ORGANIZATION THEORY New Directions For Organization Theory

New Directions for Organization Theory
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Problems and Prospects
JEFFREY PFEFFER
New York Oxford

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1997
Oxford University Press
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pfeffcr, Jeffrey.
New directions for organization theory : problems and prospects / by Jeffrey Pfeffcr.
p. cm.
includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-19-511434-5
1. Organizational sociology. 2. Organizational behavior.
3. Social control. I. Title.
HM13I.P4168 1997
3()2.V5-dc20 96-33W
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
PREFACE
I would probably have never written this book or the Handbook of Social Psy-
chology chapter that was its progenitor had the decision been a rational one.
Since the last time I had attempted such an effort in the early 1980s, the field
of organizational behavior had continued along the path of increasing growth,
differentiation, and paradigm proliferation that made undertaking any sort of over-
view or review of the field an "almost impossible" effort—a phrase used repeat-
edly by colleagues who were kind enough to provide advice and comments on
the attempt. But within days of receiving the invitation to do the chapter for the
fourth edition of the Handbook, I learned I had almost a complete blockage of
the coronary arteries feeding the left side of the heart (which meant a "coronary
event" —I love the language of physicians —would be instantly fatal) and, conse-
quently, I needed open heart surgery. "What should I do about this invitation?" I
asked my wife and best friend, Kathleen. "Say yes," she replied. "That will give
you something to look forward to and a feeling that you will have a future." It
seemed like a good idea at the time, so 1 did say yes, and following all of the
principles of escalating commitment that we know so well, wound up writing first
a long chapter and then this book.
The task proved to be a formidable one, and I am quite resolved not to do it
again. Making sense of such a diverse field and deciding what to cover and what
to leave out is invariably both difficult and an undertaking that can never fully
please anyone except the author, and not even that person on a regular basis.
When I sent out the book manuscript for comments, and when I sent out a
working-paper version of the chapter (completed before the book, although who
knows if it will have appeared in print before the book does), I invariably got
what Bob Sutton came to call the "me, me, me" response. "This is a Rorschach
test," said Sutton, and he was, as usual, right. The modal comment I received
was something along the lines of "why didn't you include more [or anything]
vi Preface
about my favorite topic, which is also among the most important in the field?"
And, "how could you have overlooked citing some of my most important and
very best papers?" which the authors of these messages were often kind enough
to enclose so I wouldn't have to expend too much effort tracking them down. At
first I took all of this as a compliment—surely people must think this writing will
be influential and important to be willing to spend effort lobbying for the inclu-
sion of their favorite material. After a while, however, I realized it reflected an
egocentric view of the field that is an almost inevitable outcome of the absence
of agrecd-upon paradigms and frameworks. Years ago Jerry Salancik and I had
shown that when there was uncertainty to resolve, social similarity came to play
an important role in decision processes. Given the prevalent uncertainty and ab-
sence of agreement about the content and direction of organization studies, social
similarity would again be expected to play a role in people's views of the field,
and no one is more similar than ourselves.
So, let me begin with an apology. If I have failed to include your favorite
work or to cite you sufficiently, it is not because I am necessarily ignorant of that
part of the field or of your work, although I might be. It is because to keep this
effort to manageable proportions, decisions did have to be made about what to
leave in and what to leave out. These decisions were premised on my goal to
provide an overview of the field for new entrants such as graduate students and
scholars from adjacent disciplines. That implied focusing on what constitutes the
most basic and fundamental questions about how to understand organizations
and directing attention to what are some (not all) of the topic areas that have
drawn increasing research attention and controversy. I make no claims for the
ultimate wisdom of these choices—I did the best I could. I invite readers who
don't like the choices I made to supplement this material with their own.
I very much appreciate the helpful comments on drafts of this material pro-
vided by Pain Haunschild, Joanne Martin, Charles O'Reilly, Bob Sutton, Michael
Tushman, and Karl Weick. I have listened to their comments even if I have not,
in every instance, followed their advice. I also appreciate the comments of Marjo-
rie Williams of Harvard Business School Press, who was kind enough to read the
manuscript even though the press did not wind up publishing it. The editors of
the Handbook of Social Psychology, particularly Dan Gilbert, were very helpful
in their guidance. And, of course, thanks to Herb Addison, my editor at Oxford
University Press, for his guidance and confidence in the project. It has been a joy
to work with Herb and the press, and I hope they feel the same way.
My life is made easier by my incredibly wonderful assistant, Katrina Jaggears,
who did whatever I asked to help with the manuscript. My existence is made
joyous and wiser by my beloved, my bride, my wonderfulness, the Amazing Kath-
leen. And, in a sense more real than I sometimes like to think about, my complet-
ing this book (and everything else since the fall of 1993) was made possible by
Drs. James Avery and Joel Klompus, each of whom has both exceptional technical
skill and a dedicated, total quality approach to medicine. All things considered, I
am lucky indeed.
CONTENTS
1 The Development and Seope of Organization Studies, 3

Organizations Defined, 7
The Evolution of Research and Writing on Organizations, 9
The Changing Organizational Landscape, 18
2 Understanding the Causes of Behavior, 25

The Search for Individual Dispositions, 27
Problems with the Dispositional Perspective, 34
Person by Situation Interaction and Fit, 37
The Costs and Benefits of the Person—Situation Debate, 40
Some Lessons Learned, 41
3 Five Models of Behavior, 42

Economic Models of Organizational Behavior, 44
The Social Model of Behavior, 55
The Retrospectively Rational Model of Behavior, 65
The Moral Model of Behavior, 73
The Interpretive, Cognitive Model of Behavior, 77
Conclusion, 79
4 The Effects of Organizational Composition, 81

Organizational Demography, 82
Top Management Teams, 89
viii Contents
Gender, Networks, and Careers, 93

Conclusion, 98
5 Mechanisms of Social Control, 100

Rewards, Incentives, Sanctions, and Surveillance, 103
Commitment and Socialization Processes, 116
Organizational Culture, 120
Leadership, 126
Conclusion, 135
6 Developing and Exercising Power and Influence, 136

Power and Influence, 137
Negotiation in Organizations, 150
Conclusion, 155
7 Organizational Performance, 156

Structural Contingency Theory, 158
Organizational Ecology, 163
Human Resource Practices and Performance, 169
Conclusion, 176
8 Organizations from a Critical Theory Perspective, 177

Marxist Versions of Organization Theory, 179
Other Critical Theory, 186
The Role of Critical Theory in Organization Studies, 187
9 New Directions for Organization Theory, 189

How Is Organization Studies Doing?, 190
Avoiding the Dangerous Liaison with Economics, 192
Avoiding Fads and Fashion by Pursuing a Strong Inference Research
Strategy, 193
The Advantage of Being Phenomenon Driven, 196
The Relevance of Design — Physical and Organizational, 198
Conclusion, 202
References, 205
Index, 245
1
The Development and Scope
of Organization Studies
We live in an organizational world. Virtually all of us are born in an organiza-

tion—a hospital—with our very existence ratified by a state agency that issues a
certificate documenting our birth. Under the current U.S. income tax regulations,
if we are going to be claimed as a dependent on someone's tax return, within the
first year of our life we will be issued a social security number by an agency of
the federal government. When we die, a death certificate will be issued by an-
other public bureaucracy and our passing may be announced by a newspaper
organization. An organization will see to the disposition of our bodies, and other
organizations will concern themselves with the disposition of our assets. And dur-
ing the time in between, more than 90 percent of individuals living in the United
States will earn their livelihoods working for an organization (as contrasted with
being self-employed), having been prepared for employment by being schooled
in educational organizations. "Organizations arc all around us. Because of their
ubiquity, however, they fade into the background, and we need to be reminded
of their impact" (Scott, 1992, p. 3).
Not much more than a century ago, organizations were much less present in
the social landscape. Public bureaucracies and business firms were both fewer
and smaller in size. Bonlding noted:
|L]abor unions were practically non-existent. There were practically no employ-

ers' associations or trade associations. There were no farm organizations of any
importance . . . National government absorbed . . . an almost infinitesimal part
of the total national product . . . Outside of the Masons there were practically
no fraternal organizations . . . Organizations outside the government were
largely confined to the churches, a few local philanthropic societies, and the
political parties . . . In place of the sparse fauna of 1852 we now have what
seems like a vast jungle . . . Not only are there many more organizations . . .
but the organizations are larger, better organized, more closely knit . . . Yet this
3
4 New Directions for Organization Theory
revolution has received little study . . . It has crept upon us silently. (1968, pp.
3-4)
And in times past, fewer people worked for others: "We look back after wage
labour has won a respected position by two centuries of struggle. We forget the
time when complete dependence on wages had for centuries been rejected by all
who regarded themselves as free men" (Hill, 1964, p. 63).
One of the indicators of the importance of organizations is that with increas-
ing frequency "organizations are singled out as the source of many of the ills
besetting contemporary society" (Scott, 1992, p. 4). For good or ill, many of soci-
ety's assets are managed by and controlled by organizations such as mutual funds,
banks, and pension funds. Their decisions affect who will get credit, what invest-
ments and technologies will receive backing, and, as a consequence, which see-
tors of the economy will be developed, and how and where people live. "Orga-
nized" religion has spread, as have organi/ed community and self-help groups, to
do things that used to be done informally by neighbors in a community. Through
their actions, these organizations define poverty and social problems as well as
help determine their remediation. The fact that so much of our material and
social welfare and life is inextricably bound up with organizations means that it
is important to understand how they function and how they can be analyzed. As
Stern and Barley have argued, it is important to study "how organizations affect
the social systems in which they are embedded" (1996, p. 146).
The field of organization studies, developed to understand these ubiquitous
social entities, comprises an interdisciplinary focus on (a) the effect of social orga-
nizations on the behavior and attitudes of individuals within them, (b) the effects
of individual characteristics and actions on organizations, with a particular em-
phasis on the efficacy and, indeed, the possibility of potent individual influence
(e.g., through leadership) in organizational systems, (c) the performance, success,
and survival of organizations, (d) the mutual effects of environments, including
resource and task, political, and cultural environments on organizations and vice
versa, and (e) concerns with both the epistcmology and methodology that under-
gird research on each of these topics. As such, the study of organizations is broad
in both its theoretical scope and empirical focus. For instance, social psychologi-
cal theories and findings relevant to the above issues would appear as a subfield,
and possibly a small one at that, in the domain of organization studies.
Given the breadth and scope of the field, which today reaches out to the
humanities (Zald, 1993), one might well ask to what extent considering organiza-
tion studies as a separate subject of inquiry makes sense, especially since the
discipline's boundaries are so permeable. This question has traditionally been an-
swered by the claim that the interdisciplinary nature of organization studies makes
cross-level analysis and the advance of theory more likely through processes of
cross-fertilization. However, there are clear trade-offs involved. Even as organiza-
tion studies becomes broad enough in scope to include virtually all relevant
methods and theoretical perspectives, this very breadth makes integration of
knowledge or even cognizance of the entire domain of organization studies sub-
stantially more difficult.
Development and Scope of Organization Studies 5
Because of the scope and diffuseness of the subject matter, which has in-
creased substantially over time, any treatment of organization studies must neces-
sarily be somewhat arbitrary in its coverage and its organization. In previous incar-
nations of this book (Pfeffer, 1982; 1985), I chose to organize the material by-
focusing on different levels of analysis (individuals, coalitions, and subunits on
one hand and the total organization on the other) and on different perspectives
on action. This latter categorization differentiated among perspectives that em-
phasized rational choice and decision making, situational constraint and social
influence, and a third perspective focusing on the emergent, almost random na-
ture of organizational behavior. Although treatments by level of analysis are still
common, particularly in texts on organizations (e.g., Northcraft and Neale, 1994;
Wagner and Hollenbcck, 1992), and although differences in perspectives on ac-
tion remain important, for the researcher or student trying to access the field
what may be even more important are the fundamental concepts and models
used and useful for understanding organizations and the controversies that charac-
terize the development of the field. Consequently, what I have chosen to do in
this book is first to give the reader some sense of the evolution and particularly
the more recent history of the field and its scope and content and then to con-
sider the relevant literature organized by the major issues and concepts that make
sense of organizations and are relevant to those who live in and manage them.
r
lb understand or analyze organizations, it is important to consider the locus
of causality and whether that is lodged in individuals, situations, or some combi-
nation. The locus of causality directs where we place our research emphasis and
how we go about understanding and affecting behavior. This topic constitutes the
focus of chapter 2. It is the case that scholars, managers, and casual observers
approach the analysis of organizations with a set of implicit or explicit models of
behavior. These models both structure what we observe and learn and also affect
the choice of how to intervene to change organizations and their members. Chap-
ter 3 explores five various models and assumptions about behavior that distinguish
some prominent, competing theories and approaches to organizational analysis,
including the economic model, the social model, the retrospectively rational
model, the moral model, and a cognitive, interpretive model of organizational
behavior.
As developed in chapters 2 and 3, one important distinction among theories
of organizations is the extent to which dimensions of the social structure are used
to help understand behavior by analyzing the context and constraints within
which behavior occurs. Chapter 4 presents an overview of the literature on demo-
graphic composition and its effects on organizations, one prominent example of
the use of structural analysis to understand organizations and groups within them.
Chapter 5 then considers mechanisms of social control. Control has been a major
theme in organizational studies since it began more than 100 years ago and con-
tinues to be prominent in numerous literatures relevant to organizations, includ-
ing culture and socialization, rewards and incentives, and leadership. Control has
a hierarchical emphasis to it, but many of the decisions in organizations occur
through processes of interpersonal influence that rely on power and negotiation
rather than on formal systems and authority. Chapter 6 explores how power and
social influence are developed and exercised and how negotiation, one important
way in which interpersonal influence is employed, occurs. Since the beginning
of organizational studies, one of its goals has been to understand variations and
determinants of organizational performance. Chapter 7 considers some prominent
approaches to analyzing organizational performance and how they have evolved.
Subjects such as control and organizational performance speak to the manageri-
alist orientation that has been and still is prominent in organization studies. This
functionalist orientation has stimulated a reaction in critical theory, which seeks
to remind us that "organizations can trample personal freedom and individual
fulfillment" (Stern and Barley, 1996, p. 148). Chapter 8 provides a brief overview
of what constitutes some elements of a critical perspective on organizations and
organization studies. In the concluding chapter 9, some substantive topics, largely
overlooked in recent writing, are considered, and I take up the question of the
evolution of organization studies and whether or not we are increasing our under-
standing of these important social entities. Together these topics and their explora-
tion permit us to begin to understand what we know and what we don't, to iden-
tify some important directions for future research, and to glimpse the extent to
which research and writing has been unevenly distributed and some of the factors
associated with the field's attention.
A number of conclusions or themes emerge from this overview of the field.
First, the location of much of organization studies in business schools, and U.S.
business schools at that, coupled with the profusion of theories and absence of
paradigmatic consensus has led to a substantial overemphasis of economic models
and logic. The field is unduly entranced by economistic thinking. This is unfortu-
nate because social and social psychological modes of organizational analysis are
potentially both more valid and useful. Second, the location of organization stud-
ies has also led to a focus on particular subjects (e.g., performance, survival, lead-
ership, culture) and an emphasis on a more micro (individual or individual
organization) level of analysis. The relationship between organizations and society
and various social problems and issues is given only occasional attention (e.g.,
Stern and Barley, 1996). Critical perspectives are seldom seen in empirical analy-
ses and are more frequently found in European writings. But as organization
studies evolves in Europe and tends to be located increasingly in prominent
schools of administration, one wonders about the future of the European critical
tradition.
Third, the absence of paradigmatic consensus and the consequent value
placed on uniqueness (Mone and McKinley, 1993), cleverness, and being inter-
esting have not always led to research focusing on powerful but apparently obvi-
ous effects on organizational behavior. And, coupled with the occasional insecu-
rity that comes from paradigmatic profusion and the vulnerability that creates,
organization studies has often eschewed an engineering orientation, implied by
being an applied social science, that was present at its founding (e.g., Thompson,
1956). Tims, the field is at once captivated by topics that have the appearance of
being applied without always taking seriously issues of design, intervention, and
change.
Development and Scope of Organization Studies j
Organizations Defined
How are organizations distinguished from other social collectivities such as small
groups, families, mobs, and so forth? Scott noted that "most analysts have con-
ceived of organizations as social structures created by individuals to support the
collaborative pursuit of specified goals" (1992, p. 10). Parsons (1956) distin-
guished organizations from other social collectivities by noting that organizations
had some purpose or goal. Donaldson maintained that "organizations are created
and sustained . . . in order to attain certain objectives" (1995, p. 135). The goal-
oriented or instrumental view of organizations implies that organizations are col-
lections of individual efforts that are coordinated to achieve things that could not
be achieved through individual action alone (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 23).
However, defining organizations in terms of goal pursuit is somewhat prob-
lematic, and there is a large literature that treats the concept of an organizational
goal and whether or not the construct is meaningful (e.g., Simon, 1964). One
problem is that many organizations have within them members or employees
who either do not know the organization's goal or, if they do know it, do not
necessarily support it. For instance, although the goal of most publicly held cor-
porations in the United States is something like profit maximization or the max-
imization of shareholder value, many employees are more concerned with job
security and their relative influence than they are about profits. In one contract
manufacturer, employees, not knowing the elements of corporate accounting,
thought that the more overtime they worked (and the higher their own incomes),
the better. The goal of maximizing overtime, however, was not an organizationally
sanctioned or even recognized goal. Moreover, the goal of maximizing share-
holder value does not generate much commitment or excitement among most
organizational participants.
A second issue is that there is evidence that even when a goal is clearly
identified, if and when it is attained organizations often develop new goals—as if
the goal of an organization, once created, was simply its own continued survival
and perpetuation. In a notable example of this process, Sills (1957) studied what
happened to the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (the March of
Dimes) when a vaccine for polio—the reason for its existence — was discovered.
As we know, the March of Dimes did not disband upon achieving this success
but instead took on the task of understanding and assisting in the treatment of
other diseases such as genetic birth defects that crippled children.
Or consider the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), estab-
lished by legislation in 1887 to "break up huge concentrations of wealth in the
hands of the country's railroad magnates" (Sanger, 1996, p. 9). Although railroads
came to face substantial competition from trucking and the power of the railroad
magnates declined substantially, the organization's purpose evolved and it en-
dured. Over the years its powers expanded substantially so that it "gained author-
ity over trucks, buses, and virtually anything else that moved across state lines.
. . . consumer complaints about moving companies . . . had to go through the
I.C.C." (Sanger, 1996, p. 9). Although the deregulation movement of the late
1970s spelled its apparent demise, the ICC survived for some fifteen years after
virtually all of its functions were removed. Stripped of its power to set transporta-
tion rates or to control entry to the industry except in very rare instances, the
agency continued to collect reams of data on transportation rates and employ a
considerable staff:
the commission survived numerous assassination attempts. Richard Nixon tried

to merge the I.C.C. out of existence in 1970. . . . Ronald Reagan tried to elimi-
nate its budget. . . . Sheer inertia, bureaucratic guile and lobbying by compa-
nies that thought twice about what life would be like in a completely competitive
marketplace resulted in reprieve after reprieve. (Sanger, 1996, p. 9)
Pfeffer and Salancik noted that "organizations are . . . a process of organiz-

ing support sufficient to continue existence" (1978, p. 24). Organizational survival
receives focus as a goal because survival must be continually accomplished and
is never automatic. As March and Simon (1958) noted, organizations provide
inducements for social actors to participate in them and in return obtain contri-
butions that become inducements for others. From this perspective, an organiza-
tion is viable and survives only as long as the inducements-contributions balance
is positive, such that the available inducements are sufficient to produce the vol-
untary contributions of participation and effort necessary to maintain the organi-
zation. Consequently, organizational survival is more problematic than the sur-
vival of some other social groups because resources and energy must be expended
in order to keep the organization going. Individuals must be recruited and offered
sufficient inducements to remain in the organization, resources to support the
organization must be extracted from the environment, and even the very legiti-
macy of the organization and its activities must occasionally be maintained
against opposition.
For the most part, organizations have at least one goal —the survival if not the
growth of the organization. Individuals not interested in helping the organization
perpetuate itself typically leave. Individuals' well-being and status are often at least
somewhat related to the well-being and status of the organization in which they
are a member or an employee, producing some commonality of interest in per-
petuating the organization. This can be seen by noting how often individuals
identify themselves by what they do and their employment and other affiliations.
Membership in high-status organizations confers status on the member, and em-
ployment in an organization that is larger or earns more money typically brings
larger financial rewards.
Another distinction between organizations and other social entities is that
organizations arc, in many (although not all) instances, formally recognized by
some governmental entity. The family may have legal definition, but mobs and
informal small groups do not. In the case of public agencies or public bureaucra-
cies, the organization may be created by statute or charter arid is funded to carry
out certain tasks and responsibilities. But, even private corporations are granted
charters by the state and as part of that process must submit articles of incorpora-
tion that state their purpose, even if only in general terms. And unincorporated
businesses may file fictitious business name statements and other forms with the
state to document and legalize their existence. In this sense, organizations have a
Development and Scope of Organization Studies g
connection to the state, which confers legitimacy that distinguishes them from
less formal collectivities such as families, mobs, or informal groups.
Organizations can also be distinguished by the nature of their boundaries.
Inclusion in an organization is something granted by that organization, frequently
with some sort of formal designation such as a membership card or employee
identification. One is born into a family, and expulsion from the family is unlikely
if not impossible. The boundaries of small groups and mobs arc clearly evanes-
cent. It is seldom the case in less formalized groups that the task of boundary
maintenance and demarcation becomes a significant and identified role, but this
is common in organizations— hence the frequent description of organizations as
being "formal." Although organizational boundaries are clearly permeable—after
all, an open-systems view of organizations sees them as taking in various types of
inputs and, after some transformation process, exchanging what is produced for
resources to continue the cycle (Katz and Kahn, 1978) — permeability is to some
degree under the control of the organization. Formal boundary-spanning units
such as purchasing and human resources attempt to ensure that inputs meet
specifications, while other boundary-spanning units such as marketing and public
relations seek to develop external support and demand for what the organization
does.
So, we can say that organizations are more likely than other social groups to
have a goal of survival and self-perpetuation, have more clearly defined, demar-
cated, and defended boundaries, and often (although not invariably) have some
formal relationship with the state that recognizes their existence as distinct social
entities —obligated to pay taxes as an entity, capable of suing and being sued, and
so forth.
The Evolution of Research and Writing on Organizations
Several trends are apparent in organization studies as the field has evolved since
the mid-1980s. First, the field is increasingly, although certainly not exclusively,
lodged in business schools. It has virtually disappeared in psychology and political
science departments, particularly in the United States, and, although it seems to
be enjoying some slight resurgence in sociology departments, still represents a
comparatively small part of that field also. The study of management and organi-
zations is currently growing, albeit from an extremely small base, in schools of
engineering, particularly in departments of industrial engineering and engi-
neering management. This concentration of organization studies in a professional
school environment is a phenomenon with important consequences for both
what is studied and how it is studied. And, the evolution of organization studies
in various disciplines is informative about the development of the field and its
orientations, for this history still affects many aspects of the content of organiza-
tion studies.
The study of management and organizations had some substantial part of its
origins in engineering, both mechanical and industrial. Shenhav documented the
move to standardize mechanical parts and processes and to professionalize the
io New Directions for Organization Theory
discipline of engineering in the late 1800s. He noted that "beginning in the late
1880s, parallel to the attempts to standardize and systematize mechanical matters,
the movement was extended more explicitly to organizational and administrative
issues" (1995, p. 560).
The extension of technical principles to social and commercial endeavors was

based on the assumption that human and nonhuman entities are interchange-
able and can equally be subjected to engineering manipulation. . . . Including
organizational design within the jurisdiction of engineers was justified by their
claim that the analysis of organi/ations "is to the enterprise what the engine
diagram is to the designer" (Engineering Magazine, April 1908: 83-91). . . .
The rise of this group marks the origin of management as a distinct phenome-
non, (p. 561)
The rise of Frederick W. Taylor and scientific management in the early 1900s
marked the culmination of the efforts to apply engineering principles to the de-
sign and management of work and ushered in the golden age of engineering.
Between 1880 and 1920, the number of engineers in the United States grew from
7,000 to 135,000 (Jacoby, 1985).
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the scientific management

movement in the shaping of the modern corporation and indeed all institutions
. . . which carry on labor processes. . . . Taylor dealt with the fundamentals of
the organization of the labor process and of control over it. ... The successors
to Taylor are to be found in engineering and work design, and in top manage-
ment. . . . Work itself is organized according to Taylorian principles, while per-
sonnel departments and academics have busied themselves with selection, train-
ing . . . and adjustment of "manpower" to suit the work processes so organized.
Taylorism dominates the world of production; the practitioners of "human rela-
tions" and "industrial psychology" are the maintenance crew for the human ma-
chinery. (Bravcrman, 1974, pp. 86-87)
Principles of scientific management involved the separation of the planning

and design of work from its actual execution and the scientific study of work
processes (using time and motion studies, for instance) to figure out the most
efficient way of doing jobs. Concerns of the early engineering orientation to orga-
nizations and management remain in contemporary writing. The scientific study
of work processes to enhance efficiency can be seen in the contemporary writing
about recngineering and in the work-process continuous improvement programs
in many assembly plants. The separation of work design and planning from its
execution is evident in attempts to reintegrate planning and doing in self-
managing teams and in the implementation issues raised by moves toward decen-
tralization of control. Taylor (1903) maintained that his piece-rate system for
rewarding work could end labor unrest and that the science-based system was
impartial and above class prejudice (Shcnhav, 1995, p. 567). Developing manage-
ment processes that maintain labor peace and are fair remain important issues to
the present day. And, the organisation of writing and thinking about management
Development and Scope of Organization Studies n
and organizations "around engineering ideals rather than around religious, phil-
anthropic, paternalistic, or social Darwinist ones" (p. 564) also continues to the
present.
Although Taylorism and engineering remain influential in the literature, this
orientation is now more likely to be found in business schools. Management
concerns have diminished in schools of engineering. Industrial engineering de-
partments have substantially diminished in importance over time compared to
disciplines such as electrical, chemical, and civil engineering, which are based
on physical, not social, sciences. To the extent industrial engineering has survived,
much of its attention has shifted to production and operations management,
which it views from a modeling or mathematical perspective emphasizing tech-
niques such as queuing theory and linear programming. With only a few excep-
tions, the study of organizations and management diminished substantially in in-
dustrial engineering departments, which were themselves in some decline.
Since the 1980s, there has been some reversal in this trend, for two reasons.
First, business education, particularly in private schools, is often offered only to
graduate students. This permitted industrial engineering to offer engineering
management to undergraduates, an attractive option in the educational market
place. Second, concerns with the management of high-technology companies and
the frequent transition of engineers from technical to managerial responsibilities
as their careers progressed have led to a market-based demand for more emphasis
on management topics in engineering schools. Nevertheless, concern with man-
agement issues remains comparatively small in engineering colleges today, partic-
ularly when one contrasts the present with the situation around the turn of the
century, when engineering was taking a leading role in developing the study of
management and organizations.
The study of organizations began in psychology with industrial and organiza-
tional psychology, subspecialties within psychology departments. The Journal of
Applied Psychology, first published in 1917, contained articles on subjects in ap-
plied psychology—testing and measuring individual capabilities, interests, and at-
titudes through various assessment instruments (the study of individual differ-
ences), the effects of work environments on attitudes and, to a lesser extent,
behavior such as turnover and performance, and the design (both physical and
social) of jobs and work environments. Table 1-1 presents the titles of selected
articles from the first several volumes of the Journal of Applied Psychology to
illustrate both the enormous continuity in subject matter between then and now
and the substantive focus of the early research in applied psychology.
Braverman argued that both industrial psychology and industrial sociology
arose as handmaidens to the engineering orientation of Taylorism and can be
best understood in that context:
Shortly after Taylor, industrial psychology and industrial physiology came into
existence to perfect methods of selection, training, and motivation of workers,
and these were soon broadened into an attempted industrial sociology, the study
of the workplace as a social system. The cardinal feature of these various schools
. . . is that . . . they do not by and large concern themselves with the organiza-
tion of work, but rather with the conditions under which the worker may best be
brought to cooperate in the scheme of work organized by the industrial engineer.
(1974, p. 140)
Industrial and organizational psychology first lost status and then position
within the discipline, quite possibly because of its applied orientation and its role
in supporting management and engineering. 'Ibday industrial psychology exists in
relatively few psychology departments and virtually none of the most prestigious,
'['he Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology (SIOP) has split off
from the American Psychological Association and now holds separate meetings.
And social psychology's increasing emphasis on individual cognition on the one
hand and personality on the other, with a decmphasis on groups and social influ-
ence (e.g., Markus and Zajonc, 1985) has left a growing gulf between more main-
stream psychological research and organizational issues and problems.
In sociology, the study of organizations was at one time a central focus of the
discipline. Many of the central figures in sociological theory—Weber (1947),
Marx (1967), and Durkheim (1949) —contributed to the understanding of bureau-
cracy, the employment relationship, and the division of labor and basis of solidar-
ity. A series of case studies of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Selznick, 1949), a
gypsum mine (Gouldncr, 1954), and a state employment agency and federal law-
enforcement organization (P. M. Blau, 1955) began the process of developing
empirically based general principles to describe organizational functioning. Al-
though organizational sociology remains viable, particularly in comparison to in-
dustrial/organizational psychology, from 1990 to 1994 only 15 percent of the arti-
cles in the American Sociological Review, the discipline's leading journal, could
be considered to concern organizations. Thus, organization studies' place within
sociology is a small one, particularly compared to the study of stratification.
A similar erosion of interest in organizations is visible in political science.
Many of the most prominent early figures in organization science came from
Table 1-1 Titles of Selected Articles from the 1917, 1918, and 1919 Volumes of the
Journal of Applied Psychology
The Human Element in Business

An Absolute Intelligence Scale
Mental Tests for Prospective 'telegraphers
What Can the Psychology of Interests, Motives, and Character Contribute to Vocational Guidance?
Human Engineering
Vocational 'lests for Retail Saleswomen
Work on the Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army
Training Course of the American Steel and Wire Company
Air Service Tests of Aptitude for Flying
The Learning Curve in Typewriting
The Relation of the Ceneral Intelligence of School Children to the Occupation of Their Fathers
political science —people such as Herbert Simon (1947) and James March
(March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). Many of the earliest studies
of organizations were studies of public bureaucracies (e.g., P. M. Blau, 1955; Blau
and Scott, 1962; Selznick, 1949), so there were many connections between public
administration, at one point an important subfield of political science, and organi-
zational behavior. However, as documented by Green and Shapiro (1994), the
discipline of political science has evolved to a point at which it has lost its institu-
tional roots (March and Olsen, 1989) and instead has come to be dominated by
formal models of rational choice. By 1992, this particular theoretical perspective,
rational actor theory, was represented in some 40 percent of the articles published
in the American Political Science Review, the disciplinary association's major jour-
nal. This formal modeling, often based on economic assumptions and method-
ological apparatus, has left political science increasingly distant from the less
mathematical methods that characterize theory and research in organization stud-
ies and also somewhat distant from the concerns of administration and practice.
Public administration, as a major subfield of political science, has withered as the
study of institutions has become less important in the discipline, replaced by an
emphasis on voting, coalitions, and legislative behavior.
The study of organizations fit uneasily in basic disciplines such as sociology
and psychology where it appeared to be too applied and became marginalized in
engineering schools, which were more concerned with disciplines based on the
physical sciences. But the study of management, administration, and leadership
has always found a home in business schools because of continuing interest in
subjects such as motivation, human effects on productivity and performance, and
organizational structure and strategy. Although organization studies programs have
at times been under attack in various business schools (e.g., Carnegie Mellon,
Yale, Rochester) because of the field's absence of mathematical, formal rigor,
demands for relevance from business schools' constituencies have ensured it a
place in business school curricula where it is a required course at both the under-
graduate and graduate levels.
Business schools are much more prevalent in the United States than in Eu-
rope, and as a consequence the location of organization studies primarily in busi-
ness schools has given it a distinctly American flavor. Clegg has noted that "orga-
nization studies . . . have drawn on both a range of materials and theoretical
approaches which have been too restricted" (1990, p. 1). His descriptions of the
French bread industry, Benetton, and industrial organization in the Far East in-
cluding Taiwan, Korea, and Japan consistently challenge ideas of efficiency,
whether these are derived from the transaction cost theory of Williamson (1975)
or structural contingency theory ideas (Donaldson, 1985). Clegg noted that "the
major thrust of efficiency arguments has been towards predicting a convergence
in the range of organizational forms to be found in modernity" (p. 151). The
proliferation of forms actually observed—witness the difference between the bread
industries of the United States and France—belies simple efficiency accounts.
But, these differences are apparent only to the extent one's empirical and theoreti-
cal scope transcends the confines of single countries, particularly the United
States.
The crucial factor is not that a manager or an organixation is Japanese rather

than American. . . . It is what being Japanese makes available in terms of nor-
mal ways of accounting for action, of calculating strategy, of constituting rational-
ities, of mapping cognitively, which is important. These matters . . . depend
upon distinct and nationally variable institutional frameworks. . . . Action is
never unbounded. It is framed within more or less tacit understandings, as well
as formal stipulations, which enable different agencies to do not only different
things but also the same things distinctly in diverse contexts, (pp. 150-151)
Thus, the history and location of organization studies are consequential be-
cause the environment of behavior, including scholarship, has important effects
on that behavior. The increasing concentration of organization studies in business
schools or schools of management has had a number of important effects on the
development of the discipline. One such effect is the influence of adjacent disci-
plines. By being in a business school, organization studies has come to be located
in close institutional proximity to economics. Economics has a well-developed
scientific paradigm, considering it is a social science, with greater consensus con-
cerning what are the important issues to be studied and what are appropriate
styles of theory and methodological approaches (e.g., Pfeffcr and Moore, 1980a,b;
Lodahl and Gordon, 1972). Organization studies has no such paradigmatic con-
sensus (Pfeffer, 1993). Economics also has prestige, in part because of its extensive
use of mathematical formalism, and in part because many business schools (e.g.,
the University of California at Berkeley) emerged out of economics departments,
making that the mother discipline. As a consequence, economic ideas have come
to have significant influence on organization studies. The economic theories that
have been imported most frequently into organization theory—agency theory, hu-
man capital theory, and transaction cost economics —almost invariably proceed
from a theoretical position of methodological individualism, calculative rational-
ity, and presumptions of self-interested behavior and effort aversion (shirking).
As an example of economic theory's growth in prominence in the study of
organizations, consider the increase in the proportion of articles in two major
journals that cite economics, either transaction cost economics or some version
of agency theory. In 1975, just 2.5 percent of the articles in Administrative Science
Quarterly, the major journal in the field, and 0 percent of the articles in the
Academy of Management Journal, the publication of the major disciplinary associ-
ation, had citations to economic literature. Within ten years (1985), 30 percent
of the articles published in ASQ and 10 percent of the articles appearing in AM/
cited economics. By 1994, the percentages had increased to 45 percent and 28
percent, respectively, numbers strikingly similar to those tracing the growth of
rational actor models in political science. It seems almost impossible to consider
the evolution of organization theory, particularly in the future, without consider-
ing the influence of economics on the field's methods and substance.
The second effect of having organizations studies sited where professional
education (of MBA students) and practical concerns loom larger is that such
realities influence, even if only subtly, the topics chosen for study and the theoret-
ical lens brought to bear on them. For instance, although there have been a
number of critiques of the leadership literature (e.g., I.ieberson and O'Connor,
1972; Pfcffcr, 1977; Meincll, tthrlich, and Dukerich, 1985), some of which partic-
ularly question whether leadership has an effect or whether we just like to believe
in the controllability of the environment and hence have a "romance" with the
concept of leadership, research and writing on leadership continues apace. The
recent emphasis on charismatic leadership (House, 1977), the traits or personali-
ties of effective leaders (House, Spangler, and Wyocke, 1991; Winter, 1987), and
transformational leadership (Bass, 1985) — or leadership capable of accomplishing
large-scale, systemic change in organizations — reflects the effect of an environ-
ment in which leadership training is big business. For example, the Center for
Creative Leadership, which does leadership training as well as research and mate-
rials development on this subject, saw its revenues grow from about $6 million in
1985 to more than $30 million in 1994. Business leaders also want to believe
they are having, or at least could have, profound effects on their organizations.
Organizational culture —and whether such culture, seen as a social control sys-
tem, can be managed to enhance organizational performance (O'Reilly, 1989) —
is another topic in which the influence of practical concerns can be seen, as are
the growing number of studies of the effects of pay practices and other human
resource policies on organizational performance (e.g., Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer,
1994; MacDuffie, 1995), studies of organizational change, and research evaluat-
ing organizational interventions designed to enhance performance. Stern and Bar-
ley have argued that being lodged in business schools has "tugged organizational
research toward issues of efficiency and effectiveness and away from larger, sys-
temic issues" (1996, p. 154).
Using organizational culture as an example, Barley, Meyer, and Gash (1988)
demonstrated how to empirically explore the influence of academies on prac-
titioners and vice versa in a study that could serve as a useful model for explora-
tions in other topic areas as well. Barley el al. contrasted two theories of knowl-
edge transmission —"diffusion" and "political":
Whereas diffusion theorists assume that academics frame problems for prac-
titioners, political theorists contend that scholarly endeavors are ultimately de-
fined by the interests of those who dominate society and by whose largess aca-
demics retain the privilege of pursuing research. . . . A more open view of the
relation between academics and practitioners would begin by positing two worlds
that exist as separate but interdependent social systems charactcri/.cd by different
traditions, languages, interests, and norms. Under such conditions, the direction
and degree of influence might vary from issue to issue. (1988, pp. 24-25)
By analyzing the language, concepts, and content of literature written for

academics and practitioners over time, Barley ct al. were able to ascertain patterns
of influence. 'They showed that academics and practitioners were initially inter-
ested in different aspects of culture and approached its study quite differently.
However, the data suggest that "the rubric of practitioners' discourse remained
stable over time, while the pragmatics of academic discourse changed. . . .
Those who wrote for academics gradually placed more emphasis on the economic
value of controlling culture and on rational control and differentiation" (p. 52),
concerns of the managerial audience. Although their study docs not show that
the influence of practitioners necessarily exists for all subjects, the study is instruc-
tive in both its method and its results and is consistent with the claim made here
about the influence of practical concerns on academic discourse, which results,
to some degree, from where the study of organizations is sited.
Abrahamson (1996) has argued for the use of bibliographic indices both over
time and across countries to examine the rise and fall of management fashions —
topics and perspectives that are in or out of favor. For instance, he traced the
rapid rise of interest in quality circles beginning around 1980 and the subsequent
fairly rapid decline in 1984. Abrahamson argued that "fashionable management
techniques must appear both rational (efficient means to important ends) and
progressive (new as well as improved relative to older management techniques)"
(p. 255). lie noted that "intraorganizational contradictions, as well as changes in
their economic and political environments widen certain organizational perfor-
mance gaps creating incipient preferences influencing management fashion de-
mand" (p. 275). The studies of Abrahamson and Barley, Meyer, and Gash (1988)
demonstrate the importance and the feasibility of being more self-reflective as a
field and empirically examining the rise and fall of various ideas and topic areas.
Of course, trends tend to set in motion forces to create their opposite. The
increasing emphasis on productivity, performance, and the interests of organiza-
tions has prompted the development of a critical studies subcliscipline that focuses
on the perspective of those who work in organizations in contrast to those who
own or control them (Stcffy and Grimes, 1986). Thus, for example, Martin
(1992a) wrote about subcultures in organizations and has questioned whether
culture can, in fact, be managed. Other writers have been concerned with the
place of the powerless in organizations arid organization theory, with the explicit
objective of undermining what otherwise would be considered normal or legiti-
mate ways of organizing (e.g., Mumby, 1988). Such writing occasionally focuses
on women and minorities, who often do not fare well in the competition for
salary and positions, particularly compared to their human capital endowments,
and who some argue have been neglected in the writing about organizations (e.g.,
Omi and Winant, 1986; Nkomo, 1992). Still others have argued for a gendered
or gender-based theory of organizations (Mumby and Putnam, 1992; Ferguson,
1984). Much of this literature argues that "theorizing constitutes organizations in
particular ways" (Mumby and Putnam, 1992, p. 465) and, therefore, that science
is an inherently political and subjective activity and should be acknowledged as
such. Although the idea of radical or Marxist organization studies may at first
appear implausible, there are quite important critical studies of social control in
the work place (e.g., Bravcrman, 1974; Edwards, 1979; Burawoy, 1979), of the
neglect of the worker in studies of high-commitment work practices (Graham,
1995), and of the interests and role of social class in organizational and intcrorga-
nizational functioning (e.g., Palmer, 1983).
Yet another phenomenon that may partly derive from where organization
studies has come to be located is the continuing profusion of theories and dimin-
ished consensus on what are the important research questions and directions and
on what arc appropriate research methodologies. Some have bemoaned this ab-
sence of paradigmatic consensus and argued it has created problems for doctoral
student training (Zammuto and Connolly, 1984), impeded the acquisition of re-
sources and legitimacy (Pfeffcr, 1993), and made it difficult to keep up with the
development of the field (Mone and McKinley, 1993). Webster and Starbuck
argued that "ineffective theories sustain themselves and tend to stabilize a science
in a state of incompetence. . . . Theories about which scientists disagree foster
divergent findings and incomparable studies that claim to be comparable" (1988,
p. 95).
Others have argued that this proliferation of theories and methods is healthy
(Zald, 1993; Van Maanen, 1995b). Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four
worldviews or paradigms found in organizational analysis: functionalist, interpre-
tive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. The functionalist paradigm treats
"organization as an aspect of a wider societal system that serves the interests of its
members" (Morgan, 1990, p. 15). The interpretive paradigm challenges the cer-
tainty of the functionalist view, "showing that order in the social world . . . rests
on a precarious, socially-constructed web of symbolic relationships that are con-
tinuously negotiated . . . affirmed or changed" (pp. 18-19). Morgan maintained
that the radical humanist paradigm "is concerned with understanding the way
humans construct a world which they often experience as confining . . . and
with finding ways in which humans can exercise control over their own construc-
tions that allow them to express and develop their nature as human beings" (p.
21). The radical structuralist paradigm, with roots in Marxist theory, emphasizes
the importance of self-generated change and logics of action. Although Morgan
(1983) recognized the inherent incompatibility of these various theoretical para-
digms, he nevertheless argued for the benefits of paradigm diversity:
The interpretation of diversity as opportunity . . . celebrates the possibility of

obtaining new insights and understanding. Established paradigms . . . are recog-
nized as providing at best partial modes of understanding which may be supple-
mented or even replaced by those of new paradigms. . . . The challenge of
diversity is seen as resting on the potential it offers for developing new modes of
understanding the phenomenon of organization. (Morgan, 1990, pp. 13-14)
While some see paradigm proliferation and incommensurability as a problem

and others as a valuable dimension of the field, there is virtually no disagreement
about the fact of more paradigm proliferation. Coupled with the substantial
growth in the numbers of people doing research or being identified with the field,
the absence of theoretical or methodological consensus has had the predictable
result of increasing the amount of differentiation present in the field of organiza-
tion studies. Thus, for instance, the Academy of Management now has 57 percent
more divisions and interest groups than it did in 1980 and 38 percent more than
it had in 1985. More specialized journals have proliferated, and there is a more
Balkanized field as a result. As Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) noted about organiza-
tions in general, increases in differentiation necessitate more effective integration
across the differentiated units. This integration, for the most part, has not oc-
curred in organization studies.
There is a literature on how scientific disciplines evolve and change (Kuhn,
1970), how scientific work gets done, and how contests for control of intellectual
agendas within fields are played out (e.g., Green and Shapiro, 1994; Parker,
1993). The emphasis in much of this literature is on power and politics. Thus,
for instance, Ilassard noted, "For Kuhn, the everyday reality of science is more
akin to the lifecycle of the political community than to the dictates of formal
logic. . . . Kuhn speaks of discontinuous periods of normative and revolutionary
activity" (1990, p. 220). These writings about the evolution of scientific fields,
always interesting, are particularly relevant for understanding the evolution of
organization studies because research is so often housed in interdisciplinary set-
tings (schools of business, management, or administration) where there are fewer
strong disciplinary anchors to direct activity. For this reason, context probably
matters more, and the future is less easily predicted, than in fields with more
paradigmatic consensus and stronger social norms.
The Changing Organizational Landscape
The world that organization theory seeks to analyze and describe has changed in
some important ways. Four of the more significant changes arc (a) the increasing
externali/ation of the employment relation and the development of the "new
employment contract," (b) a change in the size distribution of organizations, with
a comparative growth in the proportion of smaller organizations, (c) the increas-
ing influence of external capital markets on organizational governance and deci-
sion making, and (d) increasing salary inequality within organizations in the
United States, compared both to the past and to other industrialized nations.
These changes, to be documented below, pose some challenges for organization
theory. Most directly, they beg for explanation. If people are working in different
arrangements than in the past, if managerial discretion is now more constrained
by financial markets, if pay is becoming more unequal, and if large organizational
size now seems to be more of a burden and less of a benefit, then organization
theory should have something to say about why these changes have occurred.
Unfortunately, much of organization theory is silent about the structuring of the
employment relation (Pfeffer and Baron, 1988) as well as about the size distribu-
tion of organizations, with population ecology (Mannan and Freeman, 1989) be-
ing a partial exception. Granovetter noted, "One might suppose that the fre-
quently demonstrated importance of size would have stimulated an interest in its
determinants, or at least its marginals; but such discussions are absent from the
sociological literature" (1984, pp. 323-24). Although some work has documented
the increasing influence of the capital markets and the erosion of managerialism
(G. F. Davis and Thompson, 1994), there is, again, little explanation for why
these changes have occurred, particularly in comparison with what has or has not
gone on in other countries. Commenting on the study of wage inequality, Baron
and Pfeffer noted that, although the study of inequality had a long history in
sociology and economics, "remarkably little has been done to bring the firms back
into the study of inequality, particularly in ways that are true to the social and
relational nature of work organizations" (1994, p. 190).
Second, these and other changes in organizational form and functioning
Development and Scope of Organization Studies ig
challenge organization theories that have been developed to explain a context

that has shifted. For instance, what is the relevance of a literature on organiza-
tional culture in a world in which a high proportion of the work force works part-
time or as independent contractors, with such limited attachment to firms that
culture and cultural control is almost irrelevant? Or, what is the relevance of
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), which proceeds from
the assumption that managers take action to manage external uncertainty and
dependence, even when such behaviors are not profit enhancing, in an environ-
ment in which shareholder return reigns supreme? What does a literature on
careers, premised implicitly on the idea of advancement within an organization,
have to say about situations in which small firms, without career ladders, and
employment relationships, without much long-term connection to employers, are
increasingly prevalent?
All four of the changes mentioned above are readily documented. Consider-
ing the organization of the employment relationship, Cappelli has written, "Inter-
nalized employment arrangements that buffered jobs from market pressures arc
giving way to arrangements that rely much more heavily on outside market forces
to manage employees" (1995, p. 563). Pfeffer and Baron (1988) have referred to
"externalized" employment to denote arrangements such as working off-site, work-
ing part-time or as temporary help, or being an outside contractor, all of which
diminish the connection and attachment between the worker and the firm in
which the work is done. If one includes both temporary and part-time work as
well as outside contracting for business services in the category of contingent
work, Belous (1989) estimated that in 1988 some 25 to 30 percent of U.S. em-
ployees were contingent or externalized employees. By 1985, part-time work
constituted about one-quarter of all employment in California (Dillon, 1987).
Applebaum (1987) has commented on the fact that "the majority of externalized
workers no longer perform unskilled clerical tasks; many are professionals, such
as nurses or accountants" (Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993, p. 195).
Moreover, the trend toward the externalization of employment seems to be
quite strong. Cappelli, using unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data, re-
ported that "direct employment in temporary help agencies has more than tripled
since 1985" (1995, p. 580). Dillon's (1987) study of flexible employment in Cali-
fornia reported that the number of temporary employees grew some 800 percent
between 1972 and 1985, more than seven times the rate of growth in nonagricul-
tural industries. The largest private employer in America is now Manpower, Inc.,
with 560,000 workers (Castro, 1993). Christensen reported that the number of
part-time employees "doubled from 1968 to 1992, and much of that growth was
due to increases in the number of involuntary part-time workers" (1995, p. 8).
Between 1970 and 1990, the nonagricultural work force in the United States grew
by 54 percent, but the number of individuals involuntarily employed part-time
increased by more than 120 percent (Kilborn, 1991). Mishel and Bernstein re-
ported that, as of 1989, 78 percent of employers used independent contractors to
do work that could be done by employees, that 97 percent used temporary help,
and that these figures had increased substantially in just three years (1995,
p. 229). Between 1974 and 1984, the business services industry doubled employ-
2O New Directions for Organization Theory
ment, outstripping the growth even of industries providing services to consumers

(Howe, 1986).
Fxternalization is not just a U.S. phenomenon. Atkinson (1984) documented
the rise of externalized work in the United Kingdom. Bresnen and Fowler re-
ported that a survey published in 1987 indicated that "77 per cent of the 584
firms surveyed used contractors for at least some activities, and, of these, 40 per
cent showed an increase in use over the previous three years" (1994, p. 849). As
in the United States, externalization has expanded:
subcontracting has not: only been used more in traditional ancillary services-
such as cleaning, catering, transport, maintenance and security—. . . but has
also begun to replace the use of conventional employment . . . in a much
broader range of occupational groups such as design engineering, marketing, and
publicity, (p. 849)
Job security is also a thing of the past. Wyatt Company (1993) reported that
72 percent of employers in their 1993 survey had layoffs in the previous three
years, and Louis Harris and Associates (1991) reported that 50 percent of the
surveyed firms had laid off substantial numbers of employees in the previous five
years. The American Management Association reported that in each of the years
from mid-1989 to mid-1994 an average 46.2 percent of the firms reported a work-
force reduction. Moreover, "downsizing tends to be repetitive: on average, two-
thirds of the firms that cut jobs in a given calendar year do so again the following
year" (1994, p. 1). Cappclli (1995), reviewing the evidence on average job tenure,
concluded that average tenure for men had declined. These changes have had
predictable effects on morale and commitment. Using unpublished surveys per-
formed over decades, Cappelli noted that there has been "a sharp decline in
employee attitudes in the 1980s, especially regarding commitment to the em-
ployer" (1995, p. 586). A survey of middle managers (Training, 1992) found that
only 2 percent of middle managers believed that dedication to one's employing
organization was a key to success.
The trend toward externalizing employment has tended to differentially affect
women and minorities. Pfcffer and Baron (1988, p. 270) noted that the growth
rate of employment in business services during the 1974-1984 decade was almost
twice as high for women as for men (136 percent versus 79 percent). Self-
employment in business services tripled over the same period, with women ac-
counting for most of that growth (Howe, 1986). Women are also disproportion-
ately affected by the trend toward part-time employment. Because in the United
States health insurance and pension benefits are tied to employment status, and
because one's likelihood of being covered by union or non-union due process
procedures and the salary one earns is affected by the size of one's employing
organization (Stolzenberg, 1978), the changing conditions of employment have
important social consequences.
The size distribution of organizations has also been shifting, with the trend
being toward a higher proportion of smaller organizations (Granovetter, 1984),
although the size of individual establishments (the units in which work is per-
formed) has been fairly stable since the 1920s. Some of this shift may be ex-
plained by the changing composition of the economy, in which services now play
a comparatively more important role. In 1982, the proportion of the U.S. work
force employed in services equaled the proportion employed in manufacturing
(Granovetter, 1984, p. 324), the first time this had happened. In general, service
organizations are smaller than manufacturing organizations (p. 325), although the
consolidation in financial services (banks and insurance companies) indicates that
this is not invariably the case. But, even in manufacturing, smaller organizations
are more numerous than in the past. This trend toward smaller size is consistent
with the propensity to contract out tasks and to use more contract labor, reducing
the size of the core organizations. The largest organizations —for example, the
Fortune 500 —have been shedding employees. Christensen reported that the
largest companies, those in the Fortune 500, "reduced their work forces by 2.5
million employees between fiscal years 1983 and 1993" (1995, p. 2), a decrease
of 18 percent. The fact that employment has continued to grow in the economy
as a whole means, by definition, that there has been a shift to smaller organiza-
tions. Castro reported that "the number of people employed full time by Fortune
500 companies has shrunk from 19% of the work force two decades ago to less
than 10% today" (1993, p. 43). Scherer (1980) has reviewed evidence indicating
that economies of scale in production occur at relatively small establishment
sizes, so that the economics of production do not dictate the need for large-size
organizations.
Granovetter's (1984) comparative analysis of size distributions of organiza-
tions in Sweden, the United States, and Japan reported that there were compara-
tively more small organizations in Japan and that Sweden's size distribution of
establishments was comparable to that in the United States. The Japanese manu-
facturing sector has typically operated with an emphasis on building networks of
suppliers and using a great deal of outside contracting, which permitted the core
firms to have fewer employees. To the extent this way of organizing production is
increasingly the case in the U.S. economy, then a trend toward a similar and
smaller size distribution of firms might be expected. Indeed, the emphasis on
specialization, comparative advantage, core competencies, and similar strategies
is consistent with both the changing nature of the employment relationship and
the changing size distribution of organizations that one observes.
The size distribution of organizations is important because size is related to
numerous other organizational characteristics such as having an internal labor
market, formalization, complexity and differentiation in jobs, and having full-time
employees (Kalleberg and Van Buren, 1996, p. 54). Size also affects organiza-
tional rewards, even net of other factors associated with size. Kalleberg and Van
Buren (1996) reported that organizational size was positively related to the receipt
of fringe benefits and to perceived promotion opportunities and was negatively
related to job autonomy. They found that the frequently reported positive relation-
ship between size and earnings was no longer statistically significant when other
mediating factors related to size (such as unionization and the presence of an
internal labor market) were controlled.
A third substantial change in the organizational context has been the growing
power of the external capital markets and the corresponding diminished auton-
omy of managers, at least in publicly traded companies. Bcrle and Means (1932)
first noted the issue of the separation of ownership from control and argued that
with widely dispersed share ownership among many comparatively small invest-
ors, managers could operate effectively without oversight. The top executive
largely controlled the selection of the board of directors, which ostensibly was to
oversee this individual (Pfeffer, 1972e; Demb and Neubauer, 1992), and each
individual shareholder was typically too small to make it cost effective to attempt
to intervene in corporate governance. Although there were arguments over the
empirical facts—the extent to which large firms were or were not owner-
controlled (e.g., Zeitlin, 1974)~-the presumption was that at least some substan-
tial fraction of large, publicly traded firms provided their managers with substan-
tial discretion to pursue interests such as growth (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1967) or
the enjoyment of various perquisites (Williamson, 1964).
In the 1980s, this managerial discretion began to erode substantially. The
change occurred in part because of the development of an active market for
corporate control (Manne, 1965). In this market, assets that arc not being fully
utilized or properly managed by current management are bid away by others who
then manage these assets more efficiently. The market for corporate control has
developed as riskier forms of financing—for example, through junk bonds —have
become more institutionalized and as normative prohibitions on hostile raids or
takeovers have diminished (Hirsch, 1986). Kaplan observed that of the 150 largest
U.S. industrial corporations in 1980, by 1988 some 21.9 percent had been taken
over or merged and another five had gone private in management buyouts, a
situation he correctly characterized as "a very active U.S. takeover market" (1994,
p. 515). Kaplan's study also demonstrated that this change in the context of corpo-
rate control was, to this point, primarily a U.S. phenomenon, with only 2.5 per-
cent of comparably sized Japanese companies being merged during the same
period.
Loss of managerial autonomy results not only from the risk of having the
assets currently controlled by management bid away in a hostile takeover or
tender offer if they are not being effectively employed. It is also the case that
dispersed share ownership itself is a thing of the past, with large pension funds
such as CALPERS (the state of California's pension fund), TIAA-CREF (a pen-
sion fund for college and university faculty), and other large retirement plans as
well as banks and mutual funds now controlling a significant majority of the
shares in many large corporations. These large shareholders have discovered that
simply selling their shares if they are dissatisfied with management is difficult.
Given the large concentration of institutional ownership, market liquidity for
large blocs is possibly limited. There are also the transaction costs (brokerage fees)
associated with securities sales. Consequently, these institutions have become con-
siderably more active in pressing management for desired changes that would
presumably serve shareholder interests. And, particularly for the public pension
funds, run by "outsiders" to the corporate world, there are few normative con-
straints or social ties to reduce the ardor with which such corporate reforms are
pursued. Although such shareholder rebellions are still comparatively rare events,
Development and Scape of Organization Studies 23
they are increasing in frequency and by this very faet have taken on a more taken-
for-granted and institutionalized aspect.
The increased potency of capital market control of the corporation has been
reflected in the changing backgrounds of senior corporate executives —to deal
with financial markets, it is helpful to have a background in finance. Fligstein
(1991, p. 322) argued that analyzing the backgrounds of chief executives helps
one understand both actual power and the perception of functional importance.
Fligstein (1987; 1990) has documented the shift in the backgrounds of chief exec-
utive officers during the twentieth century from generalist entrepreneurs at the
beginning of the period, to those with manufacturing backgrounds, to those with
a sales background. In the current period, most CEOs have a background in
finance.
There have been other important changes in the world of organizations that
also have escaped much analysis in the literature. For instance, there is evidence
that rewards within organizations arc increasingly dispersed, and this dispersion is
much greater in the United States than in other industrialized countries. Abeg-
glen and Stalk (1985, p. 192) showed that the ratio of the salary paid to company
presidents in Japan to the salary paid to newly hired employees has decreased
from a pretax ratio of 110 times in 1927 to 23.6 in 1963, 19 in 1973, and 14.5
by 1980. On an after-tax basis, by 1980 the ratio of president to new employee
compensation in Japan was just 7.5 times. And, this difference in executive com-
pensation cannot be explained by differences in pay levels, for the average level
of pay in Japan in the 1980s was comparable to that in the United States and in
Western Europe. In contrast, Crystal reported that in the United States, "where
[the] typical CEO earned total compensation (excluding perquisites and fringe
benefits) that was around 35 times the pay of an average manufacturing worker
in 1974, a typical CEO today earns pay that is around 120 times that of an
average manufacturing worker and about 150 times that of the average worker in
both manufacturing and service industries" (1991, p. 27). He further noted that
these large gaps were not to be found in Japan, Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom. Even in the United Kingdom, whose business community and econ-
omy is most closely aligned with the United States, the differential between CEO
and average worker pay was under 35 times. Although the topic of wage disper-
sion has occupied a great deal of public attention in the United States, and al-
though it is clear that wage dispersion is produced, at least in part, by forces
operating within organizational labor markets (Baron and Pfcffer, 1994), this sub-
ject has not drawn much theoretical or empirical attention in the organizations
literature.
The changing environment for corporate control, changing si/,e distributions
of firms, changing wage dispersion within organizations, and the profound
changes in the governance of the employment relation have not to this point
played a large role in affecting the research agenda of organization studies. In
some ways, this is because the discipline is frequently almost as unconcerned
about context and history as other related disciplines, such as economics, that
have been deservedly critici/,ed for such theoretical and empirical lacunae. As
already noted, organization theory is not only largely housed in U.S. journals, it
is also largely focused on U.S. organizations and ideas. In a comparative study of
the development of organi/ation theory, Guillen argued:
the adoption of models or paradigms of organizational management does not
necessarily follow from their scientific credibility and is not solely determined by
economic and technological factors. . . . Managers in different countries
adopted . . . paradigms in selective ways during the twentieth century, de-
pending on the problems they were facing and such institutional factors as their
mentalities and training, the activities of professional groups, the role of the state,
and the attitude of the workers. (1994, pp. 1-2)
It is also the case that the field has tended to eschew engagement with con-
cerns of public policy. The changing nature of the employment relationship and
its differential effects on women and minorities, the changing structure of wages
in firms, and the increasing influence of shareholder capitalism over what might
be called a stakeholder model all have profound social implications. For the most
part, however, the field has been content to leave public policy debates to econo-
mists and, to a lesser extent, sociologists, even though much of the phenomena
of interest occur in organizations.
This neglect is unfortunate because a comparative— both over time and
across place —research approach has much to recommend it for testing theories
and models more rigorously and helping to discover the extent to which analytical
perspectives arc bound by either period, location, or both. Neglect of policy tends
to keep the field of organization studies on the sidelines in debates about issues
in which it potentially has much to contribute. In thinking about the various
perspectives on organizations to be discussed below, the changing features of orga-
nizations—both those highlighted here and others —should be kept firmly in
mind. One way of evaluating organizational models and theories is to ask to what
extent they provide a productive way of understanding and predicting the evolving
nature of organizations.
2
Understanding the Causes of Behavior
Perhaps the most fundamental question addressed by organization studies is how

we are to understand what causes behavior. The question is important for those
seeking to affect organizations and is equally important for those doing research
on them, for, depending on how it is answered, attention focuses on some factors
or variables and away from others. For much of its history, organization studies
was dominated by a situationalist perspective, in which the causes of behavior
were sought in the environment of the individual. Thus, for instance, in learning
and operant-conditioning perspectives (Luthans and Kreitner, 1975; Nord, 1969),
behavior is seen to be a function of its consequences, and analytic attention is
therefore directed at understanding the cues that trigger behavior, the conse-
quences that follow the behavior, schedules of reinforcement, and the relative
efficacy of rewards or punishment (O'Reilly and Weitz, 1980) in altering behavior.
The large literature on job design (Ilackman and Oldham, 1980) asked what
dimensions of jobs—things such as autonomy, variety, and the feedback re-
ceived—affected employee motivation and job satisfaction. Studies of job attitudes
such as satisfaction with pay, with the job overall, and with co-workers typically
looked to the environment—the level of pay received, job characteristics, the
availability of alternatives, what co-workers thought and said (Salancik and Pfcffcr,
1978a) — as the critical explanatory factors.
There were a number of reasons for the situational emphasis, but certainly
two are a legal environment that made focusing on individual differences more
difficult and a political context in which social problems and their solutions
tended to be located in the environment and—for good or ill depending on one's
perspective—the role of individual choice and responsibility were dccmphasized.
As to the first point, a landmark legal case, Griggs v. Duke Power, established the
principle that if the application of selection criteria such as written tests had an
adverse impact on groups protected by the various civil rights statutes, such as
2
5
women or minorities, so that they scored less well on that screening device, then
the test or selection standard had to be validated in order to be employed. Valida-
tion, of course, not only involves determining whether test scores predict subse-
quent performance but can entail selecting more broadly from the applicant pool
(to avoid restriction-of-range problems) and then following those selected to see if
their scores on the test predicted their performance. Moreover, since expectations
for performance arc often self-fulfilling (e.g., Archibald, 1974), a true validation
study must gather test scores when an individual enters the organization and then
keep them secret until they can be compared to performance measures that are
uncontaminatecl by knowledge of the individual's scores. This process is quite
costly and could be undertaken only by comparatively large organizations, and
then only for those jobs that had enough incumbents to make the effort worth-
while (e.g., Howard and Bray, 1988). The practical effect of the Griggs decision
and its vigorous enforcement by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion was to make employment testing less important in selection and socially
suspect.
Without reviewing in detail the political and social history of the Great Soci-
ety of President Lyndon Johnson or other social reforms, it seems clear that the
1960s and 1970s were periods in which social interventions to affect the environ-
ment of behavior were seen as important. Early childhood education and devel-
opment was emphasized in the Head Start program, the establishment of Legal
Aid promised to give poorer Americans access to the court system for redress of
problems, and the federal role in education was greatly expanded in an effort to
provide better and fairer educational opportunities in the belief that this would
aid social mobility. By contrast, the current political climate emphasizes individ-
ual choice and responsibility. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have weak-
ened the requirements for demonstrating the adverse impact of tests or other
screening devices. Legal services for the poor are under attack, and current bud-
geting and legislation seek the devolution of responsibility for education away
from the federal government. This different social context with its focus on the
individual has surely helped shape what organizations scholars study as well as
the perspective they bring to that endeavor.
It is not just the historical context that affects how causes for behavior are
perceived. There is also accumulating evidence that the attribution of causes of
behavior is significantly affected by cultural norms and values. In a set of experi-
ments, Morris and Peng tested the idea that:
dispositionalisrn in social attribution . . . reflects an implicit theory about social

behavior that is more widespread in individualist cultures than in collectivist
cultures. . . . An implicit theory about a domain is acquired from culturally
bound experience with events in the domain and with public representations of
the domain (e.g., folktales, sacred texts, laws, and works of art). . . . In highly-
individualist cultures, such as the United States, persons are primarily identified
as individual units . . . and they are sociali/ecl to behave according to personal
preferences. In highly collectivist cultures, such as China, persons are primarily
identified as group members . . . and they are socialized to behave according to
group norms, role constraints, and siruational scripts. (1994, p. 952)
Understanding the Causes of Behavior 27
In an experiment in which subjects watched cartoon displays of physical and

social events and reported their causal perceptions, Morris and Peng (1994) pre-
dicted and found that American and Chinese would differ significantly in how
they attributed behavior in the social situation, with the Americans emphasizing
internal forces and the Chinese emphasizing external pressures. A second study
found that attributions for mass murders reported in the newspaper differed sys-
tematically between Americans and Chinese. "American reporters attributed
more to personal dispositions and Chinese reporters attributed more to situational
factors" (Morris and Peng, 1994, p. 961). This research is important because it
suggests that attributions of causality and psychological phenomena such as the
fundamental attribution error (L. D. Ross, 1977) are not invariant across cultures.
Consequently, the growing interest in dispositional explanations for organizational
behavior is almost certainly a Western if not strictly an American phenomenon,
and we need to be much more sensitive to the culturally embedded character of
our explanations of causality and, for that matter, the culturally and socially em-
bedded character of our models of behavior.
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed a renewed interest in research seeking
the causes of individual behavior and attitudes not in a person's particular organi-
zational or social environment but rather in the individual's own personality or
dispositions. One of the strongest statements of this view was made by Schneider,
who argued, "the attributes of people, not the nature of the external environment,
or organizational technology, or organizational structure, are the fundamental de-
terminants of organizational behavior" (1987, p. 437). He argued this was true
because organizations would tend to recruit, select, and retain people on the basis
of individual attributes, and consequently, those attributes would come to consti-
tute the basis of the organization. The attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) cycle
would operate to produce homogeneity over time; thus, "the situation is not inde-
pendent of the people in the setting; the situation is the people. . . . Structure,
process, and culture are the outcome of the people in an organization, not the
cause of the behavior of the organization" (Schneider, Goldstein, and Smith,
1995, p. 751). Of course, some formulations stress the interaction between per-
sons and situations (e.g., Chatman, 1991; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell,
1991), but the resurgence of interest in individual differences as an important
way of understanding organizational behavior has been both vigorous and contro-
versial.
The Search for Individual Dispositions
The search for individual differences, operationalized as cross-situational consis-

tency in behavior or attitudes, was largely dormant by the 1970s. For instance,
the study of leadership traits produced limited success in uncovering consistent
dimensions of personality or finding robust effects of individual attributes on out-
comes of organizational interest. Vroom summarized that: research: "There appear
to be a few traits which tend to distinguish leaders from non-leaders. . . . The
differences tend to be small in magnitude with large amounts of overlap between
the distributions of scores of leaders and followers. . . . There is considerable

