NEW ERA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
SY 2020-2021
MODULE 3

BARCELLANO, JOBELLE
PIL 6-9pm FRIDAY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Guide Questions……………………………………………………………………...…..1
Tomoyuki Yamashita v Styer
75 Phil 563 (1945) GR No 129 19 December 1945……………………………………...2
Kookooritchkin v Solicitor General
81 Phil 435 (1948) GR No 1812 27 August 1948……………………………………….3
Shigenori Kuroda v Jalandoni
83 Phil 171 GR No 2662 26 March 1949………………………………………………..4
Gonzales v Hechanova
118 Phil 1065 (1963) GR No 21897 22 October 1963…………………………………..5
Tanada v Angara
GR No 118295 2 May 1997……………………………………………………………...6
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v Zamora
GR No 138570 10 October 2000 396 Phil 623 (2000)…………………………………..7
Republic v Sandiganbayan
GR No 104768 21 July 2003…………………………………………………………….8
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Ass’n v Duque
GR No 173034 9 October 2007………………………………………………………….9
Vinuya v Romulo
GR No 162230 28 April 2010 619 SCRA 523 (2010)………………………………….10
Bayan Muna v Romulo
GR No 159618 1 February 2011 641 SCRA 244 (2011)……………………………….11
Poe-Llamanzares v Commission on Elections
GR Nos 221697 & 221698-700 8 March 2016…………………………………………12
Nicolas v Romulo
GR No 175888 11 February 2009 598 Phil 262 (2009)………………………………...13
Co Kim Cham v Valdez
GR No 5 17 September 1945…………………………………………………………...14
Lim v Executive Secretary
GR No 151445 11 April 2002 430 Phil 555 (2002)…………………………………….15
Abaya v Ebdane
GR No 167919 14 February 2007………………………………………………………16
Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel
GR No 183591 14 October 2008……………………………………………………….17
China National Machinery v Santamaria
GR No 185572 7 February 2012 665 SCRA 189 (2012)………………………………18
Saguisag v Ochoa………………………………………………………………………19
The Paquete Habana
175 US 677 8 January 1900…………………………………………………………….21
Sosa v Alvarez-Machain
542 US 692 (2004)……………………………………………………………………...22
Medellin v Texas
552 US 491 25 March 2008…………………………………………………………….23
Guide Questions
1. Distinguish between Monist and Dualist theories of international law.
- Monist theory prioritizes the desirability of a formal international legal order to
establish the rule of law among nations, while dualist theory prioritizes the
notions of individual self-determination and sovereignty at the state level.
International Judicial Monitor – General Principles of International Law: Monism and
Dualism
2. Distinguish between the doctrine of incorporation and the doctrine of
transformation.
- Doctrine of incorporation considers rules of international law as forming part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere while doctrine of transformation requires
legislative action to make the treaty enforceable in the municipal sphere.
Public International Law by Evelyn de Matias
3. In case of conflict between municipal law and international law, which should
prevail?
- Municipal law, when in conflict with PIL is given effect in municipal courts, the
reason being that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly
bound by it in all circumstances.
- the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
mean to imply it is primary over national or municipal law.
- in Doctrine of Incorporation, PIL is given standing equal but not superior to
national legislative enactments.
Public International Law by Evelyn de Matias

Page2
Tomoyuki Yamashita v Styer
75 Phil 563 (1945) GR No 129 19 December 1945

Facts:
Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group of the
Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a prisoner of war
of the United States of America but was later removed from such status and placed in
confinement as an accused war criminal charged before an American Military
Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding General
of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be reinstated
to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited
from further trying him. He questions, among others, the jurisdiction of said Military
Commission.

Issues:
1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case?

2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent, therefore having

jurisdiction over the war crimes?

Ruling:
1. NO. 2. YES.

1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It
seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his
former status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The relative difference
as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure,
disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue
against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper
against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made party
respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction,
no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the
petitioner.

The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the
commission be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61,
ante), “. . . an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States
Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be considered as a violation of
this country’s faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold.”

