violated
the aforestated provision via the first mode, that is, by intervening or taking part in
his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in the
transaction regarding the supply and delivery of mixed gravel and sand to the
constituent barangays.
The Sandiganbayan found that there was really no contract between D.T. Garcia
Construction and the Municipality of San Manuel, Isabela involving the delivery of
mixed gravel and sand and that accused Domingo wove an intricate web of lies, to
the extent of fabricating documents in order to cover up his business transaction with
his own municipality. Consider these:
1. There was supposedly a contract entered into on May 10, 1993 and yet, even prior
to the alleged contract date, there were already deliveries made to the different
barangays, in line with the same multi-purpose pavement project and allegedly by
D.T. Garcia Construction. Even on the contention that the acquisition was done by
emergency purchase, the alleged arrangement with D.T. Garcia Construction to make
the delivery prior to the issuance of Certificate of Emergency Purchase already
manifests irregularity in the transaction. The law requires that emergency purchases
should be based on a canvass of prices of at least three bona fide dealers yet it would
appear that no such canvass had been made as of the date of the earliest delivery.
2. The contract price for the materials delivered to the eighteen (18) barangays was
₱398,700. Three checks were issued by the municipality to cover this amount. While
the first check was issued in the name of D.T. Garcia Construction, it was shown that
said check was subsequently deposited to the account of the municipality of San
Manuel and later encashed by Rodolfo Isidro, the municipal treasurer, in order to
replenish the various cash items of accused Domingo. On the other hand, the other
two checks (901363 and 901365) were both issued in the name of accused Domingo,
despite the fact that the supporting voucher indicates that these checks had been
issued for the full payment of the sand and gravel delivered to the different
barangays. It was shown that all three (3) checks representing the supposed contract
price for the deliveries made, benefited accused Domingo.
The contention of accused Domingo that it was accused Garcia who requested that
PNB checks Nos. 901363 and 901365 be issued instead in Domingo’s name because
Garcia’s mother was indebted to Domingo’s wife fails to inspire belief. If indeed, such
loan obligation existed, as accused would have it appear, accused Domingo and
Garcia are not the parties thereto and therefore, it was highly irregular for the
municipal treasurer to issue the checks in Domingo’s name, when the voucher
specifically states that they are intended as payment for the deliveries of sand and
gravel to the municipality."
Furthermore, several other instances point to the fact that petitioner Domingo had
financial interest in the questioned transaction which he attempted vainly to conceal,
thus:
First, he was the co-drawer of the two questioned checks for which he was also the
payee.
Second, there was a certification of the municipal engineer stating that he saw the
trucks of Domingo being used for the delivery of gravel and sand to the different
barangays;
Third, the testimony of Garcia on the following remain undisputed:
1) that he was asked to sign the Affidavit and Counter-affidavit admitting that he was
the contractor for the supply and delivery of the mixed gravel and sand to the
different barangays;
2) that Domingo had "borrowed" his official receipt (Official Receipt No. 229) and
asked for three sales invoices; and,
3) that he agreed to sign the aforementioned documents after he was assured by
Domingo that the matter had already been settled by Congressman Dy;
Fourth, the supporting documents for the issuance of the checks such as the purchase
request, sales invoice and the disbursement voucher showed manifest irregularity as
the signatures of some of the municipal officials that should have appeared thereon
were absent, and said documents were undated. Likewise, the official receipt that
was supposedly issued by D.T. Garcia Construction Supply evidencing payment for
the mixed gravel and sand was undated;
Fifth, when it conducted the special audit, the COA team did not find a copy of the
contract for the supply and delivery of the gravel and sand, and the letter of request
by Garcia supposedly authorizing the municipal treasurer to issue the checks in
Domingo’s name; and,
Sixth, it has been established that the subject checks were encashed by the spouses
Domingo.
Thus, in view of the above, petitioner Domingo is guilty of violating Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law. As earlier mentioned, what the law prohibits is the actual
intervention by a public official in a transaction in which he has a financial or
pecuniary interest, for the law aims to prevent the dominant use of influence,
authority and power.
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another,
indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. To
establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts
of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken
together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of
conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances
Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless
of the degree of participation of each of them, for in contemplation of the law the
act of one is the act of all.
The Court believes that accused Mayor Domingo entered into a business transaction
with his own municipality in clear violation of the provisions of Sec. 3(h) of R.A. 3019
which prohibits any public officer from "directly or indirectly having financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which
he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest." As municipal mayor, accused
was directly responsible for the prosecution of the multi-purpose pavement project
in connection with which, the sand and gravel were delivered to the different
barangays. He was the one who approved the payment for these deliveries and he
co-signed the two checks where he was named as payee as well as the check, which
although made payable to D.T. Garcia Construction, was indorsed to the municipal
treasurer and subsequently encashed to replenish the various cash items of accused
Domingo.
The Court is also convinced that accused Diosdado T. Garcia should be held liable as
co-conspirator to the crime for having allowed his firm to be used as a front or
dummy by Domingo. Contrary to Garcia’s claim that he had been constrained to go
along with Domingo because of the latter’s moral ascendancy over him, it appears
that Garcia willingly went along with the scheme to cover up accused Domingo’s
business transaction with the municipality because Domingo had promised to give
him a project in exchange for his cooperation. Hence, he shares equal guilt with the
mayor for which he should be held answerable.
The prosecution’s evidence has established the conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.
The flimsy excuses given by petitioner Garcia cannot overturn the same. That the
checks were made payable to petitioner Domingo instead of petitioner Garcia’s D.T.
Garcia Construction Supply company could only have been done through petitioner
Garcia’s active cooperation. Finally, petitioner Garcia’s admitted acts of attempting
to cover up the transactions strongly point to his involvement therein.
Petitioner Garcia is, therefore, equally liable with petitioner Domingo pursuant to
Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019.
ROBERT P. WA-ACON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 164575 December 6, 2006 VELASCO, JR., J.
CRIME CHARGED: Malversation of Public Funds
SB: Convicted
SC: Affirmed Conviction
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Accused Robert P. Wa-acon was a Special Collecting Officer of the National
Food Authority (NFA). The Report of the Examination of the Cash and Accountabilities
of accused Robert P. Wa-acon shows that the latter incurred a cash shortage of
P114,303.00. In the Revised Summary of the Cash Examination of accused Robert P.
Wa-acon, the cash shortage was changed to P102,199.20 after deducting the cost of
sixty (60) bags of regular milled rice value of P6,900.00 and the monetary value of
the empty sacks returned by accused Robert P. Wa-acon, which is P5,203.80.
However, accused Robert P. Wa-acon made a refund of the amount of P10,000.00.
Therefore, the total shortage amounted to P92,199.20.
The SC ruled that petitioner's postulation has no legal mooring. Article 217,
as amended by Republic Act 1060, no longer requires proof by the State that the
accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property.
Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed that upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property— with which said officer is accountable—
should be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to
personal use. When these circumstances are present, a "presumption of law" arises
that there was malversation of public funds or properties as decreed by Article 217.
After the government auditors discovered the shortage and demanded an
explanation, petitioner Wa-acon was not able to make money readily available,
immediately refund the shortage, or explain satisfactorily the cash deficit. These facts
or circumstances constitute prima facie evidence that he converted such funds to his
personal use
FACTS:
On the period from July 19, 1979 to September 28, 1981, accused Robert P.
Wa-acon was a Special Collecting Officer of the National Food Authority (NFA). One
of his duties was to receive grains, consisting of rice and mongo, which shall then be
sold to the public on retail. The proceeds of the sale of the grains shall then be
collected by the same accused. On September 28, 1981, by virtue of a Travel Order,
a team of Auditors from the Commission of Audit, composed of Dionisio A. Nillo,
Mercedes Punzalan, and Raquel Cruz, conducted an examination of the
accountabilities of various Special Collecting Officers of the NFA, one of whom was
accused Robert P. Wa-acon. The audit team asked the presence of accused Robert P.
Wa-acon by virtue of a demand letter, demanding the latter to produce cash, cash
items, stocks and empty sacks and other pertinent papers. As testified by Prosecution
witness Dionisio A. Nillo, accused Robert P. Wa-acon told the audit team that "he has
no cash on hand at the time pertaining to his accountability as Special Collecting
Officer. Hence, it was indicated in the Cash Count Sheet that there was no cash
counted during the cash examination.
 Based on the examination conducted on the various Warehouse Stock
Issues, Empty Sacks Receipts, Official Receipts submitted and the Certificate of
Inventory of Stocks and Empty Sacks dated September 18, 1981, containing the
signature of accused Robert P. Wa-acon, the audit team rendered a Report of
Examination of the Cash and Accounts of accused Robert P. Wa-acon. All of the
aforementioned documents were submitted by Proceso Saavedra, to the Audit team
headed by Dionisio A. Nillo. The Report of the Examination of the Cash and
Accountabilities of accused Robert P. Wa-acon shows that the latter incurred a cash
shortage of P114,303.00. In the Revised Summary of the Cash Examination of accused
Robert P. Wa-acon, the cash shortage was changed to P102,199.20 after deducting
the cost of sixty (60) bags of regular milled rice value of P6,900.00 and the monetary
value of the empty sacks returned by accused Robert P. Wa-acon, which is P5,203.80.
However, accused Robert P. Wa-acon made a refund of the amount of P10,000.00.
Therefore, the total shortage amounted to P92,199.20).
Defense Argument:
Petitioner denied that he misapplied and converted for his personal use the
stocks of rice and empty sacks as he had been faithfully remitting all the proceeds of
the rice he sold to consumers. Petitioner also contended that the shortage
discovered by the Audit Team may be attributed to the discrepancy in the actual
weight of the rice actually delivered to him and that of the weight reflected in the
receipts. In other words, he claimed that the rice delivered to him weighed less than
that for which he signed. He alleged that he discovered the shortage of five (5) to ten
(10) kilos per sack only upon delivery of the rice to the station/outlet. Petitioner
explained that he could not check the weight of the sacks delivered to him as the
weighing scale in their office had a maximum capacity of only twelve (12) kilograms.
As to the missing empty sacks, petitioner argued that those were in the custody of
the delivery man who had a logbook where Special Collecting Officers sign as proof
that the delivery man had taken the sacks.
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of malversation of public funds under
the Revised Penal Code. In the graft court's April 22, 2004 Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable
doubt?
RULING:
YES
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code whereas provides:
Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of malversation. –
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable
for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly
or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property x x x
xxxx
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal uses (emphasis supplied).
The elements to constitute malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
are as follows:
The elements common to all acts of malversation – under Article 217 are:
(a) that the offender be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or control
of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) these funds
were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Accused petitioner has conceded that the first three (3) elements of the
crime of malversation exist but asseverates that the fourth element—that he
appropriated, took, or misappropriated the public funds for which he was made
accountable by the Commission on Audit (COA) to his own personal use––was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Unfortunately, petitioner's postulation has no legal mooring. Article 217,
as amended by Republic Act 1060, no longer requires proof by the State that the
accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property.
Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed that upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property— with which said officer is accountable—
should be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to
personal use. When these circumstances are present, a "presumption of law" arises
that there was malversation of public funds or properties as decreed by Article 217.
After the government auditors discovered the shortage and demanded an
explanation, petitioner Wa-acon was not able to make money readily available,
immediately refund the shortage, or explain satisfactorily the cash deficit. These facts
or circumstances constitute prima facie evidence that he converted such funds to his
personal use. Neither can accused petitioner claim that such presumption under
Article 217 violates the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence for
"the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of
innocence which may x x x be such as to rebut and control it." Such prima facie
evidence, if unexplained or uncontradicted, "can counterbalance the presumption of
innocence to warrant a conviction."
Since the facts adduced by the State brought about a prima facie evidence
which is considered sufficient to sustain petitioner's conviction under Article 217, it
is incumbent upon petitioner Wa-acon to destroy the presumption of law. In his
quest to exculpate himself from the legal assumption of criminal liability for the
missing funds, he insisted that: 1) the sacks of rice were less than that declared in the
receipts when they were delivered to him; 2) he sold the rice at the older and lower
prices, as he was not informed of changes in the prices of the rice; and 3) the empty
sacks of rice were in the possession of the delivery men. However, petitioner merely
settled for his bare uncorroborated testimony during the trial before the
Sandiganbayan. He never bothered to adduce other pieces of evidence to fortify his
defenses. Petitioner did not produce the delivery men whom he claims had in their
possession the empty sacks or any acknowledgement receipt for said bags.
Moreover, petitioner did not bring forward his co-workers to attest to and confirm
the practice of, and substantiate petitioner's story of receiving sacks of rice without
weighing them and that the bags received weighed less than that reflected in the
receipt. Since Wa-acon lamentably fell short of adducing the desired quantum of
evidence, his weak and unconvincing testimony standing alone did not overthrow the
presumption that he misappropriated public funds.
As a last ditch effort to exonerate himself, petitioner anchored his defense
on Madarang and Agullo, where public employees charged of malversation were
cleared of criminal liability. In these two (2) cases cited by petitioner, we elucidated
the legal presumption of assumed criminal liability for accountable funds under the
last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. In Madarang, we explained:
Concededly, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. Lacking
any evidence, however, of shortage, or taking, appropriation, or conversion
by petitioner or loss of public funds, there is no malversation (Narciso vs.
Sandiganbayan, 229 SCRA 229 [1994]). True, the law creates a presumption
that the mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which
have come into his hand on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine
his accounts is prima facie evidence of conversion. The presumption is, of
course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present adequate
evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property
to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima
facie case is effectively negated.26
In Agullo, we amplified that:
Thus, in a string of categorical pronouncements, this Court has consistently
and emphatically ruled that the presumption of conversion incarnated in
Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code is — by its very nature
— rebuttable. To put it differently, the presumption under the law is not
conclusive but disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect that the
accused did not utilize the public funds or property for his personal use, gain
or benefit.
Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can
nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use,
then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is
effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence of
funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption
is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have
existed at all.27
Unfortunately, petitioner's vaunted reliance on Madarang and Agullo does
not provide legal relief as the facts in these cases are not on all fours with his case.
The accused parties in said cases were able to produce satisfactory evidence ample
enough to prove that the missing funds were not converted to their personal uses
and thus, the legal presumption was effectively negated.
WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition and the assailed April 22, 2004 Decision and the
July 23, 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14375 are
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205693
MANUEL M. VENEZUELA, Petitione vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
REYES, JR., J.:
EMERGENCY RECIT (FACTS): Petitioner Manuel Venezuela (Venezuela) was charged
of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended. Venezuela was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan from 1986 to June 30, 1998. In the course of the investigation of the
Commission on Audit, the Audit Team (AT) discovered a shortage of Php2,872,808.00
on the joint accounts of Pacita Costes (Costes), then Municipal Treasurer, and
Venezuela, as well as illegal cash advances. Consequently, the AT issued three
demand letters to Venezuela, ordering him to liquidate his cash advances. An audit
report was thereafter submitted by the Team, which Venezuela denied the truth of
the contents thereof. Venezuela avers that he had fully liquidated his cash advances
to Costes and that he presented receipts proving his payments. On the other hand,
the People, through the Office of the Ombudsman, counter that the fact of payment
was not proven, and even if established, would not exonerate him from the crime.
Also, the receipts were issued to different persons, in different amounts and for
different purposes. Moreover, during the period shown in the official receipts
presented by Venezuela, Costes, the alleged issuer of the receipts, was no longer
holding office at the Municipal Treasurer's Office.
CRIME CHARGED: an Information was filed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, accusing Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, as
defined and penalized under Article 217 of the RPC.
SANDIGANBAYAN: The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision29
convicting Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Considering that
the other accused, [COSTES], is still at large, the case against her be archived.
However, the Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Venezuela made a partial refund of
his liabilities, thereby reducing his unliquidated cash advances to Php 2,572,808.00.
The Sandiganbayan considered such refund as a mitigating circumstance akin to
voluntary surrender.
SC: (1) Venezuela is Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt for the Crime of
Malversation of Public Funds: In the case at bar, all the elements for the crime were
sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Venezuela was a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan from 1997 to 1998, the period relevant to the time of the crime charged.
Notably, he falls within the definition of a public officer, stated in the RPC as "any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any
of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any
rank or class."58
Likewise, during Venezuela's tenure as the municipal mayor, he incurred
unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 2,872,808.00. 59 These unliquidated
cash advances constituted funds belonging to the Municipality of Pozorrubio, and
earmarked for use by the said municipality.
Finally, anent the last element for the crime of malversation of public funds,
Venezuela failed to return the amount of Php 2,572,808.00, upon demand. His failure
or inability to return the shortage upon demand created a prima facie evidence that
the funds were put to his personal use, which Venezuela failed to overturn.