variance across situations" (1976, p. 1529). Vroom also noted that there were
important problems in inferences of causality in much of the research—leader-
ship roles may create differences in traits rather than the traits being responsible
for accession to positions of leadership.
This neglect of individual differences has now changed substantially. A
search of Psychological Abstracts revealed that the average annual number of arti-
cles dealing with personality traits increased some 41 percent from the period
1974-1986 to the period 1987-1992. Examining the American Business Index,
which only began in 1985, and considering only articles that concern both orga-
nizational behavior and personality, I found that there were 9% more articles per
year in the period 1989-1992 than there were in the period 1985-1988.
Weiss and Acller (1984) wrote an influential piece that has stimulated much
of this renewed interest. They argued that the failure to find dispositional effects
of any empirical consequence in organizations was possibly more a matter of poor
theory and methods than the fact that dispositions didn't matter. They noted that
it was often the case that personality scales were grafted, almost as an after-
thought, onto studies being done for other reasons. Therefore, the particular con-
struct being measured was not always logically related to the rest of the study
design. Funder and Colvin (1991) argued that counting specific behaviors was
too restrictive a way to assess consistency across situations. They maintained that
coding behavior in terms of its social effect or psychological meaning was more
valid, because that would relocate "the essence of behavior from its superficial
appearance to the meaning it has for the person or the effect it has upon the
social environment" (p. 774). Judge argued that "not all personality constructs are
equally efficacious in predicting attitudes and behavior" (1992, p. 32), and that
the research on dispositions had not necessarily focused on the most important
dimensions. Chatman (1989) maintained that personality or individual differences
constituted an overall gestalt and that investigating single facets or dimensions at
a time would inevitably fail to capture the substance of individual differences.
Thus, neither personal dispositions, nor situations, nor the meaning of cross-
situational consistency had been adequately assessed; it was premature to con-
clude that dispositions didn't matter.
The availability of panel data, particularly data measuring job attitudes,
prompted renewed interest in and study of eross-situational consistency. A year
after the Weiss and Adler paper appeared, Staw and Ross (1985) published a
paper that, despite its acknowledged theoretical and methodological flaws,
spawned a resurgence of interest in individual differences in organizational behav-
ior and provided a substantive direction for that interest—namely, a concern with
positive and negative affect. The Staw and Ross study used a single-item measure
of job satisfaction from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Male Work-
ers (who were between forty-four and sixty-five years old) and examined the stabil-
ity of that measure over time, comparing responses in 1966, 1969, and 1971.
They found that although the measure of job satisfaction was comparatively more
stable (the longitudinal correlations were higher) for men who remained in the
same company or in the same occupation compared to those who changed either
or both—providing some evidence for the importance of the situation—it was
still the case that even in the case of the most change, the stability in job satisfac-
tion was statistically significant. They concluded that "satisfaction in 1966 was the
strongest and most significant predictor of 1971 job attitudes. Neither changes in
pay nor changes in job status accounted for nearly as much variance as prior job
attitude" (p. 475). Staw and Ross took this result to indicate that job satisfaction
was a stable individual characteristic, such that some people tended to be happier
than others regardless of their circumstances. Staw and Ross went on to argue
that one possible reason that various organizational interventions (such as job
redesign) were not always as effective as their advocates hoped was that "many
situational interventions may be prone to failure because they must contend with
attitudinal consistency or a tendency for individuals to revert back to their basic-
dispositions" (p. 478).
In a critique of the relative variance claims made by Staw and Ross for dispo-
sitions compared to situations, Johns noted that there was a test-retest correlation
of .84 for both job status and pay (the two situational factors considered in the
study) over the five-year period examined. Consequently, "the situational changes
against which Staw and Ross pitted prior job satisfaction were highly constrained"
(1991, p. 90).
The most obvious problems with this initial study—use of a single-item de-
pendent variable, definition of the personal trait of satisfaction from its stability
over time, which is tautological, and failure to control for a number of alternative
explanations for the results, such as the content of the jobs being performed —
were overcome to varying degrees in subsequent studies. The basic paradigm —
searching for longitudinal correlations in attitudes—remained essentially un-
changed. Thus, for instance, Staw, Bell, and Clausen (1986) used data on person-
ality collected at Berkeley on individuals when they were young to examine job
satisfaction decades later. They found that personality did predict job satisfaction
and that this result held even when the socioeconomic status of the individuals
was statistically controlled. Gerhart (1987) replicated the Staw and Ross study
using a sample of younger workers (who would presumably be more likely to
experience more change in job conditions). He attempted to control for differ-
ences in job characteristics by assigning job characteristic scores to occupations
on the basis of their descriptions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and by
using those items from the Job Characteristics Inventory (Sims, Szilagyi, and Kel-
ler, 1976) that measured job complexity. He found that although there were im-
portant effects of job characteristics on job attitudes, the statistical significance of
the cross-time stability in job satisfaction remained.
One issue in all of these studies is what stability in job satisfaction scores
actually says about the existence of dispositions. Gutek and Winter (1992) argued
that this apparent stability was not necessarily an indicator of some stable underly-
ing trait but rather possibly an artifact of response-shift bias (Howard and Dailey,
1979). Response-shift bias raises the possibility that there is a change in the frame
of reference used by the respondent in answering questions about job satisfaction
so that the stability in job attitudes is illusory. Gutek and Winter wrote:
evaluation of the job is confounded with a change in frame of reference that

accompanies a job change. . . . Respondents may be using a different frame of
reference each time job satisfaction is measured during a longitudinal study,

especially if they have changed jobs between the two measurements. . . . The
job change "intervention" expands their conception of the possible range of job
satisfaction and thereby affects their Post job change ratings of job satisfaction.
(1992, pp. 62-63)
Gutek and Winter noted that there were three kinds of job-satisfaction ratings: (1)
a rating of job satisfaction at an earlier time, possibly when the individual was in
a different situation, which they referred to as "Pre"; (2) a rating of job satisfaction
at the present time, called "Post"; and (3) a retrospective rating of job satisfaction
for the conditions of the initial period, called "Then." Terborg, Howard, and Max-
well (1980) have presented evidence that the comparisons of Then/Post measure-
ments were more similar to objective ratings of change in behavior than were the
Pre/Post ratings. Furthermore, Terborg, Howard, and Maxwell showed that "the
retrospective technique was robust to problems of saliency, priming, and order
effects, and Then ratings were not biased by memory distortion or social desirabil-
ity" (Gutek and Winter, 1992, p. 64).
In three separate studies, Gutek and Winter found "no consistency of job
attitudes across job situations when we designed studies that took into account
the possible occurrence of a response shift bias among job changers." The ratings
of different jobs were essentially independent, but these ratings "should have been
correlated if people are predisposed to be satisfied or dissatisfied" (1992, p. 75).
They concluded that the "fact" of cross-time consistency in job satisfaction was
artifactual and not robust.
Another issue highlighted by the Staw and Ross study and Gerhart's replica-
tion and extension is the meaning and measurement of situational versus disposi-
tional effects. In a sample, responses over time may be highly correlated even if
those responses differ significantly across the two periods, as long as the relative
scores of the subjects remain stable (Newton and Keenan, 1991). Thus, for exam-
ple, an intervention that raises everyone's job satisfaction significantly may still
leave the relative ranking among individuals unchanged, implying stability when,
in fact, there is change. In a study of British engineers whose course satisfaction
was measured while still in school in 1980 and whose job satisfaction was mea-
sured in 1982 and 1984, Newton and Keenan (1991) reported a statistically sig-
nificant correlation between job satisfaction measured two years apart (r = 0.24),
a significant correlation between course satisfaction and job satisfaction four years
later (r = 0.15), but no relationship between course satisfaction and job satisfac-
tion two years after graduation (r = 0.03). However, there were also significant
changes in the level of job satisfaction (and alienation) over time, with the results
indicating that, on the whole, respondents were less satisfied with their jobs than
they were with their university courses. This study demonstrated that, by using an
over-time correlation measure, one would infer some degree of stability (note that
the amount of variance explained at a later time by scores at the previous time is
quite small), but looking at the differences in means, one would infer statistically
significant change. Some scholars have explicitly defined a dispositional perspec-
tive in terms of the stability of rank-ordering of individuals across situations, even
if and when "these consistent individual differences . . . [are] superimposed on
Understanding the Causes of Betiavior 31
overall level differences that reflect that some work environments are generally
more satisfying than others" (Watson and Slack, 1993, p. 182).
Any theory emphasizing the importance of dispositions must necessarily an-
swer the question of where such dispositions originate. One possible answer is
genetics, and a series of studies of twins has sought to demonstrate the heritability
of both job attitudes and vocational interests. These studies have capitalized on
the availability of data gathered on twins, some of whom were separated at birth
and raised apart—something that is important in order to be able to empirically
distinguish between genetic heredity and environment. Arvey, Bouchard, Segal,
and Abraham (1989) estimated that about 30 percent of the observed variation in
general job satisfaction could be attributed to inherited or genetic factors. Lykken,
Bouchard, McGue, and Tellegen (1993), studying vocational and recreational
interests in pairs of twins, found that about 50 percent of the variation in interests
was associated with genetic variation. They also found a higher degree of correla-
tion in the monozygotic twins than for the dyzygotic twins, the latter having less
genetic material in common. Note that the amount of heritability implied by
these studies is substantial —- in some cases exceeding 50 percent.
There have been a number of methodological critiques of the twin studies.
Cropanzano and James (1990) noted that if the twins were raised in similar envi-
ronments—a plausible assumption —comparing environmental with inherited in-
fluences would not be valid. But perhaps the biggest issue is that, "absent infor-
mation regarding how the process works, one wonders what is inherited" (Judge,
1992, p. 44, emphasis in original). There have been numerous studies demonstra-
ting the likelihood that intelligence is inherited, at least in part, and has a genetic
component (Bouchard and McGue, 1981; Seligman, 1992; Hernstein and Mur-
ray, 1994). Intelligence, moreover, has been shown to affect numerous life out-
comes such as career success (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1994). The question posed
by the twin studies is whether the observed relationship between job satisfaction
and vocational interest scores across sets of twins is the consequence of the herita-
bility of job affect and career interests or of the heritability of intelligence and
the effect of intelligence on career interests and job satisfaction (see also Judge,
1992). This distinction, however, is not necessarily critical to those who argue
that the heritability of traits and their stability and existence are important, not
the particular mechanisms or even the particular traits that are inherited. Thus,
for instance, Lykken et al. noted, "the experiences people seek, and the effect of
those experiences on their developing interests, are influenced by traits of phy-
sique, aptitude, and temperament . . . that are themselves substantially geneti-
cally influenced" (1993, p. 658).
One critical problem faced by research on the dispositional bases of organiza-
tional behavior has been to identify not only the source of dispositions but also a
consistent, replicable set of meaningful dispositions. As noted previously, the work
on the stability of satisfaction over time led naturally to an interest in the possibil-
ity that one important individual trait was a propensity to be happy or unhappy.
This corresponded nicely with work in social psychology on positive and negative
affect and has resulted in a number of empirical studies. Watson, Clark, and
Tellegen (1988) reported on the development of scales for positive and negative
32 New Directions for Organization Theory'
affect and evidence that these are, in fact, two orthogonal dimensions. Costa and
McCrac (1988) reported six-year test-retest correlations of 0.82 for positive affect
and 0.83 for negative affect, providing evidence of the stability of this disposition
over time.
Levin and Stokes (1989) argued and provided evidence that negative affcctiv-
ity was related to measures of job satisfaction. Their experimental study manipu-
lated task characteristics by giving some subjects the job of rating graduate stu-
dent applications and others the task of copying transcripts. They selected subjects
that were cither in the highest or lowest quartile of the scale of negative affcctivity.
Their empirical results indicated that although task condition explained some 53
percent of the variation in job satisfaction while negative affectivity accounted for
only 4 percent, even in the two very different task conditions the effect of negative
affectivity was statistically significant. Watson and Slack (.1993) studied eighty-two
employees at Southern Methodist University, measuring them initially on scales
assessing positive affect and negative affect. Subsequently, subjects were retcsted
on these personality measures and also completed job satisfaction and job change
measures. Although there was significant attrition in the group, through both
voluntary turnover and firing, the initial measures of affect were unrelated to
whether or not the subjects remained employed at SMU. Measures of tempera-
ment showed good test-retest consistency, with correlations ranging from 0.63 to
0.74. Also, initial measures of positive and negative affect were correlated with
job satisfaction almost two years later, and, in fact, the correlations between affect
at the time of the initial measurement and subsequent satisfaction were of about
the same magnitude as contemporaneous correlations between the dispositions
and job satisfaction when measured at time 2. Moreover, even when (perceptual)
measures of job characteristics were partialed out in the analysis, the effect of
positive and negative affect remained.
Of course, positive and negative affect are not the only critical dimensions of
personality. Another advance made in the study of dispositions has been conver-
gence on the importance of five core dimensions of personality—the so-called
Big Five (e.g., Barrick and Mount, 1991; Digman, 1990; L. R. Goldberg, 1990).
The Big Five factors are: cxtraversion, agrccablcncss, conscientiousness, emo-
tional stability, and openness to experience (Barrick and Mount, 1993, p. 111).
This is an important advance because one of the criticisms of dispositional re-
search has been that it was atheorctical and tautological. For instance, Judge
and Ilulin commented on the proliferation of "empirical studies linking traits
to outcomes, with often only tangential relations to a well-developed theoretical
framework" (1993, p. 389). The search for personality dimensions has at times
involved finding some regularity in behavior and then naming that regularity a
personality dimension; at other times it has involved factor analyses of question-
naire responses, which data has been used to empirically uncover dispositions.
These factor-analytic solutions were not always stable across subject populations,
and the search for dispositions was criticized for attempting to capitalize on em-
pirical regularities.
O'Reilly and Chatman (1994) have noted that although there has been a
renewed interest in the effects of individual characteristics on organizational be-
havior, one characteristic absent in this literature is intelligence, or general cogni-

tive ability (GCA). This is despite the evidence that intelligence is in part inher-
ited and is stable over time and, most important, the evidence that "general
cognitive ability predicts job performance in all jobs" (Hunter, 1986, p. 340). A
number of studies using large samples (e.g., Rec and Earles, 1991; Austin and
Hanisch, 1990; Campbell, 1990) have shown cognitive ability to predict job per-
formance and occupational choice even better than measures of specific apti-
tudes. O'Reilly and Chatman (1994) obtained measures of the intelligence (using
Graduate Management Admission Test scores) and motivation (using the Adjec-
tive Check List as part of a personality assessment) of a set of MBA students while
they were in their first year of business school. After these students graduated
(either three and a half or four and a half years later), O'Reilly and Chatman
measured current salary, number of job offers received on graduation, number of
promotions, the increment in salary compared to the salary received on gradua-
tion, and the ratio of the number of offers received to the number of interviews
students had while looking for a job when they graduated. The study controlled
for previous work experience, sex, age, citizenship, and college major. O'Reilly
and Chatman found virtually no main effects for either intelligence or motivation
but uncovered a statistically significant interaction that predicted current salary,
number of offers, and number of promotions.
House, Howard, and Walker (1991), employing the AT&T data (Howard and
Bray, 1988), found that verbal ability was correlated .83 with verbal ability mea-
sured some twenty years after the initial measurement. Quantitative ability was
not as stable, with the correlation over twenty years being just .40. Nevertheless,
both dimensions of intelligence were much more stable than any of the other
dispositions measured by House and his colleagues and, moreover, had statisti-
cally significant effects on managerial attainment, measured in terms of the level
of responsibility achieved. For those interested in the effect of individual differ-
ences on what happens to people and how they perform in organizations, it would
seem that intelligence or mental ability would be an excellent research focus.
Furthermore, including measures of intelligence in studies of the effects of other
dispositions would permit research to eliminate this factor as an alternative expla-
nation for the results.
Another advance in the literature on traits has been the recognition of the
need to both theoretically and empirically distinguish between moods, or states
that can be induced experimentally by manipulations such as giving subjects
cookies or that vary naturally, from more stable and enduring traits such as posi-
tive or negative affect. George (1989; 1991) has shown that although there is
some relationship between mood and positive and negative affect, the constructs
are empirically distinct. Mood at work has been related to absence and prosocial
behaviors and to organizational outcomes such as sales. The evidence in these
studies does seem to suggest that mood has a stronger effect on the various depen-
dent variables than does disposition. In some sense that is not surprising, as mood
is a characteristic of the moment and might therefore be expected to be more
proximately relevant to current behavior than a more generalized affective orien-
tation.
Problems with the Dispositional Perspective
Although there has been a plethora of articles and substantially increased interest
in exploring the effect of individual traits on behavior in organizations, this litera-
ture is not without its problems. First, there remains ambiguity about the defini-
tion of some of the traits, including even the Big Five. Barrick and Mount ac-
knowledged that "some researchers have reservations about the five-factor model,
particularly the imprecise specification of these dimensions" (1991, p. 3). These
reservations flow logically from the fact that "while there is general agreement
among researchers concerning the number of factors, there is some disagreement
about their precise meaning" (p. 3). For instance, the first trait is extraversion/
introversion, associated with the characteristics of being sociable, talkative, and
assertive (p. 111). However, liogan (1986) has interpreted this dimension as con-
sisting of two components, ambition and sociability. Extraversion, ambition, socia-
bility, and talkativeness are not necessarily conceptually identical. Similar impre-
cision exists for virtually all of the traits. For instance, conscientiousness has also
been called conformity or dependability and has been referred to as the will to
achieve because of its association with various educational achievement measures:
"As the disparity in labels suggests, there is some disagreement regarding the es-
sence of this dimension" (Barrick and Mount, 1991, p. 4).
Similar problems affect the interpretation of positive and negative affect,
which have been most often measured and theorized as if they were statistically
independent dimensions. But the independence between the constructs seems to
depend on measurement and methodological issues (Chamberlain, 1988; Diener,
1990). Diener concluded that "there is not replieable evidence across samples
and methods that positive and negative affect are . . . unrelated" (1990, p. 14).
Second, although some studies have measured the stability of dispositions
across time, those dealing with positive and negative affect, for example, such
concern about ensuring that stable traits are identified and validated is not neces-
sarily the norm. For example, several authors have employed the inaugural ad-
dresses of U.S. presidents to measure presidential personality (e.g., House, Span-
gler, and Wyocke, 1991; Spangler and House, 1991; Winter, 1987). Winter coded
inaugural addresses for achievement, affiliation, and power-motive imagery. How-
ever, he chose to code a single speech-—the first inaugural address. Although a
number of the presidents were rcclccted and therefore gave second inaugural
speeches, and since many had been in public life for years and so had given
speeches that could also have been analyzed, there was no attempt in any of
the studies of the effects of presidential personality to establish that presidential
personality, as a reasonably stable underlying construct, had been measured by
using the same method to assess consistency over time.
Indeed, Winter's own data permit one to explore an alternative interpretation
for his results —namely, that the imagery in the speeches reflects not the personal-
ity of the president but rather the political ideology of the president's party. Win-
ter (1987) reported the scores for the U.S. presidents he studied. Considering only
those from the twentieth century, Democratic presidents scored, on average, 62.8
on the standardized power-imagery measure while Republican presidents scored
49.5. Democrats scored 60.1 on affiliation while Republicans scored 51. Thus,
across political parties there are differences that provide a plausible explanation
for the differences in imagery observed, without relying on the construct of per-
sonality.
Nor is there increased attention to measuring the stability of dispositions in
more recent research, conducted long after this problem was discussed (Davis-
Blake and Pfeffer, 1989). For example, in a study of the effect of the individual
characteristic of cooperativeness and of being in a more cooperative culture on
cooperative behavior, Chatman and Barsade (1995) measured individual coopera-
tiveness at a single point in time, using a scale that had not been shown to be
stable over time.
Third, there is evidence that dispositions or elements of personality appear to
change in response to learning, experience, and exposure to different situations.
House, Howard, and Walker (1991) found that the level of managerial responsi-
bility AT&T employees had attained at one point in time had a statistically sig-
nificant effect on the will to manage at a later time. Kohn and Schooler (1978;
1982) reported that individual traits such as self-direction and tolerance for uncer-
tainty changed depending on the particular jobs that people held over time.
Fourth, the definition of dispositions is frequently imprecise with respect to
the stability implied in the definition or to the distinction between dispositions
and other psychological constructs. Thus, House, Shane, and Herold wrote, "Dis-
positions generally are viewed as tendencies to respond to situations . . . in a
particular, predetermined manner. Furthermore such tendencies may vary in
their temporal stability, their activation state, and their usefulness in explaining
behavior under different conditions" (1996, p. 205). That article also noted that
while personality characteristics were the most stable dispositions, "needs, moti-
vates, preferences, and attitudes . . . need not be viewed as stable" (p. 205). This
muddies the distinction between individual dispositions and other psychological
states, including mood, which are readily induced (e.g., Isen and Levin, 1972;
Brief, Butcher, and Roberson, 1995).
Fifth, many of the effects of dispositions, particularly on outcomes of organi-
zational interest, are incredibly weak if not nonexistent. O'Reilly and Roberts,
using a sample of 578 officers and enlisted men in a high-technology navy unit,
found "no significant relationship between intrinsic traits and job satisfaction"
(1975, p. 148), once factors such as rank and tenure with the navy were con-
trolled. Barrick and Mount (1991) performed a meta-analysis of the effect of the
Big Five personality traits on job performance, reviewing 117 studies conducted
between 1952 and 1988 that covered some 24,000 individuals. They reported
that the magnitudes of the estimated true correlations between these personality
dimensions and job proficiency, training proficiency, and various career outcome
measures such as salary, turnover, and tenure were less than 0.10. Tell, Jackson,
and Rothstein's (1991) meta-analysis of the personality-job performance relation-
ship in ninety-seven field studies found that the average corrected correlation
between personality and job performance was 0.19. Hough et al. (1990), examin-
ing the validity of six personality traits in a sample of over 9,000 individuals in
the U.S. military, found predictive validities for a variety of job-related criteria in
the 0.20s. The average correlation between the traits and both technical profi-
ciency and general soldiering proficiency was 0.04. The outcomes best predicted
by the traits were physical fitness and military bearing. These reviews indicate
that dispositions invariably account for 4 percent or less of the variation in out-
comes such as job performance.
Examination of some specific studies illustrates the point that even when
statistically significant correlations with personality dimensions are found, the ef-
fect sizes are often minute. Bluen, Barling, and Burns's (1990) study of the rela-
tionship between personality and the number of policies sold by life insurance
brokers found a correlation 0.09 with impatience-irritability and 0.18 with
achievement strivings. The same study showed that experience (organizational
tenure) correlated 0.39 with the number of policies sold, demonstrating that work
experience was a better predictor of current sales than personality. George's (1989;
1991) studies of the effects of positive and negative affectivity found that absentee-
ism from work correlated —0.10 with positive affectivity and 0.08 with negative
affectivity. She also reported that positive affectivity was correlated 0.10 with a
measure of altruism, 0.02 with indicators of customer service, and 0.00 with sales
performance. Her studies found that state or mood had a stronger effect than
dispositions on the outcomes assessed, but she reported that the strongest effects
on absence were job tenure, age, being paid on commission, and full- or part-
time employment status, all situational factors.
Sixth, many of the studies of dispositions make virtually no effort to control
for plausible situational factors that might also explain the results. An important
consequence of failure to control for situational causes is that the unique effects
of situations and dispositions become impossible to untangle, and there is the
potential for misattributing situational effects to dispositional causes.
Both self-selection and organizational selection result in the nonrandom as-
signment of individuals to organizational conditions (Schneider, 1987). In this
sense, much research on individual attitudes and behaviors in organizational set-
tings consists of quasi-experiments. In these quasi-experiments, modeling only dis-
positional determinants of behavior can lead to biased estimates of effects. Achen's
(1986) book on the problems involved in making causal inferences from data
generated by quasi-experiments discussed this point at length. He demonstrated
that "an accurate assessment of a quasi-experiment depends on explicit modeling
of both the behavioral outcome of the experiment and the assignment to treat-
ment groups" (p. 37). Achen showed that, unless the assignment process is mod-
eled, the results of quasi-experiments are frequently worthless. In organizations
research, modeling the assignment process requires estimating the effects of orga-
nizational characteristics (such as the selection and reward system) that both
cause individuals to be in particular organizations and that also cause many of
the dependent variables being studied. Cropanzano and James (1990) have made
a similar point in their critique of the study of twins.
It should be noted that not every study of individual dispositions suffers from
all of these problems. For instance, Judge and Hulin made a carefully drawn
distinction between "affective disposition, defined as the tendency to respond gen-
erally to the environment in an affect-based manner, and subjective well-being,
the level of overall happiness and satisfaction an individual has with his or her
life" (1993, p. 388) and were quite precise in their measurement models. O'Reilly
and Chatman (1994) also have taken care to measure the traits carefully, ensure
their validity, and control for at least some situational factors. But the problems
are pervasive enough in the literature so that readers should keep them in mind
in evaluating this research.
Person by Situation Interaction and Fit
Rather than emphasizing dispositions or situational influences on behavior, some

formulations have argued that it is the interaction between the two that most
successfully accounts for behavior in organizations. As Pervin and Lewis (1978)
have summarized, interactional psychology encompasses some five meanings of
interaction between a person and a situation: descriptive interaction (describing
interpersonal relationships and behavior in terms of the individuals involved and
the situation or context), statistical interaction, additive interaction (two or more
variables having additive effects), interdependent interaction (in which individual
traits and situational variables compose a complex system and changes in one
variable may have different effects on other variables), and reciprocal action-
transaction interaction (a variable is influenced by its own effects on other vari-
ables). George (1992) has noted that tests of the interactional perspective in the
organizations literature are quite rare. To the extent there have been explorations
of this perspective, they have generally taken one of two forms: (1) examining
conditions under which particular dispositions have more or less effect on some
criterion and (2) developing measures of and examining the consequences of
person-situation or person-job fit.
Barrick and Mount (1993), following up on the long-standing argument that
personality would have more effect in situations that were relatively weak or had
fewer demands (Bern and Allen, 1974; Bern and Funder, 1978; Mischel, 1977),
hypothesized that job autonomy would moderate the relationship between per-
sonality and managerial performance. Studying 154 participants in a U.S. Army
training program, they found that job autonomy, as rated by the respondents and
their supervisors, did moderate the relationship between conscientiousness and
extraversion and supervisors' ratings of performance. Earlier, Lee, Ashford, and
Bobko (1990) had found that job autonomy moderated the relationship between
Type A personality and job performance and job satisfaction, reporting that indi-
viduals scoring high on the Type A scale had the highest job performance and
satisfaction under conditions of greater autonomy.
Some of the first studies of job characteristics examined whether those char-
acteristics of the job environment affected individuals with different traits differ-
ently. Hackman and Lawler (1971) found that growth need strength moderated
the relationship between job characteristics and motivation and satisfaction, such
that individuals with high growth need strength were more affected by the moti-
vating potential of jobs than those with low growth need strength. O'Reilly, distin-
guishing individuals by whether their orientation to work was primarily expressive
(desiring achievement and self-actualization) or instrumental (desiring job secu-

rity and high financial rewards), found support for the idea that "respondents with
high expressive orientations toward work" were "more satisfied in challenging jobs
while low expressive types" were "comparatively less satisfied in challenging work"
(1977, p. 41). Steers and Spencer (1977) reported that the need for achievement
moderated the relationship between job autonomy and supervisory ratings of per-
formance, and Mowday and Spencer (1981) reported statistically significant mod-
erating effects of the need for achievement on the relationship between autonomy
and absenteeism but no moderating effect when turnover was the dependent vari-
able. However, the results for the need for achievement as a moderator of the
relationship between job conditions and outcomes are not consistent. For in-
stance, Evans, Kiggundu, and House (1979) found that need for achievement did
not moderate the relationship between job autonomy and performance in a study
of 343 managers and supervisors in an automobile assembly plant.
Judge (1993) pursued the idea that the relationship between job satisfaction
and turnover—a relationship that has been consistently observed but is often quite
weak—might be moderated by an individual's affective disposition. He followed
up on an insight by Weitz that suggested "some individuals generally gripe more
than others" (1952, p. 203). For individuals who were generally happy, job dissat-
isfaction was hypothesized to be more likely to produce turnover than for individ-
uals who were generally dissatisfied. Using data collected from 234 nurses work-
ing in a Midwestern clinic, Judge found that "employees with a positive
disposition who were dissatisfied with their jobs were much more likely to quit"
(1993, p. 399). Note that virtually all forms of statistical interaction are repre-
sented in the studies just described. In some, personality moderates the effects of
the environment on various outcomes; in others, environmental characteristics,
such as the strength of the situation or the amount of autonomy, moderate the
relationship between personality and various outcomes; and in yet other studies,
personality moderates the relationship between an attitude, job satisfaction, and
some behavior, such as turnover, that might be expected to logically follow
from it.
The second form of interaction that has been studied is the idea that the
degree of person-situation fit can be assessed and is an important predictor of
outcomes such as success and turnover. Chatman (1989; 1991) has suggested that
the ability to predict and understand behavior in organizations would be im-
proved by assessing person-organization fit through the use of a Q-sort methodol-
ogy. The methodology operationalizcs Bern and Funder's (1978) suggestion of the
importance of matching templates —descriptions of the context that are compara-
ble to the ways in which individuals are characterized.
Chatman, Caldwell, and O'Reilly (1995) have noted that different situations
place different demands on people, so that what is important is the fit between
individual predispositions and the requirements of the job or situation. Their
study compared the personality profiles of MBA graduates to the personality pro-
files developed by asking sixty ralers to assess "those personal characteristics that
are important in determining success during the first five years of a person's career
as a manager" (Chatman et al., 1995, p. 11). They found that the degree of
correspondence between an individual's personality profile and the template pro-

duced by the raters was significantly related to salary several years after graduation
as well as to the increment in that salary over the starting salary received, control-
ling for other factors such as gender, age, ethnicity, and intelligence as measured
by scores on a standardized admissions test. O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell
(1991) found that the greater the degree of correspondence between an individu-
al's values and the organization's culture, the higher the level of performance, the
longer the individual stayed in the organization, and the greater the expressed
commitment to the firm. Chatman (1991) reported that the congruence between
organizational culture and personal values was a better predictor of tenure and
performance in the job than either of the factors alone.
Chatman and Barsade (1995) found that cooperative individuals behaved
more cooperatively when they worked in an experimentally induced cooperative
culture. Interestingly, their study demonstrated that cooperative individuals
tended to vary their behavior more depending on whether or not they were in an
individualistic or cooperative culture, while more individualistic individuals
tended to be less responsive to cultural norms. This result suggests that an individ-
ualistic culture, if it is created by recruiting individualistic people, is more robust,
at least in the United States. That is because the cooperative people will change
their behavior more to conform to the individualistic culture, which then will
become even more individualistic in its orientation. But since individualists con-
form less to social pressure, the reciprocal form of transformation —moving from
an individualistic to a collectivist set of norms—is much less likely.
The idea that person-organization fit is important seems intuitively sensible,
and certainly the results of these studies indicate that fit does predict important
organizational outcomes such as turnover in carefully conducted studies in which
fit is measured around the time of organizational entry and outcomes are mea-
sured at a later date. However, it is important to recognize that much of this
research does not assess stable traits or dispositions but rather more transient and
malleable individual attitudes and values. For instance, both Chatman (1991) and
O'Reilly et al. (1991) assessed person-organization fit by examining the relation-
ship between new employees' preferences for various types of organizational cul-
tures and more senior employees' descriptions of the actual organizational cul-
ture. But such preferences for cultural characteristics are quite likely to change
as a consequence of experience and as a result of organizational socialization
efforts. Chatman (1991) reported that attendance at firm social events and time
spent with a mentor significantly increased person—organization fit during the
first year on the job, so that the degree of person—organization fit at the time of
organizational entry accounted for less than 40 percent of the variation in fit a
year later. Thus, one can agree that person—organization fit is important, but note
that this degree of fit is in part a consequence of organizational efforts to change
individuals through socialization and inculturation processes and may or may not
reflect the interaction between stable individual traits and organizational situa-
tions. For this reason, research using individual dispositions as assessed in a formal
personality assessment process to predict managerial success by using the correla-
tion with a rater-generated profile of managerial characteristics is an important
step in validating the usefulness of the personal disposition—situation fit argument

(Chatman, Caklwell, and O'Reilly, 1995).
The Costs and Benefits of the Person—Situation Debate
There are a number of authors (e.g., George, 1992; House et al., 1996) who argue
that organization studies should accept the interactionist perspective—situations,
individual traits, and their interactions are all important—and stop debating the
point. George, for instance, argued that "rather than mimicking the debate that
raged in psychology over these same issues, it will probably be much more fruitful
to try to understand the effects of person factors, situational factors, their various
types of interactions, and the processes governing these interactions on organiza-
tional phenomena" (1992, p. 192). House ct al. referred to the person-situation
controversy as a "pseudo issue" and suggested that "it is more meaningful to ask
how dispositional variables and organizational variables interact in evoking behav-
ior" (1996, p. 220). Pervin (1985) and Carson (1989) also expressed exasperation
with the continuing disputes about whether individual traits mattered or which
were more important in general. The argument seems to be that the debate di-
verts time and attention away from advancing knowledge about organizational
behavior.
The continuing controversy does, however, potentially have some positive
benefit. First, the very fact of controversy, debate, and the passions aroused
thereby provide attention, energy, and emphasis on this particular subset of the
field. Thus, somewhat ironically, critiques of the dispositionalist perspective in
organization studies (e.g., Davis-Blake and Pfeffer, 1989), and the responses they
generated (e.g., House et al., 1996), have probably stimulated more and better
work on this topic than might otherwise have occurred (see also Kenrick and
Funder, 1988). As Mone and McKinley (1993) have argued, organization studies,
in part because of its pre-paradigmatie nature, values uniqueness and things that
are interesting possibly more than many scientific fields do. lb the extent this is
the case, the very controversy of the debate provides a measure of how interesting
and novel the subject is and thus encourages more research activity.
Second, there is little doubt that critiques of the dispositionalist view have
stimulated the substantive development of the study of individual traits. Without
the critiques concerning the conceptual ambiguity of traits, methodological issues
including failure to control for relevant situational influences and to use appro-
priate methods, and the very meaning of dispositions, one might question whether
the field would have seen the advances in method and conceptual development
witnessed particularly over the past several years.
The point about the relevance and usefulness of controversy is a general one
for the field of organization studies, for this particular controversy is not the only
one that has engaged the field. The fundamental issue is whether knowledge will
be better developed by accommodating a number of points of view or whether
the very absence of accommodation, particularly initially, stimulates deeper and
more insightful thinking and analysis, to the ultimate benefit of the development
of both theory and data.
Some Lessons Learned
This brief review of the person-situation debate in organization theory highlights

a number of issues that bedevil the field and appear throughout the literature
considered in this book. F'irst, almost without exception, no consideration is given
to the possibility that the answer to the question of where is the most productive
place to search for the causality of behavior in organizations varies both over time
and particularly over place. This is not to say that to have a valid theory of individ-
ual dispositions one should be able to locate a set of core dispositions that are
invariant regardless of culture or context. Quite the contrary. The argument is
that, instead of asserting generality under conditions where it is unlikely to hold,
the study of organizations would be well served to explore whether the underlying
dispositional dimensions vary and in what way across cultures and, similarly, to
assess the extent to which dispositions or situations vary in their explanatory power
over time and place. This entails much more than the few efforts at exploring
some versions of interaction that are presently available in the literature.
Second, this literature is almost totally decoupled from the profound changes
that were described in chapter 1 concerning the organizational landscape. This is
not inevitable. Although one might be hard pressed to find a dispositional argu-
ment that could account for the rise in the prominence and power of capital
market discipline over managerial behavior, one might think that exploring the
causes of increasing wage inequality, or the effects on individuals' self-concepts or
other dispositions of changing work arrangements, would occupy a larger portion
of the field's research attention.
Third, consistent with much of the literature we will see in this book, the
person-situation debate almost never engages concerns of important public or
social policy, even though it is obviously highly relevant to some of those con-
cerns. Whether behavior is caused by relatively stable, individual dispositions or
by situations clearly has profound implications for efforts to enhance organiza-
tional performance. The locus of causality for behavior is important in consider-
ing the extent to which individual selection and testing—for employment, for
placement in various ability tracks in school, for promotion, and for access to
training and development opportunities in organizations — is beneficial or harmful
and how it might be done more effectively. Although the issue of the social conse-
quences of how the causes for behavior are defined has been occasionally raised
(Davis-Blake and Pfeffer, 1989), there has not been very much discussion of the
policy implications of this concern in almost any forum in the organizations liter-
ature. As such, the contributions of other social sciences come to dominate even
if and when organization studies has important things to say about an issue. This
diminishes both the importance and the impact of organization studies, an unfor-
tunate outcome for many reasons.
3
Five Models of Behavior
Answering the question of how we are to understand behavior in organizations

requires not only locating the causality for that behavior—in persons, situations,
or their interaction —but also developing basic assumptions or premises about
behavior that guide theory building and direct empirical testing. Simon noted,
"Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our
research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings whose behav-
ior we are studying" (1985, p. 303). In some ways, these assumptions or character-
izations of behavior are related to the issues already discussed —do they empha-
size the effects of social context or, alternatively, individual attributes and
choices?—but they also involve yet additional controversies about the nature of
behavior. Moreover, as Frank perceptively noted, our assumptions and models of
human behavior have consequences, as they have a tendency to become self-
fulfilling (see also, McGregor, 1960):
Views about human nature have important practical consequences . . . They

dictate corporate strategies for preventing workers from shirking, for bargaining
with unions, and for setting prices. . . . [O]ur beliefs about human nature help
shape human nature itself. . . . Our ideas about the limits of human potential
mold what we aspire to become. (Frank, 1988, p. 237)
Zajonc (1980, pp. 202—203) made much the same point in discussing research
on social perception and social cognition: "Social perception and social cognition
create a social reality by affecting both the perceiver and the objects perceived.
. . . Thus, I have argued, social perception requires equal attention on both sides:
on the side of the observer or pcrccivcr, and on the side of the objects perceived."
Although many models of behavior are possible, here I identify and describe
five of the most important models of action and choice that are prominent in
organization studies. In each instance, we want to examine the underlying as-
42
Five Models of Behavior 43
sumptions, the research directions these models have produced, and their impli-
cations for understanding organizations. The five models are (1) the economic
model; (2) the social model; (3) the retrospectively rational model; (4) the moral
model; and (5) a cognitive, interpretive model.
There is, of course, a first question as to what extent these models should be
evaluated by the veracity of their assumptions or by the empirical confirmation of
their predictions. Friedman (1953) articulated a position that has often been re-
peated: models (and he was referring to economic models) should not be evalu-
ated on the validity of their assumptions but rather on the validity of the predic-
tions generated by such models. A variant of this position is the natural-selection
or competition argument. This argument maintains that even though, in a par-
ticular instance, a firm or individual may not engage in rational or profit-
maximizing behavior, over time, competitive selection pressures will ensure that
these decisions, individuals, or firms diminish in relative frequency (Becker,
1962). In this sense, there is no need to show how various adaptive, efficient
practices arise, because "it is implicitly assumed that inefficient ones will have
failed the test of the marketplace" (Granovetter, 1985, p. 30).
Although this epistemological position is still generally the rule in economic
analysis, it has been subjected to numerous criticisms for the logical fallacies it
contains (Samuelson, 1963; Simon, 1963). Blaug (1980) has offered a critique of
natural selection, adaptive reasoning. Boland (1979) has noted that the basic pur-
pose of a theory is to explain, and to rely solely on whether or not the predictions
are valid is foolish. "When predictions prove to be valid, we do not know why,
and hence are unable to foretell under what conditions they will continue to hold
or fail, or may need to be adapted" (Etzioni, 1988, p. 17).
One argument is that unrealistic models or theories may offer an advantage
in simplicity or parsimony over their more realistic but complex competitors. Si-
mon discussed the trade-off between theoretical simplicity and the assumptions
that were required by the theory:
Occam's Razor has a double edge. . . . Occam understood his rule as recom-
mending theories that make no more assumptions than necessary to account for
the phenomena. . . . A theory of profit or utility maximization can be stated
more briefly than a satisficing theory. . . . But the former makes much stronger
assumptions than the latter about the human cognitive system. . . . The two
edges of the razor cut in opposite directions. (1979, p. 495)
The arguments over the bases for evaluating models of behavior help to dis-
tinguish between the economic model and the others reviewed below, most of
which have been created to more accurately and completely capture empirical
reality, even at some cost in simplicity or elegance.
Resolving this issue about realism versus parsimony involves trade-offs, and
different fields and different theorists make those trade-offs differently. A parsimo-
nious and, in economics, mathematically elegant theory simplifies or neglects
institutional details that vary by time, place, and circumstance, but it may do so
at the expense of a more complete model that can capture all of the institutional
complexity. Ronald Coase, writing about the old institutional economics, made
his choice on the side of theoretical elegance: "Without a theory they had noth-
ing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire"
(1983, p. 230). As Scott has noted, "the battle between the particular and the
general, between the temporal and the timeless, is one that . . . theorists con-
tinue to confront" (1995, p. 5).
Economic Models of Organizational Behavior
Economic models are growing in prominence in the social sciences generally

(Dosi, 1995), particularly in political science (Green and Shapiro, 1994), sociol-
ogy (Coleman, 1990), and organization studies (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1992;
Eiscnhardt, 1989). At one time, there was an institutional economics that was
similar in many respects to institutional analysis in sociology (Scott, 1995), but
that form of analysis was supplanted by neoclassical analysis and a new institu-
tionalism that shares much of its theoretical assumptions and methods of reason-
ing with the neoclassical approach. In the organizations literature, one can find
citations to economic models in such fundamental topics as organizational design
and structure, rewards and incentives, control, decision making, career attain-
ment, organizational performance and survival, the structure and evolution of the
employment relation, gender and race discrimination, interorganizational rela-
tions, and numerous others. In fact, one is hard pressed to think of many substan-
tive areas in which economic models are not cited, even if only as providing an
alternative hypothesis.
Although there are a number of variants of economic models of behavior,
they all share a number of features. First and foremost, behavior is presumed to
be rational —intentionally chosen on the basis of the best information available at
the time to maximize the individual's utility (or preferences). Although "all of the
social sciences have a stake in rationality analysis . . . what distinguishes econo-
mists is that they push the approach further and more persistently" (Williamson,
1995, p. 22). Economics obviously admits the idea of bounded or limited rational-
ity (e.g., Simon, 1978), but economic models "still tend to define 'bounded ratio-
nality' as an imperfect approximation of the 'unbounded' one" (Dosi, 1995, p. 5).
Embedded in this conception of rationality is the idea that preferences are exoge-
nous (Jacoby, 1990), and few variants consider the possibility that preferences are
shaped by social institutions and should therefore be the subject of analysis rather
than taken for granted or assumed.
An important extension of the rationality principle is the idea that social
arrangements
O
are designed
O
to achieve efficiencyJ and,' over time,~ inefficient ones
will disappear. Natural selection, if not conscious managerial decision making,
ensures that organizational as well as individual action achieves rationality. The
time frame involved may be quite long, however. In discussing whether or not
power processes could supplant efficiency in affecting organizations, Williamson
and Ouchi wrote, "power considerations will usually give way to efficiency—at
least in profit-making enterprises, if observations are taken at sufficiently long
intervals, say a decade" (1981, pp. 363—364; emphasis added). Williamson (1995)
has contrasted the idea of efficiency with that of power and has vigorously main-
tained that power cannot account for organizational outcomes. Organizational
design, practices governing the employment relation, and patterns of interorgani-
zational relations that survive over time are all efficient, according to Williamson,
and do not reflect the operation of political interests and relative potency of those
interests. This assertion means that literature assessing the effects of power and
interests on these organizational arrangements provides a partial test of the eco-
nomic model of organizations.
Second, virtually all economic models proceed from a theoretical apparatus
invoking methodological individualism. That means simply that institutions or
organizations are seen as aggregations of individual preferences and actions or
at times as a nexus of contracts and agreements (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Organizations are viewed as having no substantive reality apart from this function
of aggregating preferences or agreements. Williamson argued that organizations
are simply another type of "contractual instrument, a continuation of market rela-
tions, by other means" (1991, p. 162; emphasis in original).
Third, economic models emphasize comprehensiveness and often proceed
from an assumption of equilibrium. Coase has argued that one reason economic
analysis has been successful in moving into related social sciences is that the
analysis of systems equilibria focuses on systemic interdepenclencies and is a mode
of analysis "more likely to uncover the basic interrelationships within a social
system" (1978, p. 209). The focus on equilibrium conditions and the assumptions
of market competition tend to assure a more deterministic outcome from the
analysis. In emphasizing equilibrium conditions, modern economics demonstrates
less concern with "path-dependence," or the idea that what has happened in the
past is important for understanding the present and predicting the future. Both
history and process are less important in this form of theorizing, which Jacoby
has called "timeless and placeless" (1990, p. 32), with no emphasis on how the
economy acquired its features and how these vary.
Although many social science theories share an assumption that individuals
pursue self-interest, a number of the economic theories that have penetrated orga-
nization studies, such as transaction cost economics and agency theory, take the
idea of self-interest one step farther and emphasize opportunism, or self-interest
pursued with guile and deceit (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). As Ghoshal and
Moran noted, there is an important distinction between opportunism and self-
interested behavior:
Opportunism is a stronger form of the self-interest assumption of motivation.

. . . The two are distinguished primarily by whether or not individuals can reli-
ably be expected to obey rules or keep promises. Self-interested behavior, in the
received view, is presumed to be constrained by obedience and faithfulness to
promises. Opportunism is not. (1996, p. 17)
Opportunism includes "the making of false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved

threats and promises in the expectation that individual advantage will thereby be
realized" (Williamson, 1975, p. 26). In a similar vein, agency theory implies that
"agents have opportunities to misrepresent information and divert resources to
their personal use" and that "cooperative effort is plagued by opportunities for
malfeasant behaviour" (Nilakant and Rao, 1994, p. 650). In this sense, many
economic theories differ from other social sciences in their assumptions about the
extent to which human behavior is strictly instrumental and unconstrained by
morals or values, except when behavior may be discovered and have consequent
adverse effects on reputational resources.
The presumption of opportunism, an "extreme caricature" (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1992, p. 42) of human behavior, is critical to at least some variants of
the economic model. For instance, Williamson noted that "but for opportunism,
most forms of complex contracting and hierarchy vanish" (1993, p. 97). Ghoshal
and Moran, summarizing transaction cost theory, noted that "opportunism — the
seeking of self-interest with guile —is the ultimate cause for the failure of markets
and for the existence of organizations" (1996, p. 17).
Because people are presumed to act in a self-interested fashion to maximize
their utilities, and because individuals are presumed to have a disutility for ex-
pending effort, economic models invariably view employees as effort-averse, un-
likely to do what the organization wants and needs without some form of incen-
tive, sanction, or combination of both. Baron has noted:
The image of the worker in these models is somewhat akin to Newton's first law
of motion: employees remain in a state of rest unless compelled to change that
state by a stronger force impressed upon them— namely, an optimal labor con-
tract. Various incentive features . . . are claimed to provide forms of insurance
that overcome workers' reluctance to work. (1988, p. 494)
Moreover, because individuals are concerned about their own preferences,

and these preferences may not be identical to those of owners and managers or
across levels in an organizational hierarchy, as already noted, agency problems
are presumed to be pervasive. "Agency theory holds that many social relationships
can be usefully understood as involving two parties: a principal and an agent.
The agent performs certain actions on behalf of the principal, who necessarily
must delegate some authority to the agent" (Donaldson, 1990, p. 369). Agency
problems arise when the desires or objectives of principals and agents diverge — a
condition thought to be virtually ubiquitous—and when it is expensive or difficult
for the principal to actually monitor or verify the agent's behavior (Eisenhardt,
1989). Agency theory deals with the topic of contracts —how to devise efficient
systems for aligning the interests of the agent with those of the principal, particu-
larly given the fact that the difference in the tolerance for risk (agents are pre-
sumed to be more risk averse than principals, in part because they frequently
have less capability for diversifying their risk) may make a strictly performance-
based incentive scheme for the agents costly because they would need to be
compensated for bearing that risk.
There is some evidence that formal training in economics is significantly
related Lo (he use of economic reasoning and behavior (Larrick, Morgan, and
Nisbctt, 1990). Economic reasoning includes the sunk-cost rule (only future ben-
efits and costs should be considered in a decision), the net benefit rule (that
action with the greatest net benefit should be chosen), and the opportunity cost
rule (the real cost of engaging in some action is the loss of benefits available from
pursuing the next best course of action) (Larrick, Nisbett, and Morgan, 1993).
Larrick et al. reported that "people who use these rules are more likely to have
more successful life outcomes . . . college seniors . . . had higher grade point
averages . . . and faculty . . . had higher salaries" (1993, p. 345). Frank, Gilo-
vich, and Regan (1993) summarized studies indicating that individuals with eco-
nomics training tended to defect more frequently in prisoner's dilemma experi-
ments and tended to give less to charity. However, Arkes and Blumer (1985)
reported no effect of previous courses in economics on not considering sunk costs
in decision making, and Fischhoff (1982) has also concluded that many attempts
to train people to avoid decision biases were unsuccessful. The two sets of results
together suggest that behaving on the basis of classical economic assumptions
may provide individual benefit, although whether or not it provides general social
or even organizational benefit is open to question and depends on the amount of
voluntary cooperation required for system effectiveness.
Because of the emphasis on methodological individualism and the efficiency
of market-mediated transactions, the question naturally occurs as to how and why
institutions, such as organizations, arise at all. One approach to answering this
question is provided by transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975). As re-
viewed by Williamson, the basic elements of the model are (1) the transaction is
the basic unit of analysis; (2) transactions vary with respect to their frequency,
uncertainty, and asset specificity, which affects how easy it is to redeploy the assets
to other uses; (3) there are a set of generic modes of governance, including mar-
kets, hierarchies, and intermediate forms; and (4) the basic prediction is that
"transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance struc-
tures, which differ in their costs and competence" (1995, p. 27) in a way so as to
minimize transaction costs.
These governance problems arise because of bounded rationality and uncer-
tainty, which make the future impossible to foresee perfectly and make con-
tracting for all possible future states of the world unfeasible. One might wonder
why the parties involved don't simply handle contingencies as they arise. The
answer, of course, is that each individual is presumed to be a utility-maximizing
person interested in attaining his or her own interests and so cannot be trusted.
This particular economic model of behavior has within it assumptions of the
same sort of untrustworthy behavior typical of the genre —in this case, opportun-
ism. "By opportunism, I mean self-interest seeking with guile. This includes, but
is scarcely limited to, more blatant forms such as lying, stealing, and cheating.
Opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit" (Williamson, 1985,
p. 47).
Transaction cost models also provide an account for the presence of hierar-
chy in organizations, where the degree of hierarchy is defined as the extent of
centralization of power and control (Williamson, 1985). Under the usual adaptive
logic, hierarchy exists because of its efficiency: "the least hierarchical modes, in
both contracting and decision-making respects . . . have the worst efficiency
properties" (Williamson, 1985, p. 231).
If the reader is having trouble accepting the behavioral premises or assump-
tions of these models, it is not surprising. Not only are these models at variance
with much of social psychological theory—for instance, theories emphasizing in-
trinsic motivation (Lcpper and Greene, 1975; Deci, 1975) —they also contradict
much current management practice that decrnphasizes hierarchy, individual
monetary incentives, and control. Furthermore, the economic model of behavior
presents an extremely unflattering portrait of human behavior. "Typically, such
organizational economic actors seek personal wealth, status, leisure, or the like.
. . . Accordingly, their behavior as potentially shirking or opportunistic agents can
be curbed by vigilant monitoring, together with incentive schemes based around
money, promotion, negative sanctions, and the like" (Donaldson, 1990, pp. 371-
372). To the extent such theories of behavior, when implemented in actual orga-
nizational policies and practices, produce the very behavior expected (i.e., be-
come self-fulfilling prophecies), to the extent such theories of behavior are grow-
ing in importance in the social sciences, and to the extent such theories are at
variance with basic ideas in sociology, social psychology, and organization theory,
it seems clear that this is a substantial and important arena in which these social
sciences need to challenge these models of behavior.
Problems with the Economic Model of

Organizational Behavior
Strong critiques of the economic model of behavior have been offered by econo-
mists, political scientists, and sociologists, albeit with surprisingly little effect on
the prominence of these models in the social science literature generally or the
organizations literature specifically. Ckeen and Shapiro (1994), after commenting
on the substantial growth of rational choice models in political science, noted
that such dominance could not be explained by the validity or power of this
approach. "The stature of rational choice scholarship does not rest on a readily
identifiable set of empirical successes" (p. 5). They noted that the rational choice
models made predictions that were either trivially obvious or frequently empiri-
cally incorrect. In questioning their usefulness as a foundation for understanding
politics, Green and Shapiro commented, "the case has yet to be made that these
models have advanced our understanding of how politics works in the real world"
(1994, p. 6).
Hirsch, Michaels, and Friedman (1987) contrasted the "clean" models of
rational choice theories with the "dirty hands" of social sciences, such as social
psychology and sociology, that actually empirically investigate the world. They
argued that being too removed from the empirical world risks being unable to
account for the variety actually observed and "incompetent to address the cultural
side of life in society" (p. 325). Leontief (1985), himself a Nobel-prize winning
economist, criticized the absence of original data in economic research and noted
that of the articles appearing in the American Economic Review throughout the
1970s, half contained no data at all, and of the four or five articles that did
contain original observations, two studied pigeons and mice. Mueller noted that
"in one of the major collections on organizational economics, the ratio of em-
pirical papers to nonempirical papers is 1:14 (Barney and Ouchi, 1986)" (1995,
p. 1226).
When data are employed, because ot the belief in the theory, almost any
massaging of the data to get it to conform to the theory is acceptable. The data
used are frequently previously collected for other purposes, and assumptions and
variables are added on an ad hoe basis (Etzioni, 1988, p. 18) to improve the fit
between theory and data. This makes it hazardous to evaluate the validity of the
models' predictions: "When we defend the maximization paradigm by pointing to
the similarities between its predictions and observed behavior, we often overlook
the fact that the empirical 'success' of many economic models is principally de-
rived from accommodating adjustments in complementary hypotheses" (Cross,
1983, p. 3).
The assumptions of adaptive efficiency characteristic of these models almost
invariably lead to tautological reasoning. Practices are presumed to be efficient
because of their very existence —if they were inefficient they would disappear—
and thus the logic of economic science as it is practiced is, given a particular
empirical observation, to derive a proof that demonstrates the efficiency properties
of what has been observed.
As one example, consider the analysis of seniority-based wage systems in orga-
nizations (Lazear, 1979; 1981). In most organizations and for many jobs, there is
a positive relationship between experience and earnings. But, it is not likely in
all organizations and jobs for which this relationship holds that an individual's
productivity goes up linearally with experience. So, the question is, Why not pay
workers each period on the basis of their productivity for that period, thereby
inducing effort to attain those contingent rewards? What Lazear demonstrates is
that a payment scheme that rewards employees less than their marginal product
when they are young and more when they are old can motivate effort because
there is now an incentive for the more senior workers not to shirk—if they are
discovered and fired, they lose the deferred compensation inherent in being paid
more than they are producing. And, younger workers are motivated to work hard
and stay with the firm so they can enjoy the benefits of higher earnings when
they have more experience. Since this story begins with an empirical fact and
then makes economic sense of that fact, it does not do a very satisfactory job of
accounting for the recent trends away from this sort of payment system—although
1 have no doubt that such a change could be readily accounted for by an
efficiency-based account if economic theorists were called to do so. This tendency
toward tautology has been noted by Sen (1977), Arrow (1982), and Latis (1976),
among others.
Another problem is that the methodological individualism characteristic of
these models either ignores organizations and institutions almost completely or
treats them as a residual category required by some form of market failure or
contracting problem. Clegg noted that "economic approaches to organizations
. . . operate with a particular set of a priori values: these are that organizations
are an aberration from a more natural form of economic activity. This more natu-
ral form is that of exchange on the market" (1990, p. 61). Simon, who also won
the Nobel prize in economics, has critiqued even the new institutional economics
for its relative neglect of organizations:
A fundamental feature of the new institutional economics is that it retains the
centrality of markets and exchanges. All phenomena are to he explained by
translating them into (and deriving them from) market transactions based upon
negotiated contracts, for example in which employers become "principals" and
employees become "agents." . . . The new institutional economics is wholly
compatible with and conservative of neoclassical theory. . . . In general, the
new institutional economics has not drawn heavily from the empirical work in
organizations and decision-making for its auxiliary assumptions. . . . Until . . .
the existing literature on organizations and decision making [is] taken into ac-
count, the new institutional economics and related approaches are acts of faith,
or perhaps of piety. (1991, pp. 26-27; emphasis added)
Cooperation, necessary in the interdependent activities that characterize

organizations, is ubiquitous. Economic approaches to understanding organizations
must, then, develop an approach that reconciles the assumption of self-interested,
utility-maximizing behavior with the observed organizational world. Critiquing
the approach of organizational economics to understanding this fundamental
issue of cooperation, Mueller (1995) argued that the individual utility-maximiza-
tion assumption shared with other versions of economics prevented accounting
for instances in which cooperation was sustained even when this behavior con-
flicted with self-interest. He concluded:
OF, |organizational economics] has put forward a largely static model with little
empirical grounding of how a governance structure can secure cooperative out-
comes. . . . The fact that economics makes cynical assumptions about the moti-
vation of human beings has been emphasized previously. . . . Economics-based
attempts to explain behavior in organizations lack what has become a basic un-
derstanding in organization theory, namely the ability to analyze members' mo-
tivations and behavior as varying depending upon situational contingencies.
(p. 1230)
Economics has a particularly difficult time dealing with interorganizational

cooperation. That is because ties of sentiment and friendship and the peer obliga-
tions thereby activated are presumed to exist among persons within an organiza-
tion but not among larger social entities intent on maximizing shareholder wealth
and efficiency. Granovetter sought to extend Coase's (1937) original question as
to why firms exist: "parallel to Coase's 1937 question is another of at least equal
significance, which asks about firms what Coase asked about individual economic
actors: why do they coalesce into identifiable social structures?" (1995, p. 94). In
their study of the keiretsu, the interfirm networks in Japan, Lincoln, Gerlach, and
Ahmadjian concluded:
We see the big-six keiretsu groups as ... networks, and we interpret their eco-
nomic role as one of collective action maximizing the joint welfare . . . of the
membership by restraining both the bearing of risks and the appropriation of
returns by individual firms and substituting what appears to be a group-
administered allocation plan. The actions of groups . . . a r e . . . not necessarily
rational for its strongest members. Indeed, why the best-performing corporations
. . . maintain their membership is, at least to economists viewing firms as ratio-
nal utility maximizers, perhaps the greatest puzzle posed by the keiretsu phenom-
enon. . . . There is a collective logic to the keiretsu phenomenon that, in our
view, is not reducible to rational optimizing on the part of individual firms.
(1996, p. 86)
In addition to cooperation, another important feature of organizations is un-

certainty (Thompson, 1967). Analyzing how agency theory and transaction cost
economics deal with this issue, Nilikant and Rao noted:
The applicability of principal-agent models is limited to two settings: (a) where
performance standards are precise and knowledge of the effort-outcome relation-
ship is complete, and (b) where performance standards are precise but knowledge
of effort-outcome relationships is incomplete. . . . Second, even in the settings
where they are applicable, principal-agent approaches . . . are unrealistic to the
extent that they presume that performance in organizations results exclusively
from individual-contributor jobs, exaggerate the degree to which individuals are
work averse, and emphasize the quantity of effort at the expense of the quality
and type of effort. (1994, p. 652)
A third prominent and important feature of organizations is authority. Eco-

nomic models, particularly transaction cost approaches, maintain that authority is
an efficient way of coping with information problems and opportunism and, in
fact, is one of the sources of efficiency in organizations as contrasted with markets
that lack authority relations. As an explanation of authority relations, however, the
approach is sorely deficient:
First, even if we accept the strategy of explaining governance structures in effi-
ciency terms, the literature has not examined the possibility that authority opens
up new avenues for opportunism. Hence, on the transaction cost school's own
criterion for good organizational design, we still lack a full explication of the
efficiency advantages generated by authority relations. Second, I have argued that
the underlying functionalist explanatory strategy is weak. A number of causal
mechanisms might conceivably be used to ground this approach but each candi-
date mechanism is open to significant objections. (Dow, 1987, p. 33)
But perhaps the most compelling critique of the economic model, at least as
it has been applied to understanding organizations, is its difficult)' in making
unique predictions about empirical results. Consider first an issue that is well
within the scope of the new institutional economics of Williamson and others and
is a prominent feature of the new organizational landscape —should an economic
exchange be incorporated inside the organization's boundaries or left to market-
mediated transactions? Given the significant change over time in the extent to
which the employment relation has been internalized and the change in the size
distribution of organizations that has occurred, in part, because of the more exten-
sive use of contracting arrangements rather than vertical integration, one might
think that economic analysis would provide a compelling answer as to why labor
was first internalized in the employment relation as market-mediated transactions
were supplanted and now is being increasingly externalized once more.
But it doesn't. Davis-Blake and Uzzi, studying the use of temporary help
and independent contractors, concluded that "the use of externalized workers
is determined by multiple factors and is affected by the costs and feasibility of
externalization, by the structure of the organization, and by the interests of exter-
nal groups" (1993, pp. 216-217). After reviewing the arguments of Williamson
(1975) and others for the development of internal labor market arrangements that
substituted for spot labor markets, Pfeffer and Baron (1988, p. 263) concluded:
the internalization of employment and the development of long-term employ-

ment relations is alleged to convey diverse benefits on organi/ations. . . . There
is a problem with the above talc, however: it neglects some costs of internaliza-
tion and long-term employment. . . . Even more importantly, it neglects the
fact that perhaps the most visible and prominent trends in the structuring of work
arrangements . . . involve "taking the workers back out" of their organizations.
(1988, P. 263)
One problem is that one of the crucial variables the theory employs to predict
whether transactions are better left to the market or incorporated inside the orga-
nization, asset specificity, is arguably as much a consequence of the decisions
about how to organize as it is their cause. A firm that has decided to internalize
its employment will be much more likely to engage in training and to organize
jobs on the presumption of worker continuity; a firm that has decided to rely on
temporary help and contract labor will invest less in training and will find ways
to organize production so that long-term attachments by workers are unnecessary.
A quick consideration of the various ways in which work is organized in the
automobile industry provides an example of this. Moreover, the theory docs not
anticipate the empirical reality of many firms that organize transactions both
through markets and hierarchies. For instance, most food franchisers have both
company-owned stores (hierarchy) and franchised operations (market-mediated re-
lations). Except as a transitional state (which is not the case), the economic mod-
els of organizations would predict either one or the other arrangement (but not
both) in a particular case depending on asset specificity and other contracting
issues.
Moreover, there is evidence that both institutionalization and power theories
of organizations occasionally are more successful than some presumption of ratio-
nality or efficiency in explaining both organizational structure and employment
practices. Pfeffer and Cohen (1984) found that, controlling for other factors in-
cluding size and technology, the use of internal labor market practices was posi-
tively related to the presence of a personnel department and negatively related to
the extent of unionization. Unions and personnel professionals are both potent
political groups in organizations. Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings (1986) argued that
modern human resource management practices, implemented under government
pressure during World War II, were maintained after the war in part through the
activities of personnel professionals and with the support of personnel associa-
tions. Internal labor market arrangements and modern personnel practices obvi-
ously provide a more important and central role for the personnel function in
organizations, and it is therefore not surprising that these innovations in personnel
administration would be favored by personnel administrators. What is significant

is the evidence that their presence and power affected the adoption of these prac-
tices.
J. R. Sutton et al. (1994), using longitudinal data on 300 American employers
over the period 1955-1985, explored what factors were associated with the adop-
tion of disciplinary hearing and grievance procedures for nonunion salaried and
hourly employees. Controlling for numerous other factors plausibly related to
technical or efficiency reasons for adopting these practices, they observed strong
positive effects on adoption of having a personnel office and having a labor attor-
ney on retainer and strong negative effects of having a union contract (pp. 963-
964). With respect to personnel professionals and labor lawyers, they noted that
"these professionals actively interpret legal doctrine — typically overstating the le-
gal threat to employers—and disseminate recipes for compliance as a means for
enhancing their prestige, autonomy, and authority within organizations" (pp. 949-
950).
In a study of hiring selectivity that measured the use of educational require-
ments, the use of tests, and whether or not the establishment screened on traits
that presumably assessed worker reliability and attachment to the labor force,
Cohen and Pfeffer (1986) found that technical or rational requirements, such as
the amount of technological change and the importance of training, accounted
for less of the variation than did the presence of a personnel department and the
extent of unionization. Unions care about organizational selectivity because of
their concern that such procedures are used to weed out individuals who might
be sympathetic to unions. Considering the results from the studies of the determi-
nants of internal labor market: practices, the adoption and persistence of bureau-
cratic personnel practices, the adoption of due-process grievance mechanisms,
and the evidence on hiring standards, the evidence strongly suggests that political
factors do account for how the employment relationship is governed.
Some studies suggest that rational considerations also have limits in their
ability to account for organizational structures, particularly in public sector orga-
nizations. J. W. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that organizational structure
was often decoupled from any actual effect on organizational operations. Rather,
organizations adopted structural forms that signaled compliance with social de-
mands, including demands for accountability and for the appearance, if not the
reality, of rationality. Thus, organizational design and organizational behavior
could bear little connection to each other. Organizational structure was best un-
derstood as a response to social pressures for legitimacy and conformity to norma-
tive requirements. In a study of school organizations in California, J. W. Meyer,
Scott, and Deal (1981) found support for these ideas. Similar forces affect private
sector organizations as well. In a study of the adoption of the multidivisional
organizational form in large firms, Fligstein (1985) found a statistically significant
effect on adoption, once that form had become institutionalized, of being in an
industry in which other, similar firms had already adopted the M-form. This re-
sult provides evidence of the effect of imitation on the adoption of a particular
structure, net of factors related to efficiency.
The dominance of the economic model of behavior comes from a number
of factors other than the validity of its assumptions or its empirical support. Its
mathematical elegance provides status and makes it less accessible to the un-
trained, which lends it prestige. How can something carry prestige if anyone can
do it? Conversely, some technique or line of reasoning accessible and understood
only by the few carries the value imparted by scarcity (Cialdini, 1988). The para-
digmatic consensus born out of a way of thinking about problems provides the
field with greater potential for unity of thought and action, always a major advan-
tage in political contests (Pfeffer, 1992).
Furthermore, economists have taken a number of strategic behaviors to en-
force and maintain theoretieal hegemony (R. Parker, 1993). S. Cole has argued
that "one of the primary mechanisms through which consensus is maintained is
the practice of vesting authority in elites" (1983, p. 137). R. Parker (1993) has
documented the dominance by graduates of elite schools in the discipline of
economics. And those who do not conform to the orthodoxy of the discipline are
excluded from its most prestigious positions, regardless of the importance of their
ideas or their general scholarly reputation. The case of Robert Reich, secretary of
labor in the Clinton administration, offers a good case in point:
Although the general approach of Mr. Reich is increasingly shared by others, his
specific work has nevertheless been criticized by trained economists, mostly on
the grounds that he is a lawyer, not a Ph.D. in economics. . . . That criticism
has been one reason that Mr. Reich . . . has failed to get a tenured professorship
at the Kennedy School, where he has been a lecturer . . . for more than a
decade. . . . The criticism of Mr. Reich's credentials . . . has intensified with
his appointment last week as chief of the economics transition team. (Uehitelle,
1992, p. 17)
But perhaps the most important reason for the persistent dominance of the
economic model as a way of understanding organizations is its implicit ideology.
The economic model presents a benign view of social organization. By stressing
markets and the operation of voluntary exchange, power, coercion, and exploita-
tion are left out of view. Employment relationships are voluntary—if someone
doesn't care for his or her employer, the person simply finds another one. One's
persistence in a particular exchange, including the exchange of work for wages,
is taken as prima facie evidence of the person's revealed preferences. The implica-
tion is that the particular exchange is preferred to other available alternatives, or
else the person would pursue one of those options. Thus, the economic model
permits and, in fact, encourages one to avoid dealing with or even thinking about
the potential conflict of interest between individuals and organizations and about
issues such as power and social control. The idea of voluntary exchange implies
that social control is accomplished readily and without coercion— and surely this
is a much more benign portrayal than in the ethnographic studies of actual work-
place relations (e.g., Burawoy, 1979; Graham, 1995; Kunda, 1992).
Granovettcr has also noted that the attractiveness of economic logic lies in
its way of dealing with the problem of social order, coordination, and control:
It has long been recognized that the idealized markets of perfect competition
have survived intellectual attack in part because self-regulating economic struc-
tures are politically attractive to many. . . . Competition determines the terms

of trade in a way that individual traders cannot manipulate. If traders encounter
complex or difficult relationships, characterized by mistrust or malfeasance, they
can simply move on to the legion of other traders willing to do business on
market terms; social relations and their details thus become frictional matters.
(1985, p. 484)
In this regard, economics shares with many other social sciences, including
some versions of organization theory, a perspective that sees "all that is real as
necessary, all that exists as inevitable, and thus the present mode of production as
eternal" (Braverman, 1974, p. 16). At the end, however, regardless of its ideologi-
cal comfort and the active exclusion of dissenters, there is little evidence that the
economic model's dominance in the literature derives from the ability to make
nontrivial predictions about organizational issues.
The Social Model of Behavior
Economic models exclude social context or social relations almost entirely, except
tangentially and indirectly. For instance, one could potentially incorporate the
welfare of others or one's relationship with others into the typical economic utility
function, but the analyses seldom do so. Lazear (1995) did discuss peer pressure
in attempting to develop an economic rationale for team-based compensation.
But the inclusion of these more social considerations is still within the context of
individual utility maximization and choice: "Norms can be thought of more rigor-
ously as the equilibrium level of effort that results when an organization punishes
deviance" (pp. 49-50).
What might be termed a social model of behavior, in contrast, emphasizes
the embedded nature of behavior (Granovetter, 1985). P. M. Blau has noted,
"The fundamental fact of social life is precisely that it is social—-that human
beings do not live in isolation but associate with other human beings. . . . The
study of social structure . . . centers attention on the distribution of people
among different positions and their social associations" (1977, p. 1). Social models
emphasize that "one's behavior is rarely explicable without reference to previous
and persisting effects of interaction with others and the overall pattern of such
interactions in groups" (Granovetter, 1986, p. 31). Organizational behavior is
"embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations" (Granovetter, 1985,
p. 487). Pfeffer and Salancik, outlining the resource dependence perspective on
interorganizational behavior, argued that "to understand the behavior of an orga-
nization, you must understand the context of that behavior. . . . Organizations
are inescapably bound up with the conditions of their environment" (1978, p. 1).
Social models of behavior emphasize the context of behavior more generally and
networks and social actors' positions in them and their social relations more spe-
cifically as causal explanations.
Several studies have demonstrated that individuals' perceptions of their work
environment, including task characteristics, are affected by what others say. White
and Mitchell (1979), O'Reilly and Caldwell (1979), and Weiss and Shaw (1979)
demonstrated experimentally that social cues from co-workers affected subjects'

judgments about task characteristics. Interaction with others, then, helps to frame
what we notice about our environment and how that environment is evaluated
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978a).
Not only affective responses but also cognitive structures arc affected by social
influence. Walker (1985), for instance, studied judgments about means-ends con-
nections associated with success for software products as a measure of cognition
in a software firm. He found that network position was a stronger and more stable
predictor of differences in cognition than cither the particular function the indi-
vidual held or the type of product the person worked on. Ibarra and Andrews
(1993) explored the effects of individual attributes, formal position, and network
connections in explaining variation in individuals' perceptions of work conditions
in an advertising firm. The basic argument was that people would share percep-
tions with others to whom they were proximate, in communication network
terms. Their results suggested that network factors shaped job-related perceptions,
even when individual attributes and formal position effects were accounted for.
Krackhardt and Porter (1986) examined organizational turnover as a process
that was socially mediated. Their study gathered data on friendship and interac-
tion patterns in fast-food restaurants. They reported that turnover was clustered
both in time and social space. When members of a friendship group began to
leave, other members soon followed. As a consequence, turnover tended to snow-
ball, with the propensity for turnover among individuals being related to patterns
of social interaction.
Granovetter's (1974) study of job-finding behavior discovered that individuals
who located their jobs through personal contacts tended to earn higher salaries
and to stay in their jobs longer (i.e., they were more satisfied with them) than
those who found their positions through more impersonal mechanisms such as
newspaper advertisements. The study also found that personal contacts were par-
ticularly important in locating managerial jobs, as contrasted with technical or
professional jobs. This is undoubtedly the case because of the more uncertain
nature of managerial work and the consequent difficulty of making evaluations of
managerial candidates (Kanter, 1977). Under conditions of uncertainty, personal
social relations become more necessary, because they are more effective than
impersonal mechanisms in resolving that uncertainty (Salancik and Pfeffer,
1978b). Granovetter's work, and subsequent research that has related promotion
or salary in organizations to network positions (e.g., Burt, 1992), has defined an-
other form of capital to correspond to the economists' notions of individual hu-
man capital — namely, social capital, which is a function of one's position in the
social structure and can be assessed only with reference to that structure.
The social model of behavior also has implications for understanding the
behavior of organizations as units, because what an organization docs is signifi-
cantly affected by who it is connected to and what they do. Galaskiewicz and
Wasserman noted that ties between boundary-spanning personnel, including di-
rectors, "act as a conduit to disseminate ideas and innovations throughout an
organizational field" (1989, p. 456). In a similar vein, Haunschild wrote that di-
rector ties "render events that arc otherwise distant more proximate . . . creating
an immediate concrete example that may encourage imitation" (1993, p. 568).
Studying the adoption of the poison pill antitakeover defense, G. F. Davis
(1991) found that firms that had board of director interlocks to other firms that
had adopted poison pills were themselves more likely to do so, controlling for
other factors. "Being tied to one other adopter increased the rate by about 61
percent, ties to two other adopters nearly doubled the rate, and firms with six tics
to other adopters subsequently adopted at about 2.5 times the rate of comparable
firms with no ties" (p. 605). Mizruchi (1992) observed that interfirm linkages
affected the likelihood that firms would make campaign contributions to particu-
lar political candidates.
Strategy is also affected by interfirm ties. Greve (1995), studying the abandon-
ment of corporate strategy—in this instance, a particular radio format—observed
a social contagion effect from both market contacts and other units within the
same corporation. In a subsequent study concerning the adoption of a particular
radio format, Grcve (1996) observed a social contagion effect on the adoption of
a specific market strategy, with the contagion effect being particularly pronounced
for other stations with the same corporate ownership. Havernan (1993) studied
the entry of California savings and loans into six new markets over the 1977—1987
period: direct investment in real estate, mortgage-backed securities, nonresidential
mortgages, consumer loans other than mortgages, commercial loans, and other
services (e.g., insurance). For direct investment in real estate, nonresidential mort-
gages, and mortgage-backed securities, Haveman found evidence of imitation —
firms were more likely to enter a market in a given period the greater the number
of large firms and the greater the number of profitable firms that had previously
done so. Although this study did not measure interfirm linkages as precisely as
Davis or Greve, it provides additional evidence consistent with the idea that firms
are influenced by the behavior of others in their environment.
There is evidence that interfirm relationships help to account for organiza-
tional structures and do so net of technical factors. Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou
(1993) reported that interlocks with multidivisional firms influenced the adoption
of the multidivisional structure. L. R. Burns and Wholey (1993) studied the adop-
tion and abandonment of the matrix organizational form using a sample of more
than 1,300 hospitals over the seventeen-year period 1961-1978. Matrix manage-
ment is a particularly interesting structural innovation to examine, because it
"constitutes a shift from vertical-functional authority toward a hybrid, function-by-
product organization. . . . Matrix structures are team-oriented arrangements that
promote coordinated, multidisciplinary activity across functional areas, broad par-
ticipation in decisions, and the sharing of knowledge" (p. 107). As such, they are
almost diametrically different from the emphasis on hierarchy in transaction cost
economics. The empirical results showed no effect of organizational scale on
matrix adoption, but there were some positive effects of task diversity, a technical
factor predicted to be associated with the need for a matrix structure. Their results
show much stronger and more consistent effects of social influence on both adop-
tion and abandonment of matrix structures:
the prestige of a hospital influences not only its decision to adopt . . . but also
the decisions of neighboring hospitals. . . . Other significant effects suggest that
professional media . . . and regional and local hospital networks . . . are influ-
ential. Our results thus suggest that organizational networks influence the diffu-
sion of administrative innovations in much the same way that they influence the
spread of technological innovations, (p. 130)
Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) found that having a banker on a firm's board
increased the level of borrowing. Galaskiewic/ and Burt (1991) reported that cor-
porate officers responsible for philanthropy that were similarly positioned in the
interorganizational network evaluated potential contribution recipients similarly.
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989), studying patterns of corporate giving in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area, found numerous examples of the importance of net-
work connections. Nonprofits received more money from corporations that pre-
viously gave money to other nonprofits whose directors sat on the focal nonprofit's
board. And, firms gave more money to nonprofits that were previously funded by
companies whose CEOs or philanthropy officers were personally known by the
firm.
Haunschild (1993), examining the acquisition activity of 327 firms, found
that firms imitated the acquisition activities of firms to which they were tied
through directorships. In a subsequent study, Haunschild (1994) found that the
size of the acquisition premia paid by firms in takeovers was related to the premia
paid by their interlock partners as well as to the size of premia paid by other
acquirers using the same investment bank. The evidence from the studies of char-
itable giving and corporate takeover activity is consistent with the idea that net-
work influences are particularly important when there is more uncertainty, for
social communication is useful in resolving that uncertainty (Fcstingcr, 1954).
The Effect of Social Ties on Organizational Performance

