​1. What are the rights of the accused in a criminal proceeding?

Sec. 1 Rule 115 of the Rules of Court provide – In all criminal prosecutions, then accused shall
be entitled to the following rights:
● To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
● To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
● To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused
may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth
in his bail, unless his presence is specially ordered by the court for purposes of
identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat.
When an accused under custody escape, he shall be deemed to have waived his
right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained.
Upon motion, the accused may be able to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel.
● To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on
matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner preju-
dice him.
● To be exempt from being compelled to be a wit- ness against himself.
● To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party
may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out
of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philip- pines, unavailable, or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party
having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
● To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of other evidence in his behalf.
● To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
● To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.

2. Does presumption of innocence admit exemptions?

No. The presumption of innocence admits no exemptions. It is a constitutional right and the
accused is presumed innocent all throughout the trial. The presumption only ends when there is
final conviction. In cases of reverse trial, it is only the burden of proof that shifts. Prosecution
still has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction still rests
upon the evidence introduced by the prosecution.

Although, there exists a Presumption of guilt provided by law or Rules of Court.

Examples:

● Sec. 3(j) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provides, “a person found in possession
of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole
 act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him or her..”
● An answer to the question may be gleaned from a case decided several years ago. In that
case, the petitioners were convicted of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnox-
ious or poisonous substance penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the
Fisheries Decree of 1975. They challenge the provision of P.D. No. 704 which provides:

“The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing

combustible elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or
device for electric fishing in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman
shall constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of
this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use
of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a
presumption that the owner, operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity."

Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree violates the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. Citing previous
pronouncements, the Court held that the validity of laws establishing presumptions in
criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded that the legislature has the
power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt
of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid
any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not be
arbitrary and unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on facts and these
facts must be part of the crime when committed.

The challenged provision of P.D. No. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts
proved and hence, is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of
obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish
caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or
electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner
and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching
fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the
fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from
the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the
fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact
proved.

The Court however, stressed that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. It
cannot, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude
the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed. At no instance
can the accused be denied the right to rebut the presumption (Hizon v. Court of Appeals,
265 SCRA 517).

● In cases of SELF-DEFENSE, the person who invokes the self-defense is presumed guilty.
The burden of proving the elements of self-defense is incumbent upon the accused.

3. When does right to counsel arise?

● The right to counsel arises from the moment the person is under custody of the law.
● The right to counsel does not only arise during the execution of an extrajudicial
confession. He is entitled to counsel also at the time he is arrested and brought to the
police station to answer questions about the robbery with homicide. (People v Paris, GR
No. 218130, Feb 14, 2018)
 ● RA 7438 or “AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION” provides that “Any person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.”
● Even a person under investigation for an offense has the right to have a “competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice.”
● It is the right of the accused to be informed of his right to counsel.
● As in the People v Cabanada (GR No. 221424, July 19, 2019), the SC emphasized the
importance of the right to counsel when it said, “In the absence of any lawyer, no
custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspect person can only be detained
by the investigating officer in accordance with provisions of Art. 125 of Revised Penal
Code)… Hence, even if the confession contains a gain of truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it was voluntarily given.”
● The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins… (People v Lara, GR No. 199877, Aug. 13, 2012)

4. Is the client bound by his lawyer’s mistake? Paluca vs. COA (G.R. No. 218240, June 28,
2016)
As a rule, the mistake of counsel binds the client. Therefore, the client cannot question a
decision on the ground that counsel was an idiot. However, an exception to this is if counsel
misrepresents himself as a lawyer, and he turns out to be a fake lawyer. In this case, the
accused is entitled to a new trial because his right to be represented by a member of the bar
was violated. Thus, he was denied of his right to counsel and to due process.

The rationale for this rule is reiterated in the recent case Bejarasco v. People:

The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even mistakes
in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once
retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the
prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or
omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law,
as the act or omission of the client himself.

