DY TEBAN TRADING, INC. vs. PETER C. DY, et al.

G.R. No. 185647 July 26, 2017

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Due process is fundamental in our judicial system. In court litigation, it is upheld
through the establishment of, and strict adherence to, procedural rules that
govern the behavior of party litigants. In our adversarial system, the right of a
litigant to cross-examine a witness is essential to the principle of due process.
The right to cross-examine a witness does not imply, however, an absolute
command that an actual cross-examination be had. The right is sufficiently
protected when there is a real opportunity to conduct a cross-examination. What
our laws proscribe is the absence of a chance to cross-examine. Further, the
right to cross-examination is a personal right that may be waived. In Savory
Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, this Court explained:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a

judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is
part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived
expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-
examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right
to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness
will be received or allowed to remain in the record. (Citations omitted.)

The waiver of the right to cross-examine a witness may be express or implied. In

these instances, no violation of the constitutional right to due process is
committed as the party himself or herself has opted not to exercise the right. The
validity of a waiver of the right to cross-examine is recognized in our jurisdiction.
The difficulty, however, is in cases where the waiver of the right is only implied.
An implied waiver may take various forms. In ascertaining whether a party has
waived his or her right to cross-examine a witness, this Court has identified a
general standard that depends, for its application, on the surrounding facts of
each particular case. In Savory Luncheonette, this Court said that a party may be
deemed to have waived his or her right to cross-examine a witness when he or
she was given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing
witness but failed to do so for reasons attributable to himself or herself alone.
MARLON CURAMMENG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 219510 November 14, 2016

Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct

rather than serve the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing
circumstances of the case, such as where strong considerations of substantive
justice are manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the strict application of
the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. The Court's
pronouncement in Heirs of Zaulda v. Zaulda is instructive on this matter, to wit:

The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be

attained by precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice
would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of
justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more
prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression
of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not
miscarriage of justice."

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The
rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. At this juncture, the Court reminds all members of the
bench and bar of the admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v. Villamar [16
Phil. 315, 322 (1910)]:

Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when
it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no
vested rights in technicalities. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Otherwise stated, procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of
reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may
not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright
deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so
requires.