Rights During Trial

Section 14. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal

offense without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
(Art III)
DUE PROCESS (in Criminal Cases)
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over
the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
Due Process, Waiver
Rule: We are aware of the usual practice of presiding judges in warning a party in a
case that he will be considered to have waived his right to adduce evidence if he fails
to present it at the next hearing, after prior unwarranted postponements, despite
previous agreement of the parties. Its objective is to instill discipline on the litigants
and their counsel so that the proceedings of the court would not be unduly delayed.
However, in criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the
present cases, the presiding judge is called upon to see to it that the accused is made
aware of the consequences of not heeding the warning given by the trial court. It must
be noted that the waiver of the right to present defense evidence in the present cases
was not even voluntary nor upon the instance of the appellant but imposed by the trial
court, apparently to penalize appellant, after he and his counsel repeatedly moved for
the postponements of the scheduled hearings.
Waiver of the rights of the accused "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences," G.R. Nos. 151249-50 February 26, 2004 PEOPLE vs. MACARANG
Rule: A criminal case may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with notice to
the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the prescribed time. The phrase
"with notice to the appellant" means that a notice must first be furnished the
appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. Notwithstanding
such absence of notice to the appellant, no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the CA in considering the appeal abandoned with the failure of
petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions granted to him and non-
compliance to date.
Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but the appellant
took no steps either by himself or through counsel to have the appeal reinstated,
such an attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his abandonment and
renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute his appeal. The right to
appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who
seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing
to do so, the right to appeal is lost. G.R. No. 183975 September 20, 2010
DIMARUCOT vs. PEOPLE
Due Process for the State
• The State, like the accused is also entitled to due process in criminal
cases. People vs. Santiago 174 SCRA 143 (1989).
• The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must
be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the
charge. The Court has always accorded this right to the prosecution,
and where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the
offending court action. People v. Gomez, 20 SCRA 298; People v.
Surtida, L-24420, January 26, 1972
• Rule: It must be borne in mind … that due process is not a
monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due
process as much as the accused. G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999
PEOPLE vs. WEBB
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an
uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the
People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable
mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the
prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt
cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.
• Rule: Indeed, when, the circumstances surrounding the alleged
commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring
the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference
for her innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional
presumption of her innocence G.R. No. 168163 March 26, 2008
Eugenio vs. People
• Ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, - he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove.
Rule: Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a
mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility
of mistake. in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the
burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to
prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any
other crime necessarily included therein. Prosecution must rely on
the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon
the weakness of the evidence of the accused. G.R. No. 192432
June 23, 2014, PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA
Presumption of regularity vs presumption of innocence

Rule: The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could

not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence favoring the
accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being
presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of
evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like here, the proof
adduced against the accused has not even overcome the presumption of
innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
could not be a factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime
charged. G.R. No. 192432 June 23, 2014, PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA’

(Note: here, Accused-appellant’s argument that the procedural requirements of Section