Network linkages not only affect behavior through a process of modeling and
social contagion but also directly influence the flow of resources and legitimacy
to organizations. Baum and Oliver (1991), examining childcare service organiza-
tions in the Toronto area, found that organizations with institutional linkages were
substantially more likely to survive as competition increased. Palmer et al. (1995)
reported that firms run by managers and directors who were more central in the
structure of interfirm ties were less susceptible to predatory takeover.
D'Aveni (1990) examined the effect of an organization's management being
in elite networks on filing for bankruptcy, controlling for economic and financial
factors. He argued that the social prestige and connections of senior management
were important, because "their prestige influences creditors to support the existing
top management's right to continue in control of the firm without supervision by
the bankruptcy courts" (p. 121). He tested the idea that:
managerial prestige contributes to the legitimacy of firms by influencing social

exchanges on three levels of analysis: interpersonal relationships, interorganiza-
tional transactions and societal-level . . , interactions. On the individual level,

prestige helps to maintain an illusion of competence and control by influencing
interpersonal reactions to the individual. . . . Prestige is taken as an indication
the manager is competent, credible, and trustworthy. . . . Prestigious managers
contribute to the belief that the debtor firm will be trustworthy in its relationship
with others and will conform to elite values and norms, (pp. 121-122)
D'Aveni measured five status characteristics: "membership in the political

elite, membership in the military elite, membership in elite educational circles,
membership in webs of board directorates, and previous acceptance into the ranks
of high ranking corporate officers" (p. 128). His results confirmed the effect of
managerial membership in elites on bankruptcy. For instance, "lack of top man-
agers with cooptive links to potential creditors . . . appears to have had a signifi-
cant detrimental effect on organizational survival," and "managerial membership
in ... the inner circle of the economic elite . . . [is] significantly associated
with bankruptcy" (p. 131).
Because network linkages are consequential for obtaining resources, resource
dependence theory predicts that interorganizational linkages such as mergers
(Pfeffcr, 1972b; Hurt, 1980; Finkelstein, 1996), joint ventures (Pfeffer and Nowak,
1976), and board of director interlocks (Pfeffer, 1972c; Burt, Christman, and Kil-
burn, 1980) will develop to manage transactions interdependencies (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). The studies of interlocking directorates (e.g., M. P. Allen, 1974;
Doolcy, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972c; Pfeffer, 1973) have generally found that board com-
position is "influenced primarily by the market position of the firm and the com-
pany's needs to reduce uncertainty and secure resources from actors in its envi-
ronment" (Galaskiewicz et al., 1985, p. 404). Burt, Christman, and Kilburn
reported that "each of the directorate ties considered (establishments connected
through corporate boards by ownership, direct interlocking, and indirect financial
interlocking) tends to occur where there is market constraint and tends to be
absent in the absence of constraint" (1980, p. 837). However, not all studies have
found support for this hypothesis. Galaskiewicz et al. (1985), in a study of 116
corporations in a single metropolitan area, found no effect of the market position
of firms.
Similarly, studies of merger behavior (Burt, 1980; Pfeffer, 1972b) have found
that patterns of mergers were predicted by patterns of resource interdependencies,
measured by transactions among economic sectors. Finkelstein (1996) again
found evidence for a resource dependence effect but also found that the strength
of this effect varied by time period. There is also some evidence that firms that
develop linkages to manage constraints emanating from the environment enjoy
superior economic performance (Pfeffer, 1972a; Burt, 1983). But the evidence
here is mixed, in part because there is not much difference in the use of interor-
ganizational linkages to manage constraints. Burt noted, "successfully coopting
market constraints appears to be an attribute of all industries rather than a vari-
able distinguishing industries in terms of their ability to obtain profits in excess of
the profits to be expected from their relative levels of structural autonomy" (1980,
p. 922).
Davis and Thompson (1994) have argued that efficiency-oriented approaches

to understanding corporate governance and behavior, such as agency theory and
transaction cost economics, are limited in their explanatory ability because of
their neglect of social influence and the fact that organizations are embedded in
networks of social relationships. They accounted for the rise of shareholder activ-
ism during the early 1990s using a social movement framework that emphasized
the social contagion of demands for reform in corporate governance. It appears
that understanding intraorganizational as well as interorganizational behavior ben-
efits from explicit attention to social influences activated through network struc-
tures.
Network ideas rnay have even more importance and predictive power outside
of the United States with its emphasis on individual action and rewards. For
example, networks are particularly important in understanding Japanese organiza-
tions and their interactions (Gerlach, 1992). A study of the six major keiretsu
by Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian (1996) found that these interorganizational
networks performed important resource and risk reallocation functions. In partic-
ular, they noted: "The keiretsu . . . equalize the fortunes of their members,
smoothing inequality in financial returns across participating firms at any given
time, and perhaps over time as well, for any given company. These adjustments
amount to "taxing" prosperous members to guarantee the survival and hasten the
recovery of financially troubled affiliates" (p. 68).
Network Concepts
There arc a number of important concepts and ideas in network analyses of orga-
nizations. One concept has to do with the fact that, among social actors, "weak
ties" often offer advantages over stronger ties. One of the ironies uncovered by
Granovetter (1973; 1974) was the relative importance and effectiveness of com-
paratively weak ties among individuals in the job-finding process. Although one
might think that strong ties, such as friendship or kinship, would be more useful
in activities such as job finding, this was not the case. Although strong ties create
a closer bond between individuals, people to whom one is more strongly tied are
more likely to be in the same social network and thus provide redundant contacts
and information. Weak ties link individuals to different and more diverse sets of
contacts and consequently provide less-redundant information and social relations
compared to strong ties.
Network models of organizations have been developed most completely by
Burt (1992), who has also developed a computer program, Structure, to imple-
ment his method of social network analysis. Hurt's basic ideas of structure concern
structural equivalence, constraint, and structural holes. If a social unit has the
same relations with others as another unit (which could be an individual or a
firm), the two social entities are considered to be structurally equivalent. Because
they have the same pattern of social relations, the entities are competitors, even
if they arc not aware of each other. Burt has noted, "competition is a matter of
relations, not player attributes" (p. 3). Reanalyzing data on the diffusion of the
antibiotic tetracycline (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966), Burt (1987) found
that structural equivalence was a more powerful predictor of diffusion than was
social contagion. In social contagion models of diffusion, the argument is that
information or an innovation diffuses through direct social contact or ties (e.g.,
you talk to a colleague who tells you about the new product, and then you are
more likely to adopt it). This mode of analysis, emphasizing direct social contact,
has a long history in sociology. For instance, Lazersfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet
(1944) demonstrated that individuals who voted for a particular political party
tended to have friends affiliated with that party. Hurt found that individuals in
structurally equivalent positions— competitors—were more likely to adopt some
innovation once it had been adopted by their competitors even in the absence of
direct contact. Thus, competition, as defined by the network measure of struc-
tural equivalence, was a better predictor of diffusion than social contagion.
Constraint is also defined in terms of one's network of relations. A given
organization, for instance, is constrained to the extent that it transacts with other
organizations and has few alternatives to those organizations, while the organiza-
tions themselves have diffuse or unconcentratecl transactions. Conversely, one has
power in exchange relations to the extent that one has options and transacts with
others who themselves are highly constrained. Burt (1980; 1983) has shown that
measures of network constraint can predict profitability and interorganizational
relationships, such as board of director interlocks, designed to co-opt or otherwise
mitigate such constraints.
Finally, a structural hole represents separation between nonredundant con-
tacts and is similar, in some respects, to the idea of weak ties. When contacts,
members of one's own network, are not themselves linked, Burt (1992) argued
that there could be profit in serving as an intermediary—not directly linking the
parties but mediating transactions among them. Burt has theoretically derived and
empirically tested the idea that "players with a network optimized for structural
holes, in addition to being exposed to more rewarding opportunities, arc also
more likely to secure favorable terms in the opportunities they choose to pursue"
(p. 30). This is because the social actor in the middle can play the parties off
against each other and can also profit from arranging transactions that otherwise
might not occur. Indeed, Burt has defined this role of being an intermediary as
an important component of entreprencurship.
Recently, Podolny (1993) has developed a fourth important concept for un-
derstanding social networks, that of status. Status is defined as "the perceived
quality of that producer's products in relation to the perceived quality of that
producer's competitors' products" (p. 830). Status is determined not only by the
objective quality of the good or service but, particularly when that quality is diffi-
cult to directly assess, by the ties a given organization maintains with buyers,
other producers, and third parties. For a producer of a given level of quality, status
translates into higher revenues and lower production costs (p. 837). Civen the
advantages of attaining higher status and the advantages that accrue to those
organizations with high status, two important questions emerge. First, what keeps
other organizations from acquiring status and therefore disturbing the stability of
the status order? And second, why doesn't one or a subset of the highest-status
producers come to totally dominate the market?
The answers to both questions come from the fact that status is produced, in
part, through network linkages, and this fact provides both opportunity and con-
straint. Although lower-status organizations may seek to form linkages with higher-
status producers in order to enhance their status, there is little or no incentive for
the higher-status organizations to want those linkages formed. Indeed, to the ex-
tent that higher-status organizations do form linkages with lower-status entities,
their own status is potentially at risk. This idea also helps to answer the question
about the limits of market dominance:
Since the relationship between actual and perceived quality is mediated by the
producer's tics to others in the market, the producer invariably changes how it is
perceived if it broadens relations with others in the market. . . . Ib the extent
that a higher-status producer attempts to expand into the position of a lower-
status competitor, it changes its reputation and thus alters the cost-and-revenue
profile that provided it with the initial advantage. As a result, just as status pro-
cesses help reproduce inequality by constraining those at the bottom of the status
hierarchy, so status processes also place limits on the higher-status producer's
expansion into the lower end of the market. (Podolny, 1993, pp. 844-845)
Podolny (1993) showed that the percentage spread in debt underwritings (the
gross spread divided by the dollar amount of the bond offering) was negatively
related to the status of the underwriting firm, indicating that, as predicted, higher-
status investment banks enjoyed a cost advantage that resulted from their status
and permitted them to underbid their lower-status competitors. Podolny (1994),
studying which banks formed relationships with others, found that there was an
effect of market uncertainty on this process. When uncertainty was greater, orga-
nizations tended to engage in transactions with those with whom they had dealt
in the past, and they tended to engage in transactions with those of similar status.
These results suggest that the status hierarchy will be particularly stable under
conditions of greater uncertainty, because it is under precisely those circum-
stances that transactions, and presumably other relationships, will be most re-
stricted by history and status similarity.
Other Social Models of Organizational Behavior
In some sense, network models of organizations arose out of the resource depen-
dence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), which was filled with network
imagery and concepts but did not employ formalized network measures or meth-
ods in the empirical research. Both approaches depart from the "rationalist, indi-
vidualistic perspective" that "has denied both the reality of organizations as insti-
tutions . . . as well as the embedded and at times quasi-political character of
organizational action and choice" (Pfeffer, 1987, p. 25). The resource depen-
dence perspective, however, focuses attention not just on the social effects on
behavior but also on the fact thai organizations have a reality apart from "serving
as settings and apart from the various people who were in them at any point in
time" (p. 26). As such, the theory is a reaction to the view, increasingly common
in both economics and political science, that "formally organized social institu-
tions" are "arenas within which . . . behavior, driven by more fundamental

factors, occurs" (J. G. March and Olsen, 1984, p. 734). Resource depen-
dence departs from economics because of its emphasis on uncertainty reduction
and power apart from considerations of efficiency. It departs from a Marxist or
intraclass perspective on organizations, discussed in chapter 8, because of its em-
phasis on "actions serving the interests of and being organized by organizations
rather than families, individuals, or a social class" (Pfeffer, 1987, p. 27). And it
departs from at least some variants or implications of a network perspective in
its emphasis on organizations as social units with an existence distinct from the
members.
The basic arguments and premises of the resource dependence perspective
are readily summarized:
(1) the fundamental units for understanding intereorporate relations and society
are organizations; ours is a society of organizations (Presthus, 1978); (2) these
organizations are not autonomous, but rather are constrained by a network of
interdependencies with other organizations; (3) interdependence, when coupled
with uncertainty about what the actions will be of those with which the organiza-
tion is interdependent, leads to a situation in which survival and continued suc-
cess are uncertain; and, therefore, (4) organizations take actions to manage exter-
nal interdependencies, although such actions are inevitably never completely
successful and produce new patterns of dependence and interdependence. Fur-
thermore, (5) these patterns of dependence produce interorganizational as well
as intraorganizational power, where such power has some effect on organizational
behavior. Organizations tend to comply with the demands of those interests in
their environment which have relatively more power. (Pfeffer, 1987, pp. 26-27)
Institutional theory is another important variant of a social model of behavior.
Scott argued that institutional theory broadened the conception of the environ-
ment considered in some other organization theories: "To the earlier emphasis
on the importance of the technical environment—resources and technical know-
how—institutional theory has called attention to the importance of the social and
cultural environment, in particular, to social knowledge and cultural rule sys-
tems" (Scott, 1995, p. xiv). One variant of institutional theory has emphasized
cognitive, mimetic processes in which organizations, particularly when confronted
with uncertainty, resolve that uncertainty by imitating what appears to be preva-
lent practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Scott wrote: "We seek to behave in
conventional ways . . . that will not cause us to stand out or be noticed as differ-
ent. . . . We attempt to imitate others whom we regard as superior or more
successful. One principal indicator of the strength of such mimetic processes is
prevalence: the number of similar individuals or organizations exhibiting a given
form or practice" (p. 45). Another variant of institutional theory emphasizes con-
formity deriving from the taken-for-granted or assumed character of social life.
Zucker noted that "institutionalization is rooted in conformity—not conformity
engendered by sanctions . . . nor conformity resulting from a 'black-box' internal-
ization process, but conformity rooted in the takcn-for-granted aspects of everyday
life. . . . Institutionalization operates to produce common understandings about
what is appropriate and, fundamentally, meaningful behavior" (1983, p. 5).
Although some (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988) have argued that institutional theory
deemphasizcs the role of interests as contrasted with resource dependence or
network perspectives, Scott argued that "institutional theory reminds us that inter-
ests are institutionally defined and shaped" (1987, p. 508). What institutional
theory has emphasized is the role of the state and external authority in imposing
organizational arrangements and the fact that organizational structures and pro-
cesses may serve to legitimate organizations rather than to advance technical effi-
ciency.
In comparison to economic models, social models of behavior dcernphasize
individual characteristics but rather emphasize the relationship and connection
among social actors. One achieves promotions, for instance, not so much as a
consequence of one's individual human capital (Becker, 1964) but because of
one's location in the social structure. Turnover is related to the turnover of one's
social contacts (Krackhardt and Porter, 1986), job attitudes are affected by the
attitudes of others in one's social environment (e.g., Thomas and Griffin, 1983)
and particularly by those in one's communication network (Ibarra and Andrews,
1993), and one's ability to find a job depends importantly on social relations
(Granovetter, 1986). Status and associated perceptions of quality depend on the
status of those organizations (or individuals) to which one is tied (Podolny, 1993).
Organizational survival and economic success depend on the pattern of connec-
tions to other organizations (Pfcffer and Salancik, 1978).
Although we know that organizations are, fundamentally, relational entities,
and that the environment of organizations is composed of other organizations and
filled with transactions and other interchanges among them, many theories and
analyses take the individual or the organization alone as the unit of analysis
and fail to incorporate ideas or measures of social structure into either theory or
empirical research (Pfeffer, 1991, p. 800). The social model of behavior avoids
this pitfall even as it challenges more individualistic conceptualizations of organi-
zational and intcrorganizational behavior.
Some Problems with the Social Model

Although the social model of behavior and associated network ideas have enjoyed
a great deal of empirical support, particularly in the domain of interorganizational
relations, predictions of network relations and their effects have not been consis-
tently observed, and there is some disagreement over how to measure network
ties. The problem arises because ties among organizations are frequently multi-
plex and potentially accomplished through a number of mechanisms including
joint ventures, other forms of alliances, as well as board of director interlocks. The
public availability of data on board composition has resulted in a large amount of
empirical research focusing on this particular mechanism for linking organiza-
tions. One complexity is that interlock ties can be "sent" (a manager or CKO of
the focal organization sits on another organization's board), "received" (another
organization is represented on the focal organization's board), or "neutral" (the
two focal organizations arc linked because representatives from each serve on
another organization's board and meet in that context). As Palmer et al. (1995)
have noted, there is much debate about the relative importance of sent and re-
ceived interlocks compared to neutral interlocks, which are often called weak
when compared to more direct interlocking. Some studies find effects of neutral
interlocks (Palmer et al., 1995) and not of stronger ties, but there arc few a priori
predictions about which type of tie should be important in a given study. Re-
viewing much of this literature, Fligstein and Brantlcy concluded that "we should
abandon our concentration on ... directors as a source of network data, in gen-
eral, and financial linkages across boards of directors, in particular, unless their
possible relevance can be specified theoretically" (1992, p. 304).
Further complicating the issue, many studies that ostensibly use network lan-
guage don't employ network methods for analyzing the actual structure of the
network but use very reduced measures instead. For instance, Palmer ct al. (1995)
measured connections in terms of the number of sent industrial and commercial
bank interlocks, the number of received industrial and commercial bank inter-
locks, and the number of neutral industrial and commercial bank interlocks.
They measured industrial and banking interlocks separately because of the im-
portant role of banks in some theories of how organizations are linked (e.g., Soref
and Zeitlin, 1987). Numbers do not indicate the importance of the particular
organizations linked by a tie, and these studies typically don't measure centrality,
closeness or proximity, and similar indicators of network structure.
Using formal network models requires a great deal of data on relations among
individuals or organizations, data which often are not available. Thus, for in-
stance, studies of interorganizational relations from a resource dependence or
structural autonomy perspective use data not on the specific transaction interde-
pendencies of given organizations but rather the patterns of transactions among
economic sectors. This is because specific organizational transactions data are not
available. As Finkelstein (1996) noted, however, this presents a problem of aggre-
gation bias in the data. Gathering data on ties among individuals to model career
mobility (Burt, 1992) requires a lot of information, so such studies are typically
confined to just one or a very few organizations. But this type of design necessarily
limits the researcher's ability to explore conditions under which network effects
are stronger or weaker or to compare measurement models directly in different
settings. In this sense, network models of organizations are richly detailed depic-
tions of social relations, but the empirical specificity constrains the empirical re-
search process.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that the social model of organizational
behavior is a useful and productive way of understanding how information, struc-
tures, decisions, and other policies and practices diffuse across social actors. This
model, however, does not have as much to say about how the various practices or
structures arise in the first place. In that sense, the social model is potentially a
useful complement to other perspectives on the source of behavior in organiza-
tions.
The Retrospectively Rational Model of Behavior
While economic models tend to emphasize prospective, intentional rationality, an

alternative perspective emphasizes the retrospectively rational nature of behavior
(Aronson, 1972). The retrospectively rational model suggests that individuals and
organizations will take actions to make sense of or to appear to be consistent with
previous choices. There are two important variants of the retrospectively rational
model —one that emphasizes a "cooler" cognitive process of self-perception and
one that implicates "wanner" social psychological processes such as commitment
and self-justification.
The basic premises of the self-perception model are well enough known in
psychology to bear only brief recitation. First, behavior may be initially mindless,
habitual, or automatic (Langer, 1983) or, alternatively, produced by other salient
influences; behavior is not always prospectively chosen to be consistent with pref-
erences—indeed, one of the intended consequences of engaging in some activity
is discovering what one's true preferences are (J. G. March, 1978). Second, indi-
viduals, particularly when questioned or called to account for their behavior, pre-
fer to appear sensible, logical, and consistent, if for no other reason than as part
of a strategy of self-presentation (Alexander and Knight, 1971); in this sense, indi-
viduals act as if they were lay social scientists inferring the causality of their own
behavior (Kelley, 1971). Third, when questioned about their attitudes or behav-
iors, individuals will look to their own past statements and actions and to the
external environment for explanations as to the sources of those attitudes or be-
havior; this process has been referred to as self-perception (Bern, 1972) or retro-
spective rationality (Staw, 1980). Because there arc social norms valuing consis-
tency, individuals will often attempt to behave in a fashion consistent with the
attitudes and beliefs they have inferred they hold by retrospectively examining
their own past behavior, thereby creating a situation in which the past comes to
affect the future through its influence on self-perceptions and attitudes.
Weick's (1964) study of the effect of cognitive dissonance on performance is
a good example of studies of this type. In the study, individuals agreed to do a
difficult cognitive task after they learned they would get a smaller reward for
participating in the study than they had expected. "Those that were deprived most
severely rated the subsequent task more interesting and were three times more
productive at performing it than were people who felt less deprived" (Weick,
1993, p. 11). Faced with the prospect of a greatly diminished reward for some-
thing they were committed to do, individuals made sense out of their commit-
ment by evaluating the intrinsic interest and worth of the task more highly. And,
"by working hard and solving more problems, they created a situation that con-
firmed the sensibleness of agreeing to participate in the first place" (p. 11). Thus,
a process of commitment caused individuals to cognitively revalue a task, and
having engaged in that revaluation, they proceeded to act differently, working
harder than those that had not gone through the same degree of cognitive revalu-
ation created by the diminished external reward.
Thus, one particularly important formulation of this perspective notes that if
there are no salient extrinsic reasons for engaging in some activity—such as large
external rewards or the threat of important sanctions —individuals will come to
believe that they are doing the activity because they truly like it. This is the
insufficient justification paradigm that is discussed thoroughly in the literature on
behavioral commitment (Kiesler, 1971; Salancik, 1977) and cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957). By contrast, if individuals are provided with salient extrinsic

reasons or constraints for doing something, particularly when such rewards or
sanctions are not customary (Staw, Calder, Hess, and Sandelands, 1980), they will
see the activity as less interesting and attractive. Consequently, the provision of
extrinsic rewards and controls, including surveillance, can undermine intrinsic
interest in, enjoyment of, and motivation to do task activities (e.g., Deci, 1975;
Lepper and Greene, 1975; Enzle and Anderson, 1993).
The commitment or self-justification variant of retrospective rationality postu-
lates a more active process than mere self-perception. Individuals — to maintain
their self-identity, to appear to others and themselves to be acting consistently, to
make their past decisions appear sensible or turn out well, to avoid the political
costs of being discovered as having made a mistake —will persist with a course of
action and, at times, even escalate their commitment to it. The prediction is the
greater the commitment, produced through an investment of resources, the more
perseverance there will be.
The implications of both variants of the retrospectively rational model of
behavior are almost completely at odds with those of economic models and with
other theories emphasizing the importance of extrinsic rewards. The self-
perception version suggests that incentives may be counterproductive and that
pay-for-performance schemes may actually reduce performance (Kohn, 1993). It
is, therefore, not surprising that particularly the early work by Dcci (1975) is
known by economists. Economists and others have tended to dismiss much of this
research because it (1) frequently used children as subjects, (2) was experimental
and therefore appeared to some as artificial, (3) couldn't really be generalized to
organizational settings because it dealt with different activities, "(learning vs. work-
ing), the people involved are different (children vs. adults), and the purpose is
different (developing vs. earning a living)" (Montemayor, 1995, pp. 943-944),
and most important, (4) on occasion introduced incentives or surveillance into
situations —for example, free play or recreation —in which they would not nor-
mally be expected, as contrasted with organizational situations in which incen-
tives and control would be a more natural part of the environment. Although
these are valid concerns, they are not a significant challenge to this model of
behavior, because a number of studies have tested the rationalizing model of
behavior with adults in field situations and found results consistent with the
theory.
Staw (1974) studied ROTC cadets and capitalized on the introduction of the
draft lottery during the Vietnam War to test the effects of insufficient justification.
Some men joined ROTC under a two-year program that was less committing,
and others joined and were committed to serve as officers upon completion of
the program. Once having joined ROTC, when the draft lottery was held, some
individuals learned because of the number assigned to their birthday that they
would have been likely to be drafted, others learned that the odds of their being
drafted were very low, and still others learned they had intermediate odds. Those
with low odds of being drafted in a program that permitted them to withdraw did
so. Those with high odds of being drafted remained in the less-committing
ROTC program and had reason to be pleased with their decision to be in the
more committing program. But those men who were committed to ROTC but
discovered they had a high draft number (low probability of being drafted) faced
a problem. They joined ROTC to avoid the draft and serve under better circum-
stances as commissioned officers, but now they learned that they might not have
had to serve; they no longer had an extrinsic reason for being in ROTC. But
because of their contractual commitment, they could not withdraw. As might be
expected under insufficient justification predictions, this group earned higher
grades in their ROTC courses and expressed the most favorable attitudes toward
the program compared to the cadets with extrinsic reasons for being in ROTC.
They made sense of their commitment in the presence of insufficient external
justification by finding, within the program, benefits and elements to enjoy and
appreciate.
O'Reilly and Caldwell (1980), in a study of 108 MBA graduates, examined
the effects of the bases of job choice on job satisfaction and commitment. They
found a "positive relationship between intrinsic decision factors [intrinsic interest
in the job itself, personal feelings about the job, etc.] and satisfaction and commit-
ment" (p. 561). They also found evidence that "decisions made under external
constraints, that is, decisions based on a concern for family and financial consider-
ations, are inversely related to job satisfaction and commitment" (p. 563). O'Reilly
and Caldwell (1981) studied the effects on MBA graduates of the number of
offers they received and whether or not they took the highest offer. They predicted
that graduates who had several job offers and who accepted a job that did not pay
the best among the offers should have fewer extrinsic reasons for their choice
than those who either took the best offer or had only one offer and, consequently,
should be more committed to the job. They found that, consistent with this pre-
diction, individuals who took their initial offer with fewer external reasons for
doing so in fact were more satisfied with the job and stayed in it longer.
In a third field test of these ideas, Caldwell, O'Reilly, and Morris (1983)
studied both satisfaction with and intrinsic interest in an evening MBA program
on the part of 132 students, some of whom received more generous employer-
provided subsidies for attending the program than others. They found that suf-
ficiency of justification effects depended both on orientation toward the activity
and beliefs about the subsidy. Specifically, "providing an educational subsidy
is associated with lowered task interest for employees who are expressively ori-
ented. . . . Failure to provide an extrinsic reward is related . . . to increased
interest for those who do not [believe] the subsidy is a normal employee benefit"
(p. 506).
One implication of this retrospective rationalization argument is that once
individuals are committed to some organization or activity, additional incentives
probably will not increase their motivation or positive affect and can, in fact,
undermine their positive attitudes and actions. Pfeffer and Lawler (1980), studying
college and university faculty, found a positive relationship between overly suffi-
cient justification (salary was higher than would be predicted based on experi-
ence, productivity, and other characteristics) and job satisfaction for faculty who
had been in their organizations for a shorter period of time. For faculty with
longer organizational tenure, who were more committed to the organization as a
consequence (Sheldon, 1971), there was no relationship between compensation

and satisfaction or intentions to look for another job.
It is important to recognize that it is the self-perception and rationalization
of behavior, not something inherent in intrinsic or extrinsic rewards, that account
for these results. To demonstrate this, Porac and Salancik (1981) conducted an
experiment in which the addition of one extrinsic reward, extra credit for taking
part in the experiment, undermined the effect of another extrinsic reward, money.
They argued that the addition of a new, salient reward undermined the value of
another reward, because it provided yet another explanation for the person's be-
havior. Moreover, because attribution of causality and self-justification are the
critical processes, the undermining effect of extrinsic rewards or surveillance can
be diminished by providing alternative explanations for the external control. Thus,
for instance, Enzle and Anderson (1993) found that the effect of surveillance to
undermine intrinsic task interest was eliminated when the surveillance was ex-
plained either as necessary to make sure the equipment was working properly or
to satisfy curiosity. But the undermining effect was evident when either no expla-
nation was provided or an explanation emphasizing control was given.
These findings are important because there are situations in which it is nec-
essary to use extrinsic rewards or surveillance in order to obtain the desired behav-
ior, but at the same time there is a desire not to eliminate intrinsic interest in the
task. As Cialdini et al. noted, "External rewards and sanctions do work (Eisen-
berger, 1992); and when nothing else does, it becomes necessary to generate . . .
desirable behavior. Yet, the immediate gains . . . can be undercut and reversed
by the presence of these same external constraints when independent, long-term
interest in the activity is considered" (1994, p. 1). Their study of children's writing
demonstrated that by attributing an action undertaken under the influence of a
controlling reward to a stable trait of the actor, the undermining effect of the
external control was neutralized.
The attribution and self-perception of behavior mean that Frank's (1988) ob-
servations on the importance of the models of behavior for creating that behavior
are very much on target. Strickland (1958) found that subjects placed in a situa-
tion where they monitored one subordinate (a confederate of the experimenter)
more closely than the other came to believe the more closely monitored individ-
ual needed more surveillance and could not be trusted as much, even though
there were no objective differences in the performance of the two. Strickland
wrote of the supervisor's dilemma, in which "the supervisor . . . may become
victimized by his own previous supervisory behavior" (p. 201). Not only does
close supervision not provide the supervisor an opportunity to learn about unsu-
pervised work efforts, but the action of supervising can cause the individual to
make sense of that behavior by coming to believe that this activity was necessary
to get the work done. Lingle, Brock, and Cialdini found that individuals "who
become involved in covert surveillance may feel a need to justify their actions by
generating evidence that the surveillance effort is worthwhile" (1977, p. 423).
Their study demonstrated that surveillance can stimulate entrapment activities
that increase the frequency of the undesircd behavior, therefore reaffirming the
need for the surveillance activity.
jo New Directions for Organization Theory
Furthermore, those closely supervised can develop a self-perception that they

are not trustworthy or intrinsically motivated and may then continue to act on
those self-perceptions. Constraints provide an external explanation for engaging
or not engaging in a behavior, thereby potentially negating intrinsic motivations
that might otherwise control the behavior. Wilson and Lassiter (1982) conducted
an experiment in which subjects had an opportunity to cheat on a trivia quiz, but
where the incentive to do so was minimal. They found that subjects exposed to a
more severe threat against cheating actually cheated more frequently than sub-
jects exposed to a milder threat or than control subjects exposed to no threat at
all. They concluded that "broad applications of threats . . . can be counterpro-
ductive, because they may increase interest in the undesirable behaviors among
the large number of people who had little desire to perform them in the first
place" (p. 818). In this way, the mental models of behavior that form the basis
for actions can come to be true even if they were initially incorrect—they set up
a cycle of behavior that confirms the assumptions of the models.
The commitment or self-justification version of the rationalizing model is
also at odds with economic conceptions of rational decision making. Economics
suggests that sunk costs should not matter in decision situations. Once resources
have been expended, they are "sunk" and cannot be regained, no matter what
one does. Therefore, rational choice models suggest that decisions should be
based solely on incremental analysis — whether the expenditure of additional re-
sources will provide benefits greater than the costs of those resources. In contrast,
the rationalizing model suggests that individuals may want to justify their previous
commitment, evidenced by the expenditure of resources, by persisting in the be-
havior. Also, not demonstrating continued commitment to a previously chosen
course of action to some extent acknowledges that one has made a decision error,
and this can be politically risky as well as threatening to one's self-esteem. Better
to persist and hope that things will turn out all right or that one will be rewarded
for the positive attribute of perseverance.
Arkes and Blumer provided a number of demonstrations, both experimental
and field, of the sunk cost effect—"a greater tendency to continue an endeavor
once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made" (1985, p. 124). In
a field demonstration of this effect, individuals who carne to a ticket window to
purchase season tickets to the Ohio University Theater's 1982—1983 season were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (1) paid the normal price ($15);
(2) were sold the ticket at a $2 discount; or (3) were sold the ticket at a $7
discount. "The seller explained to the latter two groups that the discount was
being given as part of a promotion by the theater department" (p. 127). Because
the discounts were randomly assigned, "the groups should not have differed on
the costs and benefits they could have anticipated by attending each play" (p.
128). Since the different price tickets were color coded, it was possible to precisely
determine how many persons in each condition attended each performance. The
results indicated that the "no discount group used significantly more tickets (4.11)
than both the $2 discount group (3.32) and the $7 discount group (3.29)" during
the first half of the season, although there were no differences among the groups
in the second half of the season (p. 128).
Staw and Hoang (1995) demonstrated the effect of commitment and sunk
costs in a field study of the National Basketball Association. They showed that
draft order—how early a player was drafted—was a statistically significant pre-
dictor of the amount of playing time even over a five-year period, controlling for
performance in the preceding year, position, and injuries. They also found that
draft order affected a player's career length and the likelihood of being traded,
again with performance and other factors statistically controlled. Players taken
earlier in the draft were less likely to be cut from a team or traded. Staw and
Hoang discovered that being traded was negatively associated with subsequently
being retained by the new team and with playing time, even with performance
held constant. They interpreted this latter result to mean that "the further teams
were from the original drafting of players, the less committed they were to them"
(p. 491), and this reduced commitment had predictable effects on player use and
retention.
Another arena in which commitment effects have been demonstrated is the
performance appraisal process. Bazerman, Beekun, and Schoorman (1982), in an
experimental simulation of a managerial situation that involved making a promo-
tion decision, found that "subjects who were responsible for the promotion deci-
sion gave higher pay increases and bonuses, evaluated the manager's potential
more favorably, and projected higher sales and earnings than did the subjects
who were not responsible for the promotion decision" (Schoorman, 1988, p. 58).
Schoorman (1988) replicated this result in field research conducted in a large
public sector organization. He found that when the individuals filling out perfor-
mance appraisal ratings had input into and agreed with the promotion or hiring
decision for the person being rated, the performance appraisal score was more
positive than when the rater did not have input into the decision. Schoorman
reported that "the escalation effects accounted for 6% of the variance in perfor-
mance appraisal ratings" (p. 60), which was more than the variance accounted
for by the measures of clerical ability that were used to actually select employees
for the jobs. Having once made or agreed with a hiring or promotion decision,
the way to make sense of or rationalize that choice was apparently to evaluate the
performance of the selected individual more positively.
The "Rationality" of the Rationalizing Model

Not all of the studies of sunk cost necessarily demonstrate behavior that is irratio-
nal using decision theory logic (Northcraft and Wolf, 1984), as many of the exper-
imental situations involved scenarios in which it would be rational to increase or
continue investment. For instance, in the counter game reported by Brockner
and Rubin (1985), players paid one cent for each click of a 600-point counter,
received an initial stake of $5, and therefore had a 5/6 chance of winning a prize
of varying size, ranging from $2 to $20. "In most conditions, the expected value
of the game is positive, and the appropriate strategy is to enter and never quit.
However, the average amount invested in these games is quite low" (Heath, 1995,
p. 41). And, the marginal returns to subsequent investments, given one has not
yet won a prize, actually increase over time. The available evidence seems to
J2 New Directions for Organization Theory
suggest that people escalate commitment when they do not set a budget and
when incremental costs and benefits are difficult to track (p. 47). Heath summa-
rized the existing literature:
There is currently no evidence that people will make errors of escalating commit-
ment when marginal investments are explicit. . . . The literature provides no
clear demonstration of such errors because previous demonstrations of "escalat-
ing commitment" with explicit investments did not provide relevant information
about marginal costs and benefits. . . . When researchers omit information
about benefits . . . their studies may not control subjects' expectations about the
benefits of a marginal investment. Subjects may assume that benefits increase as
sunk costs increase. . . . Other studies . . . do not control for expectations about
costs. (1995, p. 52)
Heath (1995), in a series of experiments, tested the idea that people set men-
tal budgets for investments and resist exceeding those budgets as they track their
expenditures against the budgets. He warned about the problem of de-escalation
of commitment even in the presence of high marginal returns because of adher-
ence to the mental budget model:
when benefits come from completing a project, investments toward the end of a
project produce increasingly high marginal returns. In situations where there is
learning, previous investments may decrease marginal costs and increase mar-
ginal benefits by moving people clown a learning curve. Mental budgeting pre-
dicts that in such situations people are more likely to make errors of de-escalating
commitment (p. 53).
The rationalizing model of behavior may, in fact, be quite rational, using a

noneconomic, commonscnsc definition of the term. Commitment to decisions
may make political sense and demonstrate persistence in the face of adversity, a
characteristic that is often valued. After all, if you hire an individual and then
aren't committed to this decision when the person makes a mistake, it may be
more difficult to attract other, talented individuals to work with you. In a study
demonstrating the different weights more- versus less-experienced managers give
to persistence, Staw and Ross (1980) presented subjects with a decision-making
case in which a hypothetical manager had behaved in either a consistent or in-
consistent fashion, allocated either many or few resources, and had achieved ei-
ther success or failure. Subjects in each condition had to evaluate the administra-
tor and recommend the size of a raise. Staw and Ross found that all three
conditions were positively associated with the evaluations given: being successful,
behaving consistently, and using as few resources as possible were positively re-
lalcd to both the evaluations and the size of the raise recommended, '['he study
used different subject populations —evening MBA students who had full-time
jobs, psychology undergraduate students, and undergraduate business students.
Staw and Ross found that who did the evaluating affected the weight given to the
three factors. They noted that the evening MBA students gave performance the
smallest weight in evaluating the manager and showed the greatest difference in
the evaluations of consistent versus inconsistent administrators. The results suggest
that business experience, for whatever reason, tends to lead to a greater value
being placed on consistency and persistence: individuals who persist can come to
be evaluated more positively than those who don't maintain their commitments,
making perseverance rational for those individuals.
Commitment can also be sensible in that the very commitment can have
positive effects on results. Consider, for instance, the Staw and Hoang (1995)
study of the effects of draft order on playing time and being retained in the NBA.
Why might it make sense to play someone more than might be warranted by that
individual's performance in the previous year? Because there is evidence that
playing time itself positively affects future performance: "We regressed perfor-
mance for years 2 through 5 on prior year's performance, prior year's time on the
court, draft number. . . . The results of these four analyses supported a straight-
forward investment hypothesis. . . . An increase in performance was associated
with the investment of prior playing time" (p. 489).
Moreover, Staw and Hoang wrote about "the vagaries of forecasting talent"
(p. 477) and also did an analysis that demonstrated that "draft number" was "a
significant predictor of subsequent performance during players' second and third
years in the NBA" (p. 488). Consequently, "draft order does appear to contain
some useful information." Given these facts, some persistence in following one's
initial predictions concerning talent might appear to be justified.
In the world outside of the experimental laboratory, the rationalizing model
may be more rational than sometimes thought. That is because performance is
not necessarily fully determined by preset factors and is affected by expectations
and by the resources that individuals receive as a consequence of commitment,
such as an opportunity to gain more experience. Moreover, performance is often
ambiguous in terms of its assessment, which means that acts of commitment can
change the evaluation of results. In this real world, the effects of both self-
perception and commitment on subsequent behavior and performance help to
create the very results that the rationalizing model seek to explain. These feed-
back cycles —resulting from both self-perception and commitment—to subse-
quent attitudes, behavior, and dimensions of performance would seem to warrant
more attention not only to evaluate the ability of the rationali/ing model to ac-
count for behavior but also to establish its implications for actually managing
behavior.
The Moral Model of Behavior
Recently, there has been growing interest in models of behavior that move away
from the neoclassical economic paradigm but in some instances retain a focus on
individual or organizational rational choice. These models differ from the eco-
nomic model of behavior in their core assumptions. Etzioni (1988, p. 4) has
articulated the core assumptions of one behavior model that includes morals.
First, a moral model postulates that individuals pursue not only pleasure (as they
do in the utilitarian approach) but also morality. Consequently, "individuals are,
simultaneously, under the influence of two major sets of factors — their pleasure
and their moral duty" (p. 63). Second, this perspective emphasizes the fact that
individuals choose means, not just goals, and these means are chosen on the basis
of their values and emotions. Because moral and utilitarian considerations are
qualitatively different, they cannot be traded off against each other (p. 71). An
individual obtains "a sense of affirmation . . . when a person abides by his or her
moral commitments" (p. 36). Third, the neoclassical presumption of the primacy
of the individual is modified to account for the fact that social collectivities, in-
cluding organizations but also including neighborhood and ethnic communities,
arc important decision-making units.
Frank (1990) has counterposcd what he has called the self-interest model
with a commitment model of behavior. Frank (1988; 1990) first reviewed the
various "rational" reasons to forgo short-term self-interest, such as building a repu-
tation for being trustworthy, as well as evolutionary or selection mechanisms that
might produce more cooperative behavior. For example, the fact that people who
cheat in transactions and are discovered will probably not have too many more
opportunities to cheat again means that those who remain in the arena of ex-
change are probably not going to behave completely opportunistically. Frank dis-
tinguished these more sophisticated versions of self-interest from his view of com-
mitment, which he described thus: "The motive is not to avoid the possibility of
being caught, but to maintain and strengthen the predisposition to behave hon-
estly. . . . It is this change in my emotional makeup . . . that other people may
apprehend" (1988, p. 95, emphasis in original).
There is extensive empirical evidence consistent with the moral model of
behavior, particularly as it is contrasted with a model of attitudes and behaviors
resulting from the operation of simple self-interest. However, most of the relevant
research does not deal with organizational contexts or problems, which leaves an
important research agenda — applying the ideas of the moral model of behavior
to organizations.
There have been studies showing that political behavior is not completely
explainable by the idea of self-interest. Voting is a public-spirited act—it requires
some effort, but the odds that a given individual's vote will be consequential for
determining the election outcome is almost infinitesimally small. Flirschleifer
(1985) reviewed studies showing that there was a correlation between the ex-
pected closeness of the election and voting—people were more likely to vote
when the election was thought to be close, as self-interest would predict—but the
relationship was comparatively small. Barry (1978) presented data indicating that
closeness of the election accounted for about 9 percent of the variation in voter
turnout, while a citizen duty score, a measure of moral obligation, accounted for
between 30 percent and 40 percent.
Scars and Funk (1990) reviewed numerous studies of the role of self-interest
in accounting for the political opinions of Americans on issues including race,
taxes, crime, and war. They concluded that only about one-quarter of the self-
interest terms in regression equations met even minimal standards of statistical
significance and that the average bivariate correlation between a measure of self-
interest and the corresponding political attitude was about 0.07, indicating that
even when statistically significant, self-interest contributed in only a small way to
explaining political attitudes. By contrast, symbolic predispositions, which include
the possibility that "people may be socialized to respond to public issues in a

principled and public-regarding manner" (Sears and Funk, 1990, p. 169), had
considerably greater explanatory power. Similar results emerged from studies not
of political attitudes but of actual voting. Sears et al., reviewing a number of these
voting studies, concluded that "symbolic attributes (liberalism, conservatism, party
identification, and racial prejudice) had strong effects, while self-interest had al-
most none" (1980, p. 679).
There is evidence that individuals behave altruistically and according to
moral precepts and, by so doing, ignore simple self-interest. As one example,
experiments show that many people mail back presumably lost wallets to strangers
without taking anything (Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes, 1968). Hornstein, Masor,
and Sole (1971) found that some 64 percent of subjects who had an opportunity
to return a lost contribution to a fictitious institute doing research in medicine
did return the money. Latane and Darley (1970), in a study conducted in New
York City, found that when strangers were approached by the researchers (in
disguise) requesting aid, a high proportion furnished help.
The economic model of behavior has emphasized the free-riding problem —
the tendency of individuals to take advantage of the efforts of others and shirk in
situations in which the benefits are collective and cannot be distributed in propor-
tion to individual contribution or performance. Discussions of the free-riding
problem dominate consideration of group-based incentive schemes in organiza-
tions such as profit or gain sharing and lead many economists to believe that
collective ownership of assets, as in a cooperative form of organization, is inher-
ently inefficient. Thus, for instance, Williamson wrote that "cooperatives are un-
able to retain superior managers, who are induced to leave by offers of better pay
in capitalist firms" (1985, p. 266).
There is only one problem with all of this concern for the free-riding prob-
lem—empirical evidence indicates that it is often not much of a problem at all:
"A large number of experiments, under different conditions, most of them highly
unfavorable to civility, show that people do not take free rides, but pay voluntarily
as much as 40 percent to 60 percent of what economists figured is due to the
public till if the person was not to free ride at all. The main reason: the subjects
consider it the 'right' or 'fair' thing to do" (Etzioni, 1988, p. 59).
Another review of the literature on free riding came to the same conclusion:
The logic of the problem of collective action is both compelling and illuminat-
ing. The problem with this logic, however, is that the empirical evidence for its
ability to predict actual behavior is either scant or nonexistent. . . . Under the
conditions described by the theory as leading to free riding, people often cooper-
ate instead. . . . In over 13 experiments we have found that subjects persist in
investing substantial proportions of their resources in public goods despite condi-
tions specifically designed to maximi/c the impact of free riding and thus mini-
mize investment. The prevalence of such economically "illogical" behavior was
replicated over and over again. (Marwell, 1982, pp. 208, 210)
Etzioni,(1988) has reviewed a set of studies that indicate that for moral issues,
activities or behavior that have been deemed to be sacred, the calculative ap-
proach does not do very well in explaining behavior and, instead, nonrnarkets
exist. He concluded, "in any given society and period, certain items are not con-
sidered legitimate material for exchange. . . . As a result, market models are
expected to depict the relations poorly at best; socio-economic conceptions that
include moral as well as economic factors are necessary" (p. 81).
Institutional theory in some of its variants has a normative component: "em-
phasis . . . is placed on normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative,
and obligatory dimension to social life" (Scott, 1995, p. 37). Sclznick defined
institutionalization as "to infuse with value" (1957, p. 17). Holm has noted that
"the study of institutions is the study of norm-governed behavior" (1995, p. 398).
J. G. March and Olsen, arguing for the importance of institutions for understand-
ing politics, noted the importance of social obligations in understanding behavior:
"To describe behavior as driven by rules is to see action as a matching of a
situation to the demands of a position. Rules define relationships among roles in
terms of what an incumbent of one role owes to incumbents of other roles" (1989,
p. 23, emphasis added).
An interesting illustration of the effect of the normative order on the adoption
of specific organizational practices is provided by 'Iblbert and Zucker's (1983)
study of the diffusion of municipal civil service reform in the United States during
the period 1885-1935. Early in the period, which cities adopted reforms could
be predicted on the basis of characteristics that might be reasonably argued to
account for the need and desire for reform: larger cities, cities with a larger pro-
portion of immigrants, and those with a higher proportion of white-collar to blue-
collar workers were more likely to adopt reform. Although city characteristics
were strongly predictive of adoption of civil service reforms during the early pe-
riod from 1885 to 1904, the effects of these characteristics became weaker over
time so that by 1935, city characteristics no longer had predictive power. 'Iblbert
and Zucker interpreted this residt as demonstrating normative influence: "As an
increasing number of organizations adopt a program or policy, it becomes progres-
sively institutionalized, or widely understood to be a necessary component of ra-
tionalized organizational structure. The legitimacy of the procedures themselves
serves as the impetus for the later adopters" (p. 35).
The normative order is importantly influenced by the actions of the state,
which has important coercive and regulatory powers. Baron, Dobbin, and Jen-
nings (1986), examining the diffusion and implementation of modern personnel
practices, observed an important discontinuity at the time of World War TI. At
that point, the state intervened in organizational administration — for instance,
forbidding strikes, demanding personnel records so that an inventory of manpower
could be maintained and managed, and limiting wage increases. Baron et al.
noted that "these interventions . . . fueled the development of bureaucratic con-
trols by creating models of employment and incentives to formalize and expand
personnel functions" (p. 369). Bridges and Villemez (1994), analyzing a matched
sample of employees and employers from Chicago in the early 1980s, found that
both government influence in the industrial sector and how close organizations
were to the public sector had important effects on the development and spread
of due-process procedures and bureaucratic control.
Five Models of Behavior jj
The conclusion from this brief review of relevant empirical evidence seems
inescapable: social and individual values matter in understanding behavior and
are often more powerful predictors than simple conceptions of self-interest. In
determining the normative order, both prevalence and the actions of legitimate
authorities, such as governments, are important. Consequently, understanding the
emergence of norms and moral conceptions in organizations, and examining their
effects on behavior, are important research tasks.
The Interpretive, Cognitive Model of Behavior
Cognition is explicitly present in most of the models already considered. The

economic model often presumes rational choice, a cognitive process. Indeed, one
of the prominent critiques of the rational decision-making foundations of eco-
nomic theory has proceeded by showing how human judgment and decision pro-
cesses frequently violate the principles of rational choice (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). The moral model of behavior proceeds from its own version of rationality,
which includes moral values in the decision calculus. The retrospectively rational
model of behavior is concerned with the connection between cognition and ac-
tion but posits that on many occasions cognitions follow actions to rationalize or
justify them rather than guiding action prospectively. What distinguishes what I
have termed an interpretive, cognitive model of behavior from the others is its
focus on the sensemaking and perception processes and the extent to which re-
searchers using this approach on occasion separate cognition from objective real-
ity. In that sense, many versions of the cognitive model argue for a relativism that
makes them attractive to critical theorists and other postmodern conceptions of
organization science that bemoan the machinelike quality of much social science
and organizational research.
The cognitive model is not readily summarized because it has numerous
variants that emphasize somewhat different aspects of cognitive process. Some
cognitive models, as we will soon see, emphasize the social aspects of cognition
and become almost indistinguishable from the social model of behavior with its
emphasis on social context. On occasion, writers in the cognitive tradition empha-
size retrospective sensemaking based on commitment processes and in this sense
become identical to the rationalizing model of behavior. Throughout, however,
the interest in cognition is premised on the idea that behaviors and outcomes are
better understood if we focus on the "cognitive processes that influence those
behaviors and outcomes" (Gioia and Sims, 1986, p. 3).
Weick is probably the most consistent and forceful proponent of the cognitive
view:
An organization is a body of thought thought by thinking thinkers. . . . In reply
to the question "what is an organization," we consider organizations to be snap-
shots of ongoing processes, these snapshots being selected and controlled by hu-
man consciousness and attentiveness. This consciousness and attentiveness, in
turn, can be seen as snapshots of ongoing cognitive processes . . . where the
mind acquires knowledge about its surroundings. . . . In these epistemological
processes, both knowledge and the environment are constructed by participants

interactively. (1979, p. 42)
The relativism inherent in this conception of organizations can be readily

seen in Weick's elaboration of these ideas. Thus, "an organization can be viewed
as a body of jargon available for attachment to experience" (1979, p. 42). Or,
"Organi/ations exist largely in the mind" (Wcick and Bougon, 1986, p. 102).
What do managers do? "Managerial work can be viewed as managing myths,
images, symbols, and labels. The much touted 'bottom line' of the organization
is a symbol, if not a myth" (Weick, 1979, p. 42). Managers traffic in images, and
as such, "the appropriate role for the manager may be evangelist rather than
accountant" (p. 42).
Note that this approach differs in some important respects from other treat-
ments of the symbolic role of management (Pfeffer, 198 Ib) and the use of politi-
cal language and symbols (e.g., Kdelman, 1964). For instance, Edelman noted,
"Political analysis must, then, proceed on two levels simultaneously. It must exam-
ine how political actions get some groups the tangible things they want . . . and
at the same time it must explore what these same actions mean to the mass public
and how it is placated or aroused by them" (p. 12). Edelman's comment that "it
is not uncommon to give the rhetoric to one side and the decision to the other"
(p. 39) and Pfeffer's argument that substantive outcomes and "the attitudes, be-
liefs, norms, and values which are generated around them" (1981c, p. 180) may
be loosely coupled both speak to the existence of a substantive reality apart from
cognition that is implicitly denied if one takes Weick's position literally.
Individuals' beliefs about the causal relationships in an organizational setting
can be represented in a cause map: "participants edit their own organizational
experience into patterns of personal knowledge. A representation of that knowl-
edge is called a cognitive map. A cognitive map consists of the concepts and the
relations a participant uses to understand organizational situations" (Weick and
Bougon, 1986, p. 106).
Bougon, Weick, and Binkhorst (1977) measured the cause maps of members
of the Utrecht Jazz Orchestra. In these maps, a — 1 indicated an inverse relation,
a 0 indicated no relation, and a +1 indicated a positive relationship between the
entries in the rows and columns. It is possible to obtain the entries (which repre-
sent behaviors, contextual factors, and outcomes such as the difficulty of the
piece, the amount of rehearsal time, and the quality of the performance) from
the organizational members themselves or to provide the members with a list
based on preliminary interviewing. But in either case, to assess the similarity of
cause maps one must present the same set of stimulus materials to each organiza-
tional member. Summing across all the orchestra members provides an average
map of the causal structure as seen by the organizational members and a "consen-
sual view of what the orchestra is" (Weick and Bougon, 1986, p. 112). Bougon
(1983) has developed one possible method for measuring cause maps in organiza-
tional contexts. Although the cause map idea and method is interesting, it has
not come to play a prominent role in subsequent empirical research, possibly
because collecting these data is an arduous task.
One might ask, Where do cognitive representations of organizations come

from? At one point, Weick and Bougon suggested that "when people build cogni-
tive maps, they start with outcomes, small experiments, and consequences. . . .
These perceived regularities form the raw materials for cognitive maps" (1986, p.
105). This conception is consistent with that seen in attribution theory, viewing
individuals as lay social scientists. The implication that a great deal of cognitive
effort goes on in organizations is inconsistent with the view that much behavior
is mindless (Langer, 1983) or is controlled by rules and standard operating proce-
dures (Cyert and March, 1963). All this cognitive activity is also inconsistent with
Mintzberg's (1973) depiction of managerial work as involving little time spent
reflecting or thinking as compared to acting or interacting with others.
Subsequently, Weick argued that behavioral commitment is the critical pro-
cess underlying cognition in organizations: "behavioral commitment is a stimulus
to build . . . coherent world views out of whatever resources are at hand. . . .
Justification can become an important source of social structure, culture, and
norms. . . . Organizations begin to materialize when rationales for commitment
become articulated. . . . Justifications can easily be transformed into organiza-
tional goals because these goals themselves are so general" (1993, pp. 12-13).
This view of cognition as being based on behavioral commitment obviously
makes the cognitive model of organizations very similar to the retrospectively ra-
tional model already discussed.
Although research on the cognitive model of organizations will sometimes
use the phrase "social cognition" and will frequently invoke the term "organiza-
tion," much of the work is actually quite silent on the obvious social and contex-
tual influences on the processes of attribution, sensemaking, and constructing of
causal maps that go on. In this sense, the cognitive model of organizations is
consistent and in fact may derive from the trend in social psychology to downplay,
empirically if not in the language used, the social, relational reality of organiza-
tional life. Although there are exceptions to this tendency, they are relatively few.
As R. A. Baron has noted, "social psychology has undergone nothing short of what
some have described as a cognitive revolution. During this transformation, the
primary emphasis of the field shifted from social behavior (interpersonal relations
and group processes) to social thought—how we think about others and interpret
their characteristics, words, and deeds" (1993, p. 64, emphasis in original). Mim-
icking this trend in organization studies may not have been the wisest choice.
Inattention to the social aspect of organizational life and the corresponding em-
phasis on individual cognition coupled with the difficulties of actually mapping
cognitive structures has left the cognitive model in the position of being more of
a metaphor for writing about organizations than a major stimulus to empirical
research.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, the relative prevalence of the various models of behavior in the

organizations literature and in managerial discourse about organizations is only
loosely related to the degree of empirical support they enjoy or the reasonableness
of their assumptions. Apparently, models of behavior often take on a religious
quality, adopted or rejected on the basis of belief or aesthetics rather than on the
basis of scientific evidence. So, even though organizations are inherently social
and relational entities, there is great interest in the economic model of behavior
in spite of the fact that many of its variants proceed from a position of method-
ological individualism that denies the very reality of the institutions and organiza-
tions being explained. Even though self-perception and commitment processes
have been repeatedly demonstrated in both field and experimental situations, and
these perspectives have important implications for the effects of surveillance, in-
centives, and other forms of external control, the insights of these models are
seldom incorporated in either the research on or design of organizational incen-
tive systems. Even though moral considerations loom large and often dominate
self-interest in studies of political behavior, a moral model of organizational be-
havior has yet to be developed or explored to any great extent.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty is that the models often seem to simply ignore
each other. Empirical explorations that attempt to compare and contrast at least
some of the various competing models of behavior—the economic model, the
social model, the retrospectively rational model, and the moral model — are sub-
stantially less common than warranted. Because these theoretical perspectives af-
fect the practice of management, the formulation of public policy, and the eon-
duct of research, attention to their assumptions, evidentiary base, and implications
would seem to be critical for anyone doing research on organizations.
4
The Effects of Organizational

