NATURAL JUSTICE

THE RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING

The principles of Natural Justice represent nothing more than the imposition of certain
procedural safeguards on a body or person whose decisions may affect the rights, interests and
legitimate expectations of others thus, natural justice is based on fairness. Natural Justice applies
to public authorities, clubs, associations, trade unions and professional associations. The twin
pillars of natural justice were identified by Phillips JA in Bazie v Ag: the right to a fair hearing
(audi alteram partem) and freedom from bias in an adjudicator (nemo judex in causa sua).
Constitutional natural justice is secured in caribbean constitutions where the provisions secure to
the individual the protection of law when charged with a criminal offence as seen in Section 18
of the Barbados constitution. The section thus mandates a fair hearing within a reasonable time
by an independent and impartial court established by law. Also, in other constitutions such as
T&T, parliament may not deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations or deprive a
person of the right to such procedural provisions as are necessary for the purpose of giving effect
and protection to the fundamental rights and freedoms. The procedural safeguards guaranteed by
the constitution are of a far higher standard that of the common law. A recent source of natural
justice worth mention is that of statutory source of the Administration Act of Barbados.
The principles of natural justice were unsettled and then Ridge v Baldwin it was stressed that,
despite the great difficulty of classifying powers into judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
components, the right to be heard had to depend on the consequences of the decision to the
individual rather than upon the nature of the power in question. In this case it was held that the
committee was bound to observe the principles of natural justice in charging the chief constable
by informing the appellant of the charges made against him and giving him an opportunity of
being heard. They had done neither so their dismissal was unlawful. The legal requirement on
the adjudicator is nothing more than a basic duty of fairness and the court must balance several
interest such as those of the State, principles of good administration, speed and efficiency in
decision making and the level of injustice suffered by the individual in having been denied the
opportunity to present their case. There are no fixed rules or requirements, it all depends on the
circumstances of the case. However, from the practice of the courts it is possibly to identify the
ingredients of a fair hearing.
In the context of criminal and disciplinary offences, the courts insist that adequate notice of a
charge should be provided to a party. Fair or adequate notice depends on several factors such as
the nature of the case, the type of hearing and the consequences flowing from the charge. Instant
notice of a charge is inadequate as shown in Annamunthodo v OWTU, and also represents the
principle as per Lord Denning that a person cannot be tried on a charge which has not been
notified to him, especially if that charge carried a heavier penalty than the original. In order that
an individual may have a fair crack of the whip, it is important that they must have full
particulars of that charge together with any relevant factual evidence. A failure to do so breaches
the fair hearing doctrine. such a case was Maharaj v Ag where the committal of the appellant to
prison for contempt was quashed because the trial judge failed to make plain the particulars or
the specific nature of the contempt. The HOL was satisfied that his failure to explain that the
contempt with which he intended to charge the appellant was what the judge described in his
written reasons as a vicious attack on the intergrity of the court vitiates the committal for
contempt. Also a person cannot be tried on a charge on the which he has not been heard. This
means that there must be a hearing on each charge as illustrated in Diggs-White v Dawkins.
One of the ingredients of natural justice is that a party charged must be furnished with full
particulars of that charge. It is submitted therefore, that it is now more accurate to regard the
right as one to make representations (written) to the decision maker. In Katwaroo v Burroughs,
the appellant applied to the Commissioner of Police for a licence under the Firearms Act.
Subsequently was advised that his application had been granted and that a firearm user‘s licence
had been granted to him. The commissioner wrote to advise him that his firearm user‘s licence
had been cancelled and gave no reason. It was held that although the commissioner was given a
wide and unfettered discretion the court applied the objective test. The court held that the
commissioner‘s failure to give reasons for the revocation constitute a breach of the rules of
natural justice. It conferred a privilege on the licence holder to be afforded a hearing before such
revocation and amounted to his written representation. A contrasting decision was outlined in
Naraynsigh v Commissioner of Police, where the appellant a holder of a firearm user licence
had his licence revoked by the Commissioner of Police pursuant of Section 21 of the T&T
Firearm Act 1970. The Commissioner‘s decision was based on a search of the appellant‘s home
where a second firearm (unlicence) was found on his premises. Judicial review was sought by the
appellant on the grounds that the COP decision was reached unfairly and without sufficient
investigation. The claim failed and on appeal to the COA the appellant arguments were centered
upon the fairness and adequancy of the process by which the decision was arrived at. The appeal
was quashed.