21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 with respect to the custody and
disposition of confiscated drugs were not complied with is equally bereft of merit.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD PERSONALLY OR BY COUNSEL
Includes;
• The right to be present from arraignment to
promulgation of sentence (The right to be present
may be waived by the non-attendance of the
accused.)
• The right to effective representation of counsel
Rule: “The right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing
constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being
well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental
procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right
of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put,
it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a
simple perfunctory representation.” G.R. No. 153414 June 27,
2006 CALLANGAN vs. PEOPLE
Rule: The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal
prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel
deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded
from appointing a de oficio counsel, which it considers
competent and independent, to enable the trial to proceed
until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise,
the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by
the accused, to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the
case. G.R. No. 186472 July 5, 2010 PEOPLE vs. SIONGCO
Rule: The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel
binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the
negligence is so gross or palpable that courts must
step in to grant relief to the aggrieved client. It can be
gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that Milla
was given opportunities to defend his case and was
granted concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot be said
that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel
were so gross and palpable to have deprived him of
due process. G.R. No. 188726 January 25, 2012
MILLA vs. PEOPLE
RIGHT TO FREE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE
•Section 11. Free access to the courts
and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
• Rule: This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the
conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even during
appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio
persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a
case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his
intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the
reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the
withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a
counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect
the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason.
After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." Justice
should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for
everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced
and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party
over another. G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991 PEOPLE vs. RIO
• Rule: Equity will not suffer a wrong to be
without a remedy. “Ubi jus ibi remedium”.
Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.
The remedy must not only be effective and
efficient, but also readily accessible. For a
remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC August 28, 2009 RE:
REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
AID TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION
Purposes
a. Allow the accused to know the description of the
charge against him, permitting him to make his
defenses
b. To prevent further prosecution of an already
disposed action
c. To inform the court of the facts alleged
Rule: “Under Article 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by
the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical
handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying
circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. Rule 110
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information.
In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the
appellant had carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded complainant.
It does not state that appellant knew of the mental disability of the
complainant at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears stressing
that the rules now require that the qualifying circumstance that sanctions
the imposition of the death penalty should be specifically stated in the
information. Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus,
be applied and the supreme penalty of death could not be validly imposed.
G.R. No. 179477 February 6, 2008 PEOPLE vs. TABIO
Rule: It is true that the information in Criminal Case No. C-58693
alleged that appellants conspired in raping AAA on 7 November 1999,
and that the RTC convicted appellant Ferol alone in Criminal Case No. C-
58693 of raping AAA on 8 November 1999. Nonetheless, the
discrepancy on the actual date of rape does not constitute a serious
error warranting the reversal of appellant Ferol’s conviction. The date
or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the
said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman through force and intimidation. The precise time or date when
the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As
such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is
sufficient that the information states that the crime has been
committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual
commission. People v. Aure, G.R. No. 180451, October 17, 2008, 569
SCRA 836, 852.
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

SPEEDY TRIAL -
• This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays,
• To assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose.
• "JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED.
Rule: “The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a
speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and
to prevent delays in the administration of justice by
mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch
in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and
a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No.
162214 November 11, 2004
Rule: “In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right
to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must
be considered:
(a) length of delay;
(b) the reason for the delay;
(c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and
(d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x. “
We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. G.R. No. 187728 September 12, 2011 MARI and the PEOPLE
vs. HON. GONZALES
PUBLIC TRIAL

- The requirement of public trial is for the benefit

of the accused, that the public may see that he is
fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned,
and that the presence of spectators may keep his
triers keenly alive to a sense of responsibility and
to the importance of their functions. (1 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, p. 647)
Rule: Did respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in
stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the holding of the trial of
the other respondents inside the chambers of city court Judge
Gregorio Garcia named as the petitioner.
There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce
the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is
not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of
uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as
admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices
to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could
"have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with
what offense he may be charged. “G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973
HON. GARCIA vs. DOMINGO
Rule: An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs
to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small
as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the
trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free
to report what they have observed during the proceedings. A.M. No. 01-4-
03-S.C. June 29, 2001 RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL
OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
IMPARTIAL TRIAL
Rule: With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but
also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely
certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just
and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after
the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased
witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle,
in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from
its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,
and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions or passions. A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C. June 29, 2001
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
•An impartial judge – “This Court has
repeatedly and consistently demanded
"the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we
have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just.
Right to an impartial tribunal and
trial of civilians in military courts
Rule: We take this opportunity to reiterate that as long as
the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for offenses committed by them. Whether or not martial law
has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part
thereof is of no moment. The imprimatur for this observation
is found in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987 EDUARDO B. OLAGUER vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34
RIGHT TO CONFRONT
WITNESSES
Rule: The right of confrontation, is held to apply specifically to
criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose:
(1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of
witnesses by cross-examination, and
(2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.
The constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his
testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury
charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a
valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth;
and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and
assess his credibility." G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 GO vs. PEOPLE
RIGHT TO SECURE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES
Rule 21, of The Rules of Court
• Section 7. Personal appearance in court. — A person present in court before a
judicial officer may be required to testify as if he were in attendance upon a
subpoena issued by such court or officer.
• Section 8. Compelling attendance. — In case of failure of a witness to attend, the
court or judge issuing the subpoena, upon proof of the service thereof and of the
failure of the witness, may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the province, or his
deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him before the court or officer where his
attendance is required, and the cost of such warrant and seizure of such witness
shall be paid by the witness if the court issuing it shall determine that his failure to
answer the subpoena was willful and without just excuse.
• Section 9. Contempt. — Failure by any person without adequate cause to obey a
subpoena served upon him shall be deemed a contempt of the court from which
the subpoena is issued. If the subpoena was not issued by a court, the disobedience
thereto shall be punished in accordance with the applicable law or Rule.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights….
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the
judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial
pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The
absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial
dates until custody over him is regained. (Rule 115, Rules of Court)
THE REQUISITES OF A VALID TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