(2) VENEZUELA’S DEFENSES:
(A) Seeking to be exonerated from the crime charged, Venezuela claims that he had
fully paid the amount of the unliquidated cash advances.
This contention does not hold water. To begin with, it bears stressing that payment
or reimbursement is not a defense in malversation. The payment, indemnification,
or reimbursement of, or compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or
misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the
accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by
the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the offender's civil
liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to
voluntary surrender.
(B) As for his other defenses, suffice it to say, demand is not necessary in
malversation. Demand merely raises a prima facie presumption that the missing
funds have been put to personal use. The demand itself, however, is not an element
of, and is not indispensable to constitute malversation.66 Malversation is committed
from the very moment the accountable officer misappropriates public funds and fails
to satisfactorily explain his inability to produce the public finds he received. Thus,
even assuming for the sake of argument that Venezuela received the demand after
his term of office, this does not in any way affect his criminal liability. The fact
remains that he misappropriated the funds under his control and custody while he
was the municipal mayor.
FACTS: Venezuela was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
A team of auditors conducted an investigation on the cash and accounts of Pacita
Costes (Costes), then Municipal Treasurer of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
In the course of the investigation, the Audit Team discovered a shortage of Php
2,872,808.00 on the joint accounts of Costes and Venezuela. Likewise, it noticed that
the 17 cash advances made by Venezuela were illegal, due to the absence of such
essential requirements. Moreover, the Audit Team found out that Venezuela was
neither bonded nor authorized to receive cash advances. Finally, the Audit Team
noted that most of the vouchers were paid in cash, notwithstanding the fact that the
amounts covered by such vouchers were in excess of Php 1,000.00, in violation of the
rules of the Commission on Audit (COA) which mandate payment in checks for
amounts over Php 1,000.00.8
Consequently, team member Ruiz issued three demand letters to Venezuela,
ordering him to liquidate his cash advances. In response, Venezuela sent an
explanation letter acknowledging his accountability for the cash advances amounting
to Php 943,200.00, while denying the remainder of the cash advances.9
Meanwhile, on March 20, 2000, an Information11 was filed by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, accusing Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the RPC.
That for the period from December 4, 1997 to June 10, 1998, or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Pozorrubio, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[VENEZUELA], a public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, and as such is accountable for public funds
received and/or entrusted to him by reason of his office, acting in relation
to his office and taking advantage of the same, conniving and
confederating with [COSTES], also a public officer being then the Municipal
Treasurer of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, misappropriate, and convert to his personal use and
benefit the amount of TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]TWO
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHT PESOS (₱2,872,808.00) from such public
funds received by him as unauthorized cash advances to the damage of the
government in the aforestated amount.
The Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest for the immediate apprehension of
Venezuela. On May 11, 2000, Venezuela voluntarily surrendered, and posted bail.
However, Costes remained at large.14
Venezuela moved for reconsideration and reinvestigation of the case, which was
denied by the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded, but only with respect to Venezuela.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses, in the persons of Ruiz,
State Auditor II of the COA and Unit Head of the Municipal Audit Team of Binalonan,
Pangasinan;16 and Marita Laquerta (Laquerta), Municipal Accountant of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.
Ruiz affirmed that on June 10, 1998, he, together with other state auditors,
conducted an investigation on the cash and accounts of Costes. The investigatiort
unraveled a shortage of Php 2,872,808.00, in the same account of Costes and
Venezuela, as well as illegal cash advances. They likewise discovered that Venezuela
was not bonded or authorized to receive cash advances.19 Ruiz further confirmed that
they issued demand letters to Venezuela, who admitted accountability for the cash
advances amounting to Php 943,200.00.20
On the other hand, Laquerta confirmed that the signatures appearing on 16 of the 17
illegal disbursement vouchers belonged to Venezuela, who was the claimant under
the said vouchers.21
On the other hand, Venezuela vehemently denied the charge leveled against him. To
corroborate his claim of innocence, he testified, alongside his other witnesses,
namely, Arthur C. Caparas (Caparas), Venezuela's Executive Assistant I; and Manuel
D. Ferrer (Ferrer), Senior Bookkeeper of Pozorrubio from 1994 to 2004, among
others.
Venezuela declared that he submitted to then Municipal Treasurer Costes all the
supporting documents to liquidate his cash advances before the end of his term in
June 1998. Further, he asserted that he remitted the amount of Php 2,572,808.00, in
installments to Costes.
On rebuttal by the prosecution, Zoraida Costales (Costales), Officer in Charge in the
Municipal Treasurer's Office of Pozorrubio, testified that as per records of the
Municipal Treasurer's Office, the receipts presented by Venezuela, which
purportedly evidence his payment of the unliquidated cash advances, did not actually
reflect the payments so claimed by Venezuela. Rather, the receipts were issued to
different persons, in different amounts and for different purposes. Moreover, during
the period shown in the official receipts presented by Venezuela, Costes, the alleged
issuer of the receipts, was no longer holding office at the Municipal Treasurer's
Office.27
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision29 convicting Venezuela of the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime
beyond reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan observed that during the period
material to the case, Venezuela was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of
Pozorrubio from 1986 to 1998. His failure to have duly forthcoming the public funds
with which he was chargeable, served as prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds to his personal use.32
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan opined that Venezuela's defense of payment was
unsubstantiated. Moreover, Costes, to whom Venezuela allegedly remitted his
payments, was no longer the Municipal Treasurer of Pozorrubio during the dates
when the supposed payments were made.
However, the Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Venezuela made a partial refund of
his liabilities, thereby reducing his unliquidated cash advances to Php 2,572,808.00.
The Sandiganbayan considered such refund as a mitigating circumstance akin to
voluntary surrender. .
Considering that the other accused, [COSTES], is still at large, the case against her be
archived.
Aggrieved, Venezuela filed a Motion for Reconsideration,38 which was denied.
Undeterred, Venezuela filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish Venezuela's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (YES)
VENEZUELA’s contention: Venezuela avers that he had fully liquidated his cash
advances to Costes. In fact, he presented receipts proving his payments. In this
regard, Venezuela bewails that the Sandiganbayan erroneously discredited his
receipts, adopting the prosecution's version. Moreover, Venezuela alleges that the
charge of conspiracy with Costes was not sufficiently proven. As such, pending the
arrest of the latter, the case should have first been provisionally dismissed. 44 It was
unfair for him to solely bear the charge, while Costes was "absolved" from liability.45
Finally, Venezuela points out that the COA auditors sent the demand letters ordering
the liquidation of his cash advances at a time when he was no longer the Mayor of
Pozorrubio. Consequently, if he should be charged of any offense under the RPC, it
should have been Article 218 thereof, or Failure of Accountable Officer to Render
Accounts.
RULING: YES. The instant petition is bereft of merit.
At any rate, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any reversible error in convicting
Venezuela of Malversation of Public Funds.
Venezuela is Guilty Beyond
Reasonable Doubt for the Crime of
Malversation of Public Funds
Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the RPC, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951,55 as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. -
Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property shall
suffer:
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods,
if the amount involved is more than Two million four hundred thousand
 pesos (₱2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand
pesos (₱4,400,000).
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
Parenthetically, the elements of malversation are (i) that the offender is a public
officer, (ii) that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office, (iii) that those funds or property were public funds or property
for which he was accountable, and (iv) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated
or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take them.56
Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction
is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed
to account for the said funds upon demand without offering a justifiable
explanation for the shortage.57
In the case at bar, all the elements for the crime were sufficiently proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Venezuela was a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan from 1997 to 1998, the period relevant to the time of the crime charged.
Notably, he falls within the definition of a public officer, stated in the RPC as "any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any
of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any
rank or class."58
Likewise, during Venezuela's tenure as the municipal mayor, he incurred
unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 2,872,808.00. 59 These unliquidated
cash advances constituted funds belonging to the Municipality of Pozorrubio, and
earmarked for use by the said municipality.
Incidentally, in People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al.,60 the Court held that a municipal
mayor, being the chief executive of his respective municipality, is deemed an
accountable officer, and is thus responsible for all the government funds within his
jurisdiction.61 The Court explained that:
Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. - Any officer
of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession
or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible
for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of this title.
Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of their duties,
may likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local
government funds through their participation in the use or application
thereof.
In addition, municipal mayors, pursuant to the Local Government Code, are chief
executives of their respective municipalities. Under Section 102 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines, he is responsible for all government funds
pertaining to the municipality:
Section 102. Primary and secondary responsibility. - (1) The head of any
agency of the government is immediately and primarily responsible for all
government funds and property pertaining to his agency.62
Undoubtedly, as the municipal mayor, Venezuela had control of the subject funds,
and was accountable therefor.
Finally, anent the last element for the crime of malversation of public funds,
Venezuela failed to return the amount of Php 2,572,808.00, upon demand. His failure
or inability to return the shortage upon demand created a prima facie evidence that
the funds were put to his personal use, which Venezuela failed to overturn.
VENEZUELA’S DEFENSES:
(1) Seeking to be exonerated from the crime charged, Venezuela claims that he had
fully paid the amount of the unliquidated cash advances.
This contention does not hold water.
To begin with, it bears stressing that payment or reimbursement is not a defense in funds under his control and custody while he was the municipal mayor. To claim that
malversation.63 The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or the demand should have been received during the incumbency of the public officer,
compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the is to add an element that is not required in any of the laws or jurisprudence.
commission of the crime, does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability or
relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by the law. At best, such acts of (3) The Court likewise finds no basis in Venezuela's argument that the case against
reimbursement may only affect the offender's civil liability, and may be credited in him should have been dismissed considering that Costes, his alleged co-conspirator
his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender.64 is at large. Neither is there any truth to Venezuela's allegation that the
Sandiganbayan allowed Costes to go scot-free, while letting him take the blame for
Moreover, the Court observed that Venezuela did not fully prove his defense of the offense.
payment. Although Venezuela presented official receipts, which purportedly prove
his payment of the cash advances, the following circumstances easily cast serious A perusal of the Sandiganbayan decision shows that the said tribunal did not in any
doubt on the validity of the same receipts: (i) the receipts bore serial numbers way absolve Costes. The Sandiganbayan ordered the case to be archived pending the
pertaining to slips issued in 2007, and were actually issued to different payees and apprehension of Costes. Moreover, the funds subject matter of the case for
for different purposes; (ii) Costes, who supposedly received the payments and issued malversation were those for which Venezuela was responsible for.
the receipts was no longer working as the municipal treasurer on the dates indicated
in the receipts; (iii) there are no records in the Municipality of Pozorrubio that Needless to say, in People v. Dumlao, et al., the Court emphasized that the death,
confirm the fact of payment; (iv) the defense of payment was never raised during the acquittal or failure to charge the co-conspirators does not in any way affect the
start of the COA investigation; and (v) the COA has no record or information regarding accused's criminal liability.
the supposed payments. All these circumstances easily belie the fact of payment. The
Thus, it is not necessary to join all the alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for a
only payment proven to have been made was the amount of Php 300,000.00. This
crime committed through conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy,
shall be credited in Venezuela's favor in reducing the fine that shall be imposed
any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law,
against him.
the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.
(2) As for his other defenses, Venezuela claims that he was incorrectly charged for
Thus, based on all the foregoing facts and circumstances, it becomes all too
Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217. He points out that he had ceased
apparent that the Sandiganbayan did not commit any reversible error in convicting
to hold office as municipal mayor on June 30, 1998, when the COA auditors sent
Venezuela of the crime charged.
the demand letter ordering him to liquidate his cash advances. Thus, the offense
that must be charged against him should fall under Article 218 of the RPC or Failure
The Proper Penalty for the Crime of Malversation
of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts, which punishes an officer (incumbent
or retired) who fails to render an account of his funds. On August 29, 2017, Congress passed R.A. No. 10951, amending Article 217 of the
RPC, increasing the thresholds of the amounts malversed, and amending the
Suffice it to say, demand is not necessary in malversation. Demand merely raises a
penalties or fines corresponding thereto.
prima facie presumption that the missing funds have been put to personal use. The
demand itself, however, is not an element of, and is not indispensable to constitute Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.- Presumption of
malversation.66 Malversation is committed from the very moment the accountable malversation. - xxx
officer misappropriates public funds and fails to satisfactorily explain his inability
to produce the public finds he received. Thus, even assuming for the sake of
argument that Venezuela received the demand after his term of office, this does not
in any way affect his criminal liability. The fact remains that he misappropriated the
 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not
exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).
2. The penalty of prisi6n mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not
exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱l,200,000).
3. The penalty of prisi6n mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than One million two
hundred thousand pesos (₱l,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four
hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods,
if the amount involved is more than Two million four hundred thousand
pesos (₱2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand
pesos (₱4,400,000).
Additionally, Venezuela enjoys the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
due to his partial restitution of the amount malversed. Following the rule in Article
64 of the RPC, if a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act,
the Court shall impose the penalty in the minimum period.
Furthermore, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence
shall be imposed, consisting of a maximum term, which is the penalty under the RPC
properly imposed after considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum
term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC
for the offense committed.75 Accordingly, Venezuela shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Finally, under the second paragraph of Article 217, persons guilty of malversation
shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and a fine equal
to the amount of funds malversed, which in this case is Php 2,572,808.00.

5. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the amount

involved is more than Four million four hundred thousand pesos
(₱4,400,000) but does not exceed Eight million eight hundred thousand
pesos (₱8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the toal value of the property embezzled. 72

Although the law adjusting the penalties for malversation was not yet in force at the
time of the commission of the offense, the Court shall give the new law a retroactive
effect, insofar as it favors the accused by reducing the penalty that shall be imposed
against him. Essentially, "penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal."73

Under the old law, the proper penalty for the amount Venezuela malversed is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, with the
amendment introduced under R.A. No. 10951, the proper imposable penalty
corresponding to the amount Venezuela malversed, is the lighter sentence of
reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods.
G.R. No. 175074 August 31, 2011
JESUS TORRES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Crime charged: Petitioner Jesus U. Torres was charged with the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds.
RTC: Convicted as charged
CA: Appeal dismissed outright
SC: Affirmed Conviction
It ruled that malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through negligence. To
sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of
evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus U. Torres was charged with the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Cantanduanes.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Jesus Torres y Uchi was the principal of Viga Rural Development High
School (VRDHS). He directed Edmundo Lazado, the school’s collection and disbursing
officer, to prepare the checks representing the teachers’ and employees’ salaries,
salary differentials, additional compensation allowance (ACA) and personal
emergency relief allowance (PERA) for the months of January to March, 1994. Lazado
prepared three (3) checks in the total amount of ₱196,654.54.
Upon the instruction of the petitioner, Lazado endorsed the checks and handed them
to the accused. It was the custom in the school for Lazado to endorse the checks
representing the teachers’ salaries and for the accused to encash them at PNB, Virac
Branch and deliver the cash to Lazado for distribution to the teachers.
The following day, the accused encashed the three (3) checks at PNB, Virac Branch
but he never returned to the school to deliver the money to Lazado.
The petitioner admitted that he encashed the subject checks at PNB, Virac Branch
but instead of going back to the school, he proceeded to the airport and availed of
the flight to Manila to seek medical attention for his chest pain. Two (2) days after,
around 4:30 o’clock in the morning of April 29, 1994, while he and his nephew were
on the road waiting for a ride, three (3) armed men held them up and took his bag
containing his personal effects and the proceeds of the subject checks. He reported
the incident to the police authorities, but he failed to recover the money
The RTC convicted petitioner of the crime of malversation of public funds after
finding all the elements of the offense charged have been established.
Upon appeal to the CA (wrong tribunal, it should have been the Sandiganbayan), the
appeal was dismissed outright.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is guilty of Malversation of public funds
Ruling: YES.
Contrary to petitioner’s argument, he is an accountable officer within the
contemplation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the
fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to
account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not
malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school
principal of a public high school, such as petitioner, may be held guilty of
malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the
same.1avvphi1
Petitioner also posits that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the
Information without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
accusations against him. He maintains that the Information clearly charged him with
intentional malversation and not malversation through negligence, which was the
actual nature of malversation for which he was convicted by the trial court. This too
lacks merit.
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of
public funds or property, or passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of
malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while
the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of
the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of
negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code.
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed
through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform
penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction
for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately
proves the mode of commission of the offense. Explicitly stated –
[E]ven on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner
yielded a case of malversation by negligence, but the information was for
intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case, his
conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.
ANGELICA ANZIA FAJARDO, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 239823 September 25, 2019 PERLAS-BERNABE,*J.