It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be
informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the
bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

As clients, petitioners should have maintained contact with their counsel from time to
time, and informed themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that
standard of care "which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his business."
(emphasis supplied)

More succinct is the recent Almendras, Jr. v. Almendras,20where the Court categorically stated:

Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel.1âwphi1 The only
exception is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable
that the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the remedy is to reopen
the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence.
However, perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule.
 Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his medical
constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had a pending case
in court. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress
of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous.Although he rightfully
expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot just sit back, relax and await the
outcome of the case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he should have taken the
initiative "of making the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of
his case." For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot allow
petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no
knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending
suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client's case
and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. (emphasis supplied)

5. What is the difference between waiver or right to counsel during custodial investigation
and during trial?

In custodial investigation, the right to counsel can only be waived in writing AND with the
assistance of counsel. The counsel required in custodial investigation is competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own (the suspect’s) choice.

During the trial, the right to counsel means the right to effective counsel.

The requirement is stricter during custodial investigation because a trial is done in public, while
custodial investigation is not. The danger that confessions will be extracted against the will of
the defendant during custodial investigation does not really exist during trial.

During trial the purpose of counsel is not so much to protect him from being forced to confess
but to defend the accused.

6. Is the right to counsel absolute?

No. The right of choice must be reasonably exercised. The accused cannot insist on counsel
that he cannot afford, one who is not a member of the bar, or one who declines for a valid
reason, such as conflict of interest. Also, the right of the accused to choose counsel is subject
to the right of the state to due process and to speedy and adequate justice.

7. Is right to counsel applicable in administrative investigation?

No. A party in an administrative proceeding may or may not be assisted by counsel. Moreover,
the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance
of counsel is not an absolute requirement. There is no law, jurisprudence, or rule which
mandates that an employee be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. Assistance of
counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings.

8. What is meant by Silence in Rules of Evidence?

Admission by silence. — An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally
to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be
given in evidence against him
9. What is the extent of the right against self-incrimination?

The right against self-incrimination covers testimonial compulsion only and the compulsion to
produce incriminating documents, papers, and chattels. It does not cover the compulsion to
produce real or physical evidence using the body of the accused.

10. Exceptions to right against self-incrimination?

The right cannot be invoked when the State has the right to inspect documents under its police
power, such as documents of corporations.

11. What is the purpose of the right to confrontation?

(a) To allow the court to observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying;
(b) To give the accused the opportunity to cross-examine the witness in order to test their
recollection and credibility

12. In people vs Berdaje (99 SCRA 388), how was the compulsory process to secure
attendance of defense the witness stressed?

Again, one of the rights of an accused is "to have compulsory process issued to secure the
attendance of witnesses on his behalf. ADELINO had stated that, while MARCELINA was in the
house of Ceferino Armada, she curled the hair of Narita. One of the latter's children, as well as
the hair of other girls in the vicinity. In capital cases, it should be desirable that, whenever a
discrepancy is noted between the designation of the crime made by the Fiscal and the crime
described by the facts pleaded in his Information. The lower Court should call attention of the
accused to the discrepancy, so that the accused may be fully apprised of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. This was not done in regards to ADELINO who all the time was
under the impression that he was being tried for Rape with Illegal Detention, and not for
Forcible Abduction with Rape. If ADELINO had known that he was being tried for Forcible
Abduction with Rape, he may have changed the strategy or tactics of his defense. Not that it
could be said he would have done so; but he should have been advised he had the right, and
given the opportunity, to do so. ADELINO wanted to have Narita testify on his behalf, and a
subpoena had been issued to her. But instead of taking effective steps to have Narita brought
to Court, the lower court gave responsibility for Narita's attendance to the defense, expressly
stating that, if the defense was not able to bring her to the Court, her testimony will be
dispensed with. Considering that this case involved a prosecution for a capital offense, the
lower Court acted precipitously in not having Narita brought to Court, by ordering her arrest if
necessary ADELINO was deprived of his right "to have compulsory process issued to secure
the attendance of witnesses on his behalf."

13. What is the purpose of a public trial?

The trial should be public in order to prevent abuses that may be committed by the court to the
prejudice of the defendant. Moreover, the accused is entitled to the moral support of his friends
and relatives.

14. Is there an exception to the requirement of public trial?

Yes. The court may bar the public in certain cases, such as when the evidence to be presented
may be offensive to decency or public morals, or in rape cases, where the purpose of some
persons in attending is merely to ogle at the parties.
15. In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been
violated what are the guidelines set under MGen Carlos Garcia vs. Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 198554, July 30, 2012)?

