ARTICLEIII: BILL OF RIGHTS (Sections 14-22)

H. Constitutional Rights of the Accused. Sec. 14, Art. Ill

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2)In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

1. Criminal due process:

(i) The accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction; (ii) The accused is
proceeded against under the orderly processes of law; (iii) The accused has been given
notice and the opportunity to be heard; and (iv) The judgment rendered was within the
authority of a constitutional law.

Unreasonable delay in resolving complaint.: it was held that the failure of the Office of
the Ombudsman to resolve a complaint that had been pending for six years clearly
violates the constitutional command for the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints
and the right of the petitioner to due process of law and to speedy trial. In such event,
the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint.

Impartial court or tribunal: A critical component of due process of law is a hearing

before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. In order to disqualify a judge on the
ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove such bias by clear and convincing
evidence. In this case, the petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove
that the respondent judge was motivated by malice or bad faith when she issued the
assailed rulings.

Right to a hearing: the Supreme Court held that the accused were denied due process
of law when the trial court convicted them (after having declared that they had waived
their right to present evidence), but it was shown that there were deviations from the
regular course of trial, e.g., petitioners were not directed to present evidence to prove
their defenses nor dates set for that purpose, petitioners were not given an opportunity
to present rebuttal evidence nor dates set for that purpose, and petitioners had not
admitted the offense charged in the information which would have justified any
modification in the order of the trial.
 Plea of guilt to a capital offense: the Court enumerated the stringent constitutional
standards impelled by the due process clause whenever the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, viz: [1] The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences thereof; [2]
The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability; and [3] The accused must be asked if he
desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires.

2. Presumption of innocence.

Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment.

The presumption of innocence was held not to have been overcome by prosecution
evidence where the victim had difficulty in identifying the accused not only during the
hospital confrontation but also in open court

Circumstantial evidence.

[i] there is more than one circumstance; [ii] the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and [iii] the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Equipoise rule. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the
evidence adduced by the parties are evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused

3. Right to be heard bv himself and counsel. the right to counsel proceeds from the
fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be
heard before being-condemned. It is more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. It means that
the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause of the defense and acts accordingly.

The right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver because “even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the
rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence”.

4. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

 Rationale: [1] to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to prepare for his defense; [2] to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same
 cause; and [3] to inform the Court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.

 Requisites: In order that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him may not be violated, the
information must state the name of the accused, the designation given to the
offense by statute, a statement of the acts or omission so complained of as
constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time
and date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense had
been committed.

 Void for Vagueness Rule: The accused is also denied the right to be informed of
the charge against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself is
couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary
intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished. In such
a case, the law is deemed void.

 Waiver: Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him may not be waived, but the defense may waive the right
to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of “not guilty”. The right cannot be
waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or
information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such,
an indictment must fully state the elements Of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if
duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or
information.

5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial.

Speedy Trial a trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. But justice
and fairness, not speed, are the objectives. Accused is entitled to dismissal, equivalent
to acquittal, if trial is unreasonably delayed. The right to speedy trial is relative, subject
to reasonable delays and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body
operations, etc. Speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is filed
as the prosecution can, with reasonable diligence, prepare for trial. While accused
persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the
same rights.

Impartial trial. The accused is entitled to the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”, the
judgment of conviction was reversed upon showing that the trial judge was biased
because of the appearance and criminal record of the accused.

Public trial. This is intended to prevent possible abuses which may be committed
against the accused. The rule is not absolute. See Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143.
 Right to meet witnesses face to face. Right to cross-examine complainant and
witnesses. The testimony of a witness who has not submitted himself to
crossexamination is not admissible in evidence. The affidavits of witnesses who are not
presented during the trial — and thus, are not subjected to cross-examination — are
inadmissible because they are hearsay.

Right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence. Well- settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue,
the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books,
documents, or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue
subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably
described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness)

Trial in absentia. The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal
cases, trial of which could, in the past, be indefinitely deferred, and many times
completely abandoned, because of the defendant’s escape.

Habeas corpus. Sec. 15. Art. III :

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

Definition of a writ of habeas corpus: “A writ issued by a court directed to a person

detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated
time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, to submit to,
and to receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his
behalf.”