CRIME CHARGED: Malversation of Public Funds
RTC: Convicted
SB: Convicted
SC: Convicted
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Fajardo was the Cashier V and designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Division
Chief III, Prize Payment (Teller) Division, Treasury Department of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). By virtue of her position, Fajardo was likewise
authorized to draw a cash advance in the amount of P3,000,000.00 (P3M), from
which P2,000,000.00 (P2M) was intended as payment of sweepstakes and lotto low-
tier prizes, while P1,000,000.00 (P1M) was devoted for the PCSO-Pacific Online
Systems Corporation (POSC) Scratch IT Project. The Internal Audit Department (IAD)
of the PCSO conducted a cash examination of Fajardo's account and, after a
reconciliation of all the documents, checks, winning tickets, issuances, and vouchers
against Fajardo's cash on hand, discovered that there was a shortage from the total
accountability of P3M.
The SC ruled that Fajardo is guilty. Fajardo was a public officer, being the
Cashier V and OIC, Division Chief III, Prize Payment (Teller) Division of the Treasury
Department of PCSO. Her duties as such required her to handle cash, as in fact, at the
time material to this case, Fajardo was authorized to draw a cash advance in the
amount of P3M intended as payments for sweepstakes and lotto low-tier prizes and
the PCSO - POSC Scratch IT Project. By reason thereof, Fajardo had in her custody
public funds in the total amount of P3M for which she was clearly accountable.
Unfortunately, part of the said funds went missing while in her custody. After the
conduct of two (2) spot audits on her account, a total deficit in the amount of
P1,877,450.00 was discovered, which she failed to explain or produce upon
demand. Her failure to account for the said moneys thereby gave rise to the
presumption that she had converted the funds to her personal use, which
presumption she failed to rebut with competent evidence. Accordingly, her
conviction for the crime charged stands.
FACTS:
At the time material to this case, Fajardo was the Cashier V and designated
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Division Chief III, Prize Payment (Teller) Division, Treasury
Department of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). As such, she
exercised direct supervision and control over paying tellers and other employees
assigned in the division, instituted procedures in actual payment of prizes, conducted
periodic check-up and/or actual count of paid winning tickets, and requisitioned cash
from the Assistant Department Manager for distribution to paying tellers. By virtue
of her position, Fajardo was likewise authorized to draw a cash advance in the
amount of P3,000,000.00 (P3M), from which P2,000,000.00 (P2M) was intended as
payment of sweepstakes and lotto low-tier prizes, while P1,000,000.00 (P1M) was
devoted for the PCSO-Pacific Online Systems Corporation (POSC) Scratch IT Project.
On the basis of 2 letter-complaints from Crispina Doria, Division Chief of the
Sales Department and Gina V. Abo-Hamda of the POSC protesting the inability of the
Prize Payment Division of the Treasury Department to pay the winning Scratch IT
tickets on time, as well as the delay in the replenishment of the Teller and Provincial
District Office's prize fund, a spot cash audit on the account of Fajardo was ordered
by Betsy B. Paruginog (Paruginog), Assistant General Manager for Finance of PCSO.
Thus, the Internal Audit Department (IAD) of the PCSO conducted a cash examination
of Fajardo's account and, after a reconciliation of all the documents, checks, winning
tickets, issuances, and vouchers against Fajardo's cash on hand, discovered that there
was a shortage of P218,461.00 from the total accountability of P3M.
 The following day, Fajardo did not report for work. Fajardo reported back to
work on January 8, 2009. Mr. Mario Coral, head of the Treasury Department,
informed her that the audit team will open her vault to conduct a spot cash count in
her presence and in the presence of Paruginog, as well as representatives from the
Commission on Audit (COA) and the Treasury and Legal Departments of the PCSO.
The audit revealed a much bigger shortage in the amount of P1,877,450.00.
Moreover, the audit team found that the P1,621,476.00 worth of cash and
P37,513.00 worth of checks presented during the first audit were all missing.
Thereafter, Fajardo turned over the remaining cash in the amount of P20,000.00
inside her vault.
The then audit team issued a demand letter to Fajardo requiring her to
return the missing funds and to explain within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt
thereof the reasons why the shortage occurred. Fajardo wrote a reply requesting for
more time to explain and expressing her willingness to settle the matter as she had
no intentions of evading the same. Fajardo wrote another letter to the PCSO Legal
Department acknowledging her mistake and admitting her liability for the missing
funds and offering to settle her accountability by waiving her monetary benefits.
Eventually, the PCSO Legal Department issued a Resolution finding a prima facie case
against Fajardo and recommending that she be formally charged with Serious
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service, without prejudice to the filing of the present charge
against her for Malversation of Public Funds.
Defense argument:
Fajardo claimed that the audit team proceeded to her workstation and
announced that they will conduct a spot cash examination. They counted the cash in
her possession without giving her the opportunity to balance her accounts and when
all the cash items were produced, they did not include the same in the audit.
Thereafter, she was forced to sign two (2) Cash Examination Count Sheets indicating
two (2) different figures, one stating a shortage in the amount of P734,421.00 and
the other indicating the amount of P218,461.00. She did not report for work the
following day and extended her leave of absence until January 7, 2009 due to health
problems. However, she learned that during her absence, her safe and vault were
sealed by the auditors and that a certain Ms. Josefina Sarabia assumed her duties.
Further, she contended that it was one Carlos Lector26(Lector), a co-employee, who
was seen in her workstation opening the vault with the lights off and was
consequently administratively charged. She claimed that the sealing of her vault was
directed in order to pass the blame on her despite the shortage having occurred as a
result of pilferage, robbery or theft. As regards her letters dated January 15 and 27,
2009, she claimed that she was merely tricked into writing them, as she was then
confused, helpless, and vulnerable after being confronted with the audit results.
RTC Ruling
The RTC found Fajardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds,
The SB Ruling
The SB affirmed Fajardo's conviction, with the modification that the penalty
of imprisonment to be imposed should be for an indeterminate period of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No.
(RA) 10951,35 particularly Section 4036 thereof, and taking into account the presence
of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.37 Affirming the RTC, the SB
found that the elements of the crime charged were established and that Fajardo's
failure to adequately explain the whereabouts of the missing funds in order to rebut
the presumption that she had misappropriated the same was conclusive of her guilt
of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Fajardo's conviction for the crime
charged.
RULING:
YES
The petition is bereft of merit.
Malversation of Public Funds is defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the RPC, as amended, as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property — Presumption of
Malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office,
is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
neglect, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property,
wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such funds
or property to personal uses. (Emphasis supplied)
 The elements of the crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer;
(b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) the funds or property are public funds or public property for which he was
accountable; and (d) he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. After
a judicious perusal of the case, the Court finds the confluence of the foregoing
elements to uphold Fajardo's conviction.
As the records show, Fajardo was a public officer, being the Cashier V and
OIC, Division Chief III, Prize Payment (Teller) Division of the Treasury Department of
PCSO. Her duties as such required her to handle cash, as in fact, at the time material
to this case, Fajardo was authorized to draw a cash advance in the amount of P3M
intended as payments for sweepstakes and lotto low-tier prizes and the PCSO - POSC
Scratch IT Project. By reason thereof, Fajardo had in her custody public funds in the
total amount of P3M for which she was clearly accountable. Unfortunately, part of
the said funds went missing while in her custody. After the conduct of two (2) spot
audits on her account, a total deficit in the amount of P1,877,450.00 was discovered,
which she failed to explain or produce upon demand. Her failure to account for the
said moneys thereby gave rise to the presumption that she had converted the funds
to her personal use, which presumption she failed to rebut with competent
evidence. Accordingly, her conviction for the crime charged stands.
Fajardo insists that the SB should not have taken into consideration her
letters dated January 15 and 27, 2009, having been used in violation of her rights to
counsel and against self-incrimination. The Court is not persuaded. The right to
counsel vis-à-vis administrative inquiries or investigations has already been succinctly
explained in Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, where the Court declared that "a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel": However,
it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary
rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.
Meanwhile, a person's right against self-incrimination is enshrined in
Section 17, Article III of the Constitution. The essence of the right against self-
incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act. "However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be
claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to
testify altogether.
With the foregoing constitutional precepts in mind, the Court finds that
Fajardo's contentions that (a) she was denied her right to counsel during the
investigation conducted by the PCSO Legal Department and (b) her letters dated
January 15 and 27, 2009 were made in violation of her right against self-incrimination
are grossly misplaced. To stress, the right to counsel is not imperative in an
administrative investigation. Further, and as the SB aptly pointed out, there was no
compulsion coming from the PCSO nor any question propounded to Fajardo during
the investigation that was incriminatory in character or has a tendency to incriminate
her for the crime charged; neither has it been shown that she was in any manner
compelled or forced to write the letters dated January 15 and 17, 2009. On the
contrary, the letters appear to have been voluntarily and spontaneously written. That
petitioner subsequently retracted the said letters in her counter-affidavit before the
Ombudsman will not exculpate her. Courts look upon retractions with considerable
disfavor because they are generally unreliable, as there is always the probability that
it will later be repudiated. At most the retraction is an afterthought which should not
be given probative value. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case
which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony
or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld, which does not obtain
in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 5, 2018 and the
Resolution dated April 18, 2018 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-17-A/R-0032 are hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 192330 November 14, 2012
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. J. Abad.
EMERGENCY RECIT (FACTS): The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused
Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of
violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code.
Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte,
operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction
materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes.
When construction for calamity victims was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped
reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This
worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge. Thus, she sought the help
of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s
Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP). Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks
of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed
food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP
beneficiaries.
Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice
and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. Eldelissa Elises, the supervising
clerk of the Municipal Accountant’s Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her
view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods.
Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries.
Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present
complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head,
testified that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s
malnourished children. Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he
approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of illegal use of public property (technical malversation)
under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
SANDIGANBAYAN: The Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of technical malversation. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public
property to a public purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by
law or ordinance.
SC: The accused is guilty of technical malversation.
The evidence shows that the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133
appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on
the executive budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for
the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services 8 which covers the
CSAP housing projects. The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s
intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods
to those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical
malversation.
Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the
act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular
public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita. It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof,
that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount
diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation.
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M.
Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use
of public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code.1
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO)
of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided
construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their
homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay
Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the
reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia),
the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of
construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina
Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s
Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its
storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers,
what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal
Mayor, to seek his approval. Ysidoro approved the release and signed the
withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to
CSAP.2 Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the
accounting department regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises,
the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant’s Office, signed the withdrawal slip
based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the
goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries.
Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present
complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head,
testified that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s
malnourished children. Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he
approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project
also meant for the poor of the municipality was valid since they came from the
savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing
that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food.
Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a
comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its
transactions.
The Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical
malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public
service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The
Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a public purpose other
than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance
The Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010
Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED YSIDORO IS GUILTY OF TECHNICAL
MALVERSATION. (YES)
RULING:
One. YSIDORO’s DEFENSE: Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the
offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of
sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance
for a specific purpose
The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer;
b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public
use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is
different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance.
But the evidence shows that the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-
133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on
the executive budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for
the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services8 which covers the CSAP
housing projects. The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention
to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods
should be used for SFP’s needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the
qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods
to those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical
malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials
appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients
neither could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP
and that, therefore, the same could already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries.
He relies on Abdulla v. People12 which states that funds classified as savings are not
considered appropriated by law or ordinance and can be used for other public
purposes.
The Court cannot accept Ysidoro’s argument. The subject goods could not be
regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran throughout the year.
Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its
project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had
already distributed the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second
quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom
constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to
predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods were
no longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite premature.
In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be
enacted to validly apply funds, already appropriated for a determined public
purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available
exclusively for the specific purpose for which they have been appropriated.
No ordinance shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations
from one item to another. However, the local chief executive or the
presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be
authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget for their
respective offices from savings in other items within the same expense class
of their respective appropriations.
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in
the diversion of the subject goods, such finding should be respected. The SB ruled,
however, that since Ysidoro failed to present the municipal auditor at the trial, the
presumption is that his testimony would have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro
argues that this goes against the rule on the presumption of innocence and the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal
auditor testified, his testimony would have been adverse to the mayor. The
municipal auditor’s view regarding the transaction is not conclusive to the case and
will not necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if it happened to be favorable to
him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into speculations regarding what the
municipal auditor would have said had he appeared and testified.
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP
goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio;
and, second, he consulted the accounting department if the goods could be
distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he
cannot be convicted of the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes
the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular
public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning
that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense
because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy,
order, and convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and
not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.14
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount
diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court,
however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
NORMA A. ABDULLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
Crime Charged: Technical Malversation
Sandiganbayan: Convicted petitioner as charged
SC: Acquitted petitioner
It ruled that There is merit to the contention of the Appellant that the prosecution
was unable to prove the second and third elements of the crime charged. She argued
that the public funds in question, having been established to form part of savings,
had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific
purpose.
As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) originally intended to cover the salary differentials of thirty four (34)
secondary school teachers whose employment status were converted to Instructor I,
were sourced from the "lump sum appropriation" authorized on page 370 (should be
page 396) of R.A. 6688 and the current savings under personal services of said school.
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of
the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should
have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent.
Facts: Petitioner Abdulla was charged herein of Technical Malversation.
Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only
appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. The record shows
that the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of testimonial evidence and
instead opted to mark in evidence exhibits: Audit Report.
Thereafter, the prosecution immediately made its Formal Offer of Evidence, and,
with the admission thereof by the court, rested its case.
The defense proceeded to adduce its evidence by presenting four (4) witnesses,
namely, accused Mahmud Darkis, who was the Administrative Officer of Sulu State
College, Jolo, Sulu; accused Nenita Aguil, the Cashier of the same College; appellant
Norma Abdulla herself, who was the College President; and Gerardo Concepcion, Jr.,
Director IV and Head of the Department of Budget and Management, Regional Office
No. 9, Zamboanga City.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Request for the conversion of thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers to Instructor
I items of the Sulu State College, through its former president, accused Abdulla, was
approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Consequent to the
approval of the said request, was the allotment by the DBM of the partial funding for
the purpose of paying the salary differentials of the said thirty-four (34) secondary
school teachers in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) sourced from
the "lump sum appropriation authorized by RA 6688 (General Appropriations Act
January 1 – December 31, 1989)] and the current savings under personal services of
said school. Out of the thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers, only the six (6)
teachers were entitled and paid salary differentials amounting to P8,370.00, as the
twenty-eight (28) teachers, who were occupying Teacher III positions, were no longer
entitled to salary differentials as they were already receiving the same salary rate as
Instructor I. The amount of P31,516.16, taken from the remaining balance of the
P40,000.00 allotment, was used to pay the terminal leave benefits of the six (6)
casuals.
Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of the salary differentials
of only six (6), out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, when she testified that out of the
thirty-four (34) teachers, twenty-eight (28) were already holding the position of
Secondary School Teacher III receiving the salary of Instructor I; and that the
remaining six (6) were still holding Secondary Teacher II positions and therefore
receiving a salary lower than that of Instructor I so they were paid salary differentials.
Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only
appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision
ISSUE: WON Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation.
RULING: NO.
Anent the allegation of the movant/accused that good faith is a valid defense in a
prosecution for malversation as it would negate criminal intent on the part of the
accused which the prosecution failed to prove, attention is invited to pertinent law
and rulings of the Supreme Court on the matter.
Sec. 5(b) of the Rule 131, Rules of Court, provides, `That an unlawful act was done
with an unlawful intent.’ Hence, dolo may be inferred from the unlawful act.
The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically apply to all
charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public
use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed
an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its
employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to
under existing civil service laws. Thus, in a similar case, the Court reversed a
conviction for technical malversation of one who paid out the wages of laborers:
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the
wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to
note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’
funds and resources.
In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by
competent evidence that appellant’s act of paying the terminal leave benefits of
employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests upon the
prosecution.
The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in discharging its
undertaking to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As it is, the
prosecution did not present any single witness at all, not even for the purpose of
identifying and proving the authenticity of the documentary evidence on which it
rested its case. The prosecution definitely failed to prove unlawful intent on the part
of appellant.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The weakness of the defense
does not relieve it of this responsibility. And when the prosecution fails to discharge
its burden of establishing the guilt of an accused, an accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf. A judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral
certainty. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence must be
duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason and
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. There must be
moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who
committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant.13
The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the Barangay Jalung Road) will not make the accused guilty of violation of Article 220 of
day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor the Revised Penal Code.
could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave
conviction. benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of
The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to prove the technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688
existence of all the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation defined specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine,
in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which are: the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
1. That the offender is a public officer; Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
"2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;
"3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance;
4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or
property has been appropriated by law or ordinance."
Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the second and third
elements of the crime charged. She argued that the public funds in question, having
been established to form part of savings, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and
law or ordinance for any specific purpose.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
There is merit to the contention of the Petitioner.
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001 BELLOSILLO, J.

As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand pesos

CRIME CHARGED: Plunder under RA 7080
(P40,000.00) originally intended to cover the salary differentials of thirty four (34)
SB: There is Probable Cause to charge petitioner with Plunder
secondary school teachers whose employment status were converted to Instructor I,
EMERGENCY RECIT:
were sourced from the "lump sum appropriation" authorized on page 370 (should be
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenges the constitutionality of RA
page 396) of R.A. 6688 and the current savings under personal services of said school.
7080 because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should
Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos
accusation against him.
(P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school
SC ruled that Plunder Law is constitutional. As to the first issue, the SC ruled
teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
that as long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
Code.
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties,
The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs. Sandiganbaya that in the absence
its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
of a law or ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
(in that case, the absence of any law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
concreting of Barangay Jalung Road), the use thereof for another public purpose
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of
(there, for the payment of wages of laborers working on projects other than the
a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par.
(d), of the Plunder Law. As to the second issue, in a criminal prosecution for plunder,
as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal. It is also plain from the deliberations that the legislature did
not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a
malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenges the constitutionality of RA
7080 because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have
transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are
reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth
and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No.
26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559
to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par.
(e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No.
26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury
(Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of
An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
Defense of Petitioner:
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the
charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c"
to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges
and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that
Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the
Plunder Law.
Sandiganbayan:
The Sandiganbayan, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that
"a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused." Petitioner moved to quash the Information
in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one (1) offense. The Government filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Quash, and petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July
2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires
less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the
rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080
is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so
classify it.
RULING:
Plunder Law is constitutional.
Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly
possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. Verily, the onerous task of
rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the
statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding
of unconstitutionality. And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the
Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-
defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of
official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
 3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its
application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed,
it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is
the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par.
(d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the
law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which
petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE
VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime
of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A.
No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection
with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit,
public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(₱130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a.Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00),
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
 (d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE
OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is
obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner, however,
bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4.
These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional
for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and
every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of
its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative
will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:" Combination - the
result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to
bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series - a
number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession. That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series"
to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at
least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec.
1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2)
or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found
in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public
treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that
this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1)
to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of
overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which
is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the
term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method'
which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is
no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to
attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair
warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to
the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either
by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does
not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first
may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as
against the second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason,
the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.12 It must be
stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which
is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory
is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." This rationale
does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of
free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made
to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute,
the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported
ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by
petitioner, is more imagined than real. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to
overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the
Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is
all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be
aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote
with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that
Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing
unlawful scheme or conspiracy . The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even
to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes,
the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by
proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal. It is also plain from the deliberations that the legislature did not in any
manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden
still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or
element necessary to constitute the crime. The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with
proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception
of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for
plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The
prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they
amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his
submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and
that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive
element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of
plunder .
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential
elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph
and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For
purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x It purports to do no more than
prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being
a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right
in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec.
4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to
present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the
reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing
rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080
provides for a separability clause under Section 7.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder
is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of
mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that
the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
"willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea
and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him
would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only
evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this
crime of plunder.33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding
portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is
contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view,
would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of
cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to
commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done
to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the
elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must
be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in
1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral
or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder
as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner, vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 220953
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.
EMERGENCY RECIT (FACTS): The Ombudsmar charged several individuals, including
GMA and Benigno Aguas, with the crime of plunder.
The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as
its main witness against all the accused.
Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The Board
appointed her as Chairman of an Audit Committee. The audit review proceeded
when she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the PCSO for 2006 2007 2008 and
2009 and the annual financial statements contained therein for the years 2005 to
2009.
Her findings were:
· One of her major findings was that the former management of the
PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and the
operating fund. By commingling she means that the funds were
maintained in only one main account. This violates Section 6 of
Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally accepted accounting
principles.
· The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive
disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). There
were also excessive disbursements for advertising expenses. The
internal audit department was also merged with the budget and
accounting department, which is a violation of internal audit rules.
· There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was
given only P10 million in 2002, i.e. P5 million for the Office of the
Chairman and P5 million for the Office of the General Manager. Both
were dated February 21, 2000, and sent to then President Estrada, who
approved them. This allocation should have been the basis for the
original allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were several
subsequent requests made by the General Manager during the time
of, and which were approved by, former President Arroyo.
· The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO
Charter. PCSO did not have a budget for this. The financial statements
indicate that they were operating on a deficit in the years 2006 to 2009.
· The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO
did not have a registry of budget utilization. The excess was not taken
from the operating fund, but from the prize fund and the charity fund.
After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to the Board of
Directors in one of their executive meetings. The Board instructed her to go in-depth
in the investigation of the disbursements of CIF.
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements in excess of
P10 million. He explained that there were board resolutions confirming additional
CIF which were approved by former President Arroyo. Aguas mentioned this in one
of their meetings with the directors and corporate secretary. The board secretary,
Atty. Ed Araullo, gave them the records of those resolutions.
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte would ask for
additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo approves it by affixing her signature
on that same letter-request. There were seven letters or memoranda to then
President Arroyo, with the subject "Request for Intelligence Fund."
She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary of all the
disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010. The total of all the amounts in the
summaries for three years is P365,997,915.
They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was then
investigating the operation of PCSO, including the CIF. She was invited as a resource
speaker in an invitation from Chairman Teofisto Guingona III.
She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those who also
attended were the incoming members if the PCSO Board Directors and the directors.
Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in some hearings as resources
speakers. The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a copy
of the transcript of stenographic notes from the Office of the Blue Ribbon Committee.
In the proceeding on June 7, 2011, Uriarte testified. According to the witness, Uriarte
testified that all the confidential intelligence projects she had proposed were
approved by President Arroyo; all the requests she gave to the President were
approved and signed by the latter personally in her (Uriarte's) presence; and all the
documents pertaining to the CIF were submitted to President Arroyo. On the
After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and regulations involved
to check whether the disbursements were in accordance with law. One of the duties
and responsibilities of the audit committee was to verify compliance with the laws.
She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO Charter); P.D. 1445
(COA Code); LOI 1282; COA Circular 92-385, as amended by Circular 2003-002, which
provides the procedure for approval of disbursements and liquidation of confidential
intelligence funds.
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming
from different law enforcement agencies 10 to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to
the effect that the PCSO had not requested from their respective offices any
intelligence operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and
Aguas.
To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz Gonzales,
Office-in-Charge and Department Manager of the Human Resources of PCSO; Flerida
Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence and Confidential Fund Audit Unit of the COA;
and Noel Clemente, Director of COA were presented as additional witnesses.
After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V,
Roquero and Villar separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
CRIME CHARGED: Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice
Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio 0.
Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose
R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission on Audit
(COA) Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund
Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder.
SANDIGANBAYAN: On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to
evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the charge against
them. It held that said accused who were members of the PCSO Board of Directors
were not shown to have diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided
the public treasury by conveying and transferring into their possession and control
any money or funds from PCSO account; that as to Villar, there had been no clear
showing that his designation of Plaras had been tainted with any criminal design;
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia,
holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to
commit plunder; and that the Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of
malversation against Valencia.
As to the determination whether the threshold amount of P50million was met by
the prosecution's evidence, the Court believes this to have been established. Even
if the computation is limited only to the cash advances/releases made by accused
Uriarte alone AFTER Arroyo had approved her requests and the PCSO Board approved
CIF budget and the "regular" P5million CIF budget accorded to the PCSO Chairman
and Vice Chairman are NOT taken into account, still the total cash advances through
accused Uriarte's series of withdrawals will total P189,681,646. This amount
surpasses the P50million threshold.
As to Arroyo's participation,
The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only Uriarte's request for additional
CIF funds in 2008-2010, but also authorized the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's
"OK" notation and signature on Uriartc's letter-requests signified unqualified
approval of Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds because the last
paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this phrase: "With the use of
intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its image and integrity of its operations. Arroyo
cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what she approved were only the request
for the grant or allocation of additional CIF funds, because Arroyo's "OK" notation
was unqualified and, therefore, covered also the request to use such funds, through
releases of the same in favor of Uriarte. 11
The Sandiganbayan later also denied the respective Motions for Reconsideration of
GMA and Aguas, observing that:
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was
used to acquire real or personal properties or used for any other purpose to
personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already illegally
amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and just
decided to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit
him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the
monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for
the person to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases,
a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal
benefit should still be evidence-based must fail.
What accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit any "overt
act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF
funds but also their releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on
the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a coconspirator of
Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act
is not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind.
SUPREME COURT:
A. No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas:
After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for
plunder against the petitioners.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth valued at not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the
corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced
no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter,
had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was
also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing
even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either
GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any
knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of the criminal prosecution for plunder.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas,
and dismissed the criminal action against them.
B. The Prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080,
which provides:
Section I .Definition of Terms. - x x x
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is
to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or
malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of
statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a
particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which
the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase
in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its
meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter. 49
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were
one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own
benefit;50 misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly,
unforeseeably, or not as intended;"51 and malversation occurs when "any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially."52 The common thread that binds all
the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken.
Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other
terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public
treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and
gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to
the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use
the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations (exchanges between Senator
Enrile and Senator Tanada) removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder.
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that
what was removed from the coverage of the bill and the final version that
eventually became the law was a person who was not the main plunderer or a co-
conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The
requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-
conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but,
more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same.
Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury
beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS: On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice
Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio 0.
Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose
R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission on Audit
(COA) Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund
Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder.
By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over
GMA, Valencia, Morato and Aguas.
Plaras, on the other hand, was able to secure a temporary restraining order (TRO)
from this Court in Plaras v. Sandiganbayan .
Insofar as Roquero is concerned, the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him
by the early part of 2013. Uriarte and Valdes remained at large.
Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail.
The Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia, Morato and Roquero
upon finding that the evidence of guilt against them was not strong.
In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the
resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the ground
that the evidence of guilt against them was strong. 5 The motions for reconsideration
filed by GMA and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan on February 19, 2014.6
Accordingly, GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail in this Court, but her
challenge has remained pending and unresolved todate.
Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by the Sandiganbayan in
2014. Thereafter, said accused sought to be granted bail, and their motions were
granted on different dates.
ATTY. ALETA TOLENTINO’ S TESTIMONY:
The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as
its main witness against all the accused.
Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The Board
appointed her as Chairman of an Audit Committee. The audit review proceeded when
she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the PCSO for 2006 2007 2008 and 2009 and
the annual financial statements contained therein for the years 2005 to 2009. The
reports were given to them by the COA.
One of her major findings was that the former management of the PCSO was
commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and the operating fund. By
commingling she means that the funds were maintained in only one main account.
This violates Section 6 of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally accepted
accounting principles.
The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive disbursement of the
Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). There were also excessive disbursements
for advertising expenses. The internal audit department was also merged with the
budget and accounting department, which is a violation of internal audit rules.
There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was given only P10
million in 2002, i.e. P5 million for the Office of the Chairman and P5 million for the
Office of the General Manager. Both were dated February 21, 2000, and sent to then
President Estrada, who approved them. This allocation should have been the basis
for the original allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were several subsequent
requests made by the General Manager during the time of, and which were
approved by, former President Arroyo.
The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO Charter. PCSO
did not have a budget for this. The financial statements indicate that they were
operating on a deficit in the years 2006 to 2009.
The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO did not have
a registry of budget utilization. The excess was not taken from the operating fund,
but from the prize fund and the charity fund.
In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, Pl,000,078,683.23. One of the causes
of the deficit for 2006 was the CIF expense of P215 million, which was in excess of
the approved allocation of P10 million. The net cash provided by operating expenses
in 2006 is negative, which means that there were more expenses than what was
received.
In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to the prize and
charity funds. There were also excessive disbursements of CIF amounting to
P77,478,705.
The 2008 approved COB has a comparative analysis of the actual budget for 2007. It
is stated there that the budget for CTF in 2007 is only P25,480,550. But the financial
statements reflect P77 million. The budget was prepared and signed by then PCSO
General Manager Rosario Uriarte.
In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and
charity funds, adverted in the 2007 COA report. There was already a
recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or funds in 2007. But the COA
noted that this was not followed. The financial statements show the Confidential and
the Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses account is P38,293,137, which is more
than the P10 million that was approved.
In the Comparative Income Statement, the 2008 Confidential/Intelligence Expense
budget was approved for P28 million. The Confidential and Extra-Ordinary
Miscellaneous Expenses is the account being used for confidential and intelligence
expenses. The amount in the financial statements is over the budgeted amount of
P28 million.
In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the 2008 Actual
Budget, the budget for CIF and expenses was P60 million.
In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and
charity funds, despite the instruction or recommendation of COA.
After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to the Board of
Directors in one of their executive meetings. The Board instructed her to go in-depth
in the investigation of the disbursements of CIF.
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements in excess of
P10 million. He explained that there were board resolutions confirming additional
CIF which were approved by former President Arroyo. Aguas mentioned this in one
of their meetings with the directors and corporate secretary. The board secretary,
Atty. Ed Araullo, gave them the records of those resolutions.
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte would ask for
additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo approves it by affixing her signature
on that same letter-request. There were seven letters or memoranda to then
President Arroyo, with the subject "Request for Intelligence Fund."
She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary of all the
disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010. The total of all the amounts in the
summaries for three years is P365,997,915.
They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was then
investigating the operation of PCSO, including the CIF. She was invited as a resource
speaker in an invitation from Chairman Teofisto Guingona III.
She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those who also
attended were the incoming members if the PCSO Board Directors and the directors.
Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in some hearings as resources
speakers. The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a copy
of the transcript of stenographic notes from the Office of the Blue Ribbon Committee.
In the proceeding on June 7, 2011, Uriarte testified. According to the witness, Uriarte
testified that all the confidential intelligence projects she had proposed were
approved by President Arroyo; all the requests she gave to the President were
approved and signed by the latter personally in her (Uriarte's) presence; and all the
documents pertaining to the CIF were submitted to President Arroyo. On the other
hand, Valencia and Taruc said they did not know about the projects. Statements
before the Committee are under oath.
After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and regulations involved
to check whether the disbursements were in accordance with law. One of the duties
and responsibilities of the audit committee was to verify compliance with the laws.
She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO Charter); P.D. 1445
(COA Code); LOI 1282; COA Circular 92-385, as amended by Circular 2003-002, which
provides the procedure for approval of disbursements and liquidation of confidential
intelligence funds.
---- PWEDE NA RITO MAGSTOP FACTS GUYS SINCE DETAILS NALANG TOH NG NASA
TAAS. -----
The first step is the provision or allotment of a budget because no CIF fund can be
disbursed without the allocation. This is provided in the second whereas clause of
Circular 92-385. For GOCCs, applying Circular 2003-002, there must be allocation or
budget for the CIF and it should be specifically in the corporate operating budget or
would be taken from savings authorized by special provisions.
This was not followed in the PCSO CIF disbursement in 2008-2010.
The requirements in the disbursement of the CIF are the budget and the approval
of the President. If the budget is correct, the President will approve the
disbursement or release of the CIF. In this case, the President approved the release
of the fund without a budget and savings. Also, the President approved the same
in violation of LOI 1282, because there were no detailed specific project proposals
and specifications accompanying the request for additional CIF. The requests for
the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 were uniform and just enumerated the purposes, not
projects. They did not contain what was required in the LOI. There was no reason
for each additional intelligence fund that was approved by then President Arroyo.
The third step is the designation of the disbursing officer. In this case, the Board of
Directors designated Uriarte as Special Disbursing Officer (SDO) for the portion of the
CIF that she withdrew. For the portion withdrawn by Valencia, there was no special
disbursing officer designated on record.
The designation of Uriarte was in violation of internal control which is the
responsibility of the department head, as required by Section 3 of Circular 2003-002.
When she went through copies of the checks and disbursement vouchers submitted
to her, she found out that Uriarte was both the SDO and the authorized officer to
sign the vouchers and checks. She was also the payee of the checks. All the checks
withdrawn by Uriarte were paid to her and she was also the signatory of the checks.
Aside from Uriarte, Valencia also disbursed funds in the CIF. For the funds
withdrawn by Valencia, he was also the authorized officer to sign the vouchers and
checks. He was also the payee of the checks.