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by
the delay.

16. When is the right of the accused to speedy trial deemed violated? factors to consider
(Braza vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013)?

The doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors
that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

17. What is meant to the notion that right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory right?

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it must
comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence
failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing party
has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also does the prevailing party
have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of a decision in his favor.

Cases
1. MGen Garcia vs Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554. July 30, 2012
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATION
DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP
(RET.), DIRECTOR BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondents
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2010

FACTS:
Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation
of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th
Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all
his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as
required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year
detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement
subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010
after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his
quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and later to the Camp Crame
Custodial Detention Center. Accused has been in confinement since October 18, 2004.
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial
against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the
maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29
of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Garcia’s right to speedy trial was violated

RULING:
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy
disposition of cases. However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and
flexible concept.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. In determining whether or not the right
to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the Supreme Court has laid down the
following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being
questioned by petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the
case has already been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the
proper reviewing authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of
sentence by the President. The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the
decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally confirmed by
the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his
case.
This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, where, in spite of the lapse of
more than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain of
delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason
for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution.
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights. In fact, the delay in the
confirmation of his sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the
President, his sentence cannot be served.
2. Cadet Cudia vs. PMA
Title: FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA Vs PMA, G.R. No. 211362 Feb. 24 2015
Ponente: PERALTA,
Action: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Issues:
Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia from the
academy in utter disregard of his right to due process.
Material facts:
Petitioner, Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA. He
belonged to the “A” Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. He was supposed to
graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top
Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy. Petitioner was
issued a Delinquency Report (DR) by his professor, Juanita Beron, because he was late for two
minutes in his ENG 412 class, while other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The
DR’s reached the Department of Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to the
Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation.Two days later, Cudia received his DR. After
giving out his explanation that they were “dismissed late” from their previous class, Cudia’s CTO
incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Asking for clarification, Cudia’s CTO
told him he was caught lying. Apparently, Cudia’s CTO found out that his professor did not
dismiss them late as he had asserted.
Several days later, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the
Honor Code. Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a
team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be
formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was an 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of
the Chairman,The Honor Committee reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer
announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.
The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a
formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on indefinite
leave of absence and pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Cudia Submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his
reinstatement.
The matter was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld
the decision. Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of
the CRAB.CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights Violations.
Decision: Petition is denied. Cadet Cudia’s dismissal is affirmed
Ratio Decidendi:
No, the PMA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia from the
academy.
The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education, and
property should be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All the administrative remedies
were exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private
interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary measures
and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA
has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and regulations. It is within PMA’s
right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the
institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In
fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code
violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of
the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would
undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a
written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report
together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings
and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed
of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his
side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence on his behalf. After a thorough
 discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level –from the OIC
of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA
Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics
Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate
the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact- Finding Board/Investigation
Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct
a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President.
Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the
findings of facts by these bodies.