ANAYLSIS – The question before the court was what fairness required in the present case?
Where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be
exercised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances. The standards of fairness are not
immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in the general and in their
application to decisions of a particular type. The principles of fairness are not to be applied by
rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the
decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects. An essential feature of the context
is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal
administrative system within which the decision is taken. Fairness will very often require that a
person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make
representations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a
favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both. Since the
person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors
may weigh against his interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of
the case which he has to answer. The Act gave the COP a wide discretion and unfettered
discretion according to Sub section (d) ―as he thinks fit‖. Unlike, Katwroo case the court did not
take an objective test as it did not see it fit to trammel on the COP powers.
The rules of fair hearing do not necessarily mandate that an oral hearing be required. However, it
appears that the constitutions of some of the West Indian States insist on an oral public hearing
in all proceedings for the determination of civil rights or obligations. Thus, the hearing must
embrace the right to call witness, to cross-examine, and to request for an adjournment for good
cause. In Ex. P Smith the claimant sought judicial review on the grounds that the decision to
revoke his prison release was taken without holding an oral hearing even after his written
representation. It was held that the board should be altogether readier to hold oral hearings if
their determination is likely to turn upon the resolution of important issues of fact such as was
the prisoner suitable for release. An individuals right to call witnesses was illustrated in R v
Clarke where the trial judge failed to inform the appellant of his right. It was held that it is the
99
constitutional right of every person who is charged with a criminal offence to be afforded such
facilities as would enable him to obtain the attendance of witnesses for examination on his own
behalf before the court. It a practice of natural justice in aiding a right to fair hearing that one is
entitled to cross-examine.
In Western Broadcasting Services v Seaga, A judge refused to hear the oral evidence of a
defamation claim between two parties. There was a dispute as to whether the parties had in fact
reached an agreement with respondent claiming they had. The judge in the absence of the oral
hearing held that the affidavits was enough for her to make her determination on the matter. The
PC held that the judge acted ultra vires in declining to hear the oral evidence and was guilty of an
abuse of power. They held that the procedure adopted by the judge was unfair and went outside
the ambit of the judge‘s case management. The PC also held that the COA was wrong in
concluding that there was ample opportunity for the attorneys to cross –examine and in
upholding the trial judge decision. Thus in the absence of cross-examination the COA was in no
better position than the judge to assess the credibility of the respective deponents. As said
previously, natural justice mandate for the right to adjournment especially where refusal
reasonably justified. In AG of Grenada v Gairy, the court refused a fourth adjournment request
by the appellant after being granted three adjournments.

There is no general duty to give reasons for a decision, but there are classes of case where there
is such a duty. (1) where the subject matter is an interest so highly regarded by the law that
fairness requires that reasons, at least for particular decisions, be given as of right. (2) Where the
decision appears deviatant. Here fairness may require reasons so that the recipient know whether
the deviation is in the legal sense challengable or apparent. If the respondent fails to prove that
there decision is fair then relief may take the form of an order of mandamus to give reasons or
other appropriate relief as seen fit. HEFC case.
The advantages of the provision of reasons have been often rehearsed. They relate to the decision
–making process, in strengthening that process, in the public confidence in it, and in the
desirability of the disclosure of error where error exists. They relate also to the parties
immediately affected by the decision, in enabling them to know the strengths and weakness of
their respective cases, and to facilitate appeal where that course is appropriate. There is also
dangers and disadvantages in a universal requirement for reasons. It may impose an undesirable
legalism into areas where a high degree of informality is appropriate and add to delay and
expense. The trend of the law has been towards an increased recognition of the duty upon
decision-makers of many kinds to give reasons. This trend is consistent with current
developments towards an increased openness in matters of government and administration.