(1) the accused has already been arraigned,

(2) he has been duly notified of the trial, and
(3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable
When presence of the accused is a duty

(a) At arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of

guilt,
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and
must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and
plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not
affect the validity of the proceedings. (Rule 116 Section 1)
There can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has
been arraigned.
When presence of the accused is a duty

(b) During trial whenever necessary for identification

purposes, and

The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived

except only at that stage where the prosecution intends
to present witnesses who will Identify the accused G.R.
No. L-66469 July 29, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs. SALAS, Aquino v. Mil. Commission No. 263 SCRA 546;
People v. The Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269
When presence of the accused is a duty

(c) At the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in

which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative.
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced
in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge
is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court. (Rule 120, Rule of Court)
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arrest menor – 1 to 30m days
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. (Art III)

• “Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare”.- No one is

bound to accuse himself. (Miranda v. Ariz., 384
U.S. 436, 442-443 (U.S. 1966))
•If the party were required to testify, it
would place the witness under the
strongest temptation to commit the crime
of perjury, and of humanity, because it
would prevent the extorting of
confessions by duress.
Compulsion:
- Use of violence;
- Pressure
- Moral coercion
(Bernas)
Compulsory Self Incrimination
The main purpose of the provision …is to
prohibit compulsory oral examination of
prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the
purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in the commission
of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
Only applies to self incriminating
statements
• The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to
prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial. or
upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.
(People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.) G.R. No. 7081 September 7,
1912 THE UNITED STATES, vs.TAN TENG
• Rule: The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's
own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan
Teng [1912], 23 Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36 Phil.,
735, G.R. No. 16444 September 8, 1920 EMETERIA VILLAFLOR,
vs. RICARDO SUMMERS
Mechanical Acts (Non-use of intellect)
Such an inspection of the bodily features by the
court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege
granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not
call upon the accused as a witness — it does not call
upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility.
Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way
from the accused, is not testimony but his body itself.
G.R. No. 7081 September 7, 1912 THE UNITED
STATES, vs. TAN TENG
Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited
to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that,
an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be
avoided. G.R. No. 16444 September 8, 1920
EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, vs. RICARDO SUMMERS
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion,
but against testimonial compulsion. The right against
self- incrimination is simply against the legal process
of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission
of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought
to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence. Hence, a person may be compelled
to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,
blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion
involved. G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004 PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"
• “Measuring or photographing the party is not
within the privilege" (against self-
incrimination). "Nor is the removal or
replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is
the requirement that the party move his body
to enable the foregoing things to be done."
(Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 878, quoted in
Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil., 570, 576).
People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
It was there said that "writing is something more than
moving the body, or hand, or the fingers; writing is not
a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention; and in the
case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the
falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly
states. Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may
be documentary. Neither then could the accused be
ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may
constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. Bermudez vs.
Castillo, 64 Phil. 433
In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office,
a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their
being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being
haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives
of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still,
the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. G.R.
No. 157870 November 3, 2008 SJS vs. DDB and PDEA
RA 9165 allows for the mandatory testing of purported
users of prohibited drugs. The law provides;

• Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person

apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for
use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall
be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense,
subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act.
“Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested
for, among others, the "importation," "sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation", "manufacture" and "possession" of
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession
thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; being "employees and
visitors of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal
chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"; "manufacture
or delivery" or "possession" of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during parties, social gatherings or
meetings"; "unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof; "cultivation or
culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof"; and
"maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals.“ To make the provision
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under
Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Jaime D. Dela Cruz vs.
People, GR No. 200748, Jul 23, 2014
Right to Counsel and Self Incrimination

Rule: The purpose of providing counsel to a

person under custodial investigation is to
curb the police-state practice of extracting
a confession that leads appellant to make
self-incriminating statements. G.R. No.
182555 September 7, 2010 LENIDO
LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Generally Available in Criminal
Proceedings
The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character
thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is
not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He
could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his
license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater
deprivation. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of
Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent. G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
Rule: It must however be made clear that if the defendant
in a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is
charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of
which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific
question, on the strength of the right against self-
incrimination. G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989 THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON
Use Immunity vs. Transactional Immunity
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two:
USE IMMUNITY TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY
Prohibits use of witness' compelled Grants immunity to the witness from
testimony and its fruits in any manner prosecution for an offense to which
in connection with the criminal his compelled testimony relates.
prosecution of the witness
(except in a subsequent prosecution for perjury or giving a false statement.)
The witness can still be prosecuted The witness cannot be prosecuted
but his compelled testimony may at all
not be used against him
Exclusionary Rule
Section 12. 3. Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him. (Art III)

Rule: If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions

inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put
under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted
against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it
was a case of compelled submission. Chavez vs CA 24 SCRA
663 (1968)
RIGHT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
(Art III)
Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three months for all other lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served
upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision
or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said
period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory
period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as
may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide
or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay. (Art VIII)
Section 18 - xxx The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Par 2, Art VII)
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Art
IX A)
Code of Judicial Conduct

• Rule 3.05, Canon 3. A judge shall dispose of the court's

business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
• by Section 5, Canon 6 Judges shall perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in
all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well
as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In
this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with
the administration of justice
Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured; or even without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
Rule: Undue delay in the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and
confidence of the people in the judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its
stature. No less than the Constitution mandates that lower courts must
dispose of their cases promptly and decide them within three months from the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court
or by the Court concerned. In addition, a judge's delay in resolving, within the
prescribed period, pending motions and incidents constitutes a violation of
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requiring judges to dispose of court
business promptly.
The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is
designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, for obviously, justice
delayed is justice denied. An unwarranted slow down in the disposition of
cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170 December 16,
2009 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3094-RTJ] HEIRS OF SIMEON PIEDAD vs.
EXECUTIVE
A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for
decision or resolution and is expected to keep her own
record of cases so that she may act on them
promptly. It is incumbent upon her to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in her court so
that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and
their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court
management is as much her responsibility. A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2248* September 29, 2010 JUDGE
ADORACION G. ANGELES, vs. JUDGE MARIA ELISA
SEMPIO DIY
Rule: As correctly pointed out by the OCA, while the
respondent judge attributed his failure to render a decision
to the heavy caseload in his sala, he did not ask for an
extension of time to decide the cases. This failure to decide
within the required period, given that he could have asked
for an extension, is inexcusable; it constitutes neglect of duty
as well as gross inefficiency that collectively warrant
administrative sanction. A.M. No. MTJ-09-1738 October 6,
2010 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2033-MTJ) CIRILA S.
RAYMUNDO, vs. JUDGE TERESITO A. ANDOY