Accused Aguas signed the vouchers to certify that there are adequate funds and
budgetary allotment, that the expenditures were properly certified and supported
by documents, and that the previous cash advances were liquidated and accounted
for. This certification means that the cash advance voucher can be released. This is
because the COA rule on cash advance is that before any subsequent cash advance
is released, the previous cash advance must be liquidated first. This certification
allowed the requesting party and payee to get the cash advance from the voucher.
Without this certification, Uriarte and Valencia could not have been able to get the
cash advance. Otherwise, it was a violation of P.D. 1445 (Government Auditing
Code).
Valencia designated himself as SDO upon the recommendation of COA Auditor
Plaras. There was no board resolution for this designation. There was just a
certification This certification was signed by Valencia himself and designates himself
as the SDO since he is personally taking care of the funds which are to be handled
with utmost confidentiality
Plaras wrote a letter dated December 15, 2008 to Valencia. It appears in the letter
that to substantiate the liquidation report, Plaras told Valencia to designate himself
as SDO because there was no disbursing officer. It was the suggestion of Plaras.
COA Circulars 92-385 and 2003-002 indicate that to disburse CIF, one must be a
special disbursing officer or SDO. All disbursing officers of the government must have
fidelity bonds. The bond is to protect the government from and answer for
misappropriation that the disbursing officer may do.
Plaras should have disallowed or suspended the cash advances because there was no
fidelity bond and the disbursing officer was not authorized. There was no bond put
up for Valencia. The records show that the bond for Uriarte was only for the amount
of Pl.5 million.
Aguas submitted this fidelity bond certification, which was received on August 24,
2010, late, because under the COA Circulars, it should have been submitted when the
disbursing officer was designated.
Once an SDO is designated, the specimen signature must be submitted to COA,
together with the fidelity bond and the signatories for the cash advances.
The approval of the President pertains to the release of the budget, not its
allocation. She thinks the action of the Board was done because there was no
budget. The Board's confirmation was needed because it was in excess of the
budget that was approved. They were trying to give a color of legality to them
approval of the CIF in excess of the approved corporate operating budget. The
Board approval was required for the amount to be released, which amount was
approved in excess of the allotted budget for the year. The President cannot
approve an additional amount, unless there is an appropriation or a provision
saying a particular savings will be used for the CIF. The approvals here were all in
excess of the approved budget.
Cash advances can be given on a per project basis for CIF. For one to get a cash
advance, one must state what the project is as to that cash advance. No subsequent
cash advance should be given, until previous cash advances have been liquidated and
accounted for. If it is a continuing project, monthly liquidation reports must be given.
The difference in liquidation process between CIF and regular cash advances is that
for CIF, the liquidation goes to the Chair and not to the resident auditor of the
agency or the GOCC. All of the liquidation papers should go to the COA Chair, given
on a monthly basis.
In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just say cash
advance from CIF of the Chairman or from the GM's office in accordance with her
duties. There is no particular project indicated for the cash advance. Also, the
requirement that prior advances be liquidated first for subsequent advances to be
given was not followed. The witness prepared a summary of the cash advances
withdrawn by the two disbursing officers covering the years 2008, 2009 and 2010. It
shows that there were subsequent cash advances, even if a prior advance has not yet
been liquidated.
In this case, there were no supporting documents submitted with respect to
Valencia's cash advances in 2008. Only the certifications by the SDO were submitted.
These certifications stated that he has the documents in his custody and they can be
made available, if and when necessary.
When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back on behalf of
Valencia, who had designated himself as SDO. However, their designations, or in
what capacity they signed the voucher are not stated. Among the attachments is also
a memorandum containing the signature of Arroyo, indicating her approval to the
utilization of funds. Another memorandum indicating the approval of Arroyo was also
attached to the transmittal letter of Aguas . These two memoranda bear the reasons
for the cash advances, couched in general terms. The reasons were donated
medicines that were sold and authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The
reasons stated in the memoranda are practically the same. Uriarte did not submit
any accomplishment reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas submitted an
accomplishment report, but the accomplishments were not indicated in definite
fashion or with specificity.
The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in 2009, that
the total cash advance made by Uriarte was P132,760,096. Arroyo approved P90
million for release. P10 million in January 2009 and April 27, 2009, and then P50
million in May 6, 2009.In July 2, 2009, P10 million or a total of P70 million. In
October 2009, P20 million or a total of P90 million. The amount that was cash
advanced by Valencia was P5,660,779. Therefore, the total cash advances by these
two officials were P138,420,875, but all of these were never liquidated in 2009.
Uriarte and Valencia only submitted a liquidation voucher and a report to COA on
April I2, 2010. For the January 22, 2009 disbursements, the date of the liquidation
voucher was June 30, 2009, but it was submitted to COA on April 12, 2010. Witness
identified the transmittal letter for P28 million by Uriarte, dated October 19, 2009,
which was received by the COA only on April 12, 2010, with an accompanying
certification from Uriarte as to some of the documents from which the witness's
Summary of Liquidation was based.
Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in effect, they were
disbursed without any appropriation. These cash advances were also made without
any specific project, in violation of par. 2 of COA Circular No. 92-385. In this case,
the cash advances were not for a specific project. The vouchers only indicate the
source of the fund. The vouchers did not specify specific projects.
The memoranda to President Arroyo stated only the problems encountered by the
PCSO. These problems, as stated in each memorandum, included donated medicines
sometimes ending up in store for sale, unofficial use of ambulances, rise of
expenditures of endowment fund, lotto sweepstakes scams, fixers for programs of
the PCSO, and other fraudulent schemes. No projects were mentioned.
As regards the sixth step - the credit notice, the same was not validly issued by the
COA. The credit notice is a settlement or an action made by the COA Auditors and
is given once the Chairman, in the case of CIF Fund, finds that the liquidation report
and all the supporting papers are in order. In this case, the supporting papers and
the liquidation report were not in order, hence, the credit notice should not have
been issued. Further, the credit notice has to follow a specific form. Instead of
following this form, the COA issued a document which stated that there is an irregular
use of the price fund and the charity fund for CIF Fund. The credit notice also did not
specify that the transaction had been audited, indicating that no audit was made.
There were no supporting papers attached to the voucher, and the certification
issued is not in conformity with the required certification by COA Circular 2003-002.
The certification dated July 24, 2008 by Valencia was not in conformity with the
certification required by COA. The required form should specify the project for
which the certification was being issued, and file code of the specific project.
There are two kinds of audit on disbursements of government funds: pre-audit and
post-audit. Pre-audit is the examination of documents supporting the transaction,
before these are paid for and recorded. On the other hand, the post-audit
requirement is the process where the COA or the auditor will have to do exactly what
was done in the pre-audit, and in addition, the auditor must supplement what she
did by tracing the transaction under audit to the books of accounts, and that the
transaction is all recorded in the books of accounts. The auditor, in post-audit, also
makes the final determination of whether the transaction was not illegal, irregular,
extravagant, excessive, unconscionable or unnecessary.
In this case, no audit was conducted.. The auditor should also include a certification
that these have been audited. In this instance, no certification that the transaction
was audited. All transactions of the government must be subject to audit in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the requirements
for audit are the same.
The witness also related that she traced the records of the CIF fund (since such was
no longer stated as a receivable), and reviewed whether it was recorded as an
expense in 2008. She found out that the recorded CIF fund expense, as recorded in
the corporate operating budget as actually disbursed, was only P21,102,000. As
such, she confronted her accountants and asked them "Saan tinago itong amount
na to?" The personnel in the accounting office said that the balance of the P86
million or the additional P21 million was not recorded in the operating fund budget
because they used the prize fund and charity fund as instructed by Aguas
The witness reported the discrepancy because there were violations of R.A. 1169,
Sec. 6, which provides for the different funds of PCSO namely: prize fund (55% of the
net receipts), charity fund (30% of the net receipts), and operating fund (15% ). The
proceeds of the lotto and sweepstakes ticket sales provide the money for these
different funds, removing first the printing cost and the net proceeds (98%) is divided
among the three funds mentioned.
Apart from the President violating LOI 1282, the witness also observed that the
President directly dealt with the PCSO, although the President, by Executive Order
No. 383 dated November 14, 2004, and Executive Order No. 455 dated August 22,
2005, transferred the direct control and supervision of the PCSO to the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and later to the Department of Health
(DOH). A project should first be approved by the Supervising and Controlling
Secretary of the Secretary of Health; that the President had transferred her direct
control and supervision, and lost the same.
--PWEDE PANGDUGTONG SA FACTS SA ITAAS KASI OTHER TESTIMONIES ITO--
OTHER WITNESSES’ TESTIMONIES:
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming
from different law enforcement agencies 10 to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to
the effect that the PCSO had not requested from their respective offices any
intelligence operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and
Aguas.
To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz Gonzales,
Office-in-Charge and Department Manager of the Human Resources of PCSO; Flerida
Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence and Confidential Fund Audit Unit of the COA;
and Noel Clemente, Director of COA were presented as additional witnesses.
After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V,
Roquero and Villar separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato,
Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the charge against them. It held that said
accused who were members of the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to have
diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by
conveying and transferring into their possession and control any money or funds
from PCSO account; that as to Villar, there had been no clear showing that his
designation of Plaras had been tainted with any criminal design;
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia,
holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to
commit plunder; and that the Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of
malversation against Valencia
As to the determination whether the threshold amount of P50million was met by
the prosecution's evidence, the Court believes this to have been established. Even
if the computation is limited only to the cash advances/releases made by accused
Uriarte alone AFTER Arroyo had approved her requests and the PCSO Board approved
CIF budget and the "regular" P5million CIF budget accorded to the PCSO Chairman
and Vice Chairman are NOT taken into account, still the total cash advances through
accused Uriarte's series of withdrawals will total P189,681,646. This amount
surpasses the P50million threshold.
The evidence shows that for the year 2010 alone, Uriarte asked for P150 million
additional CIF funds, and Arroyo granted such request and authorized its use.
Uriarte made a series of eleven (11) cash advances in the total amount of
P138,223,490. According to Uriarte's testimony before the Senate, the main
purpose for these cash advances was for the "roll-out" of the small town lottery
program. However, the accomplishment report submitted by Aguas shows that
P137,500,000 was spent on non-related PCSO activities, such as "bomb threat,
kidnapping, terrorism and bilateral and security relations These were thus improper
use of the additional Cff funds amounting to raids on the PCSO coffers and were ill-
gotten because Uriarte had encashed the checks and came into possession of the
monies, which she had complete freedom to dispose of but was not able to properly
account for.
These findings of the Court clearly point out the commission by Uriarte of the crime
of Plunder under the second predicate act charged in the Information.
As to Arroyo's participation, the Court stated in its November 5, 2013 Resolution
that:
The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only Uriarte's request for additional
CIF funds in 2008-2010, but also authorized the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's
"OK" notation and signature on Uriartc's letter-requests signified unqualified
approval of Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds because the last
paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this phrase: "With the use of
intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its image and integrity of its operations.
Arroyo cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what she approved were only the
request for the grant or allocation of additional CIF funds, because Arroyo's "OK"
notation was unqualified and, therefore, covered also the request to use such
funds, through releases of the same in favor of Uriarte. 11
The Sandiganbayan later also denied the respective Motions for Reconsideration
of GMA and Aguas, observing that:
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was
used to acquire real or personal properties or used for any other purpose to
personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already
illegally amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government
funds and just decided to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any
purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after
such amassing, the monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating
any opportunity for the person to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder?
Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the
fact of personal benefit should still be evidence-based must fail.
Also, accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-
gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of approving the disbursement is not the
"overt act" contemplated by law. She further stresses that there was no proof of
conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution
was unable to prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets
is that although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing
CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their
releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public
treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a coconspirator of Uriarte
who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not
indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind. 12
Considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers to evidence of GMA and
Aguas, they have come to the Court on certiorari to assail and set aside said denial,
claiming that the denial was with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant
violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the law on plunder, and was consequently
arbitrary and oppressive, not only in grave abuse of discretion but rendered
without jurisdiction because:
GMA DEFENSES:
First Ground:
On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has denied petitioner
Arroyo's Demurrer to Evidence and considering the reasons for doing so, would find
petitioner Arroyo guilty of the offense of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 as
charged in the Information notwithstanding the following:
a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A.
No. 7080, and as charged in the Information, is that the public officer ... "amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions extirpate this vital element of the offense of plunder;
b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the prosecution
nor a single testimony of the 21 witnesses of the prosecution was offered by the
prosecution to prove that petitioner amassed, accumulated or acquired even a
single peso of the alleged ill-gotten wealth amounting to P365,997,915.00 or any
part of that amount alleged in the Information;
c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis solely of
petitioner Arroyo's authorization of the release of the Confidential/Intelligence
Fund from PCSO's accounts, the Sandiganbayan ruled that she has committed the
offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080 for the reason that her release of CIF funds
to the PCSO amount to a violation of Sec. l(d) [11 of R.A. No. 7080 which reads, as
follows:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust
enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury", thereby disregarding the
gravamen or the corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080.
Second Ground
Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolutions, with absolutely
no justification in law or in the evidence, purportedly as the "mastermind" of a
conspiracy, and without performing any overt act, would impute to petitioner
Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO
coffers" by Uriarte as "raids on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public
treasury" and "in every sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte looted government funds and
appears to have not been able to account for it". Parenthetically, Uriarte has not
been arrested, was not arraigned and did not participate in the trial of the case.
Third Ground
That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of petitioner Arroyo's
Demurrer To Evidence for the reasons stated in the Sandiganbayan Resolutions,
amounting no less to convicting her on the basis of a disjointed reading of the crime
of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080, aggravated by the extirpation in the process
of its "corpus delicti" - the amassing, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth, hence, of a crime that does not exist in law and consequently a blatant
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
Fourth Ground
The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in Crim. Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174, namely: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Rosario C. Uriarte, Sergio 0. Valencia,
Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, [M]a. Fatima A.S. Valdes,
Benigno B. Aguas, Reynaldo A. Villar and Nilda B. Plaras" ... all public officers
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar
schemes or means, described as follows ... " or each of them, P36,599,791.50 which
would not qualify the offense charged as "plunder" under R.A. No. 7080 against all
ten (10) accused together, for which reason the Information docs not charge the
offense of plunder and, as a consequence, all proceedings thereafter held under
the Information arc void.13
AGUAS’ DEFENSES
A. In light of the factual setting described above and the evidence offered and
admitted, does proof beyond reasonable doubt exist to warrant a holding that
Prosecution proved the guilt of the accused such that there is legal reason to deny
Petitioner's Demurrer'?
B. Did the Prosecution's offered evidence squarely and properly support the
allegations in the Information'?
PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
PROSECUTION’S CONTENTION
THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE SANDIGANBAYAN
MERELY INTERPRETED WHAT CONSTITUTES PLUNDER UNDER LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF FACTS OF THE CASE. IT DID NOT JUDICIALLY LEGISLATE
A "NEW" OFFENSE.
1. ACTUAL PERSONAL GAIN, BENEFIT OR ENRICHMENT IS NOT AN
ELEMENT OF PLUNDER UNDER R.A. No. 7080.
2. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ARROYO, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION,
CONSPIRED WITH HER CO-ACCUSED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE COMPLEX,
ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF
PESOS, WHICH CONSTITUTES PLUNDER.
3. ARROYO IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH ACCUSED PCSO BOARD
MEMBERS AND CANNOT THUS DEMAND THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN
DISMISS THE PLUNDER CASE AGAINST HER.
C. ARROYO'S BELATED, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE INFORMATION CHARGING
HER AND CO-ACCUSED FOR PLUNDER IS HIGHLY IMPROPER, ESPECIALLY AT THIS LA
TE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING.
1. THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE ARE CLEARLY ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM OR
RELATING TO SB-12-CRM-0174 PROVES THAT SHE HAS ALWAYS KNOWN AND
UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HER.
Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the decisive issues to
be considered and resolved, as follows:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte; (NO)
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of
plunder:
 a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (NO)
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information proved by the Prosecution? (NO)
Ruling of the Court
The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious.
1. The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is
either a crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes
a penalty for it.24 The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal
to commit treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat,
rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the
Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is
indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators,
or their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a
conscious one. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by
positive and conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express
form, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to
commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been
expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An
implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. 27 Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose,
a concert of action and a community of interest.28
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to
have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy,
for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and
each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts.
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having affixed
her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte.
She argues that such act was not even an overt act of plunder because it had no
immediate and necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being per
se illegal or irregular. However, the Sandiganbayan, in denying the Motions for
Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas vis-a-vis the denial of the demurrers, observed
that: What accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit any
"overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional
CIF funds but also their releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids
on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co-
conspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance
of an overt act is not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind.30
It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with, its conclusion that GMA had been
the mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded
considering that the information did not aver at all that she had been the
mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily.