The trend is proceeding on a case by case basis and has not lost sight of the established position
of the common law that there is no general duty, universally imposed on all decision-makers. It
was affirmed in Ex.P Doody that the law does not at present recognize a general duty to give
reasons for administrative decisions. But it is well established that there are exceptions where the
giving of reasons will be required as a matter of fairness and openness. These may occur through
the particular circumstances of a particular case as was recognized in Ex. P Instutute of Dental
Surgery, there may be classes of cases where the duty to give reasons there may be classes of
cases where the duty to give reasons may exist in all cases of that class. Those classes may be
defined by factors relating to the particular character or quality of the decisions, as where they
appear aberrant, or to factors relating to the particular character or particular jurisdiction of a
decision-making body, as where it is concerned with matters of special importance, such as
personal liberty.
There is certainly a strong argument for the view that what were once seen as exceptions to a rule
may now be becoming examples of the norm, and the cases where reasons are not required may
be taking on the appearance of expections. But the general rule has not been departed from and
their Lordships do not consider that the present case provides an appropriate opportunity to
explore the possibility of such a departure. Turning to the particular circumstances of Stefan v
General Medical Council their Lordships are persuaded that there was a duty at common law
upon the committee in the present case to state the reasons for their decision. The decision was
on which was open to appeal under the statute. Secondly, a consideration of the whole procedure
and function of the committee prompts the conclusion that the procedures which it follows and
the function which it performs are akin to those of a court where the giving of reasons would be
expected.
Thirdly, the issue was one of considerable importance for the practitioner. Fourthly, Dr. Stefan
has repeatedly asked for an explanation of the committee‘s view and for the diagnosis which
they have reached of her condition. Fifthly, the only expert witness who had examined Dr. Stefan
and appeared to give evidence before the committee, Dr. Adams, stated in his written report that
she was now well able to control the expression of her attitudes to race and gender, which had
been matter of earlier concern, and that the passage of time had reduced the intensity of her
distress and anger. Sixthly, this was the first time that an indefinite suspension was decided upon.
The depature from the periodic suspensions which had been imposed before was certainly a
legitimate course under the amended legislation but, particularly in light of an apparently less
serious condition, the selection of it called for an explanation.
In a Caribbean approach in an extradition case, Rey v Government of Switerzland, the
applicant was charged in Switerzland with commercial fraud, falsification of accounts and
bankruptcy offences and he absconded to The Bahamas. Request for extradition made by the
Government of Switerzland. Proceedings against the applicant commenced and he was arrested
and remanded in custody. The magistrate committed the applicant to custody to await his
extradition. His appeal and application for habeas corpus was refused. The magistrate was not
satisfied in respect of one charge on the evidence placed before her. Counsel for the applicant
submitted that the magistrate‘s decision was unlawful in as much as she failed to give reasons on
disputed issues of fact. They also acknowledge that there was no authority for the proposition
that a magistrate seized with the duty to decide whether to commit an accused person to custody
to await extradition is bound to give reasons for his or her decision. The legal position is that the
law does not at present recognize a general duty to give reasons for an administrative decision
and such a duty may in appropriate circumstances be implied.
Ex.P Doody, in the present case the judicial nature of the magistrate‘s function is a factor that
generally speaking tends to support an implied duty to give reasons. The turning point of the case
was that in the Bahamas a person committed to custody for extradition has under s. 11 of the Act
has right to apply for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court with a further right to appeal to the
COA if his application for habeas is refused. Thus in the circumstances the HOL were not
prepared to hold that there was a general implied duty upon magistrates to give reasons in respect
of all disputed issues of fact and law in extradition proceedings. They however entered a
cautionary note: it was unnecessary in the present case to consider whether in the great diversity
of cases which come before magistrates in extradition proceedings the principle of fairness may
in particular circumstances require a magistrate to give reasons. It did not so require in this case.
It was held that the magistrate‘s failure to give reasons on disputed issues of fact was not
unlawful. The common law does not recognize a right to legal representation. However, in the
Caribbean, the constitutions do provide for the right to legal representation in criminal matters.
In Thornhill v AG of T&T, after a shooting incident, the appellant was arrested and taken to a
police station. Several requests were made for him to be given the opportunity of communicating
with his lawyer but these requests were initially refused. It was three days after his arrest and
after an identity parade that the appellant was permitted to communicate with the lawyer.