2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and
convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to create a
military commission is an aspect of waging war, military commanders have that power
unless expressly withdrawn from them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States has
explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall
have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the laws of war in appropriate
cases.
Page2
Kookooritchkin v Solicitor General
81 Phil 435 (1948) GR No 1812 27 August 1948

Facts:
In August, 1941, Eremes Kookooritchkin (appellee) filed with the lower court a petition
for naturalization, accompanied with supporting affidavits of two citizens, copy of a
declaration of intention sworn in July, 1940, and proper notice of the hearing. The
petition was finally set for hearing on December 18, 1941, but it was held on that date
because the province was invaded by the Japanese forces on December 14, and the case
remained pending until the records were destroyed during the military operations for
liberation in March, 1945. The case was declared reconstituted on May 10, 1947, and
the evidence was presented on August 28 and September 30, 1947. On the same day
resolution was issued granting the petition.

Appellant signs four errors in the appealed resolution.

1. Appellant alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence was introduce to
establish the fact that apellee had lawfully been admitted into the Philippines
2. Appellee cannot speak and write any of the principal Philippine languages
3. Appellee is not stateless therefore disqualified for Philippine citizenship under
section 4(h) of the Revised Naturalization Law

Issue:
WON appellee is entitled to acquire Filipino citizenship based on the lower court’s
findings

Ruling:
YES.
The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of intention to become a
Filipino citizen were filed, had been lost or destroyed during the battle for the liberation
of Manila, and the certificate alluded to has not been reconstituted.

The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously residing in the Philippines
for about 25 years, without having been molested by the authorities, who are presumed
to have been regularly performing their duties and would have arrested petitioner if his
residence is illegal, as rightly contended by appellee, can be taken as evidence that he is
enjoying permanent residence legally. That a certificate of arrival has been issued is a
fact that should be accepted upon the petitioner's undisputed statement in his declaration
of July, 1940, that the certificate cannot be supposed that the receiving official would
have accepted the declaration without the certificate mentioned therein as attached
thereto.

We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid under section 5 of the Naturalization

Law, failure to reconstitute the certificate of arrival notwithstanding. What an
unreconstituted document intended to prove may be shown by other competent
evidence.
Page2
Shigenori Kuroda v Jalandoni
83 Phil 171 GR No 2662 26 March 1949

Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a
period covering 1943 and 1944 who is now charged before a military Commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting
them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians
and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of
war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order
No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S.
Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before
the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with
the case of petitioners.

Issues:
WON EO 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines
is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law,
national and international.

Ruling:
No. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule
and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President
of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid
and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that —

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present
day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents
of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military
or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression
and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in
violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held

accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution

Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

Also, the promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his
power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces.

Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound
together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in
the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not
erased by our assumption of full sovereignty.
Page2
Gonzales v Hechanova
118 Phil 1065 (1963) GR No 21897 22 October 1963

Facts:
Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed a petition questioning said act because
Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 —
explicitly prohibits the importation of foreign rice by the Rice and Corn Administration
or any other government agency.

Hechanova countered that the importation is authorized by the President for military
stock pile purposes (the president is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of
war or emergency without waiting for special authority). He also contends that there is
no prohibition on importation made by the “Government itself”. He also further that the
Government has already entered into 2 contracts with Vietnam and Burma; that these
contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; and, that such
agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by the representatives of
both parties. Hechanova also maintains that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does
not give him sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein
prayed for and that Gonzales has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to
him before coming to court".

Issues:
What is the nature of the government contracts with Vietnam and Burma? Are they
valid?
May an international agreement be invalidated by our courts?

Ruling:
The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive
agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of
the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in
the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 138, in all purchases by the Government, including
those made by and/or for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials
produced in the Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this
general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452.
Yes. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be
deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
Page2

conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Tanada v Angara
GR No 118295 2 May 1997

Facts:
On April 15, 1994, Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and
Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is
composed of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
(3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof."
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed arguing mainly (1) that the WTO
requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits
and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both

Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods."

Issue:
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution prohibits the Philippines from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

Ruling:
NO. 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized. The Court DISMISSED
the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the President’s
ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
Page2

neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v Zamora
GR No 138570 10 October 2000 396 Phil 623 (2000)

Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto
Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Having a key
determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered
grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval”
by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139
signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence
process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

Issue:
Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.

Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture
being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international
doctrines, practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of
incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and
international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the
category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form
of international agreement.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements – whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as
the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof
or as consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding
international written contract among nations.
Page2
Republic v Sandiganbayan
GR No 104768 21 July 2003

Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, Corazon
Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the PCGG to recover an ill-gotten wealth of former
President Marcos.
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its Chairman Jovito Salonga, created an AFP Board
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired. Investigations include the alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Ramas, Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.
Evidence showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City as well
in Cebu City. Moreover, equipment and communication facilities were found in the
premises of Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment, the raiding team
also confiscated P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit disclosed that Elizabeth
Dimaano is the mistress of respondent Ramas. Dimaano had no visible means of income
and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
With these, a prima facie case exists against respondent Ramas for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth.

Issue:
WON the search of Dimaano’s home was legal.

Ruling:
NO. It is true that the Bill of Rights under 1973 Constitution was not operative during
an interregnum (any period which a state has no ruler or only temporary executive).
However, the protection accorded to individuals in International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect
during the interregnum.
When no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted on them. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt
together with other items not included in the search warrant. Dimaano was also not
present during the raid.
Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to
insure that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration provides in its Article 17(2)
that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Thus, the revolutionary
government is obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals
under the Declaration.
Page2
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Ass’n v Duque
GR No 173034 9 October 2007

Facts:
On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President
Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article
112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are
not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the
RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of said law.

Issue:
W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?

Ruling:
No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in
turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other
WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of
the land.
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered customary law, it
must be established that such rule is followed by states because it is considered
obligatory (opinio juris).
In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by member states. Further, they failed to
establish that provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law
that may be deemed part of law of the land.
Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions into domestic law.
They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law to be
enacted by legislature.
Page2
Vinuya v Romulo
GR No 162230 28 April 2010 619 SCRA 523 (2010)

Facts:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ,
and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the
victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World
War. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with
the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in
refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the
war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.

Issue:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

Ruling:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has
the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against
Japan.
The Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this
case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be
inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to
overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
Page2
Bayan Muna v Romulo
GR No 159618 1 February 2011 641 SCRA 244 (2011)

Facts:
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d'Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
the Rome Statute which, by its terms is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition only 92 out of the 139
signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence
process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
DFA proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement between the USA
and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03,
hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted
the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect
the Agreement with the US government Inesse the Agreementaims to protect what it
refers to and defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits
that might be brought against them in international tribunals. It is reflective of the
increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two
countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and
between the US and 33 other countries.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the
non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28,
2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement
under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the
advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
For their part, respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit and counter
that the Agreement, being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require
Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons detailed in their comment,
respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement.

Issue:
WON the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized
principles of international law.

Ruling:
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture
being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international
doctrines, practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of
incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and
international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the
category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form
Page2

of international agreement.
Poe-Llamanzares v Commission on Elections
GR Nos 221697 & 221698-700 8 March 2016

Facts:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the
parental care and custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his
wife, she has been reported and registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.
When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley
(aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her
adoption. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and
pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She
graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in
Political Studies.
She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding.
She gave birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the
Philippines.
She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines to
support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to
her youngest daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she
rushed back to the Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the
petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in
2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed suit; acquired property
where she and her children resided.
In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a
sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three children which was granted. She registered as a voter;
secured Philippine passport; appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB
after executing an affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice
Consul of the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in
2011.

Issue:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

Ruling:
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born
Filipino.
It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already
impliedly so recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to
equal protection of the laws.
Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties,
adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.
Page2
Nicolas v Romulo
GR No 175888 11 February 2009 598 Phil 262 (2009)

Facts:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the US Armed
Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner
herein, sometime on November 1, 2005. Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the US entered into, the US, at its
request, was granted custody of Smith. The RTC of Makati rendered a decision finding
defendant Smith guilty due to sufficient evidence.
Defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the DILG and brought to a
facility for detention under the control of the US government under the new agreements
between the Philippines and the US, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith
because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.

Issue:
WON the VFA is void and unconstitutional.

Ruling:
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of
the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence
“allowed under” the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US
Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such
presence.

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions.

