Armageddon Averted Review (Questions 1, 2, 4, 7, 8)

Michael Ryan

EUH4576: History of Russia in the 20th Century

Dr. Vladimir Solonari

July 28, 2020

Word Count: 2326

 1

In Stephen Kotkin’s book Armageddon Averted, he explored the idea that the Soviet

Union collapse began much earlier than what originally thought as well as the collapse having

continued beyond the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Oil was one of the first topics

explored as the Soviet economy was so heavily dependent on the substance, and when the CIA

began blocking Soviet access to Arab oil, it posed a large threat to the economy as a whole. This

problem was solved as the Soviets struck oil in Western Siberia, making it possible to shift from

an importing economy to one that exported to foreign countries, which in turn gave the Soviet

economy a large influx of hard currency. The main issue with Soviet industry when compared to

other industrialized nations was that Soviet factories guzzled oil and energy at exorbitant rates,

so when oil prices dropped dramatically in 1986, the rust belt of Russia finally had to face the

same fate as those in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, only on a much larger

scale.1 Reform, according to Kotkin, was an unlikely scenario as the Soviets had created what

essentially amounted to junk on a level never before seen and was paralleled by the lack of

creation of new sectors. This set the economy into a freefall with no real end in sight, and it even

got the point that money was refused, and people bartered instead. The problem was not only

industry however, as was revealed at the end of the Second World War; socialism in itself

claimed to be the superior system when compared to capitalism, but after fascism was defeated,

rather than seeing the end of capitalism as Stalin and many socialists envisioned they instead saw

unprecedented growth. This fundamentally challenged the picture of capitalism as it had been

portrayed for years prior. Kotkin also focused on the story of Mikhail Gorbachev and his lucky

and tactful rise to leadership, having become the youngest member of Kremlin leadership due to

1
Kotkin, Stephen “History's Cruel Tricks.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, 10–31 New
York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
 2

the original candidate, Fyodor Kulakov, having died of an alcohol overdose.2 This was just the

start of Gorbachev’s ascent to power, and in 1983, a bedridden Andropov directs him to take

responsibility for the entirety of the economy and led him to assume the role of second secretary

with no real vote. Another leader Kotkin focused heavily on was Putin and how he attempted to

halt the Russian economy from further collapse; he touted a major tax overhaul in 2000 as an

attempt to create incentives for businesses while they still remain transparent in practices. This

was extremely hypocritical for Putin due to the amount of brazen illegal surveillance being

conducted on the elites and others, adding up to cost a fortune for the Russians.

The beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union began in the 1970s when oil began to

be extracted in West Siberia according to Kotkin, leading to an extreme dependency on oil

within a outdated form of industry that used more for less results. While the boom in oil prices

provided the Soviet leadership with an influx of hard currency, rather than update their industry,

they built up the military in order to be on parity with the United States as well as cushioned the

oil shock that was occurring in their East European satellite countries.3 While this was mostly

due to the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet leadership failed to

account for when their oil money would run dry. Despite being the largest producer in oil and

natural gas, it still suffered from chronic energy shortages due to the outdated and gas-guzzling

machinery. The Soviet leadership’s failure to address the nation’s issues while it had the influx

of money proved to be fatal in 1986 when oil prices dropped dramatically, and Kotkin believed

the major troubles actually stemmed from the success of the Soviet industry. These factories

made up approximately 70 percent of the Soviet economy, dwarfing any other nation at that time

2
Kotkin, Stephen “Reviving the Dream.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, 32--58 New
York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
3
Kotkin, Stephen “History's Cruel Tricks.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, 10–31 New
York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
 3

in terms of industrial “power”; however, these factories were mostly built the 1930s and had seen

no upgrades, and while the large amount of oil money acted as a temporary fix, it just allowed

for Soviet leadership to delay the inevitable.4 The sheer size of the Soviet rust belt made it

extremely difficult to reform as it spanned across time zones and was simply put obsolete in spite

of the previous increased profits. The system as it was needed a reformer on the level of

Khrushchev, and it attempted to find that in Gorbachev, and that move would prove to be fatal to

the Soviet Union.

To take a look at the story of Mikhail Gorbachev, a small amount of backstory is needed

to place him in context with the collapse of the Soviet Union; he was born as many are within a

peasant family, victim to the collectivization process, but rather than become a farmer he pursued

education. The access to higher education and the ability to critically think despite the

consequences is what made Gorbachev stand out when it came to Russian leaders, for example in

1969 he visited Czechoslovakia and was able to see the truth of the Soviet presence despite what

the Kremlin had officially stated. One major part of Gorbachev’s rise to power was his

relationship with Yuri Andropov, the then chairman of the KGB who engineered a promotion for

Gorbachev as the Central Committee secretary for agriculture.5 This was especially helpful to

Gorbachev when Andropov was voted in as general secretary following the death of Brezhnev

and then became deathly ill shortly after taking office. Before his death, however, Andropov

was able to put in place a team he saw fit to rule with specific instruction to Gorbachev to

assume responsibility for the entirety of the economy. Gorbachev did not officially have the

power to do so, but he assumed the role of de fact general secretary and was voted in

4
Kotkin, Stephen “History's Cruel Tricks.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, 10–31 New
York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
5
Kotkin, Stephen “Reviving the Dream.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, 32--58 New
York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
 4

subsequently. Gorbachev was hailed in his use of tact as well as his absolute commitment to the

reinvigoration of socialist ideals; while not his intention, Gorbachev’s idea of a humane

socialism proved to be fatal to the system as a whole.6 Politically, Gorbachev played a cautious

game, for example when accusations against Ligachev were brought as Gorbachev returned from

a trip, rather than just accept the accusation and condemn Ligachev, he investigated it in private

as well as exonerated Ligachev in private. This secured Ligachev’s loyalty, and also made it

abundantly clear that Gorbachev was not one to fall for trick of the ego. On the subject of

Yeltsin, Gorbachev originally had brought him as an ally in order to promote some political

reforms, but he had also brought his worst enemy. Yeltsin supposedly had concrete plans for the

economy, something that Gorbachev changed his tune on multiple times, and Yeltsin also had

the support of the common people while Gorbachev was hated for his glasnost and perestroika

policies. This further divide between the two led to Yeltsin proposing there be a president of the

Russian federation as well as a general secretary and him being elected to that position. The

disregard for Yeltsin and his policies cost Gorbachev a great deal of power when it came to the

two-president system.