―Subject to the provisions of Sections 3,4 and 5 of the T&T constitution, no law shall abrogate,
abridge or infringe or authorize the abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any of the rights
and freedoms hereinbefore recognized and declared and in particular no Act of parliament
shall… © deprive a person who has been arrested or detained… (ii) of the right to retain and
instruct without delay a legal adviser of his own choice and to hold communication with him…‖.
It was held that section 2 © (ii) of the constitution of 1962 secured the right of a detained person
to access to a lawyer without delay, independently of any rights enjoyed under the law at the
commencement of the construction. In Hinds v Ag of Barbados, the judge refused the application
made by the applicant for a legal aid certificate and the trial proceeded without him being
represented. He was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The COA dismissed his
appeal against conviction and held that the denial of legal representation at his trial had not
infringed his constitutional rights. Although not every criminal defendant of insufficient means
was entitled to legal aid, his right to a fair hearing guaranteed by section 18 (1) was not qualified
by section 18 (2)(d) or section 18 (12) constitution.
The right to be heard is not absolute. It may therefore be excluded for good reason. The CCSU
case illustrates one set of in which the right to a fair hearing may be curtailed. Principal among
these are national security considerations. Lord Fraser explained the point well by saying, the
decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any
particular case is for the government and not for the courts. In other words, there are some
matters, of which national security is one, which are not amenable to the judicial process. Rees v
Crane case also refers to a set of circumstances in which a fair hearing may be denied to an
applicant. Among these may be the fact that the investigation is purely preliminary, that there
will be a full chance adequately to deal with the complaints later, that the making of the inquiry
without observing the right to fair hearing maxim is justified by urgency or administrative
necessity, (Ex.P Pegasus Holdings) that no penalty or serious damage to reputation is inflicted by
proceeding to the next stage without such preliminary notice and that the statutory scheme
properly construed excludes such a right.
Ex. P Pegasus the court held that while the rules of natural justice required that a person affected
by an administrative action should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case,
comparatively little was required in a situation of emergency where the safety of aircraft and
passengers was concerned. In Bates v Lord Hailsham, it was held that considerations of natural
justice and fairness did not affect legislative process whether primary or delegated. In the sphere
of the so-called quasi-judicial the rules of natural justice run, and that in the administrative or
executive field there is a general 104
duty of fairness. The court held that the committee‘s function under S56 was of a legislative and
not administrative, executive or quasi-judicial nature. Consequently it was not bound by rules of
natural justice or by any general duty of fairness to consult all bodies that would be affected by
the order it made under the powers delegated to it by S.56.
THE RULE AGAINST BIAS
The right to a fair hearing would be a very hollow unless it were twinned with the requirement
that the hearing should be before an unbiased decision maker. Every person has a bias of one
form or the other based on their life experiences. Bias, is sufficient to disqualify a decision
maker, therefore, has a narrower technical meaning than in ordinary parlance. The law on bias is
not concerned with actual bias thus, there need not be any proof of bias just an apparent bias.
Lord Hewarts famous dictum in Ex. P McCarthy said, ―It is not merely of some importance
but it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly
and undoubtedly be seen to be done.‖ However, this dictum has been seen to provide too long a
threshold for bias.
The issue arises as to what is the true test for bias. The HOL in R v Gough seemed to have
finally settled the interchangeable use, confusion and uncertainty of application of the real
likelihood of bias and the reasonable suspicion of bias tests. The leading The COA in the UK
took the opportunity, which presented itself in Re Medicaments and Related Classess of Goods
to consider the whole question of apparent bias and how its presence was to be tested. The
adjustment of the test in R v Gough laid the basis for the final stage in the formulation of the
objective test.
The objective test was set out in Porter v Magill of whether the fair-minded decision of the
House was delivered by Lord Goff, who shifted the focus of the court‘s scrutiny away from real
likelihood and reasonable suspicion of bias to that of a real danger of bias test, emphasizing the
possibility and not the probability of bias. The court also whittled away the need to ascertain the
perceptions of the reasonable man and stressed 105
that the views of the court were founded upon the facts must be imputed to the reasonable man
personified by the court. The real danger test has been applied in Commonwealth Caribbean, it
has not been so applied in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, or in Guyana where the
uncertainty which beset the pre-Gough situation in England still prevails. In Porter v Magil, the
COA having examined the question whether the real danger test might lead to a different result
from that which the informed observer would reach on the same facts, concluded in Locabil that
in overwhelming majority of cases the application of the two tests would lead to the same
outcome. It was observed that the precise test to be applied when determining whether a decision
should be set aside on account of bias had given rise to difficulty, reflected in judicial decisions
that had appeared in conflict in R v Gough had not commanded universal approval.