Composition
As discussed thus far in this book, underlying all organization theory and research
is the basic question, How are we to understand organizations? One variant of a
social model of behavior that has drawn sufficient research attention to merit
more extended consideration is an approach to organizational analysis emphasiz-
ing the effects of social composition.
Although many organization theories have psychological or social psychologi-
cal foundations (Mowday and Sutton, 1993), which emphasize attitudes, disposi-
tions, and cognitive processes, one important portion of the field employs a struc-
tural perspective. "This focus on structure tends to direct attention . . . toward
the enduring properties of the relations among actors that both constrain and
enable action to occur" (Pfeffer, 1991, p. 789). Structural analysis explains "pat-
terns of social relations in terms of properties of social structure, not in terms of
the assumptions made, whether or not these are derivable from psychological
principles" (P. M. Blau, 1977, p. 246). Although structural accounts may rely on
psychological principles or assumptions, these are not always directly tested or
even examined in the analyses. The structural perspective relies on the social
model of behavior for its core assumptions and so emphasizes the effect of context
on behavior. One advantage of analyzing organizations in terms of the effects of
their composition is that such analyses rely on more readily observable variables
(Pfeffer, 1983; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Wcick has noted the advantages of
analyzing organizations in terms of observable behaviors and other properties:
There are several plaees in the organizational literature where investigators seem
to resist defining their concepts in terms of observable actions by individuals
in the mistaken belief that, in doing so, they will have to explain the actions
psychologically. If ... properties can be defined in terms of observable individ-
ual behaviors, there is a better chance the empirical research . . . can be made
more cumulative. (1969, pp. 31-32)
81
One subtle but important implication of the social model, with its emphasis
on the effects of social influences, is that not every social entity is going to be
equally available to exert influence. Thus, there is the argument that patterns of
social relations are explained not solely on the basis of motives but "on the basis
of external opportunities for social relations created by population composition
and the structure of positions in the social environment" (Iluber, 1990, p. 2,
emphasis added). What this means is simply that who you interact with and are
therefore influenced by and, in turn, influence, is a function of the existing social
structure. If you never have contact with Democrats because of the particular
composition of your social environment, your political attitudes will be affected
accordingly. If an individual's social environment is made up almost exclusively
of males, the opportunity for interaction with women is limited simply by the
composition of the social group, regardless of the individual's interest in inter-
acting with women. This latter example is particularly relevant, as we will see
below, in understanding women's networks and careers in numerically male-
dominated environments. As an empirical illustration of this compositional effect,
P. M. Blau and Schwartz (1984) explored patterns of intermarriage among racial,
occupational, ethnic background, and birth-region dimensions in a sample of
metropolitan areas. They acknowledged that individuals would prefer to associate
with similar others. However, exercising this preference is constrained by the
available interaction partners. Blau and Schwartz demonstrated that the relative
size of various demographic groups affected the observed rate of intermarriage.
Many explorations of structural effects have examined the impact of varying
group composition in terms of salient demographic differences such as age, orga-
nizational tenure, gender, or work background (Pfeffer, 1983; Stewman, 1988).
These studies usually proceed from the empirically justifiable presumption that
similarity is an important basis of interpersonal attraction and contact (Bcrscheid
and Walster, 1969) as well as the assumption that background and contact matter
for understanding behavior. In the organizations literature, structural effects have
been explored most completely in the literature on organizational demography, a
related literature on the effects of the composition of top management teams, and
a literature that has explored the effect of gender composition on work-related
outcomes such as wage and position attainment. A part of the literature on gender
composition examines how this affects social networks, and through such network
connections, mobility prospects.
Organizational Demography
Kanter's (1977) argument that proportions have an important effect on the experi-
ences of those in the minority was an explicit recognition of compositional effects.
She wrote, "If one sees nine X's and one O, the O will stand out" (p. 210). Kantcr
argued that women in token status suffered from being more visible and thus
under more intense scrutiny and came to be stereotyped, seen as representative
of the group (women) rather than as distinct individuals. Differences between
those in token status and the majority were exaggerated because the presence of
Effects of Organizational Composition 83
persons who were different: made the similarities among those in the majority
more salient. Kanter argued that the pressures that confronted someone in token
status made success difficult, particularly in organizational contexts such as man-
agement positions in which trust and interpersonal communication were im-
portant. Her research identified three sources of stress:
Because their "differentncss" is highly visible, tokens feel that they are always
under scrutiny. . . . Because they are symbolic representatives of their "type,"
tokens experience added pressure to perform well, since this may determine fu-
ture opportunities for other individuals in their social category. . . . One re-
sponse to performance pressure is to overachieve; another is to avoid calling
attention to oneself or one's accomplishments. . . .
The second source of stress, boundary heightening, results from majority
group members' tendencies to exaggerate their own commonalities as well as
their differences from tokens. . . .
The third source of stress, role entrapment, involves typecasting by domi-
nants. (P. B. Jackson, Thoits, and Taylor, 1995, p. 545)
Spangler, Gordon, and Pipkin (1978), empirically examining Ranter's ideas,

found that women in law schools in which they constituted less than 20 percent
of the student body spoke up less in class, earned lower grades, and tended to go
into more "female" law specialities compared to women in a law school in which
they constituted about a third of the class. Jackson, Thoits, and Taylor, studying
167 elite black leaders in the United States, found that "numerical rarity by race
and by gender significantly increased symptoms of depression and anxiety" (1995,
p. 543).
Pfeffer (1983) proposed that age and tenure distributions, as well as gender
and race composition, were consequential for understanding organizations. In
particular, he argued that organizations that had more discontinuous tenure distri-
butions were more likely to experience intercohort conflict and consequently
greater turnover. Organizations consisting almost solely of long-tenured people
lacked demographically adjacent individuals to link newcomers into the organiza-
tion. In a series of studies of organizations including university departments, top
management groups, and nurses in hospitals, heterogeneity in organizational ten-
ure was observed to be positively related to turnover (McCain, O'Reilly, and Pfef-
fer, 1983; W. G. Wagner, Pfeffer, and O'Reilly, 1984; Pfeffer and O'Reilly, 1987).
Furthermore, those individuals who were most demographically distant or dissimi-
lar were more likely to leave.
Demographic diversity can occur along several dimensions —age, tenure in
the organization, gender, education and training, and so forth. This fact raises
two questions. First, are certain of these bases of heterogeneity more important in
affecting organizational outcomes such as turnover than others? Second, what
happens when organizational populations are quite heterogeneous along a num-
ber of dimensions simultaneously? Studying turnover among top management
teams in fifty-one banks and using a number of measures of heterogeneity, Jack-
son ct al. (1991) reported that only age-based diversity affected turnover rates.
Alexander et al. (1995), in a study of nursing turnover in a set of 398 U.S. com-
munity hospitals, found that both heterogeneity in educational preparation and

diversity in tenure were significantly and positively related to increased turnover.
However, they found that heterogeneity in employment status (full- versus part-
time) was related negatively to turnover. They also examined whether or not het-
erogeneity had a curvilinear relationship with tenure, under the argument that
very high levels of diversity "will improve communication, interaction, and social
integration, because the barriers to such interactions are broken down by the
presence of small, similar size of groupings" (p. 1459). Their study did not find
any evidence of this curvilinear effect, but the underlying idea, derived from
P. M. Blau's (1977) discussion of heterogeneity and group si/e and the effects on
in-group versus out-group communication, is worth exploring in other settings.
Alexander et al. also explored the effects of heterogeneity along multiple di-
mensions. They argued that if organizational "members manifest differences on
multiple demographic characteristics, it becomes more difficult to create homoge-
neous groups that exhibit internal consistency on every demographic dimension"
(1995, p. 1460). Consequently, they expected that multiform heterogeneity would
result in reduced turnover compared to settings in which there was heterogeneity
only on one dimension. Their empirical results were consistent with their predic-
tion "that when heterogeneity is high on multiple dimensions, organizations are
likely to experience lower turnover among their members" (p. 1472).
These studies hypothesized that demographic dissimilarity hindered interper-
sonal communication and, consequently, social integration and interaction; they
also hypothesized that it was through these effects that turnover occurred. How-
ever, because of data limitations, the research tended to relate measures of demo-
graphic heterogeneity directly to outcomes such as turnover without exploring the
mediating mechanisms. Some studies have more directly examined the conse-
quences of demography for interpersonal evaluation, communication, and inte-
gration, finding support for the basic argument. Tsui and O'Reilly (1989) found
that, after controlling for an individual's own demographic characteristics, the
greater the difference between that person's age, education, race, and gender and
that of his or her supervisor, the lower the supervisor's ratings of the subordinate's
effectiveness and the greater the degree of role ambiguity experienced by the
subordinate. This result suggests that demographic differences affect the perfor-
mance evaluation process and have important consequences for rewards and rec-
ognition that are likely to be linked to turnover, motivation, and performance.
Zenger and Lawrence (1989) examined age and tenure effects on actual commu-
nication in technical work groups, finding that more heterogeneous groups had
less interpersonal communication.
O'Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett (1989) studied twenty work units with
severity-nine respondents. They measured cohesivcness, satisfaction with co-
workers, and the amount of socialization with other co-workers off the job. These
three components formed a scale with satisfactory reliability that they called social
integration. The study was important because it explored the consequences of
individual-level processes (the extent to which a given individual was different
from the rest of the group and a measure of how integrated that individual was)
and of those operating on a more macro level (the extent of demographic hctero-
geneity in the group as a whole and the amount of group-level social integration).
Their "results show group-level tenure homogeneity to be associated with lower
turnover rates of individuals, with group-level social integration as a moderator.
. . . Furthermore, this process is not merely the aggregate of an individual-level
process, since individual-level social integration does not affect the turnover rates"
(p. 33). The results of this study demonstrated substantive as well as statistical
significance. Individuals in the group with the least social integration had an
estimated turnover rate nine times as high as would be expected without this
effect of demographic diversity. By contrast, individuals in the most integrated
group had an estimated turnover rate 94 percent lower than it would have been
without this effect of demographic cohesion.
A further study of processes that undergird the effects of composition and
demography demonstrated that the greater the work-unit diversity, the lower the
levels of psychological attachment, operationalized as commitment, attendance at
work, and turnover intentions (Tsui, Egan, and O'Reilly, 1992). This study also
found that the effects of heterogeneity were not constant across demographic
groups, with whites and males evidencing larger negative effects from being in
more demographically heterogeneous units than nonwhites and women. This
finding raises the point that being different in a specific work setting is not the
whole story; there are also institutional or societal expectations about organiza-
tional composition and individual status, power, and rewards that affect how indi-
viduals react. Wharton has argued that "researchers should . . . examine how
organizational arrangements help to evoke . . . distinctions at both the individual
and group levels" (1992, p. 57) and her recourse to social identity theory linked
the study of what happens inside organizations to broader concerns of social cate-
gorization.
The importance of the social context for understanding the effects of de-
mography is nicely illustrated by a study of Japanese top management teams
(Wiersema and Bird, 1993). They found, first of all, that there was less diversity
in top management teams in Japan than there was, on average, in the United
States. This reflects Japanese organizations' policies of promotion from within,
slow evaluation and promotion, and an emphasis on consensual decision making.
But, even though there was less heterogeneity in Japanese top management
teams, the effect of what heterogeneity there was on turnover was substantially
stronger than that observed in studies of U.S. managers. Heterogeneity on the
dimensions of age, team tenure, and the prestige of the university attended were
all significantly correlated with team turnover. In Japan, there is less heterogeneity
in senior management, but heterogeneity also has a larger effect than in the
United States.
The distribution of length of service in an organization affects not only turn-
over and interpersonal processes such as conflict and social integration; it also
effects innovative activity and organizational change. At the group level of analy-
sis, R. Katz (1982) reported that research and development project groups with
either fairly short (less than one and a half years) or fairly long (greater than five
years) average tenure in the group were less productive than groups intermediate
in average tenure. He argued that this was because in groups with fairly short
tenures, individuals spent a lot of time organizing themselves and learning how
to work together and access necessary information and expertise distributed across
group members. In groups in which individuals had worked together on average
quite a long time, the negative effect on performance came from restricted com-
munication and hence less search and access to new information, particularly
from outside the particular project group, than might be optimal.
Much of demography's effect on organizational change and adaptation comes
through its impact on career processes in organizations. Stewman (1986) has
shown that "the commonly held view that organizational pyramids necessitate
declining career chances the higher one rises in the organization" is inaccurate
(Stewman, 1988, p. 175; see also Stewman and Konda, 1983). Rather, career
chances depend most importantly on the rate of organizational growth and to a
lesser extent on the rate of voluntary quitting. Thus, individuals in organizations
that cease growing face substantially more limited promotion prospects, and this
effect on careers has implications for attracting and retaining talent.
As a nice illustration of this phenomenon, S. Morris (1973) examined the
development and evolution of the U.S. railroad industry, one of the first industries
to have organizations operating on a national scale and one in which many of
the early management practices originated. However, some time after its creation
the industry stagnated, both in terms of its competitive success and in terms of its
management-systems innovation. Morris argued that much of the problem from
the 1920s onward was a consequence of the industry's demography. The railroads
grew quite rapidly around the turn of the century and then abruptly stopped
growing. This left them with a fairly young management cadre, but without the
business that created additional management positions, producing blocked pro-
motional opportunities for new organizational entrants. With few prospects for
mobility, new organizational entrants left, and recruiting of talent became more
difficult. When one considers that this was a period in which the average level of
education was rising, management practices were evolving as large companies
increasingly populated the landscape, and technological change was also acceler-
ating, the loss of expertise resulting from the inability to attract and retain young
managerial talent was substantial. Thus, a particular demographic situation gener-
ated personnel problems that left the organizations not well suited to solving the
performance problems, generating a cycle of decline that can be observed in
other industries as well.
Demography may make adapting to changing environmental conditions
more difficult. T. L. Reed (1978) studied the U.S. Foreign Service and its appar-
ent inability "to change rapidly in response to the shift in the complexity of inter-
national relations in World War II and thereafter" (Stewman, 1988, p. 188). Reed
argued that this problem arose from the organization's opportunity structure,
which was based on seniority and typically had long waiting times before some-
one could advance to the more senior grades. Because of this recruitment and
advancement process, there was "an extended time lag . . . to get new recruits
into the middle and senior levels of the expanded areas of responsibility" (Stew-
man, 1988, p. 188) and thereby bring new expertise and points of view into the
foreign policy development process.
Demography affects not only the rate of succession and adaptation but also
elements of the choice of a successor. In particular, Pfeffer and Moore (1980a)
found that academic departments that had more long-tenured individuals tended
to choose new department heads more frequently from within the department. If
for no other reason than availability, demography will affect succession — one is
more likely to choose a successor from within an organization if there is an abun-
dance of senior individuals with the requisite experience from which to choose.
Determinants of Demography
As Mitman has noted, most of the research literature on demography has explored
the effects of demographic distributions on various outcomes, and "only a small
number of studies have focused directly on the origins and determinants of demo-
graphic patterns" (1992, p. 5). Because organizational demography is determined
"by the past history of the social composition of net flows into it" (Stinchcombe,
McDill, and Walker, 1968, p. 221), understanding organizational demography
requires understanding demographic composition at some initial point and the
subsequent flows into and out of the organization. Because the processes of orga-
nizational entry, internal transitions such as promotion, and organizational exits
are themselves affected by demographic composition (e.g., the studies cited above
on turnover and the tendency for recruiting to reproduce friendship and social
composition), the evolution of an organization's demography over time is a dy-
namic process with important feedback loops. External labor market conditions,
government regulations such as antidiscrimination and affirmative action require-
ments and the vigor with which these are enforced, and economic factors such
as the rate of industry growth or decline are among those forces that affect entry
and exit processes and the consequent organizational demography. Although
modeling the dynamics over time imposes substantial data requirements, to the
extent demography is an important explanation for organizational processes and
outcomes, understanding demographic dynamics is an important undertaking.
One notable example of what might be done in the study of the determinants
of demography is a study of gender integration in the government of the State of
California (Baron, Mittman, and Newman, 1991). Using a linear partial-
adjustment model, the study examined the determinants both of the "target level"
of segregation — "a minimum level of gender segregation that is possible, given
the organizational configuration, toward which the agency is posed to adjust but
which social forces might resist" (p. 1376) —and the speed of adjustment to that
target level. The research employed quarterly staffing data over a six-year period
for all state agencies that described the ethnic and gender composition of each
job title within each agency—detailed data that permit quite fine-grained analysis.
Baron et al. found that both initial segregation levels and the speed of adjustment
were related to the same factors:
Segregation . . . was markedly lower in large agencies and those with high pro-
portions of female and nonwhite employees and was somewhat higher among
agencies that lacked an affirmative action program, were unionized along craft
lines, were clerical intensive, derived their mandate from the state constitution
|and consequently were presumably less subject to legislative influence], reported
objective quantitative output measures (i.e., had well-defined core technologies),
were not dependent on the General Fund for revenues, or experienced frequent
chief executive turnover, (p. 1385)
The study also found that agencies with female heads adjusted faster, as did agen-
cies that grew faster and faced more scrutiny. The effect of employment growth
on demographic change is likely to be an effect observed in many different orga-
nizational contexts, as is the importance of political interests, in this study repre-
sented by unions and the amount of legislative oversight and pressure from the
state personnel board. The methods and models employed in this study are
broadly applicable to the study of demographic change in general and should
have stimulated more follow-on studies than they did.
A second example of an analysis of changes in organizational demography
over time is Haveman's (1995) study of the entry rate, the exit rate, the average
tenure, and the dispersion in tenure for managers in savings and loans. She noted
that "explanations of organizations' tenure distributions must be rooted in explana-
tions of job mobility, because movement of employees into and out of the labor
force and movement of employees between organizations drives individual tenure
and thus drives changes in organizations' tenure distributions" (pp. 588—589).
Ilaveman found that the rate of entry into organizations was positively affected by
the industry merger rate, dissolution rate, and firm acquisition rate as well as by
the industry birth and dissolution rate. Average tenure was positively affected
by the industry dissolution rate and negatively by the firm acquisition rate. Tenure
dispersion was positively related to both the industry birth rate and the industry
merger rate. Haveman's study also indicated that larger and older organizations'
demographies are affected differentially by industry dynamics.
Most of the existing research on the determinants of organizational composi-
tion has focused on the proportion of women or minorities as the dependent
variable to be explained. Studying the gender composition of college and univer-
sity faculties, Tolbert and Oberfield (1991) found that there was a smaller propor-
tion of female faculty when there were more slack resources and that there was
more female faculty the higher the proportion of female students. This latter
finding is consistent with research by Borjas (1980; 1982; 1983), who explored the
connection between the proportion of minorities and women in constituencies for
agencies served by the federal government and the hiring and salary of women
and minorities in those agencies. He argued that to maximize political support,
agencies that served minorities and women would tend to match the demograph-
ics of their client population in their employees. He did find that the demo-
graphic composition of the groups served by agencies strongly affected both the
proportion of women and minorities hired and their relative wages (compared to
white men) —agencies serving women, for instance, employed a higher propor-
tion of women and the women's earnings were more similar to men's. Tolbert
and Oberfield's first result, on the effect of resource levels, echoes the results of
other studies that have also found that women tend to work in organizations that
have fewer resources (e.g., Szafran, 1984; Pfeffcr and Davis-Blake, 1987). Al-
though studying the determinants of gender and race composition of organiza-
tions is obviously important, it would be useful to have studies of other demo-
graphic factors such as age and tenure in the organization and, as in the Haveman
(1995) and Baron et al. studies described above, to have these changes dynami-
cally modeled.
Top Management Teams
At about the same time as Wagner et al. (1984) were studying how demographic
diversity affected turnover in top management teams, Mambrick and Mason
(1984) were proposing an "upper-echelons" theory of management that empha-
sized the organizational effects of the composition of the top management group.
Their argument was that both strategic choices and organizational performance
were related to the characteristics of the top management team because of the
presumption "that top managers structure decision situations to fit their view of
the world. . . . A central requirement for understanding organizational behavior
is to identify those factors that direct or orient executive attention" (Finkclstein
and Harnbrick, 1990, p. 484). Ilambrick and Mason argued:
a manager, or even an entire team of managers, cannot scan every aspect of the
organization and its environment. The manager's field of vision —those areas to
which attention is directed —is restricted, posing a sharp limitation on eventual
perceptions. Second, the manager's perceptions are further limited because one
selectively perceives only some of the phenomena included in the field of vision.
Finally, the bits of information selected for processing are interpreted through a
filter woven by one's cognitive base and values. (1984, p. 195)
This meant that the individual's worklvicw was probably related to his or
her functional background, education, and experience, all of which affected the
information one attended to and how one processed that information. Conse-
quently, research on the charactcristies of top management teams has emphasized
heterogeneity in functional backgrounds, the amount of time the team has spent
working together, and other indicators of experience, diversity and similarity. The
other important emphasis in this literature has been the focus on characteristics
of the team, as contrasted with the research linking strategy and organizational
performance to the characteristics of the chief executive (e.g., Carlson, 1972).
The evidence suggests that team effects are important in understanding organiza-
tional change and performance. Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli noted that
"the data are consistent across diverse industries and companies. . . . An execu-
tive team's ability to proactively initiate and implement frame-breaking change
and to manage convergent change seem to be important factors which discrimi-
nate between organizational renewal and greatness versus complacency and even-
tual decline" (1986, p. 15).
For instance, Finkelstein and Ilambrick (1990) examined 100 organizations
in the computer, chemical, and natural gas industries. They found that long-
tenured managerial teams tended to have more persistent strategies and that the
strategics and performance more closely conformed to industry norms. They also
found that the effects of top management team composition were strongest in
those competitive environments that permitted managers the greatest decision-
making discretion. This result is important in reminding us that any effects of top
management teams will be stronger in environments that permit managerial discre-
tion and in which performance variation is consequently greater. Bantel and Jackson
(1989) observed a negative relationship between top management team tenure and
organizational innovativeness. Wiersema and Bantel (1992), measuring corporate
strategic change as the absolute change in the level of diversification, found that
firms that had individuals in top management who were younger, had less average
organizational tenure, and had higher levels of education, more training in the sci-
ences, and longer tenure working together in the top management team tended to
experience more strategic ehange. Their results suggest that cognitive perspectives
are reflected in demographic measures of team composition.
O'Reilly, Snyder, and Boothe (1993) explored the effects of top management
demography in a sample of twenty-four electronics firms, defining the top man-
agement team as those who reported directly to the CEO. They measured turn-
over, organizational change, performance, and top management team dynamics
in terms of how positive these dynamics were using a seven-item scale. The study
controlled for company age, firm size, and the size of the top management team.
Consistent with other studies, they found that increased heterogeneity within the
team was negatively associated with team dynamics and was positively related to
turnover. They also found that "heterogeneity within the executive team is sig-
nificantly linked to less structural ehange, whereas homogeneity is positively asso-
ciated with change" (p. 167). They noted that "when an executive team operates
in a turbulent context, there may be an important premium on their ability to
function effectively as a group and to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings that
can slow them clown and deflect their attention" (p. 172). Thus, ironically, the
heterogeneity that brings different information and perspectives can also have dys-
functional effects, particularly if it is not managed effectively.
The O'Reilly et al. (1993) study is one of the few that have explored the
process through which top management team demography operates. In another
study of this process, K. G. Smith et al. (1994) used data from fifty-three high-
technology firms to test a direct model of the effect of top management team
demography on organizational performance, a model in which demography af-
fected performance through its influence on interpersonal processes, as well as a
model in which process itself had direct effects. Figure 4-1 shows the three ways
in which process and top management team demography might affect organiza-
tional performance. Controlling for past performance, firm size, industry demand,
and competition, K. C. Smith et al. (1994) found that demography affected in-
tervening processes such as informal communication, which in turn affected sales
growth and return on investment. They also observed direct demographic effects
of heterogeneous experience and heterogeneous education on these two measures
of performance as well as direct effects of informal communication and social
integration.
Figure 4-1 Models of the Effects of Demography on Performance. Source: K. G. Smith
ct al., 1994
These latter two studies are noteworthy because they are exceptions to much
of the upper-echelon literature that has been almost completely unconcerned
with processes of interaction among individuals. Recall that the organizational
demography literature focused on issues such as intcrcohort conflict, succession,
career advancement, and so forth —all of which are also issues within the top
management team. What most of the upper-echelon research has done, however,
is to simply aggregate individual characteristics — for example, average length of
tenure in the team or the organization, average education —but it has not ex-
plored the consequences of varying distributions of these characteristics for the
processes of conflict and career advancement that one would also expect to be
important in top management groups.
i)2 New Directions for Organization Theory
Virtually all of the top management team literature has focused on the conse-
quences of upper-echelon composition. That, of course, leaves the question of
how senior management composition emerges in the first place. Demographic
similarity may play an important role in understanding this process. Westphal and
Zajac (1995) examined 413 large corporations over the period 1986-1991. They
found that when the chief executive was more powerful, new directors appointed
to the board tended to be more similar to the existing CEO. When the board was
more powerful, new directors were demographically more similar to the existing
board members. They also found that the greater the demographic similarity be-
tween the chief executive and the board, the more highly compensated was the
CEO, even when other factors affecting compensation were statistically con-
trolled. Their study presents an upper-echelon case of the type of homosocial
reproduction —the tendency to hire and promote similar others —that Kanter
(1977) had described more generally.
Another study of the filling of senior-level college and university administra-
tive vacancies also illustrates the importance of demography for the construction
of senior management teams. The literature suggests that there is both a tendency
to choose similar others and a propensity for jobs to become categorized by gen-
der and race depending on their composition (Bielby and Baron, 1986). Konrad
and Pfeffer (1991) found that a woman or a member of a minority was more
likely to be placed in a vacant college administrative position (1) the higher the
proportion of women (or minorities) in similar positions in the labor market as a
whole; (2) the higher the proportion of women (or minorities) in senior adminis-
trative positions in the organi/ation; and (3) if a woman (or minority) had been
the previous occupant of the position. They found that each of these effects was
significant, even with the others in the model, which meant that the gender or
race of the position's previous occupant affected the gender or race of the new
occupant even with labor market supply and the power of the demographic group
in the senior administration statistically controlled. The study provided evidence
that positions were typed by the characteristics of the previous occupant and also
for the importance of the proportion of women in comparable positions in the
labor market and in the administrative hierarchy in the specific organization for
predicting the characteristics of those hired to fill vacant positions.
It is important to recognize that the top management teams literature, em-
phasizing the effects of senior team composition on organizational change, strat-
egy, and performance, represents a reaction to perspectives on both organizational
behavior and strategy that decrnphasize the role of action and choice:
organizations were disembodied, or perhaps, "beheaded," by many in the aca-

demic community. . . . Essentially mechanical models came to the fore. An
organization's structure was seen as determined by such factors as environment,
technology, and size. . . . In the ecologist's framework, the environment was
the centerpiece. . . . Organizational variation was largely random, accidental,
or rooted in history. . . . Even the field of strategy . . . lost sight of senior execu-
tives. . . . Strategy scholars become preoccupied with product life cycles, portfo-
lio matrices, industry and competitor analysis, . . . experience curves, and ge-
neric strategies. (Finkelstcin and Hambrick, 1996, pp. 4—5)
John Child's (1972) article on strategic choice argued that political considerations
loomed large in understanding organizations and their structures. Child noted
that "many available contributions to a theory of organizational structure do not
incorporate the direct source of variation in formal structural arrangements,
namely the strategic decisions of those who have the power of structural initia-
tion" (p. 16).
The top management team literature provides evidence that backgrounds,
which, of course, represent individual history and learning, are important in un-
derstanding organizational dynamics. More important, it focuses attention on the
composition and interrelationships of the senior management team. This focus
stands, for instance, in contrast to the literature on leadership, which, for the
most part, examines the correlates and consequences of individual leader behav-
ior—even though we know that, outside of the experimental laboratory, leaders
seldom act alone in their roles. By demonstrating the importance of top manage-
ment team dynamics and the effects of composition on those dynamics, this
research has implications for constituting top management teams and for execu-
tive and leadership development, implications that remain to be more fully re-
searched and explored.
Gender, Networks, and Careers
The effects of composition and structural relationships have been particularly

prominent in studies attempting to understand problems confronting women and
ethnic minorities in organizations. Many studies have reported that women fare
better within organizations when they are in comparatively larger numbers. For
instance, Izraeli (198?), studying the attitudes of union representatives in worker's
committees in Israel, found that women in more gender-balanced committees
deemed women to be as effective as men while women in male-dominated com-
mittees thought that women were less effective than men. Hcery and Kelley
(1988), studying local British unions, found that women in office were more
likely than men to encourage women's participation. Alexander and Thoits (1985)
and Spangler, Gordon, and Pipkin (1978) reported that female students' grades
were lower in male-dominated departments. Tidball (1980) argued that one rea-
son women graduates from all-women's colleges did so well subsequently was the
presence of a greater proportion of women faculty members. Sackett, Dubois, and
Noe (1991) reported that the performance ratings obtained by women were lower
when their proportion was less than 20 percent and that this diminished perfor-
mance assessment held even with job and firm variables statistically controlled.
Mellor (1995), in a study of fifty-six northeastern locals of a single union,
examined the effects of the varying gender composition of local unions' offices
on women's and men's ratings of their competence, their ability to participate in
local activities, their desire to participate, and their perceived acceptance. His
study distinguished between gender representation, defined as the ratio of women
officers to women members, and gender composition, based on a count of
women and men in local office (p. 709). He concluded:
gender composition in local office did have a positive influence on women's

ratings but did not influence men's participation ratings. Women in locals with
a higher composition of women in office reported higher competence and op-
portunity to participate in local activities. . . . Women in locals with a greater
representation of women in office reported greater opportunity and desire to par-
ticipate in local activities as compared with women in locals with lower represen-
tation, (pp. 714-716)
Ely (1995) argued that it was not just the proportion of women but where in
the hierarchy of power they were located that mattered. Using both quantitative
and qualitative data, she found that sex roles were more stereotyped and women
rated themselves less positively in firms with relatively low proportions of senior
women. But, Gutek, Cohen, and Konrad (1990), examining the sexual harass-
ment of women at work, found that the higher the proportion of women up to a
point, the more sexual behaviors and sexual harassment there was. The relation-
ship was curvilinear, because in an organization that was composed solely or
virtually entirely of women, there would be no sexual harassment. Their results
reflected the greater amount of contact between men and women when there
were more women in the work place.
An alternative perspective argues that women and minorities fare worse and
face more discrimination when they are in larger proportions (Blaloek, 1967).
The logic is that "a larger minority is thought to represent a greater perceived
threat to the economic and political security of the majority" (South et al., 1982,
p. 587). If there are only one or a few women or minorities, these individuals
themselves may face more pressure and less social support, but because they are
few in number, they may be different but are not a threat. In larger numbers,
they may be perceived as a threat or as competition, and this can engender more
forceful hostility on the part of the majority. "Members of the majority group are
assumed to respond to competitive threats posed by a large minority by actively
denying minority group members access to ... rewards" (p. 589). Writing about
the effects of increasing proportions of women, Allmendinger and Hackman
noted, "The Kanter position is that things will get better, mainly because of what
the women are doing; the Blaloek position is that things will get worse, mainly
because of how the men are reacting" (1995, p. 427).
South and his colleagues administered a survey to employees in six offices of
a government agency. They examined the effect of the gender composition of the
work group on the frequency of contact with co-workers and the amount
of encouragement for promotion from male and female co-workers as well as
from a male supervisor. The results showed that there was less contact with male
co-workers and more contact with female co-workers the higher the proportion of
women in the work group, but there was no effect on the amount of contact with
a male supervisor. There was no statistically significant effect of group gender
composition on promotion encouragement from male co-workers, but the higher
the proportion of women in the work group, the less encouragement there was
from both the male supervisor and from female co-workers. South et al. (1982)
argued that both contact and competition effects were important, and which was
stronger depended not only on the particular proportions but also on the specific
context. In another study of this issue, Toren (1990) found that the greater the
proportion of women on the faculty of Israeli universities, the lower were their
academic ranks relative to those of their male colleagues. And, Wharton and
Baron (1987) reported that men in mixed-gender work settings had lower levels
of job satisfaction.
Allmendinger and Hackman (1995) studied seventy-eight symphony orches-
tras in four countries that varied in the proportion of women members. This is a
particularly appropriate setting, because "variation associated with both organiza-
tional tasks and member talent is relatively low across both orchestras and na-
tions" (p. 428), eliminating alternative interpretations for the results of gender
composition. The study collected questionnaire data from a sample of orchestra
members on a number of dimensions including (1) the organizational features of
the orchestra, such as integrity as an ensemble, player involvement, and recogni-
tion; (2) behavior of the music director; (3) orchestral processes, such as the qual-
ity of relationships and musical outcomes; (4) player motivation and satisfaction;
and (5) specific satisfaction with features such as management, work relationships,
and job security. They found that gender composition was significantly related to
nineteen of twenty-two dependent variables, with there being less effect on the
music director's behavior. "Almost all of the dependent measures decline signifi-
cantly as the proportion of women in an orchestra increases from token to more
substantial levels. However, 10 of the 19 significant effects exhibit a statistically
significant reversal of the decline at some point on the gender composition spec-
trum" (p. 435). Moreover, ratings by observers of two features, integrity as an en-
semble and orchestra structure, matched the members' survey descriptions and also
evidenced a negative effect for increasing proportions of women (p. 443). The
study also found that it was "men who respond most strongly to changes in organi-
zational gender composition" (p. 443). The stirdy is consistent with the view that
"things really do get more difficult . . . as more women enter traditionally male
organizations, at least until a state of gender balance is achieved" (p. 454). The
importance of this line of work is to note that there are competitive effects from
increasing the proportions of those in token status in a work context, and these
need to be considered along with the effects of contact and social support.
Konrad, Winter, and Gutck have drawn a useful distinction between theories
that consider proportions and numbers by themselves and those that bring in the
status characteristics of those in greater or lesser proportion as being important in
understanding organizational dynamics:
"Generic" composition theories assume that the important factor affecting indi-
viduals in work groups is whether they are in the majority or in the minority and
that the specific demographic characteristics of the majority and the minority do
not add anything to the prediction of individual behavior and outcomes. . . .
"Institutional" composition theories assume that members of different demo-
graphic groups will react differently to being in the minority or the majority,
depending upon the social significance of particular demographic characteristics
in society at large and in the particular organization. (1992, pp. 116-117)
Their data from eighty-nine work groups provided support for an "institutional"
version of the effects of composition. The authors found that "women holding
superior positions in predominantly male work groups experienced the most un-
desirable social outcomes of any group" (p. 116).
Although women themselves sometimes may do better in larger proportions,
organizations and occupations in which they constitute a larger proportion fre-
quently offer fewer rewards. For example, the proportion of women administrators
in colleges and universities has been found to be negatively related to the salaries
earned by both men and women administrators (Pfcffer and Davis-Blake, 1987).
Baron and Newman (1990), studying the California Civil Service, reported that
the proportion of women and minorities in a given job was negatively related to
the prescribed salary for that job, even when education and experience require-
ments were controlled, and this effect helped explain changes in prescribed wage
rates for positions in the state civil service over time. Shenhav and Haberfcld
(1992) found that both men and women scientists in disciplines employing a
higher proportion of women had lower earnings. England et al. (1988) have re-
viewed the extensive evidence demonstrating that, at the occupational level of
analysis, wages are negatively related to the proportion of women in the occupa-
tion.
Pfeffcr and Davis-Blake's study of academic administrators observed an im-
portant nonlinearity in the relationship between the proportion of women and
wages. At very low and at very high percentages of women, when the addition of
a few more women would not make a great deal of difference in how the organi-
zation and its work was seen, the negative effect of an increase in the proportion
of women on salaries was less than around a tipping point, a value at which
work apparently became reelassified as being "women's work" and consequently
devalued.
The organization- or job-level effects of the proportion of women on wages
probably occur because of the societal devaluation of women's work. It is im-
portant to note that these results eontradiet human capital theory, with its empha-
sis on individual abilities and experience, for they demonstrate a compositional
effect on economic outcomes net of individual differences.
What may be of equal interest, however, are the more micro-level processes
occurring within organizations that affect women's progress. These processes in-
volve the availability of similar others with whom to form close relationships and
the trade-off between network relations that provide social support through
stronger ties and network relations that provide access to a wider range of informa-
tion and contacts but entail weaker tics.
Because there are, in most organizations, fewer women (and minorities) in
high-status positions in the hierarchy, in most contexts men and women differ in
the opportunity to have informal interaction with same-gender others who arc
also instrumental!}' useful (Ibarra, 1992; 1993b). Because there are preferences
for same-gender relationships, particularly for providing the social support that
requires strong social ties, women have social networks and task-related, instru-
mental networks that overlap less than men's. Thus, the difference in men's and
women's career attainment is not simply that men and women have different
network structures—because there are no such differences (Brass, 1985; Ibarra,

1992) —but because men and women have different capabilities to convert posi-
tional resources into a network advantage (Ibarra, 1995). Harlan and Weiss (1982)
reported that men and women managers did not differ in their reliance on infor-
mal networks. However, "women with minority status reported that access to in-
fluential groups required sustained effort, whereas men . . . reported that access
was gained without effort" (Mellor, 1995, p. 707).
There is evidence that the position or prestige of an individual with whom a
person is connected and how many contacts the person has with such individuals
affect that person's mobility and occupational and wage attainment. "Access to
people with specific resources . . . creates a correlation between theirs and yours"
(Burt, 1992, p. 11). For instance, studies have demonstrated that the occupational
prestige of a given person's job is affected by the occupational prestige of a per-
sonal contact leading to the job (Lin, 1982; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn, 1981). Box-
man, De Graaf, and Flap (1991) found that individuals with larger contact net-
works obtained positions that paid better than those with smaller networks.
The evidence also indicates that information networks that are larger and that
have fewer indirect ties among those in the network (i.e., that have more struc-
tural holes [Burt, 1992]) are related to advancement (Burt, 1992; Podolny and
Baron, 1995). In a study of the careers of senior managers in a high-technology
firm, Burt found that "managers with networks rich in structural holes get pro-
moted faster and at a younger age than do their peers" (1992, p. 115). Studying
a high-technology company in California, Podolny and Baron (1995) found that
mobility through the salary system in a one-year period was positively related to
the number of new ties formed after the most recent shift in salary grade. This
means that, in order to remain mobile, an individual must reconstruct his or her
network on a continuing basis as that person's career advances, because each
change in position means a change in the instrumentality of various actual and
potential network ties.
But, if women are more likely to develop strong tics and if developing cross-
gender tics are more difficult, then they are disadvantaged in their ability to de-
velop new relationships compared to their male counterparts. Although some of
this disadvantage may derive from gender-based differences in the importance
of social (as contrasted with instrumental) lies, a lot of the difference is because
of the difficulty of developing social support and task-related information networks
that overlap and because of the scarcity of same-gender contacts as women ad-
vance in organizations.
Consistent with this line of reasoning, Ely (1994) found that women in firms
with fewer women in senior positions were less likely to perceive senior women
as role models, less likely to base identification on gender, more likely to perceive
competition in their relations with women peers, and less likely, therefore, to find
social support in their peer relationships. Ely's results support the view that the
proportion of women in senior ranks in organizations is a critical variable, be-
cause it affects women's social identity and consequently the kinds of relationships
they form and networks they build.
Similar issues confront minorities in organizations. Ibarra reported that "when
g8 New Directions for Organization Theory
human capital variables, such as tenure and graduate education, and positional
resources, such as rank and potential for advancement, were held constant, mi-
nority and white middle managers in comparable jobs differed in the homophily
and intimacy of their organizational network ties" (1995, p. 693), with minority
ties being less homophilous and close. This evidence is consistent with structural
constraints on network patterns, although the study also found strategic differ-
ences in network behavior that differentiated high-potential from other minority
managers.
There is compelling evidence that network relations predict career success
(e.g., Hurt, 1992). This has led to discussions of the concept of social capital, to
complement ideas such as human capital and cultural capital. Burt defined social
capital as "at once the resources contacts hold and the structure of contacts in a
network" (1992, p. 12). He distinguished social capital from human capital by
noting that human capital is a property of an individual while social capital is
"owned" jointly by the parties to a relationship. If the relationship is severed, one's
social capital that originates in that relationship disappears. An individual's social
capital depends on his or her structural position in the social system. Although
there may be some ability to strategically affeet one's social relations, this ability
is clearly constrained by, among other things, the social composition of the envi-
ronment in which one is operating. Also, building network ties and maintaining
social relations takes time, and thus investment in networking must be balanced
against alternative activities. The fact that studies of career attainment are able to
explain variance from a knowledge of network relations provides support for the
social model of behavior and for the importance of the social context in under-
standing organizations.
Conclusion
The available research evidence seems compelling that although demography is

not destiny, there are important compositional effects on perseverance and con-
servatism in decision making, interpersonal conflict and turnover, and social inte-
gration and communication. Demographic similarity affects the choice of those
placed in positions of authority. The literature clearly suggests that compositional
effects in organizations and work groups are consequential and that these struc-
tural factors constitute a powerful environment within which other processes op-
crate. Therefore, this literature means that (1) one of the ways in which the
environment affects organizations is through demographic processes and (2) envi-
ronmental determinism is limited in its explanatory power, simply because differ-
ent organizational demographies often lead to different organizational behavior
even in similar environments.
Compositional effects constrain the operation of network processes, as the
literature on women and minorities in organizations nicely illustrates. One's social
network is affected, although not completely determined, by the comparative
availability of different types of individuals in the immediate environment. In this
sense, the study of organizational demography complements the social model of
Effects of Organizational Composition gg
behavior, with its emphasis on social influence, which often operates through
interpersonal networks or structural equivalence. Composition helps to determine
the content of those influences and the composition of the networks through
which social influence travels.
In a fashion similar to other areas of organization studies, there has been a
tendency to overlook the structural context within which individual behavior oc-
curs. The leadership literature is a good example of this, in its neglect of the
effect of managerial team composition on leader behavior. What the research on
demography and social context has done is to bring these issues of structural
constraint back into focus. A large number of substantively important empirical
contributions suggest that one ignores the effects of social composition at some
peril. Demography has a tendency to perpetuate itself—to use Kanter's (1977) apt
phrase, to exhibit "homosocial reproduction." And demography has effects on
organizations ranging from innovation and change to strategic decision making to
the welfare of women and minorities in those organizations. As such, the study of
organizational demography reminds us yet again of the social, relational nature of
organizations and has provided both theoretical ideas and some empirical appara-
tus for taking these ideas seriously.
5
Mechanisms of Social Control
The various models for understanding organizations developed in chapters 3 and

4 and the discussion in chapter 2 concerning the locus for causality of behavior
have as their goal being able to explain, predict, and ultimately influence organi-
zational behavior. Although each perspective has its own specific implications for
controlling behavior, control is at once the essential problem of management and
organization and the implicit focus of much of organization studies. As Bravcrman
noted, "control is ... the central concept for all management systems" (1974, p.
68) and is a fundamental issue in organizations.
Organizations, after all, are composed of individuals who arc working intcrde-
pendentiy to produce some good or service. Even holding aside issues of incen-
tives and motivation, the very fact of interdependence requires coordination to
ensure that activity results in the efficient production of the organization's output.
What would happen in an automobile plant if there were no social controls of
any kind to determine when people would start work and what they would do?
Almost certainly there would be chaos. Coordination and control are necessary,
and how to achieve these ends efficiently and, in some formulations, humanely,
arc fundamental organizational issues. Kunda has written:
Purposeful collective action, whatever its circumstances, requires the coordina-

tion of activities of a diverse and heterogeneous membership. 'I'here is, however,
an inherent conflict between demands organizations place on the time and ef-
forts of their members and the desires and needs of members when left to their
own devices. Thus, the age-old management dilemma: how to cause members
to behave in ways compatible with organizational goals. (1992, p. I I )
The various models of behavior have quite different implications for how to
best achieve the requisite level of social control and coordination, and assump-
tions about human behavior inevitably undcrgird all organizational control sys-
100
Mechanisms of Social Control 101
terns. What is often not done, either by the theorists or by organizational manag-
ers, is to make these assumptions explicit. O'Reilly and Chatman provided a good
definition of control in organizational settings: "control comes from the knowl-
edge that someone who matters to us is paying close attention to what we are
doing and will tell us if our behavior is appropriate or inappropriate" (1996,
p. 161).
The control process begins with recruiting and selection, in which organiza-
tions try to find individuals who already possess necessary skills and attitudes that
make them good prospects for being productive. Uncovering who is a good em-
ployment prospect and possesses the requisite qualities is inevitably an uncertain
undertaking. One cannot always directly observe motivation, diligence, or intelli-
gence. Consequently, in the recruiting process, organizations frequently rely on
signals or proxies for the underlying quality being sought.
According to Spencc (1974), a signal is any observable indicator, of a quality or

qualities, that meets two criteria: (1) the indicator must be at least partially ma-
nipulable by the actor and (2) the marginal cost or difficulty of obtaining the
indicator must be nonzero and inversely correlated with the actor's level of qual-
ity. A college diploma is a signal of productivity because its attainment is at least
partially within an individual's control and because it is more difficult for those
who lack organizational skills (or other such attributes that help constitute pro-
ductivity) to obtain a college degree. (Podolny, 1993, p. 831)
R. Collins (1979) has analyzed the use of educational credentials as a hiring

criterion, in particular as signals of conformity to social values including dili-
gence, motivation, and fitting in. His review of the evidence indicated that the
rise in the level of education in the United States could not be traced to technical
factors such as the changing skill mix of occupations or to the upgraded skill
requirements within occupations. Rather, there is evidence that "education has
been used as a means of cultural selection" (p. 32). R. Collins (1974; 1979)
developed a theory of hiring criteria based on the organizational requirements for
loyalty. He argued that "public trust" organizations-organizations emphasizing "a
public image of service, ideals, safeguards and/or confidentiality" (1979, p. 33)-
would require more loyalty than market organizations. He found that, net of size,
technological change, and other factors, public trust organizations did have
higher educational requirements than did market organizations, and that at virtu-
ally all employee levels, the organization's control type was the single most im-
portant predictor of educational requirements (p. 42). Edwards (1976) also noted
that organizational selection procedures often seemed to reward conformity and
the willingness to subordinate oneself to social controls.
The existing theory and evidence suggests that (1) selection is an important
part of the control process; (2) conformity to social norms and dominant cultural
values is an important criteria being sought, particularly by certain types of orga-
nizations; and (3) because such characteristics are difficult to observe directly,
indirect indicators or signals, such as educational attainment and job stability, are
often used by organizations seeking employees with those characteristics.
Once hired, individuals encounter varying degrees of socialization and train-
1O2 New Directions for Organization Theory
ing (Pascale, 1985) to help them understand what is expected and to come to
want to do those activities. Individuals also receive wages, the possibility of promo-
tion, and other benefits — incentives designed to induce them to remain in the
organization and to work hard in its interests. Also, people work most often in
hierarchies under supervision. How well they are led may also affect their atti-
tudes and behavior.
Because control and coordination are such ubiquitous issues, virtually the
entire organizations literature concerns this topic, at least indirectly. This chapter
discusses four mechanisms of social control: (1) the use of rewards and incentives,
including "negative" rewards and surveillance; (2) commitment and socialization
processes; (3) organizational culture; and (4) leadership. Each of these processes
is a fundamental mechanism of social control in organizational settings and is
intended to direct and motivate behavior, and each has stimulated substantial
research and theoretical interest and controversy.
There is an important difference in emphasis across these mechanisms of
social control. Rewards and incentives work primarily on the environment of em-
ployees, and the literature on organizational rewards almost invariably proceeds
from the presumptions of the economic model of behavior. As such, reviewing
the literature on rewards and compensation will permit us to see in yet another
research context to what extent the predictions of the economic model of behav-
ior are, in fact, empirically supported and under what circumstances. The use of
rewards and incentives as mechanisms of organizational control varies over time
and place depending on the degree of acceptance and dominance of the eco-
nomic perspective on organizational behavior. By contrast, commitment, culture,
and some aspects of leadership try to engage and change fundamental decision
premises, self-perceptions, beliefs, and values and frequently work on the emo-
tions using social psychological principles, using the heart as well as the head. As
such, these control strategies are premised largely on the retrospectively rational
and, to a lesser extent, the social and moral models of behavior.
Interest in rewards and incentives —a rational basis of control—and norma-
tive control, based importantly on social psychological principles, has waxed and
waned over time and, contrary to some accounts (Edwards, 1979), has not simply
evolved from coercive to normative control (Barley and Kunda, 1992). Table 5-1
reproduces Barley and Kunda's depiction of the succession of different managerial
Table 5-1 Succession of Managerial Ideologies
Ideology Kra of Ascent Tenor
Industrial betterment 1870-1900 Normative

Scientific management 1900-1923 Rational
Welfare capitalism/human relations 1923-1955 Normative
Systems rationalism 1955-1980 Rational
Organizational culture 1980-prcsent Normative
From Barley and Kunda, 1992, p. 364.

ideologies over time. These bases of control have fluctuated over time because of
the fundamental tension between community and individual self-interest that
forms the basis for the various control systems:
each sensed that industrialization was problematic because it juxtaposed two con-
trasting paradigms for social order. These two forms of social organization were
given different names by different scholars. Weber wrote of the "communal" and
the "associative." Durkheim contrasted "mechanistic" with "organic" solidarity.
. . . However, the essence of their vision was the same. In a Gemeinschaft, people
share a common identity, are bound by common values and traditions, and par-
take of a way of life that contrasts sharply with the competition, individualism,
and calculative self-interest associated with the Gesellschaft. The central di-
lemma identified . . . concerned the integrity of the social fabric. How could
relations based on utilitarianism and rational calculation remain integrated and
socially fulfilling? (p. 385)
Barley and Kunda found no evidence that changes in managerial ideology

followed changes in the quality of labor relations in the United States. Although
"heightened labor activity may . . . have fanned interest in human relations dur-
ing the 1940s . . . rhetorics of organizational culture and commitment unambigu-
ously arose in an era of declining labor militancy" (1992, p. 389). Rather, they
found that "surges of normative and rational theorizing occurred, respectively, in
conjunction with periods of contraction or expansion" (p. 391). They argued,
"Rational and normative rhetorics both promise managers greater productivit)' and
profitability but advocate radically different means for obtaining these ends. . . .
Rational rhetorics should surge when profitability seems most linked to the man-
agement of capital. Conversely, normative rhetorics should surge when profit-
ability seems to depend more on the management of labor" (p. 389).
Their study of the shifting language and preference for control of different
types reminds us that particular control strategies are invariably historically and
contextually located. That makes it important to understand how mechanisms of
organizational control vary not only across time but also across different social
contexts. Technologies of organizational control, and the models on which they
are implicitly or explicitly premised, are neither timeless nor ubiquitous in their
validity, a factor seldom acknowledged in the relevant literatures.
Rewards, Incentives, Sanctions, and Surveillance
There are a number of fundamental issues in the literature on rewards and incen-
tives:
1. What determines the incentive structure organizations actually em-
ploy with different groups of people? For instance, why is there pay
for performance on an individual basis in some organizations but pay
for seniority in others? Within a given organization, why are some
jobs paid more on the basis of individual performance than others?
2. What are the effects of various amounts, forms, and distributions
104 IVew Directions for Organization Theory
of incentives on individual and organizational behavior and perfor-

mance?
3. To administer contingent rewards, there must he some degree of mon-
itoring or surveillance of cither behavior or results. What are the ef-
fects of this surveillance?
4. In addition to the use of incentives and rewards, there is also the
possibility of controlling behavior through punishment or sanctions.
What determines when these are used and what are their effects?
Throughout the discussion that follows, I focus on pay, which is the principal
(although not the only) reward in organizations. But A. Kohn (1993) argues that
the issue isn't what is given as a reward but rather the fact that something-
praise, a prize, or pay—is provided contingent on the focal person exhibiting
some desired behavior. Thus, the issues and principles discussed are general, but
the focus on pay has the advantage of more directly engaging a lot of the empiri-
cal literature and confronting the predictions of the economic model most di-
rectly. Although there has recently been much more empirical research on pay
practices in organizations, stimulated by the availability of data sets on managerial
compensation collected by various compensation consulting firms, definitive an-
swers to any of the questions posed must await further research.
There are several facts one needs to keep in mind in thinking about these
issues. First, the bases of rewards are changing, particularly in the United States
but almost certainly elsewhere as well. One basic dimension of the change is the
growing emphasis on variable pay—pay that changes depending on the perfor-
mance (or skill) of the individual, his or her work group, or organization and a
corresponding dcemphasis on paying simply for time worked or for seniority. The
change can be seen most dramatically in the pay of senior managers such as chief
executive officers. Useem (1996), studying the compensation of the seven top
executives from forty-five large companies over the period 1982-1995, reported
that the proportion of managers' total compensation that was variable increased
from 37 percent to 61 percent. The proportion of variable pay for CEOs in-
creased even more, from 41 percent in 1982 to 70 percent, in 1995. The biggest
change was an increase in the use of long-term incentive pay.
Nor is the increase in variable pay plans confined to senior management.
Ledford, Lawler, and Mohrman (1995) reported the results from surveys of the
pay practices of the 1'brtune 1000 (the 500 largest industrial and 500 largest ser-
vice firms) conducted in 1987, 1990, and 1993. Between 1987 and 1993, the
proportion of firms using individual incentives for at least 20 percent of their work
force increased from 38 percent to 50 percent; the proportion using gain sharing
for at least some of the work force increased from 7 percent to 16 percent; and
the proportion of firms that had an employee stock ownership plan covering at
least 20 percent of the work force increased from 53 percent to 62 percent. The
proportion of firms using profit sharing for some of the work force actually de-
clined slightly over the period, from 45 percent to 43 percent. Although the
growth in some of these innovations in incentives is modest, there is little doubt
that there is much more experimentation occurring with incentives throughout
organizations (Kanter, 1987), with the emphasis being to link pay to performance,
thereby making pay more contingent or variable. Increased use of variable pay is
also evident in other countries besides the United States. Wood, in a study of 135
manufacturing plants in the United Kingdom, reported that "some form of merit
pay was claimed to be used in 50 per cent of plants, and profit-sharing in 25 per
cent, and moreover, the adoption of both increased between 1986 and 1990, by
13 per cent in the case of merit pay and 8 per cent in the case of profit-sharing"
(1996, p. 60).
This movement is quite consistent with operant conditioning principles (e.g.,
Skinner, 1953; Luthans and Kreitner, 1975), which emphasize the connection
between actions and their consequences. These changes are congruent with the
economic model of behavior, with its emphasis on incentives, particularly exter-
nally controlled and administered incentives, as being important. Indeed, one of
the important challenges to the economic model has been the historically rela-
tively small relationship between pay and performance, even for senior-level exec-
utives (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988). Jensen and Murphy noted, "actual
compensation contracts look very different form those predicted by economic the-
ory. The failure of theory to explain actual compensation arrangements suggests
that the theory is wrong" (1987, p. 43).
Second, reward practices vary dramatically across organizations and even
more dramatically across cultures. There are large, well-known, and effective
firms (e.g., Mars Candy, Southwest Airlines) that use virtually no merit pay. There
are others, such as Hewlett-Packard, that do use individual merit pay. There are
countries, with Japan and Korea being notable cases, in which pay is based pri-
marily on seniority, to a lesser extent on position, and virtually not at all on
individual differences in merit or performance, although these practices may be
changing. There are companies and countries in which pay is emphasized as the
primary mechanism for controlling and directing behavior, and there are coun-
tries and companies in which pay is deemphasizcd, with control being achieved
in other ways and rewards and recognition being more symbolic than economic.
The distribution of rewards also varies dramatically across companies and cul-
tures, with large dispersion in rewards characteristic of some but not others.
This substantial variation in pay practices is interesting and important for two
reasons. First, if some pay practices were invariably more effective than others
regardless of the context, one would expect to see more uniform adoption of these
more effective practices as a response to competitive pressure. Second, because
of the strong ideological component of pay—practices are frequently based more
on beliefs about behavior than on hard evidence (A. Kohn, 1993)—this is a topic
in which there is much more good theory than field-based empirical results that
inform the theory. Thus, there is an important opportunity for research progress.
Determinants of Pay and Pay Systems in Organizations

What do we know about how pay is determined and why it varies across organiza-
tions? Unfortunately, not as much as we might like. Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawlcr
concluded their review of the compensation literature by stating, "The use of
alternative pay systems in the American labor market is a result of a complex set
of economic, historical, and institutional forces. A folk wisdom has grown up
around the different types of plans" (1990, p. 87). Much of what we do know
about pay and incentive schemes is, however, at variance with predictions from
the economic model of behavior.
We know that pay is less differentiated in union as contrasted with nonunion
settings and that pay is more strongly related to seniority and is seldom related to
individual performance differences in unionized work places (Freeman and Med-
off, 1984). We know that even in nonunion private corporations that have perfor-
mance appraisals and presumably some form of merit pay, pay is often signifi-
cantly related to seniority and is not much related to performance if at all (Mecloff
and Abraham, 1980; 1981). There are substantial gender and race effects on pay
(Jacobs, 1992; Johnson, 1978; Sigelman, Milward, and Shepard, 1982), evidence
of discrimination in the wage determination process and that economic returns
are affected by more than an individual's human capital.
Leonard (1990), in a study of about 20,000 executives, found that pay was
related to the degree of organizational hierarchy—executives in flatter hierarchies
earned less. Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993), studying more than 4,000
executives in 303 different companies, found that the relationship between pay
and other factors such as performance, the number of people supervised, or chief
executive power varied greatly across industries. This suggests that managerial
labor markets are not completely efficient and that there are important industry
(and undoubtedly company and national) differences in the wage determination
process.
In a challenge to strictly economic, efficiency-based conceptions of the pay
determination process, Lambert and his colleagues found effects of managerial
power on pay. For instance, they reported a positive association between the level
of executive compensation and the percentage of the external board members
who had been appointed by the chief executive; they also reported statistically
significant effects for virtually all of their other measures of managerial power
such as the percentage of stock owned by the chief executive. Other evidence
also suggests the importance of power in the salary determination process. A study-
by Pfeffer and Konrad (1991) of academic salaries found that power had a main
effect on pay and positively affected the returns to research productivity and years
of experience, with more powerful individuals enjoying greater returns. Several
indicators of individual power were employed in that study: (1) receiving outside
research funding, (2) having an outside job offer, (3) extensive contact and com-
munication with individuals in other institutions, and (4) a scale composed of
responses to questions asking about the level of involvement in departmental af-
fairs and perceptions of opportunities to influence policies in the department and
in the broader institution. Moore and Pfeffer (1980) found that more powerful
departments on two campuses of the University of California were able to achieve
greater acceleration in salaries for their faculty members even when measures of
departmental quality and size were controlled.
A study of Australian establishments (Drago and Heyvvood, 1995) explored
predictions from the so-ealled new economics of personnel literature (Hart and
Holmstrom, 1987), which relates pay schemes to the ease of monitoring worker
effort, as well as predictions from the managerial strategic choice literature (Ko-
chan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986). The reported results for the use of various pay
systems such as piece rate, group pay, and profit sharing were both complex and
did not consistently support either theoretical perspective. For instance, the use
of piece rates was positively related to the proportion of long-tenured employees.
This result is exactly opposite to the predictions of the new economics of person-
nel literature, which argues that "firms will tend to avoid more immediate wage
incentives, such as piece rates, where the expected job tenure of workers is long,
since increasing wages over the employees' life-cycle provides a less costly alterna-
tive" (Drago and Heywood, 1995, p. 508). They also reported that the use of
piece rates was higher the larger the proportion of managers, which contradicts
the prediction that individual incentives provide an alternative to direct supervi-
sion. And they reported that the use of piece rates was less the larger the propor-
tion of casual labor—but one would expect that it would be casual workers, with
no long-term attachment to the organization or their fellow workers, who would
most require individual incentives to induce effort. They did find, consistent with
the strategic choice-managerial strategy predictions, that there was more use of
profit sharing in organizations that had quality circles or other systems to encour-
age worker participation.
Wood's (1996) study of U.K. manufacturing plants found no statistically sig-
nificant relationship between the use of high-commitment work practices and any
particular payment system. His study did find that the proportion of pay com-
prised of profit sharing payments was associated with the use of high-commitment
work practices, which means that "when profit-sharing is taken seriously, it is
likely to be in conjunction with" high-commitment management (p. 64).
We know that pay is strongly related to performance in professional sports
(e.g., Harder, 1992), but even here there is some evidence of racial discrimination
(Kahn and Sherer, 1988; Scully, 1974). Of course, performance is quite measur-
able in professional sports, and, moreover, there is an efficient national labor
market (for experienced players who can change teams) that makes the strong
pay—performance connection expected.
From a study of college and university faculty (Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990), we
know that research productivity, a measure of performance, had a larger effect on
pay in private, higher quality institutions, in institutions governed by collective
bargaining agreements, in institutions in which there was more collaboration on
research and more social contact among faculty, in departments that had chair-
persons with shorter, fixed-length terms and had norms emphasizing research,
and in fields with more highly developed scientific paradigms. However, even in
contexts in which productivity could be readily assessed and in which merit was
ostensibly emphasized, the effect of productivity on salary was quite small. Being
one standard deviation above the mean for research productivity produced only a
5.5 percent increment in salary. The results suggest that paying for productivity is
more likely where productivity can be more unambiguously assessed (fields with
more-developed paradigms), in contexts in which there is more contact (both

social and research), which also provides more information about performance,
and in places where the social norms and values emphasize productivity.
The interpretation that paying for productivity is more likely when there is
less uncertainty and ambiguity about measuring performance and administering
salaries makes sense of the apparently anomalous finding that returns to produc-
tivity were actually higher in institutions in which faculty were covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Konrad and Pfeffer noted that "unions . . . open the
salary determination process to scrutiny by the members and instill due-process
procedures that increase the certainty . . . in the salary determination process. In
the absence of collective bargaining, salaries may be determined by the arbitrary
and occasionally secret decisions of administrators" (1990, p. 265). Although some
unions have eschewed merit-based considerations in determining pay, the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors "advocated a more professional system in
which teaching and research excellence would be rewarded" (p. 265). The results
from the study overall support the importance of perceptions of fairness in process
as being a necessary condition for pay to reflect productivity.
We are inclined to think of faculty labor markets as being reasonably effi-
cient. Faculty have few organization-specific skills and interorganizational mobil-
ity is frequent. Efficient labor markets are presumed to result in fairly equal re-
turns to dimensions of human capital or performance regardless of where one is
located. But Konrad and Pfeffer reported that context—the particular organization
and its attributes —mattered a great deal in determining returns to productivity:
Consider those individuals who were in settings that were above the median,
simultaneously, on resource levels, paradigm development, research emphasis,
research collaboration, and who worked in high quality institutions. . . . Individ-
uals producing research at a rate that is one standard deviation above the mean
in their fields lost more in salaries if they were in the wrong organizational con-
text than they would have lost had they simply worked less hard and produced
less research, falling to the mean level. (1990, p. 277)
There is evidence from a study of college and university administrators (Pfef-

fer and Davis-Blake, 1990) that there is less pay dispersion in public colleges
(where salaries are more likely to be known), when there is more promotion from
within, and in more socially homogeneous organizations. A study of wage disper-
sion in more than 1,800 academic departments (Pfeffer and Langton, 1988)
found greater inequality in wages in private colleges, in larger departments, and
in settings in which people tended to work on research alone. More social contact
among department members and more participative departmental governance
were both associated with less dispersed salaries. The evidence is consistent with
the explanation that more social contact and publicness of information diminish
salary inequality in organizations.
Given the prominence of the economic model of behavior, with its emphasis
on incentives, the question naturally arises as to why there has not been more
incentive-based compensation or why incentives are so small even when perfor-
mance can be fairly unambiguously assessed (Frank, 1984). Lazear (1989) has
argued that when teamwork and cooperation are important, individually based
rewards can reduce the incentive to cooperate. Milgrom and Roberts (1988) have
argued that merit systems that provide very different rewards can encourage un-
productive political behaviors as individuals jockey for those rewards.
Studying this issue empirically, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1992) found that
salary differentiation was related to turnover among academic administrators, with
those lower in the salary distribution being particularly affected by pay dispersion.
Pfeffer and Langton (1993), studying college and university faculty, found that
the greater the pay dispersion, the lower the job satisfaction, arid that paying for
performance and greater pay dispersion were associated with diminished levels of
research productivity and with a smaller likelihood of working collaboratively on
research. They noted that such adverse effects of wage dispersion were particularly
pronounced for individuals with shorter tenure (who were less committed), in
public colleges (where pay is more likely to be known), and in departments that
had less highly developed scientific paradigms (there was less consensus on stan-
dards of evaluation and performance). Cowherd and Levine (1992), using a sam-
ple of 102 business units, compared the pay and inputs of lower-level employees
to those of top management to compute a measure of pay equity. They found
that the greater the degree of pay equity across classes of employees, the higher
was the level of product quality. Thus, one answer as to why there is not more
use of differentiated incentives is that at least in some contexts they have negative
consequences.
Many of the studies of pay determination process have focused on CEO pay.
The basic message of these studies is that, at least historically, there has been
either no or a very weak relationship between CEO pay and company perfor-
mance, where performance is measured in almost any way (Crystal, 1991; Main,
O'Reilly, and Wade, 1995; Miller, 1995). Instead, CEO pay seems to be related
to organizational size, to the industry in which one works—with there being a
premium for working in unregulated and more competitive and risky industries —
and to the composition of the compensation committee of the board of directors.
O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988) found that there were important social influ-
ences in the pay determination process (see also Main, O'Reilly, and Wade,
1995). Specifically, CEOs in companies in which members of the compensation
committee were themselves more highly compensated in their own roles as CEOs
earned more, controlling for other factors —a result the authors interpreted as
meaning that salaries were set in a process of social comparison. Compensation
committee members who themselves were well paid would be more generous
when setting the salaries of others because those salaries would not look high by
comparison. O'Reilly and his colleagues also discovered that this result was partic-
ularly strong when the compensation committee directors had joined the board
after the CEO had assumed his position —which probably meant that they owed
their positions to the CEO and therefore were more under his influence. Main
ct al. (1995) further reported that demographic similarity between CEOs and
members of the compensation committee, an important basis of interpersonal
attraction (Berscheid and Walster, 1969), was positively related to CEO pay.
The literature on CEO pay has attempted to provide an explanation for the
no New Directions for Organization Theory
increasing difference in pay between CEOs and the rest of the organization —an
explanation that is consistent with principles of economic efficiency—by devel-
oping a tournament model of executive compensation. The theoretical problem
is nicely described by La/ear and Rosen (1981, p. 847): "On the day that a given
individual is promoted from vice-president to president, his salary may triple. It is
difficult to argue diat his skills have tripled in that one-day period, presenting
difficulties for standard theory" that relates wages to human capital or to produc-
tivity. The basic idea behind the tournament model is that vice presidents (or
those one level below the CEO) compete for the top job. In order to induce
maximum effort, the "prize"—the salary earned when one achieves that posi-
tion—must be sufficient to compensate for the effort and the probability of
achieving the prize. So, Rosen (1986) "has shown that top prizes of a dispropor-
tionate size are theoretically necessary to motivate tournament survivors so they
will not rest on past achievements or winning as they enter the final contest.
Elevating the top prize has the effect of lengthening the career ladder for high-
ranking contestants" (O'Reilly et al., 1988, p. 260).
The predictions of the tournament model arc straightforward—the lower the
probability of winning the contest, or the greater the number of contestants, the
greater the difference in salary should be to compensate for this reduced expected
payoff. This model would suggest, for instance, that as organizations have flat-
tened their hierarchies, salary differences across levels would be expected to in-
crease to induce effort on the part of those who now have a lower expectation of
being advanced because of the greater number of people competing for the fewer
number of promotions. In one empirical test of this model, its predictions were
found not to hold. O'Reilly et al. (1988, p. 266) reported that, controlling for
other factors, the number of vice presidents was negatively related to CEO com-
pensation (and to the difference between the salaries of CEOs and vice presi-
dents). Moreover, also inconsistent with tournament ideas, the average vice-
presidential salary was positively related to CEO salary. The fact that the tourna-
ment model is inconsistent with the evidence has, unfortunately, not diminished
its popularity as an explanation for the rise in CEO compensation.
It is possible and indeed likely that because of the prevalence, particularly in
the United States, of belief in the economic model and its associated assumptions,
pay systems may be designed for legitimation —to signal to outsiders that the firm
is well managed and doing the right thing by implementing incentives to tie
senior executive pay to performance. Westphal and Zajac (1994) studied 570 of
the largest corporations over a two-decade period, examining not only which firms
adopted long-term incentive plans but which firms actually used them. They dis-
covered that a substantial fraction of firms announcing the adoption of long-term
incentive schemes in their proxy statements never actually used such plans to set
compensation and that this separation between form and substance was particu-
larly likely in organizations that had poor prior performance and powerful chief
executives. This result suggests that pay and pay systems have important symbolic
and legitimating aspects.
Evidence on the Effects of Incentives