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different
treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. “Art. V, Sec. 10. The
confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and US authorities.”
Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are
agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in
accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.”
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives
of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
Page2
Co Kim Cham v Valdez
GR No 5 17 September 1945

Facts:
Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the
CFI of Manila. After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,
respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued
by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings
and judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the American occupation.
Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces
to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now the
proceedings in actions pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were
reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces

Ruling:
Yes. All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a
de facto government are good and valid. If the governments established in these Islands
under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto
governments, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and
valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces.

No. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to
the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional,
processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established
in the Islands during the Japanese occupation.
The legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or
reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military
and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in
chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation, it is to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government
and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the United
States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by
the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by
the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of
1907.

Yes. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes
place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his
own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the
country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect.
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the
right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is
restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to
continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.
Page2
Lim v Executive Secretary
GR No 151445 11 April 2002 430 Phil 555 (2002)

Facts:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the
armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin
"Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation
of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is
rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W.
Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers
of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington,
D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on
September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of
the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of
Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition- in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a
fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of
certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it
is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover,
there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof
of direct personal injury.

Issue:
WON the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper

Ruling:
NO. Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an
impermanent basis, in “activities”, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US
personnel “must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement,
and in particular, from any political activity.”
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is
only logical to assume that “Balikatan 02-1” – a mutual anti-terrorism advising assisting
and training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the
context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and
the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities – as opposed to combat
itself – such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other
treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in
the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration
of Principles and State Policies in this case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign
relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory
Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or
of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the
Philippines only by way of direct exception.

International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws

Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from
international agreements.
Page2
Abaya v Ebdane
GR No 167919 14 February 2007

Facts:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines based on the
Exchange of Notes through their respective representatives have reached an
understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines. These loans
were aimed at promoting our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts.
In accordance with the agreement reached by the Government of Japan and the
Philippine Government, the Philippines obtained from and was granted a loan by the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
Under the terms and conditions of Loan Agreement, JBIC agreed to lend the Philippine
Government an amount not exceeding Japanese Yen (Y15,384,000,000) as principal for
the implementation of the Arterial Road Links Development Project (Phase IV) on the
terms and conditions set forth in the Loan Agreement and in accordance with the
relevant laws and regulations of Japan. The said amount shall be used for the purchase
of eligible goods and services necessary for the implementation of the above- mentioned
project from suppliers, contractors or consultants.

Issue:
Whether the procurement loan extended by the JBIC is an executive agreement or treaty

Ruling:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes
dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine
Government is an executive agreement. The Exchange of Notes expressed that the two
governments have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended
to the Philippines and that these loans were aimed at promoting our country’s economic
stabilization and development efforts.
Under the circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an adjunct of the Japanese
Government. Further, Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 is indubitably an integral part of
the Exchange of Notes. It forms part of the Exchange of Notes such that it cannot be
properly taken independent thereof.
An exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes
binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress.
Under the fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is, in
fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184 as it provides that "[a]ny treaty or international
or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine
government is a signatory shall be observed," the DPWH, as the executing agency of the
projects financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the contract for
the implementation of civil works for the CP I project to private respondent China Road
& Bridge Corporation.
Page2
Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel
GR No 183591 14 October 2008

Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the
MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

Ruling:
Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the
local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents
from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority
by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation
of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial
review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-
intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the
liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo. In Pimentel Jr. v. Aguirre, this
Court held: x x x By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x By the same token, when an act
of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. That the law or act in question is
not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Page2
China National Machinery v Santamaria
GR No 185572 7 February 2012 665 SCRA 189 (2012)

Facts:
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery& Equipment Corp.
(Group) (CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation(Northrail),
represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a
possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).On
30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank)and the Department of
Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug
30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer‘s Credit to the Philippine
government to finance the North rail Project. The Chinese government designated
EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the
borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not
exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year
grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum. On 1 October 2003, the Chinese
Ambassador to the Philippines,Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF
Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG‘s
designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.On 30 December 2003,
Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Sec. 1,
Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey
basis (the Contract Agreement)

Issue:
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local
court.