The alternative test had been thought to be more closely in line with Strasbourg jurisprudence
which since 2 October 200 the English courts were required to take into account, the occasion
should now be taken to review R v Gough to see whether the test it lays down is, indeed, in
conflict with Strasbourg jurisprudence. It was suggested that they should now approve the
modest adjustment of the test in R v Gough set out in that paragraph. It expresses in clear and
simple language a test which is in harmony with the objective test which the Strasbourg court
applies when it is considering whether the circumstances gives to a reasonable apprehension of
bias. It removes any possible conflict with the test which is now applied in most Commonwealth
countries and in Scotland. I would however delete form it the reference to a real danger. Those
words no longer serve a useful purpose here, and they are not used in the jurisprudence of the
Strasbourg court. The principle laid down in Porter v Magil is whether the fair-minded and
informed observer, having considered the facts, would consider that there was a real possibility
that the tribunal was biased. Lord Steyn said in Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd, public perception
of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key.
The case of Meerabux v AG of Belize represents the latest successful impeachment of a judge
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The appellant, a former justice of the 106
Supreme Court of Belize, was removed from office for misbehavior by the Governor General
acting on the advice of the Belize Advisory Council. His case on appeal was that the decision of
the Belize Advisory Council that he misbehaved while performing his duties as a judge, and its
advice to the Governor General that he should be removed from office, were fundamentally
flawed for two reasons.
The first was that the person who presided over the proceedings in his capacity as the chairman
of the BAC was also a member of the Bar Association of Belize by which the majority of the
complaints of misbehavior had been made. It is said that he was automatically disqualified from
taking any part in these proceedings by reason of his membership of the Bar Association, or
alternatively that a fair-minded he was biased. The second reason was that the hearing into the
allegations of appellant‘s right under S 6 (8) of the Constitution, as it required that the
proceedings for the determination of the question whether he should be removed from office as a
justice of the Supreme Court should be heard in public.
In dismissing the appeal, the Privy Council relied on four grounds. These were as follows:
(a) Where there was an allegation of bias on the part of a tribunal (in this case, the Belize
Advisory Council) the appropriate test was whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having
considered the facts, would consider that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.
Having regard to the nature and composition of the tribunal, the qualifications required of the
chairman of the Belize Advisory Council, the requirement (in the first proviso to S54 (11)) that
in a case under S 98 the chairman must preside, and the fact that specific provision was made
should the Council be convened to consider the removal of the chairman, it seemed that a fair-
minded observer would not have concluded that this person was biased.

(b) The chairmanship of the Belize Advisory Council would in practice almost always be held by
a person who was a member of the Bar Association (an association
107
necessarily concerned with matters relating to judicial inability or misbehavior and, possibly,
actively involved with such) and these facts must be taken to have been within the contemplation
of the draftsman of the Constitution. This was a conclusive indication that that membership of
the Bar Association was not, in itself, a ground of disqualification of the chairman.

(c) S 6(8) of the Constitution had no application in this case, not because the appellant had no
civil rights in respect of his office, but because S 6 (8) applied only to courts and other
authorities forming part of the judicial branch of government and the Belize Advisory Council
(being an independent body, uniquely constituted as part of the executive arm of government)
was not such an authority.

(d) A public hearing was not an indispensable element in a fair hearing; the common law
requirements of procedural fairness were essentially that the person affected had to have prior
notice and an effective opportunity to make representations before a decision was made or
implemented, and that the tribunal was unbiased; the appellant had not given or led nay evidence
to contradict the allegation against him and it could not be said that he had suffered any
unfairness as a result of the decision to hold the proceedings in camera.

In R v Gough, there is only one established special category where the law assumes bias and that
exists where the tribunal has a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject matter of the
proceedings. The court should hesitate long before creating any other special category.