'['he effects of incentives, particularly individual incentive schemes, are empiri-
cally ambiguous, in sharp contrast to the claims made in some of the economics
literature about optimal incentive arrangements. The literature on the effects of
pay is plagued with methodological problems, and most of the studies that use
existing compensation data bases and that claim to examine the effects of incen-
tives fail virtually completely in this effort. This is because of the failure to control
for a number of highly plausible alternative interpretations of the results. Most
important, it is critical to distinguish between incentive effects, which are pre-
sumed to result from increased motivation and diligence, and information effects.
Incentive schemes do more than just motivate effort. They also tell people spe-
cifically what is valued and comparatively more important in the particular setting
and how, therefore, to allocate attention and effort among competing objectives.
In that sense, incentives are similar to goal setting (E. A. Locke and Latham,
1990), establishing explicit objectives and letting individuals know what is ex-
pected and important. The goal-setting literature is quite clear that setting specific
and demanding goals, by itself, can have a powerful effect on performance (e.g.,
E. A. Locke and Bryan, 1966; E. A. Locke, Frederick, Lee, and Bobko, 1984;
E. A. Locke and Latham, 1990). Moreover, the introduction of incentives is also
frequently accompanied by the introduction of information —about workers' per-
formance and productivity, for instance, or about workers' productivity compared
to some standard or to that of other workers. This information is often new as
productivity data or comparisons may have been nonexistent in the work place.
Knowledge of results has also been found to have profound effects on behavior
and to be one of the elements that determines the motivating potential of jobs
(e.g., Hackman and Oldham, 1980). Few studies, particularly those relying on
archival data, have recognized these critical theoretical distinctions, and virtually
none have attempted to empirically examine them.
There is another important methodological issue that plagues many if not
most of the studies of the effects of incentive systems. The choice of pay system
parameters is not exogenous, and "differences in pay policies may reflect system-
atic forces. . . . Failure to model the causes of variation in pay policies . . . may
bias . . . empirical results" (Ehrenberg, 1990, p. 90).
Why might incentives not work? Incentives can actually undermine intrinsic
motivation, as already discussed, and can also undermine performance on tasks
that require higher levels of judgment and creativity. Amabile (1985) found that
having creative writers just think five minutes about receiving a reward caused
them to write less creatively. Amabile, Hennessey, and Grossman (1986) found
that on a series of tasks ranging from making collages to inventing stories and
using subjects of various ages, the simple promise of reward diminished creativity.
Summaries of the research literature on the effects of rewards (McGraw, 1978; A.
Kohn, 1993) suggest that rewards are particularly detrimental to performance
when the tasks are intrinsically interesting enough that rewards aren't necessary
and when the task is complex enough that there are no simple steps to solve it.
In considering the effects of incentives, it is important to recognize that con-
tingent pay or pay for performance can be based on individual performance, sub-
unit or work-group performance, the performance of the entire organization, or
some combination. Wclbourne and Cable have noted that "very little is known
about how employees covered by various group incentives interpret the programs"
(1995, p. 712). They also noted the absence of literature on the effects of
group incentives on job satisfaction. There have been studies of some forms of
group incentives, such as gainsharing, stock ownership, and profit sharing on
organizational-level outcomes (e.g., Kaufman, 1992; Weitzman and Kruse, 1990;
Rosen, Klein, and Young, 1986; Jones and Kato, 1993). There has not been much
study of the effects of group or organizational incentives on individual behavior
and attitudes. The distinction among the unit of analysis rewarded should be kept
in mind in thinking about incentives and behavior.
It is also the case that wage incentives are effective only to the extent that
the measurement system that underlies them measures the right thing. Most in-
centive systems are premised on the idea of individual merit and confront the
problem of interdependence. They all too often solve this problem by measuring
the wrong thing, and not very well. Simon provided a compelling critique of the
typical pay scheme and why it would probably not be effective:
If the indices used to measure outcomes are inappropriate, either because they
do not measure the right variables, or because they do not properly identify
individual contributions, then reward systems can be grossly inefficient or even
counterproductive. . . . In general, the greater the interdependence among vari-
ous members of the organization, the more difficult it is to measure their separate
contributions. . . . But of course, intense interdependence is precisely what
makes it advantageous to organize people instead of depending wholly on market
transactions. . . . Although economic rewards play an important part in securing
adherence to organizational goals and management authority, they are limited in
their effectiveness. Organizations would he far less effective systems than they
actually arc if such rewards were the only means, or even the principal means,
of motivation available. (1991, pp. 33-34)
As implied by the foregoing discussion, the evidence on the effects of varia-
tions in pay policies in organizations on performance is mixed. Leonard (1990)
found that firms with long-term incentive plans enjoyed greater increases in re-
turn on equity over the period 1981-1985, but he also reported that corporate
success was not related to the level of executive pay or to the steepness of the pay
differentials across ranks —a measure of the reward for achieving promotion.
Abowd (1990), in a study of 16,000 managers, found that the sensitivity of mana-
gerial compensation to performance was related to measures of shareholder return
but not to accounting measures of performance. This result is somewhat surpris-
ing, since executive pay tends to be set more frequently on the basis of the
achievement of objectives measured by the accounting system. Asch (1990), ex-
amining an incentive program for navy recruiters, found a positive effect of finan-
cial incentives, but there were also some negative results. The best recruiters
(based on historical data) produced less as they approached the prize eligibility
date, and after winning a prize, recruiters enlisted fewer recruits. Studying manag-
ers in a single company, Kahn and Sherer (1990) reported that managers for
whom bonuses were most sensitive to performance performed better the following
year, even when past performance was statistically controlled. However, the same
study found that differences in the sensitivity of merit pay to performance had no
significant effects on subsequent performance —thus, bonuses had an effect on
performance but merit pay did not.
A longitudinal study tracing the implementation of merit pay in a govern-
ment bureaucracy reported no relationship between merit pay and performance
(Pearce, Stevenson, and Perry, 1985). Marsden and Richardson (1994), studying
the use of individual performance pay in the Inland Revenue department in the
United Kingdom, reported that performance pay had little motivational effect and
may have demotivated some employees.
In a study of 8,000 workers in the United States and Japan, Levine (1993)
found that employees receiving high wages were less likely to quit, were more
satisfied with their pay, and reported a higher level of effort on the job. These
results support the idea that paying above-market wages may be rational because
it results in lower turnover costs and more employee effort, but Levine's data do
not speak to the issue of the effects of contingent pay practices.
The principal controversy in the pay literature concerns the use of individual
incentives (as contrasted with group or organizational incentives), and particularly
the effectiveness of contingent or merit pay. Deming and many other of the qual-
ity gurus have bemoaned the use of individual merit pay, arguing that it fre-
quently rewards or punishes workers for things over which they have little control,
since they don't often control the system of production within which they work
(Gabor, 1990). They also maintained that merit pay practiees often leave workers
discouraged and dissatisfied and create internal organizational competition and
conflict.
Other authors have noted that individual merit pay practices are inconsistent
with many of the underlying precepts of high-commitment work practices. For
instance, Beer ct al. maintained that "by making pay contingent upon perfor-
mance (as judged by management), management is signaling that it is they—not
the individual—who arc in control" (1984, p. 114). Consequently, "performance-
related pay may lower the individual's feeling of competence and self-determina-
tion and run counter to an intrinsic reward policy" (Wood, 1996, p. 55). Because
"out-put based incentive schemes, and particularly piecework, arc . . . very much
identified . . . with the past emphasis on a Taylorist control strategy and the ills
associated with it" (p. 56), many argue that piecework and other individual incen-
tive schemes conflict with the ideas of commitment, involvement, and intrinsic
motivation.
Besser's study of pay practices at Toyota Motor Manufacturing in Kentucky
found evidence of high productivity, quality, and discretionary effort in a work
setting in which equal pay was the norm — "81 percent of T'MM's employees
receive roughly the same pay with distinctions based on job category, not individ-
ual performance" (1995, p. 388) Bcsser noted that most motivation theories (e.g.,
Lawler, 1981) focused on the individual and took what motivated the particular
individual as given. By contrast, "Cole's (1979) contention and the argument of
this paper is that large Japanese firms take a much more active role in shaping
114 ^ew Directions for Organization Theory
employee motivation than organizations are usually given credit for. They do this
. . . by turning small work groups and company ideology into official reward
mechanisms with powerful consequences for individual motivation" (p. 387). Acl-
ler's (1992) study of New United Motor Manufacturing also documented an in-
stance of extremely limited use of differential monetary rewards in a system that
was highly effective by any measure.
A good portion of the literature on the effects of incentives has focused on
the connection between CEO incentive schemes and organizational perfor-
mance. This research is frequently plagued by two problems. One is that the
choice of incentives is not exogenous. For instance, a CEO who anticipates im-
proved corporate performance and a rising stock price is much more likely to
want to be paid with stock options or incentive compensation. Thus, a study that
simply finds a contemporaneous correlation between incentive compensation and
performance may have the causality reversed—the incentives may be imple-
mented because of the enhanced performance (Leonard, 1990). Second, the as-
sumptions that CEOs, already exceedingly well compensated, will work harder
for some extra compensation and that a single individual, even a CEO, can pro-
foundly affect the performance of large organizations are both suspect. There is
little evidence, for instance, that CEOs who have long-term incentives as part of
their compensation package in fact manage companies who do better in terms of
economic returns over time (Crystal, 1991; but, see Leonard, 1990).
There are more consistent results on the effects of incentives in studies of
sports. There is, for instance, evidence that larger prizes produce better scores in
golf tournaments (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1988; 1990), even controlling for
the quality of the players who choose to participate. A study of race car drivers
found that larger prizes produced greater speed but also more accidents (Becker
and Hnselid, 1992). Of course, many sports, including golf and race car driving,
involve comparatively little interdependence among the contestants. This absence
of important task-related interdependence is the exception, rather than the rule,
in most work organizations. Consequently, results from studies of incentive effects
in sports need to be generalized to other settings with some caution.
Monitoring and Surveillance

In order to reward or sanction behavior or results, one must be able to assess
them. The development of electronic monitoring capability has undoubtedly
shifted the balance toward monitoring behavior as contrasted with monitoring
outcomes, but in cither case surveillance has important consequences. By 1990,
more than 10 million workers were subjected to electronic performance monitor-
ing. Moreover, this monitoring is moving from covering only fairly low-skilled
workers doing simple tasks (such as data input or telephone work) to work done
by professional, technical, and managerial employees (e.g., Carson, 1988). Eor
instance, physician treatment practices, such as the number of drugs prescribed
or tests ordered, are increasingly gathered in data bases, eompared to norms, and
used to influence physician behavior.
There is evidence that electronic performance monitoring results in increased
Meclianisms of Social Control 115
stress (Amick and Smith, 1992; Smith, et al., 1992; Irving, Higgins, and Safayeni,
1986), decreased job satisfaction (Irving, et al., 1986; Grant and Higgins, 1989),
increased feelings of social isolation (Aiello, 1993), and an increased tendency to
believe that the quantity of work is more important than its quality (Shell and
Allgcier, 1992). The evidence from several studies is consistent with the social
facilitation prediction that computer monitoring decreases performance on more
complex tasks (Aiello and Svec, 1993) while it can increase performance on very
simple tasks (Aiello and Chomiak, 1992).
One might wonder, in an era in which there is increasing emphasis on build-
ing employee commitment, on working in teams, and on devolving responsibility
as organizations take out layers that make work more complex, how there can be
a concomitant increase in electronic and other surveillance activities—a practice
that research indicates often produces effects opposite those being sought by the
high-commitment work practices so frequently discussed. One avenue to pursue
in understanding this apparent contradiction is to note that, virtually without ex-
ception, the studies of surveillance (and other forms of external control) have
asked about their effects on those subject to these practices. For the practices to
persist, in spite of their often deleterious consequences, it would seem useful to
understand their effects on those administering the practices. It is quite possible
that the control, or at least the illusion of control, produced by implementing
surveillance, and the higher level of involvement and responsibility that accrues
to those who more closely supervise and monitor work, may explain why those
who administer such practices persist in using them even if the results arc not
always positive.
A similar set of issues concerns the use of sanctions. There have now been a
large number of studies of managerial succession showing how various conditions
such as the power of the CEO and the firm's ownership moderate the relationship
between performance and turnover (e.g., Ocasio, 1994; Salancik and Pfeffer,
1980). With few exceptions, these studies have not asked whether or not firing
those associated with poor performance subsequently improves the performance
of the organization. Gavin, Green, and Fairhurst distinguished two strategics of
managerial control, particularly in situations of poor performance: "Managers
may utilize a judicial approach which has its focus on using primarily punitive
measures as a deterrent to future poor performance incidents. . . . Alternatively,
a problem-solving approach may be used which can be characterized as more
interactive, cooperative, and non-punitive in nature" (1995, p. 209).
Gavin et al. (1995), in a laboratory experiment, found partial support for the
ideas that managers use consistent control strategies over time, that they are more
likely to be punitive the worse the level of performance, and that subordinates
perceive punitive control strategies as less just. O'Reilly and Weitz (1980) studied
the behavior of managers in a large retail chain. They found a positive correlation
between the use of sanctions, such as warnings and dismissals, and unit perfor-
mance. They argued that how managers treated poor performers sent an im-
portant signal about the performance culture of the organization. The fact that
firing is often a form of ritual scapegoating (Garrison and Scotch, 1964) is well
known but sometimes overlooked in both theory and empirical research. As Zajac
and Westphal (1995) reminded us, all organizational incentives (and sanctions)
have a symbolic, public face to them and can be partly understood in that con-
text.
Commitment and Socialization Processes
Commitment is based on the rationalizing model of behavior: if an individual

can be induced to do something and this behavior cannot be attributed to some
powerful external force such as a reward or sanction, the person will become
more committed to the action and to its implications for other attitudes and be-
havior. Because this commitment results from a process of self-perception (Bern,
1972) and dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957), it represents a change in indi-
viduals' perceptions of themselves and the world. Consequently, commitment pro-
cesses create fundamental change in perceptions and attitudes, and in that sense
commitment represents a form of internal control that does not need to rely
nearly as much on continuing surveillance and reward. Commitment may, there-
fore, be a much more efficient as well as more effective means of coordinating
and managing behavior. "Willingness of employees at all levels to assume respon-
sibility for producing results —not simply 'following the rules'— is generally be-
lieved to be a major determinant of organizational success" (Simon, 1991, p. 37).
Salancik (1977) has argued that commitment arises under the conditions of
choice or volition, publicness, and explicitncss. Without choice, there is no impli-
cation of the behavior for the individual's beliefs or perceptions. All of the litera-
ture is consistent in emphasizing the importance of choice —or at least the ap-
pearance of it—in building commitment (e.g., Cialclini, 1988; Kiesler, 1971).
Publicness makes it harder for the person to deny having done the action and in
that sense binds the person and his or her choice more closely together. Fxplic-
itness means that behaviors are more committing to the extent they have a clear,
logical relationship to subsequent behaviors and attitudes. So, the act of taking a
lower-paying job from among many offers (O'Reilly and Caldwcll, 1980; 1981)
represents a choice that has explicit implications —one must really like the job
and the organization if one is willing to forgo more money elsewhere to be there.
And a job choice is almost inevitably a public decision—known by one's friends
and family and obviously by one's co-workers and those whose offers have been
declined.
One of the more customary times in which to activate the mechanism of
commitment is when an individual joins an organization. If the organization
makes the recruiting process difficult and demanding, individuals who are not
seriously interested and committed will drop out during the process. But those
that persevere will be much more committed and loyal—after all, if they didn't
really want to join the organization and have the particular job, why would they
have gone through so much? Graham (1995), in a participant observation study,
described what it was like to be hired into Subaru-Isuzu. She was told that 30,000
people had applied to work at the company (p. 20). First, she had to take a
battery called the General Aptitude Test (GAT), which consisted of "nine written
and four dexterity tests" (p. 21). Then, having scored sufficiently well, she re-
ceived a letter saying she was selected to "enter Phase I of a two phase pre-
employment assessment activity" (pp. 21-22). The assessments, involving working
in groups, were tiring and stressful. It took more than six months to get hired (p.
31):
The reactions of the training class members to the selection process ran from
"grueling" and "demanding" to "fun." . . . Everyone agreed, however, that they
had never worked so hard to land a job. The general sentiment was that we had
really accomplished something and were among a select few. . . . In order to
maintain their status in the selection process, most applicants were forced to
make some degree of sacrifice, (p. 31)
Similar selection processes have been described at New United Motors (Ad-
ler, 1992), even though in this instance, under the United Automobile Workers
contract, the workers had recall rights and the evidence is that even union "trou-
blemakers" were rehired if they applied. Adler noted that "each applicant for the
manager, Group Leader, Team Leader and Team Member positions had to pass
the same three-day assessment test" (p. 120). Initially, 78 percent of the 3,200
hourly applicants were rejected, although most who persisted were later hired.
Why reject those who were later going to be hired? This process tends to create
the feeling of being in a special, highly selected work force. It is also a process
that requires perseverance, and this persistence in efforts to get a job will result
in more commitment to that job. Nor are these commitment tactics used and
useful only for hourly workers. At Data General (Kiddcr, 1981), two project lead-
ers, West and Alsing, used a process called the "signing up" to ensure that those
recruited onto a team of engineers to design a computer had consciously chosen
to undertake a difficult and demanding task and would therefore be willing to
sacrifice themselves and work hard for the project:
"It's gonna be tough," says Alsing. "If we hired you, you'd be working with
a bunch of cynics and egotists and it'd be hard to keep up with them."
"That doesn't scare me," says the recruit.
"There's a lot of fast people in this group," Alsing goes on. "It's gonna be a
real hard job with a lot of long hours. And I mean long hours." (pp. 65—66)
There is, of course, a potential downside to commitment—namely, a resis-

tance to change and an irrational perseverance in behavior. Staw (1976) and
Brockner (Brockner and Rubin, 1985; Brockner, Rubin, and Lang, 1981) have
both examined escalating commitment to failing courses of action and some of
the conditions under which such perseverance occurs.
It is interesting that the study of commitment in the empirical organizations
literature seems to be most often associated with some kind of organizational or
individual pathology—some error in decision making. Thus, for instance, there
are case studies of commitment to building sites for the World's Fair in Vancouver
(Ross and Staw, 1986) even in the face of massive cost overruns, and persistence
in building nuclear power plants and resistance to closing them down (Ross and
Staw, 1993) even when confronted by budget overruns and technical problems.
u8 New Directions for Organization Theon>
There are numerous studies of the escalating commitment involved in recruit-

ment to a religion, a cult, or a self-help group (e.g., Barker, 1984; Galanter, 1989;
O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996). Many of these groups emphasize recruiting others,
as a way of cementing the individual's own commitment to the organization
through the activity of proselytizing. Admitting one has made a mistake by joining
is always difficult: "Kst trainees rarely will complain later; they more often will
boast of their exceptional bargain in personal fulfillment. . . . The alternative to
claiming this is to admit that they were conned and didn't even have the courage
to walk out in the middle. Very few people will admit to that" (Baer and Stolz,
1978, p. 60).
It seems paradoxical that, even as the organizations literature emphasizes the
pathologies of commitment such as escalation to failing courses of action and
seduction by cults, building organizational commitment is seen by most practic-
ing managers as something that is desirable, not dysfunctional:
Much research literature focuses on ways of developing arid enhancing commit-

ment among employees (Mowday, Porter, and Steers, 1982), suggesting that orga-
nizations view commitment as a desirable attribute. Support for this perspective is
shown by studies linking commitment with a variety of work behaviors including
voluntary turnover (Mowday, et al., 1982), employee performance (Meyer, Pau-
noncn, Gellatly, Coffin, and Jackson, 1989), organizational citizenship (O'Reilly
and Chatman, 1986; Shore and Wayne, 1993), and absenteeism (Mowday, et al.,
1982). (Shore, Barksdale, and Shore, 1995, p. 1593)
That is why there is so much interest in understanding the psychological dynam-

ics of commitment and culture (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996). Some may object
and argue that commitment to decisions and organizational commitment are two
different phenomena. They are different in their apparent desirability, but the
research literature is clear that they are produced by similar psychological dy-
namics.
Pascalc's (1985) discussion of socialization practices in organizations speaks
both to how socialization is accomplished and to the deeply ambivalent attitudes
toward socialization and commitment that seem to characterize Americans and
particularly academics. Writing about this ambivalence, he noted, "Mention the
term 'socialization' and a variety of unsavory images come to mind. . . . Ameri-
cans, dedicated by constitution and conviction to the full expression of individual-
ity, regard 'socialization' as alien and vaguely sinister. . . . The underlying di-
lemma of socialization is so sensitive to core American values that it is seldom
debated" (pp. 27, 37).
Socialization is "the systematic means by which firms bring new members
into their culture" (Pascale, 1985, p. 27). Pascale identified seven steps that consti-
tuted the socialization process. The first step is "careful selection of entry-level
candidates" (p. 29), a process observed in the various Japanese automobile plants
operating in ihc United States as well as in organizations such as Southwest Air-
lines. The second step entails "humility-inducing experiences in the first months
on the job" (p. 30) that dislodge the individual's old habits, behaviors, and social
identity. This part of the process proceeds on the premise that for there to be a
fundamental change in values and behaviors —the goal of socialization —the indi-
vidual must be confronted with evidence that his or her previous social identity
won't bring comfort in the new organizational environment. Hard work, long
hours, and the social isolation that derives from spending so much time at work
all help to make the individual susceptible to social influenees emanating from
within the organization. The stress makes the individual open to these influences.
The corporate hazing also has some of the same effects as other forms of hazing:
it produces a perception that the organization must be worthwhile —otherwise,
one's willingness to suffer so much would be inexplicable. As Aronson and Mills
explained, "Persons who go through a great deal of trouble or pain to attain
something tend to value it more highly than persons who attain the same thing
with a minimum of effort" (1959, p. 177).
The third part of the socialization process involves thorough training through
exposure in the field to the organization's operations and to individuals who ex-
emplify its values. Many retail organizations, such as grocery and department
stores, emphasize putting new employees in the store, regardless of their subse-
quent anticipated career path, to ensure that they fully understand the organiza-
tion and what it is about. Career advancement is slow so that sufficient time is
spent getting thoroughly socialized to the organization's values and behaviors.
The fourth step in the socialization experience entails paying close attention
"to systems measuring operational results and rewarding individual performance.
Systems are comprehensive, consistent, and triangulate particularly on those as-
pects of the business that are tied to competitive success and corporate values"
(Pascalc, 1985, p. 31). What is measured is what is attended to, and measurement
therefore helps to create as well as to reinforce a set of values and norms.
The fifth step in the socialization process involves strict adherence to the
organization's core values. As Pascale (1985, p. 32) noted, subjecting oneself to
an intense socialization experience puts oneself at the mercy of the firm and
leaves one quite vulnerable. In order to convince individuals that socialization
will not work against their interests, the organization must build and maintain a
bond of trust with its employees. That means making promises that ensure indi-
viduals' well-being, and it means keeping those promises. For instance, at New
United Motor Manufacturing, the union and its members gave up the right to
strike over work rules, company contributions to the Supplemental Unemploy-
ment Benefits scheme of General Motors, and the protection of numerous job
classifications in return for higher wages and a promise of no layoffs. When this
no-layoff policy was sorely tested in 1987 and 1988 because of inadequate sales
of the company's cars, the organization found ways of meeting the commitment.
The comptroller and general manager stated, "There's no question in my mind
but that the commitment to no layoffs and the ability of managers to operate on
a day-to-day basis in a way that supports this underlying philosophy are absolutely
crucial to our success. Team members know that when they contribute ideas for
more effective operations they are not jeopardizing anyone's job" (Adler, 1992,
p. 123).
The sixth step in the socialization process is developing reinforcing folklore,
stories, and legends that validate the organization's culture and its aims and that
12O New Directions for Organization Theory
interpret history in ways consistent with its values. Finally, "consistent role models
and consistent traits arc associated with those recognized as on the fast track"
(Pascalc, 1985, p. 33). In other words, through whom it rewards and recognizes,
the organization sends a consistent message about what behaviors and attitudes it
values.
Van Maanen and Schcin (1979) proposed six socialization tactics that could
vary along a bipolar continuum. As reviewed by Ashforth and Saks (1996, p. 150),
these socialization tactics were (1) collective versus individual (were newcomers
grouped together or handled individually?); (2) formal versus informal (were new-
comers separated from the rest of the organization or not?); (3) sequential versus
random (was there a fixed sequence of steps required to assume a new job role?);
(4) fixed versus variable (was there a specified timetable for the socialization pro-
cess?); (5) serial versus disjunctive (was the new member socialized by an experi-
enced member?); and (6) investiture versus divestiture (are the newcomer's iden-
tity and personal characteristics affirmed or stripped away?).
Ashforth and Saks found that, on the one hand, "the six tactics of institution-
alized socialization were negatively related to role ambiguity, role conflict, stress
symptoms, and intentions to quit and positively associated with job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, and organizational identification" (1996, p. 169).
This suggests that more extensive and formalized socialization has positive effects
on those subjected to it. On the other hand, institutionalized socialization was
negatively related "to both attempted and actual role innovation at four months
and to actual role innovation at ten months" (p. 169). But the trade-off between
innovation and change and reduced stress and enhanced job satisfaction may be
more apparent than real. As Ashforth and Saks noted, the issue is what is learned,
not how it is taught, that is important, and it is possible to inculcate norms that
encourage innovation in an institutionalized socialization process.
The evidence suggests that commitment is intentionally built and managed.
There is evidence that the psychological and social psychological processes that
produce commitment are reasonably well understood. There is also literature that
suggests deep ambivalence about commitment, be it to a decision or an organiza-
tion. Being committed is, almost by definition, to some degree a loss of personal
freedom and choice —to be committed to an organization is to stay with it even
in the absence of rational reasons to do so. It is this aspect of commitment that
some find troubling. But, it is important to recognize that individuals often
choose commitment and to be committed. Institutionalized socialization pro-
duced less role stress and higher job satisfaction. Thus, commitment has obvious
positive effects for organizations but also for the individuals who are committed
as well.
Organizational Culture
Although closely related to the idea of control through commitment and socializa-
tion, the topic of organizational culture is somewhat distinct. Commitment is one
important mechanism through which strong cultures may be built (O'Reilly and
Chatman, 1996), but the concept of culture incorporates more than simply com-
mitment. Kunda defined culture as:
a learned body of tradition that governs what one needs to know, think and feel
in order to meet the standards of membership. . . . When applied to organiza-
tional settings, culture is generally viewed as the shared rules governing cognitive
and affective aspects of membership in an organi/ation, and the means whereby
they arc shaped and expressed. Of particular concern have been the shared
meanings, assumptions, norms, arid values that govern work-related behavior; the
symbolic, textural, and narrative structures in which they are encoded; and —in
the functionalist tradition —the structural causes and consequences of cultural
forms and their relationship to various measures of organizational effectiveness.
(1992, p. 8)
Pettigrew has defined culture in a similar fashion:

in order for people to function within any given setting, they must have a contin-
uing sense of what that reality is all about in order to be acted upon. Culture is
the system of such publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a
given group at a given time. This system of terms, forms, categories, and images
interprets a people's own situation to themselves. . . . The offspring of the con-
cept of culture . . . are symbol, language, ideology, belief, ritual, and myth.
(1979, p. 574)
The definition of the concept of culture has occasionally been contested and
lacks consensus. Some (Reichcrs and Schneider, 1990) have argued that culture
is conceptually not distinguishable from the construct of organizational climate.
Culture has been defined and measured at different levels of analysis, including
the group, the entire organization, or even the industry (e.g., Chatman and Jehn,
1994). O'Reilly and Chatman have noted that some "define culture as what an
organization is while still others argue that it is what an organization has (Schein,
1985; Smircich, 1983)" (1996, p. 159). O'Reilly and Chatman offered a definition
that is grounded in the view of culture as a form of organizational control: "we
define culture as a system of shared values (that define what is important) and
norms that define appropriate attitudes and behaviors for organizational members
(how to feel and behave)" (p. 160). Defined in this way, one can ask, empirically,
to what extent there is agreement about values (consistency) and to what extent
violations of organizational norms and rules are sanctioned severely (the intensity
with which values and beliefs about appropriate behavior are held). This defini-
tion is, therefore, quite amenable to empirical, tjuantitative measurement and,
moreover, links culture with other social psychological constructs such as norms
and values.
Given the disagreements about the definition of culture, it is not surprising
that there is also a variety of opinions about how to operational ize and measure
the concept. One approach, the Organizational Culture Profile (O'Reilly, Chat-
man, and Caldwell, 1991), employs a Q-sort profile comparison process that asks
respondents to put fifty-four value statements into a set of nine categories from
"most characteristic of my firm's culture" to "most uncharacteristic of my firm's
culture." The sorting process permits fewer cards at the extremes than in the
middle. The procedure produces a measure with good test-rctcst reliability. With
an average of thirty-five respondents from fifteen firms in various service indus-
tries, Chatman and Jehn (1994, p. 531) observed a high degree of consensus
within firms, although the extent of consensus varied, as might be expected as
some firms had stronger cultures than others. In several studies using the OCP, a
consistent set of seven factors emerged: "(1) innovation, (2) stability, (3) an orien-
tation toward people, (4) an orientation toward outcomes or results, (5) an em-
phasis on being easygoing, (6) attention to detail, and (7) a collaborative or team
orientation" (p. 534). Chatman and Jehn demonstrated that even within the ser-
vice sector, individual firms had unique cultures. They also found that "industry
differences explain more variance than organization differences for six of the
seven culture dimensions" (p. 537). It seems fair to state that progress has been
made in operationalizing the concept of culture and developing measurement
procedures that produce results consistent with theoretical expectations and that
are replicable. As noted below, however, fragmentation in the culture research
literature, compared to the literature on personality and organizational behavior,
for instance, has resulted in less borrowing of measurement processes across stud-
ies and consequently less cumulation of results.
Since the mid-1980s there have been a plethora of both scholarly and
practitioner-oriented books on the subject of culture. Barley, Meyer, and Gash
(1988, p. 33), searching six bibliographic data bases, noted that the total number
of papers published annually on organizational culture increased from less than
twenty in 1979 to about fifty in 1984 and to close to 130 in 1985, an exponential
rate of growth. Some of this activity has been stimulated by the idea that strong
cultures arc positively related to economic performance (e.g., Kottcr and Heskett,
1992; Dennison, 1990), that managing culture is possible (e.g., S. Davis, 1984;
O'Reilly, 1989), and that culture is an effective managerial method used in exem-
plary organi/ations such as Hewlett-Packard (e.g., Deal and Kennedy, 1982). Bar-
ley ct al. also noted that "the upsurge of interest in organizational culture in large
part reflected the back-to-back commercial success of three bestsellers that spoke
of culture under various guises. . . . By attracting attention in both the academic
and managerial communities, organizational culture attained the status of a domi-
nant idea in a relatively short period of time" (1988, p. 32).
Not all empirical studies have found a relationship between strong cultures
and performance (e.g., Sichl and Martin, 1990), and even those that have uncov-
ered an effect have noted the relationship is often complex. Thus, for instance,
Kotter and Heskett found that in order to enhance performance, culture needed
to be matched to the firm's strategy, and even then, "strategically appropriate
cultures will not promote excellent performance over long periods unless they
contain norms and values that help firms adapt to a changing environment"
(1992, p. 142).
Unfortunately, the vast amount of writing on the subject of organizational
culture has been accompanied by a fragmentation that makes this topic domain
an excellent exemplar of the costs of an absence of paradigmatic consensus.
There is agreement on the fact that "research on organizational cultures is highly
fragmented. Empirical research addresses a wide variety of content themes and
research subjects. With regard to theory, researchers employ different ontological

as well as epistemological assumptions, research programs, concepts, and method-
ologies" (Kbers, 1995, p. 129). Thus, for instance, Martin (1992a), in an overview
of the literature, distinguished among three competing perspectives on organiza-
tional culture: (1) an integration perspective emphasizing consistency in the rela-
tionship among cultural manifestations, relatively great consensus among organi-
zation members, and the exclusion of interpretive ambiguity; (2) a differentiation
perspective emphasizing inconsistency in the relationship among cultural ele-
ments, consensus only within subcultures, and a channeling of ambiguity outside
subcultures; and (3) a fragmentation perspective that sees complexity in the rela-
tionship among cultural manifestations, a multiplicity of views rather than either
subcultural or total organizational consensus, and a focus on ambiguity.
Ebers noted that although the interpretive stance of much field research
might be useful for understanding cultural phenomena and the "theoretical heter-
ogeneity of organizational cultural research contributes to richness of ideas and
intellectual scrutiny" (1995, p. 131), the domain of culture research incurred
some costs as well from this fragmentation. The nature of the research literature
on organizational culture makes it "difficult to bring the various research findings
into relation and to consolidate what has been learned" (p. 132).
Ebers (1995, p. 153) developed a typology of organizational cultures repro-
duced here in Table 5-2. There are a number of advantages of this typology. First,
it considers the fact that "it might be fruitful not only to consider the intensity and
dispersion of a particular set of cultural orientations . . . but also their domain of
validity" (p. 157). Second, the typology highlights the various bases of individual
compliance to cultural values, a distinction not often emphasized. And the typol-
ogy highlights both the internal self-regulatory consequences of culture and also
the possibility of culture serving external legitimation and adaptive uses. In short,
the typology, based on the existing literature on culture, defines not only four
ideal types but, more important, some critical dimensions along which concep-
tions of culture can be usefully described.
Even as the academic debate about culture has proceeded, the world of prac-
tice took ideas as they were deemed useful and implemented them. So, as some
academics argued about whether or not culture could be managed, in some orga-
nizations, particularly many high-technology organizations, it was quite effectively
managed. Kuncla's (1992) ethnographic study of cultural control in a high-
technology firm obviously uncovered instances of resistance and control failure-
there is no system of management control, including the use of financial incen-
tives, that works perfectly. But what was striking was the extent to which there
was management consciousness about what they were doing and their overall
effectiveness in accomplishing what they sought to do. Even as some debated
about how to change cultures, or whether culture change can be directed, organi-
zations ranging from Ford (Paseale, 1990) to Sears were doing it.
Culture as a social control mechanism is important because it offers several
advantages over external control accomplished through rewards and sanctions. In
order to manage behavior through external control, it is generally necessary to
know in advance what behaviors or outcomes are important and are to be re-
r24 New Directions for Organization Theory
Table 5-2 Typology of Organizational Cultures
Cultural Ideal-types
Legitimate Efficient Traditional Utilitarian

Characteristic Culture Culture Culture Culture
Origination of Environmental Constituencies' Members' values, Members' (self-)

content norms and demands on beliefs, and tradi- interests
values performance tions
Basis of validity Ideology Adequate per- Affiliation Psychological and
formance legal contracts
Focus External support; Outcomes; ex- Trust tradition; Achievement; just
legitimacy pertise; plan- long-term commit- allocation of re-
ning; control ment wards and contri-
butions
Basis of indi- Identification; Social and ma- Internalization Calculations of
vidual com- ideological pres- terial sanc- consequences
pliance sures for confor- tioning
mity
Co-ordination Normative regu- Shared tele- Dramaturgical and Interlocking inter-
of actions lation ology communicative est and strategic
action action
Characteristic Public institu- Structurally in- Croups with stable Small, heteroge-
setting tional setting; terdependent membership, long neous groups of
performance dif- groups; moni- history, and inten- regularly con-
ficult to assess tored; perfor- sive interaction vening individu-
mance readily als with mutual
assessable interests and pur-
poses
From fibers (1995, p. 153).
warded. Because of task complexity and because of unanticipated circumstances,

this foresight is not always possible. A second problem is that, as already noted,
relying on external rewards or sanctions requires some supervisorial effort or sur-
veillance, and this effort can be both costly and counterproductive. Indeed, in
some situations, supervisorial control is simply impractical. Consider an airline
that intends to compete on the basis of outstanding levels of service, such as
Virgin Atlantic. How could one possibly monitor the numerous interactions be-
tween customers and airline personnel, many of which take place in dispersed
locations during flights? As Kunda wrote, cultural control is "designed to mini-
mize the use and deemphasizc the significance of traditional bureaucratic control
structures — hierarchical and functional differentiation, economically motivated
performance—and to elicit instead behavior consistent with cultural prescrip-
tions" (1992, p. 218).
A third issue is that external controls arc more likely to evoke psychological
reactance, particularly when such controls are first introduced into a situation.
Reactance theory suggests that individuals do not like to lose freedoms, and the
imposition of external constraint is a relatively obtrusive intervention that may

elicit feelings of constraint. Ironically, psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966) can
produce rebellions behavior that in turn makes further control even more neces-
sary (e.g., Pfeffer, 1994). Cultural control largely overcomes this problem because
controls come from the internali/ation of values and from peer enforcement. In
systems of cultural control, "there is evidence of a decentralization and a deepen-
ing of control: performance of the member role and particularly of the extensively
articulated beliefs and emotions it prescribes is 'supervised' by a broader group of
control agents —practically anyone who is a member of the organization" (Kunda,
1992, p. 219).
O'Reilly and Chatman (1996) noted that there were four mechanisms
through which organizations attempted to manage culture. Systems of participa-
tion in organizational decision making, a frequent feature of high-commitment
work organizations (Walton, 1985), provide individuals with the feeling that they
are making choices. This perception of choice increases commitment to the orga-
nization and to the decisions made. Consider, for instance, the application of
Taylorist principles of standardized work at New United Motor. In many settings,
employees rebel against the regimentation of minutely standardized work proce-
dures. This resistance was largely overcome at NUMMI by involving the workers
themselves in the process:
The first thing you do is teach workers the techniques of work analysis. Next . . .
you get the workers as a group to time each other with a stopwatch. . . . After
everybody has been timed, workers analyze what they think is the best perfor-
mance and break that process down into little pieces. . . . All this leads to a way
of doing the job that everybody agrees with. . . . The point is to get workers to
participate in defining the standards and encourage them to constantly make
suggestions to improve them. (Adler, 1992, p. 141)
Second, managers in organizations send signals about what is important and

valued through mechanisms such as what they spend time on, what they ask
questions about, and what they talk about (Peters, 1978; Pfeffer, 198Ib). Lan-
guage, symbols, and rituals are important in developing and maintaining a cul-
ture. Pettigrew wrote about "man as a creator of symbols, languages, beliefs, vi-
sions, ideologies, and myths, in effect, man as a creator and manager of meaning"
(1979, p. 572, emphasis in original). Graham's ethnographic study of Subaru-
Isuzu noted the importance of "certain words and actions which conveyed a sense
of equality" (1995, p. 107). The team metaphor was consistently repeated, and
workers were called associates. Symbolic measures also helped to reinforce the
culture of equality and teamwork:
Everyone, from the company president on down, wore the same basic uniform,
parked in the same general parking lots, ate in the same cafeteria, and was re-
stricted to a half-hour lunch period. . . . Clerical and management Associates
worked together in one large room without barriers. . . . SIA used rituals and
ceremonies to create a shared experience of belonging. These included morning
exercises and daily team meetings, (p. 110)
Even though the equality and egalitarianism was not always authentic, the steps
taken to provide evidence of these values did affect how employees felt about and
reacted to their work environment.
Third, cultures arc created through shared social information — informational
social influence (Dcutsch and Gerard, 1955). Particularly when people first enter
an organization, they arc often uncertain about what to do and what the rules of
the game are. If they arc exposed to consistent social information —consistency
in norms— about expectations for behavior, they are likely to conform to those
expectations. Consistency is often difficult to maintain under immediate perfor-
mance pressures but is critical to building a strong culture and implementing
cultural control, as Adler's reporting of the observations of a NUMMI manager
indicated: "At GM, it's easy to slip into the mentality of 'just do it—I've got a
production schedule to meet.' The biggest challenge for managers coming into
NUMMI is the absolute commitment to consistency to all our principles, not just
to a production schedule set by Marketing. At NUMMI, we've got to walk like
we talk" (p. 127). Many strong-culture organizations attempt to manage the infor-
mational environment by isolating, either physically or socially, through hard
work and inclusive social activities, individuals from other social influences that
would be distracting or diversionary, such as other organizations or outside inter-
ests.
Finally, organizations shape behavior through reward systems, although such
systems frequently don't use monetary rewards. Biggart's (1989) study of direct
sales organizations, such as Mary Kay and Tupperware, found that such organiza-
tions used frequent meetings, recognition of achievements, awards, and even visits
from a charismatic founder to reinforce behavior consistent with cultural values.
Underlying all of these forms of cultural control is always the implicit threat that
those who don't fit in will be expelled from the organization, and this fear of
social ostracism is also a strong factor promoting conformity to the organization's
core values and decision premises.
Leadership
Control in organizations is also exercised through individual, interpersonal influ-

ence, in which those in roles of authority motivate and direct others to act as they
would like. This interpersonal influence is often called leadership, a subject big
enough for a book, or many books, on its own. What is important is to understand
the issues that currently concern this subject of research. Perhaps the foremost
issue is whether or not leadership matters and, if so, in what situations individual
leadership action is likely to be most efficacious. Second, there is a question as to
whether leadership skills and behaviors can be learned; if so, to what extent, and
what are the most effective ways of shaping and changing behavior to enhance
leadership effectiveness? Third, and closely related, there is the question of what
effective leaders do, in terms of specific behaviors and actions. Here we briefly
review each of these issues.
Leadership Effects
Obviously, there are important differences on a variety of outeome variables de-

pending on leader behavior—for instance, the original studies on the effects of
democratic versus autocratic leadership demonstrated differences in both perfor-
mance and subordinate attitudes (Lippitt, 1940), and other experimental studies
over the years have also revealed leadership effects (sec House and Bactz, 1979,
for a review). The issue in the literature is not whether differences in leader
behavior might matter but whether, given the sorting and filtering that goes on
before people rise to leadership positions and the constraints under which those
leaders operate, the effects of leadership are of substantive importance in actual
organizational situations (Pfcffer, 1977). The argument that there is not much
effect of leader behavior maintains this is because leader behavior, within natural
situations, does not vary much across leaders, for two reasons: (1) external con-
straints and (2) a selection and socialization process that homogenizes those who
rise to leadership positions.
Not only do organizations select those for leadership positions in a process
that often constitutes homosoeial reproduction (Kanter, 1977), but a labor market
also constrains variation in who assumes leadership roles. Thus, for instance, Pfef-
fer and Davis-Blake (1986), studying National Basketball Association teams, ar-
gued that one reason why there may be no observed effect for coaches on team
performance is that the choice of new coaches is itself constrained by past team
performance. In general, it is probably reasonable to argue that effective and
successful leaders or managers would prefer to work in better organizations, so
that poorly performing organizations may have trouble in attracting the talent
necessary to make things different. Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1986) observed there
was no direct effect of succession on performance. But, when the competence of
the new coaches was included in the analysis (with competence assessed by previ-
ous win-loss record or by previous professional basketball coaching experience),
there was evidence of a succession effect.
The very real constraints on leader behavior (and indeed all behavior in orga-
nizations) make it problematic to find leader effects even if and when they occur.
Johns took as an example the proposition that "considerate behavior on the part
of leaders will be positively associated with subordinate performance" (1991, p.
80). He noted that for this research hypothesis to be supported, the following
conditions must exist:
1. The leaders in the sample must exhibit interpersonal variation in con-

sideration.
2. Subordinates must be capable of detecting variation in consideration.
3. Subordinates must report variations in consideration on the . . . ques-
tionnaire.
4. Variation in consideration must lead to variation in subordinate be-
havior. . . .
5. Variation in subordinate behavior must be translated into variation in
subordinate performance, (p. 80)
Johns noted that organizations might do things that restrict variation in leader
consideration and that subordinate performance could he affected by equipment
or other conditions. He noted that "constraints may exist that restrict required
variance and thus threaten the hypothesis in spite of an actual true-score relation-
ship between consideration and performance in the population" (p. 81). These
comments on the effects of constraints on evaluating hypotheses are applicable to
literatures other than that on leadership, but the arguments are particularly im-
portant in this context because of the very real selection and behavior constraints
often encountered. These constraints at once reduce the likelihood of finding
leadership effects and also make such effects less likely to exist.
Another variant of the argument to use caution in assessing the effects of
leaders is that one needs to be careful in inferring effects of leader behavior in
natural situations, because it is quite likely that managerial style itself adjusts
to differences in performance. An observed relationship between leadership and
performance might well be because performance causes leader behavior rather
than the reverse (Lowin and Craig, 1968).
The debate about whether or not leadership matters has occurred on two
fronts—theoretical and empirical. The empirical issue was joined with a study by
Lieberson and O'Connor (1972) that decomposed the variation in sales, profits,
and profit margins (profits/sales) for a sample of 167 large corporations over a
twenty-year period to effects associated with year, industry, company, and leader-
ship (as represented by the chief executive). The study found, not surprisingly,
that there were much larger industry and company effects than leadership effects.
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) replicated this methodology in an examination of the
effect of mayors on city budgets, specifically spending on different categories.
Again, there was only a small effect of leadership observed. The methodology
employed in these studies depends importantly on how the variance is decom-
posed (the order in which factors are considered) and also requires one to esti-
mate a time lag (including no lag, or contemporaneous effects) between leader-
ship succession and a change in the variable being studied. Moreover, effects
were described in relative terms. In absolute terms, a small percentage change in
either sales, profits, or budgetary expenditures can amount to a lot of actual dol-
lars, given the size of the units that were examined.
Weincr and Mahoney (1981), using a somewhat different methodology that
included more direct measures of company, industry, and period effects (e.g.,
organizational size, industry sales, and capital structure), observed substantially
larger effects for leadership in their study of 193 business firms over a nineteen-
year period. However, neither of their measures of leadership strategy explained
much variance. They argued that "means to identify causal variables of leadership
at the corporate level are needed" (p. 469). Meyer's (1975) study of government
finance offices from 1966 to 1972 discovered that there were more changes in
organizational structure in offices that selected new leaders compared to finance
departments in which there were no changes in leadership.
Two studies illustrate different methodologies that are more useful and valid
in assessing leadership effects. Lieberman, I.au, and Williams (1990) used Cobb-
Douglas production function models of factor productivity to examine the growth

in both labor and capital productivity in six automobile firms over an almost
forty-year period. The study is important, because it relied only on publicly avail-
able data and employed a different methodology for estimating leadership effects.
The authors found that "the hypothesis of no top management effects can be
rejected . . . for all of the firms except Toyota" (p. 1209). Moreover, the esti-
mated effects were large. For instance, the results indicated that "Ford's productiv-
ity level in the initial year of Petersen's [the CEO] regime was 21% above the
average initial year productivity level of all Ford executives over the sample pe-
riod" and that "his [Petersen's] annual rate of productivity growth was 3.1% above
the average of all Ford executives" (p. 1209).
If employed on a larger sample, this methodology, which permits the identi-
fication of specific magnitudes of effects of specific leadership regimes, would
permit one to explore which specific factors associated with a change in leader-
ship regime were responsible for increased or diminished productivity and pro-
ductivity growth as well as the conditions under which leadership effects were
larger and smaller. For instance, one inference from this study is that a well-
defined system (the Toyota manufacturing system) negates the effects of changes
in executive regimes but that executive change can have large effects when
the firm in question is struggling to catch up with an industry leader. It is unfor-
tunate that this line of research and associated methodology has not been
pursued.
A second promising empirical line of inquiry is represented in a study of the
performance of major league baseball players (Kahn, 1993). Kahn argued that a
good manager would be (1) better able to turn player inputs into victories and
(2) better able to cause players to perform better. Me measured the quality of
major league managers by their predicted salary based on performance. Player
ability was measured by past performance. He concluded that "managerial quality
was found to have . . . a positive . . . effect on team winning percentage, con-
trolling for team offensive and defensive inputs, as well as on player performance
relative to player ability" (p. 543). Kahn's study did not permit the estimation of
whether this managerial effect persisted over time or rather represented just an
initial change in performance. The basic ideas and methodology could potentially
be applied to other sports and in other contexts in which both aggregate and
individual performance was measurable.
The theoretical question was, why the persistent fascination with leadership?
Calder (1977) and Pfeffer (1977) both argued that leadership effects were attrib-
uted, particularly in uncertain situations, to achieve a feeling of mastery or con-
trol (Kelley, 1971; Langer, 1983). In this sense, the study of leadership repre-
sented the fundamental attribution error (Nisbett and Ross, 1980) at work.
Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich commented on the prominence of the study and
discussion of leadership: "it appears that the concept of leadership is a perma-
nently entrenched part of the socially constructed reality that we bring to bear in
our analysis of organizations. And there is every sign that the obsessions with and
celebrations of it will persist. . . . Such realities emphasize leadership, and the
concept has thereby gained a brilliance that exceeds the limits of normal scien-
tific inquiry" (1985, p. 78).
Meincll et al. (1985) introduced the idea of the romance of leadership, an
elevated belief in the efficacy of leaders and leader behavior. They found an
inverse relationship between the relative number of doctoral dissertations con-
cerning leadership and economic conditions, indicating that there was more inter-
est in leadership when economic conditions were worse. They also observed a
positive relationship between the number of articles published in the Wall Street
Journal concerning leadership and firm performance and, in a set of experimental
studies, found thai extreme performance outcomes were more likely to result in
attributions of leadership effect. In an analysis of their data that explored the
extent to which there is a desire to attribute performance to human agency, re-
gardless of hierarchical position, Meincll et al. observed statistically significant
positive correlations between attributions to leaders and to subordinates in the
experimental studies. The idea of the romance of leadership is persuasive, but
again, there has been insufficient pursuit of an initially promising idea. Two direc-
tions would seem to warrant exploration. First, it is highly unlikely that people
are born with the idea that leaders matter. The romance of leadership is learned,
and that stimulates the question of how and under what conditions some come
to believe in leadership effects more than others. It is likely that the degree to
which people have a romance of leadership varies across cultures, with possibly
more relevance in more individualistic cultures. Second, it would be worthwhile
to explore factors other than extreme performance or performance problems that
produce an increased attribution of leadership effects.
Even if one accepts both the empirical and theoretical critique of the leader-
ship literature (and certainly not everyone docs), the focus on leadership is quite
understandable and rational, given a pragmatic orientation. Even if a leader's
effects are constrained, someone in a leadership position must still do something.
After all, one cannot affect general economic conditions or the history of an
organization. Decisions about whom to choose for key positions remain, while
occupants of those positions have to take some action, regardless of how effica-
cious that action may or may not be. In that sense, the arguments about leader-
ship effects are theoretically interesting but possibly managerially and practically
irrelevant—people must be chosen for positions, trained to he as effective as they
can be in them, and, once in the jobs, do something, whether the impact is large
or small. It therefore remains important to develop research that can at least help
in addressing these three issues.
Nevertheless, the comments of Meindl and his colleagues are useful in help-
ing us understand how the leadership literature has evolved. For instance, the
current emphasis on building organizational vision and visionary organizations
(Collins and Porras, 1994) and the relative neglect of leader behaviors such as
consideration and initiating structure, behaviors that used to be studied (Fleish-
man, 1973) —arc comprehensible given the less hierarchical nature of many of
today's organizations. This has made the exercise of hierarchical, role-based lead-
ership less relevant and the task of building the ability to take coordinated collec-
tive action in the absence of direct hierarchical authority more important.
What Do Leaders Do?
On the question of what effective leaders do, the leadership literature has been
particularly interested in distinguishing charismatic or transformational leaders
from transactional leaders. Bass (1985) argued that transactional leaders exchange
rewards for behavior provided by followers while transformational leaders develop
relationships with followers that inspire and stimulate them to forgo their own
self-interest for some higher collective good. Shamir, House, and Arthur (1993)
argued that noncharismatic leaders affected followers' cognitions, such as their
calculations about the desirability of engaging in some behavior, and possibly
their ability to perform specific tasks. By contrast, charismatic leaders affected
followers' emotions and self-esteem or self-concept. Shamir et al. operationalized
charismatic leadership as an interaction and communication process between a
leader and others that results in the internalization of the leader's goals and val-
ues, a strong moral or personal (as contrasted with a calculative) commitment to
those values and goals, and a tendency on the part of the followers to submerge
their own interests and identity for the sake of the collectivity. House (1977) has
noted that one charismatic behavior is articulating ideological goals, which he
maintained had a more potent effect on the motivation and self-confidence of
followers than more utilitarian or pragmatic objectives. Shamir et al. (1993) noted
that, in comparison to noncharismatic leaders, charismatic leaders would tend to
use more references to values and moral justifications, make more references to
the collective, use more references to history and to more distant objectives, make
more positive statements about followers' self-worth, and communicate higher
expectations for the followers.
House (1977) argued that charismatic leaders differed from other leaders not
only in their behaviors but also in their own personal characteristics. In particular,
he linked the study of dispositions to the study of leadership by arguing that
leaders that have charismatic effects on subordinates differed from those that did
not have such effects in terms of their dominance, self-confidence, need for in-
fluence or power, and strong belief in the righteousness of their ideas.
Charismatic leadership is not likely to be exhibited equally in all circum-
stances. Shamir et al. (1993) argued that charismatic leadership is more likely to
emerge under conditions of greater uncertainty and ambiguity—when perfor-
mance cannot be easily quantified or measured, when means to achieve objec-
tives arc uncertain, and when it is difficult to link extrinsic rewards to individual
achievement. They also noted that charismatic leadership is more likely under
exceptional organizational conditions such as rapid changes in the environment,
performance pressures, reorganizations, mergers, or sudden growth. Note that the
conditions for the emergence of charismatic leadership are similar to those that
Meindl et al. (1985) argued were associated with the romance of leadership. But
that link is logical. The conditions that lead observers to attribute leadership and
to want to feel control are precisely those conditions that would make the appear-
ance of charisma more probable.
Because of the issues of attribution already discussed, experimental studies of
charisma offer the cleanest exploration of these ideas. Howell and Frost (1989)
conducted a study in which 144 second-year business students worked on a com-

plex and realistic in-basket exercise as the experimental task. Participants were
exposed to one of three leader behavior treatments — consideration, structuring,
or charismatic —delivered by confederates who were provided scripts and had
been trained to exhibit all three of the leadership styles employed in the study.
The study also manipulated social information about the task by using co-worker
confederates. Under one condition, co-workers expressed interest and enthusiasm,
while in the other they expressed disinterest and boredom and made disparaging
remarks about the relevance and usefulness of the exercise. Howell and Frost
(1989) found that individuals who worked for charismatic leaders performed sig-
nificantly better on the exercise, as rated by experts, and generated a wider variety
of courses of action, indicating more flexibility and creativity. Furthermore, those
subjects working for charismatic leaders reported significantly higher satisfaction
and less role ambiguity and a better relationship with the leader. There was also
a main effect of the social information manipulation.
The Howell and Frost (1989) study also begins to answer the question of
whether leadership can be learned. Although there have been arguments that
charisma emerges from certain distinct personality types (e.g., House, 1977;
House, Spanglcr, and Wyocke, 1991), the Howell and Frost study demonstrated
that, when people were given a script and training, various types of leader behav-
ior can be exhibited, at least for a short period of time. The scientific exploration
of whether leader behavior can be changed by various forms of training remains
largely underdeveloped, but the burgeoning market for leadership courses and
leadership training suggests at least that a substantial number of individuals and
organizations believe that such learning is possible.
The literature on charismatic and transformational leadership also has some-
thing to say, indirectly, about some of the other mechanisms of social control.
This literature suggests that the use of rewards and incentives, which is associated
with transactional leadership, is likely to be less effective and possibly ineffective
in ambiguous or stressful situations. And the literature on charisma is consistent
with the implications of psychological commitment and organizational culture
for developing control in organizations. Because the "rewards" offered by the
charismatic leader are not tangible, abiding by the leader's requests creates a situa-
tion in which behavior has been altered for insufficient extrinsic reasons, which
should lead to greater commitment to those behaviors. And, the organizational
culture literature's emphasis on values is consistent with the similar emphasis in
the transformational leadership literature.
There are a number of studies that have demonstrated the potency of infor-
mational social influence (e.g., R. W. Griffin, 1983; O'Reilly and Caldwcll, 1979;
see also Cialdini, 1988, for a review), such that we come to believe and to behave
as others in our environment do and tell us to. Clearly, therefore, one of the
critical roles of the leader is to interpret an ambiguous social reality, making sense
of the situation in a way that can mobilize behavior and provide reassurance (e.g.,
Pfeffer, 1981b). This is accomplished through the use of language, and language
is a powerful tool of leadership and social influence more generally. Pondy
(1978), Weick (1979), and Peters (1978) have all emphasized the importance of
language in the task of leadership. Eccles and Nohria noted, "To view manage-
ment from a rhetorical perspective is to recognize that the way people talk about
the world has everything to do with the way the world is ultimately understood and
acted in. . . . The primary task of managerial language has always been to per-
suade individuals to put forth their best efforts in a collective enterprise with other
men and women" (1992, p. 29). Consequently, "the basic task of management
. . . is to mobilize action by using language creatively to appeal to the self- and
collective identities of individuals" (p. 37).
The symbolic, rhetorical role of leadership would seem to rely on linguistic
skills, having a good vocabulary, and possessing the ability to select images and
language that reach and touch others. There is some case evidence that this is
true. Eccles and Nohria (1992) compared the language of Jack Welch, CEO of
General Electric and an individual who led it through an important transforma-
tion, with that of Roger Smith, the CEO of General Motors, who is generally
acknowledged not to have helped the organization become better at competing
in the automobile industry. They describe Welch's language as conveying "an
imaginative vision of the future, a realistic portrayal of the present, and a selective
depiction of the past which can serve as a contrast to the future" (p. 32). By
contrast, Smith "externalized GM's problems" and never provided enough detail
to his vision of building a twenty-first-century corporation to inspire action. Rheto-
ric that is effective in mobilizing action also maintains a balance between clarity
and ambiguity:
effective rhetoric aims to be clear but never too clear. It aims to be robust across
as many different situations as possible, and to be flexible enough to incorporate
the different meanings, emphases, and interpretations that different people will
inevitably give to it. . . . The concept of robustness also implies that the rhetori-
cal strategy should be dynamic, adjusting over time to evolving contingencies.
(p. 35)
To the extent rhetorical skill is critical for leaders, leadership training might
profitably involve training in drama and literature. It would be interesting to as-
sess the extent of such training in conventional leadership education as well as to
evaluate the effectiveness of this type of skill building compared to more cognitive
and rationality-based leadership development. The literature on management as
symbolic action presumes that there is enough uncertainty or ambiguity in situa-
tions such that language can direct and divert attention, creating meaning out of
ambiguity. This symbolic role of management has been emphasized in writings
about organizational culture (e.g., O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996) and is another
link between these mechanisms of social control.
Can Leadership Be Developed, Taught, or Learned?

Management training, broadly defined, is big business indeed. Each year some
70,000 plus students graduate from MBA programs just in the United States, and
business schools arc developing and expanding all over the world. Books on lead-
ership typically sell well, and leadership training for practicing managers is a
134 New Directions for Organization 'iheory
boom industry in its own right. There have been literally decades of study about
leader behaviors and their effects, and even the elements of charisma have been
studied. Consequently, one might expect to see a large literature on whether or
not leadership training makes a difference and which approaches are the most
effective. However, such a literature is virtually nonexistent. As Gaziel noted, "it
is ... difficult to find reports on empirical investigations concerning the degree
to which academic studies of management develop the skills and qualifications in
their students required for successful performance of managerial roles" (1994, p.
341), and a similar scarcity of reliable research exists for other forms of manage-
ment and leadership training as well. There are studies that rely on the self-reports
of those who have experienced leadership training. Such reports should, of
course, be viewed with a great deal of caution. Having invested time and energy
in a course of study, one is likely to rationalize that investment by saying that it
was helpful and useful. Moreover, many of these courses are at a minimum more
pleasant than work and often allow students to bond with the other members of
the class, and each of these effects would also be expected to produce high levels
of participant-reported satisfaction with the programs.
Kirkpatrick (1979) has developed a useful overview of how to evaluate the
effectiveness of leadership or, for that matter, any other kind of training. He ar-
gued that four criteria should be employed: (1) attitudes and perceptions of those
who participated in the program; (2) learning, which refers to mastery of princi-
ples, concepts, facts, and techniques; (3) behavior, or whether participants actu-
ally do things differently as a consequence of having been exposed to the training;
and (4) results, which refers to whether or not morale and turnover improves,
whether economic performance is better, and so forth. Of course, doing a com-
pletely valid study of these four dimensions would be difficult, as the problems of
inference are severe even with a control group design. Nevertheless, it does seem
that given the substantial investment of effort, it would be useful to know whether
the effort is worthwhile and, perhaps even more important, what forms of training
and education arc comparatively more efficacious under what circumstances.
In a study of the use of an assessment center process for developmental pur-
poses, Engelbrecht and Fischer (1995) did find that the experience did have an
effect even three months after participants had gone through it. Compared to a
control group, those managers who went through the developmental assessment
center process differed "in action orientation, task structuring, development, em-
pathy, managing information, and probing. No significant difference was found
in either synthesis or judgment. The results . . . indicate an improvement in
managerial performance regarding the six ... dimensions" (p. 397). Using be-
haviorally anchored rating scales, the study indicated that "the developmental
assessment center process can . . . be considered to be accountable for 14.3% of
the total variance in overall managerial performance . . . 3 months after center
attendance" (p. 398). This study provides evidence that interventions can affect
managerial behavior. It would be wonderful to have many more studies of this
type, with samples large enough to indicate under what conditions these interven-
tions have the greatest effect.
Mechanisms of Social Control i^
Conclusion
The subject of social control provokes ambivalence: on the one hand, it is a

necessary and important part of organizations, but on the other hand, individuals
want to believe that they are autonomous decision makers, exercising free will.
Thus, there seems to be a preference for social control practices such as the use
of financial rewards that have more of the character of a voluntary exchange and
that don't rely on deeper social psychological processes such as commitment and
emotion. Such control practices also fit more easily with the economic model of
behavior, which is more ideologically attractive. It seems to be the case that U.S.
organizations rely more on financial rewards than organizations in other cultures.
This is also reflected in the disproportionate research attention on compensation.
One wonders if this emphasis is because of individualistic, rational decision-
oriented social values. The evidence docs seem persuasive that control premised
in culture, language, and socialization and commitment processes is quite effec-
tive, while the evidence on the efficacy of financial rewards is substantially more
equivocal.
The ambivalence about the effects (if not the effectiveness) of social control
is in part responsible for the development of a critical perspective on organiza-
tions and their control practices, a subject considered in chapter 8. And this
ambivalence also has tended to result in the various social control perspectives
talking past each other, thereby missing opportunities for studies contrasting and
comparing the approaches. This remains an important research agenda.
6
Developing and Exercising Power

and Influence
Social control is often, although not invariably, embedded in a hierarchical pro-

cess. Certainly leadership, the use of rewards and sanctions, and the development
of an organizational culture all convey the implication of some central authority
that is setting up the reward system, appointing the leaders, and establishing the
corporate culture. For those living and working in organizations but not necessar-
ily in the most senior positions, social control takes on another connotation —how
to develop informal influence and power to achieve what one wants and needs
for task accomplishment as well as for individual benefit.
The exercise of informal influence is important not only because of individ-
ual agendas, however. Changes in organizations have made lateral, nonhierarchi-
cal influence comparatively more important. Organizations have flattened their
hierarchies, taking out levels of management as well as leagues of middle manag-
ers. There is simply less hierarchy left. The increasing emphasis on high-
commitment or high-involvement work practices and the concomitant emphasis
on self-managing teams (e.g., Katzenbach and Smith, 1993) means that the exer-
cise of formal, hierarchical control is less consistent with organizational values
and ways of organizing.
This dcemphasis on formal authority has been hastened by the increasingly
rapid pace of technological, social, and market change, with the corresponding
requirement for organizations to reduce the time it takes to make decisions, de-
sign products or services, and bring them to market. The emphasis on speed
means that few organizations can afford having decisions and information move
up and down formal hierarchies of authority. As a result of these trends, there is
increasing managerial and research interest in less formal ways of getting things
done; these less formal methods rely more on power and influence, leverage indi-
viduals' positions in social networks, and entail ongoing negotiations among orga-
nizational participants. Consequently, the subjects of power and influence and
136
Developing and Exercising Power and Influence 137
the biases and problems that beset negotiations have drawn increasing scholarly
attention.
Power and Influence
Power has had a bad name in social science research and is most often conspicu-
ous by its absence from the literature. It is not just Williamson (e.g., Williamson
and Ouehi, 1981) who has critiqued the concept and argued that it was neither
necessary nor useful for understanding organizations. Courses about power and
influence in schools of administration started only in the late 1970s and still exist
in comparatively few institutions. A perusal of management texts at that time and
even later reveals that power was often omitted entirely from consideration. When
it was discussed, the emphasis was on a relatively simple conception of interper-
sonal power—French and Raven's (1968) bases of power (expert, reward, sanc-
tion, and so forth). Perrow noted that "the literature on power in organizations is
generally . . . preoccupied with interpersonal or intergroup phenomena . . . or
else it takes as the major dimension of power the relative and absolute power of
levels in the hierarchy" (1970a, p. 60). Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson wrote that
"organizational psychologists have not been particularly interested in studying the
ways in which people at work influence their colleagues and superiors to obtain
personal benefits or to satisfy organizational goals" (1980, p. 440). Although power
may have always been important and certainly is becoming more so as hierarchi-
cal bases of authority erode under the environmental changes described above,
power as an idea docs not fit very well with either our conception of organizations
and individuals as being rational utility and efficiency maximizers or with our
social values that emphasize cooperation and deernphasize inequality in the ac-
cess to social resources.
We are profoundly ambivalent about power (Pfeffer, 1992) and that ambiva-
lence has led to recurrent questioning of the concept and its definition. Illustrat-
ing the pervasiveness of the ambivalence, Kanter noted, "Power is America's last
dirty word. It is easier to talk about money—and much easier to talk about sex—
than it is to talk about power" (1979, p. 65). John Gardner wrote, "In this country
. . . power has such a bad name that many good people persuade themselves
they want nothing to do with it" (1990, p. 55). Gandz and Murray, from a survey
of 428 managers, provided empirical evidence of the ambivalence: although the
managers overwhelmingly agreed with the statements "the existence of workplace
politics is common to most organizations" and "successful executives must be
good politicians," they also thought that "organizations free of politics are happier
than those where there are a lot of politics" and "politics in organizations arc
detrimental to efficiency" (1980, p. 244).
After first considering the definition of power and issues of its measurement,
we address three fundamental questions concerning power in organizations: (1)
under what circumstances are power and influence more important in organiza-
tional decision making, and under what circumstances are political skills less
critical for getting things done? (2) what are the important sources of power? and
(3) what arc the strategics and tactics through which interpersonal influence is
developed and exercised and power gets employed?
The Definition and Critique of the Concept of Power