In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten
unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted
considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying
approval of a fund release by the President
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,31the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating
conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain
conspiracy.
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the
spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However,
in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other
spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.32
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-
conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A
co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither
does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal act.39 Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is
individual and independent.
A review of the records of the case compels us to reject the Sandiganbayan's
declaration in light of the information filed against the petitioners, and the
foregoing exposition on the nature, forms and extent of conspiracy. On the
contrary, the Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show
was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis
of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is
notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the
accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with
the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all
ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including
the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic
Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
 4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as
the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly
states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described
in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder
against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-
conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words,
the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner.
Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact
must be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating
and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be
improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be
the main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot
amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten
wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for
plunder.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan41 to the effect
that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges
conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic
facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would
enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based
on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to
the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main
plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime
of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary
because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in
safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges
they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the
accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged. 42
In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal
to the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each
accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.
Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts
showing the existence of an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making
all of them the main plunderers. On this score, the Prosecution points out that the
sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the
marginal note of "OK" of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional
intelligence fund
The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of Uriarte's
requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any design to raid the public
treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Absent
the specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof
thereon, GMA' s approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if unqualified, could not make
her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime
considering that her approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.
The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request despite the
requests failing to provide "the full detail [ ofJ the specific purposes for which said
funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity
for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished." It posits that the
requests were not specific enough, contrary to what is required by LOI 1282.
However, an examination of Uriarte' s several requests indicates their compliance
with LOI No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished: (a) the full details of
the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent; (b) the explanations of the
circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and (c) the particular
aims to be accomplished.
The specific purposes and circumstances for the necessity of the expenditures were
laid down.
A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were to be
used to protect PCSO's image and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus
cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of the requests for not being
compliant with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any
qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we should not
make any other pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were compliant
with LOI No. 1282.
COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be approved
only when there was available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution suggests that
there was no longer any budget when GMA approved Uriarte's requests because the
budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed out and used.
The suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds of the PCSO
were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although only 15%
of PCSO's revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the CIF could
be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled with the
operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was
available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.
It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of funds, did
not rule such co-mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the requested additional CIFs
from one account was far from illegal.
Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has led
it to claim that GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and
would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by
virtue of her power of control over PCSO.
The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to
impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The
reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally
unacceptable and incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command
responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations.
The Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo44that command responsibility
pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found application in
civil actions for human rights abuses.
But this case involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it is
legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any
conspiracy between them.
On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as much a member
of the implied conspiracy as GMA was. The Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas
became a part of the implied conspiracy when he signed the disbursement vouchers
despite the absence of certain legal requirements, and issued certain certifications
to the effect that the budgetary allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn
were available; that the expenditures were supported by documents; and that the
previous cash advances had been liquidated or accounted for.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the
disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA's participation, he
could not release any money because there was then no budget available for the
additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount
to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the existence of the
conspiracy to commit plunder was unsustainable. It then becomes unavoidable for
the Court to rule that because the Prosecution failed to properly allege the
elements of the crime, as well as to prove that any implied conspiracy to commit
plunder or any other crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was no
conspiracy to commit plunder among them. As a result, GMA and Aguas could be
criminally responsible only for their own respective actions, if any.
MAIN ISSUE: ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A. No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas
After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for
plunder against the petitioners.
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and
establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance
with members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting
directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest
or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.46
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth valued at not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the
corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced
no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter,
had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was
also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing
even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either
GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and decisive aspect of the
criminal prosecution was explicitly noted in the concurring and partial dissenting
opinion of Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of the
crime of plunder as no evidence was presented that any of the accused,
accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the principal
witness of the prosecution when asked, said that she does not know the
existence or whereabouts of the alleged ill-gotten wealth, to wit:
Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-gotten wealth are (sic) now?
A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether they saved it, squandered it
or what? We don't know, Your Honor.47 [bold emphasis supplied]
After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any
knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of the criminal prosecution for
plunder. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA
and Aguas, and dismissed the criminal action against them.

B. The Prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury
SANDIGANBAYAN’s RULING: In this case, to require proof that monies went to a
plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire real or personal properties or used
for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a
plunderer had already amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of
government funds and just decide to keep it in his vault and never used such funds
for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right
after such amassing, the monies went up in flames or recovered by the police,
negating any opportunity for the purpose to actually benefit, would that not still be
plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument
that the fact of personal benefit should still be evidence-based must fail.48
The Sandiganbayan contended that in order to prove the predicate act of raids of
the public treasury, the Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had
benefited from such act; and that what was necessary was proving that the public
officer had raided the public coffers.
We do not share the Sandiganbayan' s contention.
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080,
which provides:
Section I .Definition of Terms. - x x x
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is
to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or
malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of
statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a
particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which
the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase
in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its
meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter. 49
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were
one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own
benefit;50 misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly,
unforeseeably, or not as intended;"51 and malversation occurs when "any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially."52 The common thread that binds all
the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken.
Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other
terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public
treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and
gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to
the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use
the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as
a requirement for plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan
quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada, viz.:
Senator Emile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person
who conspired or knowingly benefited". One does not have to conspire or
rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly benefited".
Senator Emile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with
the plunderer to plunder the country but because she is a dutiful wife or a
faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse.
And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the
Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of plunder simply because
 she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore,
he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken
off."53
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that
what was removed from the coverage of the bill and the final version that
eventually became the law was a person who was not the main plunderer or a co-
conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The
requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-
conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but,
more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same.
Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury
beyond reasonable doubt.
V. Summation
In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that the Sandiganbayan
completely ignored the failure of the information to sufficiently charge conspiracy to
commit plunder against the petitioners; and ignored the lack of evidence establishing
the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in
the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the predicate
crimes. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely abusing its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE
the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan
on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective
demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the
petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of
evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and
MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
November 7, 2017
G.R. No. 224162
JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), Respondent
Crime Charged: Petitioner along with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald John Lim
and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder.
Sandiganbayan: Denied Petition for Bail of Petitioner Napoles.
SC: Affirmed Denial.
It ruled that there are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger
socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling
to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. It is precisely the
enormous gravity of this offense that capital punishment is imposed on those who
are found guilty of Plunder. As a necessary consequence, provisional liberty is not
easily granted to those accused of this offense, especially when the prosecution
more than amply established that the evidence of guilt is strong. This is a matter of
judicial discretion on the part of the trial court, which this Court may nullify only
when the exercise of this discretion is tainted with arbitrariness and capriciousness
that the trial court failed to act within the contemplation of law.
Unfortunately for Napoles, there is nothing in the records showing that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It has discharged its judicial duty in Napoles' bail application in a
manner consistent with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and the evidence
on record. Thus, all things considered, the Court finds no reason to nullify the
assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions. The Petition for Bail of Napoles was correctly
denied.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), regarding its investigation on several persons, including Napoles,
former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) and his former Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica
Lucila Reyes (Reyes). In its report, the NBI recommended to prosecute Napoles,
former Senator Enrile, Reyes, and several other named individuals for the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7080, as
amended, for essentially misappropriating former Senator Enrile's Priority
Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) through non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that were selected without the required bidding procedure.
The Office of the Ombudsman received a Complaint from its Field Investigation Office
(FIO), criminally charging former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Napoles, and fifty-two (52)
other individuals with violations of RA No. 7080 and Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman Special Panel of Investigators found probable
cause to indict Napoles, among others, with one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15)
counts of violating Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. They likewise recommended to
immediately file the necessary Informations against all the named accused.
Thus, in an Information , Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald
John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The information avered that:
In 2004 to 2010, accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA
LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Emile's Office, both public officers,
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspired with JANET
LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, and accumulated
ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php 172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:
a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES
received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE's Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE's endorsement,
directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES'
non-government organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementors (sic) of ENRILE's PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out
to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;
b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions,
authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines.
Napoles filed her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is
insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the
credibility of the State witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistle blowers) as these
are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter alias
acta rule, Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these whistleblowers are
inadmissible against her.
After the conclusion of the prosecution's presentation of evidence, Napoles
manifested that she is not presenting any evidence for her bail application
The petition for bail of Napoles was denied for lack of merit. It ruled that It is true
that none of the prosecution witnesses testified that Senator Enrile directly received
the kickbacks/commissions/rebates from accused Napoles. Based on the DDRs of
Luy, accused Napoles repeatedly gave kickbacks/commissions/rebates to Senator
Emile's middlepersons. Also, prosecution witnesses Suñas and Luy categorically
testified that they were the ones who prepared the documents and money in paying
the kickbacks/commissions/rebates for Senator Enrile. These
kickbacks/commissions/rebates were given by them or by accused Napoles to Ruby
Tuason and other middlepersons for Senator Enrile.
Napoles moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution denying
her Petition for Bail but this was likewise denied.
ISSUE: WON the evidence of gult of Napoles is strong.
RULING:
Yes. Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the
imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua, he cannot be admitted to bail when the
evidence of her guilt is strong. This was the burden that the prosecution assumed in
the subsequent hearings that followed the filing of Napoles' Petition for Bail before
the Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the
jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence of the prosecution and the defense.
At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are limited to the determination
of whether there is a strong presumption of Napoles' guilt. It is merely a preliminary
determination, and the Sandiganbayan may deny admission to bail even when there
is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles. Thus, the prosecution can discharge
its burden by proving that the evidence against Napoles shows evident proof of guilt
or a great presumption of guilt.
As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan
may deny the application for bail on evidence less than that required for the
conviction of Napoles. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan "does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to
the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial
or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted." It should not be
forgotten that the purpose of the bail hearing is to determine whether the accused
is entitled to provisional liberty before conviction. To require more from the
prosecution, as well as from the trial court, effectively defeats the purpose of the
proceeding.
Napoles points out in her petition, however, that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding
strong evidence of her guilt for the crime of Plunder. She challenges the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses, particularly the whistleblowers Luy, Suñas, Sula, and
Baltazar
She further claims that her bail application should have been granted because the
prosecution did not present any documentary evidence directly connecting her to
the NGOs that facilitated the misappropriation of former Senator Enrile's PDAF. In
the same manner, she likewise argues that there was no direct proof of any
agreement with former Senator Enrile and Reyes to obtain kickbacks from the
implementation of former Senator Enrile' s PDAF projects. Napoles particularly
repudiates the evidentiary value of the Summary of Rebates that Luy prepared from
the Daily Disbursement Reports (DD Rs) and Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) that came
into in his possession while he was an employee of Napoles.
The prosecution was able to establish with evident proof that Napoles participated in
the implied conspiracy to misappropriate public funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth.
The charge of Plunder against Napoles in this case alleges a conspiracy among former
Senator Enrile and Reyes, as public officers, and Napoles, Lim, and De Asis, as private
individuals. On this point, this Court has consistently ruled that the conspiracy among
the accused to commit the crime of Plunder is usually an agreement or connivance
to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful act.
Seeing as it would be difficult to provide direct evidence establishing the conspiracy
among the accused, the Sandiganbayan may infer it "from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts
of some complete whole." It was therefore unnecessary for the Sandiganbayan to
find direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, former Senator Enrile and Reyes.
The conspiracy may be implied from the intentional participation in the transaction
that furthers the common design and purpose. As long as the prosecution was able
to prove that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy
may be inferred even if no actual meeting among them was proven.
Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through
various documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the
common goal of misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.
When Commissioner Garcia testified how Napoles and her co-accused committed
Plunder through an elaborate scheme. It began through a letter originating from the
office of former Senator Enrile being sent to the concerned implementing agency,
informing the latter that the office of former Senator Enrile designated Jose Antonio
Evangelista (Evangelista) as its representative in the implementation of the PDAF-
funded project. Evangelista, who was likewise the Deputy Chief of Staff of former
Senator Enrile and acting in representative capacity, then sends another letter to the
implementing agency designating a specific NGO to implement the PDAF-funded
project. Thereafter, the NGO that was endorsed by Evangelista submits a project
proposal to the implementing agency, and proceeds to enter into a memorandum of
agreement (MOA) with the implementing agency and former Senator Enrile as the
parties.
After the signing of the MOA, the project proposal is attached to the Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO), which allows the implementing agency to incur the
expenses that are stated in it. These documents are submitted to the DBM for
processing, and if not lacking in requirements, the DBM issues the Notice of Cash
Allocation (NCA). This authorizes the payment of the allocated amount to the
implementing agency, which is done by way of crediting the same to its account. After
the amount is credited to its account, the implementing agency prepares the DV s
and checks payable to the identified NGO. The NGO, in turn, drafts and submits the
requirements for liquidation (i.e. the accomplishment report, the disbursement
report, and the list of beneficiaries) after receiving the check. However, as it turned
out, the Special Audit Team found that the beneficiaries denied receiving any
proceeds, whether in terms of projects or equipment, from the PDAF of former
Senator Enrile.
Commissioner Garcia and the rest of the Special Audit Team found that the release
of the PDAF to the concerned NGOs through this system violated the following:
 (a) DBM National Budget Circular No. 476 or the guidelines on the release of the
PDAF, which requires national government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations to only implement programs that are within their functions;
(b) Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) Resolution No. 12-2007, which
requires the selection of an NGO through public bidding or negotiated procurement;
and
(c) COA Circular No. 2007- 001 or the guidelines on the grant, utilization, accounting
and auditing of funds released to NGOs.
Remarkably, the respective testimonies of Commissioner Garcia and the supposed
beneficiaries of former Senator Enrile's PDAF were corroborated on material points
by the whistleblowers. These whistleblowers, who were former employees of
Napoles, participated in different capacities to the conspiracy.
Merlina P. Sufias (Suñas), a former employee of Napoles, testified that the
office of Napoles received copies of the SARO from the office of former
Senator Enrile. Upon receipt, Napoles held meetings where they would be
given instructions to prepare an indorsement letter addressed to the
implementing agency, and a project proposal identifying the local
government unit that would benefit from the PDAF-funded project. The
drafts of these documents were sent to Evangelista for review, and
subsequently, the finalized versions were returned to their office. Suñas, as
the custodian of documents involving transactions with legislators, retained
a copy for their file. Suñas also testified that Benhur K. Luy (Luy) prepared
the letters authorizing Evangelista to implement the PDAF-funded projects
on behalf of former Senator Enrile. She likewise participated in the
preparation of the MOA executed among the concerned implementing
agency, former Senator Enrile, and the relevant NGO.
Luy confirmed that Napoles asked them to prepare the documents referred
to in Suñas' testimony. He also substantiated the statement of Suñas that
the office of former Senator Enrile furnished them with copies of the PDAF
requirements after its submission to the DBM.61 Luy was the first to receive
the documents because he had to verify if the entries as to the name of the
NGO and the project cost were correct.
In their separate testimonies, both Suñas and Luy confirmed that former
Senator Enrile received 40% to 50% of the project cost. According to Luy,
they referred to the share of the legislators as rebates, which he recorded
in line with his position as the finance officer of Napoles. Napoles, on the
other hand, took 5% of the project cost as her share. The middlepersons
who received the rebates on behalf of former Senator Enrile, such as
Tuason, were also given 5% of the project cost.
Another former employee of Napoles, Marina Cortez Sula (Sula), narrated
that Napoles gave her instructions to register approximately twenty (20)
NGOs, including those that implemented the ghost projects funded by
former Senator Enrile's PDAf; The relevant information regarding these
NGOs were listed in a red notebook that Sula kept to assist her in the
preparation of the General Information Sheets that were regularly
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This notebook
was presented to the Sandiganbayan during the bail hearing.70Sula also
stated that the NGOs were created at the instance of Napoles. According to
Sula, Napoles asked her and the other employees to come up with the
names of these NGOs. Upon Napoles' approval of the name, Sula reserved
its use at the SEC. Sula also purchased forms for the articles of incorporation
and by-laws of the NGOs, which she completed under the direction of
Napoles. Napoles then provided the amount necessary for the initial deposit
to open a bank account in the name of the NGO. The bank accounts were
opened at either Metrobank or Landbank because the branch managers
were already familiar with Napoles, making it easy for Sula to facilitate the
process. Thereafter, Sula registered the NGOs with the SEC.71Sula noted that
Napoles selected the incorporators and officers of the NGOs. The
incorporators and officers were usually employees of Napoles, or the
relatives of these employees. Sula testified that those chosen as presidents
of the NGO were aware that their names were used because they were
made to sign the incorporation documents. In cases where the president
was not an employee of Napoles, the employee who provided the name of
the NGO president was made to sign in their stead. Sula likewise admitted
to forging the signatures of the incorporators, or using the incorporators'
names without their knowledge.73
Suñas and Luy corroborated the testimony of Sula on the fictitious manner
by which the NGOs were incorporated. The three of them were all
presidents of different NGOs, and they provided the names of their relatives
as its officers and incorporators. In exchange for agreeing to become
presidents of the NGOs, both Sufi.as and Sula testified that Napoles
promised to provide them 1% of the project cost as their commission.