Ruling:
No. Applying the foregoing ruling to the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG
cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental
functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity, just as the term "implementing agency" has no precise definition for purposes
of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a
government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to
be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court's ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a
government-owned and - controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result,
it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.|||
The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) As it
stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to
sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii).
The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary
acts jure gestionis).
Page2
Saguisag v Ochoa
GR No. 212426, January 12,2016

Facts:
Petioners question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America. Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the U.S.
claiming that the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions. In reply,
respondents argue that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the legality
of their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial
precedents.
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within
certain “Agreed Locations” in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive’s understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly, in June
2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the completion of all necessary
internal requirements for the agreement to enter into force in the two countries.
According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of EDCA was the result of
intensive and comprehensive negotiations in the course of almost two years. After eight
rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to
the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III
ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. The OSG clarified during the oral arguments that the
Philippine and the U.S. governments had yet to agree formally on the specific sites of
the Agreed Locations mentioned in the agreement.
Two petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed before us assailing the constitutionality
of EDCA. They primarily argue that it should have been in the form of a treaty
concurred in by the Senate, not an executive agreement.
On 10 November 2015, months after the oral arguments were concluded and the parties
ordered to file their respective memoranda, the Senators adopted Senate Resolution No.
(SR) 105.91, the resolution expresses the “strong sense” of the Senators that for EDCA
to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation
and concurrence as according to Sec. 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President

Ruling:
Yes. This Court, a plain textual reading of Article XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to
the conclusion that it applies only to a proposed agreement between our government and
a foreign government, whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign
government would be “allowed” or would “gain entry” Philippine territory.
In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Commission on Elections, we reiterated this guiding
principle:

“It is safer to construe the Constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than in the framers’ understanding thereof”.
Thus, it is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts
are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and
Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity
through a treaty.
Page2
Therefore, EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in
the form of a mere executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the
President is empowered to enter into executive agreements on foreign military bases,
troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of
such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves “adjustments in
detail” in the implementation of the Mutual Treaty Defense and the Visiting Forces
Agreement. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have
already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these
prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.
“Executive agreement” is so well-entrenched in this Court’s pronouncements on the
powers of the President. When the Court validated the concept of “executive
agreement,” it did so with full knowledge of the Senate’s role in concurring in treaties. It
was aware of the problematique of distinguishing when an international agreement
needed Senate concurrence for validity, and when it did not; and the Court continued to
validate the existence of “executive agreements” even after the 1987 Constitution.

Page2
The Paquete Habana
175 US 677 8 January 1900

Facts:
At the breaking out of the recent war with Spain, two fishing smacks, The Paquete
Habana and The Lola, were regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba, sailing
under the Spanish flag, and each owned by a Spanish subject, residing in Havana; her
crew, who also resided there. Each vessel left Havana on a coast fishing voyage, and
sailed along the coast of Cuba about two hundred miles to the west end of the island; the
sloop there fished for twenty-five days in the territorial waters of Spain, and the
schooner extended her fishing trip a hundred miles farther across the Yucatan Channel,
and fished for eight days on the coast of Yucatan.
On her return, with her cargo of live fish, along the coast of Cuba, and when near
Havana, each was captured by one of the United States blockading squadron. Neither
fishing vessel had any arms or ammunition on board, had any knowledge of the
blockade, or even of the war, until she was stopped by a blockading vessel, made any
attempt to run the blockade, or any resistance at the time of her capture, nor was there
any evidence that she, or her crew, was likely to aid the enemy.
Both the fishing vessels were brought by their captors into Key West. A libel for the
condemnation of each vessel and her cargo as prize of war was there filed on April 27,
1898; a claim was interposed by her master on behalf of himself and the other members
of the crew, and of her owner
When the owners appealed, they argued that both customary international law and
writings of leading international scholars recognized an exemption from seizure at
wartime of coastal fishing vessels

Issue:
Whether or not coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews excluded from
prizes of war?