Ex.P Pinochet, the principle of automatic disqualification was applied. The applicant‘s advisers
discovered that one of the judges, Lord Hoffman, who had been part of the majority was,
although not a member of Amnesty International, an unpaid director and chairman of Amnesty
International Ltd., a charity which as wholly controlled by Amnesty International and carried on
that part of its work which was charitable. One of the objects of AIC Ltd. was to procure the
abolition of torture, extra-judicial execution and 108
disappearance. The Home Secretary signed the authority to proceed. The HOL held that in order
to maintain the absolute impartiality of the judiciary there had to be a rule which automatically
disqualified a judge who was involved, whether personally or as a director of a company, in
promoting the same causes in the same organization as was a party to the suit; and that,
accordingly, the earlier decision of the House would be set aside.
In Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd, the CA held that where a judge had a direct
personal interest, which was other than de minimis, in the out come of proceedings bias was
presumed to exist and he was automatically disqualified from hearing or continuing to hear the
case and any judgment he had given would be set aside. It was further held that such
disqualification arose irrespective of the judge‘s state of knowledge as to his interest; but that a
party with an irresistible right to object to his hearing or continuing to hear the case might waive
that right so long as he did so in clear and unequivocal terms and with full knowledge of the
relevant facts Ex. P Pinochet applied.
That in any automatic disqualification where the judge had knowledge of his interest, he should
recuse himself before objection was raised and at the earliest possible stage. Where, following
appropriate disclosure, no objection was taken to his hearing or continuing to hear a case no
subsequent complaint of bias could be made in respect of the matter so disclosed. What
constituted appropriate disclosure would largely depend on the stage reached in the proceedings
so that where, in advance of the hearing, the judge became aware of a matter which might affect
his fitness to sit he should inquire fully into it and make full disclosure but where such a matter
emerged during the hearing the judge, while the being required to disclose what he then knew,
was not obliged to conduct any fuller inquiry.
In Jones v Das Legal Expenses Insurance Co Ltd, is a situation where bias will not apply. In
this case the COA did not consider that in these circumstances the claimant could be said to have
acted freely in waiving his right to object. They were left with a nagging doubt that he had been
―hustled into‖ his decision. The court went on to find, 109
however, that he had subsequently waived his right to object to the chair. It offered the following
guidelines: ―If there is any real as opposed to fanciful chance of objection being taken by that
fair-minded spectator, the first step is to ascertain whether or not another judge is available to
hear the matter. It is obviously better to transfer the matter than risk a complaint of bias. The
judge should make every effort in the time available to clarify what his interest is which gives
rise to this conflict so that the full facts can be placed before the parties.‖
―Some time should be taken to prepare whatever explanation is to be given to the parties and if
one is really troubled perhaps even to make a note of what one will say.‖ ―Because thoughts that
the court may have been biased can become festering sores for the disappointed litigants, it is
vital that the judge‘s explanation be mechanically recorded or carefully noted where that facility
is not available. That will avoid the kind of controversy about what was or was not said which
has bedeviled this case.‖ A full explanation must be given to the parties. That explanation should
detail exactly what matters are within the judge‘s knowledge which give rise to a possible
conflict of interest. The judge must be punctilious in setting out all material matters known to
him. Secondly, an explanation should be given as to why the problem had only arisen so late in
the day. The parties deserve also to be told whether it would be possible to move the case to
another judge that day.
The options open to the parties should be explained in detail. Those options are, of course, to
consent to the judge hearing the matter, the consequence being that the parties will thereafter be
likely to be held to have lost their right to object. The other option is to apply to the judge to
recuse himself. The parties should be told it is their right to object, that the court will not take it
amiss if the right is exercised and that the judge will decide having heard the submissions. They
should be told what will happen next. If the court decides the case can proceed, it will proceed. If
on the other hand the judge decides he will have to stand down, the parties should be told in
advance of the likely dates on which the matter may be re-listed. The parties should always be
told that time will be afforded to reflect before electing. That should be made clear even where
110
both parties are represented. If there is a litigant in person the better practice may be to rise for
five minutes. The litigant in person can be directed to the Citizens Advice Bureau if that service
is available and if he wishes to avail of it. If the litigant feels he needs more help, he can be
directed to the chief clerk and the listing officer. Since this is a problem created by the court, the
court has to do its best to assist in resolving it.