Similar to Suñas and Sula, Mary Arlene Joyce Baltazar (Baltazar), testified
that Napoles likewise promised to give her a commission in exchange for
using her name as the president of an NGO. As the former bookkeeper of
Napoles, Baltazar further confirmed that Napoles used the names of her
employees, and that of their friends and relatives to make them appear as
incorporators or officers of the concerned NGOs. Once they became
president of an NGO, Napoles instructed them to become voluntary
members of the Social Security System (SSS) and Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PhilHealth), because Napoles needed to terminate their
employment. Baltazar stated that this was purposely done in order to avoid
any connection between Napoles and the NGOs.
As to the manner by which Napoles obtained the amount allocated for the
PDAF-funded projects, Sula narrated that this was equally done through the
employees of Napoles. Whenever the DBM disbursed the allocated amount
to the implementing agency, a check was issued to the Napoles-controlled
NGO. Since Sula and the other employees were designated as presidents of
these NGOs, they were authorized to receive the check for the PDAF-funded
project from the implementing agency.
With respect to the actual delivery of the PDAF-funded projects to its
intended beneficiaries, Sula, Luy, Suñas, and Baltazar admitted that they
fabricated the liquidation documents. This was done by forging the receipts
and the signatures of the beneficiaries, making it appear that the project
was indeed implemented.81 Again, this supported the findings of the COA
Special Audit Team82 and the FIO83 on the fictitious projects funded by the
PDAF of former Senator Enrile.
It is plain from the foregoing that Napoles and her co-accused, as well as the
former employees of Napoles who were eventually admitted as State
witnesses, had a common design and objective-to divert the PDAF of former
Senator Enrile from its lawful purpose and to their own personal accounts.
The individuals involved in this case performed different criminal acts, which
contributed, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation, and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with the doctrine on implied
conspiracy, these actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are
sufficient to prove the existence of a "concurrence in sentiment," regardless
of any proof that an actual agreement took place.
Arguably, there is no documentary evidence directly linking Napoles to the
NGOs used as conduits for the PDAF-funded projects of former Senator
Enrile. However, her ties to the officers of the NGOs involved in this case
reveal otherwise. Napoles' participation in the conspiracy was established
through testimonial evidence, not only from one of her former employees,
but from four (4) witnesses-all of whom corroborate each other on material
points. More importantly, they testified on the minute details of the scheme
that only those privy to the conspiracy would be able to provide. Notably,
Napoles did not even refute their claims that they were her former
employees, relying instead on singling out inconsequential details in their
testimonies.
Even the testimony of Ruby Chan Tuason, the middleperson who received
the rebates of former Senator Enrile on his behalf, confirmed that Napoles
oversaw the implementation of the scheme to divert the disbursements of
the PDAF. She personally met with Napoles to negotiate the respective
shares of the conspirators, and received the amount on behalf of former
Senator Enrile, which she subsequently turned over to Reyes.
Since the whistleblowers personally received instructions from Napoles to
incorporate the NGOs, prepare the requirements for the release of the PDAF, prepare
and deliver the rebates to the middlepersons, and fabricate the liquidation
documents, they were competent witnesses on the subject of their respective
testimonies. Clearly, the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence
supply interlocking pieces of information that when taken together, provide a
complete picture of the indispensability of the participation of Napoles in the scheme
to misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select individuals, by using the NGOs
as conduits for the PDAF projects of former Senator Enrile. The directions and
instructions she gave to her former employees constitute a clear evidence of her
active participation, not mere acquiescence or presence, in the conspiracy.
The core issue, therefore, of whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of
Napoles, was resolved by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with the relevant laws,
rules, and jurisprudence.
Plunder is a deplorable crime that unfairly exploits the trust that the public reposed
in its officials. It is inherently immoral not only because it involves the corruption of
public funds, but also because its essence proceeds from a rapacious intent.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a
malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring
Opinion
xxxx
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be
deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993
to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659.
Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by
their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the
victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen
in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured,
or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and
drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for
more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim
or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and can1apping
where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or
raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly
heinous by their very nature.
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage
to society.92 (Emphasis in the original)
It is precisely the enormous gravity of this offense that capital punishment is imposed
on those who are found guilty of Plunder. As a necessary consequence, provisional
liberty is not easily granted to those accused of this offense, especially when the
prosecution more than amply established that the evidence of guilt is strong. This is
a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the trial court, which this Court may
nullify only when the exercise of this discretion is tainted with arbitrariness and
capriciousness that the trial court failed to act within the contemplation of law.
Unfortunately for Napoles, there is nothing in the records showing that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It has discharged its judicial duty in Napoles' bail application in a manner
consistent with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and the evidence on record.
Thus, all things considered, the Court finds no reason to nullify the assailed
Sandiganbayan Resolutions. The Petition for Bail of Napoles was correctly denied.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance
and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger
socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be
struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over.
Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
G.R. No.166680 July 7, 2014 DEL CASTILLO, J.
offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Article 218 of RPC
SB: Acquitted for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019; Convicted under Article 218
RPC
SC: Affirmed Conviction under Article 218
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioner, as municipal Mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao received cash
advance of P101,736.00 intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage
of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality. Such amount was not
settled or liquidated with the Provincial Liquidator.
SC held that petitioner is guilty under Article 218 of RPC. Petitioner
received the subject cash advance sometime in 1994, he was, thus, required to
liquidate the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid liability under
Article 218, he should have liquidated the cash advance within two months from the
time it was due, or on or before March 20, 1995. In the case at bar, petitioner
liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as correctly found
by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of Article 218 because it
took him over six years before settling his accounts.
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L.
Paguirigan examined the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso
Lista, Ifugao. She came across a disbursement voucher for ₱101,736.00 prepared for
petitioner, a former mayor of the municipality, as cash advance for the payment of
freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated
to the municipality. The amount was covered by Land Bank Check dated August 29,
1994 wherein the payee is petitioner. Her further investigation of the accounting
records revealed that no payment intended for the charge was made to Royal Cargo
Agencies for the month of August 1994. Thus, she issued a certification to this effect
on November 29, 2001. She likewise claimed that she prepared two letters to inform
the petitioner of his unliquidated cash advance but the same were not sent to him
because she could not get his exact address despite efforts exerted. She averred that
on June 4, 2001, petitioner paid the subject cash advance before the treasurer of the
municipality, for which reason, incumbent Mayor Glenn D. Prudenciano executed an
Affidavit of Desistance.
Petitioner admitted having obtained the cash advance of ₱101,736.00
during his incumbency as municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. This amount was
intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of
motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of Manila. However,
instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He
claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced
since the vehicles were already turned over to the municipality. He alleged that he
was neither informed nor did he receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash
advances. It was only in 2001 while he was claiming for separation pay when he came
to know that he still has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not to prolong the
issue, he paid the amount of ₱101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer.
Sandiganbayan:
The Sandiganbayan rendered a consolidated Decision disposing thusly:
1. In Criminal Case No. 26527, accused ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG is hereby
ACQUITTED. No civil liability shall be imposed there being no basis for its award. The
cash bondposted for his provisional liberty is ordered returned to him, subject to the
usual accounting and auditing procedure; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 26528, accused ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG is hereby
CONVICTED of the felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner under
Article 218 of RPC.
RULING:
NO.
The acquittal of petitioner in the anti- graft case is not a bar to his conviction
for failure to render an account in the present case.Petitioner stakes the present
Petition on the assertion that since the cases for which he was indicted involve the
same subject cash advance in the amount of ₱101,736.00, his exoneration in the anti-
graft case should likewise exculpate him from further liability in the present case. We
are not persuaded.
It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident.
"However, we have consistently held that the same act may give rise to two or more
separate and distinct charges." Further, because there is a variance between the
elements of the two offenses charged, petitioner cannot safely assume that his
innocence in one case will extend to the other case even if both cases hinge on the
same set of evidence.
To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e)of RA 3019, the following
elements must be present:
 (1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former;
(2) That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government
or a private party;
(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated
therefrom;
(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA
or to a provincial auditor; and,
(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account
should be rendered.
The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses
necessarily imply that the requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the
accused would certainly differ in each case. Hence, petitioner’s acquittal in the anti-
graft case provides no refuge for him in the present case given the differences
between the elements of the two offenses.
Prior demand to liquidate is not a requisite for conviction under Article 218
of the Revised Penal Code. The central aspect of petitioner’s next argument is that he
was not reminded of his unliquidated cash advances. The question has been settled
in Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan where we ruled that prior demand to liquidate is not
necessary to hold an accountable officer liable for violation of Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code: Citing United States v. Saberon, petitioner contends that Article
218 punishes the refusal of a public employee to render an account of funds in his
charge when duly required by a competent officer. He argues that he cannot be
convicted of the crime unless the prosecution has proven that there was a demand
for him to render an account. Petitioner asserts that COA Circular No. 90-331
provides that the public officer shall be criminally liable for failure to settle his
accounts after demand had been made. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the case
had become moot and academic since he already submitted his liquidation report.
Petitioner’s reliance on Saberon is misplaced. As correctly pointed out by
the OSP, Saberon involved a violation of Act No. 1740 whereas the present case
involves a violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 218 merely
provides that the public officer be required by law and regulation to render account.
Statutory construction tells us that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and
provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed
repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise.
Petitioner is liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 5 of COA Circular No. 90-331, the circular in force at the time petitioner
availed of the subject cash advance, pertinently provides:
5. LIQUIDATION OFCASH ADVANCES
5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:
5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20
days after the end of the year; subject to replenishment during the year.
Since petitioner received the subject cash advance sometime in 1994, he
was, thus, required to liquidate the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to
avoid liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated the cash advance within
two months from the time it was due, or on or before March 20, 1995. In the case at
bar, petitioner liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as
correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of Article
218 because it took him over six years before settling his accounts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the Sandiganbayanin
Criminal Case No. 26528 dated September 10, 2004 convicting petitioner of the
felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMEDwith the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. Petitioner is
sentenced to a straight penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, and 2.
The imposition of finein the amount of ₱1,000.00 is deleted. SO ORDERED
LUCIO DULPO, petitioner, vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
YAP, J.:
CRIME CHARGED: ILLEGAL ASPORTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY ORDERS
NOTE: (not sure kasi description lang nakalagay below. Nagbase ako sa SB ruling since
hindi yan yung chinarge daw kundi Art. 226)
SANDIGANBAYAN: found him guilty of the crime of infidelity in the custody of
documents under Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code for the loss of the two
airmail letters.
SC: HE IS GUILTY OF ART. 226. The fact that the two letters in question were
entrusted to, and received by, the accused letter-carrier, Lucio Dulpo, for delivery to
the addressee is admitted by him. It is also a fact admitted by him that those letters
were never delivered to the addressee.
The accused claimed, in his defense, that he recorded in a logbook which he kept for
the purpose the fact that he returned the letters to the sender. However, he could
not produce said logbook, saying that they were kept in the post office. The
incumbent postmaster of Bacoor Post Office, who was subpoenaed at the request of
the accused to bring the logbook in question to the court at the hearing on the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, brought only two logbooks, one bearing the
date October 18, 1982, and the other with the date June 23, 1983, and stated to the
court that these were the only books of the accused which he found in the post office
and that he could not find any logbook of the accused for the year 1985.
FACTS: Petitioner Lucio Dulpo was an employee of the Post Office at Bacoor, Cavite,
holding a temporary appointment. Upon the complaint of Mrs. Lorna Lacorte
(formerly Mrs. Lorna Abelon) of Zapote, Bacoor, the accused letter-carrier was
charged on July 10, 1985 before the Sandiganbayan in two separate informations for
having feloniously taken and carried away two airmail letters allegedly containing
international money orders for $150 and $100 received at the Bacoor Post Office
on January 8 and January 21, 1985, respectively, and entrusted to him for delivery to
the addressee.
After trial, the respondent Sandiganbayan, while absolving Dulpo as to the alleged
asportation of the international money orders on the ground that it was not
sufficiently proven that the letters contained said money orders, found him guilty of
the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents under Article 226 of the Revised
Penal Code for the loss of the two airmail letters.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration, both of which were denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence
the petition.
Two assignments of error were raised by petitioner, namely: (1) the Sandiganbayan
erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of infidelity in the
custody of documents; and (2) it erred in imposing too severe a penalty considering
that what were involved were ordinary airmail letters.
ISSUE: WON PETITIONER CAN BE HELD GUILTY OF INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF
DOCUMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 226. (YES)
RULING: YES.
The first assignment of error alleged by petitioner is devoid of merit. The finding of
the Sandiganbayan as to the guilt of petitioner is amply supported by the evidence.
The fact that the two letters in question were entrusted to, and received by, the
accused letter-carrier, Lucio Dulpo, for delivery to the addressee is admitted by
him. It is also a fact admitted by him that those letters were never delivered to the
addressee.
Dulpo's defense is that he could not deliver the letters because the addressee was
unknown at the given address, hence, in accordance with standard procedure, he
returned the said letter to the sender by putting them in the dispatch box in the post
office. However, the burden of proof to establish such defense lies on the accused.
He cannot rely simply on the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed, since there was evidence presented by the prosecution which negated
such presumption.
The complainant testified that upon verification from her son, she learned that the
letters were not returned to, and received by, him. In fact, it was shown that the
money orders which were intended for the complainant apparently went to
someone else as they were encashed by a certain Adela Bonavie, and someone had
apparently signed complainant's name on the money order, putting her address as
1221 P. Sevilla Street, Caloocan City. The accused claimed, in his defense, that he
recorded in a logbook which he kept for the purpose the fact that he returned the
letters to the sender. However, he could not produce said logbook, saying that they
were kept in the post office. The incumbent postmaster of Bacoor Post Office, who
was subpoenaed at the request of the accused to bring the logbook in question to
the court at the hearing on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, brought
only two logbooks, one bearing the date October 18, 1982, and the other with the
date June 23, 1983, and stated to the court that these were the only books of the
accused which he found in the post office and that he could not find any logbook
of the accused for the year 1985.
WHEREFORE, with the modification above-mentioned, i. e. reducing the penalty of
imprisonment imposed upon the petitioner Lucio Dulpo, the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan is affirmed in other respects. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 192698-99, April 22, 2015
RAYMUNDO E. ZAPANTA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Crime Charged: Zapanta and Atty. Gadia were charged with the crime of Infidelity in
the Custody of Documents under Article 226 of the RPC for causing the removal and
disappearance of TCT No. 256662, which public document is under their custody and
officially entrusted to them, thereby causing damage to the mortgagee of TCT No.
256662 and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for deleting the encumbrance
annotated in TCT No-25662.
Sandiganbayan: Convicted Petitioners as charged.
SC: Affirmed conviction of Atty. Gadia but acquitted Zapanta.
It ruled that not a scintilla of proof was adduced to show with absolute certainty that
Zapanta was the one who actually withdrew the original copy of TCT No. T-256662
from the vault of the RD. It must be emphasized, however, that what he did here was
the very function he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. Also,
once the title was released from his custody, his responsibility ceased and it then
devolved upon the recipient to keep the document until the transaction was finished.
Hence, Zapanta could not be faulted if after the subject title was released to the
requestor, it was subsequently utilized in the furtherance of an illegal and fraudulent
design as he had no control or participation over the registration process or in the
issuance of TCT No. T-285369.
FACTS:
Dr. Ang was a physician who was also engaged in a lending and investment business
using the business name Cebu Sterling Lending Investors, Inc. (CSLII). A certain Erlinda
Galvez-Sultan applied for a loan in the amount of P500,000.00 and offered to
mortgage a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-256662 in the
names of Zenaida Galvez-Lamparero, et al, to secure the said loan. TCT No. T-256662
was registered at the Registry of Deeds of Davao City (RD) and was duly signed by
Atty. Gadia, the Register of Deeds.
Dr. Ang agreed to extend the loan and caused the annotation of the real estate
mortgage in favor of CSLII at the back of TCT No. T-256662 in the office of the RD.