Ruling:
Yes. The vessels of fishermen have been generally declared exempt from confiscation
because of the eminently peaceful object of their humble industry and of the principles
of equity and humanity. The exemption includes the vessel, the implements of fishing,
and the cargo resulting from the fishery. This usage, eminently humane, goes back to
very ancient times, and although the immunity of the fishery along the coasts may not
have been sanctioned by treaties, yet it is considered today as so definitely established
that the inviolability of vessels devoted to that fishery is proclaimed by the publicists as
a positive rule of international law, and is generally respected by the nations.
At the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and
independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of
international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order
of men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels,
with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing
their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as
prize of war.
The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or their vessels if employed
for a warlike purpose, or in such a way as to give aid or information to the enemy, nor
when military or naval operations create a necessity to which all private interests must
give way.
Nor has the exemption been extended to ships or vessels employed on the high sea in
taking whales or seals or cod or other fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are
salted or otherwise cured and made a regular article of commerce.
Page2
Sosa v Alvarez-Machain
542 US 692 (2004)

Facts:
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) approved using petitioner Sosa and other
Mexican nationals to abduct respondent Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), also a Mexican
national, from Mexico to stand trial in the United States for a DEA agent's torture and
murder. After his acquittal, Alvarez sued the United States for false arrest under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives sovereign immunity in suits "for . . .
personal injury . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
[Government] employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment.”
Alvarez also sued Sosa for violating the law of nations under the Alien Tort statute
(ATS), a 1789 law giving district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.” The District Court
dismissed the FTCA claim, but awarded Alvarez summary judgment and damages on
the ATS claim. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ATS judgment, but reversed
the FTCA claim's dismissal.

Issue:
Were remedies under the FTCA and the ATS available to Alvarez?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that with respect to Alvarez's allegation that the DEA had instigated
his abduction from Mexico for criminal trial in the United States:

(1) Alvarez was not entitled to a remedy under the FTCA, because § 2680(k) applied,
for (a) the alleged actions in Mexico were most naturally understood as the kernel of a
barred claim arising in a foreign country; and (b) contrary to the Court of Appeals'
headquarters doctrine, § 2680(k) barred all claims based on any injury suffered in a
foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.

(2) The ATS was in terms in terms a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action.

(3) This jurisdictional grant was best read as originally having been enacted on the
understanding that common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number
of international-law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.

(4) The ATS right of action asserted by the individual did not fall within this modest
number.

(5) Alvarez was not otherwise entitled to a remedy under the ATS, for when his claim
was gauged against the existing state of international law, his claim did not meet the
requirement that federal courts ought not to recognize private claims, under federal
common law, for violations of any international-law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when the ATS
had been enacted.
Page2
Medellin v Texas
552 US 491 25 March 2008

Facts:
Jose Medellin (D), a Mexican national was found guilty for being part of the gang rape
and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. He argued that the state had violated his
rights under the Vienna Convention in which the United States is a party. Under the
Vienna Convention, any foreign national detained for any crime has a right to contact
his consulate.
Though his appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court, the Court took up his case
again and Medellin (D) argument rested in part on a holding by the International Court
of Justice in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex v U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12 that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican national
(including Medellin (D) and that their state-court convictions must be reconsidered,
regardless of any forfeiture of the right to raise the Vienna Convention claims because
of a failure to follow state rules governing criminal convictions.
Based on these, Medellin (D) argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an
individual right that state courts must respect. A memorandum from the U.S. President
that instructed state courts to comply with the I.C.J’s rulings by rehearsing the cases was
also cited by Medellin (D). He further argued that the Constitution gives the President
broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the
treatment of treaties in state court proceedings.

Issue:
Are state courts required under the U.S. Constitution to honor a treaty obligation of the
United States by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice?
(2) Are states courts required by the U.S. Constitution to provide review and
reconsideration of a conviction without regard to state procedural default rules as
required by a memorandum by the President?

Ruling:
(Roberts, C.J). (1). No. States courts are not required under the U.S. Constitution to
honor a treaty obligation of the United States by enforcing a decision of the
International Court of Justice. What the Vienna Convention stipulate is that if a person
detained by a foreign country asks, the authorities of the detaining national must,
without delay, inform the consular post of the detainee of the detention.
(2). State courts are not required by the U.S. Constitution to provide review and
reconsideration of a conviction without regard to state procedural default rules as
required by a Memorandum by the President. The presidential memorandum was an
attempt by the Executive Branch to enforce a non-self-executing treaty without the
necessary congressional action, giving it no binding authority on state courts.
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