When available. Habeas corpus restores the liberty of an individual subjected to

physical restraint. The high prerogative of the writ was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and is the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.

5. Suspension of privilege does not suspend right to bail [Sec. 13, Art. III].

Speedy disposition of cases. [Sec. 16. Art. Ill: “All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.”

This right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties
in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Thus, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
 However, like the right to a speedy trial, this right is violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient.

Self-incrimination. Sec. 17, Art. Ill: “No person shall be compelled to be a

witness against himself.”

Availability. The right is available not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other
government proceedings, including civil actions and administrative or legislative
investigations. It may be claimed not only by the accused but also by any witness to
whom a question calling for an incriminating answer is addressed.

Rule. As a rule, it may be invoked only when and as the question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked, since the witness has no way of knowing in advance the
nature or effect of the question to be put to him. This is true, however, only of an
ordinary witness.

Scope. kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but testimonial compulsion
only [Alih v. Castro, supra.]. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of his guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement
but an object evidence.

Immunity. The immunity granted to the witness may be either transactional immunity,
such as that which may be granted by the Commission on Human Rights to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority, which makes the witness immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to
which his compelled testimony relates [Sec. 18(8), Art. XIII]; or use and fruit immunity,
which prohibits the use of the witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner
in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness [Galman v. Pamaran, 138
SCRA 274].

Waiver. The right against self-incrimination may be waived, either directly or by a failure
to invoke it, provided the waiver is certain and unequivocal and intelligently made. Thus,
the accused who takes the witness stand voluntarily and offers testimony in his behalf
may be cross-examined and asked incriminating questions on any matter he testified to
on direct examination.
S. Non-detention by reason of political beliefs or aspirations. [Sec. 18 (11. Art. Ill:
“1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Reinforced by Art. 272, Revised Penal Code, which provides: “The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine of not exceeding P10,000 shall be imposed upon anyone who shall
purchase, sell, kidnap, or detain a human being for the purpose of enslaving
him.” See Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil 851.

2. Exceptions:

 punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted.

 service in defense of the State [Sec. 4, Art. II], See People v. Zosa, 38 0.G.
1676].

 naval [merchant marine] enlistment. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 75.

 posse comitatus. See U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil 245.

 return to work order in industries affected with public interest.

See Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, 45 O.G.
Supp. No. 9, p. 147.

T. Prohibited punishments. Sec. 19. Art. Ill: “(1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any

prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.”

U. Non-imprisonment for debt. Sec. 20. Art. Ill: "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax. ”]

V. Double Jeopardy. Sec. 21. Art. Ill: “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.’]
1. Requisites:

 Valid complaint or information. Double jeopardy does not attach in preliminary

investigation.

 Filed before a competent court

 To which the defendant had pleaded.

 Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or

otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Doctrine of Supervening Event. The accused may still be prosecuted for another
offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the first indictment under
which he may have already been charged or convicted. Thus, under Section 7, Rule
117, Rules of Court, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the original
complaint or information when: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening
facts arising from the same act or omission; (b) the facts constituting the graver offense
arose or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal or
the offended party.

Ex post facto law and Bill of attainder. Sec. 22. Art. Ill: “No ex post facto law
or bill of attainder shall be enacted.”

1. Ex post facto law

Kinds: (i) Every law that makes criminal an action done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such action; (ii) Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (iii) Every law that
changes punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed; (iv) Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense, in order to convict the offender; (v) Every law which, assuming to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of
a right for something which when done was lawful; (vi) Every law which deprives
persons accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which they have become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of a proclamation
of amnesty;

a) Characteristics: (i) It refers to criminal matters; (ii) It is retroactive in application; and

(iii) It works to the prejudice of the accused.

2. Bill of Attainder.

a) Defined: It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial.

Characteristics: It substitutes legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. Thus, it

is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial
that it becomes a bill of attainder. In People v. Ferrer, supra., the Supreme Court held
that the Anti-Subversion Act is not a bill of attainder, because it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment; what it does is simply declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government; and the term “Communist Party of the Philippines” is used
solely for definitional purposes.