Later, Dr. Ang was informed that the mortgaged property had been the subject of a
sale transaction and that TCT No. T-256662 was already cancelled and that two new
derivative titles were issued bearing the same technical description as that of TCT No.
T-256662.
To check the veracity of the report, Dr. Ang made a formal request to the RD for the
issuance of a certified true copy of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 which was
in the custody of the said office. Zapanta told Dr. Ang that the original copy of TCT
No. T-256662 could not be located in the particular volume where it was filed in the
vault of the RD.
Suspecting an irregularity, Dr. Ang filed a complaint before the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and requested for an investigation. Results of
the investigation confirmed that the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 was missing
from the vault of the RD. Dr. Ang then filed a complaint against Atty. Gadia and
Zapanta before the Office of the Ombudsman.
After investigation, it was reported that TCT No. T-285369, the derivative title of TCT
No. T-256662, bore all the signatures of Atty. Gadia on all its pages and that it was
registered in the name of First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc. (FOPVI) whose
president was former Congresswoman and Governor, Atty. Corazon N. Malanyaon
(Atty. Malanyaon).
Atty. Cruzabra, the Acting Register of Deeds of Davao City, testified that while both
criminal cases were awaiting trial, she conducted an investigation regarding the
missing title. She the vault keeper, Zapanta, and the records officer, who were tasked
with the safekeeping of the documents in the office, to look for the missing title but
she was told that the same was nowhere to be found inside the vault.
In her letter-report, Atty. Cruzabra stated that the missing TCT No. T-256662 was
found in the "pending transactions" steel cabinet located outside the vault but within
the premises of the office of the RD. She observed that the original copy of TCT No.
T-256662 did not bear any signs of cancellation. She added that another certificate
of title, TCT No. T-285369, which was also signed by Atty. Gadia, was also found
within the "pending transaction" files together with TCT No. T-256662.
It was opined that TCT No. T-285369 (issued on May 28, 1997) was spurious and was
without any legal basis because:
1] TCT No. T-256662 had never been cancelled;
2] the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between the original owners, Zenaida Galvez-
Lamparero, et al., and FOPVI (subject deed of sale), which could have been the basis
for cancellation of TCT No. T-256662, was not registered and annotated at the back
of the latter title; and
3] the encumbrance in favor of CSLII was not carried over to TCT No. T-285369.
In her defense, Atty. Gadia countered that she was no longer the Register of Deeds
of Davao City on August 24, 2000, when Dr. Ang requested for a certified true copy
of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662. She admitted that, as the Register of Deeds,
she signed TCT No. T-256662 as well as the encumbrances annotated at the back
page. She also admitted that she signed the derivative title TCT No. T-285369 on May
28, 1997, which bore the following certification: "This certificate is a transfer from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-256662 which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far
as the above described land is concerned." She claimed that she had nothing to do
with the removal and disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662.
Atty. Gadia further averred that the subject deed of sale was not registered because
there were some requirements that had not been submitted, particularly the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-256662. She admitted to have written the following
notation on the routing slip attached to the subject deed of sale: "Pls. don't deliver
the title unless requirements are complied." She would usually write such cautionary
notice because it always took some time before the registering parties could
complete the submission of the required documents. Atty. Gadia explained that there
were occasions when she had to leave her station for some meetings in Manila or to
report to Region XI where she was the Regional Register of Deeds, and so as not to
prejudice the public for want of signature, she would usually sign the title but
cautioned the examiner not to release or deliver the title until all the requirements
were completed. According to her, TCT No. T-285369 should not have been delivered
because certain requirements were still lacking. She asserted that transactions,
which were not completed or transactions in which the requirements were not
complied with, were filed in the "pending transaction" cabinets. She denied
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of TCT No. T-285369
despite her signature on it.
Zapanta, on the other hand, proffered the defense of denial. He alleged that he was
the vault keeper of the RD, whose duty was to safeguard the archives and the original
copies of certificates of title. He claimed that the original copy of a title could be
pulled out from the vault upon the written request of the examiner or records officer,
indicating the title and volume numbers. The said officer would then take custody of
the same until the transaction would be finished. He stated that Atty. Gadia, being
the Register of Deeds, could also order the pull out of the documents from the vault.
He denied participation in the removal and disappearance of the original copy of
TCT No. T-256662 from the vault. He insisted that he did not participate in the
processing of TCT No. T-285369. He pointed out that aside from him, three utility
workers were allowed by his office to pull out titles from the vault. His only link to
the missing title incident was that he was the one who helped Jimboy Ibafiez, the
person approached by Dr. Ang, to look for the missing title. He assured Dr. Ang that
he would continue to look for it. He denied that he conspired with Atty. Gadia in the
commission of the crimes charged.
The Sandiganbayan found Atty. Gadia and Zapanta guilty as charged. It found
sufficient evidence inculpating Atty. Gadia and Zapanta for conspiring and
confederating with one another in the anomalous registration and issuance of TCT
No. T-285369 in favor of FOPVI, which resulted in undue injury to private complainant
Dr. Ang in the sum of P500,000.00. Also, it held that Atty. Gadia and Zapanta
conspired with each other in causing the removal and disappearance of the original
copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault of the RD, which was then under their official
custody, to the damage and prejudice of the mortgagee, Dr. Ang.
ISSUE:
WON Atty Gadia and Zapanta are both guilty of Infidelity in the Custody of
Document. (NO)
RULING:
Zapanta should be acquitted.
Anent the charge of Infidelity in the Custody of Document, the Sandiganbayan held
that Atty. Gadia, who was entrusted with the safekeeping of TCT No. T-256662,
caused the removal of its original copy from the vault of the RD and, thereafter,
concealed the same to facilitate the issuance of TCT No. T-285369. This caused
damage to Dr. Ang and eroded public trust and confidence in the Register of Deeds.
Citing the case of Kataniag v. People, the Sandiganbayan wrote that damage under
Art. 226 of the RPC may also consist in mere alarm to the public or in the alienation
of its confidence in any government agency. The Sandiganbayan added that Atty.
Gadia's act of concealing TCT No. T-256662 constituted a breach of trust in the official
care of the said certificate of title.
Regarding the guilty verdict against Zapanta, the vault keeper, the Sandiganbayan
explained that the series of acts of Atty. Gadia would not have been completed or
their criminal purpose would not have been achieved were it not for the
disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault which was
amply covered by the active participation of the said petitioner. It added that those
series of acts smacked of conspiracy which showed their common design to achieve
one common goal to the damage and prejudice of Dr. Ang.
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusions
of the Sandiganbayan with respect to the criminal culpability of Zapanta.
In People v. Bautista the Court had the occasion to elaborately discuss the concept
of conspiracy, to wit:
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern
prosecutor's nursery." There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree
to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of
incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven
by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features
of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common
purpose and design. Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in
Regina v. Murphy, conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.
To reiterate, in order to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity. Conspiracy can be inferred from, and
established by, the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to
a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.
What is determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated
by one and the same purpose.28 There must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. Conspiracy must, like the crime itself, be proven beyond
reasonable doubt for it is a facile device by which an accused may be
ensnared and kept within the penal fold. Suppositions based on mere
presumptions and not on solid facts do not constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the case at bench, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Zapanta conspired with Atty. Gadia in committing the crimes
charged. No testimonial or documentary evidence was presented to substantiate
Zapanta's direct or indirect participation in the anomalous registration of TCT No. T-
285369, and in the concealment/disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-
256662.
Not a scintilla of proof was adduced to show with absolute certainty that Zapanta
was the one who actually withdrew the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the
vault of the RD. It was testified that there were several vault keepers in the RD31 and
they were all authorized to pull out titles from the vault at the instance of the
examiner or the records officer. At best, the prosecution witnesses only identified
Zapanta as a vault keeper of the RD but not necessarily the vault keeper who pulled
out the subject title. Prosecution witnesses neither testified that he was present
during the withdrawal of the subject title from the vault nor mentioned or referred
to Zapanta in any manner to show his probable complicity or involvement in the
crimes charged. Further, there is no showing that Zapanta was instrumental or that
he ever participated in the registration process of the spurious derivative title or had
foreknowledge of any irregularity therein or of its fraudulent nature.
Granting, in gratia argumenti, that it was Zapanta who took the original copy of TCT
No. T-256662 from the vault, this alone would not suffice to prove the conspiracy
theory advanced by the prosecution. Plainly, the accusation against Zapanta rests
upon his alleged act of pulling out the subject title from the vault which the
Sandiganbayan considered as necessary for Atty. Gadia to attain her criminal design
of entering TCT No. T-285369 in the Registry Book of the RD in the name of FOPVI
and concealing the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 to prevent the discovery of the
aberrant registration of the said derivative title. The only deduction extant from the
prosecution evidence is that, being then the vault keeper, Zapanta had the duty to
safeguard the documents kept inside the vault and to withdraw any title therefrom
upon the request of any proper officer of the RD.
It must be emphasized, however, that what he did here was the very function he had
to discharge in the performance of his official duties. Also, once the title was released
from his custody, his responsibility ceased and it then devolved upon the recipient to
keep the document until the transaction was finished. Hence, Zapanta could not be
faulted if after the subject title was released to the requestor, it was subsequently
utilized in the furtherance of an illegal and fraudulent design as he had no control or
participation over the registration process or in the issuance of TCT No. T-285369.
Verily, it is also too sweeping to conclude the existence of conspiracy against Zapanta
from the evidence on record. Besides, a public officer is presumed to have acted in
good faith in the performance of his duties. Well-settled is the rule that good faith is
always presumed and the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every
person, inter alia, to observe good faith which springs from the fountain of good
conscience. The burden is on the prosecution to prove bad faith on the part of
Zapanta or that he was impelled by malice or some evil motive but the prosecution
failed to do that. To repeat, it is sheer speculation to perceive and ascribe corrupt
intent and conspiracy of wrongdoing for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
and Violation of Article 226 of the RFC, solely from the mere pulling out of a title from
the vault of the RD because Zapanta was just performing one of his duties as a vault
keeper.
The Sandiganbayan believed that Zapanta took part in the conspiracy to commit the
offenses charged because of the following circumstances:
1] Zapanta was then the vault keeper and as such had access to the certificates of
title kept therein;
2] It was the official duty of Zapanta to pull out a title from the vault upon request of
authorized and proper officers of the RD;
3] Dr. Ang was informed by Zapanta that the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 could
not be found in the particular volume where it was supposed to have been filed inside
the vault and that he promised to look for the missing title; and
4] Zapanta confirmed during the preliminary hearing at the PAOCTF-Davao Satellite
Office that the subject title was indeed missing.
The pieces of circumstantial evidence are not sufficient to convict Zapanta of the
crimes charged. When the four circumstances are examined with the other evidence
on record, it becomes clearer that these circumstances do not lead to a logical
conclusion that Zapanta lent support to the alleged conspiracy. Moreover, there is
no proof that he allowed an outsider inside the vault or that he knew of the
unauthorized withdrawal of the subject title and consented to it. There is nothing to
indicate that he was simply negligent in securing the safety of the subject certificate
of title under his custody. If Zapanta were negligent, this would be incompatible with
conspiracy because negligence denotes the absence of intent while conspiracy
involves a meeting of the minds to commit a crime.
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan had no basis to convict Zapanta because the prosecution
failed to produce the evidence necessary to overturn the presumption of innocence.
Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered to indicate that he
had taken part in the alleged conspiracy to commit the crimes charged. Otherwise, a
careless use of the conspiracy theory could send to jail even innocent persons who
may have only been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds really responsible
for those irregularities.
The evidence adduced must be closely examined under the lens of the judicial
microscope and that conviction flows only from moral certainty that guilt had been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bench, that quantum
of proof has not been satisfied. Hence, the Court must reckon with a dictum of the
law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused.

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE, REPRESENTED BY ITS
FOUNDING PARTNER, FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, PETITIONER, vs. ATTY. JOSEJINA C.
FRIA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 183014 August 7, 2013 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
CRIME CHARGED: Open Disobedience under Article 231 RPC
MTC: Dismissed for lack of probable cause
RTC: Affirmed Dismissal
SC: Affirmed Dismissal
EMERGENCY RECIT:
The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in a Civil Case
instituted before Branch 203. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff (July
29, 2005 judgment), prompting the defendant in the same case to appeal. Due to the
denial of the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the July 29, 2005 judgment
became final and executory. The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it
had been following up on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July
29, 2005 judgment. However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her
ministerial duty of issuing said writ.
The SC ruled that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause. The dismissal ought to be
sustained since the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral
elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the
offender is a judicial or executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Fria’s position as
Branch Clerk of Court, the second and third elements of the crime evidently remain
wanting. To elucidate, the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that
there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope
of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that
all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due
to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. This fact has been finally settled
in Reyes. The third element of the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal
justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment, decision, or order, which
he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without any jurisdiction,
there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or, conversely, disobey.
FACTS:
On July 31, 2006, an Information was filed against respondent Atty. Josejina
C. Fria (Atty. Fria), Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 203 charging her for the crime of Open Disobedience under Article 231of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in a Civil Case
instituted before Branch 203. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff (July
29, 2005 judgment), prompting the defendant in the same case to appeal. However,
Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered that a writ of execution
be issued to enforce the foregoing judgment. Due to the denial of the defendant’s
motion for reconsideration, the July 29, 2005 judgment became final and executory.
The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had been following up
on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment.
However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing
said writ. In her Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of execution
(draft writ) was not addressed to her but to Branch Sheriff Jaime Felicen (Felicen),
who was then on leave. Neither did she know who the presiding judge would appoint
as special sheriff on Felicen’s behalf. Nevertheless, she maintained that she need not
sign the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge issued an Order stating
that he himself shall sign and issue the same.
The prosecutor then issued a Memorandum recommending, that Atty. Fria
be indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience. Atty. Fria filed a Motion for
Determination of Probable Cause (motion) which The Law Firm opposed on the
ground that the Rules on Criminal Procedure do not empower trial courts to review
the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause and that such rules only give the trial court
judge the duty to determine whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused.
Pending resolution of her motion, Atty. Fria filed a Manifestation with
Motion17 dated November 17, 2006, stating that the Court had rendered a Decision
in the case of Reyes v. Balde II (Reyes)– an offshoot of Civil Case No. 03-110 – wherein
it was held that Branch 203 had no jurisdiction over the foregoing civil case. The Law
Firm filed its Comment/Opposition, contending that Atty. Fria already committed the
crime of Open Disobedience 119 days before the Reyes ruling was rendered.
MTC:
The MTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of
probable cause. It found that aside from the fact that Atty. Fria is a judicial officer,
The Law Firm failed to prove the existence of the other elements of the crime of Open
Disobedience. In particular, the second element of the crime, i.e., that there is a
judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its
jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities, unlikely existed since the Court
already declared as null and void the entire proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 due
to lack of jurisdiction.
RTC:
The RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the latter’s part since its dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable
cause was "in full accord with the law, facts, and jurisprudence."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in sustaining the MTC’s dismissal of the case
for Open Disobedience against Atty. Fria, i.e., Criminal Case No. 46400, for lack of
probable cause.
RULING:
NO.
Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court
judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause, viz:
Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
– Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence
of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It must, however, be observed that the judge’s power to immediately
dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is
clear. In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s authority, it must
be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when
the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the
contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime
charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the
judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial.
In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the
presentation of additional evidence.
Applying these principles to the case at bar would lead to the conclusion
that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No.
46400 for lack of probable cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since the
records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the
crime of Open Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a
judicial or executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Fria’s position as Branch Clerk of
Court, the second and third elements of the crime evidently remain wanting.
To elucidate, the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that
there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope
of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that
all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due
to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. This fact has been finally settled
in Reyes. Hence, since it is explicitly required that the subject issuance be made
within the scope of a superior authority’s jurisdiction, it cannot therefore be doubted
that the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience does not exist. In this
light, it cannot be argued that Atty. Fria had already committed the crime based on
the premise that the Court’s pronouncement as to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction
came only after the fact. Verily, Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction was not merely a
product of the Court’s pronouncement in Reyes. The said fact is traced to the very
inception of the proceedings and as such, cannot be accorded temporal legal
existence in order to indict Atty. Fria for the crime she stands to be prosecuted.
Proceeding from this discussion, the third element of the crime, i.e., that the
offender, without any legal justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment,
decision, or order, which he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably,
without any jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or,
conversely, disobey. Besides, as the MTC correctly observed, there lies ample legal
justifications that prevented Atty. Fria from immediately issuing a writ of execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated January 8, 2008 and Order
dated May 16, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in
S.C.A. Case No. 07-096 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.