Wrong defined power as the "intentional and effective control by particular
agents" (1968, p. 676), a definition closely related to that offered by Russell: "the
production of intended effects by some men on other men" (1938, p. 25). There
are three key elements in the definition: the influence of some over others, the
fact that power is not relegated to relations between superiors and subordinates
but includes interactions among equals as well, and the idea that this influence
is conscious and intended. Because of the concept of intent, Wrong saw power as
narrower in its definition than the broader idea of social control: "When social
controls have been internalized, the concept of power is clearly inapplicable.
. . . We must distinguish the diffuse controls exercised by the group over social-
ized individuals from direct, intentional efforts by a specific person or group to
control another" (1968, p. 676).
Power is also sometimes distinguished from authority. Authority is authorized
or legitimated power. The vesting of control in authorities not only makes the
exercise of power appear less arbitrary and visible, it also reduces the costs of
exercising power (Pfeffer, !981b, p. 4). The exercise of authority is expected —
that is why the authority is vested in certain roles and individuals in the first
place. The exercise of power may not always be so welcomed.
In order to demonstrate influence or control, most definitions of power in-
clude the idea of overcoming resistance. Dahl (1957, pp. 202-203) defined power
as a relation among actors in which one can get another to do something that
the other would not otherwise have done. Emerson wrote, "The power of an actor
A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be poten-
tially overcome by A" (1962, p. 32).
There are also important distinctions made between power as a capacity and
power as actually employed. Wrong noted, "power is usually defined as a capacity
to control others. . . . The evidence that a person or group possesses the capacity
to control others may be the frequency with which successful acts of control have
been carried out in the past" (1968, p. 77). March also maintained that "there
seems to be general consensus that . . . potential power is different from actually-
exerted power" (1966, p. 57). He wrote about what he termed activation models,
which assume that "power is a potential and that the exercise of power involves
some mechanism of activation" (p. 57).
The measurement of the concept of power, then, requires providing evidence
of intentional effects on outcomes of importance and the ability to overcome
resistance. As March has noted, this may be more difficult to do than first imag-
ined. He contrasted power with models relying on chance:
Suppose we imagine that each power encounter occurs between just two people
chosen al random from the total population. . . . Further, assume that at each
encounter we will decide who prevails by flipping a coin. If the total number of
encounters per person is relatively small and the total number of persons rela-
tively large, such a process will yield a few people who are successful in their
encounters virtually all of the time, others who are successful most of the time,
and so on. . . .All of the chance models generate power distributions. They are
spurious distributions in the sense that power, as we usually mean it, had nothing
to do with what happened. But we can still apply our measures of power to the
systems involved. (1966, pp. 51-52)
March noted that to distinguish power from chance, one needed to assess (1)
whether power was stable over time, (2) whether power was stable over subject
matter, (3) whether power was correlated with other personal attributes, and (4)
whether power was susceptible to experimental manipulation. He argued that
there was evidence for the presence of all of these conditions, and since that time
in particular an extensive experimental literature on power (e.g., Cook et al.,
1983) has emerged.
Nevertheless, March was concerned about the overuse of the concept of
power in analyzing social decision situations. Because power was so ubiquitous
and obvious in conversations about everyday life, there is a tendency "to assume
that it is real and meaningful. . . . However . . . we run the risk of treating the
social validation of power as more compelling than it: is simply because the social
conditioning to a simple force model is so pervasive" (1966, pp. 68-69). He also
was concerned that because of the obviousness of power, it would come to be
used as a residual category for explanation—a name for the unobserved variance
in research studies. As Dahl noted, "a Thing to which people attach many labels
with subtly or grossly different meanings in many different cultures and times is
probably not a Thing at all but many Things" (1957, p. 201). Unless considered
and studied quite carefully, the force activation model of power is quite difficult
to disprove:
It is clear from a consideration both of the formal properties of activation models
and of the problems observers have had with such models that they suffer from
their excessive a posteriori explanatory power. If we observe that power exists and
is stable and if we observe that sometimes weak people seem to triumph over
strong people, we are tempted to rely on an activation hypothesis to explain the
discrepancy. (March, 1966, p. 61)
In studies of power, it is essential to measure power separate from its use and
results and to define and measure power before the analysis of the social choice
rather than after. Again, however, since these initial concerns, a number of studies
have been reasonably successful in overcoming these empirical and theoretical
difficulties. Nonetheless, it is wise to keep them in mind in evaluating the litera-
ture on power.
There is an alternative perspective that maintains that the very ability of re-
spondents to so quickly identify power and to discuss it provides evidence of the
validity of the concept. Perrow has argued forcefully for this position:
Power is a preoccupation of the managers in the firms, as evidenced by the
interview data. . . . Given the nature of the concept and the "reality," I am not
disturbed that the term "power" has different meanings. . . . A single, consistent
meaning of power, or decomposition of the concept into various types, might be

preferable, but I doubt it. The annual production of new typologies and distinc-
tions . . . has been intellectually stimulating, but operationally a nightmare.
. . . To tic respondents to only one meaning would violate their own perceptions
of the complexity, as well as the reality, of power. (1970a, pp. 83-84)
Concepts are defined in fact by their operationalization, and consequently it

is useful to consider how power has been measured. One approach has been to
rely on reputation, with the presumption being that informants as individuals are
both willing and able to provide information on the power of social units. Perrow's
(1970a) study of power in twelve organizations asked respondents to rank each of
the four groups (sales, production, research and development, and staff services,
including accounting and finance) in terms of how much power they had. This
procedure defines power as zero-sum through the measurement process. Perrow
noted that such a simple question "docs not reflect the complexity of the concept.
. . . Yet . . . the internal consistency of subgroup perspectives suggests that the
bald term 'power' does have some consistent meaning" (p. 63). A study of the
power of subunits in breweries in Canada (Minings ct ah, 1974) also relied on
interviews and questionnaires to assess power. Studies of resource allocations in
universities (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Pfeffer and Moore, 1980b) assessed
power, in part, by asking each department head to rate all the departments as to
how much power they thought the departments possessed. In these latter cases,
since ratings rather than rankings were used, power was not defined so as to be
zero-sum.
'I'he evidence is compelling that individuals understand the question and,
moreover, that reputational indicators of power produce information that is highly
correlated across respondents:
In the University of Illinois study, department heads were asked to rate, on a

seven-point scale, the power of all of the departments being studied. Only one
department head even asked for a definition of what was meant by the concept
of power. . . . No department that was judged, overall, to be in the top third of
the departments in terms of power was rated by a single individual as being lower
than the top third. Similarly, no department that, overall, was rated in the bottom
third in terms of power was rated by a single person as being higher than the
bottom third. (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 55)
In part to overcome problems with reactivity and to be able to study power

historically, which is obviously not possible if one relies solely on the reports of
informants, other indicators of power have been developed. The studies of power
in universities, for instance, assessed what were key committees in the university
and then examined departmental representation on these committees as a mea-
sure of departmental power. The evidence indicated that this representational
measure was significantly correlated with the measure of departmental power
based on respondent reports, with a correlation of .61 at Illinois and .57 at the
University of California (Pfeffer, 1981c, p. 59).
In corporations, power of various subunits can be similarly assessed by exam-
ining the functional backgrounds of senior-level executives such as the CEO or

inside directors. For instance, the timing of the rise of attorneys to power at Pacific
Gas and Electric can be ascertained by their representation in officer- and
manager-level positions, where they increased from four in 1960 to eighteen by
1980 (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 58). Another measure of the power of attorneys in corpora-
tions is provided in a cross-cultural study by Miyazawa of U.S. based subsidiaries
of Japanese firms. He measured the power and prominence of the legal depart-
ment by its degree of professionalization, defined as "the employment of U.S.
licensed lawyers as in-house lawyers and . . . the placing of a U.S. in-house law-
yer at the head of the legal department" (1986, p. 100). In the typical Japanese
corporation, the legal department is part of a general affairs department and tends
to have lay people working on legal-related matters, so that using licensed attor-
neys represented a shift in the power of the department.
There are also suggestions in the literature that a reliable way to assess power
is by examining its consequences (Pfeffer, 1992) — for instance, the salaries paid
to people at comparable levels in different divisions, growth in budget, and so
forth. As long as the assessment of power using one set of indicators, including
effects of power on resource allocations, is used solely to predict other, distinct
outcomes, there is no problem with this procedure. If power has been measured
in a valid and reliable way, the various indicators should correlate with each other
and should operate as theoretically expected in studies of power (e.g., the mea-
sures of power should be predicted by theoretically developed determinants of
power and should explain outcomes that are presumably affected by power).
Finkelstein provided one of the most comprehensive evaluations of the mea-
surement of power in corporations, albeit he was focusing on the power of indi-
viduals in the top management team. Many of his measures, however, could be
generalized to other levels of analysis such as organizational subunits. He devel-
oped four separate indices of power. The first measured structural power, which
"is related to the distribution of formal positions within an organization" (1992,
p. 512). His indicators of structural power were the percentage of individuals in a
top management team with higher titles than the given individual (for the CEO
this number is 0), the total cash compensation received, and the number of offi-
cial titles a manager held. The second power index measured ownership power.
The indicators were (1) the percentage of a firm's shares owned by an executive,
(2) the percentage of the firm's shares owned by the executive's family, and (3)
whether or not the manager was the founder of the firm or was related to the
founder and whether or not the manager was related to other senior managers.
The third dimension of power assessed expert power. The measures were the
number of different functional areas a manager had worked in, the number of
different positions a manager had held in the firm, and whether or not the manag-
er's functional background matched the requirements of the environment for par-
ticular expertise. The final overall indicator of power was called prestige power
and "is related to a manager's ability to absorb uncertainty from the institutional
environment" (p. 515). The four indicators of this dimension of power were (1)
the total number of corporate boards a manager sat on; (2) the number of non-
profit boards a manager sat on; (3) the financial standing of the corporate boards
of which an executive was a member; and (4) whether or not the manager had
an elite education.
Finkelstein tested his measures of power on a sample of 1,763 top managers
from 102 firms in three industries over a five-year period. A factor analysis of all
of the indicators reproduced the four scales. Cronbach's alphas for each of the
scales were reasonably high, ranging from .67 for prestige power to .83 for struc-
tural power. A second study that asked for the perceived power of individuals
revealed that perceived power was most strongly correlated with structural power
and prestige power and was not statistically significantly correlated with expert
power and was only weakly correlated with ownership power. Finally, Finkelstein
reported that the consideration of the power of senior managers permitted better
predictions of diversification strategics than models that did not include the power
indicators.
Conditions Affecting the Use of Power

Because of the inherent appeal of force activation conceptions of power, it is
important to understand the conditions under which power is more likely to be
employed. Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) argued that power and influence would be
employed under conditions of resource scarcity and for critical resources or im-
portant decisions. If resources weren't scarce, there was little or no allocation
problem and no need to mobilize power. Similarly, if the decision did not con-
cern critical issues, there was little need to expend power resources on its determi-
nation. Their study of allocations of a number of different resources at the Univer-
sity of Illinois found evidence consistent with these predictions, although resource
criticality and scarcity were too highly correlated for the items they studied to
assess separate effects. For instance, the most critical and scarce resource, gradu-
ate fellowships, was correlated .44 with departmental representation on important
committees, while the least critical and scarce resource, summer faculty fellow-
ships, was correlated only .01 with that measure of power (p. 468).
A subsequent study of resource allocations to departments on two University
of California campuses that varied in the scarcity of resources confronted again
found support for the idea that power was used more under conditions of scarcity
(Pfeffer and Moore, 1980b). Studying 295 management units in forty-six divisions
of a large organization to explore the determinants of interunit influence attempts,
Gresov and Stephens also found that resource constraints increased the likelihood
of a unit's attempting to exercise influence. They noted that "proactive attempts
to influence other units may lead to an alteration of work and information flows
. . . that will change the extent and nature of demands on unit members and
existing structures" (1993, p. 256), so that influence activity within a set of related
units is one possible response to resource constraints and organizational design
problems. They reported that interunit influence attempts were also more likely
the lower the commitment to the status quo, the lower the managerial tenure,
and the greater the managerial dissatisfaction with unit performance.
A somewhat different view of the relationship between slack and power be-
havior comes from V. E. Schein (1979). She distinguished between power-

acquisition strategies and tactics related to the process of getting the work done
and power processes "designed to promote the self-oriented objectives of the indi-
viduals. Objectives such as promotion or increased status are related far more to
individual self-aggrandizement than they are to work-related objectives" (p. 290).
She argued:
it is proposed that the ratio of personal to work-related power acquisition behav-
iors is in favor of personal power . . . in high-slack systems, whereas the reverse
is true in low-slack systems. . . . Vigorous competition in the environment will
prevent managers from tailoring their activities to achieve their own personal
end and will require more work-related behaviors. . . . The absence of such
competitive conditions permits managers to pursue their own goals without obvi-
ous disruption of the system, (p. 290)
Schein's article did not provide any evidence for the claim that efficiency
considerations would drive out at least some forms of power behavior—the most
self-serving—and this remains an important empirical question. There is the
problem with this argument that the very definition of how much slack or how
much environmental pressure there is, the question of what is the most appro-
priate response, and the issue of which individuals or units are best suited to
coping with the problem are all settled at least in part through a political process.
Surveys of managers by Gandz and Murray (1980) and Madison et al. (1980)
asking what levels, functions, and decisions in organizations seemed to most in-
volve the use of power revealed that power was used more in major decisions,
such as reorganizations or personnel changes, and was used more at senior organi-
zational levels, which also presumably deal with more important decisions. Their
results also indicated that power was used more in areas in which there was more
uncertainty and in which performance was harder to assess (e.g., staff rather than
line production operations).
This idea that power would be used more under conditions of uncertainty or
ambiguity has been examined in a number of studies focusing on science and
academia. The basic idea came from a typology of decision situations developed
by Thompson and Tuden (1959). They categorized decision situations according
to whether or not there was agreement about goals or preferences and whether or
not there was agreement about technology—the connections between actions and
their consequences. A summary of their typology noted:
computational decision making procedures involved in rational choice are used
in decision making only when there is agreement both on the goals and on the
connections between actions and outcomes. When there is no agreement on
goals, compromise is required to reach a decision. When there is no agreement
on technology, judgment is necessary to determine the best course in achieving
consensually shared goals. And when there is neither agreement on goals nor on
technology, an unstructured, highly politicized form of decision making is likely
to occur. (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 71)
The operationalization of the operation of power in these studies has typically

been to examine the extent to which resources are allocated to individuals who
144 ^'ew Directions for Organization Theory
share an important social affiliation under varying conditions of uncertainty — for

instance, to what extent do National Science Foundation grant allocations match
the composition of the review panel, controlling for other factors, under varying
degrees of uncertainty? 'I'he presumption in this research is that allocations based
on social similarity or on shared social connections reflect the operation of influ-
ence and politics. In a scries of studies that equated the degree of uncertainty
with the extent to which a scientific field was paradigmatically developed (Lodahl
and Gordon, 1972), it was shown that the greater the degree of uncertainty (or
the lower the level of paradigm development characteri/ing a field), the greater
the effect of politics on National Science Foundation grant allocations (Pfcffer,
Salancik, and Leblebici, 1976), the choice of editorial board members (Yoels,
1974), and the publishing of articles (Pfeffer, Leong, and Strehl, 1977).
Pfeffer (1992) has also argued that power is used more when there are differ-
ences in point of view or disagreements that must be resolved. And social influ-
ence and polities will be used more when interdependence among subunits is
higher, requiring more coordination of behavior and increasing the interdepen-
dence of that behavior.
Sources of Power
Research has identified numerous sources of power for both individuals and orga-
nizational subunits. Some sources of power are personal characteristics. R. W.
Allen et al. (1979) interviewed eighty-seven managers, including thirty chief exec-
utives, in southern California electronics firms to assess their beliefs about the
personal characteristics associated with being powerful and being effective in the
use of organizational politics. The characteristics mentioned most frequently
were: articulate, sensitive, socially adept, competent, and popular. The study-
raises two issues. First, in relating personal characteristics to power, one needs to
be careful that the characteristics associated with power (for example, self-
confidence or being popular) are not a consequence of power rather than its
source. It is reasonable to argue that one will be more socially adept and popular
to the extent one has power—these characteristics may be both products and
sources of power. The characteristics may also not be independent of each
other—articulate and sensitive people may be more popular as a result. Second,
there is the question of the extent to which these characteristics arc relatively
fixed or are malleable. Some, such as sensitivity and articulateness, can presum-
ably be affected by training in clinical skills and public speaking, respectively.
Other sources of power are structural, deriving from one's position in the
division of labor or one's location in the network of communication. As Perrow
noted, "the preoccupation with interpersonal power has led us to neglect one of
the most obvious aspects of this subject: in complex organizations, tasks are di-
vided up between a few major departments or subunits, and all of these subunits
are not likely to be equally powerful" (1970a, p. 59). One structural source of
power is the ability to cope with the uncertainty an organization faces (Hickson
et al., 1971; Minings et al., 1974). Since the form and amount of uncertainty can
vary, depending on the particular decision and situation, so too do the characteris-
tics associated with having power.
For instance, a study of 304 professionals in a research and development

laboratory (Tushman and Romanclli, 198?) found that the type of person who
had the most influence depended on the type of project—in applied research
units, individuals who spanned boundaries were the most influential, while in
technical service projects, with less uncertainty, those most central in the internal
communication structure had more power. Boeker (1989), examining the power
of subunits in semiconductor firms, discovered that founding conditions and the
background of the entrepreneur that started the company affected relative power
and the perceived importance of different functional units. Miyazawa's study of
the status and professionalization of legal departments in thirty-six of the largest
Japanese subsidiaries operating in the United States found that this varied by "the
industrial specialization of the subsidiary" (1986, p. 152). Although the trading
subsidiaries were the largest, they were among the least professionalized. By con-
trast, subsidiaries in the field of transportation equipment had comparatively
larger legal staffs with higher-status personnel, because there were more legal
risks, particularly pertaining to product liability and antitrust.
Another important source of power is the ability to provide resources for the
organization. Studies of universities (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974; Pfeffer and
Moore, 1980b) found that those departments that brought in the most grants and
contracts, with their associated overhead, had the most power. J. D. Ilackman
(1985) has referred to the ability to obtain critical resources needed by the institu-
tion as environmental power and found this to be related to university depart-
ments' power.
The ability to cope with uncertainty or to bring in resources is not enough —
it is also important that the individual or work unit be central in the workflow
and communication structure to develop and exercise influence. Pettigrew's
(1972; 1973) ease study of a computer purchase decision illustrated how a man-
ager who sat astride the flow of communication was able to substantially influence
the final decision through his ability to filter and selectively present information.
Ibarra, investigating the effects of individual attributes, formal position, and net-
work centrality on the exercise of influence, reported that centrality was more
important for administrative innovation roles and was equal to formal position in
its effects on exercising influence in technical innovation roles. She concluded
that "an organization's informal structure may be more critical than its formal
structure when the exercise of power requires extensive boundary spanning"
(1993a, p. 471). Brass and Burkhardt (199?) also found that an individual's net-
work centrality was significantly related to others' perceptions of that individual's
power.
Power accrues to those who can more accurately assess the social landscape.
Krackhardt (1990) studied a small entrepreneurial firm and compared perceptions
of the friendship and advice network to the actual networks, as empirically as-
sessed. Those with more accurate perceptions of the existing advice network were
rated as being more powerful by others in the organization, although accurate
perceptions of the friendship network were unrelated to perceived power.
Because power is used to obtain resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Pfeffer
and Moore, 1980b), power becomes self-perpetuating through the effective use of
the resources so acquired. Boeker (1989) found that the power distribution estab-
lished at the time of a firm's founding tended to persist in his sample of semicon-
ductor firms. Studying subunits in health care clinics, Lachman (1989) observed
that previous power position was the best predictor of subsequent power. One way
in which power is self-perpetuating is through the impact of the effective use of
power on an individual's reputation, which then becomes a source of power:
"Most observers would agree that present reputations for power are at least in part
a function of the results of past encounters. . . . Most observers would probably
also agree that power reputation, in turn, affects the results of encounters" (J. G.
March, 1966, p. 57).
Power also derives from formal position or authority. Brass and Burkhardt
(1993) reported that level in the organizational hierarchy was significantly related
to others' perceptions of a focal individual's power. Sometimes that formal posi-
tion can be used to protect the powerholder from the consequences of poor per-
formance. Bocker (1992) studied sixty-seven organizations over a twenty-two-year
period and asked what happened to chief executives when organizational perfor-
mance was poor. He found that powerful chief executives were able to survive
performance downturns by displacing the blame onto their subordinates, who
tended to be replaced when perfonnance suffered. By contrast, less powerful chief
executives, who had less power because they owned less of the company's stock
and there were more outsiders on the board of directors, were not able to displace
poor perfonnance and fire their subordinates; rather, they were replaced them-
selves.
Power is built by doing favors for others. Studies of the power of chief execu-
tives and its effects consistently find that the higher the proportion of outside
directors the CF,O has appointed, the more favorably that individual is treated.
The argument is that being appointed to the board by someone activates a norm
of reciprocity, and one is tied to the individual who did the appointing. Wade,
O'Reilly, and Chandratat (1990) noted that there was a higher incidence of the
provision of golden parachutes —contracts that pay off executives if they lose their
jobs because of a change in control of the corporation, through a takeover, for
instance — for CEOs who had been able to appoint more outsiders to their boards.
Strategies and Tactics for Using Power

Studies of how power is actually employed are scarcer than studies of the determi-
nants of power or the conditions under which it is used in organizations, for the
simple reason that the empirical obstacles to conducting such analyses are
greater. Pfeffer (1992) has proposed a number of tactics for exercising power: (1)
those having to do with timing, including delay, waiting, and moving first; (2)
interpersonal influence strategics such as social proof, liking, commitment, con-
trast, reciprocity, and scarcity (Cialdini, 1988); (3) strategic presentation of infor-
mation and analysis and selective use of data to buttress one's case; (4) reorganiza-
tion to consolidate power or to break up the ability of one's opponents to coalesce;
(5) use of evocative, emotion-producing language to mobilize support or quiet
opposition; and (6) use of task forces and committees to co-opt opposition. Most
of these techniques were illustrated with examples, bill a few have sonic system-
atic empirical study behind them.
An insightful article by Schwartz (1974) analyzed waiting and delay as both

indicators of power and as ways of exercising power. Schwartz provided anecdotal
examples to illustrate the general theoretical point:
Waiting is patterned by the distribution of power in a social system. This assertion
hinges on the assumption that power is directly associated with an individual's
scarcity as a social resource and, thereby, with his value as a member of a social
unit. . . . The person who desires a valued service generally cannot gain imme-
diate access to its dispenser, but must instead wait until others are accommo-
dated. . . . To be able to make a person wait is, above all, to possess the capacity
to modify his conduct in a manner congruent with one's own interests. To be
delayed is ... to be dependent upon the disposition of the one whom one is
waiting for. The latter . . . by virtue of this dependency . . . finds himself fur-
ther confirmed in his position of power, (pp. 843-844)
Schwartz noted that waiting is a form of investment and, like other forms of
investment and commitment, increases the value of the object being sought. If
one did not think the person waited for was important or valuable, then one
would have engaged in a senseless activity. Conversely, the more one waits, the
more important and valuable must be that which is waited for, to make sense of
one's own behavior:
if we regard waiting for a scarce service as an investment or sacrifice in return
for a gain, we may measure part of the value of the gain by assessing the degree
of sacrifice occasioned on its behalf. . . . The subjective value of the gain is
therefore given not only by the objective value of the service but also by the
amount of time invested in its attainment. . . . The other's service becomes
valuable (and he becomes powerful) precisely because he is waited for. (1974, p.
857)
These initial insights on the relationship between time, waiting, and power
have not been extensively pursued in subsequent empirical study. This seems a
shame, because, as Schwartz noted, "queuing for resources is ... a fundamental
practice of social organization" (1974, p. 842). Much could be learned about
power distributions by examining patterns of waiting time, and the use of delay
or waiting to create or ratify power remains to be empirically explored, particu-
larly as to the boundaries beyond which this strategy may backfire.
In an attempt to systematically understand influence tactics, Kipnis, Schmidt,
and Wilkinson (1980) developed a fifty-eight-item questionnaire focused on vari-
ous targets of influence (peers, superiors, and subordinates) that was factor ana-
lyzed to extract eight dimensions of influence: assertiveness, ingratiation, rational-
ity, sanctions, exchange, upward appeals, blocking, and coalitions. They found
that the use of these influence tactics varied systematically with the context in
which they were attempted. The higher the status of the target person, the greater
the reliance on rationality tactics (e.g., writing a memo, using logic, or making a
plan). Assertiveness was used more with lower-status targets, and exchange was
used most frequently with co-workers. The reasons for exercising influence also
affected the choice of tactics: personal assistance prompted the use of ingratiation,
while efforts to improve a target individual's performance tended to rely on assert-
iveness and rationality. Kipnis ct al. found that "respondents showed the least
148 New Directions for Organization 1'heory
variation in choice of tactics when attempting to influence their subordinates. No

matter what the reason for influencing subordinates, the use of assertiveness . . .
accounted for the most variance for each reason" (1980, p. 450). The study found
no effect of gender on the choice of influence tactics. Brass and Bnrkhardt
(1993), studying how others perceive an individual's power, found that some be-
havioral tactics, such as the use of assertiveness, ingratiation, exchange, and form-
ing coalitions with others, were significantly related to perceptions of power, and
this effect was independent of structural position.
Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) explored how the influence tactics used by subor-
dinates on their superiors affected their salaries, evaluations, and tension or stress.
Based on responses to six scales, four types of influence styles were identified: (1)
shotgun, typified by individuals who tended to use all of the influence strategies
almost indiscriminately, and were particularly high on the use of assertiveness; (2)
ingratiator, typified by individuals who scored high on friendliness and had aver-
age scores on the other scales; (3) bystander, typified by individuals who scored
low on their use of all of the influence strategics, and (4) tactician, typified by
individuals who scored high on the reason (or rationality) strategy and had aver-
age scores on the other scales. They found that men and women who used a
shotgun style received lower performance ratings. For men, the style that worked
best was the tactician. In a study of CEO salaries, Kipnis and Schmidt (1988)
found that those that employed the tactician strategy earned more than those
using other approaches. The shotgun style was associated with the most stress and
tension. This study complements the earlier study of Kipnis and his colleagues
that investigated the correlates of the use of different influence approaches by
showing that different influence styles have different levels of effectiveness. One
issue with all of the Kipnis studies is that they rely on self-reports of influence
behavior, which may not be completely accurate. However, there is no reason to
believe that the errors arc systematically related to the effects being studied.
Gargiulo (1993) studied the use of co-optation to overcome political con-
straint in a cooperative agribusiness in South America. He found that, consistent
with resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salaneik, 1978) predictions, leaders
tended to build ties of interpersonal obligation with people who directly affected
their performance in the organization. When, however, such direct ties could not
be built, because of interpersonal friction or fundamental differences about pol-
icy, effective leaders used a two-step process in which they built co-optive rela-
tions with others who could affect the behavior of the person on whom they
depended. Pfeffer and Salaneik (1977), in their study of resource allocations at
the University of Illinois, discovered that department heads that (1) knew their
department's comparative position along a set of possible criteria for resource
allocation and (2) advocated those criteria in decision making were able to obtain
more resources for their departments, even controlling for the power of the de-
partment.
Power is accomplished through talk. In an interesting analysis of some testi-
mony from the Watergate hearings, Molotch and Boden investigated "the ways
people invoke routine conversational procedures to accomplish power" (1985,
p. 273). They noted that there were three faces of power:
The first face of power is the capacity to prevail in explicit contests. . . . A

second face of power (somewhat less visible) is the ability to set agendas, to
determine the issues over which there will be any explicit contest at all. . . .
Our third face of power is the most basic of all: it is the ability to determine the
very grounds of the interactions through which agendas arc set and outcomes
determined; it is the struggle over the linguistic premises upon which the legiti-
macy of accounts will be judged, (p. 273)
Their focus was on Senator Gurncy's attempts to discredit the very damaging
testimony of John Dean. Gurney was a Republican and a partisan defender of
President Nixon; John Dean had been the president's legal counsel and provided
evidence concerning Nixon's role in the Watergate cover-up. Gurney's strategy
was to demand the literal truth, free of any interpretive context—to demand just
the facts. When Dean could not provide this "literal truth" and sought to explain
the circumstances of a particular conversation, Gurney used this as a way to
discredit Dean's account. As Molotch and Boden noted, "if all accounts are poten-
tially vulnerable to the challenge that they are not really objective, then any conver-
sationalist is open—at all times —to the charge of interactive incompetence"
(p. 274, emphasis in original). They concluded by noting that "demands for 'just
the facts,' the simple answers, the forced-choice response, preclude the 'whole
story' that contains another's truth" (p. 285). Gurney was able to translate his
potential power advantage, derived from being a U.S. senator, the questioner in
the proceedings, and Dean's admission of personal culpability in the events, into
an interactional advantage through the use of a conversational ploy of asking only
for the literal truth. In addition to providing a specific example of a conversational
strategy used for exercising power, the Molotch and Boden study illustrates the
potential for this line of analysis to illuminate other situations in which talk is
part and parcel of how power is accomplished.
Emotion is, along with language, another important way in which influence
is exercised in organizational settings. As Rafaeli and Sutton wrote, "The view
that organization members routinely use expressed positive emotions as tools of
social influence is ubiquitous in organizational behavior" (1991, p. 749). Ex-
pressed negative emotion can also be a potent influenccr. Sutton's (1991) study
of bill collectors found that negative emotions could be part of an influence
strategy of negative reinforcement—when the debtor paid (or at least promised to
pay), the anger and disapproval expressed by the bill collector stopped. Thus, the
debtor was reinforced (a noxious external stimulus was removed) for agreeing to
pay. "Bill collectors believe that expressed emotions such as anger, irritation, and
mild disapproval serve as tools of social influence when such conveyed feelings
induce anxiety in debtors, and debtors construe that escape from such anxiety
will be the consequence of complying with the collectors' demands" (Rafaeli and
Sutton, 1991, p. 750).
In an ethnographic study of bill collectors and Israeli police interrogators,
Rafaeli and Sutton explored the use of emotional contrast strategies as tools of
social influence. The principle is that "stimuli that are presented before, during,
or after a given stimulus shape its meaning" (1991, p. 750), so that what is nice
or noxious behavior is very much affected by the context in which that behavior
occurs. Thus, for instance, Kipnis and Vandervccr (1971) found that subjects in
the role of supervisor were more likely to give larger pay raises and higher perfor-
mance evaluations to subordinates attempting influence through ingratiation
when a hostile co-worker was present as contrasted to situations in which that
hostile co-worker was not present. The Rafaeli and Button data suggested that five
emotional contrast strategies were employed: "(1) sequential good cop, bad cop,
(2) simultaneous good cop, bad cop, (3) one person playing both roles, (4) good
cop in contrast to hypothetical bad cop, and (5) good cop in contrast to expecta-
tions of bad cop" (1991, p. 758). They argued that the presence (or threatened
presence) of both styles of behavior made the good cop behavior appear nicer
and the bad cop behavior appear nastier than if either were presented alone.
They concluded that there were three mechanisms through which the perceived
amplification of expressed emotion, accomplished by using emotional contrast
strategies, worked:
First, target persons may experience accentuated anxiety in response to bad cops
and accentuated relief in response to good cops when there is a contrast. . . .
They may acquiesce with requests for compliance in order to escape from the
anxiety or fear. . . . Second, the contrast may accentuate the targets' perceptions
that good cops are kind arid helpful. As a result, the targets may feel pressure to
reciprocate the kindness by complying with the good cops' wishes. Third, accen-
tuated feeling of relief in response to good cops . . . may lead target people to
develop trust in the good cops. (pp. 764-766)
Our understanding of power and influence processes has advanced substan-
tially through research using multiple methods. What that work has not done yet
is to explore the scope conditions for the various influence strategies and sources
of power. We know less than we might about how strategies of social influence
fail, about when theoretically predicted determinants of power don't predict actual
power, and about when power is used in situations either more or less than pre-
dicted by the context. Consequently, some important research remains to be
done.
Negotiation in Organizations
One of the important ways in which interpersonal influence is accomplished is

through negotiation. Research on negotiation is an active area and therefore war-
rants attention distinct from other interpersonal influence issues. One reason re-
search on negotiation has grown is that negotiation is ubiquitous in and between
organizations (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Individuals negotiate salaries and other
terms and conditions of employment, they negotiate for budgets and other re-
sources for their work groups, they may negotiate with suppliers or customers or
with various regulatory or governmental bodies, and as members of a task force
or team they may negotiate over preferred courses of action and decisions. Inter-
personal influence is often exercised through a process of negotiation. Since the
mid-1980s there has been an explosive growth in research on negotiations and a
possibly even greater increase in courses and seminars dealing with the subject.
Up until the 1990s, virtually all of the literature on negotiation ignored con-
text almost completely, focusing either on the structure of payoffs and relative
power or on individual differences in negotiation behavior. More recently, much
of the research has focused on cognitive biases because of the premise that "to
negotiate most effectively negotiators need to make more rational decisions"
(Neale and Bazerman, 1991, p. 1). This research builds on the extensive work on
biases in decision making (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) under the premise
that "negotiation represents a special case of decision making" (Neale and North-
craft, 1990, p. 56). This cognitive emphasis contrasts with the game theoretic
approach to analyzing strategic interaction in economics, an approach that im-
plies that "the structure of the negotiation determines its outcomes. The behavior
and cognitions of players during negotiations simply represent the unfolding . . .
of the structure. . . . Similarly, game theory allows no explicit role for the social
processes that behavioral scientists often argue characterize negotiation (Neale
and Bazerman, 1991, p. 9).
The decision- or cognitive-bias approach also contrasts with an earlier focus
on the effect of individual differences and personality on negotiation processes
and outcomes. Neale and Bazerman, reviewing the extensive literature on the
effect of individual differences such as gender, cognitive complexity, locus of con-
trol, self-esteem, and risk preferences on negotiations, concluded that "individual
differences offer little insight into predicting negotiator behavior and negotiation
outcomes" (1991, p. 4). These authors also eschewed emphasizing the effects of
situations, not because situational factors such as power differences or a negotia-
tor's particular audience or constituency are unimportant, but rather because
these situational factors cannot typically be altered by negotiators.
A number of cognitive biases have been reliably uncovered, many of which
are consistent with the more general literature on decision biases (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). "A variety of heuristics have been identified which systemati-
cally distort the negotiation process and potentially bias negotiation outcomes.
Four of these cognitive heuristics are framing, anchoring-and-adjustment, avail-
ability, and overconfidence" (Neale and Northcraft, 1990, p. 57). There is a ten-
dency for negotiators to rely too much on available information (Neale, 1984).
"Colorful, dynamic, concrete, and otherwise vivid or distinctive stimuli dispropor-
tionately attract attention and . . . influence decision makers' deliberations"
(Neale and Northcraft, 1990, p. 59). As an example in a negotiating context,
opportunity costs, the cost of an alternative forgone, are much less vivid than out-
of-pocket costs and are therefore not given enough weight in negotiations (North-
craft and Neale, 1986).
The idea of framing comes from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), which suggests that "decision makers are risk-averse when choosing be-
tween certain gains and the risk of larger or no gains, but are risk-seeking when
choosing between certain losses and the risk of larger or no losses" (Neale and
Northcraft, 1990, p. 57). The same outcome can be framed as a gain or a loss
depending on the individual's initial negotiating position and expectations. Stud-
ies (e.g., Neale and Bazerman, 1985) have shown that positively framed negotia-
tions result in more completed agreements, but negatively framed negotiations
result in completed agreements of greater value (Neale and Northcraft, 1990,

p. 58).
Anchoring-ancl-adjustment reflects the process by which an arbitrarily chosen
reference point influences judgments and behavior. This phenomenon accounts
for the importance of the initial offer in bargaining, which then anchors subse-
quent adjustments. Northcraft and Neale (1987) have shown how a house's listing
price anchors the estimates of its market value, even for experienced real estate
agents. Because of the importance of the initial bargaining position in anchoring
future concessions (which move from this initial position), "tough-to-soft" (Chert-
koff and Conley,. 1967) and "door-in-thc-facc" (Coker, Neale, and Northcraft,
1987) negotiating strategies are quite successful. Negotiation research has also
demonstrated that negotiators arc frequently overconfident in their ability to ob-
tain favorable outcomes (Bazerman and Neale, 1982). In a situation of final offer
arbitration, negotiators believed their offer had a 67.8 percent probability of being
accepted (Bazerman and Neale, 1982). This overconfidence decreased negotia-
tors' willingness to make concessions (Neale and Bazerman, 1985). Research has
shown that negotiators frequently overlook the opportunity to negotiate for mutual
gains because of the assumption that the situation is zero-sum (Ba/erman, Magli-
o/zi, and Neale, 1985) and are trapped by previously adopted positions in a pro-
cess of commitment (Northcraft and Neale, 1986). There is evidence that conces-
sions by opponents arc devalued (Stillcnger et al., 1990) and that there is
frequently little effort made by negotiators to try to understand their opponent's
cognitive perspective or interests (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987), thereby missing
out on some information that would be useful to formulating a more effective
negotiating approach.
Although cognitive bias may be important, it is not everything in understand-
ing negotiation or, for that matter, other behavior in organizations. Tetlock has
identified much of this research as relying on one of two metaphors: (1) "the
social perceivcr as intuitive psychologist who strives for 'cognitive mastery of the
causal structure of the environment' (Kelley, 1967, p. 193)" and (2) "the intuitive
economist whose primary goal in life is the maximization of subjective expected
utility" (1992, p. 334). He wrote, "the psychologist and economist research pro-
grams have largely ignored the social settings in which people make most deci-
sions. Subjects in laboratory studies of cognitive processes rarely feel accountable
to others for the positions they take. They function in a social vacuum . . . in
which they do not need to worry about the interpersonal consequences of their
conduct" ('I'ctlock, 1992, p. 335).
Recent research has brought social context into the study of negotiations
(e.g., Kramer and Messick, 1995). Much as Tetlock (1985a) demonstrated that
decision biases were affected by the presumed presence of a social context that
made an individual accountable, this research on negotiation has demonstrated
that the experimental induction of a particular social identity, accomplished on
occasion by subtle changes in task structure (Larrick and Blount, 1995), have
important consequences for activating cooperative or competitive behavior. Some
studies on the effects of social context involve constituent accountability, where
negotiators are acting on behalf of a larger constituency. "These studies find that
when negotiators are accountable to constituents who are monitoring their perfor-
mance, they are more likely to engage in noncoopcrative behavior during negotia-
tion" (Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton, 1993, p. 639). Under conditions of
accountability, there is less likelihood of reaching agreement, concessions arc
reduced, and there is more use of competitive bargaining tactics, Tetlock has
noted, "accountability to constituents . . . induces concern for appearing strong
by refusing to make concessions. People respond by employing competitive bar-
gaining tactics that, while obstacles to resolving conflicts of interest, are quite
effective in protecting their images in the eyes of constituents" (1985a, p. 311).
Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton (1993) examined the effect of making
social identity and accountability salient in a two-person negotiation context. So-
cial identity was manipulated by having the subjects, MBA students, list all the
ways in which they were similar to other MBAs (high social identification) or to
list all the ways in which they were unique or different (low social identification).
Kramer et al. argued and found that in high social-identity conditions, negotiating
outcomes would be more equal (there would be smaller differences in the scores
earned by the two parties to the negotiation), because "decision making will re-
flect greater concern with the outcomes obtained by the other person" (p. 638).
Accountability also increased the equality of negotiating outcomes, because
"when individuals feel interpersonally accountable to another part)', they are
more likely to use an equality rule when dividing resources" (p. 640).
As Barley has noted, "In daily life, persons are almost always members of
groups whose values and beliefs shape their behavior and cognition. People typi-
cally dispute and bargain as members of families, communities, cliques, and or-
ganizations, not as isolated actors whose judgment is unfettered by social rela-
tionships" (1991, p. 169). Consequently, this line of research is substantively
important for understanding negotiation. It brings elements of the social model
of behavior to the task of understanding this important social process.
In addition to bringing in social context effects, research has explored the
effects of motivational and affective processes on negotiations. Carnevale and Isen
(1986), for example, found that inducing a positive mood facilitated integrative
bargaining. Kramer, Newton, and Pommerenke (1993) reported that individuals
who were higher in self-esteem were more confident and optimistic prior to nego-
tiating and more confident about their doing well in the negotiation process.
Inducing a positive mood also increased negotiator optimism and confidence.
They noted that "if negotiators maintain unrealistically optimistic beliefs about
their abilities and outcomes, they may avoid accepting agreements that they per-
ceive as falling short of their aspirations" (p. 125). Consequently, self-enhancing
bias may be another factor that affects the negotiating process in important ways.
The rise of social cognition as a dominant theoretical perspective in the nego-
tiations realm duplicates its prominence in much of social psychology. But partic-
ularly in the domain of interpersonal influence, the emphasis on cognitive biases
and departures from rational decision making seems too limited. First, in spite of
Neale and Bazernian's (1991) concern with the link between description and
prescription, it is not clear that knowing about cognitive biases, or even training
in them and how to overcome them, invariably alters subsequent behavior (but
see Lehman, Lcmpert, and Nisbett, 1988).
In light of the numerous courses and training programs in negotiation, there
is a paucity of research on what determines negotiator effectiveness and whether
or not negotiation training has an effect. Neale and Northcraft (1986) contrasted
the negotiation outcomes produced by professional corporate real estate negotia-
tors with those produced by undergraduate and graduate business students. They
found that there was no difference between amateurs and experienced negotiators
in their susceptibility to the framing bias but that "experts were significantly more
integrative (i.e., were able to achieve agreements of greater joint benefit) than
were amateurs" (Neale and Northcraft, 1990, p. 69). Northcraft and Neale (1987)
examined the anchoring-and-adjustment bias using both experienced real estate
agents and students that asked subjects to estimate the value of a house. The
anchor was the presumed listing price. The study found that experts did not over-
come this decision bias better than amateurs and that, in fact, amateurs were
more aware of the fact that the listing price was influencing their judgments.
Neale and Northcraft concluded, "Experience . . . can lead to superior negotia-
tor performance. However, the truly adaptive superior performance or expertise
comes from having an appropriate strategic conceptualization of the negotiation
process. . . . If cognitive bias in negotiation is preconscious, amelioration of bias
will depend upon the identification of non-cognitive aids to decision making"
(1990, pp. 71-72).
In an experimental study of the effects of assigned goals and training on
negotiator performance, Northcraft, Neale, and Earley (1994) found evidence
that training improved performance and that there was a significant training by
goal setting interaction. In the study, the training manipulation consisted of a
presentation on bargaining and negotiation in which the lecturer "defined negoti-
ation, defined and described advantages of distributive and integrative negotiating
strategics, and developed a model of transforming potentially distributive negotia-
tions into integrative agreements" (p. 263). The data reported in their Table 2
(p. 265) reveals that subjects exposed to training increased their performance sub-
stantially, compared to control subjects who had only the benefit of experience
in a prior negotiation. Thus, there is some evidence that training can have an
effect, although how long and under what conditions remains to be examined.
The effect of experience on negotiation outcomes is more equivocal, which calls
into question how much learning occurs. There would seem to be real value in
seeing what can overcome the cognitive biases that beset negotiators and if over-
coming these biases affects negotiation outcomes.
A second problem with the almost exclusive emphasis on decision making
and social cognition is that the neglect of situational factors because they are not
presumably under the negotiator's control seems an unsatisfactory reason for
avoiding their study. It is far from clear that some relevant situational factors,
including changing the situation to make certain social identities and affiliations
more or less salient, are not capable of being affected. And, the study of processes
of interpersonal influence would benefit from a comprehensive exploration of
what actually affects interpersonal influence before moving to judgment about

what is and what is not capable of being altered.
Conclusion
The topics of power and negotiation again illustrate many of the issues that char-
acterize and influence the development of organization studies. The topic of
power is more likely to be comfortably located in a sociology or political science
department than in a business school, with its emphasis on the economic model
of behavior and on rational decision making. Thus, one might speculate that one
consequence of the changing locus of organization studies has been less emphasis
on power and influence than there might otherwise be, given the importance of
the subject for understanding organizations.
Moreover, the study of power was particularly vigorous in the early 1970s —a
time at which both the strategic contingencies (Hickson et al., 1971) and resource
dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) perspectives developed. The 1970s was
a particularly political period, comprising both the end of the Vietnam War and
the associated political protests and the resignation of Richard Nixon as a conse-
quence of the Watergate scandal. The 1980s and 1990s have been much more
politically quiescent; this fact, coupled with a sometimes difficult job market, may
also have made power and influence less likely to be subjects of as much research
attention.
Power as a topic also suffers from the problem of being politically incorrect.
As noted in the discussion of views of control, we prefer a voluntaristic, choice-
based conception of action. Considerations of domination and force, of getting
one's way against opposition—which is, after all, a part of most definitions of
power—perhaps are better left out of sight or discussion. The field's increasing
embeddedness in an economic, rational conception of behavior is nicely coupled
with its renewed emphasis on the individual as contrasted with the situation. Both
rationality and a focus on the individual in isolation more easily permit neglect
of issues of interpersonal influence.
To the extent the field borrows from psychology, then the cognitive emphasis
in psychology becomes evident in the literature on negotiations. Moreover, there
is a practicality to conducting research on negotiations that further pushes the
literature in this direction. Subject pools are virtually nonexistent in business
schools, which means that, if one wants subjects for experiments, one needs to
capitalize on the availability of students in classes, for instance, on negotiation.
Although it is possible to study cognitive biases in class settings, explorations of
the effects of social context are much more difficult to conduct. So, context and
influence of adjacent fields come to affect not only what is studied but how.
7
Organizational Performance
One important goal of organization studies is not only to be able to explain and
predict outcomes within organizations but also to be able to understand why
some organizations fare better than others. There is, of course, substantial mana-
gerial interest in understanding performance, but there are theoretical reasons
as well for attempting to explain why some organizations do better than others.
Performance differences, once generally apprehended, will almost certainly lead
to attempts to mimic the more effective organizations. In that sense, performance
differences create pressures for imitation. Second, to the extent that competitive
markets function, both labor and capital will be drawn to more successful organi-
zations, so that over time a continuing process of natural selection favors higher
performing organizations. Thus, understanding what factors affect performance
can help us predict what the distribution of organizational characteristics will
look like in the future —those characteristics associated with success will be more
frequently represented in the population because of processes of mimetic adapta-
tion and natural selection.
The study of organizational performance is a vast topic and includes contri-
butions from economics as well as organization theory. We focus here on three of
the more prominent organizational approaches for understanding performance-
structural contingency theory and the literature on organizational design, the pop-
ulation ecology of organizations, with its focus on competition and natural selec-
tion as a way of understanding organizational births and deaths, and the recent
work on the effects of management practices, particularly with respect to how
the firm manages its human resources, on organizational performance typically
measured in terms of productivity, quality, or stock market performance. Another
important perspective on performance, emphasizing the organization's network
position and its connection to external sources of support, was considered as part
of the discussion of the social model of behavior in chapter 3 and is therefore not
156
Organizational Performance 157
repeated here. The evidence is clear, however, that an organization's network

position and the resulting structural constraint has important effects on profitabil-
ity (e.g., Hurt, 1983).
A cautionary word is in order. Although all of economic theory and much of
organization theory treats survival and performance as highly correlated — organi-
zations that don't perform effectively don't survive — Meyer and Zucker (1989)
provided evidence that there were frequently loose connections between perfor-
mance, as measured by profits, efficiency, or productivity, and organizational sur-
vival. J. Blau (1984), studying more than 150 architectural firms, reported that
those characteristics that permitted the firms to survive the early 1970s recession
also made them less likely to grow in either sales or profits subsequently. Meyer
and Zucker argued that organizations that persisted even in the face of poor per-
formance—so-called permanently failing organizations—survived because they
"yield benefits that motivate investment in and maintenance of them, but these
benefits often accrue to those who are in one way or another dependent on orga-
nizations rather than to those who legally own or control them" (1989, p. 45).
Although many of the examples of organizations whose survival is very loosely
coupled to performance arc in the public sector—for example, public transit sys-
tems— by no means is this phenomenon confined to the public sector. Factors
that affect performance are not necessarily the same ones that govern survival, as
Carroll and IIuo reported from a study of newspapers: "At a general level our
analysis suggests that institutional environmental variables, especially political tur-
moil, more strongly affect the founding and death rates of organizations . . .
whereas task environmental variables more strongly affect the performance of
ongoing organizations" (1986, p. 867).
There is a method for using measures of performance to help validate theory
and to provide insight on performance differences that was once more commonly
used than it is currently, although its validity and ability to generate potential
insights remain. The method proceeds from the idea that a regression that pools
the experience of many organizations (possibly over time as well) provides a
parametrization of the optimal relationship between a set of independent vari-
ables and a dependent variable of theoretical interest. One can then use the
coefficients from the regression to estimate, for each unit under study, a predicted
value for the dependent variable. One would expect that the greater the differ-
ence in the observed actual value from the predicted value, the worse perfor-
mance would be.
This approach was first demonstrated in an industrial scheduling context by
Bowman (1963) and was subsequently used, for instance, in studies of board com-
position. In a study of hospital boards of directors:
regression equations were constructed for each dimension of board si/e and corn-
position, in this instance, the proportion of persons from agricultural organiza-
tions and from financial organizations on the board of directors. For each hospi-
tal ... the absolute value of the difference between the predicted (from the
regression equation) value for a dimension of board composition and the actual
value is computed and used as an independent variable. In this case, the amount
of volunteer support the hospital received is explained. (Pfeffer, 1973, p. 360)
This approach is, of course, applicable to contexts other than the effects of
board composition (Pfeffer, 1972c; 1973) where it has been demonstrated to have
a statistically significant association with various measures of performance. The
method provides a way of operationalizing the idea of fit, using the actual empiri-
cal results from a sample of organizations under the assumption that, in the aggre-
gate, observed relationships provide a reasonable estimate of the optimal (or at
least better) connection between independent and dependent variables. This
method could be used, for instance, in testing the consonance hypothesis from
structural contingency theory (to be described below), although it has typically
not been. It is a relatively straightforward way of incorporating performance into
studies of other things, and it provides another way of testing the theory. If some
set of variables are presumably related to a given independent variable of theoreti-
cal interest, then it is reasonable to explore whether or not deviations from the
predicted relationships have consequences. To the extent they do, one can have
somewhat more confidence in the underlying theoretical reasoning.
Structural Contingency Theory
In the mid- to late 1960s and early 1970s, the organizations literature was literally
filled with articles from a structural contingency perspective that maintained: "1.
There is no one best way to organize. 2. Any way of organizing is not equally
effective" (Galbraith, 1973, p. 2). The first statement means that under different
conditions such as variations in strategy (Chandler, 1962), size, technological un-
predictability, or environmental uncertainty, differences in structural arrange-
ments will be observed (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The second statement,
also known as the consonance hypothesis, means "that those organizations that
have structures that more closely match" or fit "the requirements of the context"
will be "more effective than those that do not" (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 148). Another
implication of structural contingency theory is that "organizations adapt their
structure by moving out of misfit . . . in order to restore effectiveness and perfor-
mance. . . . Much structural change is seen as being positive and productive"
(Donaldson, 1995, p. 33).
At one point, contingency theory seemed to be both widely accepted and
noncontroversial (Schoonhoven, 1981, p. 349). With some notable exceptions
(e.g., Donaldson, 1985), structural contingency theory has since virtually faded
from the research and managerial literature scene. What happened to structural
contingency theory reflects in part characteristics of the field of organization stud-
ies already discussed: (1) an attraction to the new and unique, which makes fol-
lowing through on any cumulative program of research difficult and unlikely—by
the time of Sehoonhoven's (1981) critique the major ideas were more than four-
teen years old and consequently the field's attention was already beginning to
shift; (2) an interest in ideas that are readily translated into action; and (3) a
fascination with economic logic, which is almost invariably noncontingent. As
such, the rise and fall of this brand of organizational analysis provides an example
of what has happened elsewhere in the field as well as a possible forecast for the
future for other, similar topics.
It is important at the outset to note that not all theories of organizational
structure are contingent. For instance, in economics Williamson (1975) promul-
gated what has come to be known as the M-form hypothesis, which maintained
that the multidivisional (M-form) structure was more efficient than either a hold-
ing company or a functional structure (U-form). Although one might argue that
there was some implicit condition of large size implied —one could scarcely have
an efficient multidivisional structure or perhaps even one at all in very small
organizations—the prediction of the advantages of the M-form were largely non-
contingent: "The organization and operation of the large enterprise along the
lines of the M-form favors goal pursuit and least-cost behavior more nearly associ-
ated with the neoclassical profit maximization hypothesis than does the U-form
[functional] organizational alternative" (p. 150).
The multidivisional form was presumably so effective because it at once sepa-
rated the strategic and capital allocation function of management, performed at
headquarters, from concerns with operational efficiency, located in the divisions.
At the same time, the M-form internalized transactions that would otherwise be
subject to the problems of recontracting under conditions of information asymme-
try and small numbers bargaining and permitted more efficient capital allocation
because of the better information possessed inside organizational boundaries. Wil-
liamson was particularly concerned with problems of commitment to unprofitable
lines of investment in organizations, a problem, he maintained, that would be
overcome by separating the capital allocation process from operational manage-
ment: "existing activities embody sunk costs of both organizational and tangible
types while new projects require initial investments of both kinds. The sunk costs
in programs and facilities of ongoing projects thus insulate existing projects from
displacement by alternatives which, were the current program not already in
place, might otherwise be preferred" (1975, p. 121).
The fact that transfer pricing in multidivisional structures was a highly politi-
cal and contested process filled with its own forms of inefficiency (Eccles, 1985)
seemed to go unnoticed. Armour and 'leece (1978), in a study of firms in the
petroleum industry, did find that adoption of the multidivisional form provided
economic gains until the point at which the form had been so widely diffused
that there was no longer any competitive advantage to be achieved by its adop-
tion. And 'leece (1981), in a study comparing two firms in each of fifteen indus-
tries, one of which had adopted the M-form and one of which had not, also
found a profit advantage for the M-form firms.
There were two problems with the M-form hypothesis as a theory of organiza-
tional structure. First, it did not capture the rnultidimensionality and complexity
of organizational structures. A multidivisional firm still faced a range of choices
about specifically what staff functions, such as human resources, research and
development, and so forth, to place in the divisions and which to centralize
(S. A. Allen, 1978). Furthermore, divisionalization by itself did not capture much
of the range of design variables, including how much discretion to permit the
divisions (the degree of centralization) and how to decide what products to put in
one division rather than another (how to coordinate and apportion interdepen-
dence). As Starhuck noted, "organizations are complex entities with myriad mea-
surable characteristics" (1981, p. 181). His review of the so-called Aston studies
of organization structure (e.g., Pugh et al., 1968; 1969) noted that these studies
took more than 1,000 measurements in each organization. Reducing this organi-
zational complexity to a single construct such as divisionalization grossly oversim-
plifies the measurement and meaning of organizational structure.
Second, the theory did not fit the facts as they were being uncovered by
empirical studies of organizational structures — namely, that structure seemed to
vary quite systematically with an organization's strategy, size, technology, and con-
ditions of the organization's environment (e.g., Pugh et al., 1969; Child, 1973;
Child and Mansfield, 1972). Common sense suggested that the appropriate orga-
nizational arrangements must surely depend on what is being organized and the
environment in which that organization has to operate; consequently, the ideas of
structural contingency theory assumed prominence.
Figure 7-1 presents an overview of the major variants of structural contin-
gency theory. The facets of organizational structure that have been examined
include the size of the administrative component, formalization, centralization,
the degree of both vertical and horizontal differentiation, and the degree of task
specialization and complexity. The factors associated with variations in organiza-
tional structure have included strategy, technology, particularly the technology of
production, organizational size, and dimensions of the organization's environ-
ment, including the degree of competition and the amount of uncertainty or
change in the environment.
There has been more support for the proposition that structure varies predict-
Kactors that affect .structure Structural elements affected
Strategy 1'brrn (Multidivisional, functional, matrix)

product differentiation
price
Si7.c Size of the administrative component
'technology Degree of bureaucratization
production process formalization (use of rules)
information technology functional specialization
amount of variability' centralization
standardization
formalizalion
Environment Differentiation
uncertainly/unpredictability number of levels
degree of competition number of departments/divisions
amount of change
resource munificence
Figure 7-1 An Overview of Structural Contingency Theory

ably across organizational contexts than there has been for the consonance hy-
pothesis, which maintains that a match between context and the structure best
suited to that context is associated with enhanced organizational performance.
Considering first some of the evidence on the effect of context on structure, there
is evidence that organizational size has been among the most important predictors
of structural variation. Blau (1970) argued that size produced structural differenti-
ation but at a diminishing rate as size increased. Meyer (1972b), in a longitudinal
study of state and municipal finance departments, found that siz.c did cause struc-
tural differentiation. Other general findings from the literature on the effects of
si/e are: larger organizations tend to be more formalized (Meyer, 1972a; Hall,
Haas, and Johnson, 1967), more specialized (Child, 1973; Pugh et al., 1969), and
less centralized (Meyer, 1972, Blau, 1973). Child (1975) and Khandwalla (1973)
found that larger size was associated with increasing levels of the degree of bu-
reaucratization.
Scott (1992) has reviewed the literature on the effects of technology on struc-
ture, where technology has most frequently been conceptualized in terms of its
routincness, variability, or unpredictability. The basic argument is that nonrou-
tine, variable, or unpredictable technologies require more flexible organizational
arrangements such as decentralization and less formalization (Perrow, 1970b;
Hage and Aiken, 1969). The literature on the environment has also emphasized
uncertainty or variability (e.g., Duncan, 1972). Burns and Stalker (1961), in what
is probably one of the first studies in the structural contingency tradition, found
that a more mechanistic or bureaucratic structure was appropriate for more stable
and certain environments while a more flexible, organic structure was both ob-
served more frequently and was more successful in more dynamic and uncertain
environments. There is also some evidence that competition or the degree of
stress emanating from the environment is associated with more centralization of
control (Pfefferand Leblebici, 1973; Khandwalla, 1973).
There have also been a number of demonstrations of the relationship be-
tween strategy and structure. Rurnelt (1974) found that more diversified firms
were more likely to employ a divisionalized structure. Undiversified firms were
more likely to retain a functional structure. Moreover, the evidence is that firms
diversified first and then changed their structure, not the other way around, as
would be expected if structure caused strategy (e.g., Rumclt, 1974; Channon,
1973) rather than the reverse.
Schoonhoven (1981) has detailed the extensive theoretical and empirical
problems that beset the test of the consonance hypothesis. This hypothesis has
received support in some studies (e.g., Woodward, 1965) but not in others (Mohr,
1971; Pennings, 1975). Schoonhoven noted that (1) "contingency theory is not a
theory at all ... it is more an orienting strategy or metatheory" (p. 350); (2)
there is a lack of clarity by contingency theorists that they are, in fact, predicting
interactions; (3) "theoretical statements fail to provide any clues about the specific
form of the interaction intended" (p. 351); (4) relationships are assumed to be
linear, even though there are many reasons to suspect nonlinearities; and (5)
there is an assumption that effects are symmetrical, even though, again, there is
reason to suspect asymmetry in the interactions.
Although Schoonhoven's study—which used patient outcome data as mea-

sures of effectiveness, hospital unit structure as the independent variables, as well
as sophisticated analytical methods —did find support for some version of struc-
tural contingency theory, in many respects her carefully done study and thought-
ful theoretical critique marked virtually the end of empirical research on organi-
zational structure. To some extent this is surprising, given the proliferation of
studies that had occurred and given the frequent reorganizations that continued
to occur in the world of management and begged for guidance. The question is,
What happened to structural contingency theory? Donaldson has argued that the
newer organization theories are, in various ways, antimanagerial, and he attributes
the demise of structural contingency to some antimanagement bias: "The view
taken of managers and management is more negative in these newer theories
than is the . . . positive model of managers implicit in most structural contin-
gency theory" (1995, p. 24). The argument that the neglect of structural contin-
gency theory was from some antimanagerial bias is implausible on its face, given
the numerous topics that are receiving research attention ranging from culture to
leadership in which the interests of organizations and their managers are clearly
prominent if not preeminent. A more likely reason is that, as it came to be opera-
tionalized and elaborated, structural contingency theory was neither readily com-
prehensible nor useful.
As a usable theory of organizational performance, structural contingency the-
ory had several problems. First, empirical support for the consonance hypothesis
has been inconsistent. But that could conceivably be remedied by more careful
studies and measures. A greater problem was that most of the concepts used in
the theory were too abstract and were not decision variables (Argyris, 1972). For
instance, formalization, centralization, and specialization are constructs that arc
most often measured as scales (e.g., Pugh ct al., 1969) and seldom directly
changed. Organizations change reporting relationships, the measures used to
monitor performance, and the amount of budgetary discretion permitted to indi-
viduals at different levels in different departments, but they don't change "central-
ization" or "formalization." In his review of the Aston studies, "one of the most
important clusters of organizational research during the last 20 years" (Starbuck,
1981, p. 167), Starbuck argued that one problem with this research was the diffi-
culty of making sense of highly aggregated agglomerations of variables and con-
structs: "Several other macro variables appear to be confusing hodgepodges. . . .
The correlations make little sense to me because the macro variables themselves
lack meaning and validity" (p. 174).
This problem affects virtually all of the existing studies of structure. Argyris
(1995) has argued that for knowledge to be actionable:
1. The generalizations should inform the users not only what is likely to
happen under the specified conditions but how to create the condi-
tions and actions in the first place. . . . (p. 5)
2. Propositions that are intended to be used . . . if used correctly should
lead to the predicted consequences, and not to others that are counter
to those predicted. . . . (p. 8)
3. The generalizations should be usable over time and under different

conditions while, at the same time, usable in the individual case.
(P-9)
Structural contingency theory was too complicated to be easily compre-
hended or summarized, which is necessary if it is to be used by people who do
not have the luxury of returning to the texts for guidance. The theory was too
disconnected from decision variables actually controlled in organizations, em-
ployed concepts that were too abstract, and did not deal in robust, parsimonious
ideas. That is probably why clear theoretical statements (Thompson, 1967; Gal-
braith, 1973) were used in designing organizations to some extent even as the
theoretical research spawned by those ideas was not. There are important caution-
ary lessons in this tale for much of organization theory.
Organizational Ecology
Organizational ecology studies populations of organizations, with the individual

organization as the unit of observation. Because inertia —defined not as "no
change" but as the inability for organizations to change as rapidly as the environ-
ment—is seen as a prominent feature of organizations (Hannan and Freeman,
1984), changes in organizational populations arise largely through the processes
of organizational birth and death as contrasted with the adaptation of individual
organizations. "Organizational ecology investigates the role of selection processes"
(Singh and Lumsden, 1990, p. 162).
Although the ability to reproduce (birth) and to survive (the converse of orga-
nizational mortality) may not be finely variegated measures of organizational per-
formance or the performance of various types or forms of organizations, these
are clearly consequential outcomes. Organizational ecology does, therefore, have
something important to say about organizational performance. There is, however,
one important caveat to keep in mind in thinking about the connection between
ecology and an understanding of organizational performance: organizational mor-
tality is not always a bad thing. Some organizational mortality reflects bankruptcy
and the disappearance of the entity. Some organizational mortality is the result of
poor performance and a depressed stock price or financial condition that compels
a merger or buy-out. But some organizational mortality is the consequence of
being successful and represents selling out as a way of cashing out. Because stud-
ies of organizational mortality never discriminate as to either the voluntary nature
of the disappearance or the economic returns to those involved in the organiza-
tion that disappears, inferences about performance and its determinants from life
tables of organizational populations should be done with some care and caution.
In addition to studies of births and deaths, ecological thinking has been ap-
plied to study organizational performance measured more directly, a very wel-
come addition to this literature for the very reason that the meaning of organiza-
tional mortality is often quite ambiguous. In a study of banks in Illinois from
1987 through 1993 (Barnett, Greve, and Park, 1994), performance was assessed
164 New Directions for Organization 'Theory
as return on average assets. This was a period in which the regulatory rules were
evolving, both nationally and also in Illinois, which was modifying its limitations
on branch banking to permit more branching. Barnett et al. examined the relative
performance of rmiltiunit and single-branch banks. They found a paradox: unit
banks suffered from competition, but the survivors were more successful competi-
tors from learning how to survive under intense competitive pressure. By contrast,
"branch systems . . . circumvent and avoid competition by attaining positional
advantage — but then forego [sic] the evolutionary benefits competition brings"
(p. 25). The authors argued that "rather than strategy and structure driving com-
petitiveness, it is competition that drives evolution, which is then shaped by the
strategies and structures of organizations. Ironically, the more they mollify selec-
tion pressures, the more that strategics and structure allow organizations to survive
regardless of their ability to learn from the market" (p. 24).
Ecology empirically defines organizations that are independent, competitive,
or mutualistic with each other in terms of the effects of population density on
births and deaths: "By ecological conception, shared fates among organizations
indicate interdependence. When organizations negatively affect one another, they
are competitive. When they enhance each other's viability, organizations are mu-
tualistic" (Barnett and Carroll, 1987, p. 400). Thus, an ecological view of techno-
logical interdependence examines the effects of density of organizations with a
given technology on the failure rates of organizational populations —if the pres-
ence of more organizations with a given technology increases failure rates, then
there is evidence of competition; if they decrease failure rates, there is evidence
of mutualism (Barnett, 1990). The nature of the interdependence among organi-
zations is, therefore, defined by its consequences.
Hannan and h'reeman (1984) argued that inertia itself was produced by envi-
ronmental selection pressures and was not simply the consequence of managerial
incompetence. They noted that "in modern societies organizational forms that
have high levels of reliability and accountability are favored by selection pro-
cesses. Reliability and accountability of organizational forms require that the orga-
nizational structure be highly reproducible" (Singh and l.umsden, 1990, p. 168),
which favors structures that don't change.
The basic ecological argument is that organizational forms that are compara-
tively more suited to the environment or niche within which they are operating
will fare better —that is, they will tend to exhibit a higher founding rate and a
lower mortality rate. It is important to note that the operative phrase is "compara-
tively" more fit, for unlike economics, ecology makes no claims about optimality
or even progress. If a better form is not present in the population, for whatever
reason, it cannot triumph in the selection process, which means that there is no
guarantee that the organizational forms that scern to be winning are optimal.
Moreover, because survival depends on the fit or match between the characteris-
tics of organizations and their environments, which constantly change, what is a
better or worse organizational form obviously changes also. Thus, in the popula-
tion ecology of organizations, there is never a best way to organize — only a way
that has outperformed rivals in the past, given the conditions of the environment
that prevailed at that time. Finally, it is important to note that while organiza-
tional ecology deals with selection pressures, those selection regimes may have
political elements. There is no assurance that selection is only on the basis of
efficiency or economic performance (Hannan and Freeman, 1989).
The empirical results of the numerous organizational ecology studies are
readily summarized. First, there is a liability in newness (Stinchcombc, 1965), in
that new organizations tend to fail at a higher rate than older ones. Singh and
Lumsden summarized the arguments about why new organizations have higher
failure rates:
Young organizations and the individuals in them have to learn new roles. . . .
A significant amount of time and effort has to be expended to coordinate these
new roles for the individual actors and in their mutual socialization. . . . In
dealing with external clients, customers, and other relevant actors, new organiza-
tions are forced to compete with existing organizations that have well-established
client groups who are familiar with the organization. (1990, p. 168)
This is an interesting and nontrivial prediction, when one considers the fact that
older organizations arc likely to have greater inertia and be more difficult to
change. A prediction founded just on considerations of adaptability, then, would
predict a higher failure rate for older organizations, particularly in more rapidly
changing environments that would require more change.
This age dependence of organizational mortality holds even when size is
controlled —it is not the case that age dependence occurs simply because new
organizations also tend to be smaller and smaller organizations disappear more
frequently, although there is a liability of smallness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986).
Smaller organizations have more difficulty raising capital, face diseconomies of
scale in dealing with government regulations, and face problems in attracting
labor in competition with larger organizations, because they cannot offer the ca-
reer prospects and stability of larger organizations. However, in a study of health
maintenance organizations, Wholey, Christiansen, and Sanchez (1992) found
that the liability of small size depended importantly on organizational form and
was not necessarily a universal effect.
Carroll (1983) examined the liability of newness in a diverse sample of firms
in fifty-two quite different industries and found support for the idea. Carroll and
Delacroix (1982), studying Argentine and Irish newspapers, found that failure
rates were related to age, and Freeman and Hannan's (1983) study of restaurants
also observed age-dependent mortality. Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan (1983) ex-
plored the liability of newness using data on unions and semiconductor firms, an
analysis continued in Hannan and Freeman (1989). The argument that many
organizational routines and practices entail tacit knowledge and skill and that,
until that knowledge is developed and those interdependencies effectively coordi-
nated, organizations are at greater risk for failure implies that reorganizations or
other substantial changes (such as a change in the leadership of the organization)
should reintroduce at least some of the initial mortality risk, until the organization
learns to operate under the new conditions. And, indeed, there is evidence that
the succession of a publisher in newspapers (Carroll, 1984) and change in publi-