3. US vs Katigbak et al. 35 Phil 367

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. MIGUEL CATIMBANG ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL CATIMBANG and PERO MALALUAN, appellants G.R. No 11750 | Nov. 24, 1916
FACTS:
On the night of Nov. 30, 1914, 2 cows with their calves disappeared. The said cows were tied close
by the houses of their owners. The rope which was used to tie the cows have disappeared along
with the animal. After a fruitless search for the stolen animals, the owners reported their loss to the
police.
While looking for the animals, one of the owners, Antonino Templo, met the accused Miguel
Catimbang, told him of his loss, and asked him to aid in the search. Catimbang promised to do so,
and the next day in reply to an inquiry as to whether he had seen the animals, he asked Templo for
P40 as ransom (rescate) for the return of his property, warning him that if he did not pay the money
demanded of him, he would lose the animals altogether.
Templo did not have the money demanded of him and failed to recover the animals. Soon
thereafter Miguel Catimbang was arrested, and having been set at liberty on bail, went to Templo's
house and promised to return Templo's animals if he would aid him to escape from the criminal
charges pending against him. Templo agreed, and sent two men to Catimbang's house to get the
animals. Catimbang gave them the calf which had been stolen from Templo but despite his
promises did not turn over the cow.
Two brothers, name Lirit, testified that on the Dec. 9, 1914, the appellants, together with a 3rd
unknown persons, approached them and asked them to take care of 2 cows and their calves for a
few ​days, until their owners should ransom them. The brothers declined the offer and the party went
away, taking the animals with them.
Accused Miguel Catimbang, testified on his own behalf and denied the testimony of the Lirit
brothers in so far as it tended to show that he had ever been in possession of the animals or had
any guilty knowledge of the theft with which he was charged.
The trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses testify, accepted as true the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution, and declined to give any credence to the denials of Catimbang
testifying in his own behalf.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of the rights of the accused on the course of the
trial
RULING:
It has sometimes been said that the unexplained possession of stolen property creates a
presumption of law that the possessor committed the larceny, and casts the burden of proving the
innocent character of the possession upon the accused; and thus stated, it must be admitted that
there is some force in counsel's contention that such a ruling may have the effect, in some
instances, of destroying the right of the accused to be exempt from testifying against himself, and of
declining to testify without having that fact used against him.
According to the modern view, however, convictions in cases of this kind are not sustained upon a
presumption of law as to the guilt of the accused. The conviction rests wholly upon an inference of
fact as to the guilt of the accused. If as a matter of probability and reasoning based on the fact of
possession of the stolen goods, taken in connection with the other evidence, it may fairly be
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the theft, judgment of conviction
may properly be entered. The conviction rests upon the evidence introduced by the
prosecution—not upon the refusal or failure of the accused to testify.
The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But the
experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to
rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put witnesses on the stand or go on
the witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any reasonable explanation of his
possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the
inference as to his guilt which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the
stolen goods.
It is in this sense that it is sometimes said that the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods
will sustain a conviction of the crime of larceny. When the prosecution closes its case there must be
enough evidence in the record to establish the guilt of the accused if nothing further appears; and
proof of the possession of recently stolen goods taken together with proof of the commission of the
theft, may be and generally will be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused, if there is nothing
in the record to raise a doubt as to the guilty character of the possession, though there is no
presumption of law to that effect
It then rests with the accused to rebut the inference of fact as to his guilt arising from his possession
of the stolen goods by the submission of evidence tending to prove that his possession of the stolen
goods was not inconsistent with his innocence of the crime of larceny. But this is not to compel him
to give evidence against himself. It is merely to give him the opportunity which is given the
defendant in all criminal cases, to submit evidence in his own behalf after the prosecution has
introduced evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction unless that evidence is rebutted or
satisfactorily explained.

4. Herrera v. Alba and Hon. Cuesta-Vilches, G.R. No.148220

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A.
ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Brach 48, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, respondents
G.R. No. 148220 | June 15, 2005
FACTS:
Armi Alba, mother of 13-year-old Rosendo Alba, filed a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. Petitioner denied that he is the biological father respondent. He
also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support this motion, respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Saturnina C. Halos,
the head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute, a DNA analysis
laboratory. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted
that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. He further
argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA testing violates the right against self-incrimination
RULING:
By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.
The Court moved from the issue of according “official recognition” to DNA analysis as evidence to
the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.” This privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence.
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity
case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is “communicative” in essence taken under
duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a
defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body; the substance emitting
from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness; morphine forced
out of the mouth was received as proof; an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants
for size was allowed; and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for
pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on “testimonial compulsion.”

5. JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
FACTS:
· NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido claiming that Ariel Escobido
(live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito) was picked up by police officers for allegedly selling
drugs.
· An errand boy gave a number to the complainants. When they called the number, they were
instructed to go to the Gorordo Police Station.
· In the said police station, they met “James” who demanded 100,000 (later on lowered to 40,000) in
exchange for the release of Ariel.
· After the said meeting, the complainants went directly to the NBI wherein the NBI formed an
entrapment operation.
· The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz through the use of mark-money.
· Jaime dela Cruz was brought to the forensic laboratory of NBI where he was required to submit his
urine for drug testing. The test yielded positive for presence of dangerous drugs.
· Based on dela Cruz’ testimony, he was contending that he refused the drug examination and
requested to call his lawyer but it was denied by the NBI.
· RTC – found dela Cruz guilty of violating Sec. 15 of RA9165; ruled that all the elements were
present: 1) accused was arrested 2) accused was subjected to drug test 3) confirmatory test shows
that he used a dangerous drug
· CA – affirmed RTC ruling; ruled that extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act,
hence falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.