Kotkin noted that the 1990s was an especially difficult time for what was originally the

Soviet Union for a number of reasons; economically, the massive waste that was Soviet industry

had no capability to be reformed due to the many issues that had simply gone ignored over the

decades. Another problem was the rampant corruption that had simply become commonplace,

which inevitably lead to those in power taking as much as they could before the whole system

collapsed around them. On top of this, no one had truly enacted economic reforms as they said

they would, it rather turned into a competition of breast-beating as to what would actually work

6
Kotkin, Stephen “Reviving the Dream.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, 32--58 New
York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
 5

while the KGB and Central Committee did anything in their power for profits. This, just as the

Soviet military appeared to disappear into thin air, spelled disaster. At the end of 1991, inflation

was estimated at 250 percent per month, which brought about the barter economy between

employers and employees; paper money held such little value that food, vodka, and televisions

were being distributed rather than normal wages.7 Even after this disaster which stemmed from

the industry, government officials managed to convince Gaidar to hold off on the liberalization

of fuel and energy prices in order to “protect” what remained of the industry. In 1992 there came

some attempt at economic reform, replacing the Soviet central bank with fifteen separate banks

within each republic, and yet it came with a fatal flaw; despite Russia being the only one bank

capable of printing paper roubles, each republic bank could issue credits in the form of roubles,

which of course only exacerbated the already tired Russian economy.

Putin attempted to right these wrongs in the form of a massive tax overhaul but still had

to put some work in before Russia became a decently run federation. The KGB within Russia at

this time was grossly oversized for what was needed, and with the KGB came mass illegal

surveillance of Russian elites. This surveillance was a massive portion of the budget at this time,

but nonofficial black markets invaded almost every aspect of Russian life, making the “official”

budget nothing more than a crude guess. Everything was for sale in this Russia, the “news” was

just cleverly hidden infomercials, the politicians most against corruption were the most corrupt,

and attacks on different political ideologies could be purchased in the news.8 Even though you

could buy a news story which in turn effectively makes news stations absolutely useless, they

still remained an extremely valuable commodity for public life. Elections were also run

7
Kotkin, Stephen “Survival and cannibalism in the rust belt.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-
2000, 113--141 New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
8
Kotkin, Stephen “Democracy without liberalism?” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, 142--
170 New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
 6

similarly with either financial or political backers guaranteed the “victory.” This was a

paradoxical time for Russia, as it proudly stated everything was being done with utmost

professionalism when that could not be further from the truth. Putin adopted a system of

democracy without liberalism which made it so industries did not have to be torn down and

rebuilt from the very beginning but rather could begin an era of reconstruction.9

While the Soviet Union officially collapsed in 1991, Kotkin made a strong case as to how

it started in the 1970s and ended in the 2000s; the beginning of the end came when Soviet

industry was allowed to continue in the face of new oil money despite its efficiency and output

problems. This was then only made worse when more and more of the Soviet economy was

surrounded by the use of fossil fuels, making them wholly dependent on the substances. This

problem reared its head when oil prices dropped dramatically in 1986. The drop in price

crippled the Soviet economy, 70 percent of which was reliant on fossil fuels, more than any other

nation at the time. The industry part of Russia’s gigantic rust had no chance at being reformed at

that point, and there was likely little to be done years ago when oil was struck; it was an

inevitability for these types of factories to fail, just as they had done in the West. Gorbachev’s

idea for a more humane way of socialism was laudable, but the way in which he went about it

only hastened the collapse. His glasnost policies revealed what had been kept from the people

for so many years: corruption, executions, spying, banned media, and simply how life fared in

other nations. These policies were applauded by Western leaders but condemned by his own

people as how could they ever trust the government again in light of what was revealed. With

the official collapse of the Soviet Union saw real ruin begin to take place; the separate republics

caused massive inflation due to them having issued credits for roubles, even more accounts of

9
Kotkin, Stephen “Democracy without liberalism?” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, 142--
170 New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
 7

corruption, and the Soviet military was dissolved. When Putin came into power, the collapse

was still in effect and he took immediate action to attempt to halt the post-Soviet economy from

sinking any further. While this was a good effort, rampant corruption still took place and media

such as the news could be bought, and anything could be presented as fact. This made it

especially difficult to recover from the farrago of badness that the Soviet Union had left. While

the American view of the Soviet Union saw it destined to collapse due to its socialist nature and

capitalist superiority, Kotkin presented facts that show the Union’s collapse was an

amalgamation of a lack of transparency and foresight, corruption, and the inability to accept

change.

Bibliography

Kotkin, Stephen “History's Cruel Tricks.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-

2000, 10–31 New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Kotkin, Stephen “Reviving the Dream.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-

2000, 32–58 New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
 8

Kotkin, Stephen “Survival and cannibalism in the rust belt.” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet

Collapse, 1970-2000, 113–141 New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Kotkin, Stephen “Democracy without liberalism?” In Armageddon Averted: The Soviet

Collapse, 1970-2000, 142–170 New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.