cation content and frequency in newspapers (Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993)
are associated with initially increased failure rates that then decline over time.
Both founding and mortality for a number of different organizational popula-
tions have been found to depend on density, or the number of organizations, and
to do so in a curvilinear relationship. The interpretation is as follows. Both rates
of organizational founding and mortality depend on two factors, legitimacy and
competition. As the number of a particular form of organization in an environ-
ment increases, the legitimacy of that type or form increases, although at a de-
creasing rate (there are declining returns in legitimation to increasing numbers of
organizations). By contrast, competition increases at ever higher rates as organiza-
tional density climbs and there are more and more demands on the carrying
capacity of the niche (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). "Thus, growth in density from
zero mainly legitimates an organizational form, but continued growth eventually
generates enough competition to overwhelm the effect of legitimation. . . . As
density rises from zero . . . founding rates rise initially and then fall, and mortal-
ity rates fall initially and then rise" (Hannan, Carroll, Dundon, and Torres, 1995,
p. 510).
This curvilinear effect of density on organizational foundings has been dem-
onstrated in studies of New York state life insurance companies (Budros, 1994),
U.S. semiconductor firms (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), day care centers in To-
ronto (Baum and Oliver, 1992), Pennsylvania telephone companies (Barnett,
1990), automobile manufacturers in Europe (Hannan et al., 1995), and numerous
other organizational populations including labor unions, Irish newspapers, U.S.
breweries, and newspapers in Argentina (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Baum and
Powell, 1995). The effect on organizational mortality has been observed in an
equally wide range of types of organizational populations (see Baum and Powell,
1995, pp. 534-535).
Although the empirical facts of density dependence and the liabilities of new-
ness and smallness are no longer much in dispute, three issues remain. First,
some argue that the age dependence of organizational mortality is a spurious
result of unobserved heterogeneity. Assume, for instance, that some organizations
at their founding have better-skilled management and that management skill is
importantly related to survival. Organizations with less-effective management will
fail early, which means that those organizations that survive have better manage-
ment pnd arc more likely to continue to survive. What looks like a liability of
newness is really just a liability of poor management. Hannan and Freeman
(1989) attempted to empirically distinguish their argument from this methodolog-
ical problem and were able to demonstrate an age dependence effect neverthe-
less.
The second issue is the substantive meaning of the relationship of founding
and mortality to organizational density, a concern because neither legitimation
nor competition is often measured directly. Measuring legitimation by numbers
of organizations has been particularly problematic to some (e.g., Zuckcr, 1989).
Again, there are forceful replies (Hannan and Carroll, 1995), and efforts have
been made to empirically demonstrate the validity of the theoretical ideas. A
third, related problem arises beeause of the concern in much of the literature
solely with demonstrating effects of density rather than fully understanding all the
forces affecting organizational birth and death. This leads to models that may
underspecify causes of birth (or failure) that vary with density and, as a conse-
quence, lead to estimated density effects when there are, in fact, no such effects
in better specified models. Wholey, Christiansen, and Sanchez (1993) examined
the founding of health maintenance organizations. They reported that:
There are no density effects in the fully specified model, which is surprising
given the consistent density effects reported by population Geologists. . . . We
found nonmonotonic density effects that are consistent with ecological research
in much simpler models. . . . This suggests that the nonmonotonic density ef-
fects in simpler models are a consequence of specification bias with density serv-
ing as a proxy for other processes affecting entry. Density effects disappear when
we include comprehensive measures for these processes, (p. 178)
As Baum (1995, p. 178) has noted, density dependence ideas treat competi-
tion as a property of the population and consequently assume that each member
of the population contributes equally to the competitive environment and experi-
ences competition similarly. This seems unrealistic on its face, as there are organi-
zations of different sizes that overlap in their market niches with competitors to
varying degrees, and consequently the competitive effects should not necessarily
be the same. This insight has led to refinements or modifications in the basic
density dependence ideas. Baum and Mezias (1992) found that the failure rate of
Manhattan hotels was greater the greater the intensity of competition from hotels
of similar price, location, and size. Carroll and Wade (1991) found that an in-
crease in density measured at the local geographic level had a greater effect on
the failure rate. Baum and Singh (1994) developed the concept of overlap density
and used it to study the failure rate of day care centers, measuring population
overlap density in this instance in terms of the ages of children each day care
center was licensed to serve.
Barnett and Amburgcy (1990) argued that what might be important was not
just population density but also population mass—the aggregate of the sizes of
organizations in a population. They noted that larger organizations might gener-
ate more intense competition because such organizations enjoyed economies of
scale and would deplete common resource pools to a greater extent. On the
other hand, larger organizations may be less flexible and adaptive. They defined
population mass as "population density with each organization weighted by its
size" (p. 83). Their study of telephone companies in Pennsylvania found a mutu-
alistic rather than a competitive mass effect, but the study measured mass "by the
total number of subscribers of all existing companies in a given year" (p. 90).
This measure of mass-dependent competition was not consistent with their own
definition and could be argued to be a measure of total market size, not the size
distribution of the competitors. Baum (1995, p. 181) has summarized the research
on mass-dependent competition by noting that the empirical results were mixed.
While density- dependence ideas presume that each organization in a population
competes with all other organizations, in models of size-localized competition,
the basic argument is that the failure rate of organizations increases with the
number of organizations of similar size in the population (p. 182). This prediction
comes from the assumption thai organizations of different sizes compete primarily
with similarly sized organizations that have similar strategies and cost structures.
Closely related to size-localized competition is the idea of resource parti-
tioning. In a study of newspapers, Carroll (1985) argued that competition among
large, generalist organizations increased their failure rate but lowered the failure
rate of small, specialist organizations that could serve small market niches ne-
glected by the large, generalist firms. Carroll did observe that as the newspaper
industry become increasingly concentrated, the failure rate of large, generalist
newspapers increased while the failure rate of small, specialist newspapers (often
published in foreign languages) actually fell. Similarly, Carroll and Swaminathan
(1992) observed that as the level of concentration increased in the American
brewing industry, the failure rate of microbreweries decreased. Baum (1995),
studying the New York City hotel industry, found empirical support for each of
these bases of competition and also noted that which form of competition pre-
dominated depended on period—there were temporal differences in the stages of
competition. Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that competitive dynamics are
better modeled using more refined measures of organizational similarity (size,
price, geographical location, target population served, and so forth) rather than
just aggregate population density.
What we have learned from the various ecological studies is that there is a
liability in being new or young, a liability that recurs to some extent when there
are reorganizations or important successions. There is also a liability to being
small. We have learned that foundings are more likely and organizational mortal-
ity is diminished the fewer similar organizations there are and, conversely, that
foundings are less likely and mortality is greater the more dense the population
becomes. We have also learned in numerous studies that both foundings and
mortality have a curvilinear relationship with population density because of the
joint effects of legitimation and competition. The studies of particular industries
have also examined more specific effects such as political and economic condi-
tions that are relevant for understanding organizational birth and death in the
particular population.
As a theory of performance, population ecology focuses attention on factors
that may be substantively important but over which there is virtually no organiza-
tional control (e.g., age, size, and the density of competing organizations) except
to the extent organizations can choose their competitive niche. But once that
niche is chosen, given presumptions of inertia and the very real constraints that
make entering and leaving market sectors difficult, a given organization's fate is
largely in the hands of others and selection forces that are outside of its control.
And even how to choose a niche is not clear from the empirical results. In the
study most directly focused on performance (Barnett et al, 1994) and strategy,
there was a paradoxical result: the very strategies that insulated organizations from
competitive pressure and therefore enhanced their life chances also insulated or-
ganizations from the selection pressures that foster learning. The choice posed is
between enhanced survival and enhanced learning from competitive pressure —

surely a difficult decision that the research has thus far failed to address.
We know that there is a desire for a feeling of mastery and control on the
part of most people (Langcr, 1983), so much so that individuals will act as if they
have control even in situations where they don't (e.g., by being willing to place a
larger wager on a game of chance such as throwing dice when they actually get
to throw the dice). One can only suspect that the control illusions and require-
ments of managers arc at least as great if not greater than those of the subjects in
the experiments on the control illusion. Consequently, population ecology, for all
of its attractive elements and empirical support, is in its present versions reason-
ably far from a theory that permits knowledge to be translated into action. That
property limits not only its applicability but also its attractiveness in the multipara-
digm organi/ation theory marketplace in which it competes.
Human Resource Practices and Performance
As organizations have faced increasing competitive pressure, and as other sources

of competitive advantage such as product and process technology have become
somewhat less important because of the more rapid diffusion of technical infor-
mation (Pfcffcr, 1994), firms have tried to positively affect their performance
through their practices for managing their employees. There is a growing litera-
ture that documents the facts that (1) there are substantial differences in perfor-
mance between the most and least effective firms or plants; (2) some significant
portion of that difference can be shown to be from differences in the management
of the employment relationship; (3) there is fairly consistent agreement on what
constitutes high-performance work practices; (4) there is conflicting evidence
about whether what constitutes "best practice" is or is not contingent on the firm's
strategy and whether or not the practices interact in producing their effects (i.e.,
it is important that they all be present at some level); and (5) there is evidence
that the diffusion of these so-called high-commitment work practices and their
persistence once they are implemented is not as great as one would expect given
their apparent effectiveness.
As to the first point, VVomack, Jones, and Roos (1990, pp. 89, 90) docu-
mented differences of almost two to one between the most productive and least
productive automobile assembly plants operating in the same country and having
the same country of ownership, and differences in quality of more than three to
one among the comparable plants. For instance, the most efficient U.S.-owned
automobile assembly plant in North America took 18.6 person hours to assemble
a car, while the least efficient required 30.7 hours. The best U.S.-owned plant in
North America produced cars with on average 35.1 defects per 100 automobiles,
while the worst plant had a defect rate of 168.6 per 100. Ichniowski, Shaw, and
Prennushi (1993), in a study of integrated steel manufacturers, argued that the
most relevant dependent variable for that particular production setting was down-
time, the proportion of time the production line was shut clown. They found a
ryo New Directions for Organization Theory
600 percent difference between the most effective lines, which were shut down 2
percent of the time, and the least effective, which were down about 13 percent
of the time.
There is also evidence that an important portion of the variation in economic
performance is associated with differences in human resource practices. MacDuf-
fie (1995), using data from the MIT study of the world automobile industry,
observed a strong positive relationship between his measure of production organi-
zation and both quality and productivity. His production organization index in-
cluded scales measuring the use of buffer inventories, work systems (including
the use of work teams and suggestion systems), job rotation and decentralization,
and human resource management policies (including contingent compensation,
an emphasis on training, and limited differentiation in status). Previous but less
comprehensive studies in the automobile industry had already demonstrated im-
portant effects of, for instance, participation in suggestion programs, involvement
in quality of work lite programs, and worker attitudes on both productivity and
quality (Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille, 1983; Kate, Kochan, and Weber, 1985). The
magnitude of some of the bivariate effects are astonishing. Katz, Kochan, and
Weber (1985, p. 519) reported a bivariate correlation of 0.73 between participa-
tion in suggestion programs and product quality in their study of twenty-five Gen-
eral Motors' automobile assembly plants.
Kravetz (1988) examined the connection between human resource policies
and financial performance for 150 of the 500 largest companies listed in Forbes.
His measure of human resource progressiveness included the extensiveness of
career development and training, participative management, flexible work sched-
ules, and the degree of emphasis on people in the company culture. He found
that the more progressive companies enjoyed 64 percent greater sales growth, 61
percent higher profit margins, four times the rate of increase in profits, and a
larger increase in earnings per share than companies using less progressive human
resource policies. Reviewing 131 field studies in North America between 1961
and 1991 that assessed the effects of changes in work systems, Macy and Izumi
concluded that "there seems to be large overall performance improvements ob-
tained from work innovation . . . and organizational development efforts" (1993,
p. 265). A metaanalysis of forty-three studies of various forms of worker participa-
tion— participation in decision making, mandated co-determination, profit shar-
ing, worker ownership (either through employee stock ownership or individual
worker ownership of the firm's assets), and collective ownership —concluded that
except for co-determination, all of the forms of worker participation were posi-
tively associated with productivity (Doucouliagos, 1995). Moreover, the effects of
participation were larger in firms owned and controlled by workers compared to
firms in which participation was granted by owners or managers to workers.
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi's (1993), study of thirty integrated steel pro-
duction plants, using the percentage of time the line actually operated as the
dependent variable, found that, controlling for technological factors, human re-
source systems had a significant effect on performance. Studying thirty steel min-
imills, Arthur (1994) observed a statistically and substantively significant relation-
ship between how an organization managed its work force and measures of both
productivity and turnover. He reported a statistically significant correlation be-

tween labor productivity and scrap rate, a result that is consistent with MacDuffic
(1995) in indicating that quality and efficiency are positively related. Controlling
for the plants' age, size, degree of unionization, and business strategy, using a
high-commitment work system decreased the labor hours to produce a ton of
steel and the scrap rate. Ichniowski (1986), in a study of nine unioni/ed paper
mills over the 1976-1982 period, observed a connection between employee rela-
tions practices and productivity, with the more grievances filed, the lower the
productivity. Studies of the textile industry (Dunlop and Weil, 1995) and fifteen
semiconductor wafer fabrication facilities (Brown, 1994) have also shown a rela-
tionship between how employees were managed and various industry-relevant
measures of productivity.
One problem with many of these studies is that, because of their cross-
sectional design, inferring causality is problematic. It is plausible that instead of
financial performance resulting from high-commitment work practices, those or-
ganizations that are doing well are more willing and able to implement suggestion
systems, allow participation, offer flexible work schedules, do more training, and
other similar things. Note, however, that Macy and Izumi's (1993) review covered
studies of change and found important effects. Ichniowski et al.'s (1993) study of
steel mills reported that firms that changed their work systems to utilize more
high-commitment practices increased their performance subsequently. And Huse-
lid's (1995) study of 968 firms used a more rigorous statistical methodology and
estimated sample selection bias to overcome this and other methodological prob-
lems. He observed a statistically significant impact of high-commitment work
practices on turnover, sales per employee, profits per employee, and the market
value of the firm. Again, these effects were substantively large. "A one-standard-
deviation increase in High Performance Work Practices yields a $27,044 increase
in sales and a $3,814 increase in profits. . . . The estimated per employee impact
on firm market value [is] $18,614" (p. 662).
Welbourne and Andrews (1996) studied the five-year survival rate of 136 non-
financial companies that began initial public offerings in 1988, using the firms'
human resource policies as one predictor of survival. Since these policies were
measured from the initial public offering document and the outcome variable,
survival, occurred subsequently, causality is more unambiguously assessed. The
study employed a sample of comparatively smaller firms than those used in other
studies, extending the analysis to a different outcome (survival instead of produc-
tivity or quality) and to a different part of the size distribution. Welbourne and
Andrews measured human resource policies by two indices: (1) a human resource
value index composed of items such as the quality of employee relations (citing
employees as a key strategic asset), having an executive with full-time human
resources responsibility, and having an employee training program, and (2) a re-
wards index containing items assessing the extent to which the firm had stock
plans, profit sharing, and other incentives for either management or all employ-
ees. For the whole sample the overall survival rate was 70 percent. Firms that
were one standard deviation above the mean on the human resource value index
had a 79 percent survival rate, while of firms one standard deviation below the
vj2 New Directions for Organization Theory
mean, only 60 percent survived. The effect of rewards was even larger. The sur-
vival rates for firms one standard deviation above and one standard deviation
below the mean were 87 percent and 45 percent, respectively. Welbourne and
Andrews's results demonstrate yet again that human resource practices are both
statistically significantly related to important performance outcomes and that
these effects are substantively important.
Husclid's results indicated that there was little evidence for complementarity
either among the various internal practices or between the internal practices and
the firm's strategy. The data showed that the effects of the various high-
performance practices were largely additive and noncontingcnt on a particular
strategy. Ichniowski et al. (1993) did find evidence of complementarity among
the various practices, and Arthur (1992) had found a relationship between strategy
and the use of high-commitment or cost-reduction work practices in his study of
steel minimills. Complementarity and the effectiveness of practices regardless of
strategy may be contingent on the particular firms and their environment.
Although the various studies differ somewhat in what they include when they
measure high-performance or high-commitment work practices, there is substan-
tial overlap in the commonly accepted meanings of these terms. Figure 7-2 pre-
sents dimensions of work practices from a number of studies and indicates that
there are a number of common themes across the studies. Specifically, high-
performance work practices are characterized by higher levels of wages, employee
skills, effort in selecting employees, and training and a set of practices associated
with the devolution of power, including the use of quality circles or self-managed
teams (Katzenbaeh and Smith, 1993; Mohrrnan, Cohen, and Mohrrnan, 1995;
Seaman, 1995), fewer job classifications, more information sharing, and fewer
supervisors. Having better-trained and more-carefully screened employees working
a system that permits and, indeed, encourages them to use their skills results in
higher levels of organizational performance.
The Diffusion of High-Performance Work Practices

Although there is little doubt that high-commitment work practices are diffusing
(Osterman, 1994), there is also evidence that their adoption is neither extensive
nor easily accomplished, particularly given their apparent substantial effects on
organizational performance. For instance, Lawler et al. (1992) reported on the
proportion of firms from the Fortune 1000 that had either not adopted a particu-
lar practice at all or used it with less than 20 percent of their employees. They
found that, as of 1990, 90 percent of the firms made virtually no use of self-
managing teams, 56 percent of the firms did not use profit sharing, 89 percent
did not employ gain sharing, 79 percent did not use work-group or team-based
incentives, 68 percent did not use job enrichment or job redesign, and 70 percent
did not employ quality circles or problem-solving groups. Moreover, the "data
indicate that the power sharing practices that had diffused most widely . . . are
those that redistribute power and authority the least" (McCaffrey, Faerman, and
Hart, 1995, p. 608). The Commission on the Skills of the American Workplace
stated that " 'the vast majority' of U.S. employers aren't moving to 'high perfor-
Arthur (1994) career ladders and progression

decentralization teamworking
participation quality circles
general training long-term training budgets
skill level workers responsible for own quality
wage level job design to use workers' skills
bonus or incentives regular briefings
due process procedures flexible job descriptions
span of control no compulsory redundancy
higher benefits use of temporary staff to protect security of
social activities core work force
percent unionized single-status terms and conditions of employ-
Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) ment
reduction of status differences formal assessment for production workers
contingent compensation Osterman (1994)
high levels of training self-directed work teams
commitment to retain employees job rotation
emphasis on quality employee problem-solving groups
elimination of buffers/inventories total quality management
mnltiskilled workers Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford (1992)
emphasis on flexibility sharing of information
emphasis on commitment of workers amount and type of training
Huselid (1995) performance-based rewards
promotion from within alternative reward systems (all-salaried pay,
information sharing skill-based pay)
training power-sharing practices
incentive compensation job enrichment or redesign
participation practices self-managed work teams
access to formal grievance procedure employment security
selectivity in recruiting suggestion system
surveys of employee attitudes flextime
formal job analysis employee stock ownership
merit-based performance appraisals Walton (1985)
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1993) frequent use of teams
incentive pay job design combines doing and thinking
selective recruiting and selection flat organization structure
teamwork and cooperation minimum status differentials
employment security variable rewards; gain sharing or profit
flexible job assignment sharing
knowledge and skill training pay for skill
communication of information business data widely shared
quality of labor relations attempt to ensure employment stability
Wood (1996) employee participation on many issues
trainability as selection criterion mutuality in labor relations
commitment as selection criterion
Figure 7-2 Dimensions of High-Commitment/I ligh-Pcrformance Work Practices

174 ^ew Directions for Organization ^heory
mance' work organizations" (Karr, 1990, p. A4). Diffusion is equally slow in the
United Kingdom. R. Loeke reported that "no more than 2% of all establishments
with more than 25 workers have quality circles or problem-solving groups. Team
work and major alterations in job content are even more rare" (1995, p. 16).
In the textile industry, the existing bundle system of production, which is
characterized by low wages, a high rate of occupational injury, and little career
mobility, is favored by almost no one. Dimlop and Weil (1992) noted that many
industry observers favored an alternative system of production called modular pro-
duction, which could potentially solve problems of absenteeism, turnover, and
labor shortages. Nonetheless, the diffusion of the modular production system and
the abandonment of the bundle system lias been slow:
In 1985, 97% of all manufacturers used the bundle system, according to industry
surveys. Although this figure decreased to 90% by 1988 and to 82% by 1992,
given the economic pressures and the fact that industry publications were filled
with articles advocating the new system, one might have expected more change.
The components of the bundle system, such as individual (rather than group)
piece rates and narrow (as opposed to broad) training also maintained their domi-
nance in the industry. (Pfeffer, 1994, p. 83)
Moreover, there is evidence that even when adopted, high-commitment work

practices such as quality of working life programs and quality circles have high
mortality rates (Drago, 1988). Rankin (1986) estimated that about 40 percent of
all employee involvement or quality of working life efforts failed within the first
two to three years. Goodman's (1980) review of participation programs imple-
mented during the 1970s indicated that after five years only one quarter of the
quality of work life programs survived. A University of Michigan study (Cammann
et ah, 1984) of eight programs implemented between 1973 and 1978 discovered
that by 1984, they all had been terminated.
A number of explanations for this diffusion failure have been offered. R. E.
Cole (1989) has argued that the United States has very little social infrastructure
to encourage the diffusion of these practices; in contrast, Japan has strong industry
associations, and in Sweden the government has played an active role. He noted
that Japanese and Swedish corporations were more oriented toward collective so-
lutions to the various costs involved in starting small-group, participative activities
and that they seemed to have a greater appreciation of the economizing benefits
of collaboration than did comparable American managers. Levine and Tyson,
asking, "if employee participation often has positive effects on productivity, why
don't we see more of it?" (1990, p. 184), argued that the firm's environment,
including capital market conditions and labor laws, create "market failures" in
which efficient practices are not adopted because it is not sensible for a single
firm to do so by itself. Kor instance, if only one or a few firms offer employment
security, they face a potential problem of adverse selection, in which the least
able and least hard-working employees will flock to those firms because of the
disproportionate benefit of that security. Of course, if every firm offers the same
policies, perhaps because of regulation, then there is no particular advantage or
disadvantage to any single firm. Or, consider the problem of underinvestment in
training. It may be irrational for a given firm to invest in training, particularly

general training, when employees can leave and other organizations can capture
the training benefits. But if every firm invested proportionately, there would not
be the potential loss.
Belief systems may also be important in accounting for the relatively slow
diffusion of management practices that appear to have high economic benefit. A.
Kohn (1993) has implied that it is managerial ideology, and particularly a belief
in external, often individually based incentives, that helps determine management
practices. McCaffrey ct al. noted that "participative systems reduce the chances
of control of situations by managers . . . and increase the chances of stability;
this will encourage the reassertion of controls" (1995, p. 604). They argued, "bar-
riers to participative systems are embedded in social, economic, and political prin-
ciples deeply valued in their own right. . . . The structures and attitudes imped-
ing participative systems are usually valued more highly than the prospective
gains from the systems" (p. 604). The idea that incentives take care of all prob-
lems, an idea derived from the economic model of behavior, would certainly not
encourage an emphasis on team-based, more participative programs that empha-
size intrinsic motivation and control.
McCaffrey et al. (1995) noted that participative methods made the most
sense in precisely those situations in which they were least likely to be adopted —
settings in which hierarchical and adversarial relations had substantially adversely
affected performance through effects on commitment and the sharing of informa-
tion. A review of the literature on cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games as
well as the organization development literature on collaboration led these authors
to propose four conditions in which collaborative, participative practices were
likely to begin and survive: "(1) prior dispositions toward collaboration based on
history, beliefs, and other residues of earlier actions; (2) social and political organi-
zation; . . . (3) the nature of incentives, issues, and values presently facing par-
ties"; and "(4) leadership capacity and style" (p. 613).
Pil and MacDuffie (1996) have conducted one of the few studies that actu-
ally examined change in the use of performance-enhancing work practices over
time, using data gathered in two rounds of surveys approximately five years apart
from forty-three automobile assembly plants located around the world. They
noted that the use of high-involvement work practices increased considerably dur-
ing this period but that there was still substantial variation in the rate of increase
of adoption of these practices. Their results showed, first of all, that performance
problems did not predict the adoption of the practices. Contrary to their expecta-
tions, neither productivity nor quality in 1989 predicted the amount of change in
the use of these practices over the ensuing period. Also counter to expectations,
there was no evidence that the practices diffused more readily to plants that had
either production workers or managers with less tenure—who, presumably, would
have less commitment to the past and therefore resist change less. In fact, their
results indicated that high-involvement work practices tended to diffuse more
readily in plants with higher managerial tenure. They did find that changing the
product produced by the plant—in this instance, model changeovers—facilitated
the adoption of high-involvement work practices, but there was no effect of plant
ij6 New Directions for Organization Theory
additions or expansion. They also found no effect for previous layoffs on change
in the use of these ways of organi/ing work. They argued that the absence of an
effect might reflect two counteracting forces —the tendency for layoffs to, on the
one hand, create distrust and fear, which would make change difficult, but on
the other hand to create the perception of the need for change and thereby un-
freeze strongly held attitudes, thereby making change easier.
The Pil and MacDuffie study did not directly examine many of the factors
that have been discussed as affecting the diffusion of high-performance work prac-
tices—for instance, managerial ideology, the environmental context, which obvi-
ously varies dramatically across the various nations in which their plants were
located, or even the tendency for high-performance practices to diffuse more
within a single corporation or geographic area compared to across organizational
or geographic boundaries. The literature indicates that there arc a number of
potential explanations for why some firms adopt high-commitment work practices
while others do not. What is clear is that this is an increasingly important area
for research.
Conclusion
The four perspectives on organizational performance— the three reviewed in this

chapter and the social model, with its emphasis on interorganizational linkages
and structural position — do have some commonalities that have yet to be empiri-
cally realized. For instance, one could explore failure rates of organizations as
affected by the density of competing firms using high-performance work practices,
and the diffusion of such practices themselves could be modeled as an ecological
process. Social relationships and network connections undoubtedly affect the pat-
tern of diffusion of such practices. Just as Burt (1987) examined the diffusion of
an antibiotic using concepts of structural equivalence to account for that process,
so one could use similar methods and arguments to explore the diffusion of high-
commitment work practices generally, or specific practices such as employee own-
ership or decentralization, in a network of organizations.
The models of performance also have some important differences, particu-
larly in the extent to which they incorporate decision variables and therefore
promote action. As already noted, typical ecological analyses incorporate few vari-
ables that are potentially subject to organizational or managerial discretion. Struc-
tural contingency theory suffers not from its disregard of normative implications
but rather from its use of a set of concepts that are difficult to grasp and a theoreti-
cal structure that is better suited to multiple regression analysis than it is to being
remembered and implemented. The network and employment system analyses
of performance both offer some advantages of being theoretically grounded and
empirically testable but also of being normatively focused and incorporating po-
tential decision variables.
8
Organizations from a Critical

Theory Perspective
Much, although not all, of the literature on organizations seeks to address mana-
gerial problems — how to enhance organizational performance, how to exercise
more effective control over behavior in the work place, how to create and manage
organizational cultures, how to identify and develop leaders, and so forth. The
dominant approach in this literature has been functionalist:
The functionalist paradigm has provided the foundation for most modern theory
and research on the subject of organizations. . . . The perspective . . . encour-
age^ us to see the role of values as a separate variable in the research process.
. . . Functionalist theory has typically viewed organization as a problematic
phenomenon, and has seen the problem of organization as synonymous with
the problem of'efficiency' and, more recently, of'effectiveness'. (Morgan, 1990,
P. 15)
The language of efficiency and effectiveness, the presumption of voluntary

exchanges and transactions (as with the economic model), and the invocation of
environmental —competitive or regulatory—constraints and pressures arc frequent
in the organizations literature. Each of these linguistic and theoretical conven-
tions has the effect of rendering many organizational outcomes as inevitable and
produced without much intervention of human agency. Constraints, competition,
and efficiency mean that what has occurred is either required for organizational
survival or voluntarily preferred by those involved or both. The place of those
harmed by the drive for efficiency, the fact that some are disadvantagcd by organi-
zational controls, and the possibility that social arrangements are and can be cho-
sen is frequently absent from the discussion. Social scientists frequently make
sense of what is —recall the retrospective accounts produced by economic models
that demonstrate the efficiency of organizational arrangements —and make pre-
scriptions based on social science theories to enhance managerial control. In this
177
sense, many of those who do organization studies become "servants of power"

(Baritz, I960). This managerialist orientation, with its neglect of the contested
organizational landscape, has provoked criticism:
Most of the undesirable features of modern capitalistic society are not mentioned
by organization theorists, presenting the appearance of value neutrality, but in
actuality masking a politically conservative bias. This compromises the social
function of the field to the point where organizational theory serves primarily the
dominant interest of capital, rather than society at large. (Jermier, 1982, p. 204)
Perrow echoed many of the same themes:
we arc intellectual captives of the organizations we study, and thus are burdened
with some unproductive assumptions. . . . We have failed to pay our dues to
society by devoting . . . roughly a quarter of our efforts to applying our organisa-
tional expertise to pressing public problems and in particular, those of the power-
less. . . . I question the assumption that efficiency can be addressed by exam-
ining survival, legitimacy, growth or profits, thus neglecting the multiple
stakeholders within and without the organisation with quite different notions of
. . . goal attainment. . . . We should question our evolutionary bias that sees
big organisations as more complex, efficient, and selected by an indifferent envi-
ronment, and instead sec organisational birth, death and change as a process of
decimation of forms and reduction of adaptability. (1992, p. 371)
In response to this prevailing managerialist and functionalist perspective, a

number of variants of critical theory have arisen to challenge conventional depic-
tions of organizations and to propose other theoretical lenses for understanding
them. Critical theory or critical studies have emerged in law, the humanities, and
the social sciences. One reasonable definition of critical theory (CT) is provided
by Alvesson and Willmott: "A fundamental claim of the proponents of CT is
that social science can and should contribute to the liberation of people from
unnecessarily restrictive traditions, ideologies, assumptions, power relations, iden-
tity formations, and so forth, that inhibit or distort opportunities for autonomy,
clarification of genuine needs and wants, and thus greater and lasting satisfaction"
(1992, p. 435).
There are a number of branches of critical theory, some of which operate
largely in the realm of philosophical discourse and some that launch empirical
challenges to existing organization theory orthodoxy. The focus here is on the
more empirically grounded critical approaches. Organization theory is, after all,
fundamentally a social science; although philosophy and moral reasoning are im-
portant and interesting, critical theory has had and probably will have its most
effect where it engages organization studies in a realm with testable empirical
implications.
Much, although certainly not all, of critical organization theory derives from
Marxist roots, and there have been a number of empirical studies in a Marxian
tradition that challenged some of the received wisdom of organization theory.
Consequently, we begin the review of critical theory in organizations with the
Marxist critique and alternative conceptualization of organizations. We then move
Organizations from a Critical Theory Perspective 179
on to consider some other variants of critical theory applied to organizations,

including feminist organization theory.
Marxist Versions of Organization Theory
The Marxist critique of organization theory was pursued most vigorously in the
1970s. In some sense this is not surprising, as the 1970s saw the end of the Viet-
nam War, a very politicizing event for American culture, Watergate and the resig-
nation of President Nixon, and the economic stresses associated with oil shocks,
inflation, and recession. It was a time of heightened political awareness and a
questioning of the institutions of authority. Marxist theory provided a useful theo-
retical lens for that critique:
the Marxist approach began essentially as a critique of the dominant rationalist

views. . . . Marxists argue that organizational structures are not rational systems
for performing work. . . . Rather, they are power systems designed to maximize
control and profits. Work is divided . . . not to improve efficiency but to "deskill"
workers, to displace discretion from workers to managers, and to create artificial
divisions among the work force. . . . Hierarchy develops . . . as an instrument
of control and a means of accumulating capital through the appropriation of
surplus value. . . . Human relations . . . reforms are misguided because they
do not challenge the fundamental exploitative nature of organizations; indeed
they help to shore it up by assuming a congruence of goals. (Scott, 1992, p. 115)
There are two topic domains in which Marxist approaches pose the most
direct challenge to traditional organization theory—in the structuring of work
within enterprises and in the understanding of relations among enterprises and
between enterprises and the state and the reasons for those relations. We consider
each of these topics in turn.
A Critical View of the Employment Relation

Most approaches to understanding the structuring of the employment relation
proceed from an efficiency rationale—governance arrangements that minimize
both transaction and production costs prevail (Williamson, 1975). The presumed
objective of control, whether achieved through the use of incentives or through
socialization and ineulturation, is enhanced organizational performance in a com-
petitive marketplace. Although managerial motives may not be benign, managers
are compelled by competitive pressures to manage the way they do. Contingency
theories of organizations (e.g., Donaldson, 1985; Lawrence and Lorseh, 1967;
Woodward, 1970) have an environmental or technological determinism to them,
so in form they are quite parallel to economic reasoning—there are environmen-
tal exigencies of size, competition, or technology that virtually dictate what orga-
nizations and their managers must do in order to survive or prosper.
Marxist analysis challenges these arguments in two ways. First, it asserts that
control, not efficiency, is the objective of organizing arrangements and that when
there are trade-offs involved, efficiency concerns are frequently subservient to the
achievement of control over the labor process. Marglin's (1974) analysis of the
development of hierarchy during the industrial revolution, Stone's (1973) descrip-
tion of the development of job ladders in the steel industry m the late nineteenth
century, and Clawson's (1980) review of the demise of the inside contracting and
putting out system and their replacement by hierarchically structured employ-
ment relations all argue that changes in the structure of the employment relation
emerged "as much from the desire to effect organizational control as from the
need to apply continually advancing technology to production" (Goldman and
Van Iloutcn, 1977, p. 109). Edwards has argued that several factors enter the
evaluation of profitability, including "the extent to which any technology provides
managers with leverage in transforming purchased labor power into labor actually
done" (1979, p. 112). Second, a critical or Marxist perspective argues that many
of the prescribed (and often acknowledged as effective) mechanisms for achieving
control of the work process are not benign and achieve their results at some
substantial cost to the individuals working in organizations.
Empirically testing whether control is instituted to enhance efficiency or for
other reasons is obviously difficult. One can observe outcomes or behavior much
more unambiguously than motives. Four lines of evidence and argument may be
relevant to the debate. First, there is evidence, already discussed, that there is less
diffusion of high-commitment work practices, and particularly practices that in-
volve fundamental changes in the power structure and in control of work, than
one might expect given the effects of such practices on productivity and perfor-
mance (e.g., Levine and Tyson, 1990; Pfeffer, 1994). Data from a General Ac-
counting Office survey of the Fortune 1000 reported by Lawlcr et al. (1992)
showed that self-managed teams and gain sharing (sharing financial benefits from
increased performance accompanied customarily by some degree of control over
the work process) were work-place changes that had diffused the least. By contrast,
survey feedback and all salaried pay had diffused the most completely. Note that
changing pay from an hourly to a salaried basis and collecting survey data and
feeding it back involve less change in the control of work than going to self-
managing teams. The data also indicate that the differences in diffusion cannot
be explained by differences in perceived effectiveness of the changes. Similarly,
the failure of decentralization to readily diffuse (Levine and Tyson, 1990) is con-
sistent with a desire to maintain control.
Second, there is evidence that employers pursue control over the labor pro-
cess and contest that control even when there arc few or no apparent efficiency
reasons for doing so. For instance, although Freeman and Medoff (1984) have
documented the frequently positive and seldom harmful effects of unionization
on productivity and profitability (see also Pfeffer, 1994, chap. 7), employers in
the United States have resisted unionization vigorously (Kochan, Katz, and
McKersie, 1986).
L. J. Griffin, Wallace, and Rubin (1986), studying employer resistance to
unionization in the early 1900s, argued that such resistance was based impor-
tantly on a desire to achieve control over the labor process. They wrote, "Union-
ization is one of the most important market-driven mechanisms available to the

working class in its struggles to achieve its interests. . . . Without labor organiza-
tion and mobilization, the working class, especially in the U.S., due to its lack of
a strong socialist party presence, would be structurally hindered in its collective
action in market and state spheres" (p. 148). They noted that employers launched
two major countermovements in the early 1900s to resist unionization —an open
shop drive that began around 1903 and the "American Plan," a form of welfare
capitalism that arose in the 1930s. In empirical estimates of the effects of em-
ployer resistance, organized in part by the National Association of Manufacturers,
Griffin et al. found that "the NAM, its size and expenditures, significantly reduces
all indicators of the strength and vitality of labor organization" (1986, p. 163,
emphasis in original). Quoting industrialists, including Harry Frick, head of An-
drew Carnegie's operations, Griffin et al. maintained that the fundamental issue
was control: "Who, then, would control the factory? Management could control
the labor process only if a 'transfer of skill'---from craft worker to manager—about
production techniques occurred. This, in turn, was possible only if the power of
the craft union . . . was broken" (1986, p. 150).
Third, there is evidence that, again at least in the United States, we are
willing to spend vast sums of money on control over work. In medicine, for in-
stance, Woolhandler and Himrnelstein (1991) have estimated that almost a quar-
ter of expenditures on health care in the United States are for administration and
that this emphasis on supervision, administration, and monitoring accounts for
about one-half of the difference in health care costs between the United States
and Canada. These authors reported that in the late 1980s, there were nrorc
administrators in Blue Cross and Blue Shield in Massachusetts than there were
in the entire Canadian health care system. Also, the United States for years has
had the highest rate of prison incarceration in the world. Some would take this
willingness to spend money on prisons as consistent with an emphasis on control.
The previously discussed spread of electronic monitoring and surveillance, even
in the presence of evidence demonstrating deleterious effects on customer service
and motivation, is also consistent with this line of argument.
Fourth, Marxist analysis maintains that in the effort to effectuate control, jobs
will be deskilled (Braverman, 1974; L. R. Goldberg, 1980). Unless skill is trans-
ferred from workers to managers or owners and jobs arc comparatively easy to
learn, workers will retain significant specialized knowledge that will limit their
subordination. Braverman (1974) maintained that even if some jobs were gaining
skill and autonomy—for example, engineers —other jobs were losing skills and
autonomy, and thus he predicted an increasing polarization of jobs. The evidence
on the dcskilling of work, or even how to measure skill levels, is mixed (Spenncr,
1983; Attewell, 1987). There is little convincing evidence that job skills have
either gone down, as the Marxists predicted, or up, as those who see technological
change and progress requiring more training and knowledge have maintained.
Rather, some occupations and work places have experienced deskilling, while
others have experienced skill upgrading (Adler and Borys, 1989). Bailey (1995,
p. 33) has argued that there is a connection between the adoption of high-
performance work practices and skill and education requirements. The partial
diffusion of these practices means that skill and educational requirements have
gone up where they have been adopted and have either stayed the same or gone
done where more Taylorist forms of work organization persist. The mixed empiri-
cal results suggest that a more finely variegated theory of occupational change is
required to understand this aspect of the evolution of work in America.
The inconsistent empirical results also highlight the problems in the defini-
tion and measurement of skill levels. Spenner has argued that there are at least
two dimensions to skill: substantive complexity ("the level, scope, and integration
of mental, manipulative, and interpersonal tasks in a job" [1990, p. 402]) and
autonomy-control ("the discretion or leeway available in a job to control the con-
tent, manner, and speed with which tasks arc done" [p. 403]). As he noted, "there
is far more consistent evidence of dcskilling with respect to the effect of techno-
logical change on levels of autonomy-control than on substantive complexity"
(p. 404). Barley's (1988) review of this issue also highlights the important distinction
between autonomy and skill. Thus, the practice of health maintenance organiza-
tions and insurance companies to require preauthorization for hospitalization and
some expensive medical tests and procedures clearly limits physicians' autonomy,
but it docs not change the skill or knowledge required to do the work of a doctor.
Bailey noted that the "direct measurement of skill has proved to be extremely
difficult" (1995, p. 28) and that even when such observations are made, the re-
sults measure the skills available and used rather than those that are optimal for
doing the work. lie noted that two indirect approaches to measuring skill levels
were (1) measuring the relative earnings of workers with different levels of educa-
tion and (2) measuring the growth of different occupations with presumably dif-
ferent skill requirements. The change in relative wages during the 1980s was
consistent with the view that skill requirements were increasing, as the earnings
difference between college graduates and high school graduates increased from
13 percent in 1979 to 38 percent by 1987 (p. 29). The analysis of the entire
occupational distribution (as contrasted only with the ten fastest growing jobs)
also suggests that "the new jobs that will be added over the next decade are
disproportionately those that currently use more highly educated incumbents"
(p. 30). Educational requirements may represent credentialism rather than actual
learning required to do a task (Collins, 1979), so analyses relying on these indirect
measures are inevitably somewhat problematic.
In his review of the literature on technical change, automation, and skill
levels, Barley concluded: "current theories of technology and work are either too
brutish or too brittle to capture the subtle but multiple ramifications of technical
change. . . . Between the stark degradation heralded by the neo-rnarxists and the
bright industrial Utopia envisioned by the sociologists of automation, must lie a
more nuanced depiction of events" (1988, p. 72).
Some of the earliest Marxist works on the labor process (e.g., Blauner, 1964)
noted the alienating effects of achieving control over the labor process — which
almost inevitably entails separating the planning of work from doing the work
and a process of deskilling (Braverman, 1974). As competitive exigencies have
required the involvement and commitment of employees' minds as well as their
bodies, there has been a trend toward using high-commitment work practices
(Osterman, 1994). These practices often entail creating self-managing teams and
increasing involvement and participation in the work place.
Yet these changes are not necessarily favorable in their effects on employees.
As Barker (1993) demonstrated in an ethnographic study of an organi/ation mov-
ing from hierarchical to team-based control, the new, value-based and peer-
monitored control system was more powerful and complete in its effects than the
hierarchical system it replaced. Adler's (1992) study of New United Motors pro-
vided ample evidence that the control of work under the new system was much
more complete and efficient than under the old. The workers were possibly less
alienated and more motivated, however, because now they were supervising each
other. As M. Parker and Slaughter wrote in describing the NUMMI system and
its reduction of absenteeism, "all the difficulties of one person's absence fall on
those in daily contact with the absentee— the co-workers and immediate supervi-
sor—producing enormous peer pressure against absenteeism" (1988, p. 43). Par-
ker and Slaughter referred to the system as management by stress. The question
is whether the team model is "creating an era of cooperation between workers
and management that is rooted in coercion or consent" (Graham, 1995, p. 1).
Graham's (1995) participant observation study of a Subaru-Isuzu plant in the
United States documented the tremendous pace of work and how that pace puts
enormous pressure on employees, creating stress and even physical injury. Her
study also documented how production exigencies frequently overrode formal
company policies of egalitarianism and how, even in a nonunion environment,
the work place demands provoked resistance. Garrahan and Stewart, interviewing
a small number of workers from Nissan's plant in the United Kingdom, con-
cluded that "the Nissan Way rests upon control through quality, exploitation via
flexibility, and surveillance via tcamworking" (1992, p. 139). A study of a small
number of employees at the Mazda plant at Flat Rock, Michigan (Fucini and
Fucini, 1990), also found dissatisfaction with the production system. A study pre-
dicting individual employees' attitudes toward lean production (Shadur, Rodwell,
and Bamber, 1995) found that commitment to the company was the single best
predictor, with attitudes toward the speed of the line being second in importance.
There is irony in the fact that the Taylorist system, with its emphasis on the
analysis of work processes, has been perfected not by separating the planning of
the work from its doing, as Taylor had proposed, but rather by having the workers
participate in their own control and design their own work processes. Parker and
Slaughter found that in the NUMMI system, every move a worker made was
specified in greater detail than ever before. Because supervisors know the produc-
tion process well from working on the line themselves, and because workers are
involved in a process of continually improving (increasing the productivity) of
their own jobs, there is a much more complete form of control achieved than in
a more traditional hierarchy.
The Marxist analysis of the labor process soon came under criticism even
from critical theorists (e.g., Burawoy, 1985; M. Reed, 1990). First, some argued
that the representation of managers as all having the same interests and acting in
a unified fashion was incorrect. Second, many writers noted that, whatever the
interests and intent of managers and capitalists, workers were not as powerless as
portrayed in many of the accounts. There was resistance to the imposition of

managerial control, and indeed this resistance forms an important subtext in the
detailed case analyses of the Japanese automobile plants (e.g., Adler, 1992; Gra-
ham, 1995). Third, there was a deterministic quality to the analysis that troubled
some (e.g., Giddens, 1982) because of the limitations imposed on the study of
conflict in the work place as a social process. Nevertheless, the so-called labor
process theorists have been enormously influential in stimulating a discussion of
work place control, not from the point of view of organizational efficiency or
management but from the point of view of its determinants and its effects on
workers.
The Concept of Class and Interorganizational Analysis

The concept of social class looms large in Marxist analysis, and a second way in
which this line of thought has influenced organizational analysis is by operational-
izing the construct of class and examining its empirical implications. One line of
research has argued that class pertains to the relationship of individuals to the
means of production, with capitalists owning the means of production and work-
ers not having ownership. If class matters, then there should be economic returns
to one's position in the capitalist ownership structure, controlling for such things
as human capital endowments (e.g., education and experience), factors that obvi-
ously would also affect wages. There have been studies that do find an effect of
"control" on wages, net of other factors. Wright and Pcrrone (1977), for example,
found that the economic returns to education were less for workers than for em-
ployers or managers.
The concept of class raises the issue of class solidarity—are there connections
among individuals that are defined by class lines that serve to structure interorga-
ni/ational relationships and action? The relationship of class interests to the state
is also an issue highlighted by Marxist theory. The concept of class challenges
conventional organization theory by suggesting that organizational behavior such
as political contributions and the composition of boards of directors reflect not
some need to manage interorganizational dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978) but rather the pursuit of class interests that transcend organizational bound-
aries. There is evidence to suggest there are such class interests and they do have
predictive power, but the interpretation of the evidence is sometimes challenged.
Palmer contrasted the two approaches to interorganizational analysis suc-
cinctly: "According to the interorganizational approach, organizations arc entities
that possess interests. . . . According to the intraclass approach, individuals
within the capitalist class or business elite are actors who possess interests. Organi-
zations are the agents of these actors" (1983, pp. 40-42).
Palmer (1983) argued that if interorganizational co-optive relations, main-
tained through directorship ties, were consequential for managing interorganiza-
tional dependence', such relations should be reconstituted when accidentally bro-
ken, for instance, by a death or retirement of the individual linking the two
organizations. However, Koenig, Gogel, and Sonquist (1979) found that only 6
percent of single interlock tics were reconstituted, and Palmer (1983) concluded
that only 1 5 percent of the ties could be construed as vehicles for interfinn coor-
dination. Palmer concluded that rather than director interlocks linking organiza-
tions, organizations constituted arenas that linked the elite together. Palmer,
Friedland, and Singh (1986) found that neither competitive constraint nor inter-
industry transaction interdependence accounted for the reconstitution of broken
ties, providing further evidence that director interlocks did not apparently serve
interfirm coordination.
Another domain relevant to class solidarity is whether or not the business
elite took coordinated political activity in spite of the apparent divergence of orga-
nizational interests around specific issues. For instance, Whitt (1979; 1980) stud-
ied five transportation issues determined by referenda in California during the
period 1962-1974 and noted, "Even though there is good reason to expect that,
for each issue, some companies would favor it and some would oppose it, the
money in every case is virtually all on one side or the other of the issue" (1980,
pp. 105-106). Whitt also observed a strong correlation between measures of firm
size or stake in the issue and the amount contributed, which he took to indicate
coordination of action. Dunn's (1980) study of the Weyerhaeuser family office
provided an example of one possible coordinating mechanism and how it worked,
while Dornhoff (1974) has argued for the importance of social ties realized in
clubs and other such settings for achieving intraclass coordination. There is evi-
dence that corporate interlocks also help to structure business elite activity and
that unit)' in perspective extends to political candidates as well as to the referenda
studied by Whitt (e.g., Clawson and Neustadtl, 1989; Clawsoii, Neustadtl, and
Bcarden, 1986; Mizruchi and Koenig, 1986).
The final form of evidence mustered to show the importance of class has
been demonstrating a structure to the ruling class (Domhoff, 1967; 1970; 1974).
The argument is that there is an inner circle of elite business leaders that hold
multiple directorships, articulate classwide business interests, and make decisions,
for instance, on political contributions, with these general (as opposed to particu-
lar corporate interests) in mind. This structure is manifested in the frequency and
centrality of both directorship ties and ties to other important organizations such
as government, prestigious foundations and charities, and policy influencing bod-
ies such as commissions and associations (Useem, 1979). Useem (1984) studied
the inner circle in both the United States and the United Kingdom, examining
board of director interlocks, philanthropic and political contributions, service on
nonprofit boards, social origins, and membership on important government advi-
sory committees. He wrote:
Central members of the inner circle arc both top officers of large firms and
directors of several other large corporations operating in diverse environments,
'['hough defined by their corporate positions, the members of the inner circle
constitute a distinct, semi-autonomous network, one that transcends company,
regional, sectoral, and other politically divisive fault lines within the corporate
community. The inner circle is at the forefront of business outreach to govern-
ment, nonprofit organizations, and the public, (p. 3)
The "inner circle" distinction is critical for this line of argument, because
there is too much heterogeneity otherwise in business behavior to argue convinc-
ingly for the importance of class-based interests and action. But the inner circle
]86 New Directions for Organization Theory
argument makes logical sense. In any social structure, including individual organi-
zations, those admitted to the highest levels of power and prestige are individuals
who have been carefully filtered (J. C. March and March, 1977) and who exem-
plify and uphold the organization's central values and interests. There is no rea-
son to believe that obtaining high-level positions in a structure that transcends
organizational boundaries would not similarly depend on one's ability and willing-
ness to advocate positions that serve the network as a whole.
Yet the idea of the unity of the ruling class is challenged by the plethora of
hostile takeovers (Hirsch, 1986) as well as by the greater activism on the part of
boards of directors in the 1990s to dismiss poorly performing CEOs—friends don't
raid each other or fire each other. It is possible that both positions are partly
correct. There may be an inner circle and an attempt to develop collective inter-
ests that transcend the parochial concerns of individual organizations (Useem,
1984, p. 5). At the same time, there are obviously pressures, including those from
institutional investors (G. F. Davis and Thompson, 1994), that challenge this cozy
relationship and threaten its stability. Which tendency—-classwicle coordination
or the pursuit of individual organizational interests —dominates at any point in
time is contingent on a number of environmental factors, and as Davis and
Thompson (1994) noted, it is not just the ruling elite that can organize for collec-
tive action but their critics and investors as well.
Other Critical Theory
Marxist analysis emphasizes class, defined as the relationship to the means of

production, as the fundamental distinction among people. Other critical theories,
while similar in their opposition to the perceived hegemony and domination of
the powerless, emphasize other bases of difference and oppression such as race
and gender, for instance. Acker noted that feminist organization theory involved
helping to "create the conditions for a fundamental reworking of organizational
theories to account for the persistence of male advantage in male organizations"
(1992, p. 248). There have been numerous studies documenting the persistent
sex segregation of women and men into different occupations (Beller, 1982; Op-
penheimer, 1968; Treiman and Hartmann, 1981), different organizational jobs
and roles (Bielby and Baron, 1986), different hierarchical levels with differing
authority (e.g., Wolf and Fligstcin, 1979) with consequences for women's wages
(Ilalaby, 1979), and studies have shown that, even controlling for hierarchical
level, amount of experience, background credentials, and other factors, women
almost invariably earn less than men (e.g., Ferber and Kordick, 1978; Fox, 1985;
Madden, 1985). Acker distinguished these studies from feminist critical theory:
"studies of women's economic and occupational inequalit)' document the extent
of the problems but give us no convincing explanations for their persistence or
for the apparently endless reorganization of gender and permutations of male
power. . . . The extensive literature on women and management documents dif-
ficulties and differences but provides no adequate theory of gendered power im-
balance" (1992, pp. 248-249).
As an example, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) showed that salaries for both
male and female college administrators decreased as the proportion of women in
administrative positions in a given college or university increased and that in
colleges and universities that paid less, the proportion of women administrators
increased over time more than in settings in which pay was higher. The explana-
tion was that women's work was socially devalued, and it had become taken for
granted or institutionalized to pay less for "women's jobs." Galas and Smircich
critiqued the study not for its findings but for its apparent silence about implica-
tions. They wrote: "they don't use institutional theory to question this situation —
which defies the expected positive social consequences of an increased number
of females in professional activities" (1992, p. 231).
Critical theory maintains that social science is never neutral, particularly with
respect to issues of power, and that this needs to be more explicitly acknowledged
in both theoretical development and empirical work. Thus, critical theorists argue
that even texts that do not mention gender—or, perhaps, particularly works that
do not seem to directly implicate gender—by this very omission contribute to the
domination of women (e.g., Mumby and Putnam, 1992; Martin, 1994).
Feminist literature has criticized the separation of the public sphere of work
and the private sphere of home and family life (Olsen, 1983; Martin, 1994).
Although often portrayed as being gender neutral, some argued that "the reifica-
tion of the public-private dichotomy gives organizations a justification for refusing
to deal with the ways that home life and work life are inextricably intertwined"
(Martin, 1994, p. 409). Because the division of home and child-rearing respon-
sibilities are not gender neutral, there are differential effects of being married and
having children on women's and men's careers (e.g., Pfeffer and Ross, 1982).
Writers have argued that the very language describing organizations has gen-
der connotations. Acker noted that "the organization itself is often defined
through metaphors of masculinity of a certain sort. Today, organizations are lean,
mean, aggressive, goal oriented, efficient, and competitive but rarely empathetic,
supportive, kind, and caring" (1992, p. 253). Similar arguments have been made
about the literature on leadership (Galas, 1993); these arguments note that the
language used to describe effective leadership behavior often has implicit conno-
tations of maleness.
Critical theory also argues that there is implicit bias in what is chosen for
study. The powerful are studied, the powerless —in terms of class, race, or gen-
der—are frequently neglected. If men and women are differentially present in
senior-level positions, for instance, studies of powerful managers will not have
many women in the data. Sheriff and Campbell wrote, "Men have produced a
body of organizational theory and research in which men are assumed to be the
primary objects of study" (1992, p. 31).
The Role of Critical Theory in Organization Studies
Critical theory has a more explicit focus on social change than most social sci-
ence. Nothing is to be taken for granted, and the goal of research is to help the
i88 New Directions for Organization 'Theory
powerless and excluded. Critical perspectives help organization theory progress

by challenging conventional views—for instance, of organizational culture and
commitment and the beneficent effects of high-commitment work practices. Crit-
ical theory literature can potentially help to ensure that important substantive
arenas arc not overlooked.
But there is a paradox. Even as critical theory adopts an explicitly political
agenda, because of its acknowledged position of a comparative lack of power—
excluded, for instance, from the power structure of most academic departments
(Martin, 1994) —the more insistent and challenging it becomes, the less likely it
is to have its intended effects. Eschewing a strategy of co-optation or even coexis-
tence, some variants of critical theory demand different forms of theory and
empirical analysis — qualitative, interpretive work as contrasted with quantitative
analysis, as one instance. But one might question how direct challenges to the
established order can succeed when they are launched from a position of less
power, directly confront the established literature, and do so not on its own terms
but on terms chosen and at times knowable only by those launching the critiques.
In such a circumstance, it is all too easy for the dominant view to ignore theoreti-
cal and empirical challenges. Thus, the challenge for critical theory is to engage
conventional analysis in ways that facilitate interaction rather than rejection. The
very fact that "institutional conditions determine what kinds of knowledge are
produced and what kinds of observation and interpretation come to be accepted
as true" (Martin, 1994, p. 416) would seem to require taking those institutional
conditions and social realities into account in determining both a theoretical and
empirical strategy. In this regard, Marxist organization theory and its descendants
possibly provide a fruitful model of what might be accomplished.
9
New Directions for Organization

Theory
Three major themes recur in this overview of the field of organization studies
and the concepts and controversies that characterize attempts to understand these
ubiquitous social entities, first, there are subjects given comparatively short shrift
by the field even though they are important in the environment and pose some
interesting challenges for some strands of organization theory. Among such sub-
jects are the changing natures of organization boundaries, the employment rela-
tion, and the size distribution of organizations, changes in managerial autonomy
produced in part by changes in the capital markets, changing organizational de-
mography as the work force composition changes and as organizations interna-
tionalize, and changes in the degree of wage inequality in organizations and, as a
consequence, in the United States. There are also numerous subject domains in
which important models of behavior make competing predictions and in which
adherents of the various models tend to talk past each other, ignore competing
points of view, and dismiss conflicting evidence, discussions about interdisciplin-
ary cross-fertilization to the contrary.
Second, there is the issue of the very diversity of the field, its increasing
differentiation, and the profusion of theories, concepts, and methods as the scope
and boundaries of organization studies expand to incorporate ideas from whatever
nearby disciplines seem to be useful at the time. And third, there is the idea that
both of these facets of the field — what is ignored and the theoretical fragmenta-
tion—are consequences of the particular evolution and location of organization
studies. In particular, because organization studies is located increasingly in busi-
ness schools, particularly U.S. business schools, economics has come to play a
larger role. In this interdisciplinary setting, fewer disciplinary anchors or forces
guide or direct research, contributing to the theoretical diversity that has come to
characterize the field. Also, by being housed in business schools, the managerial
concerns focused often at the individual or at most the firm level of analysis loom
189
large, and social policy and broader macrosocial issues such as wage inequality,
size distributions, and the governance and control of organizations receive com-
paratively less attention. The particular research context favors an individualistic,
careerist, and differentiated pattern:
In North America the dominating agenda . . . is centered on individualistic

competition over careers. . . . Specialization is promoted by the desire of each
person to differentiate themselves from the mass. . . . The country with the
largest number of professional researchers into organizations, the USA, would
display the largest degree of competition and attempts at differentiation. . . .
The overwhelming impression is of pluralistic diversity. (Donaldson, 1995, p. 6)
This last chapter builds on the review of the field accomplished in the pre-
ceding chapters by taking stock of the field's progress and offering some thoughts
about useful future directions for research, paths to avoid, and ideas about the
task of building organization theory. The last time I did this, I concluded that
"the dominant perspective on action . . . has been the rational model of choice"
and that "the vast majority of the research has focused on the individual level of
analysis" (Pfcffer, 1982, p. 255). Because organizations are in fact "social entities
characterized by demographic, relational, and physical (material?) structures"
(Mirvis, 1981, p. 2), I argued that research on networks and social relations, orga-
nizational demography, and the physical design of organizations would be pro-
ductive and useful. The ensuing years have seen at least two of those recommen-
dations or predictions come to fruition. There has been extensive research on
both organizational demography (e.g., Stewman, 1988; Mitman, 1992) and social
networks (e.g., Burt, 1992). In both instances, there have been substantial ad-
vances in ideas, methods, and results.
By contrast, there has not been much attention given to physical design (e.g.,
Darley and Gilbert, 1985), and if anything there has been less research on this
subject since the 1980s. And, as noted in chapter 7, the subject of organizational
design has also diminished in the amount of research attention received. One of
the things this final chapter does is to renew the call for research on the effects
of the physical or built environment and to argue for a rcvitalization of research
on other aspects of design. This is part of a recommendation for the field to
become more phenomenon driven and to consider using issues of relevance as
one way of navigating the thicket of ideas and concepts. This chapter also pursues
another theme from the earlier review — a concern with the state of paradigm
proliferation—although now the argument is more readily made that the costs of
being unconcerned about the state of organization studies as a scientific activity
are closer at hand.
How Is Organization Studies Doing?
If judged by the formation of new journals and the expansion of existing ones,
the field of organization studies is doing well. Organization Science, Journal of
Management Inquiry, and Organization are only three of several journals that
New Directions for Organization 'Theory 191
have appeared since 1990. The Academy of Management Journal has recently
expanded by 50 percent in publication frequency (from four to six issues per year)
and has also expanded the size of each issue, and the Academy of Management
Review is larger as well. The Journal of Management has enlarged its editorial
board, scope, and ambitions. There is a vigorous and growing set of outlets for
organizational research. Book publishing is also flourishing. More and more pub-
lishers have entered the field of business publishing, which includes publication
of work on management and organizations, and the number of titles published
has expanded virtually every year. Attendance at professional meetings is up sub-
stantially, as is the size and length of the program and membership in the Acad-
emy of Management.
If judged by the passion aroused by debates over whether or not dispositions
are useful for understanding organizational behavior (House et al., 1996), whether
a critical perspective on both organizations and organization theory is useful (Fer-
guson, 1984), whether the field should seek more paradigmatic unity (Van
Maancn, 1995b), and whether the field is too functionalist (e.g., Martin, 1992b),
intellectual activity in the field is vigorous. Indeed, the vigor and scope of organi-
zation studies make the task of providing an overview of the field daunting.
By some other indicators, however, a less sanguine view of the field emerges.
Hambrick (1994) bemoaned organization studies' lack of influence on the world
of practice and its corresponding lack of disciplinary power and attention. There
is, for instance, a Council of Economic Advisors but no Council of Organiza-
tional (or Management) Advisors, even though both government and social policy
could benefit from the insights and research of organization studies. Although
economic statistics are gathered regularly by official agencies, statistics that would
assist in studying organizations must still, for the most part, be gathered by indi-
vidual scholars rather than by agencies with data gathering as their mission. The
1990s have witnessed efforts to sharply curtail federally funded research in the
sciences generally, but it is the social sciences that are particularly hard hit as
medical research, for instance, has been more successful in defending itself.
There is concern with the pace of the development of organizational knowl-
edge and even if there is such progress in our understanding. Webster and Star-
buck (1988) argued that knowledge was developing slowly, arid they buttressed
this claim by noting that the strength of relationships, as measured by the size of
reported correlations on a variety of topics, was actually getting smaller rather
than larger over time. Miner (1984) examined the connection between the use-
fulness, scientific validity, and frequency of mention by scholars for twenty-four
organization theories. He found little correlation among the three measures. For
example, more useful or more valid theories were no more likely to be frequently
mentioned than less useful or valid ones. This disconnection between validity,
applicability, and prominence is troubling for a field that aspires to be scientifi-
cally valid and useful for understanding and managing organizations. Barley and
Kunda were concerned about the field's inability to get beyond an "Anglo-
American vision of social order [that] rests on an opposition between mechanistic
and organic solidarity, associated, respectively, with normative and rational ideolo-
gies of control" (1992, p. 386).
icj2 New Directions for Organization Theory
There are a number of things that might be done to help knowledge develop
and to make the field more useful and usable by managers and poliey makers.
Some of these are suggested in what follows, but the discussion does not purport
to be comprehensive. Addressing these issues requires the discussion and attention
of all of those interested in organizations and their study.
Avoiding the Dangerous Liaison with Economics
As noted in the first chapter, there is evidence that organi/ation studies is increas-
ingly influenced by and preoccupied with an economic orientation or model of
behavior. The study of organizations seems to be not so much bothered by physics
envy (Van Maanen, 1995b) as it is by economics envy, which at the end of the
day is potentially much more troublesome. After all, most of us don't really bor-
row physics theory too often to understand organizations (chaos theory notwith-
standing), but the temptation to rely on rational economic models of choice and
organizational behavior, regardless of their ability to develop novel insights or to
produce empirically valid predictions, remains compelling. In their analysis of
waves of managerial rhetoric, Barley and Kuncla argued that the normative em-
phasis of the writing about organizational culture would be supplanted by a "re-
surgence of rationalism" (1992, p. 394). This prediction has turned out to be true
and the trend was already well advanced at the time of their article.
Why should we care about this trend? Canella and Paetzold argued that we
should not worry about the growing dominance of economic models in organiza-
tion analysis: "Should members of another field wish to mount a hostile takeover
of organizational science, we say 'let them come,' . . . recognizing that such a
takeover requires the convincing of members of our field . . . that some particu-
lar perspective is the best one offered to date" (1994, p. 337).
But this argument is wrong on two counts. It is misleading in the first in-
stance for its implications about the politics of knowledge. Those advocating an
economic approach to organizational analysis (e.g., Barney and Ouchi, 1986; Hes-
terly, Liebeskind, and Zenger, 1990) have displayed a willingness —indeed, an
eagerness —to take on topics traditionally left to psychologists, sociologists, and
organizations scholars, topics, that is, such as organizational structure (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992) and the structuring and effects of rewards and incentives
(Zenger, 1992). Many of those pushing an economic model are explicit in their
view that this mode of analysis is intended to replace, rather than to supplement,
other forms of organizational analysis. Thus, for instance, Jensen predicted "an
impending revolution in organization theory" (1983, p. 324) based on emerging
theoretical work in economics. Hirschleifer was even more direct: "The social
sciences can be regarded as in a process of coalescing. As economies 'impcrialisti-
cally' employs its tools of analysis over a wider range of social issues, it will become
sociology and anthropology and political science. . . . As these other disciplines
grow increasingly rigorous, they will not merely resemble but will he economics"
(1977, pp. 3-4, emphasis in original).
Canella and Paetzold recognized that "science is not a magnificent march
New Directions for Organization Theory 193
toward absolute truth, but a social struggle among the scholars of the profession
to construct truth" (1994, p. 332). But the implication of this fact is that truth
will not necessarily triumph since truth is itself socially determined. Or, the best
perspective offered to date is determined not by some unambiguous empirical test
but rather by which theory or perspective can muster the most social support for
its definition of truth and organizational reality. Consequently, those factors that
produce advantage in a social struggle will be important in determining which
theoretical perspective triumphs, and unity in perspective and consensus are
among the factors that provide the economic perspective with an edge in the
contest among models and theories.
Being unconcerned about the proliferation of economic explanations of orga-
nizations is also wrong as a matter of science. Chapter 3 detailed just a portion
of what is wrong with the economic model as a way of analyzing organizations.
Choshal and Moran (1996) have made the argument that not only are economic
models often theoretically and empirically misleading; they are also "bad for prac-
tice" and, by inference, a poor foundation on which to build public or manage-
ment policy. "Organization economics . . . sees managers as untrustworthy and
as requiring controls from supcrordinate levels in the organization" (Donaldson,
1995, p. 4), thereby contributing to a control-oriented set of management prac-
tices (e.g., the emphasis on hierarchy, incentives, and surveillance) that are both
expensive and counterproductive. If this is true — and certainly more research and
argument may be warranted —then there are important consequences for organi-
zations themselves from the field of organization studies being seduced by eco-
nomic logic and models. Recall that theories of behavior, to the extent they guide
policies and practices, can become true through their very implementation
(Frank, 1988; Pfeffer, 1994, chap. 4) because of the self-fulfilling, interconnected
nature of behavior. Organizational scholars have an obligation to develop and test
alternative models of behavior and not simply cede the field to economics.
Somewhat paradoxically, even as the various strands of organization theory
may have become increasingly diverse and disconnected, the field as a whole has
become more connected to adjacent social sciences that advocate the rational
actor model of behavior. Even as debate about positivism has occurred within the
field of organization studies, and even as critical perspectives have evolved, the
field has come to be increasingly dominated by models and methods that would
seem to epitomize what critical theory eschews. This is not to suggest that there
aren't subcultures of organization theory that embrace the humanities, postmod-
ernism, and critical theory or that there aren't those who seek to maintain a
diversity of paradigms. But the current trend seems clear.
Avoiding Fads and Fashion by Pursuing a Strong Inference