ISSUE: 1. Whether drug test is necessary in this case; 2. whether the drug test was a violation of
the accused right to self-incrimination
RULING: *NO. Drug text is not necessary in this case because crime the police officer was involved
in is not about the violation of the comprehensive dangerous drugs act but by the crime of extortion.
*Though the police officer tested positive, it cannot be taken against him as evidence because doing
so will violate his right to self- incrimination.
In the Gutangv. People, 335 SCRA 479 (2000) case, the Court clarified that “what the Constitution
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but
not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.” The situation in Gutang was
categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since
what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused.The Court said: This was a
mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed
facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record
shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they
in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test. Assuming
arguendo the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible inevidence, we agree with
the trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes
charged.
 It is incontrovertible that the petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He
also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his
efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances. The pertinent provisions in Article IIIof the Constitution are clear: Section 2. The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Section 17.No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the face of
these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless
of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

6. Gutang vs People, 390 Phil. 805 (2000)

FACTs:
On March 5, 1994, Accused-appellant David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and
Oscar de Venecia, Jr., was arrested by elements of the PNP-NARCOM, in connection with the
enforcement of a search warrant 3 in his residence at No. 331 Ortigas Avenue, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. When the police operatives of the PNP- NARCOM served the search warrant, which was
issued by Judge Martin Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila, they
found the petitioner and his three companions inside the comfort room of the master’s bedroom, at the
second floor of the house.
During the search, shabu and other paraphernalias were seized. They were then taken to the
PNP Crime Lab to have their urine samples to determine presence of prohibited drugs. It was positive
for shabu. The petitioner alleges that they were made to sign on the receipts of the items taken without
the presence of counsel and hence inadmissible as evidence, to which the Court agreed. They further
alleged that the urine samples taken by them is also inadmissible in violation of their constitutional right
to be Assisted by counsel.
ISSUE:
Was his constitutional right violated? RULING: DENIED
RATIO: The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed under
investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is guaranteed by the
Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, what the
Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.

7. Garcia vs Domingo, 52 SCRA, 143)

Facts: For the convenience of the parties the trial was held in the air conditioned chamber of the
respondent judge Garcia. The complaint was under the premise that such act is in violation of the right
to hold a public trial.

Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the judge in violation to the
principle of right to a public trial.

Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and there is
no showing that the public was deprived to witness the trial proceeding.
There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room
allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms... are not of uniform dimensions. Some are
smaller than others.
 There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to assure the
reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right could
be reduced to a barren form of words. To the extent then that the... conclusion reached by him was
motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly
lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him
though that such a fear was unjustified. An objective... appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts
would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases
handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to
all make for a… less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much more
in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such
courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the... bar more
considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would
be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of
the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would... run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or
arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned
chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.
The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand
it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a literal application.
There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character
when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom
may do so. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted... with any
impropriety.

8. Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013

Facts:
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and Corruption
Prevention Office(PACPO), Ombudsman Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN Summit street lighting
projects were overpriced. A panel composing of three investigators conducted a fact- finding
investigation to determine the veracity of the accusation. Braza, being the president of FABMIK, was
impleaded as one of the respondents. Eventually, the OMB-Visayas filed several informations
before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019. On August 14, 2008, the motions
for reinvestigation filed by Arturo Radaza (Radaza), the Mayor of Lapu-lapuCity, and the DPWH
officials were denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit. Consequently, they moved for the
reconsideration of said resolution. The Sandiganbayan reconsidered its August 14, 2008 resolution
and directed a reinvestigation of the case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Brazawould not be placed
in double jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the second information because his
previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that even if he was regularly arraigned, double
jeopardy would still not set in because the second information charged an offense different from,
and which did not include or was necessarily included in, the original offense charged. On
November 6, 2009, Braza moved for reconsideration with alternative motion to quash the
information. The Sandiganbayan held that the specifics sought to be alleged in the Amended
Information were evidentiary in nature which could be properly presented during the trial on the
merits. Braza was effectively discharged from the first Information upon the filing of the second
Information but said discharge was without prejudice to, and would not preclude, his prosecution for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan, however, deemed it proper that a new
preliminary investigation be conducted under the new charge.
Issue:
Whether or not double jeopardy has already set in basis of Braza "not guilty" plea in the first
Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the second Information.
Ruling:
 A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench would reveal that the arraignment of Braza
under the first information was conditional in nature as it was a mere accommodation in his favor to
enable him to travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia
in case he would abscond. TheSandiganbayan's June 6, 2008 Order clearly and unequivocally
states that the conditions for Braza'sarraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the
Information would be amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to be protected against double
jeopardy and shall allow himself to be arraigned on the amended information without losing his right
to question the same. It appeared that these conditions were duly explained to Braza and his lawyer
by the anti-graft court. He was afforded time to confer and consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he
voluntarily submitted himself to such conditional arraignment and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the
offense of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double jeopardy had been convincingly laid out. Such
waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent. It may not be amiss to state that on the day of said
arraignment, one of the incidents pending for the consideration of the Sandiganbayan was an
omnibus motion for determination of probable cause and for quashal of information or for
reinvestigation filed by accused Radaza. Accordingly, there was a real possibility that the first
information would be amended if said motion was granted. Although the omnibus motion was
initially denied, it was subsequently granted upon motion for reconsideration, and a reinvestigation
was ordered to be conducted in the criminal case.
Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal consequences,
Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to conveniently avoid being
arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second information.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another and different
offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.
Petition for certiorari is DENIED.

9. Anita Ramirez vs people, G.R. 197832, October 2, 2013

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Ramirez is bound by the negligence of her counsel.
Material facts:
On January 5, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97 convicted the petitioner
and Josephine Barangan (Barangan) of the crime of Estafa in
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100212. After several re-settings, the judgment was finally promulgated on
March 25, 2009 and warrants of arrests were accordingly issued. According to the petitioner, she failed
to attend the promulgation of judgment as she had to attend to the wake of her father/ Three (3) months
after, the petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest and to Reinstate Bail Bond,
which was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the motion to admit notice of appeal and
to post bond with the CA, asking for the reversal of the RTC Order. She subsequently filed her notice of
appeal on November 17, 2010.6 The OSG, for its part, did not oppose the petitioner’s belated filing of
the notice of appeal but objected to her application for the posting of a bond pending appeal. The CA
denied the motion. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the CA. In
denying the motion, the CA ruled that the petitioner failed to file the notice of appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, reckoned from the date of notice of the RTC’s
judgment of conviction, as she filed her notice of appeal with the CA. The CA opined that the petitioner
was already aware of the RTC judgment; however, she opted to file a motion to lift the warrant of arrest.
As such, the judgment of conviction against her has attained finality. The CA also opined that since the
petitioner knew she could not attend the promulgation of judgment, she should have exerted earnest
efforts to confer with her counsel to request for its re-setting. Failing to do so, the CA considered her
absence without justifiable cause a blatant disrespect of the judicial process. Thus, the CA denied her
application for provisional liberty in view of the finality of the judgment of conviction against her.
Aggrieved, Ramirez appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that her counsel did not inform her of the
status of the case and that it would have been unforgivable for her not to pay her last respects to her
deceased father.

Decision: Petition denied.

Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. petitioner Ramirez is bound by the negligence of her counsel.
The rule is that the omission or negligence of counsel binds the client. This is truer if the client did not
make a periodic check on the progress of her case. In this case, aside from heaving the fault entirely on
her counsel, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that she exercised diligent efforts in making
sure that she is brought up to date as regards the status of her case or the steps being taken by her
counsel in the defense of her case. The basic general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the
client; Where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable, pervasive, reckless and
inexcusable, then it does not bind the client since in such a case, the client is effectively deprived of his
or her day in court. (Reyes vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 578SCRA 322 [2009]).
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law; However, failure to perfect an appeal within the
prescribed period is not a mere technicality but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal renders
the judgment final and executory. (Cadena vs. Civil Service Commission, 663 SCRA 160 [2012])