Research Strategy
One cause for the flirtation of the field with economic models is the absence of
paradigmatic consensus over problems, theories, or research methods. This ab-
sence of a well-developed scientific paradigm makes experimenting with anything
new or different more desirable. It also has the undesirable property of permitting
taste, virtually unconstrained by scientific norms and standards, to run rampant.
Two experienced organizations scholars with extensive experience as editors and
reviewers made this point eloquently: "Even when a paper contains a well-
articulated theory that fits the data, editors or reviewers may reject it or insist the
theory be replaced simply because it clashes with their particular conceptual
tastes" (Sutton and Staw, 1995, p. 372).
Organization studies, because of its lack of a strong anchor either in a disci-
pline or in phenomena, is susceptible to being caught up by fads and fashion.
Making this same observation, Zald wrote, "organizational studies follows the rat-
ings, responding not only to academic fads but to the whims and foibles of
academic hucksters arid the problem definitions of corporate executives" (1993,
p. 514). Eccles and Nohria noted that management theory was obsessed with new-
ness, even though the "new" principles were essentially the same as the old ones:
"Even a casual reading of the management literature over the past seventy-five
years, both popular and academic, shows that every age 'discovers' these principles
anew. . . . Even as the fundamental themes of management remain the same,
the words used to express them constantly portray them as new" (1992, p. 5).
Following fads and fashion without some sense of a theoretical research
agenda that can withstand the blandishments of novelty and uniqueness can
cause problems for the development of the field of study, as Barley and Kunda
noted: "to the degree that trends in organizational theory mirror trends in mana-
gerial discourse at large, our efforts may be neither cumulative nor pathbreaking.
Instead, in the long run, the tenor of our theorizing may amount to little more
than the turning of a small cog within a larger socioeconomic clock over which
no one has control" (1992, p. 394).
Absent some consensus on the goals of the scientific enterprise, the tempta-
tion to be caught up in the new and to pursue "what's interesting" has a greater
influence on the research process. The study of organizations would probably be
well served to spend more time confronting data and phenomena and less time
being fascinated by the new, the elegant, or the obscure for their own sake. Don-
aldson maintained that "the present degree of pluralism in US organization the-
ory is excessive and harbours severe problems of incoherence, lack of cumulation,
cynicism, faddism and despair that anything of lasting worth can be accom-
plished" (1995, p. 6). Commenting on the prevalence of the uniqueness value —
"a prescription that uniqueness is good, and therefore organization scholars
should attempt to make unique contributions to their discipline," Mone and Mc-
Kinley wrote:
M. S. Davis (1971) pointed out that the criterion for evaluating the importance
of a social science theory is typically iconoclasm, rather than the theory's truth
value. . . . Astley (1985) . . . argued that "the valne attached to a theory, and
the assessment of its contribution to scientific progress, is primarily determined
. . . by its intellectual novelty." . . . Staw (1985) advocated a role for journals as
generators of variety rather than selection-retention mechanisms. . . . Gioia and
Pitre (1990) suggested that organizational science should strive to be original,
and Martin (1992[bj) stated that we should "invent our own experiments, uncon-
strained by the usual ways of thinking and writing about empirical work." (1993,
pp. 285; 286)
This value of uniqueness and innovation for its own sake, not for its truth
value or for its ability to advance our understanding of organizations, is very much
at variance with the use of a theory-building strategy employing the logic of strong
inference. MacKenzie and House advocated a strong inference approach as a
paradigm development strategy for organization studies. They described strong
inference research as:
based on the assumption that: (a) all theories, no matter how good at explaining
a set of phenomena, are ultimately incorrect and consequently will undergo
modification over time . . . and (b) the fate of the better theories is to become
explanations that hold for some phenomena in some limited conditions. . . . A
guiding principle of the strong inference research strategy is the Popperian posi-
tion that pursuit of knowledge is more efficient when scientists deliberately set
out to disprove theories, or seek rejections, than when they attempt to assemble
proof for theories. (1978, p. 13)
They noted that "paradigm development research necessarily implies commit-

ment to a program of research" (p. 21) and that this programmatic research ap-
proach "is counter to the 'success ethic' whereby researchers act as if they are
'piece workers' grinding out a quota of 'successes' per unit time, with bonuses
given for above average productivity" (p. 21).
The uniqueness value has other adverse consequences for developing knowl-
edge about organizations. It contradicts the idea of replication —even replicabil-
ity—as well as the process for developing useful knowledge, because for knowl-
edge to be useful it must be both replicable and replicated. The uniqueness value
tends to favor complexity—simple ideas are less likely to be unique or to be
"interesting." But, there is much to be said for parsimonious, simple theoretical
ideas that can serve as a foundation for understanding organizations:
If people are boundedly rational, constrained by rules and procedures, prone to
act according to habit or custom, with unclear preferences, and subject to various
forms of social influence, why do we think it necessary to develop such intricate
models and such complex variables to describe them individually and in interac-
tion? As others have noted, the phrase complex organizations may refer more to
the organization theorists' portrayal of organizations than to the entities them-
selves (Weick, 1969, p. 1). ... If we use relatively simpler processes and models,
the world will appear to be simpler and more certain. . . . In our fascination
with complexity, we overlook the potential for finding simpler models to describe
the world. (Pfeffer, 198la, p. 411)
Some argue that paradigm diversity stimulates innovation (Martin, 1992b;
Morgan, 1990; Zald, 1993). The evidence on this point is far from clear. Zam-
muto and Connolly wrote that "the organizational sciences are severely frag-
mented" and that "this fragmentation presents a serious obstacle to scientific
growth of the field" (1984, p. 30). They noted that "organization sciences incur
costs in every area: teaching, administration, research, publication, advancement,
and recognition" (p. 31). In a similar vein, Mone and McKinley maintained that
"the rapid rate of innovation . . . is not necessarily strengthening onr understand-

ing or knowledge concerning organizations" (1993, p. 293). Commenting on the
profusion of paradigms, Donaldson wrote:
The academic institutional system in the USA which so fragmented organi/a-
tional structural theory in the seventies and which has produced a plethora of
conflicting paradigms may continue . . . generating distinctiveness through prod-
uct differentiation. . . . The prospects may not he bright for an imminent reinte-
gration of the currently competing paradigms. . . . Nevertheless, such a unified
theory is needed . . . and It is the goal which all persons of good scientific
conscience will wish to see achieved. (1995, p. 214)
If, as Donaldson has suggested, the prospects for developing a more unified
theory are meager, and if the logic of strong inference or seeking sonic greater
level of paradigm development are both unattractive (e.g., Van Maanen, 1995b),
then another way of advancing knowledge is to anchor research concerns more
in phenomena and in relevance.
The Advantage of Being Phenomenon Driven
The role of theory in the organization sciences is problematic. First of all, there
are important disagreements about what theory is or should be. Van Maanen
argued that "theory makes its way in intellectual communities (and beyond) as
much by its style as by its theoretical claims, logic, sweep, empirical evidence,
or methodological strictures" (1995a, p. 690). To some, rhetoric and theory are
inseparable and almost indistinguishable (Van Maanen, 1995a; 1995b). 'There is
even the question as to whether theory is useful. "Some prominent researchers
have argued the case against theory. . . . The field first needs more descriptive
narratives about organizational life" (Sutton and Staw, 1995, p. 378). Rich de-
scription, writing that is at times indistinguishable from literature or reporting, is
necessary to build strong theory over time (Van Maanen, 1989). Others question
whether the demands placed on scholars for both good theory and rigorous data
are compatible or even feasible. Sutton and Staw (1995, p. 380—381) noted: "On
the one hand, editors and reviewers plead for creative and interesting ideas. . . .
On the other hand, authors are skewered for apparent mismatches between their
theory and data. . . . Contradictory demands for both strong theory and precise
measurement are often satisfied only by hypocritical writing."
On the other hand, some organization scholars argue for theory development
and theory testing based on principles found in the natural as well as the social
sciences. Sacks, one of the founders of conversation analysis, a branch of ethno-
methodology, itself a qualitative branch of sociology, argued for the importance
of methods that were replicable and that could be transferred to others: "When I
started to do research . . . I figured that sociology could not be an actual science
unless it was able to handle the details of actual events, handle them formally,
and in the first instance, be informative about them in the direct ways in which
primitive sciences tend to be informative, that is, that anyone else can go and see
whether what was said is so" (1984, p. 26).
MacKenzie and House (1978) argued for the importance of not only devel-
oping theory but rejecting it when it did not fit the data, a method for cumulating
knowledge and over time refining theories so that they were increasingly rigorous
and applicable. Donaldson (1995) has argued not only for theory in general but
for a specific theory, structural contingency theory, and has made the broader
argument that cumulation and integration of insights and findings are important
for the advance of organization studies.
Given these disagreements and the general absence of paradigmatic consen-
sus, prospects for theory development may not be bright. Sutton and Staw wrote,
"Lack of consensus on exactly what theory is may explain why it is so difficult to
develop strong theory in the behavioral sciences" (1995, p. 372). In a similar vein,
Weick noted "how hard it is in a low-paradigm field, in which people are novice
theorists, to spot which of their efforts are theory and which arc not" (1995, p.
387).
One way to navigate the morass of different theories, and one way to evaluate
the theories that present themselves, is to ask the extent to which each theory or
perspective is linked to a particular, important organizational phenomenon and
affords insight into understanding that phenomenon. It is, in fact, possible to
make the case that many of the prominent organization theories did, in fact,
derive from a concern with specific, interesting phenomena. What happened,
however, was that over time the theories became objects of discourse and develop-
ment in and of themselves, often losing connection to their original foundations.
For instance, one important source of institutional theory was the observation
that organizational goals and their associated technology were often only loosely
coupled with actual organizational arrangements, including structures (J. W.
Meyer and Scott, 1983). Another observation was the effect on the adoption of
various practices of the mere frequency of adoption of similar practices in the
environment rather than some technical or efficiency rationale for their use (e.g.,
Tolbcrt and Zucker, 1983). Much of the interest in social networks and the effects
of the social environment on behavior came from the observation that organiza-
tional behavior was contagious, in a social network sense (e.g., G. F. Davis, 1991),
and from the interest in the sources of the differences in individual career attain-
ments and success (e.g., Granovetter, 1974). Resource dependence theory arose
from observations of interorganizational influence (e.g., Pfeffer, 1972a). And the
rationalizing model, with its concomitant effect on the analysis of organizational
incentives and their consequences, derived in part from the observation that peo-
ple often developed attitudes to be consistent with their behavior rather than the
reverse (Aronson, 1972; Staw, 1980) and that it was the case that rewards often
had perverse effects (A. Kohn, 1993).
Theoretical perspectives that have been less phenomenon driven have some-
times gotten themselves into trouble as a consequence. Economics, for example,
often starts with a phenomenon —for example, the spread of the multidivisional
structure, the prevalence of seniority-graded wage profiles—but doesn't investigate
the cause of the phenomenon because it assumes the cause: efficiency. Rather, it
models how an efficiency-based explanation, consistent with what is observed, can
be derived. Because observations, in this mode of theorizing, can never be used
to inform or develop the theory—rather, the theory is used to account for the
observations —there cannot be any refutation or specifying of the scope conditions
of the theory, and, as a consequence, there is also no development of the theory.
Structural contingency theory (Donaldson, 1995) suffered from a different prob-
lem. Although it began with a phenomenon —differences in organizational struc-
ture and what might affect those differences and result from them—-it fairly
quickly moved to conceptualize the phenomenon using dimensions that were
both far removed from practice and managerial conversation and also too com-
plex and convoluted to be explained or recalled even to a scientific audience.
In that sense, the theory departed from the original thing it began to explain —
understanding organizational structures in the service of developing the science
and practice of organizational design.
But design remains an important concern in organizations, and issues of de-
sign have much to recommend them as important ways of analyzing and under-
standing organizations. Pursuing a design perspective, broadly defined, would,
therefore, be useful in advancing organizational analysis.
The Relevance of Design —Physical and Organizational
The effects of physical design on social behavior remain relatively unexplored in

the organizations literature and in related social sciences. For instance, the topic
of environmental psychology was only included in the Handbook of Social Psy-
chology in its third edition (Darley and Gilbert, 1985). Organizations textbooks
and courses typically ignore discussion of either the design of work environments
or the effects of physical design on organizational behavior, even though it seems
clear that "physical settings provide contexts for behavior" (Hatch, 1987, p. 387).
One possible reason for the neglect of the topic is that it represents "a problem-
centered rather than a theory-centered set of activities" (Darley and Gilbert, 1985,
p. 949). As we have just seen, organization studies is often enamored with theory,
or at least with the appearance of theory. Consideration of physical environments
is consistent with the emphasis on phenomena that may be useful for developing
understanding of organizations. As will be discussed shortly, these environments
arc themselves changing, which bears explanation, and have potent effects on
behavior.
Since the mid-1990s, there has been some indication of a growing interest in
the subject of design, both architectural design (F. Becker and Steele, 1995),
product design (Sutton and Hargadon, 1996), and systems design. Becker and
Steele have argued that considering organizational design and new work arrange-
ments such as self-managed teams without considering the physical design impli-
cations is incomplete, because "as a work setting, an effective organization is best
managed as a total integrated system that includes the physical facility, informa-
tion technology, organizational policies and practices, and management, style"
(1995, p. xii). Moreover, there is a literature that documents a set of reliable
findings with respect to design issues and design effects.
Darley and Gilbert rioted: "an interior—an artificial construction that eneap-
sulates or surrounds an occupant—influences behavior by virtue of its ambient

qualities, its spatial and architectural arrangements, and its perceived purpose.
. . . We may best gauge the influence of the built interior by examining the ways
in which it impedes, constrains, alters, or facilitates purposive behavior" (1985, p.
969).
Springer summarized the findings of three major studies of the effects of the
built environment on performance. The dimensions of the environment consid-
ered included acoustics (noise), visual (lighting and glare) and thermal (tempera-
ture and temperature variability) aspects, air quality, appearance, and spatial ar-
rangement, including dimensions such as floor space, layout, the amount of
personal storage, the work surface, and ease of circulation. lie reported that "en-
hancements to white-collar workplaces have shown consistent performance im-
provements of between 10 to 15 percent" (1992, p. 46).
One aspect of physical space that has received some research attention is the
effect of distance on interaction. "Empirical verification of the role played by
propinquity in regulating interpersonal attraction seemed to bring to the fore the
realization that one's friends are drawn from the population of persons one has
met and that meeting requires the conjoint occupation of space" (Darley and
Gilbert, 1985, p. 971). Festinger, Schachtcr, and Back (1950) studied a graduate
student housing complex and noted how friendship patterns were correlated with
visual access and with the likelihood of chance meetings. Furthermore, they ob-
served that the number of friends a person had was affected by location in the
housing complex and its influence on chance encounters. Hatch summarized a
number of studies that observed "a relationship between distance and choice of
interaction partners. . . . All of these researchers found an inverse relationship
between the distance separating employees and the likelihood of communication
occurring between them" (1987, p. 387). The effect of distance on interaction
probably affects only certain forms of interaction, such as face-to-face. Conrath
(1973), for example, noted that distance was inversely correlated with face-to-
facc interaction and telephone calls but not with written communication among
employees.
The relationship between barriers, including physical barriers such as parti-
tions and doors and social barriers such as having a secretary, and interaction is
less clear. Some studies have found a negative relationship between settings with
barriers and the amount of interaction (e.g., Gullahorn, 1952) and have reported
that moving from a closed to an open office arrangement increased opportunities
to interact and the apparent case of communication (e.g., Brookes and Kaplan,
1972; Szilagyi and Holland, 1980). However, Oldham and Brass (1979) found
that perceptions of supervisor feedback and friendship opportunities decreased
after a move to an open office setting.
In one of the more comprehensive studies of the effects of physical space and
other factors on interaction, Hatch, studying employees in two high technology
organizations, found that:
interactions among professional-technical workers . . . may be greater for work-

ers who are given enclosed work spaces than for those lacking physieal barriers.
zoo New Directions for Organization Theory
. . . Enclosure by partitions (or walls) and a door was found to be positively

associated with the amount of time individuals reported working with others.
Partition height was also positively related to reported amount of meeting time.
. . . Enclosure supports interpersonal and group interaction. . . . Time reported
to be spent building relationships was positively correlated with the use of a door.
(1987, pp. 396-397)
Hatch's interpretation was that a certain amount of privacy and personal space
was useful for building relationships and holding meetings and that an absence
of privacy actually reduced interaction. Her study also found that task interdepen-
dence and task uncertainty were not related to self-reported interaction activity.
The variables that were the primary focus of her study, the characteristics of physi-
cal space, accounted for a sizable portion of the variation in seven categories of
self-reported work activity and in most instances explained more of the variance
than either individual demographics, individual sociability scores, or the firm or
type of job.
There is a second important way in which the physical environment affects
organizational behavior. R. A. Baron has summarized the extensive literature on
the influence of affect, "the mild, temporary shifts in current mood that virtually
everyone experiences" (1993, p. 64), on a number of outcomes including negotia-
tion, conflict, performance appraisals, task performance, and absenteeism and
turnover. In a series of imaginative studies, Baron has demonstrated that "social
factors, although of obvious importance, are clearly not the only source of positive
and negative affect. Another set of factors that can produce shifts in current
moods relates to aspects of the physical environment. Included here are such vari-
ables as ambient temperature, humidity, noise, crowding, air quality, lighting, and
other features of the physical surroundings in which people work or interact" (p.
74). He reported effects of temperature on aggression, of pleasant scents on goal
setting and self-confidence, and of lighting on a number of dimensions of work
performance.
It is striking that organizations have undergone a number of transformations
without the literature linking these changes very explicitly to considerations of the
built environment. Two such changes come to mind. First, there is an increasing
emphasis on working in teams and teamwork in organizations, particularly as the
ranks of middle management have been decimated. A physical environment built
to facilitate and encourage teamwork is one that looks different from one built to
enhance managerial status or to promote individual, contemplative decision mak-
ing. There are examples of redesigning built environments to promote a sense of
team identification—for instance, when Volvo moved to a more team-based
model of production in its Kalmar truck factory, it redesigned the layout to incor-
porate areas for each team that enhanced visual contact and promoted a sense of
team identification. But, we have yet to fully understand what a team-based physi-
cal setting would encompass, and studies that relate the team orientation of the
physical environment to the success of self-managed team interventions remain
to be done.
Second, people now more frequently work off-site, in arrangements that en-
tail telecommuting from home or that involve working at customer premises or
on the road. Because physical space is expensive, some organisations have taken
these new work arrangements as an opportunity to reduce their space require-
ments and thereby cut occupancy costs. The idea is to provide individuals with
space in a central office only when and as needed—an arrangement sometimes
called "hoteling." Permanent storage with temporary work spaces reduces the
need to provide offices that sit vacant while individuals are working off-site. Al-
though this arrangement obviously saves space, it sends an interesting message
about the importance of interacting with one's peers and colleagues and, indeed,
about one's identification with the organization. Again, studies about the effects
of this arrangement on organizational identification, commitment and turnover,
career advancement (which often requires sponsorship and the building of net-
works), and learning and idea sharing would be useful. As Darley and Gilbert
noted, "layout serves not only to regulate communication but to communicate
something of its own. . . . Interior layout serves as a signaling system that defines
role, rights, and responsibilities" (1985, p. 972).
The neglect of physical design in the literature is related to the current ne-
glect of organizational design. As one way of demonstrating this current neglect,
consider the literature cited by one of the proponents of a design perspective. In
his overview of the structural contingency literature, Donaldson (1995, p. 14)
cited some sixty-one studies. Almost half of them were from the 1970s (thirty) and
only two were from the 1990s. It is fair to state that the late 1960s and early 1970s
were the heyday of academic interest in both structural contingency theory and
organizational design. Although management consultants and practicing manag-
ers remain interested in questions of design, the research literature has waned.
The problem is that both physical and organizational design share an "engi-
neering" orientation to the field of organizations. Although the study of manage-
ment has important historical roots in engineering, engineering is out, at least
among many academics today. Even as consultants have come to play a larger
role in producing books about organizations and organizational processes, and
even as consulting firms and similar organizations are increasingly involved in
doing studies and research about organizational issues, the response from re-
searchers in academic settings seems to be profound ambivalence. Although
many academics participate in these outside activities, within the academy there
seems to be some dominant notion of theoretical purity. There seems to be an
implicit belief that the way to retain both status and position is to be caiculativcly
irrelevant. As a strategy of inquiry, it is not likely to work. As MacKenzie and
House argued, "much is to be learned from applying the knowledge gained in
the laboratory to outside settings. Application is not the sole justification for basic
research, but it is certainly helpful in generating counter examples to a theory"
(1978, p. 21). Their position, with which I concur, is that it is through "engi-
neering" activities that one learns the extent to which a theory is useful and valid
and hence acquires the empirical insight necessary to develop and revise theory.
Thus, there is a case to be made that organization studies would be well
served to be both more phenomena driven and more concerned with the applica-
bility of its ideas. In pursuing these goals, an emphasis on design seems war-
ranted. The issue is not just that good theory is practical, to rephrase Lewin's old
2O2 New Directions for Organization Theory
dictum. It is that in the welter of ideas that characterizes the field, the "engi-
neering" application of those ideas provides one way of distinguishing those that
help us understand organizations and those that don't.
Conclusion
Much progress has occurred in understanding the basic foundations of behavior,

in developing and testing alternative models of behavior, in understanding social
control, and in understanding the causes of organizational performance. But
much remains to be accomplished. Empirical and theoretical work still often pays
more attention to belief and ideology than to data, and connections among topics
and tests of competing perspectives remain all too rare. Organization studies is
trapped by its context and seems almost unconscious of this fact, limiting the
likelihood of extending its research domain to be more explicitly comparative and
historical and to address more directly social and organizational policy as well as
description.
In reviewing the literature on organizational change, Barnett and Carroll
(1995) noted that the field had developed in two separate, virtually isolated
streams —one emphasizing the content of change or what actually changes in an
organization, and the other focusing on the process of change or how change
occurs. In reviewing that literature and its progress over the previous twenty years,
the authors concluded that although process and content effects are different,
there are important interactions between the two domains. They argued that
"when researchers start recognizing and incorporating such notions into studies
of the consequences of organizational change, it will be easier to sort out findings
and to resolve apparently contradictory ones" (p. 233).
A similar comment applies to organization theory generally. The field could
benefit from more connection between concerns of process and content. More
comprehensive incorporation of issues— including the locus for causality of be-
havior, the models that explain behavior, fundamental understanding of social
control processes, and the consequences of all of this for various outcomes includ-
ing survival and performance —would help sort out findings and provide guidance
for those seeking to understand organizations and for those who live in and man-
age them.
One particularly worthwhile domain in which process and content concerns
converge is the translation of knowledge into action. There are many instances
in which organizations know what to do (content) but have difficulty in actually
implementing that knowledge (action). To understand how organizations fail to
act on their knowledge, or, more prosaically, why well-informed individuals and
organizations within them pursue ineffective activities and promote dysfunctional
policies and practices, we will need to study not just "best practices" but "worst
practices" as well. Population ecology has reminded the field of the importance
of not selecting on the dependent variable and how much more can be learned
by studying the full range of organizational performance and populations of orga-
nizations. The challenge for organization studies in the future is to find ways of
New Directions for Organization 1'heory 203
understanding the connection between content and process, between knowledge

and action, and between theory and practice. It seems that such a focus would
provide some additional leverage for analyzing organizations. Most important, it
is a way of thinking about analyzing organizations that could develop knowledge
in organization science that would have both theoretical power and practical
utility.
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INDEX
absenteeism defined, 45-46

autonomy and, 38 economic model and, 45-46
control and, 183 agents, defined, 46
effects on, 36 agreeableness. See Big Five
heterogeneity and, 85 alienation, 182-83
accountability, 152—53 allocation. See resource allocation
achievement, 38 ambiguity and uncertainty
acquisitions, 88 agency theory and, 51
additive interaction, defined, 37 power and influence and, 143—45
adverse impact, 25-26 rewards and incentives and, 1 32
affect transaction cost economies and, 51
defined, 200 anchoring-and-adjustment, defined, 152
design and, 200 applied psychology, defined, 11. See also
individual differences and, 28-29 psychology
job satisfaction and, 32 ASA cycle, defined, 27
moods and, 33 assertiveness, 147-48
negotiation and, 153 asset specificity, 52
scales for, 31-32 attendance at work. See absenteeism
stability of, 31-32, 34 attitudes. See job attitudes
affective disposition, defined, 36. See also consistency of, 30
dispositions twins and, 31
African Americans. See minorities; race attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) cycle,
age, 83 defined, 27
age dependence attribution theory, defined, 79
founding and mortality and, 165, 166 authority
heterogeneity and, 166 defined, 138
agency theory economic model and, 51
ambiguity and uncertainty and, 51 efficiency and, 51
contracts and, 46 power and influence and, 138, 146
245
246 Index
autonomy. See also rewards and incentives bundle system, defined, 174
absenteeism and, 38 business schools
achievement and, 38 in Europe, 13
dispositions and, 37 organization studies in, 9, 11, 13, 14-17,
management and, 21-23, 37 18, 189-90
pension funds and, 22 relevance and, 13
size distribution and, in United States, 13
autonomy-control, denned, 182 bystander style, defined, 148. See also
power and influence
bankruptcy, 59
barriers, 199-200 capital markets. See externalization; inter-
behavior nalization
causality of, 25-41 career chances. See mobility
in China, 26-27 career mobility. See mobility
cognitive model of, 77—79 careers. See job attitudes; job choice; job
commitment and, 116 complexity; job design; job interests;
control of, 100-135 job performance; job satisfaction; job
demography and, 98 security; job success
design and, 25, 26 causality
economic models of, 44-55 of behavior, 25-41
embedded nature of, 55 high-commitment work system and, 171
individual differences and, 27-33 leadership traits and, 28
information and, 111 locus of, 5
interaction and, 55-56 normative order and, 26-27
learning perspective and, 25 organization studies and, 5
models of, 5, 42-80 cause map
moral model of, 73-77 defined, 78
normative order and, 26—27 origins of, 79
operant-conditioning perspective and, 25 centrality, 145
organization studies and, 13-14 CKOs. See also management
rationality of, 44 background in finance of, 23
retrospectively rational model of, 65-73 boards of directors and, 109
situationalist perspective of, 25 earnings of, 23, 109-10
social model of, 5, 55-65 in France, 23
structure and, 81 in Germany, 23
surveillance of, 114-16 in Japan, 23
in United States, 26-27 performance and, 109, 114
behavioral commitment. See commitment rewards and incentives and, 114
belief systems, 175 size of organizations and, 109
Big Five. See also dispositions; emotions; tournament model and, 110
tenure in United Kingdom, 23
criticism of, 34 in United States, 23
types of, 32 challenges, 37-38
birth. See founding and mortality chance, 138-39
blacks. See minorities; race change. See innovation and change
boards of directors, 109. See also manage- characteristics. See dispositions
ment charismatic leaders. See transformational
boundaries leadership
heightening of, 83 chief executive officers. See CEOs
permeability of, 9 China, behavior in, 26-27
Index 247
choice, 116 competition

class, Marxism and, 184-86 co-worker contact and, 94-95
cognitive dissonance, 66 density and, 167
cognitive map. See cause map founding and mortality and, 166, 168
cognitive model gender and, 94-95, 97
attribution theory and, 79 management and, 179
causality and, 78 mass and, 167-68
characteristics of, 77 size of organizations and, 167
commitment and, 79 competition argument. See natural selec-
criticism of, 79 tion
relativism in, 77-78 complexity of jobs, 21
retrospectively rational model and, 77 composition. See social composition
social model and, 77 comprehensiveness, 45
variants of, 77 conformity
cognitive-bias approach. See decision institutional theory and, 63
making selection and, 101
collective bargaining, 108. See also union- conscientiousness, defined, 34. See also
ization Big Five
commitment consideration, 127-28
advantages and disadvantages of, 116- consistency, cross-time, 30
17, 118 consonance hypothesis
behavior and, 116 criticism of and support for, 161, 162
choice and, 116 defined, 158, 161
cognitive model and, 79 constituent accountability, defined, 152-53
control and, 116 constraint, defined, 61
decision making and, 117-18 contacts, defined, 61. See also co-worker
defined, 66, 74, 120-21 contact
dissonance reduction and, 116 contingency theory. See structural contin-
effects of, 67-68, 73 gency theory
escalation of, 71-72 contingent employment. See externaliza-
explicitness and, 116 tion
external constraints and, 68 contracts
heterogeneity and, 85 agency theory and, 46
intrinsic decision factors and, 68 defined, 46
job choice and, 67-68 types of, 18
pathology and, 117-18 contributions-inducements balance, 7
performance appraisal and, 71 control. See also surveillance
psychological dynamics and, 118 absenteeism and, 183
publicness and, 116 alienation and, 182-83
recruiting and, 116—18 causes of, 125
retrospectively rational model and, 68- characteristics of, 22
69, 70,71-73, 116 commitment and, 116
rewards and incentives and, 116 culture and, 123-25
self-justification model and, 67 defined, 101
self-perception model and, 66, 116 deskilling and, 181-82
socialization and, 118 ecology and, 168-69
sunk costs and, 70—71 efficiency and, 180-81
surveillance and, 116 elements of, 101
commitment model. See self-justification growth of, 22
model hierarchical emphasis of, 5, 136
248 Index
control (continued) language, symbols, and rituals and, 125-

importance of, 100 26
leadership and, 126—34 management of, 125-26
management and, 6, 22, 115, 183—84 measurement of, 121-22
Marxism and, 179-83 performance and, 122
organizations and, 100 perspectives on, 123
organization studies and, 5 rewards and incentives and, 126
performance and, 179 typology of, 123, 124
power and influence and, 1 38
public trust organizations and, 101 death. See founding and mortality
purposes of, 102, 124, 179 debt underwritings, defined, 62
reactance theory and, 124—25 decision making
rewards and incentives and, 102, 135 commitment and, 117-18
selection and, 101 culture and, 125
self-interest and, 103 negotiation and, 151-52, 153-54
types of, 100-135 top management teams and, 90
cooperation. See also culture; dispositions decomposition, defined, 128
cooperative culture and persons and, 39 delay and waiting, 147
economic model and, 50 demands, 38-39
keiretsu and, 50-51 demography
organizations and, 50-51 age and, 83
research on, 35 behavior and, 98
rewards and incentives and, 108-9 design and, 98
co-optation, 148 determinants of, 87-89
coordination education and, 83-84
importance of, 100 evolution of, 87
interlocks and, 184-85 feedback loops and, 87
corporate control. See control gender and, 82-83, 85, 87-88, 93-94
corporate interlocks, 184-85 growth of organizations and, 88
co-worker contact heterogeneity and, 83-84, 99
competition and, 94-95 innovation and change and, 85—87
earnings and, 108 minorities and, 83, 85, 88, 94
gender and, 94-95 mobility and, 86, 93
job satisfaction and, 95 model of, 91
mobility and, 94-95 networks and, 93
creativity, 111 of organizations, 5, 82-89
critical theory (CT) performance and, 90-91
advantages and disadvantages of, 187-88 politics and, 88
defined, 178 race and, 83, 85
Marxism and, 178, 179-86 scrutiny and, 88
power and influence and, 187-88 sexual harassment and, 94
criticality. See resource allocation social model and, 98-99
cross-time consistency, 30 structure and, 82
CT. See critical theory (CT) tenure and, 83-84, 88
culture. See also individualistic culture; token status and, 82-83
normative order top management teams and, 85, 89-93
control and, 123-25 turnover and, 84-85
decision making and, 125 density
defined,121 competition and, 167
informational social influence and, 126 defined, 166
Index 249
ecology and, 166-67 moods and, 36

founding and mortality and, 166-67, organizational behavior and, 32-33
168 origins of, 31
descriptive interaction, defined, 37 power and influence and, 144, 145
design research on, 27—37
affect and, 200 stability of, 34-35
behavior and, 25, 26 states and, 36
defined, 25 templates and, 39
demands and, 38-39 types of, 31-33
demography and, 98 dissimilarity. See heterogeneity
determinism and, 98 dissolutions, 88
dispositions and, 36, 37-40 dissonance, cognitive, 66
engineering and, 201-2 dissonance reduction, 116
externalization and, 200-201 distance, 199
genetics and heredity and, 31 diversity. See heterogeneity
hoteling and, 200-201 downsizing
organization studies and, 190, 198-202 in fortune 500 companies, 21
performance and, 199—200 growth of, 21
teamwork and, 200 repetition of, 20
deskilling, 181-82 downtime, defined, 169
determinism draft order, defined, 71
of contingency theory, 179 due process, 108
design and, 98 Durkheim, Emile, 12
of Marxism, 184 dynamics, psychological, 118
devaluation, of "women's work," 96 dyzygotic twins, 31. See also twins
differentiation, size of organizations and,
21, 161 early childhood education, 26. See also ed-
diffusion ucation
of deskilling, 181-82 earnings. See also piece rates; seniority-
of high-commitment work system, 172- based wage systems
76, 180, 182-83 co-worker contact and, 108
of modular production, 174 determination of, 105—10
of organization studies, 4-5, 190-91 dispersion of, 108-9
social contagion and, 60-61 dispositions and, 39
structural equivalence and, 60-61 due process and, 108
diffusion theory, defined, 15 economic model and, 106
director interlocks, 184-85 in France, 23
directors, boards of, 109. See also manage- gender and, 88-89, 96, 106, 186-87
ment in Germany, 23
dispositional effects, 30-31 hierarchy and, 106
dispositional perspective, 30-31 ideology of, 105
dispositions. See also cooperation inequality of, 18, 112-13
autonomy and, 37 in Japan, 23
defined, 35 job satisfaction and, 109, 113
design and, 36, 37-40 management and, 104, 106, 109-10
earnings and, 39 of minorities, 88
effects of, 35-36 mobility and, 108
genetics and heredity and, 31 networks and, 97
importance of, 30—31 performance and, 105, 106, 107-8, 113
of management, 35, 37 power and influence and, 106
250 Index
earnings (continued) predictions and, 51-52

race and, 106 rationality and, 44
research productivity and, 107 rewards and incentives and, 105, 106,
size distribution and, 21 108
skill and, 182 social model compared to, 64
status and, 97 status and, 54
tactician style and, 148 sunk-cost rule and, 46, 47
templates and, 39 economics
tenure and, 106, 109 characteristics of, 14
tournament model and, 110 organization studies and, 6, 14, 189,
turnover and, 109, 113 192-93
unionization and, 106, 108 of production, 21
in United Kingdom, 23 resource dependence theory and, 63
in United States, 23 self-perception model and, 67
ecology economies of scale, 21
control and, 168-69 education. See also early childhood educa-
defined, 163, 164 tion
density and, 166—67 demography and, 83—84
evolution and, 163-64 effectiveness of, 134
interdependence and, 164 market organizations and, 101
liability in newness and, 165—66, negotiation and, 154
168 public trust organizations and, 101
liability in smallness and, 165, 168 selection and, 101
mass and, 167-68 as signal, 101
performance and, 163 skill and, 182
resource partitioning and, 168 top management teams and, 90
selection and, 164-65 turnover and, 83-84
economic model effecrivity, 169-70
agency theory and, 45-46 efficiency
asset specificity and, 52 authority and, 51
authority and, 51 control and, 180-81
characteristics of, 44-55, 65, 105 economic model and, 43-44, 49
comprehensiveness and, 45 employment relationship and, 179
cooperation and, 50 Marxism and, 179-80
criticism of, 47-55 power and influence and, 142-43
data employed in, 48-49 seniority-based wage systems and, 49
earnings and, 106 cffort-avcrscness, defined, 46
efficiency and, 43-44, 49 elite. See status
effort-averseness and, 46 emotions, 149-50. See also Big Five
empirical results and, 51-52 employees. See human resources
equilibrium and, 45 employment contracts, 18
externalization and, 51-52 employment relationship
growth of, 44 efficiency and, 179
ideology of, 54-55 cxternalization of, 18
individualism and, 45, 49-50 politics and, 53
mathematics and, 54 engineering
net benefit rule and, 46-47 design and, 201-2
opportunism and, 45-46 growth of, 10
path-dependence and, 45 industrial psychology and, 11-12
Index 251
industrial sociology and, 11—12 formality and formalization

organization studies and, 6, 9-11, 13 of organizations, 9
standardization in, 9-10 size distribution and, 21
entrapment activities, 69 Fortune 500 companies, 21
entrepreneurship. See self-employment founding and mortality
environment. See design age dependence and, 165, 166
equilibrium, economic model and, 45 competition and, 166, 168
Europe. See also France; Germany; Swe- criticism of and support for, 163
den; United Kingdom density and, 166-67, 168
business schools in, 13 of high-commitment work system, 174
organization studies in, 6 legitimacy and, 166, 168
evolution, ecology and, 163-64 framing, 151-52
exchange, power and influence and, 147, France, earnings in, 23. See also Europe
148 free riding, defined, 75
experience. See Big Five; tenure fringe benefits, 21. See also rewards and in-
expert power, defined, 141. See also power centives
and influence full-time employees. See human resources
explicitness, 116 functionalist paradigm
expressive orientation, defined, 37-38 defined, 17
external constraints management and, 177
commitment and, 68 fundamental attribution error
defined, 68 leadership and, 129-30
job satisfaction and, 68 normative order and, 26-27
leadership and, 127
externalization. See also internalization game theoretic approach, defined, 151
defined, 19 GCA. See intelligence
design and, 200-201 Gemeinschaft, defined, 103
economic model and, 51-52 gender
gender and, 20 adverse impact on, 25-26
growth of, 18-20, 21-22 competition and, 94-95, 97
in Japan, 21 co-worker contact and, 94-95
minorities and, 20 demography and, 82-83, 85, 87-88, 93-
size distribution and, 21 94'
social consequences of, 20 earnings and, 88-89, 96, 106, 186-87
in United Kingdom, 20 externalization and, 20
in United States, 19-20 Griggs v. Duke Power and, 25-26
extraversion, defined, 34. See also Big Five heterogeneity and, 85
job satisfaction and, 95
fads, fashion, and trends, 16, 193-96 management and, 97
family life, 187 mobility and, 94-95
feedback loops, 87 networks and, 96-97
feminist organization theory, defined, 186. power and influence and, 148
See also critical theory (CT); gender public-private dichotomy and, 187
field of vision, defined, 89 role models and, 97
finance, 23 same-gender co-workers and, 96, 97
financial services, defined, 21 selection criteria and, 25—26
firing, 115-16. See also downsizing self-employment and, 20
force activation model, of power and influ- status and, 96-97
ence, 138, 139 structure and, 82
252 Index
gender (continued) earnings and, 106

tactician style and, 148 purposes of, 47
top management teams and, 92 shrinking of, 136
gender composition, 93-94 social control and, 136
gender representation, 93-94 transaction cost economics and, 47
general cognitive ability (GCA). See intelli- high-commitment work system
gence belief systems and, 175
generic composition theories, defined, 95 causality and, 171
genetics and heredity characteristics of, 172, 173
design and, 31 diffusion of, 172-76, 180, 182-83
dispositions and, 31 founding and mortality of, 174
intelligence and, 31, 33 in Japan, 174
job satisfaction and, 31 management and, 175-76
Germany, earnings in, 23. See also Kurope market failure and, 174—75
Gesellschaft, defined, 103 performance and, 172
goals. See also rewards and incentives productivity and, 171, 172
of organizations, 7—8, 9 stress and, 183
performance and, 111 in Sweden, 174
golden parachutes, defined, 146 tenure and, 175
good cop, bad cop, 150 in United Kingdom, 174
governmental entities, organizations and, in United States, 172-74
8-9 home life, 187
grievances, 171 homogeneity. See heterogeneity
Criggs v. Duke Power, 25—26 homosocial reproduction, 99. See also het-
groups. See teamwork erogeneity
growth need strength, 37 hoteling, 200-201
human capital
happiness, 31-32 defined, 96, 97
harassment, 94. See also gender; minori- social capital compared to, 98
ties; race "women's work" and, 96
hazing, 119. See also socialization human capital endowments, defined, 184
heredity. See genetics and heredity human resources
heterogeneity. See also homosocial repro- leadership and, 148
duction management and, 170-71
absenteeism and, 85 performance and, 169-76
age dependence and, 166 policies for, 169-72
commitment and, 85 power and influence of, 183—84
demography and, 83-84 size distribution and, 21
gender and, 85
interpersonal processes and, 82, 84 identity, 153
minorities and, 85, 97-98 imitation. See also interaction
race and, 85 institutional theory and, 63
tenure and, 84-85 performance and, 156
top management teams and, 85, 90, 92 prevalence and, 63
turnover and, 84-85, 90 social model and, 56-58
upper-echelons theory of management structure and, 53
and, 92 inaugural addresses, 34—35
hierarchy incentives. See rewards and incentives
control and, 5 individual differences
defined, 47 affect and, 28-29
Index 253
behavior and, 27-33 intelligence

defined, 27 genetics and heredity and, 31, 33
job satisfaction and, 29 job performance and, 33
relative variance and, 28—29 job success and, 31
response-shift bias and, 29-30 stability of, 33
individualism interaction. See also imitation
characteristics of, 39 additive, 37
economic model and, 45, 49-50 barriers and, 199-200
individualistic culture, 39. See also culture behavior and, 55-56
individual-level processes, defined, 84 descriptive, 37
inducements-contributions balance, 7 distance and, 199
industrial engineering, 11. See also engi- social model and, 55-56
neering interactional psychology, defined, 37. See
industrial physiology, 11-12 also psychology
industrial psychology, 11-12. See also psy- interactionist perspective, defined, 40
chology interdependence, 164
industrial sociology, 11-12. See also soci- interdependent interaction, defined, 37
ology interests, institutional theory and, 64
inertia interfirm coordination. See coordination
causes of, 164 interfirm ties. See networks
defined, 163 interlocks, 184-85
ecology and, 163, 164 intermediaries, defined, 61
information internalization. See also externalization
actionability of, 162-63 personnel departments and, 52-53
behavior and, 111 size distribution and, 21
defined, 111 unionization and, 52, 53
rewards and incentives and, 111 interpersonal processes
informational social influence heterogeneity and, 84
culture and, 126 negotiation and, 5-6
defined, 132 power and influence and, 5
leadership and, 132 similarity and, 82
ingratiator style top management teams and, 90-91, 93
defined, 148 interpretive cognitive model. See cognitive
power and influence and, 147, 148 model
inner circle, 185-86. See also management interpretive paradigm, defined, 17
innovation and change intervening model, 91
demography and, 85-87 interventions, 30
organization studies and, 202-3 intrinsic decision factors, defined, 68
tenure and, 85-86 isolation, 114-15
top management teams and, 90, 92
institutional composition theories, 95-96 Japan
institutionalization, defined, 76 CEOs in, 23
institutional theory. See also social model earnings in, 23
conformity and, 63 externalization in, 21
defined, 63, 64 high-commitment work system in, 174
imitation and, 63 keiretsu in, 50-51, 60
interests and, 64 manufacturing organizations in, 21
instrumental orientation, defined, 37—38 networks in, 21, 60
instrumental view. See goals rewards and incentives in, 23
insufficient justification. See commitment size distribution and, 21
254 Index
Japan (continued) lawsuits, 9

takeovers in, 22 layoffs. See turnover
top management teams in, 85 leadership. See also management
turnover in, 85 consideration and, 127-28
job attitudes control and, 126-34
consistency of, 30 co-optation and, 148
twins and, 31 defined, 126
job choice developing, learning, and teaching of,
commitment and, 67—68 132, 133-34
job satisfaction and, 28-29, 67-68 effects of, 127-30
job complexity, 21 external constraints and, 127
job design, 25 fundamental attribution error and, 129-
job interests, 31 30
job performance, 33 human resources and, 148
job satisfaction informational social influence and, 132
affect and, 32 language, symbols, and rituals and, 132-
co-worker contact and, 95 33
cross-time consistency in, 30 performance and, 127-29
earnings and, 109, 113 purposes of, 131-33
external constraints and, 68 romance of, 130
gender and, 95 selection and, 127
genetics and heredity and, 31 socialization and, 127
individual differences and, 29 traits of, 14-15,27-28
interventions and, 30 types of, 131
intrinsic decision factors and, 68 learning perspective, 25
job attitudes and, 28-29 legal environment, 25
job choice and, 67—68 legitimacy
ratings of, 30 founding and mortality and, 166, 168
response-shift bias and, 29-30 networks and, 58
rewards and incentives and, 112 status and, 58-59
situationalist perspective and, 29 length of service. See tenure
stability of, 30-31 levels of analysis, 5
surveillance and, 114—15 liability in newness, ecology and, 165-66,
turnover and, 38 168
job security, 20. See also downsizing liability in smallness, ecology and, 165,
job success, 31 168. See also size of organizations
justification. See commitment linkages. See networks
locus of causality. See causality
keiretsu
cooperation and, 50—51 macro level, defined, 84-85
defined, 50 management. See also boards of directors;
resource flow and, 60 CEOs; leadership; top management
risk allocation and, 60 teams
knowledge. See information autonomy of, 21-23, 37
bankruptcy and, 59
labor markets. See exlernalization; internal- class and, 185-86
ization competition and, 179
language, symbols, and rituals control and, 6, 22, 115, 183-84
culture and, 125-26 criticism of 177-78
leadership and, 132—33 dispositions of, 35, 37
power and influence and, 148-49 earnings and, 104, 106
Index 255
field of vision of, 89 matrix management, 57-58

functionalist theory and, 177 MBA. See business schools
gender and, 97 mental ability. See intelligence
growth and, 22 mental budget model, defined, 72
high-commitment work system and, mergers
175-76 networks and, 59
human resources and, 170-71 resource dependence theory and, 59
ideologies of, 102-3 tenure arid, 88
interpretations of, 89 merit pay. See variable pay
Marxism and, 183-84 M-form hypothesis, 1 59-60
pension funds and, 22 minorities. See also gender; race; women
performance and, 6 adverse impact on, 25-26
piece rates and, 107 demography and, 85, 88, 94
productivity and, 170-71 earnings of, 88
profit sharing and, 107 externalization and, 20
publicly traded companies and, 21-22 Griggs v. Duke Power and, 25-26
quantitative and verbal ability and, 33 heterogeneity and, 85, 97-98
rewards and incentives and, 22 networks and, 97-98
selective perception of, 89 selection criteria and, 25-26
status and, 58-59 on top management teams, 92
structure of, 185 mobility
turnover and, 170-71 co-worker contact and, 94-95
management teams. See top management demography and, 86
teams earnings and, 108
manufacturing organizations, 21. See also gender and, 94-95
organizations size distribution and, 21
March, James, 12-13 status and, 97
market dominance, limits on, 61, 62 structural holes and, 97
market failure, 174-75 structure and, 82
market forces. See externalization; internal- tenure and, 88
ization models. See also cognitive model; eco-
market organizations, 101. See also organi- nomic model; mental budget model;
zations moral model; process model; retro-
Marx, Karl, 12 spectively rational model; self-
Marxism justification model; self-perception
alienation and, 182—83 model; social model; tournament
class and, 184-86 model
control and, 179-83 of behavior, 42-80
critical theory (CT) and, 178, 179- evaluation of, 43
86 quasi-experiments and, 36
criticism of, 183-84 modular production, 174
deskillmg and, 181-82 monitoring. See surveillance
determinism of, 1 84 tnonozygotic twins, 31. See also twins
efficiency and, 179-80 moods
management and, 183—84 affect and, 33
purposes of, 179 defined, 33
solidarity and, 184 dispositions and, 36
mass, 167-68 moral model
mathematics assumptions of, 73—74
economic model and, 54 of behavior, 73-77
industrial engineering and, 11 free riding and, 75
256 Index
motivation neutral interlocks, defined, 64. See also net-

growth need strength and, 37 works
negotiation and, 153 new economics of personnel, defined,
rewards and incentives and, 111 106-7
multiclivisional structures, 1 59-60 "new employment contract," 18
newness, liability in, 165-66, 168
natural selection nonwhites. See minorities; race
criticism of, 43 normative control. See also control
defined, 43 growth of, 103
performance and, 156 social psychology and, 102
rationality and, 44 normative order. See also culture
timing and, 44—45 behavior and, 26—27
negative affect. See affect causality and, 26-27
negotiation fundamental attribution error and, 26-
affect and, 153 27
anchoring-and-adjustment and, 152 influences on, 76
constituent accountability and, 152—53 iiistitutioiialization and, 76
decision making and, 151-52, 153-54 personal values and 39
education and, 154 selection and, 101
experience and, 154
framing and, 151-52 Occam's Razor, defined, 43
interpersonal processes and, 5-6 OCP, 121-22
motivation and, 153 off-site employment. See externali/ation
power and influence and, 150-55 operant conditioning
social identity and, 153 behavior and, 25
social model and, 153 defined, 105
tenure and, 154 rewards and incentives and, 105
ubiquity of, 150 opportunism
net benefit rule, defined, 46-47 defined, 45, 46, 47
networks. See also social model economic model and, 45-46
concepts of, 60-62 self-interest compared to, 45
constraint and, 61 transaction cost economics and, 46, 47
earnings and, 97 opportunities, defined, 82
effects of, 58-60 organizational behavior, 32-33
gender and, 96-97 organizational culture. See culture
in Japan, 60 Organizational Culture Profile (OCP),
legitimacy and, 58 121-22. See also culture
measurement of, 64 organizational demography. See demog-
mergers and, 59 raphy
minorities and, 96—98 organizational ecology. See ecology
performance and, 58-60 organizational mortality. See founding and
resource dependence theory and, 62 mortality
resource flow and, 58 organizational performance. See perfor-
social model and, 56-58, 60 mance
status and, 61-62 organizational psychology, 11. See also psy-
strong versus weak tics and, 60 chology
structural holes in, 97 organizational selection, 36
structure and, 82 organizational sociology, 12. See also soci-
Structure (computer program) and, 60 ology
of suppliers, 21 organizational structure. See structure
Index 257
organizational tenure. See tenure engineering and, 6, 9-11, 13

organizations. See also market organiza- in FAirope, 6
tions; permanently failing organiza- evolution and location of, 6, 9-18, 189
tions; public trust organizations fads, fashion, and trends and, 16, 193-
ambiguity and uncertainty and, 51 96
authority and, 51 goals of, 6, 156
boundaries of, 9 history of, 4, 5
control and, 100 industrial engineering and psychology
cooperation and, 50-51 and, 11
criticism of, 4, 6 interdisciplinary nature of, 4
defined, 7-9, 77 leadership and, 14-15
demography and, 5, 82-89 levels of analysis of, 5
existence of, 3-4, 7-8, 9, 47, 50-51 locus of causality and, 5
externalization and, 18, 19 March and, 12-13
formality of, 9 Marx and, 12
goals of, 7-8, 9 micro level of analysis and, 6
governmental entities and, 8-9 organizational sociology and, 12
growth of, 88 paradigms of, 17
history of, 3-4 perspectives on action of, 5
importance of, 4 phenomenon-driven nature of, 196-98
inducements-contributions balance and, political science and, 9, 12-13
7 practical concerns and, 14—16
inequalities in, 18 process and, 202-3
interpersonal processes and, 5 psychology and, 9, 11
lawsuits and, 9 public administration and, 1 3
organization of, 3 public policy and, 24
selection and, 36 purposes of, 4
self-perpetuation of, 7-8, 9 Simon and, 12-13
self-selection and, 36 sociology and, 9, 12, 13
size of, 3, 18, 20-21, 109, 161, 167 theory and, 196-98
social composition and structure of, 4, 5, United States' influence on, 13
81-99 Weber and, 12
taxes and, 9 outside contractors. See externalization
as units, 56-57 over-time correlation measurement, 30
organization studies ownership power, defined, 141. See also
adjacent disciplines and, 14, 18 power and influence
behavior and, 13-14
breadth and scope of, 4-5 pace of work, 183
in business schools, 9, 11, 13, 14-17, 18, parsimony, 43—44
189-90 participative method. See high-commitment
change and, 202-3 work system
comparative approach to, 24 part-time employment. See externalization
control and, 5 path-dependence, defined, 45
criticism of, 13, 189, 191-92, 198 pathology, 117-18
design and, 190, 198-202 pay. See earnings
diffusion of, 4-5, 190-91 pension funds, 22
diversity of, 189 People's Republic of China, behavior in,
Durkhcim and, 12 26-27
economics and, 6, 14, 189, 192-93 performance
empirical focus of, 4 analysis of, 6
258 Index
performance (continued) political science

appraisal of, 71 organization studies and, 9, 12-13
collective bargaining and, 108 public administration and, 13
control and, 179 rational actor theory and, 13
culture and, 122 political theory, defined, 15
demography and, 90-91 politics. See also unionization
design and, 199-200 demography and, 88
earnings and, 105, 106, 107-8, 113 employment relationship and, 53
ecology and, 163 selection and, 165
cffcctivity and, 169-70 self-interest and, 74-75
goals and, 111 status and, 185
high-commitment work system and, 172 top management teams and, 93
human resources and, 169-76 variable pay and, 109
imitation and, 156 positive affect. See affect
leadership and, 127-29 Post, defined, 30. See also job satisfaction
management and, 6, 109, 114 power and influence
measurement of, 157-58 ambiguity and uncertainty and, 143-
natural selection and, 156 45
networks and, 58-60, 156-57 ambivalence about, 137
regression and, 157-58 assertiveness and, 147-48
surveillance and, 114—15 authority and, 138, 146
survival and, 1 57 eentrality and, 145
variable pay and, 113 chance and, 138-39
permanently failing organizations, defined, critical theory (CT) and, 187-88
157. See also organizations criticism of, 137, 155
perquisites. See rewards and incentives defined, 138-40
perseverance. See commitment delay and waiting and, 147
persistence. See commitment development and exercise of, 5-6, 1 36-
personal characteristics, power and influ- 55
ence and, 144, 145 distribution of, 145-46
personal contacts, 56 earnings and, 106
personality. See dispositions effects of, 141
personal values, 39. See also normative efficiency and, 142-43
order elements of, 138
personnel departments, 52-53 emotion and, 149-50
person-situation fit exchange and, 147, 148
advantages and disadvantages of, 40-41 force activation model of, 138, 139
public policy and, 41 gender and, 148
Q-sort methodology arid, 38 human resources and, 183—84
social policy and, 41 importance of, 136
turnover and, 39 indicators of, 106
perspectives on action, 5 ingrariation and, 147, 148
physiology, 11-12 interpersonal processes and, 5
piece rates. See also earnings language and, 148-49
management and, 107 measurement of, 138—42
new economics of personnel and, 107 negotiation and, 150—55
Taylor and, 10 personal characteristics and, 144, 145
tenure and, 107 rationality and, 147
poison pills, 57 reciprocity and, 146
political context, 25 reputation and, 140-41
Index 259
resistance and, 138 public trust organizations, defined, 101.

resources and resource allocation and, See also organizations
142, 143-44, 145, 148
self-perpetuation of, 145—46 Q-sort methodology
social control compared to, 138 Organizational Culture Profile (OCP)
social model and, 82 and, 121-22
sources of, 137, 144-46 person-situation fit and, 38
strategics and tactics of, 146-50 quantitative ability, 33. See also intelli-
structure and, 144-45 gence
styles of, 148 quasi-experiments, 36
use of, 142-50
Pre, defined, 30. See also job satisfaction race. See also minorities
predictions, 51-52 demography and, 85
preferences, 44 discrimination and, 107
presidential personality, 34-35. See also dis- earnings and, 106
positions heterogeneity and, 85
prestige. See status radical humanist paradigm, defined, 17
prestige power, defined, 141. See also radical structuralist paradigm, defined,
power and influence 17
prevalence, defined, 63 rank-ordering, 30-31
principals, defined, 46. See also agency rational actor theory, 13
theory rational choice theories, 48
process, 202-3 rational control, 103. See also control
process model, 91 rationality
productivity. See also research productivity of behavior, 44
grievances and, 171 defined, 44
high-commitment work system and, 171, economic model and, 44
172 natural selection and, 44
management and, 170-71 power and influence and, 147
worker participation and, 170 retrospectively rational model, of, 71—
professionalization, defined, 141 73
profit sharing, 107. See also earnings timing and, 44—45
promotions. See mobility; rewards and in- reactance theory, defined, 124-25
centives realism, 43-44
prospect theory, defined, 151 received interlocks, defined, 64. See also
proxies, 101 networks
psychological dynamics, 118. See also psy- reciprocal action-transaction interaction,
chology defined, 37
psychology. See also interactional psychol- reciprocity, 146
ogy; psychological dynamics; social recruiting. See also control
psychology commitment and, 116-18
industrial psychology and, 12 purposes of, 101
organization studies arid, 9, 11, 13 signals and, 101
public administration, 1 3 regression, 157-58
publicly traded companies, 21-22 relative variance, 28-29
publicness, 116 relativism, 77-78
public policy reputation, 140-41
organization studies and, 24 research productivity, 107. See also perfor-
person-situation fit and, 41 mance; productivity
public-private dichotomy, 187 resistance, 1 38
260 Index
resource allocation surveillance and, 124

M-form hypothesis and, 159 for teamwork, 111-12
power and influence and, 142, 143-44, transactional and transformational leader-
148 ship and, 132
resource dependence theory. See also so- in United States, 23, 104—5
cial model variation in, 105
defined, 19, 59, 62-63 risk
economics and, 63 agents and, 46
mergers and, 59 allocation of, 60
networks and, 62 principals and, 46
resourceflow rituals. See language, symbols, and rituals
keiretsu and, 60 ritual scapcgoating, 115-16
networks and, 58 role entrapment, defined, 83
resource partitioning, defined, 168 role models, 97
resources, 145 romance, of leadership, 130
response-shift bias, 29—30
results, 73 salaries. See earnings
retrospectively rational model. See also sanctions. See also control
self-justification model surveillance and, 124
of behavior, 65-73 types of, 115
cognitive model and, 77 satisfaction. See job satisfaction
commitment and, 68-69, 70, 71-73, 116 scapcgoating, 115-16
defined, 65-66, 116 scarcity. See resource allocation
rationality of, 71-73 scientific fields, evolution of, 17-18
sunk costs and, 70 scientific management, 10
types of, 66 scrap rate, defined, 171
rewards and incentives. See also autonomy; scrutiny. See also surveillance
goals; mobility demography and, 88
ambiguity and uncertainty and, 132 token status and, 83
commitment and, 116 selection. See also self-selection
control and, 102 conformity and, 101
cooperation and, 108-9 control and, 101
creativity and, 111 criteria for, 25-26
culture and, 126 ecology and, 164-65
defined, 111 education and, 101
dispersal of, 23 leadership and, 127
economic model and, 105, 106, 108 normative order and, 101
effects of, 111-14 politics and, 165
information and, 111 purposes of, 101
issues regarding, 103—4 selective perception, 89
in Japan, 23 self-employment
job satisfaction and, 112 gender and, 20
management and, 22, 114 growth of, 20
motivation and, 111 intermediaries and, 61
operant conditioning and, 105 self-interest
self-perception model and, 66-67 characteristics of, 45
size distribution arid, 21 control and, 103
social control and, 135 opportunism compared to, 45
stress and, 132 politics and, 74-75
Index 261
symbolic predispositions and, 74-75 smallness, liability in, 165, 168. See also
self-justification model. See also retrospec- size of organizations
tively rational model social behavior, defined, 79. See also be-
commitment and, 67 havior
economies and, 70 social capital, defined, 56, 98
self-interest model and, 74 social class, 184-86
self-perception model. See also retrospec- social cognition. See cognitive model
tively rational model social composition
cognitive dissonance and, 66 effects of, 81
commitment and, 66, 116 of organizations, 81-99
criticism of, 67 structure and, 81
economics and, 67 social contagion, 60-61
incentives and, 66-67 social control. See control
premises of, 66 social identity, 153
surveillance and, 70 social influences, 5-6
self-selection, 36. See also selection social integration, 84-85
senior corporate executives, 23. See also socialization
management commitment and, 118
seniority. See tenure defined, 118
seniority-based wage systems, 49. See also effects of, 120
earnings goals of, 118-19
sent interlocks, defined, 64. See also net- leadership and, 127
works process of, 118-20
"servants of power," 177-78 tactics of, 120
service organizations, 21. See also organiza- social model. See also institutional theory;
tions resource dependence theory
sex. See gender of behavior, 55-65
sexual harassment, 94. See also gender characteristics of, 176
shotgun style, defined, 148. See also power cognitive model and, 77
and influence criticism of, 64-65
signals, defined, 101 defined, 55
similarity. See heterogeneity demography and, 98-99
Simon, Herbert, 12-13 economic model compared to, 64
situational effects, 30-31 imitation and, 56-58
situationalist perspective interaction and, 55-56
of behavior, 25 matrix management and, 57—58
defined, 25 negotiation and, 153
job satisfaction and, 29 networks and, 56-58, 60
legal and political environment and, 25 opportunities and, 82
relative variance and, 28-29 organizations as units and, 56-57
situations. See design personal contacts and, 56
size distribution, 21 poison pills and, 57
size of organizations. See also liability in power and influence and, 82
smallness structure and, 81
competition and, 167 turnover and, 56
differentiation and, 161 social policy, 41
resource partitioning and, 168 social psychology. See also psychology
variation and, 161 characteristics of, 12
skill, 182. See also deskilling normative control and, 102
262 Index
social sciences, 48 structural holes

social structure, 5 defined, 61
social thought, defined, 79 mobility and, 97
sociology. See also industrial sociology in networks, 97
Diirkheim and, 12 weak ties and, 61
Marx and, 12 structural power, defined, 141. See also
organization studies and, 9, 12, 13 power and influence
Weber and, 12 structure
solidarity behavior and, 81
class and, 184 defined, 53, 81
Marxism and, 184 demography and, 82
status and, 185 gender and, 82
specificity, 52 imitation and, 53
speed, 183 mobility and, 82
standardization, 9-10 networks and, 82
states, dispositions and, 36 opportunities and, 82
status power and influence and, 144-45
bankruptcy and, 59 social composition and, 81
characteristics of, 59 social model and, 81
debt undcrwritings and, 62 strategy and, 161
defined, 61 technology and, 161
earnings and, 97 top management teams and, 82
economic model and, 54 Structure (computer program), 60
gender and, 96-97 subjective well-being, defined, 36-37
interlocks and, 185 subordinates. See human resources
legitimacy and, 58-59 substantive complexity, defined, 182
management and, 58-59 succession. See mobility
mobility and, 97 sunk costs
networks and, 61—62 commitment and, 70-71
politics of, 185 defined, 46, 70
production of, 61-62 economic model and, 46, 47
solidarity and, 185 retrospectively rational model and,
stability of, 62 70
strategy, 161 supervision. See surveillance
stress suppliers, networks of, 21
high-commitment work system and, 183 surveillance. See also control; scrutiny
pace of work and, 183 administration of, 1 1 5
rewards and incentives and, 132 of behavior, 114—16
shotgun style and, 148 commitment and, 116
sources of, 83 entrapment activities and, 69
surveillance and, 114-15 growth of, 181
token status and, 82-83 intrinsic decision factors and, 69
structural analysis, 5 isolation and, 114-15
structural contingency theory job satisfaction and, 114-15
criticism of and support for, 158-59, performance and, 114—15
161-62, 163, 176 rewards and incentives and, 124
defined, 158 sanctions and, 124
determinism of, 179 self-perception model and, 70
types of, 159, 161 stress and, 114-15
structural equivalence, 60-61 survival, 157
Index 263
Sweden. See also Europe characteristics of, 89-90

high-commitment work system in, 174 decision making and, 90
size distribution and, 21 demography and, 85, 89-93
symbolic predispositions, defined, 74-75 education and, 90
symbols. See language, symbols, and rituals gender and, 92
heterogeneity and, 85, 90, 92
tactician style, defined, 148. See also power innovation and change and, 90, 92
and influence interpersonal processes and, 90-91, 93
takeovers, 22. See also corporate control in Japan, 85
talk. See language, symbols, and rituals minorities on, 92
taxes, 9 politics and, 93
Taylor, Frederick W. structure and, 82
importance of, 10-11 tenure and, 89-90
industrial psychology and, 11-12 turnover and, 90
industrial sociology and, 11-12 in United States, 85
piece-rate system and, 10 upper-echelons theory of management
scientific management and, 10 and, 91-92
work processes and, 183 tournament model, defined, 110. See also
teamwork. See also top management teams models
design and, 200 training. See education
rewards and incentives for, 111-12 traits. See also dispositions; individual differ-
technology, structure and, 161 ences
templates transactional leadership. See also leader-
defined, 38 ship
dispositions and, 39 defined, 131
earnings and, 39 rewards and incentives and, 132
temporary employment. See externalization transaction cost economics. See also eco-
tension. See stress nomic model
tenure. See also Big Five ambiguity and uncertainty and, 51
acquisitions and, 88 elements of, 47
demography and, 83-84, 88 hierarchy and, 47
dissolutions and, 88 opportunism and, 47
earnings and, 106, 109 transaction cost theory, 46
heterogeneity and, 84-85 transformation, defined, 39
high-commitment work system and, 175 transformational leadership. See also leader-
innovation and change and, 85-86 ship
mergers and, 88 causes of, 131
mobility and, 88 defined, 15, 131
negotiation and, 154 effects of, 131-32
piece rates and, 107 rewards and incentives and, 132
top management teams and, 89-90 trends, in organization studies, 16, 193-96
turnover and, 83—85 turnover
tests, Griggs v. Duke Power and, 25-26 age and, 83
Then, defined, 30. See also job satisfaction demography and, 84-85
theories, purposes of, 43 earnings and, 109, 113
threats, 70 education and, 83—84
token status, 82—83. See also gender; minor- heterogeneity and, 84-85, 90
ities; race in Japan, 85
top management teams. See also manage- job satisfaction and, 38
ment management and, 170-71
264 Index
turnover (continued) takeovers in, 22

person-situation fit and, 39 top management teams in, 85
social integration and, 84—85 variable pay in, 104—5
social model and, 56 unrealistic models, 43-44
tenure and, 83-85 upper-echelons theory of management
top management teams and, 90 characteristics of, 89
twins heterogeneity and, 92
heredity versus environment and, 31 top management teams and, 91-92
job attitudes of, 31
job interests and, 31 validation, 25—26
studies of, 31, 36 values. See normative order
variable pay. See also earnings
U-form hypothesis, defined, 159 criticism of, 113—14
uncertainty. See ambiguity and uncertain}' defined, 104
underwritings, defined, 62 growth of, 104-5
unionization. See also polities implementation of, 110
earnings and, 106, 108 performance and, 113
intcrnali/ation and, 52, 53 polities and, 109
size distribution and, 21 unionization and, 108
variable pay and, 108 in United Kingdom, 105
United Kingdom. See also F.uropc in United States, 104-5
CEOs in, 23 variation, 161
earnings in, 23 verbal ability, 33. See also intelligence
externalization in, 20 vision, field of, 89
high-commitment work system in, ] 74 volition, 116
variable pay in, 105
United States wages. See earnings
behavior in, 26-27 waiting and delay, 147
business schools in, 13 weak interlocks, defined, 64. See also net-
CEOs in, 23 works
control in, 22 weak ties, 61
earnings in, 23 Weber, Max, 12
externalization in, 19—20 whites. See race
high-commitment work system in, 172- women. See gender
74 "women's work," classification and devalua-
organization studies and, 13 tion of, 96, 187. See also gender
rewards and incentives in, 23, 104-5 worker participation, defined, 170
size distribution and, 21 work processes, 183

ORGANIZATION THEORY New Directions For Organization Theory

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New Directions for Organization Theory

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Copyright © 1997 by Oxford University Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

1 The Development and Seope of Organization Studies, 3

2 Understanding the Causes of Behavior, 25

3 Five Models of Behavior, 42

4 The Effects of Organizational Composition, 81

Gender, Networks, and Careers, 93

5 Mechanisms of Social Control, 100

6 Developing and Exercising Power and Influence, 136

7 Organizational Performance, 156

8 Organizations from a Critical Theory Perspective, 177

9 New Directions for Organization Theory, 189

We live in an organizational world. Virtually all of us are born in an organiza-

|L]abor unions were practically non-existent. There were practically no employ-

the commission survived numerous assassination attempts. Richard Nixon tried

Pfeffer and Salancik noted that "organizations are . . . a process of organiz-

The Evolution of Research and Writing on Organizations

The extension of technical principles to social and commercial endeavors was

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the scientific management

Principles of scientific management involved the separation of the planning

The Human Element in Business

The crucial factor is not that a manager or an organixation is Japanese rather

By analyzing the language, concepts, and content of literature written for

The interpretation of diversity as opportunity . . . celebrates the possibility of

While some see paradigm proliferation and incommensurability as a problem

The Changing Organizational Landscape

challenge organization theories that have been developed to explain a context

ment, outstripping the growth even of industries providing services to consumers

Understanding the Causes of Behavior

Perhaps the most fundamental question addressed by organization studies is how

dispositionalisrn in social attribution . . . reflects an implicit theory about social

In an experiment in which subjects watched cartoon displays of physical and

The Search for Individual Dispositions

The search for individual differences, operationalized as cross-situational consis-

the distributions of scores of leaders and followers. . . . There is considerable

evaluation of the job is confounded with a change in frame of reference that

reference each time job satisfaction is measured during a longitudinal study,

havior, one characteristic absent in this literature is intelligence, or general cogni-

Problems with the Dispositional Perspective

Person by Situation Interaction and Fit

Rather than emphasizing dispositions or situational influences on behavior, some

(desiring achievement and self-actualization) or instrumental (desiring job secu-

correspondence between an individual's personality profile and the template pro-

step in validating the usefulness of the personal disposition—situation fit argument

The Costs and Benefits of the Person—Situation Debate

Some Lessons Learned

This brief review of the person-situation debate in organization theory highlights

Five Models of Behavior

Answering the question of how we are to understand behavior in organizations

Views about human nature have important practical consequences . . . They

Economic Models of Organizational Behavior

Economic models are growing in prominence in the social sciences generally

Opportunism is a stronger form of the self-interest assumption of motivation.

Opportunism includes "the making of false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved

Moreover, because individuals are concerned about their own preferences,

Problems with the Economic Model of

Cooperation, necessary in the interdependent activities that characterize

Economics has a particularly difficult time dealing with interorganizational

In addition to cooperation, another important feature of organizations is un-

A third prominent and important feature of organizations is authority. Eco-